California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 21, 2000

Student v. Capistrano Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1196-99 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Capistrano Unified must reimburse $6,632.50 plus monthly train passes for private school, summer program and an assessment; 1999-2000 claims denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 4 of 6 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a 16-year-old eleventh grader filed for due process against Capistrano Unified School District. Their son is eligible for special education with a specific learning disability. After ninth grade in the resource specialist program at Capistrano Valley High School, the parents rejected the District's June 1998 offer. They placed him at the Winston School, a nonpublic school, and at Futures High School for summer 1999.

The Hearing Officer found the District denied FAPE for 1998-99 and the 1999 extended school year (ESY). The written offer of four periods of special day class, or up to six, did not say what kind of class, which subjects, or how much mainstreaming. District witnesses also disagreed at hearing about what it meant. The IEP lacked required short-term objectives, so it could not guide an ESY program. Both private programs met the student's needs and he made progress. The District must reimburse $4,920 in Winston tuition, $200 a month for train passes (once the parents prove the months), and $962.50 for Futures.

For 1999-2000 there was no denial of FAPE. The parents refused to attend an IEP meeting the District tried to hold, so that year's Winston costs were denied. The District's 1997 assessment was appropriate, but it never acted on the mother's March 1998 request for reassessment. The District must pay $750 for Dr. Mitchel Perlman's assessment, but nothing for Dr. Jacqueline Shohet's assessments.

Go to full decision

Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied Union School District v. Smith to a vague offer that gave a range of special day class periods. It also shows that refusing an IEP meeting can defeat reimbursement for a later year. And it shows that ignoring a parent's reassessment request can support reimbursement for a private assessment.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-99 school year, including the 1999 extended school year?

    The offer of four to six periods of special day class did not say what type of class, which subjects, or how much mainstreaming, which denied the parents meaningful participation. The IEP also lacked short-term objectives, so it could not support an appropriate ESY program. FAPE was denied for 1998-99 and the 1999 ESY.

  2. Issue 2. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1998-99 school year?

    Winston met the student's needs with accommodations such as books on tape, lecture notes and frequent staff problem-solving, and testing showed substantial progress. The parents get $4,920 in tuition and fees plus $200 a month for train passes.

  3. Issue 3. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999?

    Futures gave one-to-one instruction in a writing workshop and Algebra I, which met the student's ESY needs, and he passed both courses. The parents get $962.50.

  4. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1999-2000 school year?

    The parents refused the District's attempt to convene an IEP meeting, and the student had been out of District programs since June 1998. The District therefore had no duty to develop an IEP for 1999-2000 and did not deny FAPE.

  5. Issue 5. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1999-2000 school year?

    FAPE was not denied for 1999-2000, so there is no basis for reimbursement of the Winston placement that year.

  6. Issue 6. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained from Mitchel D. Perlman, Ph.D., and Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D.?

    The District's spring 1997 assessment was appropriate. However, the District never answered the mother's March 1998 reassessment request with an assessment plan, so it must pay $750 for Dr. Perlman's assessment, excluding his later consultation with the parents' attorney. No reimbursement is owed for Dr. Shohet's assessments.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. $4,920.00 for Winston School tuition and fees for the 1998-99 school year, due within 20 calendar days of the decision.
  • Reimbursement. $200 per month for train passes to the Winston School for 1998-99, due within 20 calendar days after the parents give proof of the months Winston was in session.
  • Reimbursement. $962.50 for Futures High School tuition and fees for summer 1999 (ESY), due within 20 calendar days of the decision.
  • Reimbursement. $750.00 for the May 1998 educational assessment by Mitchel Perlman, Ph.D. (the $150 attorney-consultation charge excluded), due within 20 calendar days of the decision.

