Student v. University Preparatory Academy

BEFORE THE

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PARENT ON BEHALF OF STUDENT,

v.

UNIVERSITY PREPARATORY ACADEMY.

CASE NO. 2026021000

DECISION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2026

On February 23, 2026, the Office of Administrative Hearings, called OAH, received a due process hearing request from Father, naming University Preparatory Academy. Father is also referred to as Petitioner. University Preparatory Academy is called Charter. A due process hearing request is called a complaint.

For good cause, on April 6, 2026, OAH continued the hearing to June 2, 2026. Administrative Law Judge Laurie Gorsline heard this matter by video conference on June 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 16, and July 29, 2026. An Administrative Law Judge is called an

ALJ.

Father represented himself and Student. Student did not attend the hearing. Attorneys Brittnee Gillespie Malone and Tellis Aucoin represented Charter at the hearing. Charter Executive Director David Porter attended all hearing days on Charter’s behalf.

At the parties’ request, the matter was continued to August 13, 2026, for written closing briefs. For good cause, on August 12, 2026, OAH continued the matter to August 20, 2026, so the parties could address the holding in [initials redacted] v. Zackery P. Morazzini, et al. (N.D.Cal., August 7, 2026, No. 5:26-cv-01672-EJD) 2026 WL 2283558 (Parent v. Morazzini). The record was closed, and the matter was submitted on August 20, 2026.

ISSUES

On April 20, 2026, Petitioner withdrew some of the alleged claims and remedies requested in the complaint, including the request for compensatory education and the entire claim labeled as Problem 4.

On May 22, 2026, ALJ June Lehrman held a prehearing conference and issued an order dated May 22, 2026, determining the remaining issues to be decided at hearing. The order stated that the parties were required to promptly file a written objection if the issues stated in the Order did not accurately reflect the remaining claims or if any issue was missing, or if they otherwise objected to the stated issue. Neither party filed an objection.

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The issues for hearing are listed below. A free appropriate public education is called a FAPE. An individualized education program is called an IEP. 1. Did Charter deny Student a FAPE by significantly impeding the opportunity of Father to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a FAPE when it refused until January 2024 to provide Father with access to Student’s educational records necessary for Father to evaluate attendance data and placement options?

2. Did Charter deny Student a FAPE by significantly impeding the opportunity of Father to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a FAPE when it held the March 6, 2024, IEP team meeting in Father’s absence after failing to provide the remote option and ignoring his attempts to join?

3. Did Charter deny Student a FAPE by predetermining placement in the March 6, 2024, IEP by failing to consider Father’s proposals regarding disability-related attendance barriers?

4. Did Charter deny Student a FAPE in the March 6, 2024, IEP by offering an inappropriate placement, specifically by offering an altered schedule and individual instruction rather than independent study to address school refusal?

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5. After the March 2024 IEP team meeting, did Charter deny Student a FAPE by failing to timely convene an IEP team meeting and revise Student’s program based on Student’s nonattendance and the failure of the subsequent independent study model?

6. Did Charter deny Student a FAPE by unilaterally determining at the end of the 2023-2024 school year that Student had to repeat seventh grade?

JURISDICTION

This hearing was held under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, its regulations, and California statutes and regulations. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2006) et seq.; Ed. Code, § 56000 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3000 et seq.) The main purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, referred to as the IDEA, are to ensure:

all children with disabilities have available to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment and independent living, and the rights of children with disabilities and their parents are protected.

(20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1); See Ed. Code, § 56000, subd. (a).)

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The IDEA affords parents and local educational agencies the procedural protection of an impartial due process hearing with respect to any matter relating to the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE, to the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) & (f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511; Ed. Code, §§ 56501, 56502, and 56505; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3082.) The party requesting the hearing is limited to the issues alleged in the complaint, unless the other party consents, and has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i); Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 546 U.S. 49, 57-58, 62 [126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387]; and see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).) As the filing party, Petitioner had the burden of proof on all Issues.

The factual statements in this Decision constitute the written findings of fact required by the IDEA and state law. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (e)(5).) Some details regarding Student or Student’s history are not included in this Decision to protect Student’s identity and the confidentiality of these proceedings. This Decision does not cite to the administrative record because the hearing transcript was not available before the issuance of this Decision and OAH policy is that decisions do not include citations to the administrative record. Pursuant to the applicable web content accessibility guidelines, OAH Decisions are written in an accessible font and format.

