California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 9, 1998
Student v. Cupertino Union School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 1123-97, SN 1144-97 · Hearing Officer Glenn A. Fait
Cupertino Union's special day class offer for a 7-year-old with a learning disability upheld; all family claims denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
Both sides filed for due process after Cupertino Union School District and a 7-year-old girl's family could not agree on her first IEP. She qualified for special education with a specific learning disability in visual processing and attention, and she had an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnosis. Her parents placed her in a private learning-assistance kindergarten at Los Altos Christian School. Later they kept her out of school for part of the 1997-98 year.
The family's advocate argued that the District should have assessed the girl in spring 1996. The Hearing Officer found that a District resource specialist had offered an assessment and the mother did not ask for one. He also rejected four other procedural claims:
- the IEP team did not need a multicultural expert;
- the District's attorney could attend IEP meetings;
- the District did not have to keep holding IEP meetings after it filed for hearing;
- the District gave adequate notice of placement options.
He found the District's December 1997 IEP appropriate. It offered a special day class using multisensory teaching, weekly occupational therapy, and 25 percent of the day in general education. The goals did not have to be broken into nine-week segments. The special day class at Meyerholz Elementary was the least restrictive appropriate placement. He denied reimbursement for the private school and for independent assessments. The District prevailed on all issues, and the student was ordered placed in the District's class.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO handled a parent's informal call to district staff for child find purposes. It also held that an IEP offer stays admissible even if parts of it came out of mediation, while statements made during mediation do not. It also upheld a district's attorney attending IEP meetings.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedChild find
Issue 1A. Did the District fail to assess STUDENT during the Spring of 1996?
A District resource specialist offered to assess the student and the mother did not ask for an assessment. The parents had received written notice of their rights, so there was no child find violation.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1B. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by not having a multi-cultural education expert attend the IEP meeting?
No law requires a multicultural expert at IEP meetings. The school psychologist was trained to assess cultural and ethnic factors, and no such factors affected the student's program.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1C. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by having its attorney participate in some of the IEP meetings?
No law bars the district's attorney from IEP meetings. Under Education Code section 56341(c), the District could include a person with expertise in special education law and procedure.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1D. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to convene IEP meetings after they had filed for a due process hearing concerning STUDENT's program?
After several IEP meetings failed to produce agreement, the District properly requested a hearing under Education Code section 56346(b). It did not have to hold more IEP meetings while the hearing was pending.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1E. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to notify STUDENT's advocate of all appropriate placement options for STUDENT?
The District's April 11, 1997 letter met Education Code section 56506(d). It named three District programs and gave contacts for other public programs and for nonpublic schools.
- District prevailedIEP content
Issue 2. Was the District's proposed IEP appropriate for STUDENT?
The IEP had thorough present levels, individualized goals, special day class instruction, occupational therapy and 25% mainstreaming, so it met Rowley. Objectives did not have to be broken into nine-week segments.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue 3. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment?
Ms. Doughty's multisensory special day class at Meyerholz Elementary, with occupational therapy and 25% mainstreaming, matched the IEP and was the least restrictive appropriate placement.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for the cost of her placement in the Learning Assistance Department of the Los Altos Christian School?
Reimbursement was denied. The District offered to assess in 1996, the parents did not ask for an assessment or a placement, and the District later offered an appropriate placement.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 5. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for the cost of independent assessments?
Reimbursement was denied because the District offered to assess in 1996 and its own assessments were appropriate. No evidence of the assessments' cost was offered.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order that district's offer may be implemented. All of the student's claims for relief are denied. The student is to be placed in Ms. Doughty's special day class at Meyerholz Elementary under the District's proposed IEP.
Key authorities
Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982); School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985); 5 C.C.R. § 3086 (mediation confidentiality); Education Code §§ 56301, 56302, 56324, 56329, 56341(c), 56343(c), 56346(b), 56506(d); 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix C, Question 39
People named in the decision
- Ed Emling, Coordinator of Pupil Services, Cupertino Union School District
- Laurie Reynolds, District attorney; attended IEP meetings and testified as a witness, Cupertino Union School District
- Martha Buel-Scott, District attorney (first day of hearing), Cupertino Union School District
- Livia Imada, resource specialist; assessor, Cupertino Union School District
- Cathy Kalisvaart, resource specialist, Cupertino Union School District
- Patricia Rose, school psychologist; assessor, Cupertino Union School District
- Nancy Diederich, speech therapist; assessor, Cupertino Union School District
- Patricia Robinson, school nurse; assessor, Cupertino Union School District
- Louise Faulkner, occupational therapy assessor
- Ms. Doughty, special day class teacher, proposed placement, Meyerholz Elementary, Cupertino Union School District
- Jim Paul, Director of Pupil Services, Cupertino Union School District
- Susan Douglas, Coordinator of Pupil Services, Cupertino Union School District
- Danni Tsai, former Coordinator of Diversity/Multi-Cultural Education; witness for Student, Cupertino Union School District
- Ann Tracy-Carlson, Reverend; expert witness for Student on cultural and ethnic issues
- Narma Mayfield, expert witness for Student on cultural and ethnic issues
- Dr. Brummer, private pediatrician
- Donnie (Bonnie) Rose Geiger, private psychologist; independent assessor
- Los Altos Christian School (Learning Assistance Department), private school, unilateral placement
- Lindamood-Bell, private assessment provider
Get new OAH special education decisions by email
A weekly Monday-morning digest of new California OAH due process decisions, each with a short plain-English summary from Vanaman German LLP.
