California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 29, 1996
Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1168-95 · Hearing Officer Kathleen S. Chovan
Los Angeles Unified denied FAPE by missing dozens of IEP speech sessions; Hearing Officer orders compensatory therapy but denies private provider.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision notes an earlier case between the same parties (SN 999-95), which was dismissed on November 15, 1995, after the parties settled through the November 14, 1995 IEP. In this decision, the Hearing Officer also denied the parents' motion to replace her.
Summary
The parents of a 12-year-old seventh grader filed this case on their own. Their daughter is eligible for special education based on an orthopedic impairment and a speech impairment, and she attends the gifted program at John Burroughs Middle School. Her IEPs called for two 30-minute speech therapy sessions each week. The parents had settled an earlier case through a November 14, 1995 IEP, which lengthened each session to 45 minutes through April 5, 1996, to make up missed fall services. Two days later, the District missed another session, and the parents filed again.
The Hearing Officer found that the District failed to deliver fifty-seven 30-minute sessions and two 45-minute sessions between September 1994 and December 1995. Time spent on record review and scheduling did not count as therapy. Neither did school assemblies the student was required to attend. The District did not argue that the IEP services were inappropriate. Its offer to make up services was relevant to the remedy but was not a defense, so the District denied FAPE.
The parents asked for a private speech therapist. The Hearing Officer denied that request because they did not show the District was unwilling or unable to provide services going forward. The Hearing Officer enforced the November 14 IEP and ordered ninety-two more 45-minute sessions after April 5, 1996. She also ordered an IEP meeting within 10 days.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a district's repeated failure to deliver IEP speech services as a denial of FAPE under Rowley. Administrative time and required assemblies did not count as sessions provided. To make up the missed services, the Hearing Officer used the same extended-session format the parties had already agreed to in the IEP.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue 1. Did the District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education by continually failing to provide speech therapy in accordance with her IEPs?
The District missed fifty-seven 30-minute and two 45-minute IEP speech sessions between September 1994 and December 14, 1995. Record review, scheduling and required school assemblies did not count as sessions provided, and this substantial failure denied FAPE.
- Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered
Issue 2. If the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, must the District pay for private speech therapy services for STUDENT and provide additional compensatory education?
Private speech therapy was denied because the Student did not show that the District was unwilling or unable to provide future services. However, the Hearing Officer ordered 92 extended 45-minute sessions as additional compensatory education beyond the November 14, 1995 IEP.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Order to provide or change services. District shall provide 45-minute speech therapy sessions under the November 14, 1995 IEP through April 5, 1996. This enforces the compensatory sessions the parties had agreed to for services missed in fall 1995.
- Compensatory education. After April 5, 1996, the District shall provide ninety-two 45-minute speech therapy sessions, each made up of 30 base minutes plus 15 compensatory minutes. Delivery runs through the end of the 1995-96 school year and resumes at the start of 1996-97. This compensates for forty-three 30-minute and two 45-minute missed sessions.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 10 calendar days of receipt of the decision, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting to amend the IEP to conform with the order.
Total: 23 hours of compensatory services
Key authorities
Rowley; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District
People named in the decision
- Sarelle Levy-Cohen, District speech and language administrator/specialist (sole District witness), Los Angeles Unified School District, Language, Speech and Hearing Programs
- Shirley H. Brown, District representative, coordinator, Due Process, Los Angeles Unified School District, Student Services Special Education
- Dorothy Jackson, Coordinator, attended for District, Los Angeles Unified School District, West Los Angeles Special Education Services Unit
- Raissa Danilova, Russian interpreter, Special Education Hearing Office
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Kathleen Chovan, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Los Angeles, California, on December 21, 1995.