Student was 15 years old and in ninth grade during the 2025-2026 school year, when the hearing began. Student has been eligible for special education since [eligibility date redacted], under the primary category of emotional disturbance and the secondary category of other health impairment.

Parents have been divorced for many years. [Residence history redacted.] The orders issued by the family court since January 2024 regarding physical and legal custody of Student have varied. At certain times, both Parents had joint legal custody, and at other times, Mother held sole legal custody.

Student resided within the Charter’s geographic and jurisdictional boundaries at relevant times. Specifically, during the 2023-2024 school year and until August 29, 2024, of the 2024-2025 school year, Student was enrolled at Charter except for a brief period in spring 2024, when she was enrolled by Father in an online private school called Acellus Academy. Charter was an independent public charter school and the responsible local educational agency when Student was enrolled at Charter.

BACKGROUND

THE MAY 18, 2023, IEP AT DISCOVERY CHARTER SCHOOL

Prior to attending Charter for seventh grade during the 2023-2024 school year, Student attended Discovery Charter II, called Discovery, for the 2022-2023 school year, her sixth-grade year. Discovery was within a different local educational agency than Charter. While Student was enrolled at Discovery, Student’s annual IEP was convened on May 18, 2023, and June 2, 2023. Over the course of the two meetings, the Discovery IEP team developed an IEP for Student dated May 18, 2023.

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STUDENT’S ENROLLMENT AT CHARTER FOR THE 2023-2024 AND

2024-2025 SCHOOL YEARS

Mother enrolled Student at Charter for the 2023-2024 school year, Student’s seventh-grade year. According to Charter’s enrollment records, Student was enrolled at Charter during the following dates:

Between August 8, 2023, and April 4, 2024;

Between May 20 and June 11, 2024; and

Between August 7 and August 29, 2024.

Father enrolled Student at Acellus sometime prior to March 19, 2024, but Charter did not process Student’s disenrollment from Charter until approximately three weeks later, on April 4, 2024. On May 20, 2024, Student was reenrolled at Charter pursuant to a family court order. Mother withdrew Student from Charter on August 29, 2024.

THE OCTOBER 30, 2023, AMENDMENT IEP AT CHARTER

On October 30, 2023, Charter convened a 30-day IEP team meeting to review the May 2023 IEP developed by Discovery, Student’s previous school. The team amended the May 2023 IEP through an amended IEP dated October 30, 2023.

FATHER’S REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO STUDENT’S EDUCATIONAL

RECORDS

When Mother enrolled Student in Charter for the 2023-2024 school year, Mother listed herself on the enrollment paperwork as the only parent for Student. It was Charter’s policy to assume that the registering parent was the sole educational rights holder if the other parent was not on the original application and registration paperwork for enrollment of the student in Charter. Sometime in January 2024, Father made a request of Charter that Student be added as a parent to Charter’s online portal, called Power School, so he could obtain certain of Student’s records. Power School was Charter’s online student records system. Only the parent who completed the registration process for their child could access their child’s records on Power School, unless Charter gave the non-registering parent access to Power School. A series of emails was exchanged between Charter and Father in January 2024 regarding Father’s access to Student’s records. Charter refused to provide Father with access to the records until February 28, 2024, and only after Father sent Charter a copy of a family court order [filing date redacted], which stated that both Parents had joint legal custody of Student. As the basis of his claim in Issue 1, Father argues that Charter’s refusal until February 28, 2024, to give him access to Student’s records, interfered with his rights to participate meaningfully in the educational process regarding Student.

THE MARCH 6, 2024, IEP TEAM MEETING AND MARCH 6, 2024, IEP

AMENDMENT

Charter held an IEP team meeting on March 6, 2024, to discuss amending Student’s IEP. Charter held the March 6, 2024, IEP team meeting without Father. At the meeting, Charter offered to change Student’s daily schedule such that Student would take only four classes instead of six and start her school day later in the day. Mother consented to the March 6, 2024, IEP amendment on March 8, 2024.

As the basis of the claim in Issue 2, Father argues that it was improper for Charter to hold the March 6, 2024, IEP team meeting without him. He contends Charter personnel knew Father wanted to and planned to attend the meeting, and that by February 28, 2024, Charter had acknowledged that Father was an educational rights holder for Student. Father argues that Charter previously assured Father there would be a virtual option for him to attend the IEP team meeting, but it never provided him with a link so he could join the meeting virtually. He argues that Charter personnel failed to respond to Father’s attempts to contact them so he could join the meeting, and that Charter’s conduct significantly impeded his right to participate in the development of Student’s program.