Total: $6,632.50 ordered

Go to full decision

Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; W.G. v. Target Range; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.; Burlington; Florence County v. Carter; Alamo Heights v. State Bd. of Educ.; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified; Mill Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Eastin

People named in the decision

  • Maureen Miller, director of special education, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Robert White, SELPA director, South Orange County SELPA
  • Steven Cogan, ninth-grade science teacher, Capistrano Valley High School
  • Shauna Kruse-Morgan, Ph.D., resource specialist program teacher and case manager, Capistrano Valley High School
  • Rebecca Bailey, resource specialist English teacher, Capistrano Valley High School
  • Teresa Victor, Basic Skills Math teacher, Capistrano Valley High School
  • Walter Ernsdorf, Ph.D., school psychologist, Capistrano Unified School District
  • Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D., licensed educational psychologist, private assessor and expert witness for Student, Private practice
  • Mitchel D. Perlman, Ph.D., licensed clinical psychologist, private assessor, Private practice
  • Winston School, nonpublic school (unilateral placement)
  • Futures High School, nonpublic school (summer 1999 unilateral placement)
  • Prentice Day School, nonpublic school (prior placement, grades 7-8)

Get new OAH special education decisions by email

A weekly Monday-morning digest of new California OAH due process decisions, each with a short plain-English summary from Vanaman German LLP.

You'll get an email asking you to confirm. Unsubscribe anytime. Subscribing does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in San Juan Capistrano, California, on October 19 and 20, 1999.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented by attorney Kathleen Loyer from the Law Offices of Kathleen M. Loyer. Also present on STUDENT's behalf were his father and mother, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Capistrano Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by educational advocate G. Robert Roice from G.R. Roice & Associates. Also present on the District's behalf was Dr. Maureen Miller, the District's director of special education. Robert White, the director of the South Orange County Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA), was also present during most of the second day of hearing.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: MOTHER; Steven Cogan, STUDENT's ninth-grade science teacher at Capistrano Valley High School (CVHS); Shauna Kruse-Morgan, Ph.D., STUDENT's resource specialist program (RSP) teacher at CVHS; and Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D., a licensed educational psychologist in private practice and retired school psychologist. The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Rebecca Bailey, STUDENT's resource specialist (RS) English teacher at CVHS; Teresa Victor, STUDENT's Basic Skills Math teacher at CVHS; Walter Ernsdorf, Ph.D., the District's school psychologist; and Dr. Maureen Miller.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES (Footnote 1)

1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-99 school year, including the 1999 extended school year?

2. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1998-99 school year?

3. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999?

4. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1999-2000 school year?

5. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1999-2000 school year?

6. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained from Mitchel D. Perlman, Ph.D., and Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D.?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old eleventh-grade student who is eligible for special education and related services due to a specific learning disability (SLD). He has resided within the jurisdictional boundaries of the District since at least kindergarten and attended the District's public schools from kindergarten through the sixth grade. For the seventh and eighth grades, he attended Prentice Day School, a certified nonpublic school. He returned to the District's public school system for the ninth grade (the 1997-98 school year) and attended Capistrano Valley High School (CVHS).

Before STUDENT attended CVHS, the District assessed him in areas such as cognitive functioning, academic achievement, and speech and language development. Walter Ernsdorf, Ph.D., the school psychologist conducting the assessment, found that STUDENT tested in the average range of cognitive functioning but that he had attention processing problems and difficulties with working memory. (Footnote 2) Additionally, he found that STUDENT's math and reading skills were within the appropriate classroom instructional range, but that his written language skills were significantly below his ability.

The individualized education program (IEP) team met on June 18, 1997, and reviewed the results of the assessment. The team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education under the category of specific learning disabled (SLD) because he had an attention processing deficit that resulted in a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement. The team agreed to placement at CVHS in the resource specialist program (RSP) for two periods per day for resource and English.

By the end of the 1997-98 school year, District personnel and the parents agreed that the then-current placement was not working well for STUDENT and that he needed a more restrictive setting. They disagreed, however, on what was the appropriate placement. At an IEP meeting held on June 11, 1998, the District made a written placement offer consisting of placement in four periods of special day class (SDC) with one period of elective and one period of physical education or, if the parents preferred, up to six SDC periods. The District also offered placement in the SDC extended school year (ESY) program at CVHS for the summer. The parents rejected both offers and indicated that they were considering a unilateral placement at the Winston School.

STUDENT's parents enrolled him in the Winston School, a certified nonpublic school, for the 1998-99 school year. In or about February 1998, the District contacted the parents about convening an IEP meeting but the parents declined to meet with the District. For the 1999 ESY, STUDENT's parents placed him in Futures High School, another certified nonpublic school. For the 1999-2000 school year, the parents again unilaterally placed STUDENT at Winston, where he continues to attend school.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-99 school year, including the 1999 extended school year?