You'll get an email asking you to confirm. Unsubscribe anytime. Subscribing does not create an attorney-client relationship.Full text of the decision
Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
Case Number: SN 1123-97 Case Year: 1997 Petitioner: STUDENT (CONSOLIDATED WITH SN 1144-97)
Issue: Assessment Individual Education Program Non Public School Placement CDS Code: 43-69419 District: Cupertino Union Disability Type: Specific Learning Disability
Case Details This matter was heard January 15 and 16, 1998 and February 4, 5, and 6, 1998, before Glenn A. Fait, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Cupertino, California.
STUDENT was represented by R.A. Drew. Also appearing on behalf of STUDENT was her mother, MOTHER. Cupertino Union School District (District) was represented by attorney Laurie Reynolds and, for the first day, by attorney Martha Buel-Scott. Also appearing on behalf of the District was Ed Emling, coordinator of Pupil Services.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. Written closing arguments were to be postmarked on or before February 20, 1998. On February 25, 1998, the record was closed, and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the District comply with required procedures in the formulation of STUDENT's Individualized Educational Program (IEP)?
2. Was the District's proposed IEP appropriate for STUDENT?
3. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment?
4. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for the cost of her placement in the Learning - Assistance Department of the Los Altos Christian School?
5. Should the District reimburse STUDENT's parents for the cost of independent assessments?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Objections to Matters Related to Mediation
During the hearing, a dispute arose concerning the admissibility of evidence that was used in, or originated during, mediation meetings in this case.
Emergency regulations adopted by the State board of Education in May 1997 contain provision relating to the use of information arising from a mediation. Title 5, California Code of Regulations, Section 3086, provides in part:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a communication made in mediation is protected to the following extent:
(1) Anything said, any admission made, and any document prepared in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation under this article is a confidential communication, and a party to the mediation has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing the communication, whether in an adjudicative proceeding, civil action, or other proceeding. This subdivision does not limit the admissibility of evidence if all parties to the proceedings consent.
(2) No reference to mediation proceedings, the evidence produced, or any other aspect of the mediation may be made in an adjudicative proceeding or civil action, whether as affirmative evidence, by way of impeachment, or for any other purpose.
(3) No mediator or interpreter or other participants are competent to testify in a subsequent administrative or civil proceeding as to any statement, conduct, decision, or order occurring at, or in conjunction with, the mediation.
(c) Evidence otherwise admissible outside of mediation under this article is not inadmissible outside of mediation under this article or protected from disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in mediation under this article.
1. Admissibility of individualized education programs (Exhibits 21 and 34).
STUDENT's advocate objected to the admission of Exhibits 21 and 24 on the ground that they had been the subject of mediations in this case. Exhibit 21 includes a letter from the District to STUDENT's advocate forwarding the District's proposed IEP for STUDENT and the IEP itself. Exhibit 24 also includes a cover letter to STUDENT's advocate dated December 22, 1997, forwarding the District's IEP for STUDENT and the IEP itself.
A school district has an obligation to conduct IEP meetings in order to develop an appropriate individualized IEP for a student who is eligible for special education services. California Education Code Sections 56340-56346. The purpose of the IEP meeting is to develop an individualized education program for the student. IF a parent does not agree with the IEP proposed by the district and the district believes that the IEP is necessary to provide a free appropriate public education tot he pupil, the district must request a due process hearing. Education Code Section 56346(b). The due process hearing decision shall be binding on all parties. Section 56346(b) also provides that, prior to the hearing, the parties may attempt to reach resolution of the dispute by holding a mediation conference.
In this case, the parties could not reach agreement concerning STUDENT's IEP after a number of IEP meetings in April, June, and August 1997. After each meeting the District forwarded its proposed IEP asking for the parents' consent. When the parents did not consent, the District requested a hearing on September 11, 1997. After the hearing was requested, the parties both agreed to attempt to reach resolution of the dispute through a number of mediation meetings. Prior to the date the hearing was scheduled to begin in December 1997, the District forwarded to STUDENT's advocate its proposed IEP (Exhibit 21). On the first day of the hearing, on December 4, 1997, the parties agreed to return to mediation to again attempt to reach resolution. When that mediation failed, the District again forwarded its proposed IEP to STUDENT's Advocate (Exhibit 24).
The IEP's contained in Exhibits 21 and 24 were similar to the IEPs proposed by the District prior to requesting a hearing, but had some modifications. It is concluded from the evidence that some of those changes were at least in part a result of the mediation meetings.
The question is whether those modifications are admissible if they were partially a product of mediation meetings.
The District is required to formulate an IEP for each child eligible for special education. The mere fact that the terms of the IEP are the subject of discussions during a mediation does not mean that the district is precluded from including those terms in its proposed IEP. The IEP that the District is proposing is admissible outside the mediation and is not made inadmissible because it was introduced or used in a mediation meeting. Title 5, California Code of Regulations Section 3086(c). It would be contrary to special education law and common sense to bar a district from including in its IEP offer a provision needed to provide an appropriate program for the student just because that provision was discussed in a mediation meeting. Excluding such evidence would also undermine the purpose of mediation. Parties to special education disputes would be discouraged from using mediation if they are afraid to mention provisions they think belong in the child's IEP for fear that later the provisions could not be used in the IEP if the mediation failed.