As the basis of the claim in Issue 3, Father contends Charter improperly predetermined Student’s placement in the March 6, 2024, IEP amendment by failing to consider Father’s prior proposals for some form of home instruction for Student. As the basis of Issue 4, Father contends that the placement offered in the March 6, 2024, IEP amendment was not reasonably calculated to help Student to make progress in light of her circumstances. Father asserts that the placement Charter offered failed to address Student’s disability-driven refusal to attend school, and improperly demanded Student continue to attend school at Charter in person through an altered schedule and individual instruction, rather than offering Student independent study. As the basis of Issue 5, Father claims that the altered schedule which began on March 7, 2024, failed “from that day forward,” and that Charter improperly failed to convene any further IEP team meetings. Father claims Charter should have convened a (This space is intentionally left blank. Text continues on the following page.)

new IEP team meeting to revise Student’s program based on Student’s nonattendance and failure of the “subsequent independent study model” he understood Charter had implemented at the end of the 2023-2024 school year.

STUDENT’S RETENTION IN SEVENTH GRADE FOR THE 2024-2025

SCHOOL YEAR

On May 31, 2024, Charter’s academic counselor recommended to Parents that Student be retained in seventh grade for the 2024-2025 school year. On May 31, 2024, Student’s academic counselor wrote an email to Parents explaining that academically, eighth grade would be a challenge for Student, and that Charter was recommending that Student re-take seventh grade to build her foundational skills needed for Student to prosper in eighth grade. Charter’s enrollment history for Student reflected that Student was retained in seventh grade for the 2024 2025 school year, until she was disenrolled from Charter by Mother on August 29, 2024.

As the basis of the claim in Issue 6, Father contends that Charter unilaterally determined at the end of the 2023-2024 school year that Student be retained in seventh grade for the 2024-2025 school year. Father contends that this decision was made without parental participation and there was no IEP team meeting to determine if Student should be retained in seventh grade. Father argues that the academic counselor’s recommendation operated as a final decision and he was never given notice of Student’s retention in seventh grade.

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ISSUES 1 THROUGH 6: FATHER’S STANDING TO PROSECUTE THIS CASE

Father contends he has standing to prosecute this case on all hearing Issues. Father argues regardless of the orders issued by the family court regarding legal custody, as a biological parent, he retained his status as a parent “to some degree.” Relying on Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist. (2007) 550 U.S. 516, 529 [127 S.Ct. 1994] (Winkelman), Father argues he has independent enforceable rights as a parent which allow him to prosecute IDEA claims on his own behalf.

Father asserts that “[p]roper-party status is assessed at filing.” Father claims his standing was acknowledged by OAH’s May 15, 2026, Order, which concluded that the record did not establish Father did not have standing. Father contends the family court orders issued in May and June 2026, giving Mother sole legal custody of Student, did not strip Father of his authority and that he filed this case before these family court orders were issued. He claims that interim or temporary custody orders, or any custody order, issued without an evidentiary hearing, cannot divest Father of his status as a parent or empower Mother to decide that Student’s IDEA rights not be enforced. He claims the validity of the family court’s June 2026 order is presently before a reviewing court. Father asserts he is not asking OAH to disregard the June 2026 family court order, but to recognize it is only temporary until Student is assessed and the family court obtains input from the school district Student is currently attending. Father asserts the district court’s order in Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558, does not affect this proceeding because that ruling only decided whether

Father had “Article III standing,” which does not govern OAH. He also asserts that the ruling did not reach the merits of the claims in that case, and that district court orders are not binding on OAH. Father claims the district court’s remarks regarding parental status are dictum and the district court failed to address other relevant state law authority Father relied upon.

Charter’s arguments regarding standing have evolved over the course of the proceedings in this case. The ALJ assumes Charter’s current position is stated in its written closing brief, and that it has abandoned other arguments inconsistent with its most recent stance. Although being specifically ordered to address Parent v. Morazzini in its written closing brief, Charter unpersuasively asserts it was unable to obtain a copy of the district court’s order, despite being previously provided with the Westlaw citation in the August 12, 2026, OAH Order, and the case being otherwise readily available on the internet.

