California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 3, 2004
Student v. Victor Elementary School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1001A-04, SN04-01001(a), SN04-01001(b) · Hearing Officer Vincent L. Pastorino
Victor Elementary School District wins residency dispute; student was not a resident, so reimbursement claims are dismissed as moot.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Bifurcated decision: residency was decided in SN04-01001(a). The placement and reimbursement issues in SN04-01001(b) were dismissed as moot in this same decision.
Summary
A mother filed for due process against Victor Elementary School District on behalf of her nine-year-old son, who is eligible for special education under autism. She represented him herself. She wanted reimbursement for private services she paid for from April 21 through July 2003. She argued that the district wrongly refused to enroll her son as a resident. The district said the family never lived within its boundaries. The district asked to split the case, and the mother did not object. The Hearing Officer heard residency first and held the placement and reimbursement claims for later.
The Hearing Officer found that the student was not a district resident during that period. The mother offered a rental agreement for a Victorville home, utility documents, and testimony from the homeowner and the homeowner's daughter. The Hearing Officer found many inconsistencies in this evidence. The lease date did not fit the mother's March 2003 dealings with Templeton Unified. Her enrollment form listed a Hesperia mailing address. The account numbers on the utility documents did not match. Testimony about bill amounts and the names on the bills conflicted with the documents. The landlord did not recognize the witness who signed the lease, and no original documents were produced. During the same period, the mother also gave Templeton Unified a Templeton address, which hurt her credibility. Because the district owed no services, the reimbursement claims were dismissed as moot.
Why it matters
This case shows how SEHO handled a residency dispute as a threshold question. The Hearing Officer decided residency first, using Education Code section 48200 and Government Code section 244. Inconsistent leases, utility records and testimony led to a finding of no residency. Once the district was found to owe no services, the related reimbursement claims became moot.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedResponsible agency
Issue 1. Was STUDENT a resident of VESD from April 21, 2003, through July 2003?
Based on the weight of the evidence, including many inconsistencies in the lease, utility documents and testimony, the student was not a district resident during the period, so the district owed him no services.
- Dismissed / withdrawnUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. Placement and reimbursement issues for April 21, 2003 through July 2003 (bifurcated into Case No. SN04-01001(b))
Because the student was not a resident, the placement and reimbursement claims were moot and Case No. SN04-01001(b) was dismissed in its entirety.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's requests for relief in SN04-01001(a) denied; SN04-01001(b) dismissed in its entirety as moot.
Key authorities
Cal. Educ. Code § 48200; Cal. Gov't Code § 244; Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d)
People named in the decision
- Martin Fine, attorney for District, Victor Elementary School District
- Marie Miller, assistant superintendent; District witness, Victor Elementary School District
- Dr. Jim Huckeba, director of special education; District witness, Hesperia School District
- Ailene Cammon, principal, Liberty Elementary School; District witness, Victor Elementary School District
- Nancy Navarro, administration manager, Liberty Elementary School; District witness, Victor Elementary School District
- Patrick McMenamin, special education compliance investigator; District witness, California Department of Education
- Ms. Castro, probation officer sent by District to verify residence, Victor Elementary School District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Vincent L. Pastorino, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, on October 27, 2004, in Victorville, California.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by his mother, MOTHER. Respondent Victor Elementary School District (Respondent, District, or VESD) was represented by attorney Martin Fine. Also present on VESD’s behalf was Marie Miller, VESD assistant superintendent.
The Petitioner called the following witnesses: MOTHER; LANDLORD, owner of the residence at ADDRESS #1; and LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER, daughter of LANDLORD. The District called the following witnesses: Dr. Jim Huckeba, Hesperia School District (HSD) director of special education; Ailene Cammon, principal at Liberty Elementary School (Liberty), a District school; Nancy Navarro, administration manager at Liberty; Marie Miller; Patrick McMenamin, State Department of Education special education compliance investigator. (Footnote 1)
Before the calling of witnesses, the District made a motion to bifurcate the residency issue from the placement and reimbursement issues. There was no objection by the Petitioner. In ruling on the motion, the Hearing Officer considered that the residency issue covers the time period from April 21, 2003, through July 2003– the identical time period encompassed in the placement and reimbursement issues. Resolution of the residency issue in favor of the District would mean that the District had no obligation to provide a placement or services to STUDENT, and the remaining issues thus would be rendered moot. Meanwhile, resolution of the residency issue in favor of the Petitioner would facilitate settlement of the remaining issues. Accordingly, to promote judicial economy the Hearing Officer granted the motion to bifurcate and ordered that hearing on the placement and reimbursement issues, if still viable, would be continued until the next available hearing date after issuance of a decision on residency. The residency portion of this matter now bears Case No. SN04-01001(a), and the remaining issues, all concerning placement and reimbursement, bear Case No. SN04-01001(b).