Petitioner was represented by her parents, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (District) was represented by Shirley H. Brown, coordinator, Due Process, Student Services Special Education. Also present on behalf of the District was Dorothy Jackson, coordinator, West Los Angeles Special Education Services Unit. The Hearing Office provided a Russian interpreter, Raissa Danilova, for the hearing, at the request of the PARENTS.(Footnote 1)
Witnesses testifying on behalf of the Petitioner were STUDENT, Petitioner, and MOTHER and FATHER, STUDENT's parents. Sarelle Levy-Cohen, specialist, Language, Speech and Hearing Programs, LAUSD, testified on behalf of Respondent.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open to allow the parties to submit written closing briefs. In a letter dated January 8, 1996, Petitioner indicated that she would not be submitting a written closing brief.(Footnote 2) Respondent's closing brief was received on January 9, 1996. Thereafter, the case was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education by continually failing to provide speech therapy in accordance with her Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)?
2. If the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, must the District pay for private speech therapy services for STUDENT and provide additional compensatory education?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Closing briefs
At the close of testimony on the afternoon of December 21, 1995, Petitioner requested that closing briefs be submitted in lieu of oral closing arguments to enable Petitioner to review the information obtained during testimony and incorporate that information into the brief. Petitioner requested that closing briefs be due the following day, December 22, 1995. Respondent agreed to the submittal of written closing briefs, but stated that it would be unable to adequately prepare a written closing brief by the next day. Respondent also stated that the District was closed for the holidays between December 23, 1995 and January 1, 1996, and requested that briefs be due on January 18, 1996. At the hearing, the Hearing Officer ordered that closing briefs be submitted by January 9, 1996.
On January 2, 1996, the Hearing Office received a letter from Petitioner which stated, in part, that the Hearing Officer should have ordered the parties to submit closing briefs by December 22, 1995, since the hearing was originally scheduled for both December 21 and 22, 1995. On January 4, 1996, the Hearing Officer received a response from the District that reiterated its statement that it would have been unable to adequately prepare a written closing brief in the time between the conclusion of the hearing on December 21 and 5:00 p.m. on December 22, 1995. In an order dated January 5, 1996, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had not presented any new information or additional arguments which justified altering the submittal date of January 9, 1996. In a letter dated January 8, 1996, Petitioner objected to this ruling, and notified the Hearing Office that she would not submit a closing brief. Respondent submitted its closing brief on January 9, 1996.(Footnote 3)
Hearing Officer
In Petitioner's letter received by the Hearing Office on January 2, 1996, Petitioner also requested that a new Hearing Officer be assigned to this case. Petitioner contended that the Hearing Officer was either biased or was not knowledgeable in the laws governing special education and administrative hearings, based on various rulings made by the Hearing Officer during the hearing. In a letter dated January 4, 1996, the District disagreed with Petitioner's characterization of the various rulings in question, and contended that there was no basis for Petitioner's allegations regarding the need to replace the Hearing Officer.
Parties to a due process hearing have the right to a fair and impartial administrative hearing at the state level before a person knowledgeable in the laws governing special education and administrative hearings. (Education Code section 56501(b)(4)). Parties have the right to appeal a hearing officer's decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. (Education Code section 56505(i)). This right includes the right to appeal a procedural ruling made during a hearing.
Petitioner claimed that the Hearing Officer was not fair and impartial because the Hearing Officer ruled against specific motions and objections made by Petitioner. Petitioner did not cite any legal authority supporting her contention that the various rulings in question demonstrated bias by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer ruled against both Petitioner and Respondent during the course of the hearing, and noted any objections to these rulings on the record. The fact that the Hearing Officer ruled against Petitioner on particular motions, after obtaining comments from both parties, does not indicate that the Hearing Officer was biased against Petitioner.
As noted above, Petitioner retains the right to appeal any ruling made during the hearing following the issuance of this decision. However, Petitioner did not provide any basis for changing hearing officers in this case. Therefore, Petitioner's motion to change hearing officers in this case was denied.(Footnote 4)
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is 12 years old and is eligible for special education because of an orthopedic impairment and a speech impairment.
