Student v. Riverside Unified School District

BEFORE THE

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PARENTS ON BEHALF OF STUDENT,

V.

RIVERSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT.

CASE NO. 2026031036

DECISION

August 19, 2026 On March 20, 2026, the Office of Administrative Hearings, called OAH, received a due process hearing request from Student, naming Riverside Unified School District, called Riverside. The complaint contained expedited and non-expedited claims. OAH set the expedited and non-expedited issues for separate hearings. This Decision addresses only the non-expedited claims.

Administrative Law Judge Alexa Hohensee heard the non-expedited matter by videoconference on July 8, 9, 15, and 17, 2026. The Administrative Law Judge is called the ALJ.

Parents represented Student, with the assistance of advocate Steven Figueroa. Parents attended all hearing days on Student’s behalf. Attorney Jack Clarke represented Riverside. Cynthia Hartshorn, Riverside’s Special Education and Special Education Local Plan Area Director, attended all hearing days on Riverside’s behalf. OAH provided Spanish language interpretation on all days.

At the parties’ request, the matter was continued to July 29, 2026, for written closing briefs. The record was closed, and the matter was submitted on July 29, 2026.

ISSUES

In this Decision, a free appropriate public education is called a FAPE. An individualized education program is called an IEP.

1.

Did Riverside deny Student a FAPE by failing to convene an IEP team meeting to consider supports and services for Student as agreed between Parents and Riverside on October 6, 2025?

2.

Did Riverside deny Student a FAPE from December 2024 through March 19, 2026, by failing to appropriately assess Student in all areas of suspected educational need, including attention, autism-related needs, social emotional concerns, and behavior?

There was significant overlap in the expedited and non-expedited issues in this case. All testimony and exhibits admitted into evidence in the expedited hearing were considered in determining the non-expedited issues, along with the additional testimony elicited and evidence admitted at the non-expedited hearing. The ALJ did not require the parties to authenticate and move to admit documents previously authenticated and admitted in the expedited case for consideration regarding the non-expedited issues. The ALJ did not require the parties to recall witnesses and have them repeat the three days of testimony already given in the expedited hearing. Accordingly, because OAH maintains separate electronic records for dual expedited and non-expedited hearings, it is important to note that the record for the non-expedited hearing in this matter consists of the combined evidentiary record for both the expedited and non-expedited hearings.

Factual findings from the Expedited Decision have been incorporated into this Decision. Some factual findings from the Expedited Decision have been modified to account for additional evidence presented in the non-expedited hearing.

JURISDICTION

This hearing was held under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, called the IDEA, its regulations, and California statutes and regulations. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2006) et seq.; Ed. Code, § 56000 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3000 et seq.) The main purposes of the IDEA are to ensure:

all children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment and independent living, and the rights of children with disabilities and their parents are protected. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1); See Ed. Code, § 56000, subd. (a).)

The IDEA affords parents and local educational agencies the procedural protection of an impartial due process hearing with respect to any matter relating to the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a FAPE to the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) & (f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.511; Ed. Code, §§ 56501, 56502, and 56505; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3082.) The party requesting the hearing is limited to the issues alleged in the complaint, unless the other party consents, and has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i); Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 546 U.S. 49, 57-58, 62 [126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387]; and see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).) Here, Student had the burden of proof. The factual statements in this Decision constitute the written findings of fact required by the IDEA and state law. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (e)(5).)

This Decision does not cite to the administrative record because it was not available before the issuance of this Decision and OAH policy is that decisions do not include citations to the record. OAH decisions are written in an accessible style, font, and format adopted by OAH in compliance with state and federal accessibility laws. Student was 18 years old and at the time of the non-expedited hearing and had graduated from his senior year of high school with a regular high school diploma. Student resided with his father, called Parent, within Riverside’s geographic boundaries at all relevant times. From 2019 through November 13, 2024, Student was eligible for special education under the category of other health impairment due to deficits in attention and executive functioning, or planning and organization. Riverside exited Student from special education on November 13, 2024, with Parents’ consent.

ISSUE 1: DID RIVERSIDE DENY STUDENT A FAPE BY FAILING TO CONVENE

AN IEP TEAM MEETING TO CONSIDER SUPPORTS AND SERVICES FOR

STUDENT AS AGREED UPON BETWEEN PARENTS AND RIVERSIDE ON

OCTOBER 6, 2026?

Student contends a settlement agreement reached between Parents and Riverside on October 6, 2025 required an IEP team meeting to be convened within 30 days of execution of the agreement to determine if, and to what extent, Student required an IEP to receive a FAPE. Student also contends the agreement required a “full” or “meaningful” IEP, which did not occur because new assessments were not completed.

Riverside contends that the IEP team meeting was timely scheduled and properly held, but the IEP team did not find Student eligible for special education or entitled to a

FAPE.

LAW ON SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AFFECTING EDUCATIONAL

PROGRAMS

A special education settlement agreement is considered a contract. (See, e.g.,

D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education (3d Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 896, 898 (D.R.).) Federal district courts have held that OAH has jurisdiction to interpret and enforce settlement agreements concerning the educational program of a disabled child. (See Pedraza v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist. (N.D.Cal. Mar. 27, 2007) 2007 WL 949603, at *4; Hayden C. v. Western Placer Unified Sch. Dist. (E.D.Cal. May 12, 2009) 2009 WL

1325945, at *4.) A parent can waive their child’s right to a FAPE. (D.R., supra, 109 F.3d at p. 898; Ballard v. Phila. Sch. Dist. (3rd Cir. 2008) 273 Fed. Appx. 184, 188.) Parties routinely enter into agreements to resolve litigation, and an agreement is not void because a party settled for less that he or she later believes the law provides. (D.R., supra, 109 F.3d at p. 898.) As explained in D.R.:

A party enters a settlement agreement, at least in part, to avoid unpredictable costs of litigation in favor of agreeing to known costs. Government entities have additional interests in settling disputes in order to increase the predictability of costs for budgetary purposes. We are concerned that a decision that would allow parents to void settlement agreements when they become unpalatable would work a significant deterrence contrary to the federal policy of encouraging settlement agreements. (D.R., supra, 109 F.3d at p. 901.)

Accordingly, the IDEA favors settlement of disputes between parents and school districts. (T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 451, 482, fn. 14; citing D.R., supra, 109 F.3d at p. 901; cf. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde (1994) 511 U.S. 202, 215 [noting, in another context, that public policy wisely encourages settlements].)

LAW ON BALANCING PARENT PARTICIPATION AND DEADLINES

The Ninth Circuit has been particularly harsh in criticizing school districts that fail to ensure parental participation in the development of their child’s IEP. (W.G. v. Board of

Trustees of Target Range School Dist. No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1469, 1484 (Target

Range), superseded on other grounds by 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).) But it has acknowledged that school districts must be allowed leeway when faced with the choice of complying with deadlines versus ensuring parental participation: The more difficult question is what a public agency must do when confronted with the difficult situation of being unable to meet two distinct procedural requirements of the IDEA, in this case parental participation and timely annual review of the IEP. . . When confronted with the situation of complying with one procedural requirement of the IDEA or another, we hold that the agency must make a reasonable determination of which course of action promotes the purposes of the IDEA and is least likely to result in a denial of FAPE. In reviewing an agency’s actions in such a scenario, we will allow the agency reasonable latitude in making that determination.