Oral and documentary evidence relevant to the residency issue was received. Closing briefs were received on November 16, 2004, and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUE
Was STUDENT a resident of VESD from April 21, 2003, through July 2003?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a nine-year-old student eligible for special education as a child with autism. He has resided within the boundaries of several different school districts, and he currently resides within the Hesperia School District (HSD). His mother asserts that he resided within the boundaries of the Victor Elementary School District (VESD) from March 25, 2003, through July 2003. However, VESD has consistently asserted that STUDENT did not reside within its boundaries. Consequently, STUDENT has never been permitted to attend a VESD school, and he has received no services from VESD.
Documentary evidence shows that on March 4, 2003, the San Luis Obispo County SELPA proposed an “Individualized Education Program (IEP) Amendment” to STUDENT’s prior IEP. (Footnote 2) The proposed IEP amendment references Templeton Elementary as STUDENT’s school of residence. STUDENT’s mother did not sign her consent to the proposed IEP amendment. By letter dated March 12, 2003, STUDENT’s mother informed the Templeton Unified School District (TUSD) that she was removing STUDENT from TUSD because of various disputes concerning STUDENT’s program. The March 12, 2003 letter lists MOTHER’s residence address as ADDRESS #2 in Templeton, California.
Ailene Cammon, Liberty principal, testified that the first contact between the District and MOTHER concerning STUDENT was on March 25, 2003. Ms. Cammon testified that MOTHER came to Liberty on March 25, told the health receptionist attendance clerk that she was not a resident of VESD, and that she wanted to enroll her son into VESD. According to Ms. Cammons, the clerk informed MOTHER that, due to space limitations at Liberty, transfers of nonresidents were not being accepted. (Footnote 3)
MOTHER testified that she went to the Liberty campus in Victorville on March 28, 2003, and requested STUDENT’s enrollment at Liberty. She signed a Liberty form (Pet. Exh. 3) containing a list of what types of documents the District may consider for proof of residence, including rent receipts and utility bills. (Footnote 4) According to MOTHER, she was told that because the District was closing on March 28 for spring break, she could return after spring break on April 21 and submit her documents for proof of residence.
MOTHER testified that she returned to Liberty on April 21, 2003, and completed a registration packet. The completed District registration form, dated April 21, 2003 (Dist. Exh. 3), lists ADDRESS #1 in Victorville as MOTHER’s residence address, and it lists ADDRESS #3 in Hesperia as MOTHER’s mailing address. The form identifies “LANDLORD” as an “other adult” living in the home. The listed telephone number is a cellular number. The form lists Templeton Elementary School as being the last school attended, ending on March 15, 2003.
MOTHER also testified that while she was at Liberty on April 21, 2003, she submitted several documents to demonstrate her residency. According to MOTHER, those documents included a rental agreement (Pet. Exh. 1) for ADDRESS #1 in Victorville; an April 14, 2003 letter from Southern California Edison verifying that her utility service at ADDRESS #1 would commence on April 15, 2003 (Pet. Exh. 2); and an April 15, 2003 “request for deposit” directed to MOTHER by Southern California Edison (Pet. Exh. 3). (Footnote 5) MOTHER testified that after leaving Liberty, she went to the District office on April 21 and signed a transfer request (Pet. Exh. 4) and a VESD special education assessment plan (Pet. Exh. 5). She testified that about two hours after leaving the District office, she received a telephone call from Ms. Cammons wherein Ms. Cammons stated that MOTHER would need to submit additional proof to establish residence.