STUDENT is a seventh grade student in the Gifted and Talented Education program at John Burroughs Middle School within the Los Angeles Unified School District. STUDENT also attended John Burroughs during her sixth grade year, which was the 1994-95 school year.
STUDENT's sixth grade IEP indicated that she was to receive two sessions of speech therapy per week for a total of 60 minutes per week. According to the IEP, these services were to begin in "9/94" and end in "6/95." (Pet. Exh. 1). STUDENT's seventh grade IEP indicated that she was to continue to receive two sessions of speech and language services per week, totalling 60 minutes per week. These services were to begin in "7/95" and end in "7/96." (Pet. Exh. 2)
In sixth grade, STUDENT did not receive speech and language services until November of 1994. She also did not receive speech services when she entered seventh grade until October 18, 1995. In October 1995, the STUDENT filed for a due process hearing on the issue of the District's failure to provide these speech services. (STUDENT v. Los Angeles Unified School District, SN 999-95) On November 14, 1995, the parties held an IEP team meeting and amended STUDENT's IEP to state that the District would increase STUDENT's services to 45 minutes per session through April 5, 1996, in order to compensate for the services she had not received since September 1995. (Pet. Exh. 3). Based on this IEP, the parties informed the Hearing Office that they had settled their dispute, and the hearing was dismissed on November 15, 1995. (Pet. Exh. 7)
On November 16, 1995, STUDENT did not receive speech therapy as scheduled. On November 20, 1995, the PARENTS filed for the present due process hearing, based on the District's continuing failure to provide speech services, including its failure to provide the compensatory education specified in STUDENT's IEP. STUDENT also did not receive speech services on November 30, and December 7, 1995.
Petitioner contended that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education because of its continuing failure to provide speech services in accordance with her IEPs during the 1994-95 school year and during the fall of the 1995-96 school year. Petitioner contended that the District's failure to implement the IEP of November 14, 1995 demonstrated that the District is unable to provide STUDENT with the speech services specified in her IEP, including the compensatory services the District agreed to provide. Therefore, Petitioner asserted, the District must pay for a private speech therapist to provide speech services to her. In addition, Petitioner contended that Respondent must provide three additional compensatory sessions because of the speech services missed on November 16, 30, and December 7, 1995.
Respondent contended that it is willing and able to provide speech and language services to STUDENT in accordance with the IEP of November 14, 1995. Respondent contended that it drafted this IEP in good faith, as demonstrated by the fact that District agreed to compensate STUDENT for some sessions that she voluntarily chose not to attend. Respondent argued that it had substantially complied with the IEP of November 14, 1995 through the date of hearing, and that it intended to continue implementing the IEP, including the compensatory sessions to be provided through April 5, 1996. Therefore, Respondent contended, Petitioner's claim was premature. Respondent argued that Petitioner's claims for private speech therapy and additional compensatory services should be denied because it had provided STUDENT with a free appropriate pubic education in the least restrictive environment.
DISCUSSION
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) and state law, students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education. (20 U.S.C. Section 1400(c); Education Code Section 56000) The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student's individualized educational program. (20 U.S.C. Section 1401(a)(18))
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et. al. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, the United States Supreme Court further defined the term "free appropriate public education " as "educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction. . . . [T]he definition also requires that such instruction and services . . . comport with the child's IEP." (458 U.S. 176, 188-89).
Appropriate relief for denial of appropriate special education services includes compensatory education. Compensatory education is not a contractual remedy, but is an equitable remedy, part of the court's resources in crafting "appropriate relief" under 20 U.S.C. section 1415(e)(2). Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F. 3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994).
(1) Did the District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education by continually failing to provide speech therapy in accordance with her Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)?
Petitioner contended that Respondent consistently failed to provide speech therapy to STUDENT, as required by her IEPs, during both the 1994-95 school year and the fall semester of the 1995-96 school year. As a result, Petitioner contended that she was denied a free appropriate public education.
