California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 6, 2003

Student v. San Diego Unified School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 1146-03 · Hearing Officer Michael F. Geary

San Diego Unified must reimburse 104 days of residential treatment costs for a late offer; local placement upheld as FAPE.

Split decision: student prevailed on 2 of 6 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

Parents of a 13-year-old eligible under emotional disturbance filed against San Diego Unified School District and San Diego County Mental Health (CMH). In June 2002 they had placed him at Villa Santa Maria (VSM), a residential treatment center in New Mexico. In November 2002 they asked the District for special education and mental health assessments. The District sent an assessment plan 41 days late. It held the first IEP meeting after the 50-day deadline and offered only to fund VSM's educational program while it referred him to CMH. CMH did not name a local residential placement, Broad Horizons, until a phone call on May 29, 2003.

The Hearing Officer found that the lack of a single written offer naming the placement was a procedural violation. It did not deny FAPE, because the parents and their attorney understood the offer. However, the Hearing Officer held that California's statutory assessment and IEP timelines control over the longer interagency mental health (AB 3632) regulations. The delay denied FAPE for 104 days, from February 14 to May 29, 2003. The District must reimburse VSM's educational and residential costs for that period. On the substance, Broad Horizons, which uses a behavioral model, was appropriate. The student did not need VSM's attachment-based approach. The request for prospective placement at VSM was denied. If the parents accept Broad Horizons, the IEP team must create a transition plan.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled delays caused by the AB 3632 mental health referral process. The Hearing Officer held that the Education Code's assessment and IEP timelines controlled, and that the district remained ultimately responsible for FAPE. A late offer supported reimbursement for the delay period even though the eventual offer was found appropriate.

Issues and holdings

  1. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure

    Issue 1(A)(1). Did the Respondents fail to timely offer and provide a FAPE during 2002-2003 by failing to make a specific written offer of a residential placement (Union School Dist. v. Smith)?

    Failure to make a single coherent written offer naming the residential placement violated Union, but it did not deny FAPE because the parents and counsel understood by May 29, 2003 that Broad Horizons was offered and fully took part in the process.

  2. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1(A)(2). Did the Respondents fail to comply with the required timelines for educational and mental health assessments and for developing an IEP and offering a FAPE?

    The Education Code timelines (sections 56321 and 56344) control over the longer interagency AB 3632 regulations. A FAPE was due by February 14, 2003, and was not offered until May 29, 2003, so the delay denied FAPE for 104 days.

  3. Issue 1(B). Did the Respondents fail to offer and provide a program with an appropriate residential component (was the offer of residential placement at Broad Horizons substantively appropriate)?

    Broad Horizons, a local RTC using a behavioral model, was designed to meet the student's needs, was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit, and was in the LRE. The student did not need VSM's attachment-model program.

  4. Issue 2. If the Respondents failed to offer or provide a FAPE during 2002-2003, are the parents entitled to reimbursement for any of the costs of the placement at Villa Santa Maria during that time?

    VSM met the student's needs and provided educational benefit. The District, which stays ultimately responsible for FAPE, must reimburse VSM's educational and residential costs from February 14 to May 29, 2003.

  5. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 3. Have the Respondents offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year (through expiration of the February 27, 2003 IEP)?

    The Broad Horizons offer continued to be an appropriate offer of FAPE for 2003-2004 through expiration of the February 27, 2003 IEP.

  6. Issue 4. If the District has not offered a FAPE for 2003-2004, is Petitioner entitled to an order for a prospective placement at VSM?

    Because a FAPE was offered, the request for prospective placement at VSM was denied.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days of receipt of proof, the District must reimburse the parents for the educational component of the VSM placement from February 14, 2003 until the date the District began paying those costs under the February 27, 2003 IEP. No duplicate payment is intended.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days of receipt of proof, the District must reimburse the parents for the residential component of the VSM placement for the 104-day period from February 14, 2003, to and including May 29, 2003.
  • If the parents agree to accept placement at Broad Horizons (or another agreed-upon placement), the IEP team must promptly develop an appropriate and carefully tailored transition plan for the move.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Fermin v. San Mateo-Foster City School Dist.; Evans v. Evans; School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Educ.; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.; Morris v. Williams

People named in the decision

  • David Hans, chief clinical officer, expert witness for Student, Villa Santa Maria
  • Suzie Friedman, student's therapist, witness for Student, Villa Santa Maria
  • Deborah Ayers, fifth-grade teacher (private school), witness for Student, Children's Creative and Performing Arts Academy
  • Mary Jayne Stoll, former teacher and special education mental health advocate, witness for Student
  • Harvey Baron, school psychologist, witness, San Diego Unified School District
  • Nancy Batinica, resource specialist and compliance troubleshooter, San Diego Unified School District
  • Carol Schmidt, school psychologist who did the records-review assessment, San Diego Unified School District
  • Andrew Rappaport, mental health case management clinician, San Diego County Mental Health
  • Nalaina Combariza, psychologist, expert witness for CMH, San Diego County Mental Health
  • Joe Concellosi, program manager and CMH hearing representative, San Diego County Mental Health
  • Mara Lynn Katzman, private psychologist (2001 assessment)
  • Chris Roberts (also referred to as Chris McRoberts), consulting psychologist, School of Urban Wilderness Survival (SUWS)
  • Scott Blackwell, consulting psychologist (admission assessment), Villa Santa Maria
  • Joseph McGuill, chief financial officer, Villa Santa Maria
  • Villa Santa Maria, residential treatment center, New Mexico (parent placement)
  • Broad Horizons, local residential treatment center offered by CMH
  • School of Urban Wilderness Survival (SUWS), private wilderness program, Idaho
  • New Haven, local residential treatment center sent a referral
  • Oak Grove, local residential treatment center sent a referral

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in San Diego, California, on July 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, and 31, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Margaret Dalton. Attorney Margaret Adams assisted Ms. Dalton. STUDENT’s parents, Mr. and Mrs. PARENT, were also present. Respondent San Diego Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by its assistant general counsel, Ricardo Soto. Respondent San Diego County Mental Health (CMH) was represented at the hearing by senior deputy county counsel Lisa Macchione. Joe Concellosi, CMH program manager, was also present.

Petitioner called the following witnesses: David Hans, chief clinical officer at Villa Santa Maria (VSM), a New Mexico residential treatment center (RTC) where STUDENT has been placed by his parents; Suzie Friedman, STUDENT’s therapist at VSM; Deborah Ayers, STUDENT’s fifth-grade teacher; Mary Jayne Stoll, a former teacher who currently advocates for special education students in connection with their mental health needs; Harvey Baron, a District psychologist; Nancy Batinica, a District resource specialist; and STUDENT’s parents. The District did not call its own witnesses, but it did examine the witnesses called by the other parties. CMH called the following witnesses: Andrew Rappaport, a CMH mental health case management clinician; Nalaina Combariza, a CMH psychologist; and Joe Concellosi.

Oral and documentary evidence was presented at the hearing. Closing arguments of the parties were heard, and the record was closed on August 1, 2003.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Several motions were presented on the first day of hearing. The Respondents’ motions relating to scheduling matters were all dealt with in due course. Petitioner made a motion for a decision in his favor and against the District on the ground that the District had failed to timely serve a list of witnesses and proposed documentary evidence. The District stated that it would offer no documents and call no witnesses, though it reserved the right to examine witnesses called and to rely on documents offered by the other parties. The Petitioner’s motion for a decision in his favor was denied. Petitioner’s motion to exclude Mr. Concellosi was also denied on the ground that CMH had the right to have a representative of its choice present to assist its attorney with the presentation of evidence.