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (Footnote 3) 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000 (Deering 1987). The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student's individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1994)).

"Special education" is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25) (1997) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16) (1994)). The term "related services" includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)). Education Code § 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California's term for related services, shall be provided "when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program." Included in the list of possible related services are psychological services other than for assessment and development of the IEP, parent counseling and training, specially designed vocational education and career development, and counseling and guidance. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997) (former version at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (1994)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(b) (Deering 1987).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student's IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student's abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a "basic floor of opportunity" that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student's educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child's IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent's opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

the 1998-99 school year

Petitioner alleged that, as a result of numerous procedural and substantive violations, the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year. The Hearing Officer agrees and finds that the evidence established that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year based on the following reasons.

First, the District failed to make a specific and coherent written offer of placement. Among the procedural violations that may constitute a denial of FAPE is the failure of a school district to make a formal, written offer of placement in compliance with the IDEA's procedural requirements. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (1997). In Union, the Ninth Circuit stated, "We find that this formal requirement has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe it should be enforced rigorously." Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. The Court went on to discuss the reasons for imposing the requirement: (1) to alert the parents of the need to consider seriously whether the school district's proposed placement is appropriate under the IDEA; (2) to help the parents determine whether to oppose or accept the placement with supplemental services; and (3) so that the school district is more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence of the appropriateness of the placement at a due process hearing. Id. The courts have continued to vigorously apply Union. See, e.g., Mill Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Eastin, No. C 98-03812 CW, slip op. at __ (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1999).

In this case, the District made rather ambiguous written offers of placement which consisted of four periods of a special day class (SDC) with one period of an elective and one period of physical education or, if the parents requested it, up to six periods of SDC per day. The written offers did not detail what type of SDC was being offered to the parents or what subjects would be covered in SDC and, therefore, failed to provide the complete formal written offer required by Union. Moreover, there was no evidence that any of this necessary information was provided to the parents orally at the meeting, which would not have satisfied the requirements of Union and the IDEA, but might have been enough to allow the parents to know enough to take the District's offers into serious consideration. To further complicate matters, District personnel presented conflicting testimony at the hearing regarding what the SDC offers included. Dr. Maureen Miller, the District's director of special education, chaired the June 1998 IEP meeting at which the offers were made and testified that the District simply meant that STUDENT could have up to six periods of special education per day, which would classify him as an SDC student. She testified that, regardless of the SDC classification, his schedule could have consisted of a combination of resource specialist program (RSP) and SDC classes, and that the mix would have been determined by looking to his individual needs. Dr. Shauna Kruse-Morgan, STUDENT's case manager and RSP teacher, testified that the offers were for an increase in special education and that she believed that STUDENT needed an increase in the number of RSP classes, not necessarily SDC classes. Thus, the District failed to clearly specify either orally or in writing whether its placement offers involved an RSP or SDC program, what types of SDC or RSP classes were being offered, what subjects were being proposed for special education, and the extent of mainstreaming being proposed for STUDENT.

The District's ambiguous and undefined placement offers constituted an incomplete placement selection process rather than a distinct, coherent offer of a placement selected to meet STUDENT's needs and to implement the IEP goals and objectives. The District's approach violated the intent of Union that a clear, coherent placement offer be made. The offer should have been detailed and specific so as to demonstrate to the parent that the District had carefully thought through and selected a placement that, in its professional judgment, would meet the unique and individual needs of the student. The District's offers did not alert the parent to the necessity of seriously considering the appropriateness of the offers. Quite the reverse is true. Such an approach suggested that the District did not know its own mind and that it was quite uncertain as to what was appropriate for STUDENT. In fact, the District could not even present a clear picture at hearing of what program was being offered for the 1998-99 school year, suggesting that the District did not even know itself what was offered. Consequently, as was made clear by the testimony of Dr. Miller and Dr. Kruse-Morgan, it was unclear to all involved, and especially the parents, what the District was actually offering for the 1998-99 school year.