It is also important to note that, by admitting Exhibits 21 and 24, the hearing officer is not admitting evidence concerning the parties positions or communications during the mediation concerning the matters contained in the Exhibits.
Therefore, it is the ruling of the Hearing Officer that Exhibits 21 and 24 were properly admitted during the due process hearing.
2. Was there evidence that the mediation meetings involved discussion of STUDENT's IEP admissible?
During the hearing, STUDENT's advocate called the District Attorney, Laurie Reynolds, as a witness.
She asked Ms. Reynolds a question concerning when the District had discussed STUDENT's IEP. In answer to the question, Ms. Reynolds indicated that STUDENT's IEP had been discussed during the mediation meetings. STUDENT's advocate then objected to the answer and asked that it be stricken from the record. She contended that it was a violation of mediation confidentiality to mention the fact that STUDENT's mediation had included discussion of STUDENT's IEP.
There are two reasons why this objection was overruled. First, Ms. Reynold's answer was in response to a question by STUDENT's advocate. To have withheld the fact that the mediation involved a discussion of STUDENT's IEP would have been misleading, because the purpose of the question appeared to be show that the District had not been willing to discuss STUDENT's IEP for a significant period of time.
Second, Ms. Reynolds' answer was merely a statement of the obvious. The hearing was requested to establish STUDENT's IEP. A mediation relating to the hearing request would naturally involve a discussion of the IEP. Almost all mediations of special education disputes involve discussions of IEPs.
3. Should evidence of what the mediator said during the mediation be admitted?
During her testimony, Ms. Reynolds stated that the mediator had advised the District to go to hearing. STUDENT's advocate objected to that statement and asked that it be stricken from the record.
Title 5, California Administrative Code, Section 3086(b) states that "anything said ... in the course of ... mediation under this article is a confidential communication .... Therefore, evidence concerning a statement by the mediator should not be admitted in a due process hearing.
The Hearing Officer sustained the objection and ordered the evidence stricken from the record.
Objections Related to Time Limits
The hearing in this matter was originally scheduled to last two days. At the conclusion of the second day, it was apparent that more time would be required to complete the hearing. The hearing officer asked each party to state what witnesses they expected to call and to estimate the time needed for each witness. Based on those estimates, the Hearing Officer scheduled the continued hearing for three additional days and advised that each party would have a total of eight hours to present its case. The eight hours was to include direct examination and cross examination of witnesses and any oral argument. The parties were also advised that cross-examination of a witness by a party could last no longer than the direct examination by the party calling the witness. The hearing officer also advised the parties that he would keep rack of the time and advise the parties of the time they had remaining. Each party had over two weeks to prepare for the continued hearing and to arrange their questioning to comply with the time limits.
During the continued hearing, the Hearing Officer interrupted the question of witnesses by ________'s advocate on two occasions. On the first occasion, the Hearing Officer interrupted the cross-examination of the District's witness, Livia Imada, a resource specialist. The cross- examination of the witness by STUDENT's advocate had lasted significantly longer than the direct examination by the District. STUDENT's advocate was advised that she could recall Ms. Imada as her witness later in the hearing if she wished and time permitted. STUDENT's advocate did not request that Ms. Imada be recalled later in the hearing.
The Hearing Officer also interrupted STUDENT's advocates' direct examination of her witness, Danni Tsai, the former coordinator of the District's Diversity/ Multi-Cultural Education. The Hearing Officer stated that because the witness had no knowledge of STUDENT and because the advocate was close to running out of time, he wished to hear the complete testimony of STUDENT's mother before continuing to Ms. Tsai's testimony.
After STUDENT's mother had completed her testimony, STUDENT's advocate had used more than eight hours in the presentation of her cause during the continued hearing. The District had used approximately four hours of its allotted time for its case. The Hearing Officer then concluded the hearing.
STUDENT's advocate requested additional time to question Ms. Tsai. The Hearing Officer denied the request. The denial was based on three grounds. First, STUDENT's advocate had exceeded her allotted time. Second, the testimony of Ms. Tsai did not appear to be necessary or relevant to the issues in the case as will be more fully discussed later in this decision. Third,
STUDENT's advocate lacked the skill necessary to ask appropriate questions or to determine what was necessary or appropriate to establish her case. (Footnote 1)
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a seven-year-old girl who has specific learning disability and has been diagnosed with Attention Deficit-Hyperactive Disorder (ADHA). STUDENT lives with her parents and her older sister Natalie. Natalie was determined to be eligible for special education services within the at the end of 1993. Natalie attended school within the district from January 1994 to June 1995, during which time she received special education services.
During the time that Natalie was receiving special education services from the District, her parents attended a number of IEP meetings and received documents which explained their rights under federal and state special education law. Mrs. PARENT testified during the hearing that she could not remember reading those rights.
During her first five years, STUDENT attended the Future Assets Child Care Center of Cupertino. In March 1995, STUDENT was enrolled by her parents in the District's kindergarten class at Lincoln Elementary School, with enrollment to commence in the Fall of 1995.
Later, during the Spring of 1995, STUDENT's teacher at Future Assets told Mrs. PARENT that STUDENT was not ready for kindergarten. STUDENT was then enrolled by her parents in the Altos Oak Day Care Center for Pre-Kindergarten from September 1995 through August 1996.