In particular, Petitioner claimed that between September 1994 and the date of hearing in this case (December 21, 1995), the District substantially failed to provide speech therapy during three separate periods: from September 1994 through February 23, 1995; in June 1995; from September 1995 through December 14, 1995. In order to evaluate Petitioner's claim that STUDENT was denied a free appropriate public education, the Hearing Officer must determine (a) whether the District failed to provide STUDENT with some or all of the speech therapy to which she was entitled during these periods and (b) whether the District provided STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, based on the amount of speech therapy provided to her.
(a) How much speech therapy did the District provide to STUDENT from September 1994 through December 14, 1995?
As noted above, Petitioner contended that she did not receive the speech therapy to which she was entitled for three separate periods of time. The Hearing Officer will consider each period individually below.
September 1994 through February 23, 1995
STUDENT's IEP for the 1994-95 school year stated that she was entitled to two sessions of speech therapy per week for a total of 60 minutes per week, beginning in September 1994. In this case, the evidence showed that STUDENT did not receive speech therapy in accordance with her IEP.(Footnote 5)
MOTHER, STUDENT's mother, testified that in the fall of 1994, STUDENT did not begin receiving speech services until October of 1994. MOTHER stated that STUDENT received only two sessions of speech at that time and then the family was told that a therapist was not available. MOTHER stated that after those two sessions in the fall of 1994, STUDENT did not receive therapy again until February 16, 1995.
The District's speech treatment records(Footnote 6) indicate that the first session documented by the speech teacher in the fall of 1994 was on November 22, 1994, and this session involved only record review. The District's records contained no evidence to explain the District's failure to provide services prior to November 22. Sarelle Levy-Cohen, a specialist with the District's Language, Speech and Hearing Programs, testified as an administrator for Respondent in the areas of speech and language.(Footnote 7) In reviewing STUDENT's speech records during this period, Ms. Levy-Cohen acknowledged that she had no record of STUDENT receiving therapy prior to November 22, 1994. Therefore, the evidence showed that the District did not provide services to STUDENT prior to November 22, 1994, and the District provided no explanation for this failure.
The first clear reference to the provision of a speech therapy session in the District's records is dated February 16, 1995. Between the dates of November 22, 1994, and February 16, 1995, the District's records listed five scheduling or record review sessions, one "holiday event," one "conversation," three assemblies, one instance where the "teacher could not find her," and one session where STUDENT "didn't show up." (Pet. Exh. 4) Between November 22, 1994, and February 23, 1995, the District's records show STUDENT receiving speech services only on February 16, 22, and 23, 1995.
The District argued that both record review and assemblies should be considered as "sessions provided," particularly since STUDENT chose to attend assemblies. With regard to record review, the District provided no explanation as to why five 30-minute sessions of record review and scheduling were necessary between November 22, 1994, and January 11, 1995, nor why this paperwork precluded them from providing any speech therapy to STUDENT during this period. With regard to sessions missed due to school assemblies, Ms. Levy-Cohen testified that school rules require that all students with IEPs attend school assemblies as a component of their mainstreaming experience and that speech therapists cannot provide services during assemblies. Therefore, Ms. Levy-Cohen's testimony refutes the District's contention that STUDENT's attendance of assemblies represented her choice to forego speech services. Therefore, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the sessions involving record review, scheduling, and assemblies listed by the speech therapist constitute "sessions provided" to STUDENT.
However, even if the Hearing Officer counted the three assemblies, the one session STUDENT missed, the holiday event, and a "conversation" as "sessions provided" to STUDENT, this finding would only increase the number of sessions the District provided to a total of nine in the twenty-five-week period between the dates of September 1994 and February 23, 1995. Since STUDENT was entitled to two sessions per week, she should have received 50 sessions during this period, not counting the weeks in which school was closed for vacation.