In its written closing, Charter argues Winkelman does not support Father’s position on standing, because unlike the parents in Winkelman, Father is no longer a “parent,” for IDEA purposes after the family court orders in January, March, May and June 2026, ruled that Mother had sole legal custody of Student. It argues that at the time Father filed the complaint in this case, and through the hearing in June and July 2026, he did not meet the definition of a parent because he did not have legal custody or educational decisionmaking rights, and that none of the family court orders expressly provided Father with standing to file a due process complaint with OAH. Charter asserts Father admitted at hearing he did not have legal custody of Student, which was confirmed by the family court’s June 8, 2026, order. Thus, Charter contends Mother is the only person who holds the right to pursue due process claims on Student’s behalf.

Charter requests that OAH either dismiss the case with prejudice, or OAH make a finding on the merits of the case notwithstanding OAH’s determination regarding Father’s standing because of the substantial cost, time, and effort it incurred in presenting its defense, and the risk of further proceedings. Charter stipulates to comply with any OAH order, regardless of Father’s standing.

Due process hearing procedures extend to the parent or guardian. (Ed. Code, § 56501, subd. (a).) The term “parent” is defined in Education Code section 56028. In pertinent part, it defines parent as the biological parent of a child. (Ed. Code, § 56028, subd. (a)(1).) The biological parent, when there is more than one parent, is presumed to be the parent of the child, unless the biological parent does not have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child. (34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1); Ed. Code, § 56028, subd. (b)(1).)

When a judicial decree or order identifies a specific person as having authority to make educational decisions on behalf of a student, that person is determined to be the parent for purposes of the IDEA. (34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(2); Ed. Code, § 56028, subd. (b)(2).) When the parents of a student are divorced, the parental rights established by the IDEA apply to both parents, unless a court order or state law specifies otherwise. (Ed. Code, § 56028, subds. (b)(1) & (2); see also, Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46568 (August 14, 2006); Letter to Biondi (October 7, 1997) Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP); Letter to Best (January 8, 1998) OSEP; and Letter to Serwecki (February 28, 2005)

OSEP.)

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In California, joint legal custody means that both parents share the right and the responsibility to make decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child. (Fam. Code, § 3003.) A court can grant joint legal custody without granting joint physical custody. (Fam. Code § 3085.) An order for joint custody may be modified or terminated upon petition of one or both parents or on the court’s own motion. (Fam. Code, § 3087.) An order for the custody of a minor child may be modified at any time to an order for joint custody. (Fam. Code, § 3088.) However, “sole legal custody” means that one parent shall have the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child. (Fam. Code, § 3006.) Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to, school records, shall not be denied to a parent because that parent is not the child’s custodial parent. (Fam. Code, § 3025.)

THE 2016, 2017 AND 2018 FAMILY COURT ORDERS

Parents were divorced. The family court issued various orders pertaining to custody of Student both before and during the special education due process hearing in this case. At the hearing, the ALJ ordered Father to submit all family court orders pertaining to legal custody of Student.

[Description of earlier family court mediation redacted.]

[Description of 2017 family court order redacted.] [Description of other 2017 and 2018 family court orders redacted.] [Description of 2018 family court visitation order redacted.]

THE 2024 FAMILY COURT ORDERS

[Description of Father's correspondence with the family court redacted.] [Further details redacted.] However, in early 2024, the family court issued an order stating that both Parents shared joint legal custody, and that both Parents had the right to access records and information about Student and consult with professionals providing services to Student.

In May 2024, the family court gave temporary legal custody to Mother. [Details of the May 2024 order redacted.] The order stated that both Parents had the right to access records and information about Student and consult with professionals providing services to Student. [Description of mid-2024 family court order redacted.] [Further order details redacted.] The order also stated that both Parents had the right to access records and information about Student and consult with professionals providing services to Student.

In fall 2024, the family court ordered that both Parents had temporary joint legal custody. [Order dates redacted.] [Physical custody and residence details redacted.] [Further order details redacted.]

In late 2024, the family court ordered that both Parents would retain joint legal and physical custody of Student. [Further order details redacted.]