(Doug C. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ. (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3d 1038, 1046 (Doug C.).) Delays in meeting deadlines do not deprive a student of a FAPE where they do not deprive the student of educational benefit. (See, e.g., A.M. v. Monrovia (9th Cir. 2010) 627 F.3d 773, 779 [“whether or not Defendant exceeded the thirty-day limit, A.M. suffered no deprivation of educational benefit and therefore has no claim”].) In most circumstances, accommodating a parent’s schedule does less harm to the student’s interests than prioritizing strict deadline compliance and proceeding without the parent’s presence at the IEP team meeting. (Doug. C., supra, 720 F.3d at pp. 1046-1047.)

SPECIAL EDUCATION ELIGIBILITY

The IDEA defines a “child with a disability” as a child with certain disabilities delineated by statute, who, because of that disability, needs special education and related services. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8.) California law calls a child with a disability an individual with exceptional needs (Ed. Code, § 56026), and these terms are interchangeable. This Decision will use the term child with a disability. California identifies 13 categories under which a student may demonstrate a degree of impairment requiring special education. (Ed. Code, § 56026, subd. (d); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subds. (a), (b)(1)-(13).)

NOT ALL PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS DENY STUDENT A FAPE

The IDEA requires that a due process decision be based upon substantive grounds when determining whether a child has received a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E); Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (j); Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at pp. 206-207.) A procedural violation substantively denies a student a FAPE when it: ⦁ impedes the student’s right to a FAPE,

⦁ deprives the student of educational benefit or opportunity.

⦁ significantly interferes with parental participation, or (Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f)); Target Range, supra, 960 F.2d at p. 1484.)

STUDENT’S EXIT FROM SPECIAL EDUCATION

Student was found eligible for special education in elementary school in 2019, under the eligibility category other health impairment. At that time, Student exhibited characteristics of chronic attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD, and related deficits in planning and organization, often called executive functioning. In 2019, Student’s attention and executive functioning deficits resulted in limited alertness with respect to the educational setting and affected his educational performance to such a degree he required specialized academic instruction to access the curriculum. Five years later, when Student was in 11th grade at the beginning of the 2024-2025 school year, he attended general education classes and was on track to graduate with a regular high school diploma. By that time, Student was not receiving direct special education services. Instead, Student’s general education teachers received a nominal 20 minutes per month of specialized academic instruction consultation from a special education teacher on how to help Student access the curriculum. Student’s IEP also provided a number of accommodations for his attention and executive functioning deficits, including, for example, extended time on tests, a seat away from distractions, on-task reminders, and extra time to turn in homework.

During the first semester of the 2024-2025 school year, Student was earning grades of As and Bs, and had an impressive 3.73 grade point average on a 4.0 scale. Student loved music, took multiple music classes, and played in the school band and other school-related musical instrument ensembles. At both the expedited and non-expedited hearings, he was described by multiple teachers and administrators as very talented, social, and well-liked by peers and adults.

On November 13, 2024, Riverside convened an IEP team meeting, including Student and Parents, for a three-year review of Student’s educational program. Riverside had completed comprehensive three-year assessments of Student in October and November 2024, which showed Student had high average to above average cognitive ability, with academic achievement scores in the average and high average range, except for one math score in the low average range. Student had made good progress on a behavior goal to timely complete classwork and turn in assignments, and he earned good grades. The special education teacher providing 20 minutes per month of specialized academic instruction consultation to Student’s teachers reported Student no longer needed that support.

The November 13, 2024 IEP team determined Student was no longer a student with a disability because he was accessing the curriculum with general education accommodations, and did not need special education and related services. The IEP team recommended exiting Student from special education. Parents agreed, and that same day consented to Student’s exit from special education. Student has not received special education services since November 13, 2024.

DISCIPLINARY INCIDENTS

Approximately one week after Student’s exit from special education, Student’s former girlfriend made serious sexual assault and battery accusations against Student to Riverside. During Riverside’s investigation, another student alleged Student sexually battered her in January 2025. Both accusers shared Student’s social group at school, and the allegations resulted in Student being shunned and ostracized by many former mutual friends. Student was very anxious and depressed about the consequences of the investigation, including a disciplinary investigation and possible expulsion. Student began playing music on his instruments late into the night or stayed out late at band activities, and completed homework late into the night or early morning. When that happened, Parent would allow Student to miss school the next day. Student was absent 30 days in the 2024-2025 school year, mostly around the time of the disciplinary incidents.

Riverside’s November 13, 2024 IEP team members referred Parents to Riverside’s 504 plan coordinator. A 504 plan team could meet to review whether Student, who no longer required special education, still required accommodations in the general education program to address his attention and executive function deficits, such as additional time to complete assignments and a quiet environment for taking tests. A 504 plan is developed by a school district pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. (A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279 (2025) 605 U.S. 335, 339.) Schools formulate 504 plans to aide a student’s access to the general education curriculum, generally by offering necessary accommodations. (McIntyre v. Eugene

School District 4J (9th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 902, 911.)

During fall 2024, Riverside’s 504 coordinator repeatedly attempted to schedule 504 plan meetings so that Student would receive any accommodations he needed. However, on the advice of Student’s advocate, Parent repeatedly declined.

POST-INCIDENT ASSESSMENTS AND MAY 1, 2025 IEP TEAM

MEETING

On December 12, 2024, January 8, 2025, and February 4, 2025, Parent requested Riverside re-assess Student for special education eligibility. The reasons for the requests varied, but in February 2025, Parent reported Student was experiencing new symptoms of anxiety and depression when trying to meet assignment deadlines without accommodations. In addition, on the advocate’s insistence, Parent demanded Student be assessed in all 13 special education eligibility categories, although many categories clearly did not apply to Student, such as:

Deaf-blindness,

Deafness,

Hearing impairment,

Intellectual disability,

Orthopedic impairment,

Traumatic brain injury, and

Visual impairment.

Nonetheless, Riverside agreed to assess Student for all 13 eligibility categories. In March and April 2025, Riverside comprehensively assessed Student in the areas of:

Academic achievement,

Social, adaptive, behavioral, and emotional functioning,

Processing abilities,

Perceptual and motor development,

Communication development,

Cognitive development,

Health and childhood development,

Vocational ability,

Orientation and mobility,

Need for assistive technology, and

Need for educationally-related mental health services.

The assessment results were documented in an April 22, 2025 speech and language assessment report, an April 23, 2025 achievement test, and a May 1, 2025 combined psychoeducational and educationally-related mental health services report. Riverside convened an IEP team meeting to review the assessments on May 1, 2025, attended by Parents, Student’s advocate, the assessors, Student’s teachers, and school administrators. Similar to the October and November 2024 assessment results, Student demonstrated average to high average cognitive ability, and scored in the average to high average range in academic achievement, with slightly below average scores in spelling and math, which were timed tests. On the April 23, 2025 achievement test, Student scored in the average to high average range in all academic indices. The April 22, 2025 speech and language assessment report showed Student’s voice, articulation, language and fluency skills were age appropriate. Student’s scores in figurative language, sentence expression, and listening comprehension were average or above average, with relative weakness in executive functioning skills, which were low average. Student’s pragmatic, or social language, skills were age appropriate.