Neither party submitted a copy of the school calendar for the 1994-95 school year, so the Hearing Officer cannot calculate the exact number of sessions missed. If the Hearing Officer estimates that six sessions would have been missed due to school vacation, then the District can be credited with a total of fifteen sessions of the fifty sessions potentially required over a twenty-five-week period. Therefore, subtracting fifteen from fifty, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with thirty-five 30-minute sessions between September 1994 and February 23, 1995.
June 1995
STUDENT's IEP for the 1994-95 school year indicated that the "ending date" of STUDENT's speech services for that year as "6/95." MOTHER testified that on June 1, 1995, STUDENT's therapist informed the PARENTS that she could not provide therapy to STUDENT in June because the District would not pay her after June 1. MOTHER contended that the speech therapist's failure to provide services in June denied STUDENT of services to which she was entitled, since the school year continued through June.
STUDENT testified that she received only one session of speech therapy in June of 1995. She stated that after her first session in June, the teacher told her that she (the teacher) did not have time for any more sessions. The Hearing Officer found STUDENT to be a credible witness. She was generally thoughtful before she answered a question, asked questions when necessary, and indicated when her response involved an estimate on her part rather than recollection of a precise fact. The Hearing Officer also gives her testimony great weight since she was the only witness with first-hand knowledge of the events.
Although the speech teacher's records contradict STUDENT's testimony, the speech teacher herself did not testify at the hearing. The District's witness, Ms. Levy-Cohen, testified that the District's speech treatment records indicated that the speech teacher provided sessions to STUDENT on June 1, 7, 8, 14 and 15, 1995. (Res. Exh. 4). The Hearing Officer finds the testimony of Ms. Levy-Cohen less persuasive because she had no personal knowledge regarding the speech therapy sessions. She had never visited STUDENT's sessions, she did not create the document in question, and she did not indicate that she had spoken to the speech therapist concerning these sessions. Based on this limited evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT received only one speech therapy session in June 1995.
On its face, STUDENT's IEP does not clearly indicate whether the IEP team intended for services to extend to the end of June, since the document states only that the services were to end in "6/95." STUDENT testified that she attended school through the end of June, and MOTHER's testimony that STUDENT was entitled to receive services through the end of the school year was not disputed by the District. Based on this evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was entitled to receive services through the end of the school year on June 30, 1995. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with approximately eight sessions of speech therapy in June 1995.
September 1995 through December 14, 1995
STUDENT's IEP for the 1995-96 school year stated that she was to receive speech therapy twice a week for a total of 60 minutes per week, beginning in "7/95" and ending "7/96." (Pet. Exh. 2). The evidence showed that school began during the week of September 4, 1995, but that STUDENT did not begin receiving speech therapy services until October 18, 1995. (Pet. Exh. 4) As discussed above, the PARENTS filed for a due process hearing based on the District's failure to provide services beginning in September 1995, and the parties amended STUDENT's IEP on November 14, 1995, in response to the PARENTS' concerns.
The IEP document resulting from the November 14 meeting indicated that STUDENT received only five speech sessions between the dates of September 5, 1995, and November 9, 1995, even though she was entitled to nineteen sessions during this time period. (Pet. Exh. 3) The IEP also stated that the District owed STUDENT fourteen sessions to make up for those missed between September 5 and November 9, 1995.(Footnote 8)
Respondent argued that the IEP team had overestimated the number of sessions owed to STUDENT and that it actually owed STUDENT only 12 sessions for those missed between September 5, 1995, and November 9, 1995. Respondent argued that the IEP team did not account for the fact that the STUDENT refused to accept speech services offered on Thursday mornings because these services interfered with STUDENT's morning academic subjects.(Footnote 9)
The Hearing Officer is not persuaded by Respondent's arguments to look behind the IEP, which it voluntarily signed. The only District witness, Ms. Levy-Cohen, became involved in the case after the IEP was developed on November 14, 1995, and did not indicate that she had any knowledge of discussions which occurred at the meeting, other than those reflected in the IEP document itself. Since both parties signed this IEP, the Hearing Officer finds this IEP to be conclusive evidence on the number of sessions that the District owed STUDENT during this time period.(Footnote 10)
The PARENTS contended that following the November 14 IEP meeting, the District failed to provide STUDENT with three 45- minute sessions. PARENT testified that the District did not provide therapy for STUDENT on November 16, 30, and December 7, 1995. PARENT admitted on cross-examination, however, that STUDENT was absent on December 7, 1995. In its closing brief, the District stipulated that it owed STUDENT two sessions for the days of November 16 and November 30, 1995.