THE 2026 FAMILY COURT ORDERS

There was no evidence that any family court orders were signed and issued in 2025 on the issue of legal custody. However, in January 2026, the family court gave sole legal custody to Mother. Specifically, based on proceedings held on January 27, 2026, the family court issued a new order signed on January 29, 2026, and filed on January 30, 2026. The January 2026 Order stated, among other things, that Parents were ordered to participate in custody mediation. It also stated, “Pending the mediation, Mother [] shall have legal custody of Student.” It also stated that all other orders not inconsistent with the January 2026 Order shall remain in full force and effect. Based on proceedings held on March 12, 2026, the family court issued a new order signed and filed on March 12, 2026. The March 2026 Order stated that Mother was awarded legal custody of Student “per prior court order,” and that Mother was the “person who decides about the [Student’s] health, education and welfare.” However, the order deleted language regarding the scheduling of mediation, which was not explained or addressed at the hearing. That custody order also stated that both custodial and noncustodial parent had the right to access school records and information about Student and consult with professionals who were providing services to Student.

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The family court mediation ordered by the January 2026 family court order took place on May 1, 2026. On May 21, 2026, the family court issued a temporary order on an ex parte basis which was filed on May 22, 2026. The May 2026 Order stated that Mother continued to have sole legal custody of Student pending further order of the court. The family court also set a hearing for June 11, 2026.

However, on June 8, 2026, the family court made new rulings, documented in a written order dated June 18, 2026, and filed on July 6, 2026. The court ordered that Mother continued to have temporary sole legal custody of Student, but Parents would continue to share joint physical custody. The family court stated that the order was temporary and would remain in effect until such time the school district where Student was currently enrolled completed its assessment and the court received input from the school district, at which time the court might set an evidentiary hearing. [Residence detail redacted.] The family court continued the post-mediation hearing to July 16, 2026, and vacated the hearing set for June 11, 2026.

A hearing was held on July 16, 2026. [Details regarding the school district's assessment attempt redacted.] Father understood that the school district would make another attempt to assess Student sometime in the fall 2026. As of the last day of hearing, to Father’s knowledge, the school district had not completed its assessment, and Father had not received a signed copy of the order regarding the hearing held on July 16, 2026. There was no evidence that the family court changed the prior order made at the hearing on June 8, 2026, giving sole legal custody of Student to Mother.

FATHER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO PROSECUTE ANY OF THE

CLAIMS IN THIS CASE

THE CALIFORNIA DISTRICT COURT ORDER IN PARENT V.

MORAZZINI

On August 7, 2026, the United States District Court issued an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Without Leave to Amend; Terminating All Remaining Motions, in Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558. In the Order, the Honorable Edward J. Davila, United States District Judge, dismissed Father’s case against OAH Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge Zackery P. Morazzini, and East Side Union High School District’s Director of Special Education. In the underlying case, Father on behalf of Student had filed an action with OAH for alleged FAPE violations committed by East Side Union High School District, including claims that it excluded Father from the planning Student’s assessment, failed to provide Father with sufficient written notice, and predetermined Student’s placement. OAH dismissed Father’s claims because Father did not hold Student’s educational rights at the time of the hearing, in that Student’s educational rights were solely held by Mother. (Id., at *1.) After OAH dismissed the case against East Side Union High School District, Father filed an action in the district court asserting various claims against the defendants based on the IDEA, among other claims. (Id., at *2.) The district court granted East Side Union High School District’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, dismissing the entire action case without leave to amend because Father’s case lacked injury or redressability. (Id., at *1, 4, 7.) Central to Judge Davila’s findings was his determination that Father did not have legal standing to prosecute the action against East Side Union High School District because Father did not have legal custody of Student, and therefore, Father was not a “parent” with authority to pursue IDEA claims. (Id., at *4-5.)

Judge Davila rejected Father’s arguments regarding standing, many of which Father also unpersuasively makes here. The district court reasoned that Father’s claims were all premised on the erroneous assertion that Father had a fundamental right to participate in education decisions regarding Student. The district court found that Father had no right to make educational decisions for Student currently or at the time OAH dismissed the due process action against East Side Union High School District, because the family court had awarded legal custody to Mother. (Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558, at *4.) The district court also explained that because Father did not have legal custody of Student, even if it were to order OAH to reinstitute the underlying OAH action against East Side Union High School District, as sought by Father as part of the district court case, the same result would inevitably occur. “[U]nder California law, OAH could not afford Plaintiff the relief he seeks unless and until he regains legal custody.” (Id., at *5.) The court highlighted that because Mother had sole authority to make educational decisions, she was the only “parent” with standing to prosecute IDEA claims. (Ibid.)