Student’s teachers reported that he performed well in the classroom when he attended, but his grades were impacted by missed lessons and incomplete homework. Throughout the 2024-2025 school year, teachers allowed Student to, and Student did, make up assignments and turn them in late. Student’s Math 3 teacher explained to the May 1, 2025 IEP team that Student had an F in math due to missing homework and a failed test, but could pass the class by turning the work in late and retaking the test. Riverside’s school psychologist Lisa Browne conducted the educationally-related mental health services evaluation over March and April 2025, specifically looking at whether Student’s reported anxiety and depression were interfering with Student’s access to his education. Browne explained to the May 1, 2025 IEP team that although Student was experiencing interpersonal difficulties and missing school, he worked collaboratively with peers and performed well academically when he was at school. Parents had arranged from January 2025 for Student to meet with a private therapist weekly, who had diagnosed Student with major depressive disorder-mild and anxious distress. However, Student’s teachers reported they did not observe symptoms related to depression or anxiety in the school setting, and no assessment results indicated Student had an inability to learn.

The Riverside IEP team members found that Student did not qualify for special education under any of the 13 eligibility categories because he did not meet the criteria of any qualifying category and did not need special education and related services to access the curriculum. This is discussed in more detail in Issue 2, but for example, in the category of autism, Student did not have communication and social interaction deficits adversely affecting his educational performance. In the category of emotional disability, Student did not have an inability to learn, or an inability to build and maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers or teachers. He did not exhibit inappropriate behavior, feelings, or a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affected his educational performance. Student’s attention and executive functioning deficits no longer adversely affected his educational performance in the eligibility category of other health impairment.

The IEP team discussed that accommodations could be provided under a 504 plan, and that Student could benefit from general education tutoring, counseling, and other services available to all Riverside students. The May 1, 2025 IEP did not offer Student special education eligibility. Parents did not sign the May 1, 2025 IEP. Student passed all his 2024-2025 classes with grades of As, Bs, and two Cs, except for Math 3. In Math 3, Student earned a B the first semester, and an F the second semester.

Parent was unhappy with the May 1, 2025 IEP result. On May 1, 2025, Student’s advocate wrote a letter to Riverside, grossly misstating what occurred at the IEP team meeting, and demanding Riverside conduct additional assessments, particularly for suspected autism, including sensory processing and pragmatic language differences. Riverside responded that, if Parent was agreeable, it would participate with Parent in Riverside’s informal dispute resolution program.

On June 6, 2025, Parents wrote to Riverside and demanded it fund independent educational evaluations in psychoeducation, speech and language, and occupational therapy. On June 10, 2025, Riverside sent Parents a prior written notice granting Parents’ request for publicly funded independent educational evaluations in psychoeducation and speech and language, but denying an occupational therapy evaluation for sensory processing.

2025-2026 SCHOOL YEAR: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND

NOVEMBER 2025 IEP

Student moved to a new school within Riverside for the 2025-2026 school year. He was placed in general education classes for 12th grade, without accommodations. Parent and Student’s advocate met with Riverside administrator Cynthia Hartshorn for informal dispute resolution on September 25, 2025. Parent and Riverside reached a written agreement, called the settlement agreement, signed by Parents and Riverside on October 6, 2025.

In the settlement agreement, Riverside agreed to provide funding that Parents could use for independent educational evaluations, or immediate counseling and tutoring for Student, or both. Riverside agreed to schedule an IEP team meeting within 30 days to review its prior assessments and any new information from Parents for purposes of considering Student’s eligibility for special education. Riverside also agreed to provide specific accommodations to Student for the 2025-2026 school year, such as extended time on tests, late assignments to receive full credit, and increased verbal response time. In return, Parents waived any and all claims arising from or related to Student’s special education programming through the date of the agreement, and agreed not to request further assessments from Riverside before July 30, 2026, that is, before the end of the 2025-2026 school year and extended school year.

The settlement agreement contained a three business day right to revoke, and did not become binding until the fourth business day after execution. Parents did not revoke the agreement, and on October 10, 2025, Hartshorn forwarded the agreement to a program specialist at Student’s new school to schedule an IEP team meeting. The program specialist reviewed Student’s file to identify necessary members for Student’s IEP team, and reached out to various Riverside staff and Student’s teachers at the new school for their availability. On October 21, 2025, the program specialist emailed Parent and left a voicemail message proposing November 3, 2025 at 10:00 AM for an IEP team meeting. She followed up with reminder voicemail and email messages to Parent on October 27, 28, and 29, 2025.

On October 29, 2025, Parent emailed the program specialist that he had received the information, but requested additional dates to ensure Student’s advocate could attend. The program specialist arranged additional dates and emailed Parent, who confirmed he could attend on November 7, 2025 at 1:00 PM. However, on November 5, 2025, Parent emailed the program specialist that Student’s advocate was no longer available on November 7, 2025, and requested three more dates. The program specialist arranged additional dates which she emailed to Parent on November 13, 2025, and Parent confirmed November 18, 2025, at 8:00 AM for the IEP team meeting. In the interim, Riverside school psychologist Meaghan Smith attempted for two days in late October 2025 to contact Student’s private therapist for new information on Student’s social emotional functioning, as permitted by a release of information form signed by Parent and given to Riverside. However, Parent told the private therapist not to respond to Riverside, and the therapist did not respond.

On November 18, 2025, Riverside convened an IEP team meeting. Parent, Student, Student’s advocate, Student’s teachers, Smith, a Riverside counselor, and Riverside program specialists and school administrators attended. Student’s teachers reported on Student’s progress in the curriculum, his grades, and his participation in the classroom. His teachers shared that Student was performing academic tasks well during class, but missed classes and was not regularly turning in completed assignments, which impacted his grades. Student was also frequently distracted on his phone, but not disruptive and easily redirected. Student was re-taking Math 3 and passing all classes needed to graduate.

School psychologist Smith reported she had introduced Student to the school counselor and other counselors at the school, and to tutoring available at lunch and after school, although Student had not taken advantage of those services. Parent admitted to the team he told Student’s private therapist not to respond to Smith’s inquiries. Parent reported Student was anxious and depressed about school and had mentioned suicidal ideation. Student had not reported suicidal ideation to anyone at school, and Smith, Student’s teachers, and school administrators on the IEP team reported Student appeared sociable and was interacting well with peers at school. In light of current teacher reports and Parent’s input, Riverside’s IEP team members reconsidered the April 22, 2025 speech and language evaluation, April 23, 2025 achievement test, and the comprehensive May 1, 2025 psychoeducational and educationally-related mental health assessment. The IEP team found Student accessed the curriculum with general education supports such as check-ins initiated by his teachers, and with general education supports such as redirection and extra time for tests and assignments. Student did not exhibit maladaptive behaviors in the classroom.

