California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 3, 2004
Student v. Vacaville Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1026A-04, SN04-01026 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu
Vacaville Unified wins bifurcated ruling barring a student's special education claims from before May 3, 2001.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Bifurcated ruling on statute of limitations only. The decision states the hearing on the remaining issues (May 3, 2001 to present) would proceed on November 4, 2004.
Summary
A 14-year-old student who is now eligible for special education under specific learning disability filed for due process against Vacaville Unified School District on May 3, 2004. He had first qualified in second grade in February 1998 because of a language impairment. The District exited him from special education in September 2001 and found him eligible again in March 2004. His claims about assessments, eligibility category, programs, qualified staff, and progress reporting reached back to December 1998. The parties agreed to split the case so the statute of limitations question could be decided first.
The student argued that the three-year limitations period did not start until about June 2003. He said his family relied on District assurances that he was progressing and did not suspect a problem until they obtained independent evaluations in 2003. Hearing Officer Van T. Vu disagreed. The parties agreed that the mother attended every IEP meeting and received the procedural safeguards, which explained her right to request a hearing. She also repeatedly raised concerns about his reading, and the IEPs recorded those concerns. Relying on Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, the Hearing Officer found she knew or had reason to know the facts behind the claims as they arose. Relying only on the District's assurances was not reasonable, so the deadline was not extended. All claims arising before May 3, 2001 were barred. The remaining claims were set for hearing on November 4, 2004.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO applied the three-year limitations period in Education Code section 56505(j). A parent who attended IEP meetings, received procedural safeguards, and voiced ongoing concerns was found to know the facts behind her claims. District assurances that the student was progressing did not extend the deadline.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 1. Are STUDENT's claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, barred by the statute of limitations?
Mother knew or had reason to know the facts underlying the claims as they arose (she attended all IEP meetings, received procedural safeguards, and repeatedly raised reading concerns), so the three-year limitations period under Education Code section 56505(j) was not tolled and all claims before May 3, 2001 are barred.
- BarredAssessment
Issue I.a. Did the District deny a FAPE from December 1998 through the end of the 1998-1999 school year and ESY by failing to appropriately assess him?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredEligibility
Issue I.b. Did the District deny a FAPE from December 1998 through the 1998-1999 school year and ESY by inappropriately classifying him as eligible as speech and language impaired rather than specific learning disabled?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue I.c. Did the District deny a FAPE from December 1998 through the 1998-1999 school year and ESY by failing to provide an appropriate educational program?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue I.d. Did the District deny a FAPE from December 1998 through the 1998-1999 school year and ESY by failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredAssessment
Issue II.a. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and ESY by failing to appropriately assess him?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue II.b. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and ESY by failing to provide him an appropriate educational program?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue II.c. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and ESY by failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need?
Time-barred as arising before May 3, 2001.
- BarredAssessment
Issue III.a. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and ESY by failing to appropriately assess him?
Time-barred to the extent the claims arose before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue III.b. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and ESY by failing to provide him an appropriate educational program?
Time-barred to the extent the claims arose before May 3, 2001.
- BarredFAPE: services offered
Issue III.c. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and ESY by failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need?
Time-barred to the extent the claims arose before May 3, 2001.
- BarredIEP procedure
Issue III.d. Did the District deny a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and ESY by failing to accurately report his educational progress?
Time-barred to the extent the claims arose before May 3, 2001.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- The District's request to bar all of Petitioner's claims arising before May 3, 2001 was granted. Remaining issues (May 3, 2001 to present) set for hearing on November 4, 2004.