ISSUES (Footnote 1)

1. Did the Respondents fail to timely offer and provide a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year?

2. If the Respondents failed to offer or provide a FAPE to the Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year, are his parents entitled to reimbursement for any of the costs of his placement at Villa Santa Maria during that time?

3. Have the Respondents offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year? (Footnote 2)

4. If the District has not offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year, is he entitled to an order for a prospective placement at VSM?

BACKGROUND

STUDENT is currently eligible for special education on the basis of an emotional disturbance (ED). He is receiving services at Villa Santa Maria (VSM), a residential treatment center (RTC) in New Mexico. STUDENT is thirteen years old and has a long history of emotional and social problems. His current principal diagnoses include attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, combined type (ADHD), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and attachment issues, possibly including reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Mr. PARENT and Ms. PARENT are STUDENT’s maternal aunt and uncle and, since he was five and one-half years old, have been his adoptive parents.

The story of STUDENT’s early years is a tragic one. According to personal histories contained in the reports of several psychologists, STUDENT lived with his mother and two older half-sisters during the first five and one-half years of his life. He was abandoned by his biological father, who eventually relinquished his parental rights. His mother was a busy record company executive who delegated much of his day-to-day care to her daughters, STUDENT’s half-sisters.

When STUDENT was five and one-half years old, his mother was murdered by his oldest sister and her boyfriend, both of whom were convicted of the murder and sentenced to prison. Shortly after the murder, STUDENT’s other half-sister went to live with her biological father. STUDENT first went to live with a maternal aunt. STUDENT was not allowed to remain in that home for long, apparently due to his aunt’s belief that he was involved in an injury to one of her children.

STUDENT then went to live in Tennessee with another maternal aunt, Ms. PARENT, and her husband at the time, Mr. PARENT. The PARENTs eventually adopted STUDENT, and the family moved to Santa Rosa, California between STUDENT’s second and third grades years. It was during this time that the PARENTs had their own son. Between STUDENT’s third and fourth grades, the PARENTs separated. The parents and two boys all moved to San Diego, where the parents established separate homes. They eventually divorced and have shared legal and physical custody of their sons.

STUDENT has been in several educational environments. He was in kindergarten when his mother was killed. He finished kindergarten while living with the PARENTs in Tennessee in 1996. He repeated kindergarten during the 1996-1997 school year. He also attended first grade in Tennessee. STUDENT attended the Merryhill Academy in Santa Rosa for the second and third grades. After STUDENT moved to San Diego, he attended Children’s Creative and Performing Arts Academy for the fourth and fifth grades. He has never attended a public school in California.

STUDENT’s attentional, social, and emotional difficulties were apparent early in his life. He was diagnosed with an attention deficit and placed on medications at age two. According to his adoptive mother, STUDENT took Ritalin for only two weeks on that occasion, but the records indicate that he has been on and off various medications since then. Ms. PARENT states that as a young child, STUDENT was usually friendly with other children but did not develop friendships easily. She explained that he tended to alienate other children as a result of his odd or aggressive behavior. His disruptive behaviors were also apparent in the classroom, where he would become easily bored or distracted, often leaving his seat, talking to classmates, or occupying himself by picking at scabs until they bled, fussing over his wounds, blowing his nose excessively or chewing on things. In spite of STUDENT’s problems at school, STUDENT has usually done well academically. The problem is not with STUDENT’s intellect. Everyone agrees that he is bright and, but for the distractibility and interfering behaviors, quite capable of doing at least grade-level work.

There were also substantial behavioral issues at home. STUDENT was frequently angry and defiant. According to both of his parents, he would lie and tantrum to get what he wanted. At times he was sincere and affectionate, but he was more often manipulative and distant.

STUDENT was in counseling for a period of time during the third grade. He and his family returned to counseling during the summer of 2001, between grades four and five at

Children’s Creative and Performing Arts Academy, after STUDENT started to talk about killing himself. (Footnote 3) Psychologist Mara Lynn Katzman assessed STUDENT in June 2001. Dr. Katzman concluded from the testing that STUDENT functioned in the superior range of cognitive development. She also found evidence of depression, a tendency to procrastinate, and hostility and resentment toward those who attempted to provide structure and guidance. In the doctor’s opinion, STUDENT was immature and self-absorbed, and tended to engage in stubborn and rigid behaviors. His primary deficit was in the area of strategic planning. Dr. Katzman’s diagnosed ADHD, by history, and ODD. She noted that testing did not evidence a severe emotional problem. Nevertheless, she provisionally diagnosed of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct bipolar disorder. (Footnote 4) Among other things, the doctor recommended that STUDENT be in a behavioral program that would provide him with clear and consistent steps toward appropriate maturation while allowing him to learn acceptable social interaction and a positive sense of self. She also suggested that a physician evaluate STUDENT for his medication needs. According to Ms. PARENT, STUDENT has taken various medications over the years but to little apparent effect.

Although STUDENT continued to perform well academically in his fifth-grade year, his inappropriate behaviors worsened. In addition to the impulsivity, defiance, and aggression, he used inappropriate sexual language and engaged in inappropriate sexual activity with his younger brother. In mid-April 2002, STUDENT’s parents sent STUDENT to the School of Urban Wilderness Survival (SUWS) in Idaho for a forty-two-day “survival skills” program. He was eleven years old at the time.

About half way through the program, an SUWS consulting psychologist, Chris Roberts, assessed STUDENT. Ms. PARENT reported to Dr. Roberts that STUDENT’s depression improved after he began taking antidepressants (first Welbutrin and then Paxil), but his anxiety and obsessive thoughts increased since then. The anger and hostility toward his adoptive parents continued, as did his self-centered and socially inappropriate behaviors. Dr. Roberts also concluded that STUDENT had ADHD and ODD. He characterized the emotional problems stemming from the loss of his mother and the many changes in his family and living arrangements as indicative of an attachment problem. However, he concluded that the late onset did not meet the Diagnostic Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV) diagnostic criteria for RAD. Because STUDENT’s symptoms did not meet the diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Dr. Roberts diagnosed the more generic depressive disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), and anxiety disorder, NOS. Dr. Roberts made a number of recommendations, including placement after SUWS in a boarding school or an RTC equipped to deal with STUDENT’s ADHD, oppositionality, and social problems with peers.

STUDENT’s parents agreed that he would need a residential placement when he completed the SUWS program. An educational consultant suggested VSM. Arrangements were made for an assessment and interview, and STUDENT’s parents brought him to VSM on the return trip from Idaho. This was a two-day visit during which psychologist Scott Blackwell, a consultant to VSM, assessed STUDENT, and STUDENT’s parents were given an overview and tour of the facility. Ms. PARENT describes STUDENT as appearing anxious and in shock during this visit.

Dr. Blackwell met with STUDENT on May 24, 2002. According to his report, a history prepared by Ms. PARENT was reviewed before the interview. The reports of Drs. Katzman and McRoberts were also reviewed. STUDENT and his adoptive parents were interviewed, as was STUDENT. Dr. Blackwell’s Axis I, DSM-IV, diagnosis was RAD, ADHD and ODD, with delayed onset PTSD and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) to be ruled out. He recommended placement at VSM.

STUDENT and his parents returned to their homes in San Diego to allow STUDENT the opportunity to transition. The decision to place STUDENT at VSM had been made. They returned to VSM the following week. STUDENT was admitted on June 1, 2002, and, after two days of “separation work,” STUDENT’s parents returned to San Diego. STUDENT has remained in his placement at VSM since that time.