Riverside’s IEP team members did not find Student needed special education or related services to access the general education curriculum, and Student was not offered an IEP. Riverside IEP team members recommended a 504 plan to ensure Student had all the accommodations he needed.

The November 18, 2025 IEP lasted approximately two hours, and Parent and Student’s advocate actively participated. Parent and the advocate discussed their concerns and asked many questions, and the assessors and other school staff provided full and detailed answers. Parent did not agree with the Riverside IEP team members, and expressed he wanted Student on an IEP. On Parents’ behalf, Student’s advocate again requested additional assessments by Riverside. Parents did not consent to the November 18, 2025 IEP’s finding of ineligibility.

Student passed all classes needed at the end of the 2025-2026 school year and graduated with a regular high school diploma.

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REQUIRED A MEETING WITHIN 30 DAYS

There was no dispute Riverside convened the IEP team meeting required by the settlement agreement more than 30 days after the agreement was signed. However, the weight of the evidence established that Riverside repeatedly rescheduled the meeting for the purpose of ensuring Parents’ participation.

The relevant term of the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement stated as follows: An IEP team meeting will be scheduled within 30 days from full execution of this agreement to consider potential eligibility for special education.

The team will consider the findings of the previous evaluation, in light of current circumstances, along with additional information provided by the parent . . . .

In interpreting an agreement between the parties, the words of the document are given their plain meaning and understood in their common sense. That is, the parties’ expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent, governs. (Vaillette v.

Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 680, 686, citing Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp. (9th Cir. 1989) 876 F.2d 702, 704.) If the plain meaning of the contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) A contract may not be interpreted so as to render one of its other provisions meaningless. (Civ. Code, § 1641;

Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (9th Cir. 2018) 903 F.3d 862, 872.) A contract must be interpreted to avoid absurd results. (Revitch v. DIRECTV,

LLC (9th Cir. 2020) 977 F3d 713, 717.)

Here, Riverside argues the plain meaning of the settlement agreement was that an IEP team meeting would be “scheduled” within 30 days, with no time requirement as to when the meeting would actually be convened. The language appears to be the result of inattentive writing, rather than an expressed objective intent of the parties to schedule, rather than convene, a meeting within 30 days. Riverside’s interpretation renders an important provision, the conduct of an IEP team meeting, meaningless by allowing Riverside to delay or eliminate that meeting entirely by scheduling it beyond the school year in which Parents sought special education services and supports for their child. The settlement agreement cannot be interpreted to lead to such an absurd result.

In addition, the mutual intention of the parties is normally determined from the written terms of the contract, so long as the contract language is clear and explicit and does not lead to absurd results. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 1638.) If a contract is ambiguous, or susceptible to more than one meaning, then extrinsic evidence may be used to interpret the contract. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37-40.)

Here, the scheduling language of the settlement agreement is subject to more than one meaning, and extrinsic evidence may be considered. Parent testified that his intention was for an IEP team meeting to be convened within 30 days, and several Riverside witnesses, including the scheduling program specialist, were making every effort to be available for and convene the meeting within 30 days of October 6, 2025. This testimony and these actions demonstrated a mutual intention for the meeting to be held within 30 days of execution of the agreement, or by November 5, 2025. Another section of the settlement agreement, under the heading “Implementation of Agreement,” states:

A copy of this Agreement will be placed in the Student’s file and the Student’s IEP team will meet within 30 days of execution of this Agreement to implement the terms of this Agreement.

This provision required the IEP team to meet, and not just be scheduled to meet, within 30 days of execution of the settlement agreement. This section would be rendered meaningless if Riverside was allowed to schedule an IEP team meeting in 30 days without convening one. Riverside’s interpretation of the scheduling provision cannot be permitted to render this subsequent section meaningless.

Accordingly, Riverside was required to convene an IEP team meeting within 30 days of full execution of the agreement, by November 5, 2026. The November 18, 2025 IEP team meeting was held 13 days later than required by the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement.

However, a delay of 13 days was a procedural error that did not deny Student a FAPE unless it impeded his right to a FAPE, significantly interfered with Parents’ participation, or deprived Student of educational benefit or opportunity. (See Ed. Code, § 56505, subd. (f)); Target Range, supra, 960 F.2d at p. 1484.) Parent did not respond to the program specialist’s scheduling requests from October 21, through October 29, 2025, and subsequently requested additional dates past mid-November 2025 to accommodate Student’s advocate. Riverside was confronted with the difficult situation of determining whether to timely convene an IEP team meeting without Parent, or delay the meeting to ensure parental participation. In keeping with guidance from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Riverside prioritized the participation of Parent, with the help of their chosen advocate, and was entitled to reasonable latitude in making that decision. (Doug C., supra, 720 F.3d at p. 1046.)

Riverside’s delay at Parent’s express request did not significantly interfere with Parents’ opportunity to engage in the decisionmaking process. Rather, it ensured Parents’ full and robust participation. Accommodating Parent’s schedule, and that of Parents’ chosen advocate, did less harm to Student’s interests than prioritizing strict compliance with the settlement agreement’s 30-day deadline and proceeding without Parents.

As discussed in Issue 2, Student was not eligible for special education, and the delay did not impede Student’s right to a FAPE or cause a deprivation of educational benefit.

Accordingly, the late November 18, 2025 IEP team meeting did not result in a loss of educational opportunity, seriously infringe on Parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process, or otherwise deny Student a FAPE. The 13-day delay was a procedural error, but caused no substantive harm.

NO REQUIREMENT FOR PRE-MEETING FURTHER ASSESSMENT

Student contends the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement required a “full” IEP with consideration of Parents’ input regarding eligibility, and Parents could not fully participate without the information additional assessments would have provided. However, the weight of the evidence established that Parents fully and meaningfully participated in the November 18, 2025 IEP without further assessment. A parent has meaningfully participated in the development of an IEP when they are informed of their child’s problems, attend the IEP team meeting, express their disagreement with the IEP team’s conclusions, and request revisions in the IEP. (N.L. v.

Knox County Schools (6th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3d 688, 693.)

Here, the notes in the November 18, 2025 IEP, and the consistent and credible testimony of multiple IEP team members, established that over a period of approximately two hours, Parent and Student’s advocate were informed of Student’s strengths and weaknesses, heard reports of Student’s progress from his current teachers, and reviewed the spring 2025 assessments. Parent and Student’s advocate reported concerns, gave their input, and participated in robust discussions throughout the IEP team meeting. Parents fully and meaningfully participated in the November 18, 2025 IEP team meeting and the discussions of Student’s eligibility for special education. The fact that Riverside IEP team members disagreed about Student’s eligibility for special education, or the need for more assessments to make that determination, did not prove that Parents were not given an opportunity to fully participate in the November 18, 2025 IEP team decisions. A school district does not infringe on the parents’ opportunity to participate if it hears their concerns but just disagrees. (Capistrano Unified School Dist. v. S.W. (9th Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 1125, 1134.) In his closing brief, Student contends for the first time that the settlement agreement required Riverside to conduct additional assessments prior to the November 18, 2025 IEP team meeting, or to conduct additional assessments and convene a second IEP team meeting, to ensure a “meaningful” IEP team meeting to consider Student’s eligibility for special education. This contention fails for many reasons.