Key authorities
Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1987); Education Code section 56505(j)
People named in the decision
- Lynda Donahue, director of special education, Vacaville Unified School District
- Allan Loyd-Jones, special education coordinator, Vacaville Unified School District
- Valerie Rogers, former principal, Sierra Elementary School; District witness, Vacaville Unified School District
- Toni Shaffer, school psychologist; District witness, Vacaville Unified School District
- Gayle Korn, resource specialist teacher; District witness, Vacaville Unified School District
- Pamela Kennedy Hunt, school psychologist; District witness, Vacaville Unified School District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Vacaville, California, on October 21, 2004.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Lina Foltz and by his parents, PARENTS. Respondent Vacaville Unified School District (Respondent or District) was represented by attorneys Jack Clarke and Jennifer Brown. Also present on the District’s behalf were Lynda Donahue, director of special education, and Allan Loyd-Jones, special education coordinator.
The Petitioner called his mother to testify on his behalf. The District called the following witnesses to testify: Valerie Rogers, former principal of Sierra Elementary School; Toni Shaffer, school psychologist; Gayle Korn, resource specialist teacher; and Pamela Kennedy Hunt, school psychologist.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties’ written closing briefs were received by the Hearing Officer on October 27, 2004. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUE
Are STUDENT’s claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, barred by the statute of limitations?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fourteen-year-old student who is currently eligible for special education and related services as a student with a specific learning disability.
STUDENT was first found eligible for special education services due to a language impairment in February 1998, while he was in the second grade. Subsequently, STUDENT’s IEP team convened in April 1998, December 1998, April 1999, February 2000, and April 2000. (Footnote 1) STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, consented to all of the IEPs developed at those meetings. In April 2001, STUDENT’s IEP team convened again and the District members of his IEP team determined that he was no longer eligible for special education services. Because MOTHER refused consent to the IEP, STUDENTcontinued to receive special education and related services for the rest of the 2000-2001 school year. Then, in September 2001, STUDENT’s IEP team convened again and the District again recommended that STUDENTbe exited from special education. Despite her concerns about STUDENT’s difficulties with reading, MOTHER consented to the September 2001 IEP. Although the September 2001 IEP exited from STUDENT from special education, the IEP team agreed that STUDENT would continue to receive special education services as he transitioned to general education. In March 2004, STUDENT was again found eligible for special education, but as a child with a specific learning disability.
On May 3, 2004, STUDENT’s parents submitted to the Hearing Office a request for a due process hearing. The Petitioner alleged in his request that the District had denied him a free appropriate public education (FAPE) “for the past three years and prior to that.” Without setting forth the actual time periods at issue, the Petitioner contended that the District failed to appropriately assess him, failed to develop appropriate IEPs for him, and failed to convene procedurally appropriate IEP meetings. Upon receipt of the request, the Hearing Office assigned the instant matter case number SN04-01026 and scheduled the case to begin hearing on May 27, 2004. After the case was taken off calendar to enable the parties to pursue mediation, the parties mutually agreed to reschedule the hearing to October 21, 2004.
On October 11, 2004, the Hearing Office received from the Petitioner a statement of issues for hearing. In the issue statement, the Petitioner contended that his family did not know or have reason to know that the District denied him a FAPE until June 2003. Thus, the Petitioner asserted that the three-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until then and that he should be able to raise issues arising from May 1999 to the present. Accordingly, for the time period from May 1999 through the 2004-2005 school year, the Petitioner generally raised issues pertaining to assessments and procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
The next day, the Hearing Office received from the District its statement of issues, along with an objection to the Petitioner’s statement of issues. The District’s issues included whether it offered or provided STUDENT a FAPE from March 2001 through the 2004-2005 school year. Additionally, the District asserted that STUDENT’s parents knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying his claims since May 1999 and, therefore, any issues arising prior to the three-year statute of limitations should be barred.
Then, on October 13, 2004, the District submitted to the Hearing Office a motion to bifurcate the issues for hearing, a request for a continuance, and a request for a prehearing conference. Specifically, the District requested that the statute of limitations issue be bifurcated from all of the remaining issues pertaining to the District’s offer or provision of a FAPE to STUDENT. Additionally, the District requested that the statute of limitations issue be heard at the hearing already scheduled for October 21, 2004, and that the remaining issues be continued to a date after the ruling on the statute of limitations issue. Moreover, the District requested that a prehearing conference be held to clarify the Petitioner’s issues.