On November 26, 2002, Ms. PARENT wrote to the District to request both a special education assessment and a concurrent mental health assessment to find out if STUDENT needed a residential placement. The District received Ms. PARENT’s letter on November 27, 2002. On December 18 or 19, 2002, the request was assigned to resource specialist and compliance troubleshooter Nancy Batinica. STUDENT’s mother delivered his records to the District on December 19, 2002. Ms. Batinica reviewed the materials and recommended a school psychologist to handle the assessment. Ms. Batinica was aware that the parent had requested that the special education and mental health assessments be done concurrently. She testified that the assigned school psychologist, Carol Schmidt, had the documents to initiate a referral to CMH pursuant to Chapter 26.5 of the California Government Code. (Footnote 5) Ms. Schmidt did not testify. However, Ms. Batinica testified that the psychologist told her that STUDENT’s referral to CMH would not take place until after the individualized education program (IEP) team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services.

By this time, the District was dealing primarily with the Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Margaret Dalton. There were discussions regarding STUDENT’s residential placement at VSM in New Mexico and about whether the District’s psychoeducational assessment would require STUDENT’s presence in California. The parents were concerned that STUDENT would suffer a setback if he left VSM. The District decided to conduct an assessment consisting of a review of records only.

As of January 13, 2003, no assessment plan had been delivered to STUDENT’s parents. Ms. Dalton wrote to inquire. Then, on or about January 22, 2003, an assessment plan providing for a review of records by the school psychologist was provided to Ms. PARENT, who signed the document the following day. Carol Schmidt’s assessment and report were completed on February 3, 2003. She concluded, in essence, that STUDENT had a serious emotional disturbance that impeded learning in a general education environment. She recommended that he be found eligible under the category ED and be provided with an IEP that included behavioral and emotional goals and supportive services in a therapeutic setting to help him to achieve those goals.

The District had not referred the Petitioner to CMH by the time it convened an initial IEP meeting for STUDENT on February 27, 2003. On the basis of Ms. Schmidt’s report, STUDENT was found eligible for special education on the basis of an emotional disturbance (ED). The District’s proposed educational program for STUDENT consisted solely of an offer to fund the thirty-five hours per week educational component of STUDENT’s program at VSM for one year “pending the results of the CMH . . . assessment.” (Footnote 6) No residential placement or other mental health service was offered or even considered at this meeting. The process for the referral of STUDENT to CMH began. The team was to reconvene later on a date to be arranged to consider the CMH assessment results.

On March 4, 2003, CMH sent a plan for its own assessment of STUDENT’s social and emotional needs to Ms. PARENT, who signed and returned the consent to CMH on or before March 12, 2003. The CMH assessment included another review of STUDENT’s records, an interview of Ms. PARENT, and a telephone conference with STUDENT’s therapist at VSM, Suzie Friedman. Over the objection of his parents, CMH required STUDENT to come to San Diego for a twenty-minute interview with Andrew Rappaport, the CMH case manager. A VSM staff person accompanied STUDENT to San Diego for the CMH interview on April 10, 2003. In his report dated April 17, 2003, Mr. Rappaport recommended residential placement for up to six months and case management services as necessary. This report was sent by Mr. Rappaport to Ms. Dalton that same date. In the cover sheet, Mr. Rappaport stated that he would be “looking at local facilities after the IEP.”

The District convened a second IEP meeting on May 19, 2003, to consider the results of the CMH assessment. The team members agreed that STUDENT required residential services. STUDENT’s therapist, Suzie Friedman, who participated in the meeting by telephone, believed that STUDENT should remain at VSM. His parents agreed. (Footnote 7) The District’s offer at this meeting remained essentially the same. (Footnote 8) CMH wanted to explore the availability of a local placement before agreeing to a placement at an out-of-state facility. (Footnote 9) At the meeting, Mr. Rappaport described the process by which he would seek to identify a local residential placement for STUDENT. He explained that, with the parent’s consent, CMH would send information about the Petitioner and his needs to local RTCs that it deemed suitable to meet STUDENT’s needs. The parents would have an opportunity to conduct their own investigation of the possible placements. If an RTC accepted STUDENT into its program, the Petitioner would be notified.

On May 22, 2003, Mr. Rappaport sent a copy of the CMH Service Plan to Ms. Dalton for her client’s review and signature. The cover sheet to this fax states that CMH would then be sending out referral packets “to local RTCs.” Ms. PARENT signed the plan on May 27, 2003. Mr. Rappaport sent referral packets to all six of the available local residential placements for ED students STUDENT’s age: Broad Horizons, New Haven, Oak Grove and three others.

Ms. PARENT and Mr. PARENT conducted their own investigation of the proposed placements. They concluded from that investigation that none of the local placements was appropriate, in large part because none based its therapeutic approach on the attachment model used at VSM.

On May 29, 2003, more than six months after STUDENT’s mother first requested services, one of these proposed placements, Broad Horizons, informed Mr. Rappaport by telephone that it would accept STUDENT. When this acceptance was reported by telephone the same day to Ms. Dalton, she replied that STUDENT’s parents would not be removing their son from VSM but would instead be filing for a due process hearing. The Petitioner’s request for due process dated June 1, 2003, was filed on June 4, 2003.

On the first day of this hearing on July 22, 2003, CMH delivered a letter to the Petitioner confirming that Broad Horizons had accepted STUDENT and was prepared to admit him immediately.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Did the Respondents fail to timely offer and provide a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year?

The Petitioner makes three specific contentions regarding the Respondents’ alleged failure to timely offer and provide him a FAPE during the 2002-2003 school year. He alleges that the Respondents (1) failed to make a specific written offer of a residential placement, (2) failed to comply with the required timelines for educational and mental health assessments and development of an IEP and offer of a FAPE, and (3) failed to offer and provide a program with an appropriate residential component. No other aspect of the IEP is disputed. Petitioner seeks reimbursement for the costs of his placement at VSM during the 2002-2003 school year from on or about February 19, 2003, the date that Petitioner claims a FAPE should have been made available to him.

The District concedes that it did not comply with the applicable timeline for providing an assessment plan, but asserts that this procedural defect did not result in a loss of educational opportunity by STUDENT or a serious infringement on his parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process. The District further contends that it otherwise followed the required procedures for referral of a student to CMH, that it correctly deferred to CMH for the determinations regarding STUDENT’s need for a residential component, and that it or CMH conveyed an appropriate offer that included a residential component. It requests that all relief be denied.

CMH contends that it timely and appropriately fulfilled its obligation to offer an appropriate mental health component to Petitioner’s program. CMH also requests that all relief be denied.

The Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and State special education law provide that a disabled student is entitled to a free, appropriate public education (FAPE). A FAPE consists of both procedural and substantive elements.

The United States Supreme Court has held that the IDEA requires certain procedural protections that will allow the student and parents to effectively participate in the IEP process. Rowley, supra, at 206-207. Not every procedural flaw is critical, but one that results in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process may in and of itself constitute a denial of a FAPE. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-1484 (9th Cir. 1992).

Substantively, a FAPE is special education and related services that are available to a student at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State LEA, and are provided in conformity with the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). A FAPE includes special education and related services that are designed to meet the child’s unique needs that cannot be met through modification of the regular instructional program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. (Footnote 10) It must also provide the student an opportunity to be educated and to participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible. The latter requirement is often referred to as “least restrictive environment” (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

An appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the student. Seattle School District No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996); Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 965 (1994). Moreover, the focus of the inquiry is not on whether the student may obtain greater benefit in the placement that is preferred by the parents but, rather, whether the school district’s proposed placement is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the student. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982); Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).

In summary, to be found to provide a FAPE, an IEP must be the result of a process that adequately and timely protects the rights of the parents and student. In addition, the IEP itself must (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs, (2) be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, and (3) conform to the student’s IEP. The FAPE must be provided in the LRE. The local educational agency (LEA) has the burden of proof on all of these issues. Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).