First, a party who requests a due process hearing may not raise issues at the hearing that were not raised in the due process hearing request, unless the opposing party agrees otherwise. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); Ed. Code, § 56502, subd. (i); County of

San Diego v. California Educ. Hearing Office (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1458, 1465.) Riverside has not agreed to expand the scope of Issue 1, and at every opportunity objected to Student’s attempts to do so. Issue 1 is stated as follows in Student’s due process hearing request:

[Riverside] did not follow the [October 6, 2025] agreement and did not hold an IEP meeting within the required timeline. The California Department of Education found [Riverside] out of compliance for this. As a result, [Student] has not received appropriate services or support. In response to a complaint made by Parent, on March 18, 2026, the California Department of Education found Riverside “failed to convene an IEP meeting within the 30-day timeline” as required by the settlement agreement. This was the one and only compliance error found. Accordingly, Issue 1, as alleged, was limited to whether an IEP team meeting was held, and when.

However, even on the merits, Student’s argument fails. First, special education law distinguishes between IEP team meetings and assessments, and new assessments are not required for every IEP team meeting. For example, review of a student’s IEP must take place no less frequently than annually. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(a); Ed. Code, § 56380, subd. (a)(1).) Reassessment of a student must occur no less frequently than every three years, and no more frequently than once per year, unless the school district and parent agree otherwise. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B); 34 C.F.R.§ 300.303(b); Ed. Code, § 56381, subd. (a)(2).) Riverside’s agreement to conduct an IEP team meeting did not, under federal or California law, simultaneously require Riverside to conduct new assessments of Student.

Second, California special education law requires only that an IEP team consider the results of the most recent assessments. (Ed. Code, § 56341.1, subd. (a)(3).) Student cites no statute or regulation that requires an IEP team meeting to include updated assessments. Riverside granted Parent’s request for independent educational evaluations in psychoeducation and speech and language on June 10, 2025, but there was no evidence that Parents obtained those assessments for the November 18, 2025 IEP team’s consideration. School psychologists Browne and Smith testified convincingly, and without contradiction, that the results of the assessments conducted in April and May 2025 were still valid in November 2025, and the November 18, 2025 IEP team correctly reviewed those as Student’s most recent assessments. Third, the settlement agreement stated the IEP team would consider “findings of the previous evaluation, in light of current circumstances, along with additional information provided by the parent.” The agreement made no reference to Riverside conducting new assessments, and expressly stated that the team would consider previous evaluations. The language that the IEP team would consider previous evaluations “in light of current circumstances” directed the IEP team to consider past assessments in the context of Student’s school performance approximately six months after the assessments were performed, and did not require new assessments. The November 18, 2025 IEP team appropriately considered Student’s current circumstances through the reports of Student’s teachers and school administrators and the input of Parent and Student’s advocate.

Fourth, a school district statutorily has 60 days to conduct an assessment and review it at an IEP team meeting. (Ed. Code, § 56344, subd. (a).) Student did not demonstrate that, or explain how, Riverside was supposed to conduct additional assessments within a shorter period than statutorily allowed, specifically within 30 days of execution of the agreement. Neither did Student demonstrate or explain which assessments he contended Riverside was required to conduct within 30 days.

Fifth, on the same page of the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement as the 30-day IEP team meeting requirement, Parents agreed that they would make no further requests for additional assessments before July 30, 2026:

In light of the compromised funding offered as set forth above, Parent(s) further agree that, should the student continue to be enrolled in [Riverside], no further requests for [independent educational evaluations] or other special education assessments will be made prior to July 30, 2026. Student’s argument that Riverside was required to conduct additional assessments as part of convening the IEP team meeting is directly contradicted by Parents’ agreement to forego additional assessments from October 6, 2025, through July 30, 2026, in return for funding with which Parents could obtain independent assessments by assessors of their choice.

Lastly, Parents waived all educational claims through October 6, 2025 in writing and cannot now inconsistently raise a claim based on the alleged inadequacies of pre-October 6, 2025 assessments to inform the November 18, 2025 IEP team. (See, e.g., Ed. Code, § 623 [a party is estopped from making a statement to cause another to act and then contradicting that statement in litigation].)

In summary, the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement did not require Riverside to conduct additional assessments of Student as part of the IEP team’s consideration of Student’s eligibility at the 30-day IEP team meeting.

Student failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Riverside denied him a FAPE by failing to convene an IEP team meeting to consider supports and services for Student as agreed between Parents and Riverside on October 6, 2025.

ISSUE 2: DID RIVERSIDE DENY STUDENT A FAPE FROM DECEMBER 2024

THROUGH MARCH 20, 2026, BY FAILING TO APPROPRIATELY ASSESS

STUDENT IN ALL AREAS OF SUSPECTED EDUCATIONAL NEED, INCLUDING

ATTENTION, AUTISM-RELATED NEEDS, SOCIAL EMOTIONAL CONCERNS,

AND BEHAVIOR?

Student contends Riverside failed to appropriately assess Student in all areas of suspected educational need from December 2024 through the filing of Student’s complaint. Riverside contends it conducted all necessary assessments and that those assessments were appropriate.

The evidence established that Student waived all claims regarding Riverside’s assessments of Student on or before October 6, 2025. Riverside was further contractually excused from assessing Student at Parent’s request from October 6, 2025, through June 30, 2026, and no other information or action triggered an obligation for Riverside to assess Student during that period.

LAW REGARDING FREQUENCY OF ASSESSMENTS

Once a child has been fully evaluated for special education, any subsequent evaluation of that child is a reevaluation. (71 Fed. Reg. 46640 (Aug. 14, 2006).) California law refers to a reevaluation as a reassessment. (Ed. Code, § 56381.) The terms are interchangeable.

Aside from a reassessment every three years, reassessment must be conducted if one of three events occurs: the school district determines that the educational or related service needs, including improved academic achievement and functional performance, of the student warrant a reassessment, or the student’s parent or teacher request a reassessment. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(a)(1); Ed. Code, § 56381, subd. (a)(1); M.S. v. Lake Elsinore Unified School District (9th Cir. 2017) 678 Fed. Appx. 543, 544 (Lake Elsinore) (nonpub. opn.).)

In Lake Elsinore, the Ninth Circuit reversed a California federal District Court decision finding that a student’s progressively more aggressive behavior posed a threat to her safety and warranted a new assessment, and that the school district denied the student a FAPE by failing to reassess. The Ninth Circuit explained that because fewer than three years had elapsed since the last reevaluation, and the school district did not determine reevaluation was necessary, the parents did not request reevaluation, and the teachers did not request reevaluation, the school district had no duty to reevaluate the student. In other words, new or worsening educational needs are insufficient to trigger a school district’s duty to assess without a school district determination or a parent or teacher request. (Lake Elsinore, supra, 678 Fed. Appx at p. 544.)