While Father took issue with the validity of the family court custody orders in the district court action, the district court explained it had no jurisdiction to overturn or otherwise alter the legal effect of the family court custody orders that are, in effect, appeals from state court judgments. (Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558, at *5.) The district court found that the relief Father sought improperly required it to disregard the family court custody orders. (Ibid.) The district court also rejected Father’s attempt to invoke an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity barring relief, as inapplicable. (Id. at *6.) It also pointed out the inconsistency of Father’s argument in which Father claimed he was not requiring the district court to review the custody orders, but only, defendants’ compliance with federal law. The district court highlighted the assertions in Father’s pleadings where he specifically took issue with the validity of the family court orders and asked that the court not give the orders operative effect. (Ibid.) The district court also found unconvincing Father’s arguments he had no other avenue to seek relief from the family court custody orders. Judge Davila pointed out that Father could have asked the family court to modify the legal custody order or sought mediation, and in any event, the lack of other avenues, was not a basis for conferring jurisdiction. (Ibid.)

THE ANALYSIS IN PARENT V. MORAZZINI IS PERSUASIVE

The analysis by the district court in Parent v. Morazzini is persuasive here. Father did not hold Student’s educational rights when he filed this case in February 2026 or at the time of the hearing in June and July 2026. At that time, based on the family court orders made in January, March, May and June 2026, only Mother held legal custody of Student, and Mother’s sole legal custody status did not change during the pendency of the hearing. Thus, Father had no right to make educational decisions for Student, which necessarily includes the right to prosecute this case before OAH. Father’s assertion that standing should be determined at the time of filing does not help him because Mother held sole legal custody when this case was filed in February 2026. Clearly, for OAH to allow Father to prosecute the claims in this case would improperly interfere with the family court orders that determined which Parent was entitled to make educational decisions for Student. Moreover, it would necessarily impact educational decision making by Mother, who the family court repeatedly determined had the sole educational decisionmaking authority regarding Student. Mother is not a party to this case and in her declaration filed with OAH on April 15, 2026, Mother declared she never consented to Father filing this OAH case, did not agree with it being filed, and she wished for it to be dismissed.

The legal effect of the 2026 family court’s orders giving Mother sole legal custody terminated Father’s rights as an educational decisionmaker and deprived him of standing to pursue the claims in this case. This applies to any FAPE violations that arose before the family court terminated Father’s educational rights because Father’s interests rest upon his right to make educational decisions that no longer existed. Father’s reliance on

Winkelman for the assertion he has independent enforceable rights as a parent which allow him to prosecute IDEA claims on his own behalf, is misplaced. Winkelman did not involve divorced parents or examine the impact of a custody order on one parent’s rights to pursue IDEA claims when the other parent has been given sole legal custody. In fact, while Father remains one of Student’s biological parents, once the family court ordered that Mother had sole legal custody, Father lost his status as a “parent” for purposes of prosecuting this special education case before OAH. In short, Father was no longer a “parent,” for IDEA standing purposes, even under Winkelman.

FATHER’S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE NOT CONVINCING

Father’s reliance on OAH’s May 15, 2026, order denying Charter’s motion to dismiss based on Father’s lack of standing, is also misplaced. That order was issued before the hearing, and before the record in this case was more fully developed. At that time, the ALJ determined Charter had not properly complied with the ALJ’s order to brief the standing issue, and thus, it failed to establish Father lacked standing. Significantly, the ALJ denied Charter’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. Thus, the order was not a ,ruling on the merits regarding Father’s standing, nor did it preclude Charter from establishing at hearing that Father lacked standing to prosecute this case. Father knew standing remained an issue for hearing because the ALJ stated this during the hearing and standing was litigated by the parties at the hearing. It was not until well after the hearing began that the ALJ was made aware that the family court issued orders in May and June 2026, giving sole legal custody to Mother just prior to the hearing beginning. Father did not provide the ALJ with a copy of the May 22, 2026, family court ex parte order until the fourth day of hearing. Father did not provide the ALJ with a copy of the June 8, 2026, family court order until July 29, 2026, the last day of hearing. Moreover, at the time of the May 15, 2026, order on Charter’s motion to dismiss, the ALJ did not have the benefit of the district court’s analysis in Parent v. Morazzini to help inform the ALJ in ruling on the issue of Father’s standing. Thus, the fact that the ALJ did not dismiss this case on May 15, 2026, does not preclude the ALJ from now finding that Father lacks standing to prosecute this case.