A prehearing telephone conference was held on October 18, 2004, before this Hearing Officer, attorney Lina Foltz on behalf of the Petitioner, and attorney Jack Clarke on behalf of the District. Upon questioning by the Hearing Officer, the Petitioner clarified that his issues for hearing related back to the time period from May 1, 1999, through the present. Through discussions with the parties and the Hearing Officer, the Petitioner also clarified in detail the issues and proposed resolutions for hearing. On October 19, 2004, the Petitioner submitted to the Hearing Office a written nonopposition to the District’s motions to bifurcate and continue. On October 20, 2004, the Hearing Office issued a Prehearing Conference Order setting forth the Petitioner’s issues as discussed by the parties. The Hearing Office also issued an order granting the District’s motion to bifurcate and granting the District’s request to continue the remaining issues until resolution of the statute of limitations issue.
The hearing regarding the statute of limitations issue convened on October 21, 2004, as scheduled. At the beginning of the hearing, referencing the Prehearing Conference Order, the Petitioner clarified further, and added to, his issues for hearing. Most significantly, the Petitioner sought to expand his issues to the timeframe beginning December 1998, rather than May 1999. As clarified at hearing, the Petitioner’s issues pertaining to the time period prior to May 3, 2001, are as follows:
I. Did the Vacaville Unified School District (District) deny Petitioner STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from December 1998, through the end of the 1998-1999 school year and extended school year by: a. failing to appropriately assess him;
b. inappropriately classifying him as eligible as speech and language impaired rather than specific learning disabled; c. failing to provide an appropriate educational program; and d. failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need?
II. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and extended school year by: a. failing to appropriately assess him;
b. failing to provide him an appropriate educational program; and c. failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need?
III. Did District deny Petitioner a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and extended school year by: a. failing to appropriately assess him;
b. failing to provide him an appropriate educational program;
c. failing to provide qualified staff to instruct him in his areas of need; and d. failing to accurately report his educational progress?
Finally, prior to the presentation of their evidence pertaining to the statute of limitations issue, the parties made the following stipulations:
1. STUDENT’s parents attended the IEP meetings in February 1998, April 1998, December 1998, April 1999, February 2000, April 2000, April 2001, and September 2001;
2. STUDENT’s parents received from the District, at the IEP meetings, the procedural rights operative at the time, which included instruction that they could request a due process hearing to resolve disputes with the District; and
3. The IEPs proffered by the District at Exhibits 7 through 16 fall within the hearsay exception as public records documents.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Are STUDENT’s claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, barred by the statute of limitations?
As described above, the Hearing Office received Petitioner’s request for a special education due process hearing on May 3, 2004. If a three-year statute of limitations were to apply, all claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, would be barred. As clarified during the prehearing conference and at hearing, the student raised claims from December 1998.
The Petitioner contends that he did not know or have reason to know of the facts underlying his claims until approximately June 2003 and, therefore, the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until then and he should be allowed to raise issues relating back to December 1998. The Petitioner essentially claims that his parents were told at IEP meetings that he was making progress and that his educational programs were appropriate. According to the Petitioner, his parents “did not suspect or have reason to suspect STUDENT’s injury” until they obtained independent evaluations in 2003. The District objects to the Petitioner’s raising claims prior to May 3, 2001, and it asserts that the Petitioner’s parents had knowledge of the facts underlying his claim, which would have caused the statute of limitations to run. In short, the District contends that those issues are barred by the statute of limitations. With respect to the parties’ dispute, the Hearing Officer turns to the question of whether the Petitioner’s parents had the requisite knowledge of the facts underlying his claims to trigger the statute of limitations to run.