In March 1996, STUDENT's parents again enrolled her in the Lincoln Elementary School to begin kindergarten during the 96-97 school year. Later in the Spring of 1996, STUDENT's teacher at the Oak Day Care Center expressed concern about STUDENT's readiness for kindergarten.
In the late Spring 1996, Mrs. PARENT contacted Cathy Kalisvaart concerning the problems she was having with STUDENT. Ms. Kalisvaart had been Natalie's resource specialist in the District. The actual contents of this conversation are in dispute.
Ms. PARENT claims that she told Ms. Kalisvaart of her problems that STUDENT was having in her pre- kindergarten and asked if it was possible to get testing for a child who was not in school, but lived in the neighborhood. Ms. PARENT claims that Ms. Kalisvaart said they were testing a lot of children this year in the First and Second Grades and had not even gotten to the kindergarten children yet. Ms. PARENT testified that after her conversation with Ms. Kalisvaart, she believed it would be years before STUDENT could be tested because of her non-student status.
Ms. Kalisvaart testified that during their conversation, Mrs. PARENT told her that STUDENT was a "handful" at home and that she was having difficulty controlling her. Ms. Kalisvaart testified that she offered to do an assessment and also told Mrs. PARENT that STUDENT should get a full physical exam by her doctor. She further testified that she referred Mrs. PARENT to the school psychologist, Patricia Rose, and even gave her Ms. Rose's phone number. Ms. Kalisvaart testified that ms. PARENT never asked for an assessment, even though one had been offered. She further testified that Ms. PARENT indicated she would call Ms. Rose.
The key facts at issue are whether Ms. Kalisvaart offered to assess STUDENT and whether ms. PARENT requested such an assessment.
Although it is probably impossible to know what exactly was said in a five-minute conversation that occurred nearly two years ago, the Hearing Officer concludes that the preponderance of evidence supports Ms. Kalisvaart's version of the conversation. During her testimony, Ms. Kalisvaart said that she had specific memory of the conversation and remembered offering to assess STUDENT and remembered that Mrs. PARENT did not request such an assessment. Ms. Kalisvaart further testified that not only does she have a present recollection of this conversation but she routinely offers to arrange an assessment when she is given information that a student is having problems like those mentioned by Ms. PARENT. Ms. Kalisvaart also stated that she had worked with Mrs. PARENT with regard to Natalie and believed that Mrs. PARENT knew she could request such an assessment.
Ms. PARENT's testimony is less persuasive. She does not really claim that ms. Kalisvaart refused to test STUDENT. Rather, she says that the conversation gave her the impression that the assessment would be greatly delayed. Mrs. PARENT also testified that she was confused about may of the events surrounding her contacts with the District. Her memory in relation to other events was quite weak. She could not remember which IEP meetings she had attended and was vague about other conversations and contacts she had with the District, even though those events were much more recent.
It is concluded that in the Spring of 1996, Ms. Kalisvaart did offer to assess STUDENT and that Ms. PARENT failed to request such an assessment.
Following the conversation between Mrs. PARENT and Ms. Kalisvaart, STUDENT was examined by her pediatrician, Dr. Brummer. Based upon his examination of STUDENT, he suspected that she had ADHD. He referred STUDENT to Donnie Rose Geiger, a private psychologist, for an assessment. Dr. Geiger performed the assessment on April 17 and 19 and May 3, 1996.
Dr. Geiger diagnosed STUDENT has having Attention Deficit Disorder, combined hyperactive-impulsive and inattentive type (DSM-IV 314.01). She also recommended further assessment because of perceived problems with fine motor control and processing visual-spatial information.
In September 1996, STUDENT's parents enrolled her in the kindergarten class in the Learning Assistance Department of the Los Altos Christian School.
In February 1997, STUDENT's parents retained the services of advocate R.A. Drew. They asked for a meeting with the District. On February 26, 1997, Jim Paul, director of Pupil Services for the District, and Susan Douglas, coordinator of Pupil Services, met with STUDENT's mother and her advocate. This meeting was brief and adversarial.
Sometime after the February 26 meeting, a mediator was brought in to assist the parties in resolving their differences. As a result of the mediation, STUDENT's parents agreed to let the District assess STUDENT.
On March 14, 1997, STUDENT's parents obtained a Lindamood-Bell assessment. The Preliminary Testing Summary of the assessment was provided to the District.
The District's assessments of STUDENT were conducted on March 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27 and April 4, 1997, at the Los Altos Christian School. Those performing the assessments were: Nancy Diederich, speech therapist; Patricia Rose, school psychologist; Livia Imada, resource specialist; and Patricia Robinson, school nurse. The assessment concluded that STUDENT was eligible for special education services because of "learning disabilities in the areas of visual processing and her attention."
The District scheduled an IEP meeting for April 9, 1997. On April 6, 1997, STUDENT's advocate, R.A. Drew, notified the District that the parents consented to the IEP meeting but that neither they nor their advocate would attend. Ms. Drew also requested that the District perform an occupational therapy (OT) assessment.
The District attempted to get personnel from Los Altos Christian School, including STUDENT's teacher, to attend IEP, but were informed that the parent's advocate had requested that they not attend.