Ms. Cammons described a somewhat different sequence of events concerning MOTHER’s completion of the registration packet. She denies that MOTHER ever submitted the rental agreement or the utility company documents (Pet. Exhs. 1, 2, 3). Ms. Cammons testified that MOTHER returned to Liberty on March 28, 2003, met with the same clerk she had seen on March 25, and attempted to enroll STUDENT. MOTHER reportedly said nothing about having attempted to obtain a transfer as a nonresident just three days earlier, and she completed an enrollment/registration form (Dist. Exh. 4). Upon receiving the completed form, the Liberty clerk went into Ms. Cammons’ office and asked her to look at the form. When Ms. Cammoms reviewed the form on March 28, she noticed several items that caused her to doubt whether MOTHER actually resided in Victorville. Specifically, she noticed that the mailing address was a Hesperia address, while the residence address was a Victorville address. She also noted that no local telephone number had been provided, that MOTHER’s listed place of work had a Hesperia phone number, that LANDLORD was the grandmother of a prior student at Liberty, and that MOTHER had once served as that prior student’s education advocate during an IEP meeting. Consequently, Ms. Cammons asked MOTHER to provide more information to demonstrate residence. (Footnote 6)
On May 7, 2003, the District sent a probation officer, Ms. Castro, to the residence at ADDRESS #1 to verify whether MOTHER lived at that address. According to the District, Ms. Castro spoke with the owner of the home, LANDLORD, and LANDLORD told her that MOTHER did not live at ADDRESS #1, but instead lived in Hesperia.
On May 20, 2003, MOTHER filed a complaint with the State Department of Education’s compliance unit, alleging that the District was wrongfully refusing to accept STUDENT as a resident of the District. On the basis of the evidence presented, the compliance investigator found “convincing evidence that the student was not a resident of the District,” and he concluded that the District was “not obligated to implement” a placement for STUDENT. (Footnote 7)
On June 12, 2003, the District received, by fax from MOTHER, what was purported to be a May 21, 2003 Southern California Edison utility bill issued to MOTHER at the ADDRESS #1 (Dist. Exh. 9).
MOTHER states that she moved with STUDENT to Hesperia in July 2003. The parties agree that STUDENT did not reside in VESD after July 2003. On April 29, 2004, the Petitioner filed the present request for a due process hearing. As the sole remedy for VESD’s refusal to provide special education services to STUDENT, MOTHER seeks reimbursement for private services obtained from April 21, 2003, through July 2003. There is no request for compensatory education. In this bifurcated portion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer will decide the residency issue.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Issue: Was STUDENT a resident of VESD from April 21, 2003, through July 2003? (
Each student who is subject to compulsory education shall attend the applicable public school of the district in which the residency of the parent is located. Cal. Educ. Code § 48200. (Footnote 9) Guidance on the definition of residencey is found in the California Government Code, section 244, which states:
“In determining the place of residence the following rules shall be observed: (a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he or she returns in seasons of repose. (b) There can be only one residence.
(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
(d) The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried minor child maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such unmarried minor child. (e) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be changed by his or her own act. (f) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent. . .”
The Petitioner’s mother, MOTHER, asserts that she rented the premises at ADDRESS #1 from LANDLORD and resided there from on or about March 25, 2003, until July 2003. The Petitioner’s chief evidence concerning residence at ADDRESS #1 consists of a rental agreement, utility-company documentation, and testimony by MOTHER, LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER, and LANDLORD. The District asserts that MOTHER and STUDENT did not reside at the ADDRESS #1 address during the period at issue. The District also asserts that the copies the rental agreement and utility documents offered into evidence by the Petitioner as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 are not authentic. The above assertions will now be examined.
The rental agreement (Pet. Exh. 1) states on the first line that it was “entered into on this 1st day of March, 2003.” The agreement states that tenancy would commence on March 15, 2003, and it states that all utilities would be paid by the “Lessor.” The document expressly states that LANDLORD is the Lessor. Signatures for LANDLORD, MOTHER, and WITNESS as a witness, are on the last page. The signatures are not dated. Although the rental agreement appears clear and unambiguous on its face, the above-listed provisions and signatures are inconsistent with other evidence.