The District unfortunately did not take the final step in the process of clearly identifying an appropriate placement from a range of possibilities, even after being informed on June 11, 1998, that the parents were considering unilateral placement of STUDENT at the Winston School because of what they perceived to be a denial of FAPE. (Footnote 4) There remained sufficient time, even at that point, for the District to convene an IEP meeting and make a clear, coherent placement offer that the parents could have seriously considered before the 1998-99 school year began. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2) (1997). A school district cannot avoid its responsibility to exercise its professional judgment in selecting and offering a specific educational placement which the district's educational experts determine is appropriate to meet a student's unique and individual needs. Moreover, in the instant case, no persuasive evidence was presented at the hearing to establish that the District's offers would have resulted in an appropriate public placement for STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year.

To result in a denial of FAPE, a procedural violation must seriously infringe on the parent's opportunity to participate in the IEP process or result in the loss of educational opportunity. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Here, the parents were denied meaningful participation in the IEP process because the District failed to provide a written, specific offer of placement - or even a clear oral offer of placement - that the parents could seriously consider for the 1998-99 school year. Further, no evidence was presented that the District's offer would have resulted in an appropriate for STUDENT.

Second, the District failed to develop appropriate objectives for inclusion in STUDENT's IEP for the 1998-99 school year. Without examining the substantive appropriateness of the goals and objectives, it is clear that the District's IEP did not even meet the basic procedural requirements of the law. The goals and objectives, which were dated January 14, 1998, failed to include short-term instructional objectives, as required by the IDEA and State special education law. 20 U.S.C.§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(ii) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(2) (Deering Supp. 1999). Short-term instructional objectives are measurable, intermediate steps between the child's present levels of educational performance and the annual goals that are established for the child. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 39 (1996). The objectives should be developed based on a logical breakdown of the major components of the annual goals and should be projected to be accomplished over an extended period of time, such as a school quarter or semester. Id. The IEP objectives provide general benchmarks for measuring the child's progress toward meeting the annual goals. Id. The District failed to develop any short-term instructional objectives for the 1998-99 school year. The proposed goals dated January 14, 1998, consisted only of annual goals that were slated to be met by January 1999. Further, there was no evidence that objectives were ever discussed by the IEP team or that the parents had any idea what the objectives might be.

In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year.

the 1999 extended school year

Extended school year (ESY) programming is educational programming that extends instruction beyond the normal school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992). In California, a school district is required to provide a special education student with ESY programming when the student requires special education and related services in excess of the regular academic year or the IEP team has determined the need for ESY programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043 (1999); compare with 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(2) (1999). Section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations defines such students in the following manner:

Such individuals shall have handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of the pupil's educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, rendering it impossible or unlikely that the pupil will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition.

Education Code § 56345(b)(5) provides that where, as here, a child has been determined by his or her IEP team to be entitled to ESY services, the written IEP must include an ESY program. See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043(f). There was no dispute that STUDENT was entitled to ESY services. The IEP proposed by the District on June 11, 1998, indicated that the District's offer included an SDC ESY program. Dr. Walter Ernsdorf, the school psychologist, testified that ESY instruction is typically based on the goals and objectives contained in the student's IEP.

Neither State nor federal law contains detailed standards for the conduct of ESY programs. While it is apparent that an ESY program need not meet all the requirements applicable to the program for the regular academic school year in order to provide a FAPE, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043, it is equally clear that ESY programming must, at the very least, be provided in accord with the IEP and, at a minimum, serve the declared purposes of ESY programming, which in California is to prevent regression over the summer months. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.309 and Attachment 1, p.12575 (1999). Accordingly, special education students are entitled to an appropriate program for the regular school year and knowledge that the ESY program will be based on, and be implemented in accordance with, that appropriate program.