The IEP meeting was conducted on April 9, 1997, without STUDENT's parents or advocate and without any personnel from the Los Altos School. An IEP was developed and sent to STUDENT's advocate. The IEP set forth a comprehensive description of her present levels of performance; established goals and objectives in the areas of reading, mathematics, and written language; and called for individual and small group instruction. The IEP recommended placement in a learning handicapped special day class using multisensory strategies. The IEP identified three special day classes in the District that the IEP team believed would be appropriate for STUDENT. The IEP also provided that an OT assessment would be performed. The IEP team postponed making recommendations concerning the amount of mainstreaming until a specific placement was established.
On April 13, 1997, STUDENT's advocate, Ms. Drew, wrote to the District that the IEP was not acceptable because all of the placement options were not listed and because the document was not "easily understood."
On May 7, 1997, the District made a formal offer of placement in any of three special day classes that had been mentioned in the proposed IEP.
On May 12, 1997, STUDENT's occupational assessment was performed by Louise Faulkner. The assessment stated that the "results of this evaluation reveals that STUDENT is very functional in most areas, but does exhibit a somewhat erratic profile indicating, perhaps, learned but as yet not internalized skills." Ms. Faulkner recommended short term therapy services to be reviewed in three to four months.
At the request of Ms. Drew, another IEP meeting was scheduled for June 5, 1997. Again, the parents were not present at the IEP meeting, but Ms. Drew did attend. The IEP meeting lasted over five hours, with little progress toward agreement on the appropriate program for STUDENT.
Another IEP meeting was scheduled for June 12, 1997, but was canceled by Ms. Drew because the District would only agree to meet for two hours on that day.
During the summer of 1997, Mr. Edward Emling was appointed Coordinator of Pupil Services. He scheduled another IEP meeting for August 22, 1997 to attempt to reach agreement on a program and placement for STUDENT for the new school year. The parties failed to reach resolution during that meeting.
On September 2, 1997, STUDENT's advocate, Ms. Drew, filed a request for a due process hearing.
On August 27, 1997, the District forwarded its proposed IEP to STUDENT's advocate. This IEP consisted of the information contained in the April IEP supplemented by results from the OT assessment and the Lindamood-Bell assessment. It also included OT goals and objectives. The proposed placements were reduced to special day classes at either Meyerholz Elementary or Lincoln Elementary. STUDENT was not enrolled by her parents in any school at the beginning of the 1997-98 school year. On September 11, 1997, the District filed a request for hearing to determine the appropriate program and placement for STUDENT. During the September and October, a number IEP meetings were conducted with the assistance of a mediator. On October 23, 1997, the District again forwarded its propose IEP to STUDENT's advocate. It is similar to the IEP of the August 27, 1997, but added a mainstreaming transition plan and proposed only once placement: the special day class at Meyerholz Elementary.
On the first day scheduled for hearing, December 4, 1997, the parties agreed to continue the hearing in order to engage in further mediation.
On December 22, 1997, the District again forwarded its proposed IEP to STUDENT's advocate. This IEP is nearly identical to the IEP of October 23 but includes minor modifications of the goals and objectives and provides for STUDENT to be mainstreamed 25 percent of the time. The District continued to recommend the special day class at Meyerholz Elementary as the appropriate placement.
On January 12, 1998, STUDENT was enrolled in a regular first grade class at Blue Hills Elementary School.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) as amended in 1997, children with disabilities are entitled to receive a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) with special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. 20 U.S.C. section 1401(8)(A-D) & 1401(25). A FAPE must be provided in conformity with the child's individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(8)(D). The IDEA provides a variety of specific procedures that must be followed in developing the IEP. 20 U.S.C. section 1414 & California Education Code Sections 56300 et. seq.
According to the United States Supreme Court in the Board of Education of Hudson Central Valley School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), 200-201 & 207-207, an IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The school district is not required to provide the best possible education, to maximize educational benefits, or to provide each disabled child with an equal educational opportunity "commensurate with the opportunities provided other children." The school district must only provide a "basic floor of opportunity." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-201. The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA.
1. Did the District comply with required procedures in the formulation of STUDENT's IEP?
STUDENT's advocate asserted that the District violated required procedures in a number of respects. Following is a discussion of those assertions that are worthy of analysis.
A. Did the District fail to assess STUDENT during the Spring of 1996?
STUDENT's advocate contends that District should have assessed STUDENT in the Spring of 1996.
Education Code sections 56300-563003 requires districts to systematically seek out and identify children with exceptional needs. Section 56301 requires districts to provide written notification to parents of their rights and procedures for initiating a referral for assessment.
Education code section 56302 provides:
Each district, special education local plan area, or county office shall provide for the identification and assessment of an individual's exceptional needs, and the planning of an instructional program to meet the assessed needs. Identification procedures shall include systematic methods of utilizing referrals of pupils from teachers, parents, agencies, appropriate professional persons, and from other members of the public. . . .
In this case, during the Spring of 1996, STUDENT's mother contacted Ms. Kalisvaart, a District resource specialist who had provided services to STUDENT's sister, Natalie. STUDENT's mother expressed concern about STUDENT. As concluded earlier in this decision, Ms. Kalisvaart offered to assess STUDENT and also suggested that STUDENT's mother contact the District psychologist. STUDENT's mother failed to request that STUDENT be assessed and did not contact the District psychologist.
The evidence establishes that STUDENT's mother had been provided written notice of her rights under special education law on a number of occasions in relation to Natalie's program. Those notifications of rights included notification of the right to initiate an assessment.
