California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 8, 2003
Student v. San Dieguito Union High School District
SEHO Case No. SN 0934-03, SN-0934-03 · Hearing Officer Lawrence E. Mendel
Hearing Officer reinstates graduate's claim against San Dieguito Union High School District for compensatory transition services after earlier dismissal.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
This order on reconsideration vacates the Hearing Office's September 29, 2003 order granting the District's motion to dismiss and restores the matter to the hearing calendar.
Summary
A 19-year-old student eligible for special education under speech and language impairment filed for due process about one month before he graduated from La Costa Canyon High School with a regular diploma. He claimed San Dieguito Union High School District failed to provide adequate transition and planning services during the 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years. He no longer challenged his diploma. He sought compensatory education and $4,380 in reimbursement for services his parents paid for. The District offered to pay the full reimbursement. It then moved to dismiss, arguing under Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) that the Hearing Office could not award compensatory education to a graduate. The Hearing Office granted dismissal on September 29, 2003. The student moved for reconsideration. The Hearing Officer found no new facts or law but granted reconsideration in the interests of justice. On reconsideration, the Hearing Officer read Student W. as a fact-specific ruling, not a rule barring compensatory education after graduation. He noted that a federal regulation ending the duty to provide FAPE after a regular diploma does not limit remedies for past denials of FAPE. He also relied on the 1997 IDEA amendments and Education Code section 56345.1. Those laws promise transition services that go beyond a diploma. The Hearing Officer vacated the dismissal, denied the motion and set the case for hearing.
Why it matters
This ruling shows how SEHO treated a graduate's claim for compensatory education. The Hearing Officer held that a regular diploma did not, by itself, defeat a claim that the district failed to provide transition services before graduation. He also held that Student W. v. Puyallup required a fact-specific analysis and did not create a jurisdictional bar.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 1. Whether the Petitioner's October 10, 2003 motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 2003 order dismissing the case should be granted.
Although the motion did not present new facts or law, the Hearing Officer granted reconsideration based on the totality of the circumstances and the importance of correctly resolving special education disputes.
- Student prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 2. On reconsideration, whether the District's motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground that the Hearing Office lacks jurisdiction to award compensatory education to a student who graduated with a regular diploma, where the District offered to pay all claimed reimbursement.
Student W. v. Puyallup does not bar compensatory education after graduation, and the 1997 IDEA transition provisions promise more than a diploma, so the graduate's claim of inadequate transition services may be heard. The dismissal was vacated and the motion denied.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- September 29, 2003 order granting the District's motion to dismiss vacated; motion to dismiss denied; matter restored to the hearing calendar to be set on the next available dates.
Key authorities
Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District No. 3 (9th Cir. 1994); School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. (1985); Browell v. Lemahieu (D. Hawaii 2000); Lester H. v. Gilhool (3d Cir. 1990); Everett v. Santa Barbara High School District (9th Cir. 2002, unpublished); School District No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc. (9th Cir. 1993); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(3)(i); Education Code section 56345.1
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) is a nineteen-year-old young man who received a regular diploma from La Costa Canyon High School, part of the San Dieguito Union High School District (District), on or about June 13, 2003. Prior to his graduation, STUDENT had been eligible for and receiving special education and related services on the basis of a speech and language impairment. Approximately one month before his graduation, he filed for due process alleging, in part, that the District had failed to provide him with adequate transition and planning services during the 2000-2001, 2001-2002, and 2002-2003 school years. The Petitioner sought remedies that included an award of compensatory education.
Although at one time the Petitioner contested the award of his high school diploma, by the time of the prehearing conference in this matter on September 18, 2003, he no longer challenged the diploma. STUDENT continued to allege that the District failed to provide appropriate transition and planning services during the years at issue and sought an award of compensatory education and reimbursement in the amount of $4,380 for necessary services obtained for him by his parents.
On September 23, 2003, the District made a motion to dismiss the Petitioner’s entire claim on the ground that there was no controversy that required resolution through a due process hearing. The District argued, in essence, that the Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office) had no jurisdiction to award compensatory education to a student who had already received a regular high school diploma. Because the District offered to pay all of the reimbursement claimed by the Petitioner’s parents, it argued that there remained no viable claim to relief. In support of its motion, the District relied principally on Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, No.3, 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994), and its progeny.
The Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing that the Parents of Student W case (Student W) and other cases relied upon by the moving party were inapposite and did not stand for the proposition urged by the District. Petitioner contended that the Hearing Office had broad discretion to fashion and grant an appropriate remedy, including an award of compensatory education, even after a student graduates from high school. In support of this argument, the Petitioner cited several cases from outside the Ninth Circuit, as well as several decisions of the Hearing Office.
On September 29, 2003, the Hearing Office issued an order granting the District’s motion to dismiss. That order relied heavily on the Student W case and held that unless a student claims that his or her graduation from high school with a regular diploma was improper, the Hearing Office has no jurisdiction to award compensatory education to a student who has graduated.
On October 10, 2003, the Petitioner made a motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal order. The District opposes the motion.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
There is no provision in special education law regarding reconsideration of orders by hearing officers. Generally, the Hearing Office will reconsider an order upon motion that is timely made and based upon new or different facts, circumstances or law. However, a Hearing Officer will look at the totality of the circumstances to decide whether or not the interests of justice require reconsideration. (Footnote 1)
The Petitioner bases his motion for reconsideration on essentially the same arguments that were presented in opposition to the original motion to dismiss. In addition to the authorities cited in his original opposition, he cites advisory letters issued by the federal Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) and an unpublished Ninth Circuit decision in support of his arguments. He also offers his own sworn declaration to the effect that he did not believe that acceptance of the high school diploma would bar his claim to an award of compensatory education.
The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the Petitioner’s showing is adequate to justify reconsideration on the basis of new or different facts or law. Nevertheless, considering the totality of the circumstances and the importance of a correct resolution of special education disputes at the administrative level, the Hearing Officer finds that reconsideration is appropriate. The motion to reconsider is granted.
RECONSIDERATION OF MOTION TO DISMISS
When a school district denies a special education student a free, appropriate public education (FAPE), the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. '' 1415(e) (1991) (current version at 20 U.S.C. '' 1415(i) (1997). With reference to the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief that may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. Student W, at 1496.
Contrary to the assertion by the District, the Ninth Circuit did not “unequivocally” state in Student W that a special education student who has been denied a FAPE before receipt of a regular high school diploma is not entitled to an award of compensatory education after graduation, even if the administrative hearing officer finds that to be the appropriate relief. Rather, the Student W Court validates a “fact-specific analysis” that takes all relevant matters into consideration, including the conduct of both the school district and the student’s parents.
The facts before the Court in Student W were as follows: in the seventh grade (1988-1989), the student received special education services in the areas of math and behavior. At the beginning of the eighth grade (1989-1990), the parent refused special education and transferred the student out of the school district. The student returned to the school district in January 1990. At that time, the school district incorrectly allowed the student, who was fifteen years old and had significant behavioral problems, to decline services without informing the parents. Services were resumed in April 1991, near the end of his ninth-grade year. At that time, the student was performing at grade level in all areas except math, and he was on track to graduate with his class without summer school. The student continued to progress with his class through the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth grades, graduating with his class in the spring of 1994, several years after the due process matter was initiated to recover, inter alia, compensatory education for services lost during portions of the eighth- and ninth-grade years.
In reviewing these facts, the Court notes that at the administrative hearing the student’s parents sought compensatory education as needed to allow the student to complete high school with his peers. It examined the conduct of the student’s parents, who at times had declined services for the student. Ultimately, the court disagreed with the parents’ contention that an award of compensatory education should be equal to the amount of time lost while a FAPE was denied. It was in this context and without citation to any authority, that the court made the statement relied upon by the District here, as follows:
. . .There is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed. Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. Student W. was able to graduate from high school, before reaching age 21, without more services than provided for in his annual IEP. The IDEA promises him no more.
(31 F.3d at 1497.)