A. Was the IEP Process Procedurally Appropriate?

Two of the Petitioner’s challenges are procedural. He alleges that the District made a written offer of a “local residential placement” but identified a specific local residential placement sufficiently to comply with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Union School Dist. v. B. Smith 15 F. 3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994). He also alleges that the process, from the parent’s initial referral to the date that services were finally made available, was untimely. More specifically, he claims that the initial referral by his mother should have resulted in the development of a complete IEP, including an offer of appropriate residential services by February 19, 2003. (Footnote 11)

1. Specific Written Offer

Districts are required to give written prior notice to the parents of the student whenever they propose to initiate or change, or refuse to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). Such notice provides the parents with information that can help them to make informed decisions about their child’s education. The notice is also important in that it helps ensure that there is a clear record of what placement, services and assistance were offered to the student and when they were offered. This information might be required years after the fact if there is a dispute about compliance with the special education laws. Union School Dist. v. B. Smith, supra.

The same reasoning supports the rule that when an offer of a FAPE is required at all, it must be a formal and specific offer, and the LEA cannot avoid its responsibility in this regard by arguing that the parents had already indicated that the offer would not be accepted. Union School District, at 1526. The key question is whether or not the failure to make a specific and formal written offer either denied the student’s parents the opportunity to fully participate in the IEP process or caused the student to lose educational opportunity. A mere technical violation that causes no harm does not amount to a denial of a FAPE. (See Fermin v. San Mateo-Foster City School District, 33 IDELR 30 (N.D. Cal 2000))

Although there was no offer of a specific residential placement in any of STUDENT’s IEPs, the IEP team agreed upon the need for a residential placement at the May 19, 2003 IEP meeting. Ms. PARENT signed the mental health treatment plan that contained STUDENT’s goals and objectives. The IEP notes state that CMH needed to review local and California placements before recommending an out-of-state placement such as VSM. Mr. Rappaport explained to STUDENT’s parents the process for identifying a placement. It was undisputed that the six local placements under consideration were identified and that STUDENT’s parents conducted their own thorough investigations of these placements. It was also undisputed that Mr. Rappaport reported STUDENT’s acceptance by Broad Horizons to Petitioner’s attorney by telephone on May 29, 2003, and that Ms. Dalton indicated that STUDENT’s parents would not remove him from VSM but would instead file for due process. The Petitioner’s request for due process was filed on June 4, 2003. It was also clear from the testimony of Ms. PARENT and Mr. PARENT that on May 29, 2003, they understood that Broad Horizons was the offered placement and had determined through their own independent investigations that the offer was not acceptable.

The IDEA and the Union case make clear that a single coherent offer of a FAPE is required in those instances where an offer must be made. Strict compliance required that the Respondents convene an IEP meeting to develop the IEP and present it to STUDENT’s parents for consideration. That is not what was done in this case. There was an initial IEP meeting on February 27, 2003, but it did not result in the development and offer of an IEP that met STUDENT’s needs. It is undisputed that the February 27, 2003 IEP was not an offer of a FAPE because it did not include any service to meet STUDENT’s one clear need—his need for a residential placement. There was an addendum dated May 19, 2003, which provided little more of substance. There was a telephone call on May 29, 2003, from CMH to Petitioner’s attorney providing the identification of the RTC. (Footnote 12) There was no IEP meeting where the Petitioner was given a single coherent offer of a FAPE.

The Hearing Officer finds that the Respondent’s failure to make a single coherent and written offer of a FAPE that specifically identified the proposed residential placement constituted a procedural violation of the IDEA under Union. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that the Petitioner’s parents fully participated in the process from the beginning and understood that the Respondents were offering Broad Horizons on May 29, 2003. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents by then had conducted their own investigation and had made their own informed decision regarding the suitability of Broad Horizons. Furthermore, the Petitioner was represented by counsel during the period of time that CMH was identifying a level of service and a residential placement. The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner’s attorney also understood that Broad Horizons was the placement being offered during the telephone conversation on May 29, 2003, and was by then already prepared to reject the offer. The Hearing Officer finds that the offer that was verbally communicated on May 29, 2003, was the last item of information that was needed to clarify the terms of the Respondents’ offer. He also finds that the offer was made to STUDENT on that date.

The Respondents’ failure to make a single coherent offer in writing did not, in and of itself, deny STUDENT’s parents the opportunity to fully participate in the IEP process. This procedural violation did not deny a FAPE to the Petitioner. Therefore, it is not determinative.

2. Timeliness of the Process

To address the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondents failed to comply with the required timelines, it is necessary to first identify the phases in the process that culminate in the offer of an IEP that makes a FAPE available to the student.

One of the express purposes of the IDEA is to ensure that students with disabilities receive special education and related services designed to meet their unique educational needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). The term "unique educational needs" is broadly construed to include handicapped child's academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical and vocational needs. Seattle School District, No. 1 v. B. S., 82 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal regulations confirm and reinforce the law’s intent that services provided to a student under the IDEA must meet all of the student’s identified special education needs, including the need for related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(i). California law conforms to these requirements. Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.

When a student is referred for special education, the local educational agency (LEA) must conduct an appropriate assessment to identify all of a student’s unique needs. (Footnote 13) Federal law requires a full and individual assessment to determine all of the educational needs of the student and all of the services that are required to meet those needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.320(a) and 300.352(h). An assessment that does not identify all areas of educational needs of the student does not comply with the IDEA. California law is in agreement. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320.

The next stage of the process is the meeting or meetings to determine the student’s eligibility for special education and to develop an IEP that provides a FAPE. Having identified the student’s unique educational needs through the assessment, the LEA and other participating agencies must design an IEP to meet all those needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2). The IEP must contain “[a] statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services to be provided to the child . . ..” 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(3). Again, the law in California is the same. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345. Federal law allows the states to decide whether or not to convene a separate meetings for the purpose of determining eligibility and developing an IEP for those students who are found eligible. 64 Fed. Reg. 12581. However, California is one of many states to adopt the procedure whereby eligibility is determined by the IEP team at its meeting. Cal. Educ Code § 56342. In other words, on initial referrals for special education, the IEP team confers at the initial IEP team meeting to determine eligibility and, if the student is found eligible, to develop and make an offer of a FAPE, including placement where appropriate.

The final stage of the process is implementation of the student’s IEP. An IEP must be implemented as soon as possible after it is developed. 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 3040(a). As discussed in detail below, the law requires that the entire process from referral to implementation be completed within a reasonable period of time. In California, the legislature has determined that a reasonable period of time does not exceed sixty-five days, plus whatever time is utilized by the parent to consider and consent to the assessment. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321 and 56344.

In 1980, California established timelines for assessment and the development of an IEP. (Footnote 14) There are, in effect, three timelines in this State. They run consecutively. The first begins on the date of the referral of the student for the development or revision of an IEP. It allows the LEA a maximum of fifteen days from the referral to provide an assessment plan to the parent. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321(a). (Footnote 15) The second begins with the provision of the assessment plan to the parent and allows the parent at least fifteen days to consider and give consent to the assessment. (Footnote 16) Id. The third timeline begins with the return of the parental consent to the assessment and allows the District a maximum of fifty days from that date to conduct a full assessment and develop an IEP that makes a FAPE available to the student. Cal. Educ. Code § 56344. (Footnote 17) (See also: Cal. Educ. Code § 56043.) The clear requirement of the California law is that the LEA must be prepared to meet all of the student’s unique educational needs no later than sixty-five days from the date of the referral, plus the time used by the parent to give consent to the assessment.

STUDENT’s mother wrote to the District on November 27, 2002, requesting special education assessment (expressly including a mental health component to determine her son’s need for a residential placement) and services for her adolescent son. Pursuant to the California statute, the District had a maximum of fifteen days, or until December 12, 2002, to provide a complete assessment plan to the parent. Cal. Educ. Code § 56321. The District did not provide the plan until January 22, 2003, forty-one days later than the law required.