It is concluded that the District provided written notice to STUDENT's parents concerning her rights, and verbally offered to assess STUDENT. The reason STUDENT was not assessed in the Spring of 1996 was that STUDENT's mother did not request such an assessment.
B. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by not having an multi-cultural education expert attend the IEP meeting?
STUDENT's advocate contends that the law requires the District to provide multi-cultural education expert to participate in STUDENT's IEP meetings. She cites no authority in the law for such a requirement. She does cite Education Code section 56324, which states:
Any psychological assessment of pupils shall be made in accordance with Section 56320 and shall be conducted by a credentialed school psychologist who is trained and prepared to assess cultural and ethnic factors appropriate to the pupil being assessed.
In this case, STUDENT was assessed by school psychologist Patricia Rose. Ms. Rose testified that she had received training regarding the assessment of cultural and ethnic factors and was competent to make such an assessment. There was no evidence to the contrary. Ms. Rose testified that she was not aware of any cultural or ethnic factors concerning STUDENT that would effect her assessment or recommendations for STUDENT's program.
The only evidence of cultural or ethnic factors concerning STUDENT was her mother's testimony that STUDENT is one quarter Irish, one quarter Czechoslovakian, one quarter Pakistani and one quarter Mexican. (Ms. PARENT testified that STUDENT's primary language was English.) But there was no evidence to establish these factors were relevant to the appropriateness of the assessment or the findings and recommendations in the IEP.
STUDENT's advocate called two witnesses who purported to be experts in the field of cultural and ethnic issues; Reverend Ann Tracy-Carlson and Dr. Narma Mayfield. Both testified that they thought it was a good idea to have a specialist in cultural and ethnic factors participate in all IEP meetings for non-Caucasian students. But neither of those witnesses could point to any legal support for such a requirement and neither of them knew STUDENT or how such factors might effect her educational program. While this testimony may have been appropriate to present to Congress or the state legislature in an attempt to change the law, it has little value in a hearing where the hearing officer is bound to follow existing law.
STUDENT's advocate also called as a witness the District's former Coordinator of Diversity/Multi-
Cultural Education, Danni Tsai. She testified that she did not think that an expert in cultural and ethnic factors was necessary for IEP's for non-Caucasian students. Ms. Tsai also said that she was not an expert in special education and did not know STUDENT. She said she had only attended one IEP meeting, but merely as a translator.
There is no law that requires the attendance of a multi-cultural expert at the IEP meetings of non- Caucasian students. There was no evidence that STUDENT had any special need of such an expert in order to develop her individualized program. And even if there was a law requiring such ane expert, the evidence supported the fact that there were representatives from the District (Ms. Rose and Ms. Imada) who had training and expertise in the evaluation of ethnic and cultural factors. For these reasons, it is concluded that the District did not violate required procedures by not having a separate multi-cultural expert attend STUDENT's IEP meetings.
C. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by having its attorney participate in some of the IEP meetings?
STUDENT's advocate claims that the District violated STUDENT's rights by having its attorney, Ms. Reynolds, participate in the IEP meetings. The evidence does establish that Ms. Reynolds participated in some of STUDENT's IEP meetings.
There is no law that prohibits the District's attorney from participating in an IEP meeting. Education Code section 56341(c) provides that when appropriate the IEP team may include:
Other individuals, at the discretion of the parent, special education local plan area or county office who possess expertise or knowledge necessary for the development of the individualized education program.
Ms. Reynolds testified that she is an expert in special education law and procedure. STUDENT's advocate had been continually raising procedural objections to the IEP meeting and how it was conducted. It was quite appropriate for the District to ask its attorney, who is an expert concerning such procedures, to attend the IEP meetings. STUDENT's procedural rights were not violated by Ms. Reynolds attendance at the IEP meetings.
D. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to convene IEP meetings after they had filed for a due process hearing concerning STUDENT's program?
STUDENT's advocate argues that STUDENT's procedural rights were violated when the District refused to convene an IEP meeting after the District and STUDENT filed requests for a due process hearing to determine the appropriate program for STUDENT. (Footnote 2) The District contends that there had been a number of IEP meetings to determine a program for STUDENT and that because the meetings had not resulted in agreement, the matter was now to be decided by the hearing officer as provided by law.
Education Code section 56343(c) provides that there will be an IEP meeting when the parent or teacher "requests a meeting to develop, review, or revise the individual education program." Since there was no active IEP, there could be on request to review or revise the IEP. There had already been three IEP meetings to attempt to develop STUDENT's program, and those meetings had not resulted in agreement.
Education Code section 56346(b) provides that if the district determines that the part of the program to which the parent does not consent is necessary to provide a free and appropriate public education to the pupil, the District should request a hearing so that Hearing Officer can decide on the appropriate program.
In this case, when multiple IEP meetings to formulate STUDENT's IEP failed to develop an IEP agreeable to STUDENT's representative, the District filed for a due process hearing. The District continued to negotiate with STUDENT's representative through mediation, but to no avail. A review of the tape recordings of the June and August IEP meetings demonstrated that further meetings would likely be fruitless. The District followed the law and requested a due process hearing and it did not violate STUDENT's rights by refusing to conduct additional IEP's pending the outcome of the hearing.
E. Did the District violate STUDENT's procedural rights by failing to notify STUDENT's advocate of all appropriate placement options for STUDENT?