Pursuant to Education Code section 56505(j), any request for a due process hearing “shall be filed within three years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request.” Prior to the provision going into effect on January 1, 1999, the three-year statute of limitations for actions arising under the IDEA was adopted by the courts. In Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, a student requested an administrative hearing in 1985 to address issues relating to the school district’s alleged failure to provide an appropriate education in 1979, some six years earlier. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal of the hearing officer’s denial of the student’s claims, the Alexopulos court found that all claims under the IDEA were time-barred. The court stated that:
Congress’ desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child's representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred.
Id. at p. 556. The Court concluded that any cause of action that Ms. Alexopulos may have had would have accrued in 1979 when she “knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying it.”
In this case, there is no dispute that STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, knew that STUDENT was eligible for special education services beginning in 1998, that he was assessed on numerous occasions by the District, and that he received special education services from the District pursuant to IEPs. The parties also do not dispute that STUDENT was identified as early as February 1998 as having reading difficulties and that those reading difficulties were an area of concern for MOTHER throughout the time period at issue. Additionally, there is no dispute that MOTHER attended all of STUDENT’s IEP meetings prior to September 2001, that she received copies of all of STUDENT’s IEPs, and that she received copies of the procedural safeguards operative at the time, which included information regarding her right to request a due process hearing to resolve disputes with the District over STUDENT’s education. Moreover, MOTHER testified that she had knowledge of who STUDENT’s service providers and teachers were and that she met many of them when they attended STUDENT’s IEP meetings. MOTHER also testified that she expressed her concerns regarding STUDENT’s educational progress, particularly in the area of reading, during many of the IEP meetings and that she was never prohibited from participating in those meetings as a member of the IEP team. From these facts, the Hearing Officer concludes that MOTHER was actively involved in the development and review of STUDENT’s special education program and that she had knowledge of sufficient facts underlying her current claims to cause the statute of limitations to run. Most significantly, she knew that the District was responsible for assessing STUDENT and for providing him with special education services, that STUDENT was in fact receiving some special education services, and that reading continued be an area of difficulty for STUDENT despite the services he was provided.
In light of MOTHER’s actual knowledge of all of the above facts and her ongoing exercise of her procedural rights by attending IEP meetings and participating in the development of STUDENT’s educational program, the Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive the Petitioner’s contention that MOTHER did not possess the requisite facts to trigger the statute of limitations. As noted above, the Petitioner contends that his family could not have suspected that STUDENT suffered his alleged injuries because they were told at IEP meetings that he was making progress and that his educational programs were appropriate to meet his needs. Although the District may have made those assurances to MOTHER, she nevertheless testified that she repeatedly raised concerns about STUDENT’s progress to the IEP team. This fact is supported by STUDENT’s IEP documents, which memorialized MOTHER’s concerns, and the uncontested testimony of the District’s witnesses at hearing.
As discussed above, the purpose of the statute of limitations is to require parents to actively and contemporaneously pursue claims on behalf of their disabled children, which would require due diligence in investigating their concerns. Given that MOTHER had continuing concerns about STUDENT’s education, the mere act of investigating her concerns through an attorney or independent educational expert would have uncovered the information the Petitioner now relies on for his claims. However, she did not do so. The Petitioner’s reliance solely on assurances made by the District, the party who may be responsible for the injuries, is not reasonable under these circumstances. Hence, the Hearing Officer finds that the statute of limitations cannot be tolled in this case for that reason.
In conclusion, because MOTHER knew of or had reason to know of the facts underlying the Petitioner’s claims as they arose, all claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, are time-barred. The hearing will proceed on November 4, 2004, as scheduled to address the remaining issues pertaining to May 3, 2001, through the present.
ORDER
The District’s request to bar all of the Petitioner’s claims arising prior to May 3, 2001, is granted.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code section 5607(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: The District prevailed on the issue decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Date: November 3, 2004 Van T. Vu, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office
STUDENT’s IEP team convened twice in April 1999, i.e., on April 14 and 28, 1999.