Father ignores the law in claiming the May and June 2026 family court orders cannot strip him of his prior legal authority as an educational rights holder or empower only Mother to decide that Student’s IDEA rights not be enforced. He ignores the definition of a parent under both federal and state law, and that he no longer fit within that definition once the 2026 family court orders determined that Mother had sole legal custody before this action was ever filed, and again prior to and during the hearing in this case. (34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1) & (2); Ed. Code, § 56028, subd. (b)(1) & (2). Father claims that because the custody orders were interim or temporary, and were not the result of an evidentiary hearing, his parental rights cannot be divested. However, he cites no persuasive authority supporting his position and his position is squarely at odds with the findings in Parent v. Morazzini.

Father claims that he maintains the right to access Student’s records and consult with Student’s educational providers under Family Code section 3025. However, that section says nothing about prosecuting a due process claim with OAH if the local educational agency denies a parent access to records or information pertaining to the minor child. Based on the family court’s 2026 orders, only Mother holds the right to decide whether those types of claims can be prosecuted before OAH. In any event, the only hearing Issue in this case alleging a denial of access to records and information is Issue 1, and as to that claim, Mother is the only Parent with authority to litigate that claim before OAH because Mother has held sole legal custody of Student since at least May 2026. (Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558, at *5.) Similarly, although Father may have jointly held Student’s educational rights at the time of some of the alleged violations forming the basis of Issues 2 through 6, that is not determinative of Father’s standing to prosecute these claims before OAH. (See

Parent v. Morazzini, supra, 2026 WL 2283558.) When Father filed this case with OAH in February 2026, and more importantly, at the time of the hearing in this case, Mother held sole legal custody of Student pursuant to the 2026 family court orders. As such, when the family court issued its orders in May and June 2026, giving Mother sole legal custody over Student, he was no longer a “Parent” within the meaning of the IDEA. and he did not have the authority to prosecute this case. (Ibid.)

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Father’s reliance on Navin v. Park Ridge School District (7th Cir. 2001) 270 F.3d 1147) (Navin) is also unpersuasive. As an initial matter, decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not binding on OAH. Moreover, Navin’s facts are distinguishable from the facts here.

In Navin, the divorce decree gave mother custody and the right to make educational decisions, but permitted father to retain important rights, including the opportunity to be involved in the education of his son. (Navin, supra, 270 F.3d at pp. 1148-1149.) The decree expressly provided that each parent had the authority to inspect the children’s school records and communicate with teachers, school personnel, and counselors to discuss the children’s standing and progress and participate in school activities, and that the parties agreed to share equally the tuition and costs incurred in connection with said education. (Id., at p. 1149, fn. 1.) If parents disagreed about educational decisions, then mother’s view prevailed unless under state law the school district view prevailed over both parents’ wishes. The court found that the hearing officer erred in dismissing father’s case solely on account of the divorce, and that the district court erred in dismissing the ensuing case for lack of father’s standing. (Id., at p. 1149.) The court remanded the case to the district court to decide whether father’s claims were incompatible with mother’s use of her rights under the decree because it was unclear if mother agreed with father’s position that school district’s choice of tutor was inappropriate or not, but stated that if parents were “at loggerheads” father could not use the IDEA to upset mother’s choices given to her by the state court. (Id., at pp. 1149-1150.) The court ordered the district court to adjudicate those claims that father retained under the decree that were not trumped by mother’s use of her own powers under the divorce decree. (Id., at. p. 1150.)

Unlike the decree in Navin, nothing in the May or June 2026 family court orders giving sole legal custody to Mother indicated that Father retained rights to weigh in on educational decisions regarding Student. In fact, both the May and June 2026 family court orders appear to be specifically designed to prevent Father from interfering with Mother’s educational decisions regarding Student. Notably, neither order contains any language giving Father influence over Student’s education, as existed in Navin, and in particular, the right to pursue the claims in this case. Unlike Navin, there is no doubt here that Father’s pursuit of this case is incompatible with Mother’s use of her exclusive educational rights under the May and June 2026 family court orders because Mother stated in her sworn declaration filed with OAH that she did not agree with this case being filed, and she wished for it to be dismissed. Nothing in Mother’s testimony at hearing indicated that Mother ever changed her position regarding her disagreement with the prosecution of this case.