Based on the evidence discussed above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not provide STUDENT with fourteen 30- minute sessions and two 45-minute sessions of the twenty-eight sessions owed to her between the dates of September 5 and December 14, 1995.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide thirty-five 30-minute speech therapy sessions to STUDENT during the period of September 1994 through February 16, 1995; that it failed to provide eight 30-minute sessions in June 1995; and that it failed to provide fourteen 30-minute sessions and two 45-minute sessions of speech therapy to STUDENT from September 1995 through December 14, 1995. Thus, in total, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with fifty-seven 30-minute sessions and two 45-minute sessions of speech therapy services between September 1994 and December 14, 1995.
(b) Did the District provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, based on the amount of speech therapy provided to her between September 1994 and December 14, 1995?
As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Rowley that the definition of "free appropriate public education" requires that the student's instruction and services comport with the student's IEP.
In this case, the evidence showed that from the beginning of the 1994-95 school year through the fall of the 1995-96 school year, the District failed to provide STUDENT with 59 of the speech therapy sessions to which she was entitled based on her IEPs. The District did not contend that the level of speech services in STUDENT's IEPs was inappropriate, nor that STUDENT did not require these services.
The District's primary defense was that it had agreed in the IEP meeting of November 14, 1995, to compensate Petitioner for sessions missed during the fall of 1995, and that it was willing and able to implement that IEP. While the District's compensatory offer is relevant for purposes of determining a remedy, it does not constitute a defense to the District's fundamental failure to provide services over a prolonged period of time. The Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education during this period because it substantially failed to provide her with the speech services to which she was entitled in her IEP.
2. If the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, must the District pay for private speech therapy services for STUDENT and provide additional compensatory education?
Having determined that Respondent failed to provide a free appropriate public education to STUDENT, the Hearing Officer must now determine the appropriate remedy. As noted above, under Parents of Student W., compensatory education is an equitable remedy which may be used when a student has been denied a free appropriate public education.
Petitioner contended that the District's failure to provide services, including those services agreed to in the IEP of November 14, 1995, demonstrated that the District is unable to provide the speech services designated in STUDENT's IEP. Therefore, she argued, the District must pay for private speech services. She also argued that she was entitled to additional compensatory education beyond that agreed to in the November 14 IEP. The District argued that it was able to provide STUDENT with speech services, as demonstrated by the fact that it had already began to provide her with the services promised in the November 14 IEP. The District argued that Petitioner prematurely filed for hearing in this case, and that it fully intended to provide her with the agreed-to services. Therefore, the District argued, it was not required to pay for private speech services, and no additional compensatory education beyond that in the November 14 IEP was warranted. Finally, the District argued that it was required to provide speech services in the least restrictive environment and that, therefore, private speech therapy was not appropriate in this case.
Although Petitioner demonstrated that the District failed to provide appropriate speech services in the past, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner did not meet her burden of demonstrating that the District is unwilling and/or unable to provide services in the future.
The Hearing Officer finds the November 14 IEP to be persuasive evidence that the District is willing to provide services, including services to compensate for those denied in the past. In addition, although the District stipulated that it failed to provide services on two occasions after November 14, the Hearing Officer finds this evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that the District cannot provide services. Finally, Petitioner provided no evidence concerning appropriate private speech therapy services to be ordered in lieu of the District's services. For all of these reasons, the Hearing Officer denies Petitioner's request for private speech therapy services.