The second timeline should have begun no later December 12, 2002, by which time the District should have provided an assessment plan to the parent pursuant to California’s statutory timeline. When the District finally provided the assessment plan to the parent, Ms. PARENT, she signed and returned the consent in just one day.

California’s third statutory timeline should have begun on December 13, 2002. The District had fifty days from that date, or until February 14, 2003, within which to conduct a full assessment and develop an IEP that made a FAPE, including a placement, available to STUDENT. The District completed its assessment, which consisted essentially of a record review by the school psychologist, by February 4, 2003. However, the initial IEP meeting was not convened until February 27, 2003, thirteen days after the statutorily prescribed fifty days. It is without dispute that a complete IEP was not developed at that IEP meeting. On February 27, 2003, the District offered to address STUDENT’s academic needs by funding the thirty-five hour per week educational component of his placement at VSM. However, it did not offer to address his mental health needs except by referring him to CMH for further assessment of those needs and a determination of how they could be met.

The Hearing Officer has found above that a FAPE was not made available to STUDENT until he was offered placement at Broad Horizons on May 29, 2003. (See preceding section.) This offer was made three and one-half months (104 days) later than permitted by California Education Code Sections 56321 and 56344. (Footnote 18) Before the Hearing Officer can determine whether or not the belated offer of Broad Horizons was procedurally deficient and a denial of FAPE, he must consider the Respondents’ contention that timelines set forth in the California Code of Regulations control under the particular circumstances of this case.

The Respondents argue, in essence, that the State statutory timelines do not apply in this instance. They assert that STUDENT was not entitled to the protections afforded by the California timeline because he required mental health services. The Respondents allege that STUDENT was required to wait until CMH was brought in to the process and made its own determination regarding his mental health needs. In essence, the Respondents argue that because the joint regulations developed pursuant to the Government Code allow time in excess of the statutory maximum when there is a referral to the community mental health service, those delays do not provide a basis for relief. (Footnote 19) A careful examination of this contention is required.

In 1984, California enacted Assembly Bill (AB) 3632. This bill and later Assembly and Senate bills make up Chapter 26.5 of the Government Code. According to the Miscellaneous Note that introduces Chapter 26.5, these laws were intended to maximize and coordinate State programs that provide supportive services necessary to assist students to benefit from special education. The Chapter establishes interagency responsibility for related services or designated instruction and services, specifically occupational therapy, physical therapy, and mental health services. (Footnote 20) Cal. Gov't Code § 7572(a).

Chapter 26.5 also provides that covered services can only be added to a student’s IEP if the appropriate assessment has been conducted as specified in the regulations developed by the State department to which that responsibility has been designated. Cal. Gov’t Code § 7572(b) and (c). The Chapter designates the California Department of Mental Health, and through it the community mental health services such as CMH, as the agency responsible for conducting mental health assessments, determining what services are required, and providing those services. Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 7572(c) and 7587. Under the joint regulations implementing Chapter 26.5, an IEP team is authorized to refer a student to the local community mental health service after the LEA has completed its assessment and the IEP team has determined that the student is eligible for special education and suspected of needing mental health services. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60040(a). This means that the LEA can exhaust the controlling statutory timeline of up to eighty days before referring the student to the community mental health service. The referral to mental health under Chapter 26.5 would permit at least an additional eighty-five days, plus an undetermined additional amount of time, for the completion of another assessment and an offer of appropriate services. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, §§ 60040 and 60045. Because the joint regulations do not specifically limit the time allowed to obtain parental consent or to identify a specific residential facility, there is no clear time limit imposed by them.

The Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the District’s argument that the additional timelines created by the joint regulations excuse compliance with the clear time limitations contained in California’s special education statutes. There is no apparent legal justification for a regulatory scheme that makes emotionally disturbed students (many of whom are adolescents that pose a significant risk to themselves or others) wait months beyond the statutory deadline for essential services. (Footnote 21) Inasmuch as the joint regulations are inconsistent the statutory timelines, the Hearing Officer finds that the statutory timelines control under State law. (Footnote 22) Morris v. Williams, 67 C. 2d 733 (1967); California Welfare Rights Organization v. Carleson, 4 Cal.3d 445 (1971); Cleveland Chiropractic College v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners, 11 Cal.App.3d 25 (1970).

Nothing in the IDEA or in its legislative history or implementing regulations suggest that students with certain disabilities or needs should receive necessary services later than others. Indeed, the federal regulations are to the contrary. They envision a single parental consent to an assessment, and a single comprehensive assessment to determine the student’s eligibility for special education and to identify his or her needs, and a single, coherent IEP that identifies the placement and all special education and related services that together constitute a FAPE for the student.

The federal timeline provides that the initial assessment and the meeting to develop the initial IEP, like STUDENT’s in this case, must be completed “within a reasonable period of time” after receipt of the parent’s consent to an initial evaluation. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343(b)(1). It also states that the meeting to develop the student’s IEP must occur within a maximum of thirty days from the initial determination that the student is eligible for special education. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (b)(2). (Footnote 23) This timeline has been part of the federal law since October 1, 1977. (Footnote 24) Its purpose is clear. It is intended to prevent significant delay. 46 Fed. Reg. 5465. By its own terms, the timeline applies specifically to initial assessments and IEPs. STUDENT’s was an initial assessment and IEP.

More to the point, the regulations provide that where a state uses interagency agreements to provide services such as “a residential facility, . . . the state must ensure that there is no delay in implementing [the student’s] IEP, . . ..” 34 C.F.R. § 300.301(a) and (c).

At least one District Court has held that systematic delay of residential placement for special education students is impermissible. In Evans v. Evans, 818 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ind. 1993), the Court examined a regulatory scheme similar to California’s in a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of children who required residential placement. The class consisted of one hundred to two hundred special education students who were required to go through an additional application and review process after they were found to be eligible for special education and in need of residential placement before they could receive a residential placement. This additional process resulted in average service delays of two hundred days. The plaintiffs contended that the state regulatory process was inconsistent with the timelines established by IDEA and its implementing regulations.

The defendants in Evans argued that there was no conflict between the federal and State laws because the IEP was not considered “finalized” until the additional process was completed. The Court concluded that the state agency had no authority to implement procedures that conflicted with the federal timeline and resulted in a significant delay of services. It rejected the defendants’ argument about the finality of the IEP, pointing out that the federal regulations do not contemplate a systematic delay and concluding that the IEP is deemed finalized at the meeting referred to in 34 C.F.R. Section 300.343. The Court also explained that if additional meetings are necessary to accommodate the participation of another state agency, those must take place before the IEP meeting at which a FAPE is offered. In summary, federal and State law envision a single, thorough assessment followed by an IEP that contains a single, coherent offer of placement and services, all to be completed within a prescribed time (See: Union, supra). California allows LEAs fifty days from the date of consent to fulfill these obligations. There is no provision in federal law or California statute that suggests these standards do not apply to students who need mental health services, including residential placement. The Hearing Officer finds that the California statutory timelines are controlling under the facts of this case and that compliance with those timelines was not excused by the joint regulations. The Respondents’ failure to adhere to these timelines was a procedural error that resulted in a denial of a FAPE to the Petitioner for a period of 104 days.