PARENT WAIVED CLAIMS REGARDING RIVERSIDE’S ASSESSMENT OF

STUDENT PRIOR TO OCTOBER 6, 2025

The October 6, 2025 settlement agreement contained a section entitled “Satisfaction and Waiver of Claims.” That section provided in pertinent part:

This Agreement resolves, to the satisfaction of [Parents] and [Riverside], all claims and issues arising from or related to Student’s special education program to date. . .

The Parties agree to compromise and fully and finally resolve their disputes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Parent understands that by agreeing to this Agreement, they are waiving any past claims and releasing [Riverside] from any past liability relating to the Student’s special education programming. This release includes any claims. . . under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.. . . and the special education provisions of the California Education Code arising from or related to the Student’s special education programming to date.

Parents voluntarily executed the settlement agreement. Parents were accompanied and advised by Student’s advocate, who purported to be knowledgeable in special education law, during the informal dispute resolution meeting at which the settlement agreement was reached. Hartshorn testified credibly and convincingly that each section of the settlement agreement was thoroughly discussed with Parents and the advocate. Parent testified he understood what he was signing. The settlement agreement included a waiver and release of all claims against Riverside arising under the IDEA or California special education law through October 6, 2025. Therefore, Student’s claim at Issue 2, that Riverside committed procedural violations of the IDEA and denied Student a FAPE by failing to appropriately assess him in all areas of suspected disability, is waived through October 6, 2025.

Student’s claims that the April 22, 2025 achievement test, the April 23, 2025 speech and language evaluation, or the May 1, 2025 psychoeducational and educationally-related mental health services assessment were inadequate or inappropriate in any way are included in that waiver of claims. In addition, as discussed in Issue 1, Student’s argument that the inadequacies of the assessments completed prior to October 6, 2025 necessitated new assessments to inform the November 18, 2025 IEP team, is disregarded as dependent on waived claims.

RIVERSIDE DID NOT DETERMINE THAT REASSESSMENT WAS

NECESSARY AND NO TEACHER REQUESTED REASSESSMENT

The weight of the evidence established that Riverside did not determine that Student needed to be reassessed, and no teacher requested reassessment, after October 6, 2025.

Student was exited from special education on November 13, 2024, and Parent requested reassessments for special education eligibility on December 12, 2024, January 8, 2025, and February 4, 2025. Riverside completed comprehensive assessments in all 13 eligibility categories and reviewed them at the May 1, 2025 IEP team meeting, and found Student ineligible for special education. Parents requested reassessments again on May 1, 2025, and on July 3, 2025, in the request for informal dispute resolution. Riverside granted Parent’s request for independent psychoeducational and speech and language assessments on June 10, 2025.

However, by the time of the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement, Riverside had already reassessed Student comprehensively and repeatedly, and instead of reassessing Student again, agreed to fund independent educational evaluations if Parents chose to obtain them. Although outside the time period at issue, Riverside sent Parents prior written notices on March 25, 2026, March 27, 2026, and May 5, 2026, again declining to assess Student further. Multiple Riverside administrators testified convincingly and consistently that nobody in Riverside administration determined Student needed further reassessment on October 6, 2025 or after. Student did not submit any evidence that any of Student’s teachers requested Student be reassessed, before or after October 6, 2025, or at any time. Accordingly, the only possible trigger for Riverside’s duty to reassess Student after October 6, 2025, would be at Parent’s request, and that contingency was expressly prohibited by the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement.

RIVERSIDE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO ASSESS STUDENT ON OR AFTER

OCTOBER 6, 2025 AT PARENT’S REQUEST

As discussed, Parents agreed in the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement that, in consideration of Riverside’s funding for services and independent educational evaluations, Parents would make no further requests for independent educational evaluations or other special education assessments prior to July 30, 2026. Both the IDEA and California special education law, and their implementing regulations, permit parents and school districts to agree not to conduct assessments, as Parents and Riverside did here. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.303(b); Ed. Code, § 56381, subd. (a)(2).) In the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement, Parents contractually agreed with Riverside not to request further assessments before July 30,

2026, absolving Riverside of assessment responsibilities through that date. Parents cannot void the agreement because they feel they settled for less than they now believe the law provides. (See D.R., supra, 109 F.3d at p. 898.)

Accordingly, if Riverside had no obligation to assess Student at Parents’ request between October 6, 2025 and July 30, 2026, because Parents had contractually agreed with Riverside otherwise, Riverside cannot be found to have denied Student a FAPE for failing to conduct assessments at Parent’s request during that period.

ASSESSMENT VARIATIONS DID NOT ESTABLISH A DUTY TO ASSESS

In his closing brief, Student points to various assessment results, parent reports, private therapist testimony, and other evidence to show possible inconsistencies in information about Student’s educational needs, available to Riverside from December 2024 through March 2026. Student characterizes this information as unresolved data, substantial contradictory data, or information not captured by assessments. At the very least, Student contends his slipping grades, increased absenteeism, and Parent’s reports of Student’s struggles with homework warranted reassessment by Riverside.

Specifically, Student contends that he had contradictory data, and suspected but unassessed disabilities existed in attention, autism-related needs, social emotional concerns, and behavior.

However, as explained in Lake Elsinore, other than a mandatory three-year assessment, only a school district’s determination that a reassessment is necessary, or a parent or teacher request for reassessment, will trigger a duty to assess. (Lake Elsinore, supra, 678 Fed. Appx. at p. 544.) Student’s evidence of potential unaddressed educational needs, in attention, autism-related needs, social emotional concerns, behavior, or any other area, was insufficient to establish Riverside had a duty to assess Student from October 6, 2024 through March 20, 2026.

In summary, Student did not meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Riverside denied him a FAPE by failing to appropriately assess him in all areas of suspected educational need, including attention, autism-related needs, social-emotional concerns, and behavior.

NO FAPE DENIAL, EVEN IF A PROCEDURAL VIOLATION, BECAUSE

STUDENT WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL EDUCATION

Even had Riverside been required to assess Student at Parent’s request, a school district’s failure to conduct appropriate assessments or to assess in all areas of suspected disability would only constitute a procedural error. (Park v. Anaheim Union

High School District (9th Cir. 2006), 464 F.3d 1025, 1031-1033.) A procedural error results in the denial of a FAPE only if the child was eligible for special education at the time of the violation. (R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School Dist. (9th Cir. 2007) 496 F.3d 932, 942; Burnett v. San Mateo Foster City School Dist. (9th Cir. 2018) 739 Fed. Appx. 870, 872.)

Said another way, a district's procedural violation cannot qualify an otherwise ineligible student for IDEA relief, and constitutes harmless error if a student is ineligible for special education. (Id.; D.G. v. Flour Bluff Independent School Dist. (5th Cir. 2012)

481 Fed. Appx. 887, 893 (nonpub. opn.) [The IDEA does not penalize school districts for not timely evaluating students who do not need special education].)