It is the Hearing Officer’s belief that the Ninth Circuit did not intend this language to stand for the proposition that a student’s claim to compensatory education based upon a denial of a FAPE is barred if the claim to that relief has not wound its way through the administrative determination and court reviews before the student graduates from high school. (Footnote 2) On the contrary, the Court acknowledges the broad power of the district court (and at least by implication, the administrative hearing officer) to use equitable powers to determine and grant appropriate relief, including compensatory education. The Ninth Circuit determined that on the basis of the facts presented, it was not a clear abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the relief sought by the parents. In so holding, the Court was not announcing a rule to limit the authority of a hearing officer to grant appropriate relief, including compensatory education, when a FAPE has been denied. Rather, it was acting to preserve the equitable power of the lower court to determine, in that “rare case,” that compensatory education was not appropriate. Id. (Footnote 3)
If the Ninth Circuit had intended to limit the remedies available to a student, it would have cited some authority in support of that holding. The Hearing Officer believes that the Court cited no authority because it did not intend to create a new rule. The Hearing Officer finds nothing in the IDEA or California statutes that would have supported such a limitation. A federal regulation states that the obligation to make a FAPE available to all children with disabilities does not apply to students who have graduated from high school with a regular diploma. 34 C.F.R. § 300.122(a)(3)(i). However, by its own terms, the regulation relates to the continuing obligation to provide a FAPE. It does not appear to limit the remedy for a past denial of a FAPE. Nor does this regulation or any provision of federal or California law state that the broad equitable jurisdiction of a hearing officer to award appropriate relief is limited if the student graduates from high school before an award becomes final. Furthermore, it would be incongruous to allow the remedy of reimbursement to the student’s parents for privately obtained services, but deny an award of compensatory education to the student whose parents could not afford private services. (Footnote 4) Likewise, compensatory education has been awarded to students who have “aged out” of eligibility at age twenty-two. Lester H. by Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S. Ct. 1317 (1991).
The District also cited one case out of the Ninth Circuit that followed Student W. However, that case, Browell v. Lemahieu 127 F.Supp.2d 1117 (D. Hawaii, 2000), is distinguishable. There, the court found that the student had already received additional services to compensate him for the alleged loss of educational opportunity. Id., at 1126-1127.
Even if the Ninth Circuit had intended in 1994 to pronounce a more general rule limiting the availability of compensatory education to high school graduates, the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA requires a different analysis. The decision in Student W appears to state, in essence, that the IDEA promises nothing more than an award of a regular high school diploma or, failing that, services to age twenty-two. However, the 1997 amendments to the IDEA reflect Congress’ recognition of the importance of transition services to disabled students. 20 U.S.C. § § 1401 (30), 1414 (d)(1)(A)(vii). The California Legislature followed Congress’ lead in 1998 when it enacted California Education Code Section 56345.1.
It is now clear that both the IDEA and California law promise more that a high school diploma or continued services to age twenty-two. They promise services that promote “movement from school to post-school activities . . ..” Id. Arguably, these services might go beyond the academic course of study that could lead to a regular high school diploma. They could include services not designed to lead to the award of a diploma, but to prepare the student in some other way for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(a). In this case the Petitioner’s primary complaint is that the District failed to provide appropriate transition and planning services for three years during high school. The receipt of a regular high school diploma does not as a matter of law negate that claim.
On reconsideration of the District’s motion to dismiss, the Hearing Officer finds that the Petitioner’s allegations regarding a denial of a FAPE and his entitlement to relief, including an award of compensatory education should be heard. Therefore, the September 29, 2003 order granting the District’s motion to dismiss is vacated. That motion is now denied. This matter is restored to the hearing calendar. It will be set for hearing on the next available dates.
Date: December 8, 2003 ____________________________ Lawrence Mendel, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
An administrative hearing officer also has the inherent authority to reconsider his or her ruling sua sponte. Albertson v. FCC, 182 F.2d 397, 399-400 (D.C.Cir.1950), Spanish International Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615, 621 (D.C.Cir.1967); Trujillo v. General Electric Co., 621 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir.1980). Reconsideration may be appropriate if (1) there is newly discovered evidence, (2) the prior ruling was clearly erroneous or manifestly unjust, (3) there is an intervening change in controlling law, or (4) there is some other, highly unusual circumstances warranting reconsideration. School District No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc. 5 F.3d 1255, 1266 (9th Cir. 1993).
2 In Student W, it took several years for the process to conclude with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Court notes that it was informed at oral argument that the student had graduated with his class that spring.
3 The more recent unpublished decision in Everett v. Santa Barbara High School District, 28 Fed Appx. 683 (9th Cir. 2002), while not citable as precedent, would seem to support the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of Student W.
4 The parties agree that a student’s receipt of a regular high school diploma does not bar a claim by the student’s parents for reimbursement for services obtained by them to meet their child’s needs.