B. Was the Offer of a Residential Placement at Broad Horizons Substantively Appropriate?

The parties agree that STUDENT is bright and academically capable and that his only needs for the purposes of this analysis relate to his emotional and social functioning and related behavior. There is no dispute regarding STUDENT’s need for a residential placement. The parties agree that STUDENT needs a residential placement that will provide constant supervision in a therapeutic environment where he can work on reducing impulsive and disruptive behaviors and increasing attention and appropriate social interaction. The central dispute in this case is over what constitutes an adequate therapeutic environment for STUDENT. His parents contend that as a result of STUDENT’s disability he needs a residential placement at VSM to receive a FAPE. There are two parts to the Petitioner’s argument. The first is that STUDENT needs an RTC that adheres to what has been referred to in this hearing as the “attachment [therapeutic] model.” The second and related argument is that to move STUDENT from VSM to any other RTC at this time would jeopardize the progress he has made. The Respondents’ contentions are that STUDENT does not need to be in an RTC that follows the attachment model, that they are required by law to place STUDENT in an available local or State placement that can meet his needs, and that the offered placement will meet STUDENT’s unique needs.

1. Designed to Meet STUDENT’s Unique Needs

The principal expert witness for the Petitioner on this issue was David Hans, Ph.D. and chief clinical officer at VSM. Dr. Hans received his undergraduate degree in 1985. He was engaged in corporate and investment banking work until he began working toward his graduate degree at the California School of Professional Psychology in 1996. His doctorate was conferred in 2000. In December 2001, he was hired at VSM. After spending eight weeks working in the milieu, he assumed his current duties overseeing the clinical activities, both in therapy and in the milieu. (Footnote 25)

VSM has been in existence for many years, but it was only in 1998 that its chief financial officer, Joseph McGuill, made the decision to focus entirely on the treatment of children and adolescents for problems related to their failures to form normal and healthy attachments to their parents or other care givers. A number of key staff members who had been working with the attachment model at another facility came over to VSM. Since then, VSM has been involved exclusively in the treatment of children and adolescents with significant attachment issues. Most of the residents have met the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Dr. Hans’s first exposure to the attachment model was at VSM. He has no experience with any other model for the treatment of attachment disorders.

According to Dr. Hans, the attachment model is a developmental and relational approach to the treatment of attachment issues. In essence, the model purports to address more than the maladaptive behaviors that result from the attachment problems. Dr. Hans testified that it addresses the underlying attachment problems by “regressing” the client to the early developmental stages where attachments form and by teaching the client how to attach to a caregiver in a healthy and developmentally appropriate way. He explained that the attachment model seeks basically to reconstruct the client’s willingness and ability to form healthy emotional attachments by providing what was missing during the formative years. Under this model, the primary “agent of change” is the childcare worker (CW), who spends the most time with the client and who is primarily responsible for implementing the attachment model in the milieu. The doctor described the three phases of the attachment therapeutic model. In the first phase, referred to as the “trust of care” phase, the CW seeks first to take the client back to a state of complete dependence, as in infancy. The child is required to ask for everything and must rely on the CW to provide what he or she needs. According to the model, once a state of complete dependence is achieved and the CW is viewed by the client as a reliable provider, the child learns that the caregiver can be trusted to fulfill his or her needs. During this time, the child is said to be learning trust of his caregiver. The second phase is referred to as the “trust of control” phase. During this phase, the client is viewed from an emotional development perspective as a “toddler.” During this phase, the client is said to learn trust of control as a result of the CW gradually providing increasing freedom with limitations. The client then enters the final phase, referred to as the “trust of self” phase. Increasing freedom with appropriate limitations is said to eventually bring the client back to his or her appropriate developmental stage in a way that encourages the client to exercise self-control with confidence. When the program is completed, typically in eighteen to twenty-four months, the trust of care is usually transferred to the parents. Dr. Hans testified that the placements proposed by the District would not meet STUDENT’s needs. He believes that STUDENT needs to be at VSM, in large part because it adheres to the attachment therapeutic model. He stated that the Respondents’ proposed placements use a behavioral model, one that does not include the regression/relational components characteristic of the approach used at VSM. His opinion is based in part upon his belief that STUDENT has not had lasting success with strictly behavioral approaches in the past; however, there was no evidence that STUDENT had ever be placed in an RTC that followed the traditional behavioral model.

Nalaina Combariza, Ph.D. and a CMH psychologist, testified for CMH. Dr. Combariza is aware of the literature about and philosophies underlying the treatment of attachment problems, including RAD, and has undergone a brief training in the type of attachment therapeutic model and techniques used at VSM. She is not familiar with other treatment models that focus specifically on attachment problems.

Dr. Combariza has treated children with diagnoses similar to STUDENT’s, including the RAD diagnosis. In her opinion, an RTC that adheres to the “attachment” therapeutic model is not required to meet STUDENT’s needs. She disagreed with the approach used at VSM, which focuses on the treatment of one particular diagnosis. In her opinion, children like STUDENT need to be viewed not as a single diagnosis, but as a complex of diagnoses. Dr. Combariza believes that treatment should depend on the needs of the particular child and that in the context of special education, the focus should be on the behavior that is the greatest impediment to learning. As a supervising member of the diagnostic team that reviewed STUDENT’s case at CMH, Dr. Combariza agreed that the proposed local RTC would be able to meet STUDENT’s emotional and social needs.

Although the Respondents questioned the accuracy of the attachment disorder diagnosis for STUDENT, the Hearing Officer does not believe it necessary to reach that issue. STUDENT is qualified for special education and related services under the category of emotional disturbance (ED). He is entitled to have his needs met.

It is also not necessary for the Hearing Officer to decide whether or not VSM and its attachment model offers the best therapeutic environment for STUDENT. The law does not require that the Respondents provide STUDENT with the best placement or services. Seattle School District No. 1 v. B.S., supra, at 1500. STUDENT’s parents are free to provide the best placement available, but the question here is whether the placement proposed by the Respondents is designed to meet STUDENT’s need for a residential placement.

Dr. Hans was relatively inexperienced when he was introduced to the attachment therapeutic model and appears to have a commitment to the model that allows little room for debate. He readily discounted the effectiveness of the more traditional behavioral approach, although the evidence did not demonstrate that STUDENT had previously been in an RTC that followed such an approach.

According to Dr. Combariza, psychiatrists and psychologists have been writing about attachment issues for decades. However, Dr. Hans, the primary spokesperson for VSM and its attachment therapeutic model, could not identify a single peer-reviewed, empirical study demonstrating the relative effectiveness of the attachment therapeutic model compared to more traditional behavioral approaches. Even VSM became a proponent of the attachment model fairly recently in 1998 when the decision to adopt the model was made not by a clinician, but by a financial officer. In December 2001, responsibility for supervision of clinical activities was turned over to Dr. Hans, a relatively inexperienced clinician who had just finished his post-doctoral work and had no prior knowledge of or experience with the attachment model. Dr. Hans testified that the VSM program continues to evolve. It was not clear from his testimony how that evolution is taking place, but according to therapist Suzie Friedman, one recent change consisted of the doubling of weekly therapy time for all residents in April 2003. That kind of program-wide change suggests that VSM is still trying to determine how to practically apply and effectively implement its theories.

The Hearing Officer was persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Combariza regarding STUDENT’s needs. She had an adequate understanding of attachment issues as described in literature over the years and was specifically familiar with the attachment therapeutic model followed by VSM. She testified credibly to her opinion that a child with multiple emotional and social difficulties that interfere with his or her education requires a therapeutic approach that addresses the behaviors that need to be discouraged and encouraged. In addition, the opinion of Dr. Combariza was corroborated by the reports of two psychologists who evaluated STUDENT in the months before his admission to VSM. Mara Katzman, M.A., Ph.D., and Chris McRoberts, Ph.D. did not testify at the hearing, but their reports are in evidence. Neither of these professionals recommended an RTC that used the attachment model. Both recommended more traditional approaches to the treatment of STUDENT’s mixed diagnosis.