STUDENT's advocate claims that the District violated STUDENT's procedural rights when it failed to notify her of all appropriate placement options for STUDENT.
Education Code section 56506(d) provides that the parents of a disabled child has:
[t]he right to participate in the development of the individualized education program and to be informed of the availability under state and federal law of free appropriate public education and of all available alternative programs, both public and nonpublic.
This section does not mandate the method of providing information about all available alternative programs. There are literally hundreds, if not thousands, of programs in the state of California and in the Nation that could be an appropriate program for a disabled student.
In this case, in a letter dated April 11, 1997, the District informed STUDENT's representative of the three programs within the district that it thought were appropriate for STUDENT. In addition, the District gave the names and phone numbers of persons who had information about programs provided by others, including public programs within the Santa Clara County, public programs outside of Santa Clara County, and nonpublic school placements within the state.
This was an appropriate way to provide such information in light of the large number of possible programs. There is no evidence that STUDENT's advocate contacted the sources listed for further information. Therefore, the District gave the required notice of the availability of appropriate program replacements.
2. Was the District's proposed IEP appropriate for STUDENT?
STUDENT's advocate asserted during the hearing that the IEP proposed by the District was not appropriate, although her objections to the IEP were not clear.
Pursuant to the IDEA as interpreted by the Rowley decision, an IEP must be specifically designed to meet a child's individual needs and must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit.
The IEP proposed by the District for STUDENT contains a description of her current level of educational performance and sets forth goals and objectives specifically designed to meet her individual needs. The IEP also includes specific educational instruction and related services to be provided for STUDENT, including individual and small group instruction in reading, written expression and math, and placement in a special day class program using multisensory strategies. It also provides for occupational therapy once a week for 45 minutes, to be reviewed at the end of six months. The IEP also provides for 25 percent of STUDENT's day to be spent in general education and sets forth a mainstreaming transition plan.
All of the District's personnel who testified during the hearing and were familiar with the provisions of STUDENT's proposed IEP testified that the IEP was appropriate for STUDENT and would meet her needs and result in significant benefit for her.
STUDENT's advocate claimed that the IEP did not contain an adequate description of STUDENT's present levels of educational performance as required by Education Code Section 56345(a)(1). However, she did not provide any evidence to support her contention and was not clear about what she believed was missing. The most recent IEP that was sent by the District to STUDENT's advocate on December 22, 1997 contains seven pages of comprehensive discussion of STUDENT's present level of performance in the areas of cognitive skills, perceptual skills, social/ emotional skills, auditory perceptual skills, academics, functional listening skills, vocabulary, language processing, syntax, auditory processing, sound articulating and discrimination, Lindamood-Bell assessment, motor skills, visual perception/ visual motor integration, and handwriting.
The only witness called by STUDENT's advocate who was familiar with STUDENT's IEP who was not a District employee was STUDENT's mother. She said that she wanted the objectives to be broken down into nine week increments. However, all of the District's witnesses who were questioned on this matter said that attempting to break the objectives down into such short intervals would not be appropriate because it would be impossible to predict when the individual milestones would be met during the year. The teacher of the District's proposed placement, Ms. Doughty, did testify that STUDENT would receive quarterly reports on STUDENT's progress, but that it would not be appropriate to predict progress in meeting her goals and objectives on a quarterly basis.
In 34 C.F. R., Part 300, Appendix C, Question 39, the regulations attempt to distinguish between short-term objectives in an IEP document from objectives in an instructional plan. The regulations state that IEP objectives are projected over a longer period of time, "E.G. an entire school quarter or semester." This comment in the Appendix to the regulations did not mandate that objectives in an IEP project a student's progress over each quarter; rather, it serves to illustrate that IEP objectives are expected to be accomplished over a longer period of time than the objectives in an instructional plan.
The evidence supports the position of the District that STUDENT's short term objectives did not need to be broken into nine week increments, but were appropriate objectives using the full year as the period for accomplishing the objectives. Evaluation of how STUDENT was doing in relation to those objectives was to be provided each quarter.
Based on testimony of the witnesses and the review of the IEP itself, it is concluded that the District's proposed IEP was appropriate for STUDENT.
3. Has the District offered STUDENT an appropriate placement in the least restrictive environment?
The IDEA and the Rowley decision taken together require that an appropriate placement be designed to: (1) conform to the student's IEP, (2) meet the unique needs of the student, and (3) provide the student with educational benefit.
The District is proposing to place STUDENT in the special day class taught by ms. Doughty at the Meyerholtz Elementary School. The IEP calls for individual and small group instruction in reading, written expression and math. It calls for instruction using multisensory strategies. It also provides that STUDENT receive short-term occupational therapy services.
Ms. Doughty's class serves students with specific learning disabilities. Ms. Doughty is familiar with STUDENT's IEP and testified that she could meet all of STUDENT's educational needs. She uses the Slingerland simultaneous multisensory approach in teaching reading and written expression. Ms. Doughty has fifteen years of teaching experience using the Slingerland approach. Multisensory instruction is also used in teaching math through the Touch Math program, Mathlands Program, and extensive use of manipulatives. STUDENT would receive pull out occupational services as provided in the IEP.
The IEP also provides that STUDENT will be mainstreamed for 25 percent of the day and provides a mainstreaming transitional plan. Ms. Doughty testified that STUDENT would be mainstreamed during the afternoon, which would constitute 25 percent of her school day.