Although Father now denies he seeks to have OAH disregard the family court June 2026 order giving Mother sole legal custody, that is exactly what he asks by insisting that OAH not give the order its intended effect. As the ALJ told the parties during this hearing, OAH has no jurisdiction to set aside or ignore the family court orders. Determinations that go beyond matters relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE are outside of OAH’s limited jurisdiction. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); 34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a); Ed. Code, § 56501, subd. (a); Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School Dist. (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-1029.)

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It is for the family court, not OAH, to determine who should make educational decisions on behalf of Student. (See 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1) & (2); Ed. Code, § 56028, subds. (b)(1) & (2); see also, e.g., Fam. Code, §§ 3003, 3006, 3022.) “’The question of which divorced parent should be allowed to perform parental functions under the [IDEA] … is a matter for State or local divorce courts. Just as these courts deal with matters of custody, they can appropriately deal with matters related to the responsibility for making educational decisions on behalf of the child.’” (Pam Taylor v. Vermont

Dept. of Education, et al. (2d Cir. 2002) 313 F.3d 768, 780, abrogated on other grounds, quoting a 1987 OSEP policy letter.)

Here, Father was given ample opportunity to petition the family court to obtain educational rights to pursue the claims in this case. Among other things, there was a six-week continuance of the hearing between June 16 and July 29, 2026. Before the continuance, the ALJ informed Father he was not precluded from seeking an order from the family court giving him the authority to prosecute the claims in this case. Thus, Father had sufficient time to obtain from the family court at least limited educational decisionmaking rights to pursue this case. There was no persuasive evidence that Father properly availed himself of the opportunity to obtain educational rights to pursue the claims in this case or that he was successful in obtaining a modification of the June 8, 2026, family court order granting Mother sole legal custody.

The ALJ is mindful and sympathetic that to deny Father the right to pursue the claims in this case may effectively preclude Father from ever pursing those claims and receiving recompense for any violation because of the statute of limitations. However, Charter has been asserting Father’s lack of standing as a defense in this case since the

April 2026 prehearing conference. Yet, Father failed to obtain a modification of the custody order to enable him to prosecute this case despite the opportunity to do so. Nor is Father’s reliance on Latynski-Rossiter v. Dist. of Columbia (D.D.C. 2013) 928 F.Supp.2d 57, 62 (Latynski) persuasive on this point. Latynski did not involve divorced parents or examine the impact of a custody order on one parent’s rights to pursue IDEA claims when the other parent has been given sole legal custody. Rather, it involved FAPE claims seeking tuition reimbursement by parents who no longer held educational rights because their child had already turned 18 years old. (Id., at pp. 59-62.) Latynski explained why in that case, denying parents the right to seek reimbursement for the months of tuition they paid before the student turned 18 years old would stymie the IDEA’s overarching purpose, noting the practical necessity of parent financing to vindicate their child’s rights and the manifest incompatibility of interpreting the law in a way to effectively eliminate a parent’s right to reimbursement. (Id., at pp. 61-62.) In contrast, here, Student is still a minor, and the issue is whether Father has standing to prosecute FAPE claims seeking reimbursement as a remedy when Mother is the only parent with decisionmaking authority to pursue these alleged FAPE violations currently or at the time of the hearing. (See Parent v. Morazzini, 2026 WL 2283558, at *4.) Thus, this is not a case where parents cannot obtain recompense for the past FAPE violations because the student turned 18 years old, but rather, a case where the family court has determined Mother is the exclusive arbiter of whether such claims can be prosecuted before OAH. In other words, because Father does not hold Student’s educational rights he cannot litigate whether Charter denied Student a FAPE merely because Father paid Acellus a $158.00 enrollment fee he now wants reimbursed – as Mother has sole authority to make the educational decision to prosecute those FAPE claims. Given the language of the May and June 2026 family court orders and Father’s failure to establish that Mother agreed to the filing and prosecution of this action before OAH, Father lacks standing to pursue any of the claims in this case. Because Father lacks standing to prosecute this case, this case shall be dismissed without adjudicating the merits of Issues 1 through 6. Furthermore, OAH does not offer advisory opinions in special education cases. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3089). In particular, OAH will not render an advisory opinion on special education claims made by a biological parent who has been determined to lack standing to prosecute those claims because that parent does not hold the student’s educational rights.

ORDER

The entirety of OAH Case Number 2026021000 is dismissed.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

This is a final administrative decision, and all parties are bound by it. Pursuant to Education Code section 56505, subdivision (k), any party may appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days of receipt.

Laurie Gorsline Administrative Law Judge Office of Administrative Hearings