The first inconsistency arises from the date of the agreement. The agreement states that it was entered into on March 1, 2003, and that tenancy would commence on March 15. Meanwhile, the March 4, 2003 IEP amendment (Pet. Exh. 16) proposed by TUSD, along with the contents of the March 12, 2003 withdrawal letter from MOTHER to TUSD’s special education director, show that MOTHER was actively engaged with TUSD during the first few days of March in attempting to agree upon an educational program for STUDENT at TUSD. Nothing in the March 4 proposed IEP amendment or the March 12 withdrawal letter suggests that MOTHER intended to move out of the TUSD boundaries. To the contrary, MOTHER’s March 12 letter states that MOTHER and TUSD had, eight days earlier, discussed a March 10, 2003 “start” date for STUDENT’s program. Thus, the content of MOTHER’s communications with TUSD during the first few days of March 2003 is inconsistent with MOTHER’s having purportedly committed herself as early as March 1 to lease a residence within the boundaries of VESD.
MOTHER testified that the rental agreement was not entered into on March 1, 2003. Instead, she testified that the rental agreement was signed either between early-to-mid March or on-or-about March 20. However, that assertion raises questions as to why MOTHER, if she had executed the lease early in March, would have waited until March 28 before attempting to enroll STUDENT in VESD, and why MOTHER, if she had executed the lease after March 15, would have made the commencement of her rental obligations retroactive to March 15.
Next, Liberty principal Ailene Cammon testified that MOTHER came to Liberty on March 25, 2004, and requested a transfer into VUSD. Ms. Cammon testified that, due to space limitations, MOTHER was told that transfers for nonresidents into VUSD were not being accepted. If the testimony of Ms. Cammon is correct, one would have to doubt that the March 1, 2003 lease agreement, signed no later than March 20 according to MOTHER, actually existed on March 25. If the lease existed on March 25, MOTHER would not have had to request an interdistrict transfer. Instead, she could have requested enrollment as a resident.
When testifying, MOTHER acknowledged that she made inquiries at Liberty or VESD about two days prior to March 28. She denied having made a written request for an interdistrict transfer on March 25, but she was vague in attempting to describe what inquiries she did make at Liberty or VESD prior to March 28, and she offered no explanation as to why she waited thirteen days after the March 15 effective date of the lease agreement before seeking to enroll STUDENT into VESD. The Hearing Officer considers those matters to be more troublesome than Ms. Cammon’s confusion about the date that she reviewed the April 21 enrollment application. Discrepancies in Ms. Cammon’s testimony concerning whether she reviewed the enrollment application on March 28 or April 21 have no effect upon the presence of the entries on the application that caused Ms. Cammons to doubt whether MOTHER resided on ADDRESS #1.
The rental agreement has signatures for MOTHER, LANDLORD, and, as a witness, WITNESS. LANDLORD testified that the signature for LANDLORD on the rental agreement was, in fact, her own signature. However, the signature for LANDLORD on the rental agreement bears, in the opinion of the Hearing Officer, a doubtful resemblance to what is purported to be the notarized signature of LANDLORD on a letter written by MOTHER and submitted by the Petitioner as Exhibit 14. (Footnote 10) Moreover, MOTHER and LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER testified that the person who witnessed the signature, WITNESS, was a friend of LANDLORD. However, LANDLORD testified that she did not recognize the name WITNESS. MOTHER offered the explanation that LANDLORD knew WITNESS by a different name, but LANDLORD testified that the only people present in her home when the lease was signed were herself, her husband, MOTHER, and possibly LANDLORD’ daughter, LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER.
The rental agreement specified that utilities would be paid in their entirety by LANDLORD. According to MOTHER, LANDLORD, and LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER, the agreement was orally amended several days or weeks after its inception because the utility bills were higher than anticipated. LANDLORD and MOTHER also testified that to resolve the problem of the higher utility costs, they asked Southern California Edison to issue the bills listed jointly in their names.
With regard to the utility company documents, MOTHER testified that on April 21, 2003, in addition to completing the enrollment application, she submitted the March 1 rental agreement and two documents dated April 14 and April 15, 2003, from Southern California Edision verifying her utility service at ADDRESS #1 (Pet. Exh. 1, 2, and 3). Ms. Cammons testified that neither the District nor Liberty ever received the rental agreement or the April 14 and April 15 utility documents. The original documents were not offered into evidence. MOTHER testified that in or about June 2003, Ms. Cammons informed her that Liberty had mistakenly shredded the rental agreement and utility documents delivered on April 21. No other utility bills purporting to be for ADDRESS #1 were offered into evidence.