Although the attachment model may hold promise for the treatment of attachment disorders, the Hearing Officer finds nothing in the evidence that would support a finding that the treatment that STUDENT is receiving at VSM is superior to or more effective than that which he would receive at an RTC that used a more traditional behavioral approach. There is no solid basis upon which the Hearing Officer can determine that a program based on the attachment therapeutic model is necessary to meet STUDENT’s needs.

According to the testimony of Andrew Rappaport, the placement at Broad Horizons is able to provide the kind of support and supervision that STUDENT needs to work on his social and emotional goals. Broad Horizons uses a traditional behavioral approach and a level system that rewards positive achievement with greater freedom. It also provides individual and family therapy. Although the proposed placement does not specialize in the treatment of RAD, it is capable of treating that diagnosis, as well as STUDENT’s other diagnoses. In addition, Mr. Rappaport testified that he has been involved in moving clients from one facility to another. He would assist with the transition and would work as necessary with others on that process.

Mr. Concellosi is the CMH program manager and was its representative at the hearing. He has a master’s degree in social work and has worked in the field since 1983. He has had significant experience working at and with RTCs since 1975. Mr. Concellosi testified that Broad Horizons is a forty-bed facility that has been receiving referrals from CMH for at least ten years. It has successfully treated CMH clients with a typical stay of six to twelve months. The twelve- to eighteen-year-old residents have a wide variety of diagnoses that are treated with a behavioral therapeutic model and social integration.

The Hearing Officer is persuaded that Broad Horizons is capable of meeting STUDENT’s need for reduction in maladaptive behaviors that interfere with his learning and his need for an improvement in social interest and skills. (Footnote 26)

The Petitioner also contends that requiring the Petitioner to move from VSM at this time, or at any time in the foreseeable future, would be harmful to him. Dr. Hans testified that STUDENT is not ready to be moved from VSM. He did not say when, if ever, STUDENT might be ready for a move. Dr. Hans explained that STUDENT does not react well to change and that he would be confused, angry, and irrational if a change were forced upon him. He would see it as just another abandonment. That would impact his receptivity to control by adults and to instruction in general. Dr. Hans also would expect STUDENT’s negative behaviors to become worse. Therapist Suzie Friedman painted an even bleaker picture, testifying that the removal of STUDENT from VSM would increase his anger and feelings of rejection and that he would stand to lose everything that he has gained while at VSM.

The Hearing Officer is persuaded that a move from VSM to Broad Horizons in the San Diego area would be difficult for STUDENT. It is reasonable to conclude that such a move will likely cause a temporary increase in negative feelings and behaviors. There is a risk of some setback. But there are often such risks when a severely emotionally disturbed student is moved. Even moves from grade to grade or school to school can cause setbacks. However, the Hearing Officer does not believe that the removal of STUDENT from VSM will be the disaster predicted by Ms. Friedman. STUDENT has been able to weather other changes in his life. There were many in the early years following the death of his mother and leading up to his admission to VSM. There were more changes to STUDENT’s environment and routine during his first fourteen months at VSM. He had no therapy and no school for the first several months. Several different people have been assigned as STUDENT’s primary childcare worker. His weekly therapy time was doubled. All of these might have caused some setback, but they are the kind of changes that can occur. No witness testified that STUDENT suffered any permanent setback as a result of these changes at VSM. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the risk of a move is so great that one cannot be considered, if otherwise appropriate.

The Hearing Officer does believe that some reasonable effort is required to facilitate STUDENT’s transition and minimize the difficulties it may cause. Mr. Rappaport testified that he can assist with a transition, but no specifics were stated. The Hearing Officer finds that a specific and carefully tailored transition plan is required to minimize the harmful effects of STUDENT’s move from VSM. The IEP team must work out the details of the transition plan.

The Hearing Officer finds that the offer of a residential placement at Broad Horizons was reasonably designed to meet the STUDENT’s needs and that the STUDENT does not require continued placement at VSM in order to receive a FAPE.

2. Reasonably Calculated to Provide Educational Benefit There is no question that STUDENT is bright and capable. He has always done well academically, even when his impulsive and disruptive behaviors clearly interfered with his learning. STUDENT’s problems have always been related to interfering behaviors, not his intellectual ability. There is no real dispute that an appropriate residential placement that addresses STUDENT’s unique social and emotional needs will also be reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. Having found that the Respondents proposed a placement that would meet STUDENT’s needs, the Hearing Officer also finds that it was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.

3. Conform to the IEP

Because STUDENT remains in the placement selected by his parents and the Respondents have not yet been allowed to implement a placement proposed by them, conformity of the program with the IEP is not an issue.

4. Least Restrictive Environment

In selecting an educational placement for a child, the responsible agency is required to ensure that the placement is as close as possible to the child’s home. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(b)(3). Once it is determined that an RTC is needed, the responsible community mental health service is required to arrange for placement of the student in an RTC that is located within the county where the parent resides or the county adjacent to that one, if possible. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60100(f). Residential placements of a child with exceptional needs may be made in an out-of-state RTC only if there is no placement within the state that will meet the child’s needs. Cal. Gov’t Code § 7572.55. (See also: Cal. Educ. Code § 56365(e).)

The Hearing Officer finds that the proposed local residential placement does offer a FAPE to STUDENT in the least restrictive environment. (Footnote 27)

In summary, although the offer that was made on May 29, 2003 was substantively appropriate, it was procedurally deficient in that it was made one hundred four days after the February 14, 2003 due date. The Hearing Officer must now determine whether or not these delays resulted in a compensable loss to the Petitioner.

Issue No. 2: If the Respondents failed to offer or provide a FAPE to the Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year, are his parents entitled to reimbursement for any of the costs of his placement at VSM during that time?

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under the IDEA and reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496. The placement or services chosen by the parents are not required to be the “exact proper placement required under the Act.” Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). However, the placement and services selected by the parents must address the student’s needs and provide the student with educational benefit. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).

STUDENT had been at VSM for five months by the time his adoptive mother came to the District for assessments. Several of the Petitioner’s witnesses testified credibly that STUDENT has done well at VSM. It appears from their testimony that the program there has helped STUDENT with social and emotional needs. He has also continued to do well in school. Under the circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that the VSM placement has addressed STUDENT’s needs and provided educational benefit.

The parties agree that the Respondents were not involved when STUDENT’s parents first placed him at VSM and are not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s parents for the costs incurred for the VSM placement prior to the date that the Respondents should have made a FAPE available to STUDENT. The District is ultimately responsible for making a FAPE available to the Petitioner, including related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B). The Government Code provisions authorizing interagency agreements and joint regulations do not alter that obligation. A FAPE should have been made available to the Petitioner no later than February 14, 2003. It was finally made available to the Petitioner on May 29, 2003. The Petitioner was entitled to a timely offer of a FAPE and an adequate opportunity to consider and respond to that offer. Therefore, the District must reimburse the Petitioner’s parents for the cost incurred for the VSM placement, including both educational and residential components, for 104 days beginning on February 14, 2003, and continuing to the date on which a FAPE was made available to the Petitioner on May 29, 2003. (Footnote 28)

The Respondents did not present any issues regarding a division of liability per se between the District and CMH. The interagency agreement between the Respondents is not in evidence. Even assuming that such an agreement requires CMH to pay for the cost of the mental health services, including the residential and therapeutic components of an RTC, the Hearing Officer cannot determine from the evidence the specific costs attributable to the acts or omissions of CMH only. (Footnote 29) To the extent that the District believes that it is entitled to some contribution from CMH, the Respondents can either settle this issue between themselves or use the dispute resolution procedures that were created specifically for that purpose. (See: Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60600 et seq.)

Issue No. 3: Have the Respondents offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year through February 26, 2004?