STUDENT WAS NOT A CHILD WITH A DISABILITY

A child may have a qualifying disability, yet not be found eligible for special education because the student’s needs can be met with modification of the general education classroom. (Ed. Code, §§ 56026, subd. (b), 56337; Hood v. Encinitas Union

School District (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 1099, 1107-1108, 1110.) In other words, it is not enough that a student has a qualifying disability – they must also need special education and related services. (Ibid.)

As already concluded in the Expedited Decision, Student was not a child with a disability eligible for special education under the IDEA or California law. No evidence presented in the non-expedited hearing changed that conclusion. Student contends he had educational needs in the areas of attention, autism-related needs, social emotional concerns, and behavior that would have been identified if he had been assessed. However, that is not enough. The weight of the evidence did not establish that Student met the criteria of any eligibility category, or that his disability-related needs could not be met with accommodations in the general education program.

ATTENTION – OTHER HEALTH IMPAIRMENT

The eligibility category of other health impairment is defined, in relevant part, as “having limited strength, vitality, or alertness, including a heightened alertness to environmental stimuli, that results in limited alertness with respect to the educational environment, that. . . is due to chronic or acute health problems such a. . . attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. . . and [a]dversely affects a child’s educational performance.” (34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (f).)As with other eligibility categories, a student within the definition of other health impairment must demonstrate that the degree of their impairment requires special education. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (a).)

Student did not have a diagnosis of ADHD prior to a private psychoeducational report prepared by Keith Belton, Psy.D., on April 15, 2026. However, since 2019, Riverside recognized that Student displayed characteristics of ADHD, particularly attention and executive functioning deficits. These characteristics could limit Student’s strength, vitality or alertness by making him easily distractible and unable to sustain attention, and as a result affect his educational performance. Accordingly, Student had a disability within the definition of other health impairment. However, even with a qualifying disability, Student must need special education and related services to be eligible for a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (a); M.P.

v. Santa Monica Malibu Unified School District (C.D. Cal. 2008) 633 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1103.)

By November 13, 2024, Student’s attention and executive functioning deficits were adequately addressed with accommodations such as extended time for assignments and tests. After Student was exited from special education in November 2024, Student passed all his classes with As, Bs, and Cs, except Math 3, in the general education program without the support of accommodations because Parent declined a 504 plan. In spring 2025, Student re-took and passed Math 3 and his other classes in general education classes without accommodations.

Credentialed school psychologist Browne conducted psychoeducational assessments of Student in October 2024 and May 2025, and attended the May 1, 2025 IEP team meeting. Browne had a master’s degree in educational psychology and experience assessing students in all 13 areas of special education eligibility, although she never assessed one student in all 13 categories before Student. From October 2024 through May 2025 she had administered 11 normed assessment instruments to Student, with 21 rating scales, with three to five participants in each scale. She observed Student over time in the classroom and on the school grounds, and interviewed Student, Parents, and Student’s teachers.

Browne testified with a professional demeanor and answered all questions thoughtfully and with explanations. She freely gave examples from her May 1, 2025 assessment report and from her interactions with Student. Given her familiarity with Student and his educational performance, her testimony was credible and persuasive. Browne’s opinions regarding Student’s educational needs, the services or accommodations to meet those needs, and whether Student was eligible for special education under any eligibility category, were given much greater weight than those of the private therapist and psychologists who had limited familiarity with Student’s educational performance.

Browne explained assessments completed in October 2024 and May 2025 had determined Student’s attention and executive function. Although Student had attention and executive functioning deficits in November 2024 and May 2025, those deficits did not negatively impact Student’s learning and could best be addressed with accommodations, such as reminders to stay focused and extra time. At hearing, Browne persuasively and convincingly opined that after Student’s exit from special education in November 2024, and throughout the remaining 2024-2025 school year, Student was not learning differently from his peers, did not need special education services, and accommodations could be tailored to address any attention or executive functioning needs within the general education program.

During the 2025-2026 school year, Student was a senior in 12th grade general education classes. He received accommodations under the October 6, 2025 settlement agreement, such as extended time on tests, full credit for late assignments, and opportunities to take pictures of lecture notes from the board. In November 2025, Student was frequently on his phone in class, and tended to complete assignments his way rather than as directed, but the quality of Student’s work was excellent. Student made up missing assignments, all assignments were done well, and Student was on track to graduate. With only the settlement agreement accommodations beginning October 10, 2025, Student passed all of his classes and graduated with a regular high school diploma by June 2026.

Despite attention and executive functioning deficits, Student did not need special education or related services to access the curriculum from December 2024 through March 20, 2026. Therefore, Student did not qualify for special education as a student with other health impairment during that period.

AUTISM-RELATED NEEDS – AUTISM

A child qualifies for special education under the category of autism if they have a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction adversely affecting their educational performance. Other characteristics often associated with autism are engagement in repetitive activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change or change in daily routines, and unusual responses to sensory experiences. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030(b)(1).)

Student had never been diagnosed with autism. Student’s private therapist, Alexa Gonzalez, testified she had not seen signs of autism during her sessions with Student. Multiple Riverside witnesses who interacted with Student during the 2024-2025 or 2025-2026 school years, and who had worked with students with autism, testified that they observed Student to be very sociable and to present as a typical high school student, not as a student with the social deficits characteristic of autism. Witnesses consistently described Student as articulate and a good communicator. At Parent’s request, psychologist Dr. Belton assessed Student for autism spectrum disorder in March and April 2026. Dr. Belton found that Student exhibited some traits of autism, but did not diagnose Student on the autism spectrum. This Decision does not repeat the extensive findings on Dr. Belton’s lack of credibility and persuasiveness contained in the Expedited Decision, but summarily stated, Dr. Belton relied on input from Parents and Student and a limited records review. He did not observe Student at school or contact any Riverside staff about Student’s academic performance or social interactions in the school environment. Dr. Belton’s findings fell far short of establishing

Student’s traits of autism significantly affected his verbal or nonverbal communication, or that Student had social interaction deficits that adversely affect his educational performance. The evidence of Student’s autistic traits, as reported by Parent and Student, was sparse and unpersuasive.

Jared Baptist, a well-qualified Riverside speech-language pathologist with extensive experience assessing children with suspected autism, assessed Student’s speech and language in April 2025. He testified with a professional demeanor and answered all questions completely and with enlightening explanations. During assessment, he observed Student in the classroom, where Student asked for clarification when needed and was easily redirected to task when distracted. During testing, Baptist observed Student to be articulate in his responses, and appropriate when inquiring about the assessor and the assessment.

During one exchange, Student correctly read Baptist’s nonverbal body language of arched eyebrows that questioned a broad statement made by Student, and Student promptly modified the statement appropriately. Baptist assessed Student’s social skills, social thinking, and social language, called pragmatics, and did not identify any deficits. Student told Baptist he got along great with most students, although he had trouble with band class members after the disciplinary incidents. Baptist persuasively opined Student did not need speech or language services in April 2025. Browne testified about October 2024 and May 2025 psychoeducational assessment rating scales that looked at adaptive functioning and significant autism characteristics, Specifically, in May 2025 none of the rating scale responders indicated concerns for autism. In both October 2024 and May 2025, Student was observed to have friends and communicate effectively with teachers and peers. Student did not engage in repetitive activities or stereotyped movements, was not resistant to environmental change or change in daily routines, and did not exhibit unusual responses to sensory experiences. The results of the psychoeducational assessments were consistent with those of the April 22, 2025 speech and language assessment, which found Student had age-appropriate pragmatic language.