MOTHER testified that she paid about $100.00 each month to LANDLORD for her share of the utilities. LANDLORD testifed that the bills were no higher than $200.00 each month. She stated that the bills were never as low as $50.00 per month, but in the summer they were about $150.00 to $175.00 per month. However, the bill for the period from April 21 to May 20, 2003 (Dist. Exh. 9), shows a total charge of $51.06. On cross examination, when confronted with this discrepancy, MOTHER testified that she paid extra money to LANDLORD each month for utilities, raising her contribution to about $100.00 each month, because she wanted to be nice to LANDLORD.
LANDLORD testified that she was certain that each utility bill had her name on it and MOTHER’s name on it. However, all of the Southern California Edison documents offered into evidence show only the name “MOTHER” as the customer. MOTHER testified she had contacted the utility company in an effort to have both names appear on the billing, but to no avail.
In addition to the above-noted discrepancies between testimony and documentary evidence concerning the names on documents and the amounts billed, the three documents purporting to be from Southern California Edison show no nexus in their account numbers. The April 14, 2003 service confirmation letter from Southern California Edison to MOTHER references “Account Number ACCOUNT #1" (Pet. Exh. 2). The April 15, 2003 “Request to Pay Deposit” references “Your Deposit Account Number ACCOUNT #2" and, on the pay stub, “Your Customer Account # ACCOUNT #2" (Pet. Exh. 3). The May 21, 2003 billing statement references “Your Customer Account Number ACCOUNT #3" and “Service Account ACCOUNT #4" (Dist. Exh. 9). From document to document, none of those numbers match.
Finally, with regard to whether the rental agreement and utility company documents were authentic, the Hearing Officer notes that extensive written correspondence concerning District proof-of-residence policies and each party’s respective position was exchanged by the parties from April 24, 2003, throughout May 2003 (Pet. Exhs. 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 28; Dist. Exh. 6). None of that correspondence, either by MOTHER or by the District, contains a definitive assertion or acknowledgment that a rental agreement and/or utility documentation had been delivered to the District by MOTHER on April 21, 2003, or at any time thereafter. Moreover, the compliance investigation report, issued on July 28, 2003, states that in her letter of complaint, MOTHER referenced leaving a rental agreement and utility bill at the District on April 21, 2003. However, the report does not indicate whether copies of those documents were provided to the compliance investigator. (Footnote 11)
Thus, although all of the above correspondence from April 24 through May 2003 was intended to address the ongoing residency dispute, none of that correspondence contains references that would verify existence of the rental agreement and April 14 and 15 utility documents at some time prior to the end of July 2003. No document by the District at any time acknowledges the existence of the above-described rental agreement or the April 14 and 15 utility documents.
With respect to testimony concerning whether MOTHER and STUDENT ever resided at ADDRESS #1, LANDLORD and LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER both testified that MOTHER and STUDENT resided there from March 15, 2003 until July 2003. On the basis of an investigation by District probation officer Ms. Castro, the District asserts that MOTHER, LANDLORD, and LANDLORD’S DAUGHTER did not testify truthfully.
Ms. Cammons testified that in an attempt to resolve her own concerns regarding proof of residency, she had sent Ms. Castro to the residence at ADDRESS #1 on May 7, 2003. At the time of hearing, Ms. Castro reportedly was hospitalized and unavailable to testify. Ms. Cammons testified concerning Ms. Castro’s oral report to her. Ms. Castro allegedly reported that she had met with and spoke to LANDLORD and LANDLORD had stated that she knew STUDENT and MOTHER but they did not live at her house.
LANDLORD testified that she told Ms. Castro that STUDENT and MOTHER did live with her. MOTHER asserts that due to LANDLORD’s limited ability to speak English, with her native language being Spanish, LANDLORD must have been confused by Ms. Castro’s questions in English. Pursuant to MOTHER’ request, Ms. Cammons had asked Ms. Castro if there was any misunderstanding. (Footnote 12) According to Ms. Cammons, Ms. Castro, who is fluent in both English and Spanish, was emphatic at stating there had been no misunderstanding.