However, the Hearing Officer is persuaded by Petitioner's argument that STUDENT is entitled to additional compensatory education beyond that designated in the November 14 IEP, since this IEP was intended only to compensate for sessions missed during the fall of 1995. The Hearing Officer found above that the District denied Petitioner forty-three 30-minute speech therapy sessions during the 1994-95 school year and two 45-minute sessions after November 14, 1995. In the November 14 IEP, the parties agreed to increase STUDENT's speech sessions by 15 minutes per session as a method of providing compensatory education, so that each session was 45-minutes long. Since the parties themselves devised this means of delivering compensatory education in the November 14 IEP, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District should compensate STUDENT in this manner for all of the sessions owed to STUDENT.
The November 14 IEP states that STUDENT will receive two 45- minute sessions per week through April 5, 1996, to compensate for the fourteen 30-minute sessions missed from September 5 through November 9, 1995. After April 5, 1996, the District owes STUDENT forty-three 30-minute sessions and two 45-minute sessions as compensatory education. If this compensatory education is delivered by adding 15 minutes to STUDENT's base level of services (30 minutes per session), then the District must provide STUDENT with ninety-two 45-minute speech therapy sessions after April 5, 1996.(Footnote 11)
The Hearing Officer concludes that the District must provide two 45-minute speech therapy sessions per week through April 5, 1996, as designated in STUDENT's IEP of November 14, 1995 (Footnote 12), and thereafter provide ninety-two 45-minute sessions of speech therapy to STUDENT. These services are to be delivered through the end of the 1995-96 school year and resume in the beginning of the 1996-97 school year.
ORDER
(1) The District shall provide STUDENT with 45-minute speech therapy sessions in accordance with her IEP of November 14, 1995, through April 5, 1996.
(2) After April 5, 1996, the District shall provide ninety-two 45-minute speech therapy sessions to STUDENT, to be delivered through the end of the 1995-96 school year and resume in the beginning of the 1996-97 school year.
(3) Within ten (10) calendar days of receipt of this decision, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting to amend STUDENT's IEP to conform with this Order.
(4) Petitioner's request for private speech therapy services is denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education by continually failing to provide speech therapy in accordance with her Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. If the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education, must the District pay for private speech therapy services for STUDENT and provide additional compensatory education?
Petitioner prevailed in part, and Respondent prevailed in part.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: January 29, 1996 ________________________________ Kathleen Chovan, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. During the hearing, the PARENTS requested that Ms. Danilova not translate all of the statements of all parties at the hearing, but only translate statements by the PARENTS as necessary. The Hearing Officer granted this request, but emphasized that parties should ask for the assistance of the interpreter if a particular statement was unclear.
During the lunch break (at approximately 1:00 p.m.), Ms. Danilova informed the Hearing Officer that she had a previously scheduled appointment at 3:00 p.m., and had to leave the hearing at 2:30 p.m. When the parties returned from lunch, the Hearing Officer informed the PARENTS of Ms. Danilova's schedule, and asked the PARENTS if they wanted to continue that day, given Ms. Danilova's schedule. The PARENTS agreed to proceed with the hearing and reevaluate whether to continue at 2:30 p.m. when Ms. Danilova was scheduled to leave. When Ms. Danilova left at approximately 2:45 p.m., the PARENTS agreed to proceed with the hearing for the remainder of the day without the services of the interpreter.
2. Petitioner's issue regarding closing briefs is described in the discussion of procedural matters below.
3. In Petitioner's January 2 letter, the PARENTS also contended that they requested the submittal of written closing briefs because they lacked the assistance of an interpreter. The record reflects, however, that the PARENTS requested that written briefs be submitted to allow them the opportunity to incorporate the information gained at the hearing into their brief. In addition, as described above, the record reflects that the PARENTS were given the opportunity to stop the hearing on December 21, 1995, when the interpreter left, but the PARENTS elected to continue without the assistance of the interpreter.