The weight of the evidence did not demonstrate that Student had poor adaptive functioning or other developmental disability significantly affecting his verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction, and adversely affecting his educational performance. Student did not need special education or related services to address autism traits to access the curriculum, and did not qualify for special education as a student with autism, from December 2024 through March 20, 2026.

SOCIAL EMOTIONAL CONCERNS – EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE

The eligibility category of emotional disturbance requires a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affects a child’s educational performance:

An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or other health factors,

An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers,

Inappropriate types of behavior feelings under normal circumstances,

A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression,

A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems, and

Emotional disturbance includes schizophrenia.

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030, subd. (b)(4)(A)-(F).)

In February 2025, Student’s private therapist Gonzalez reported a diagnostic impression of Student as having major depressive disorder–mild, with symptoms of distress, irritability, social isolation, struggles with focusing, insomnia, and restlessness. Browne’s March and April 2025 psychoeducational and educationally-related mental health services assessment found Student was experiencing a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression after the disciplinary incidents, and tended to develop physical symptoms associated with personal or school problems, resulting in his irritability and insomnia. However, Student was not experiencing an inability to learn, was working collaboratively with peers in class, and was maintaining satisfactory relationships with teachers.

None of Student’s teachers reported symptoms related to depression or anxiety in the school setting. Although Student had missed 30 days of school during the 2024-2025 school year, most of those occurred around the time of the disciplinary incidents. On this evidence, Student did not exhibit a mental health diagnosis over a long period of time, and did not exhibit the characteristics of emotional disturbance to a marked degree. Student was making good progress in completing missed assignments and in May 2025 did not meet the eligibility criteria for emotional disturbance. Student passed all of his classes at the end of the 2024-2025 school year, and throughout the 2025-2026 school year Student had no new mental health diagnoses. At the time of the November 18, 2025 IEP team meeting, Student was doing excellent schoolwork, although he was turning assignments in late, which was impacted his grades until those assignments were completed and turned in. Although Parent reported that Student had experienced suicidal ideation, Student was doing well in school, and certainly enjoying frequent band activities late into the evening. Student did not display characteristics of emotional disturbance over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affected his educational performance any time between December 2024 and March 20, 2026.

At hearing, Gonzalez was very forthcoming in stating that she was not familiar with special education eligibility and could not opine on that topic. Jennifer Most, an educational psychologist retained by Student one week before the non-expedited hearing, ventured an opinion that she would have found Student eligible for special education from December 2024 through March 20, 2026, under the eligibility categories of other health impairment or specific learning disability. She based her opinion on a limited records review of Browne’s May 1, 2025 psychoeducational and educationally-related mental health services assessment report, Student’s expulsion packet, Dr. Belton’s psychoeducational assessment, Student’s transcript, and a one-hour conversation with Father and Student. She did not review Riverside’s April 22, 2025 speech and language evaluation report, or the results of Student’s April 23, 2025 achievement test. Most did not speak with anyone at Riverside, and did not look at any of Student’s IEPs. Her one-sided and very limited records review resulted in unpersuasive opinions with unconvincing reasoning regarding Student’s eligibility for special education under any eligibility category at any time.

An example of the foundational errors for Most’s opinions can be seen in Most’s testimony that Student failed Math 3 due to fourth and fifth grade level math skills reported in Belton’s report, and that Student needed specialized academic instruction to improve his math skills or would flounder in college. Most was unaware Student had failed Math 3 due to missing assignments. She also ignored a note in Browne’s psychoeducational report referencing the April 23, 2025 academic achievement test, which in which Student scored in mathematics at the 12th grade level. Most’s testimony that she would have given more weight to certain assessment results than other assessors did was particularly unpersuasive in light of her unfamiliarity with relevant and concurrent assessments available. In addition, Most opined she would have found Student eligible under the category of specific learning disability, a category Student did not allege he was eligible for in his complaint, and an opinion no other testifying school psychologist endorsed. Most’s opinion that Student was eligible for special education in the category of specific learning disability due to a discrepancy between his cognitive ability and his achievement scores in math, was contradicted by all other evidence and unpersuasive.

Dr. Belton testified in the non-expedited hearing as well as the expedited hearing. In the non-expedited hearing, he stressed that his assessment identified concerns with attention and executive functioning, depression and anxiety, autism and social pragmatics, and social emotional and behavior. He opined that each of these concerns should have been considered by Student’s IEP teams, which the evidence established were considered by Student’s IEP teams. Dr. Belton did not opine that Student was eligible for special education at the non-expedited hearing. Instead, Dr. Belton opined that Student should have had an IEP or a 504 plan, whichever would have addressed the concerns he identified.

From December 2024 through March 20, 2026, Student did not exhibit a pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression, or tend to develop symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems, over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely affected his educational performance. Student’s needs could be met with accommodations in the general education classroom. Accordingly, Student was not eligible for special education as a child with emotional disturbance during that period.

NO OTHER ELIGIBILITY CATEGORY APPLIES

There is no special education eligibility category specific to behavior, Student’s other alleged educational concern. Accordingly, Student’s claim that he should have been assessed for behavior with a functional behavior assessment does not address his ineligibility for special education.

There was a plethora of evidence that Student did not display maladaptive behaviors in the classroom, and that Student was easily redirected from distractions in class such as his cell phone. Student freely admitted to multiple assessors that he missed class to escape classwork, and Browne and Smith testified persuasively that there was no need to conduct a functional behavior assessment to determine why Student missed class.

Student does not contend, and Student submitted no evidence, that he was eligible for special education under the categories of:

Deaf/blind,

Deafness,

Hearing impairment,

Intellectual disability,

Multiple disabilities,

Orthopedic impairment,

Language and speech disorder, or

Visual impairment.

In summary, Student was not a child with a disability under the IDEA or California law. Therefore, even if Riverside had failed to appropriately assess Student, which it did not, that failure would not have resulted in a denial of FAPE and Student would not be entitled to relief.

CONCLUSIONS AND PREVAILING PARTY

As required by California Education Code section 56507, subdivision (d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided.

ISSUE 1:

Riverside did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to convene an IEP team meeting to consider supports and services for Student as agreed between Parents and Riverside on October 6, 2025.

Riverside prevailed on Issue 1.

ISSUE 2:

Riverside did not deny Student a FAPE from December 2024 through March 19, 2026, by failing to appropriately assess Student in all areas of suspected educational need, including attention, autism-related needs, social emotional concerns, and behavior.

Riverside prevailed on Issue 2.

ORDER

All Student’s requests for relief are denied.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

This is a final administrative decision, and all parties are bound by it. Pursuant to Education Code section 56505, subdivision (k), any party may appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction within 90 days of receipt.

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ALEXA HOHENSEE

Administrative Law Judge Office of Administrative Hearings