In summary, the Petitioner’s evidence concerning residency is replete with discrepancies. As described above, those discrepancies include: (a) inconsistencies between the date of the rental agreement and MOTHER’s communications with TUSD and VESD in March 2003; (b) the listing of a Hesperia address as MOTHER’s mailing address on April 21; (c) the absence of any specific mention in written correspondence between MOTHER and VESD from April 24 through May 2003 that MOTHER had submitted a rental agreement or the April 14 and 15 utility documents to VESD; (d) the findings by the compliance investigator that make no mention of the investigator having received the rental agreement or the April 14 and 15 utility documents; (e) the Petitioner’s failure to produce original lease or utility documents or offer production of original documents even after the authenticity of the copies had been challenged at hearing; (f) the lack of a commonality between account numbers on the three utility documents presented by MOTHER; (g) the testimony about the amount of the utility bills and the names on the utility documents being inconsistent with what is stated on those documents; and (h) the questionable signature of LANDLORD on the rental agreement and LANDLORD’s failure to recognize or recall the purported witness to her signature.
Finally, the Hearing Officer notes that on a May 8, 2003 letter to the Templeton Unified School District concerning the educational program of her daughter (not STUDENT), MOTHER lists her address as being on ADDRESS #2 in Templeton, California (Dist. Exh. 14). Thus, regardless of which district MOTHER actually resided in during the period at issue, she diminished her credibility by simultaneously representing herself to TUSD as being a resident of TUSD and to VESD and as being a resident of VESD. (Footnote 13)
On the basis of the above, the Hearing Officer finds by the weight of the evidence that STUDENT was not a resident of VESD during the period at issue. Thus, VESD had no obligation to provide educational services to STUDENT. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s placement and reimbursement issues raised in the other portion of this bifurcated matter, Case No. SN04-01001(b), are now rendered moot, and those issues and Case No. SN04-01001(b) are dismissed.
ORDERS
1. All of the Petitioner’s requests for relief in Case No. SN04-01001(a) are denied.
2. All of the Petitioner’s issues raised in Case No. and SN04-01001(b) are dismissed, and Case No. SN04-01001(b) is dismissed in its entirety.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
The hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d). The District prevailed on the residency issue. All other issues were rendered moot and dismissed.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Dated: December 3, 2004 ____________________________________ Vincent L. Pastorino, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. Mr. McMenamin’s testimony was received via a telephone conference call.
2. The proposed amendment references a prior IEP dated March 20, 2002. It is unknown whether either of STUDENT’s parents had signed his or her consent to the March 20, 2002 IEP.
3. MOTHER testified that she made some “inquiries” at Liberty or VESD about two days prior to March 28, but that she never submitted a form for an interdistrict transfer.
4. The form bears a signature date of March 28, 2003.
5. The rental agreement states that MOTHER’s tenancy on ADDRESS #1 was to commence on March 15, 2003.
6. Ms. Cammon’s version of the events on March 28, 2003, is inconsistent with the fact that the registration form she allegedly reviewed on March 28 is actually dated April 21, 2003 (Dist. Exh. 4). The Liberty clerk who reportedly dealt with MOTHER on March 25 and March 28, 2003, was not called to testify.
7. The compliance investigation report was issued on July 28, 2003.
8. According to MOTHER, spring break at VESD commenced on or about March 29, 2003, and school did not resume until April 21. Thus, MOTHER seeks no reimbursement for private services obtained before April 21, 2003.
9. Children with disabilities have the right to a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “FAPE” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform with the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).
10. As described in the District’s closing brief, the signatures show notable differences in letter spacing and formation, while showing few, if any, similarities.
11. The report references a District assertion that it had “contacted her [MOTHER] utility company” and it was revealed by the utility company that some person other than MOTHER was listed as the resident of the ADDRESS #1 address. That particular assertion by the District may have been in reference to the bill faxed to the District by MOTHER on June 12, 2003 (Dist. Exh. 9).
12. The Hearing Officer noticed no such impairments in LANDLORD’s ability to understand English when LANDLORD testified at the hearing.
13. The law allows only one legal residence. Cal. Gov’t Code § 244(b).