4. To avoid delay in the issuance of this decision, the Hearing Officer did not issue a separate order denying the PARENTS' request for a change in hearing officer, but has incorporated the discussion of the PARENTS' motion into this decision. Therefore, this document incorporates an order which denies Petitioner's request to change hearing officers in this case.
5. In evaluating the evidence, the Hearing Officer notes that STUDENT herself did not testify regarding this time period, and none of STUDENT's speech teachers testified. Therefore, the Hearing Officer must rely on the limited information provided in the record, as described below.
6. Petitioner and Respondent submitted into evidence identical copies of the District's speech treatment records for STUDENT for the periods of November 22, 1994, through February 23, 1995, and from October 18, 1995, through November 1, 1995. (Pet. Exh. 4 and Res. Exh. 4). On their face, these records indicate that they were created by STUDENT's speech therapists, but none of STUDENT's therapists testified at the hearing.
Respondent also offered into evidence STUDENT's treatment records covering the period of March 1, 1995, through June 22, 1995. (Res. Exh. 4) The PARENTS objected to these records because they contended that they had not received these records five days before the hearing, as required by Education Code section 56505(e)(7). Respondent contended that it had made several attempts to serve Petitioner with these records five days before the hearing, but Petitioner was not at home to receive the evidence, and, as a result, the evidence was retained at the post office.
As discussed above, the record in this case was left open until January 9, 1996, to allow the parties to submit closing briefs. The Hearing Officer informed the PARENTS that they could raise objections to Respondent's exhibit 4 through January 9, 1996, and that the Hearing Officer would allow them to call a District witness, if necessary, to question the witness regarding this exhibit. The PARENTS raised no objections to Respondent's exhibit 4 other than the violation of the five day notice under 56505(e)(7). Since Petitioner had an opportunity, with more than five days notice, to question a witness or object to this evidence, but declined to do so, the Hearing Officer admitted Respondent's exhibit 4 into evidence when the record closed on January 9, 1996.
7. As noted above, Ms. Levy-Cohen was Respondent's sole witness. Ms. Levy-Cohen provides administrative services for the District's speech and language program, but she testified that she has never attended one of STUDENT's therapy sessions.
8. In the IEP, the District offered fifteen makeup sessions, which the parties agreed would be made up by adding 15 minutes to STUDENT's 30-minute sessions through April 5, 1996.
9. Respondent also argued that the IEP team had erroneously included sessions which STUDENT had refused in order to attend assemblies. As discussed above, the evidence showed that STUDENT did not have the option of attending speech therapy on these days because she was required by school rules to attend assemblies.
10. Respondent also argued that it offered to compensate Petitioner for the sessions missed and that, therefore, the District provided Petitioner with a free appropriate public education. In this section of the decision, the Hearing Officer is determining how much speech therapy the District provided compared to that required by STUDENT's IEPs. The District's offer of compensatory education in the November 14 IEP will be taken into account in determining the appropriate remedy for Petitioner.
11. As noted above, the Hearing Officer adopted the approach taken in the November 14, 1995 IEP of extending STUDENT's speech therapy sessions to 45 minutes per session, with 30 of those minutes being the base level of services to which she is entitled in her IEP, and 15 minutes of each session representing compensatory education. Obviously, if the IEP team changes STUDENT's existing base level of services to a level other than 30 minutes, then the total number of minutes provided per session must be adjusted accordingly.
12. This decision has the effect of enforcing the terms of the IEP of November 14, 1995, which involved the District's agreement to provide compensatory education to STUDENT. In general, the enforcement of IEP provisions is left to the compliance unit within the California Department of Education. However, in the interest of addressing STUDENT's speech services in an efficient and comprehensive manner, the Hearing Officer concluded that this decision should address the District's obligation to provide the services in the IEP of November 14, 1995, as well as its obligation to provide services beyond those included in this IEP.