The FAPE that was made available to the Petitioner on May 29, 2003 is the same FAPE that continues to be available to the Petitioner for at least the beginning of the 2003-2004 school year. To the extent that the 2003-2004 school year is at issue, the analysis also is the same. STUDENT needs an appropriate residential placement. He does not need placement in an RTC that uses the attachment therapeutic model, and he does not need continued placement at VSM. CMH has offered an appropriate local RTC placement. The Hearing Officer finds that the Respondents have offered the Petitioner a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year through expiration of the February 27, 2003 IEP.

Issue No. 4: If the District has not offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year, is he entitled to an order for a prospective placement at VSM?

The Hearing Officer has determined that the Respondents have offered the Petitioner a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. The Petitioner is not entitled to a prospective placement at VSM.

ORDER

1. Within thirty calendar days of receipt of proof, the District shall reimburse the Petitioner’s parents for the cost of the educational component of the Petitioner’s placement at VSM from February 14, 2003 to the date on which the District began to pay such costs pursuant to the February 27, 2003 IEP.

2. Within thirty calendar days of receipt of proof, the District shall reimburse the Petitioner’s parents for the cost of the residential component of the Petitioner’s placement at VSM for the 104-day period from February 14, 2003, to and including May 29, 2003.

3. If the Petitioner’s parents agree to accept placement at Broad Horizons (or at any other agreed-upon placement), the IEP team shall promptly develop an appropriate and carefully tailored transition plan to assist with that move.

4. The Petitioner’s other claims to relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the Respondents fail to timely offer and provide a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

2. If the Respondents failed to offer or provide a FAPE to the Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year and ESY, are his parents entitled to reimbursement for any of the costs of his residential care and education at VSM during that time?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

3. Have the Respondents offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year?

The Respondents prevailed on this issue.

4. If the District has not offered a FAPE to Petitioner for the 2003-2004 school year, is he entitled to an order for a prospective placement at VSM?

The Respondents prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: October 6, 2003 Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

The issues have been stated in a way that facilitates analysis and adjudication.

2 The question of a FAPE for the 2003-3004 school year is ripe only through expiration of the current offer.

3 On one occasion, his father found him in the kitchen with a knife to his stomach. He later told a counselor that he did not intend to hurt himself, but STUDENT’s parents were understandably concerned.

4 These diagnoses were on Axis I according to the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, IV. They provide little guidance in the context of special education analyses.

5 All references to Chapter 26.5 are to California Government Code Chapter 26.5 (§§ 7570 et seq.). Chapter 26.5 governs interagency responsibilities for the delivery of related services, including mental health services, to individuals entitled to them under the IDEA and related State laws. Such related services are frequently referred to by the number designations of the many Assembly bills that have gone into making up the statutes in Chapter 26.5 over the years since AB 3632 was first passed in 1984. In this case, the common reference by parties and witnesses was to Assembly Bill (AB) 2726. That bill, passed in 1996, amended Sections 7576 and 7587 and added Section 7586.6 to the California Government Code. Those statutes establish the responsibility of the California Department of Mental Health to provide mental health services required in a students individualized education program. References in this decision will be either to Chapter 26.5 or to one or more of the specifically applicable statutes or regulations.

6 The evidence showed that STUDENT’s unique needs were solely in the areas of emotional and social functioning and behavior. There was no evidence that he required special education or related services to address needs in any other areas, including academic functioning.

7 Mr. Rappaport’s notes state that the District also wanted STUDENT to stay at VSM.

8 At this IEP meeting, the District agreed to reimburse the parents for up to four two-day visits per year to “the NPS” at times recommended in the CMH treatment plan. This may indicate the District’s belief that CMH would agree to keep STUDENT at VSM, but the offer is of not consequence to this decision.

9 Generally, a “local” placement in this context means a facility located within, or in a county adjacent to, the student’s county of residence. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60100(f).

10 A FAPE should enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347; Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). This element is not at issue in this case.

11 The source of the February 19, 2003 date was not clear to the Hearing Officer. The Petitioner likely contended it was the date an IEP should have been completed and offered.

12 There was also the CMH letter delivered to Petitioner and his attorney on the first day of hearing which was apparently intended to be the written offer of the residential placement at Broad Horizons. That letter is of little consequence because STUDENT’s parents were fully aware weeks earlier that Broad Horizons was the offered residential placement.

13 Federal law uses the term “evaluation.” California uses the term “assessment.” They have the same meaning. Cal. Educ Code § 56302.5. The Hearing Officer will use the latter term.

14 The federal timelines were established by regulation in 1977. Those are discussed below.

15 The California timelines typically do not count days between regular sessions and school vacations in excess of five days. (See: Cal. Educ. Code § 56043)

16 These are maximum timelines. When a school district or parent uses less than the allowed maximum time, the time allowed for the process is compressed accordingly.

17 AB 1859, effective January 1, 2003, amended California statutes to bring them into stricter conformance with federal law. One of those amendments specifically requires that IEPs be developed in accordance with 34 C.F.R. 300.343(b)(2). Cal. Educ Code § 56340. As discussed in more detail below, the federal regulation requires the development of the IEP within thirty days from the determination of eligibility. However, because the same assembly bill also amended California Education Code Section 56344 without altering the fifty-day timeline, the Hearing Officer concludes that this timeline remains the law in this State.

18 The calculation of 104 days counts February 15, 2003 to and including May 29, 2003. Because residential placements like VSM continue through weekends and school vacations, those are not excluded.

19 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, Div. 9, Ch. 1, Articles 2, 3, and 4, are the principal regulations that deal with mental health related services. These will be referred to collectively in this Decision as “the joint regulations.” Other joint regulations deal with occupational and physical therapy services provided through California Children’s Services. The latter regulations are not addressed in this Decision.

20 The community mental health service is financially responsible for the provision of mental health assessments and services, including necessary residential placement costs. The LEA remains responsible for special education instruction, transportation, and other non-mental-health-related services. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 60200.

21 This part of the analysis should not depend on whether or not the student’s parents are able to use their own resources to provide their child with a safe residential placement.

22 In effect, the joint regulations delegate the power to make decisions relating to necessary mental health placements and services to the community mental health agency without imposing on it the corresponding obligation to make those decisions within California’s statutory timelines. The District remained ultimately responsible for making a complete FAPE available to STUDENT within the time permitted by California Education Code Sections 56321 and 56344. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(12)(B)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.142(b)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56340.

23 Shortly after the 1997 reauthorization, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Education proposed a Note to the amended Section 300.343, which indicated that LEAs would be allowed sixty days after parental consent to make services available to the student. After receiving comments to the proposal, the reference to the sixty-day time limit was deleted. Currently, federal law does not provide a timeline to run from the initial referral or receipt of parental consent.

24 The regulations were originally issued as part of 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.340-121a.349. They were redesignated in 1981 as 34 C.F.R §§ 300.340-300.349. (See: 42 Fed. Reg. 42490 and 46 Fed. Reg. 5460 et seq.)

25 At VSM, the residential environment is referred to as the milieu.

26 Although Ms. PARENT and Mr. PARENT testified to their inquiry into many features of the placement proposed by the Respondents, none of these other features were identified by the Petitioner as disputed issues to be addressed by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer addresses the aspects of the placements that were identified as disputed issues.

27 The Petitioner argued that CMH did not approve STUDENT’s continued placement at VSM because of budgetary constraints. The implication was that a January 25, 2003 CMH memorandum showed that CMH established a policy that there would be no out-of-state placements authorized regardless of the needs of the student. That memorandum does not have the force and effect of law. It had no effect on the analysis of the issues presented.

28 The Hearing Officer understands that the District began paying for the educational component of the VSM placement at about the time of the first IEP meeting on February 27, 2003. No duplicate payment is intended.

29 Had the District involved CMH in the IEP process as soon as possible, the Hearing Officer might have been able to attribute losses, if any, to specific Respondents.