Based on the evidence, it is concluded that placement in Ms. Doughty's special day class conforms to STUDENT's IEP.
All of the District personnel who were familiar with STUDENT's IEP and Ms. Doughty's class testified that ms. Doughty's class would be appropriate to meet STUDENT's unique needs and would result in significant educational benefit. Ms. Doughty's class is similar to the class STUDENT attended at the Los Altos Christian School and is consistent with the kind of program recommended by Los Altos Personnel. Both the District's witnesses and the Los Altos personnel concluded that STUDENT needed small group instruction which could not be appropriately provided in a setting less restrictive than a special day class.
The only witness who opposed placement of STUDENT in Ms. Doughty's class was STUDENT's mother. She stated that she felt STUDENT would not do well in the class because she would be one of only two girls in the class of ten students; some of the other children are bigger than STUDENT; and the class is too noisy.
Ms. Doughty testified that the fact that there are would only be two girls in the class would not interfere with STUDENT's learning. She said that this has not been a problem with the only girl currently in the class. She also did not believe that the fact that some of the students are bigger than STUDENT would interfere with her learning. She said that the other students have needs similar to STUDENT's, although STUDENT would probably be starting a little a behind the others because she has lost some time from school. Ms. Doughty and witnesses who have visited the class testified that the class was quiet and the students were given much individual attention by Ms. Doughty, her aide, and the part-time parent volunteers.
The evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. Doughty's class with occupational services and mainstreaming for 25 percent of the day is an appropriate placement for STUDENT in the least restrictive environment.
4. Should the District Reimburse STUDENT's Parents for STUDENT's Placement in the Learning Assisted Class at Los Altos Christian School?
Parents of a disabled child may be entitled to reimbursement for the placement and services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement procured by the parents is appropriate. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359.
In this case, STUDENT's parents are seeking reimbursement for STUDENT's placement in the Learning Assisted Class at the Los Altos Christian School. They contend that they placed STUDENT at Los Altos Christian because the District neither assessed STUDENT in the Spring of 1996 nor offered to provide a free appropriate education for STUDENT.
As concluded above, the District offered to assess STUDENT in the Spring of 1996, but STUDENT's parents did not request assessment or placement of STUDENT in a District program for the 1996-97 school year.
Additionally, as concluded above, after the District did assess STUDENT in the Spring of 1997 it offered an appropriate placement for STUDENT. Therefore, STUDENT's parents are not entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at the Los Altos Christian School.
5. Should the District Reimburse STUDENT's Parents for the Cost of Independent Assessments?
STUDENT's advocate contends that the District should reimburse STUDENT's parents for assessments they procured for STUDENT. The record is not clear concerning which assessments are the subject of the request for reimbursement. No evidence was provided concerning the cost of such assessments.
There was an assessment done by STUDENT's pediatrician and one done by Ms. Bonnie Geiger, a psychologist. Later, STUDENT's parents obtained a Lindamood-Bell assessment.
Pursuant to Education Code Section 56329, a parent has the right to obtain, at public expense, independent educational assessments unless the public agency can demonstrate that its assessments are appropriate.
In this case, STUDENT's advocate contends that the District should reimburse STUDENT's parents for the assessment done by STUDENT's pediatrician and the assessment by ms. Bonnie Geiger because the District refused to assess STUDENT in the Spring of 1996. As has already been concluded, the District did offer to assess STUDENT at that time, but STUDENT's parents did not accept the offer.
STUDENT's parents might also have been able to receive reimbursement for the assessments that they obtained if the District's assessments were not appropriate. However, all of the witnesses who testified concerning STUDENT's assessments concluded that the District's assessments were appropriate. A review of the assessments obtained by STUDENT's parents does not reveal any information that was not provided in the District's assessments.
Therefore, STUDENT's parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the independent assessments that they obtained.
ORDER
All of STUDENT's claims for relief are denied. STUDENT shall be placed in Ms. Doughty's special day class at Meyerholtz Elementary.
PREVAILING PARTY
Pursuant to Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finds are made in accordance with this requirement: The District prevailed on all issues.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made ninety (90) days of the receipt of this decision. Education Code 56505(i).
Dated: March 9, 1998 ___________________________________ Glenn A. Fait, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Special California SpecialEducation Administrative Education Hearing Office Hearing Decisions (SEAHD)
Footnotes 1. STUDENT's advocate demonstrated a significant lack of skill in representing STUDENT's interests. She did not appear to recognize appropriate issues, lacked skill in asking appropriate questions, did not know how to cross-examine witnesses, and failed to file a closing brief. Both during the hearing and prior to the hearing, she demonstrated questionable judgment in advising her clients. She advised her clients not to attend IEP meetings. She advised STUDENT's private school teachers not to participate in the IEP meetings and, rather than seeking an appropriate program for STUDENT, used the IEP meetings to play procedural games. Worst of all, while she was advising STUDENT's parents, they decided to remove STUDENT from any schooling for at least half a year. This case calls into question the practice of the Special Education Hearing Office of allowing just anyone to act as an advocate in special education hearings. The Hearing Office believes that the Department of Education and the Legislature should seriously consider allowing the Special Education Hearing Office authority to bar incompetent advocates from appearing on behalf of parties in special education mediations and hearings. 2. This complaint is ironic in light of the fact that STUDENT's advocate failed to attend the April IEP meeting and had advised STUDENT's parents not to attend.