In this case, the District represented that the proposed ESY programming was to be based on the goals and objectives contained in STUDENT's IEP. (Footnote 5) However, as discussed above, the IEP proposed for the 1998-99 school year was inappropriate and, thus, there was no appropriate IEP to guide the implementation of the ESY. Among other things, the proposed IEP failed to contain benchmarks or short-term objectives by which STUDENT's instruction could be guided and his progress measured. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q.39 (1996). Additionally, the District's failure to develop appropriate benchmarks or objectives would have resulted in an inability to tailor the ESY instruction to the instructional level STUDENT needed and to address his weak skill areas. Goals and objectives are meant to focus on offsetting or reducing the problems resulting from a child's disability that interfere with learning and educational performance in school. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 40 (1996). For a child with a learning disability who is functioning several grades below his or her indicated ability in written language, such as STUDENT was, the IEP should contain goals and objectives directed to (1) closing the gap between the child's indicated ability and current level of functioning, and (2) helping the child improve the specific skills that are contributing to the discrepancy between ability and functioning. Id. STUDENT's goals failed to target the intermediate problems or weak skill areas that were contributing to his low functioning in written language. Only with appropriate goals and objectives in his IEP would it have been possible for the instruction during the ESY to be individualized to his goals and objectives at the level to which he had attained them and to address the specific skill areas that were contributing to the discrepancy between his ability and achievement in written language.

Consequently, the evidence did not establish that the instruction would have met even the minimal standards for ESY programming because there did not exist an appropriate IEP from which ESY instruction could have been tailored. Moreover, without appropriate benchmarks, the IEP team would not have known what level STUDENT had been able to achieve by the end of the normal school year and would have been without guidance as to what level of instruction it had to provide to prevent regression over the summer months. In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer an appropriate ESY program for the 1999 ESY.

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 regular school year and the 1999 ESY.

ISSUE NO. 2: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1998-99 school year?

When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (1997). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement or services and the services provided by the parents were appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated the following about the rationale behind the Court's decision in Burlington:

The rationale behind Burlington's holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an "empty victory." [Footnote omitted.] As stated by the Court, if "appropriate relief" in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed, "the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parent's right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete." [Footnote omitted.]

Id.

In light of the conclusion reached in Issue No. 1, that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-99 school year, the Hearing Officer must now determine whether the program provided by STUDENT's parents was proper under the IDEA. In Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student's IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the state. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court has recognized that the parents' placement does not have to meet a standard as high as a school district's must meet, the parents' placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student's needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.

The evidence presented at hearing demonstrated that Winston was an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year because it addressed his unique needs and provided him with educational benefit. MOTHER worked closely with STUDENT for hours every night on school work during the 1997-98 school year and developed a working knowledge of his learning disabilities. She testified that Winston provided STUDENT with the modifications and instruction he needed to benefit from his education. For example, MOTHER testified that Winston provided STUDENT with modifications such as books on tape and lecture notes, which were modifications the District recognized (in its otherwise wholly inappropriate offer) that STUDENT needed to benefit from his education and that addressed, among other things, his attention and memory problems. MOTHER also testified that the Winston staff met frequently to find solutions to any problems STUDENT presented with in the classroom setting, a practice that Dr. Jacqueline Shohet testified was necessary in providing STUDENT an appropriate program because of his rather complicated profile. (Footnote 6)

Petitioner also submitted examples of the lecture notes and assignment calendars provided by Winston as visual aides for STUDENT, accommodations which ameliorated the effects of STUDENT's attention difficulties and other ADHD symptoms such as disorganization. Furthermore, MOTHER testified that STUDENT did very well at Winston and that he progressed in Winston's program. The fact that STUDENT benefitted from the program he received at Winston during the 1998-99 school year was confirmed through standardized testing done in May 1999 by Dr. Shohet. The achievement test results obtained by Dr. Shohet, when compared with the results obtained by Dr. Mitchel Perlman in May 1998, showed that STUDENT made substantial progress in almost all areas tested over the course of his first year at Winston. No persuasive evidence was provided to the contrary.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that, as a matter of law, the parents are entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to STUDENT's placement at Winston for the 1998-99 school year.

Petitioner established that the parents paid $4,920 in tuition and fees to the Winston School for the 1998-99 school year. Through MOTHER's testimony, Petitioner also established that the parents paid $200 per month for a train pass to transport STUDENT to the Winston School. Transportation expenses are reimbursable if the services are necessary for the student to benefit from his or her special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997). There is no doubt that transportation was necessary for STUDENT to be able to attend and benefit from the instruction at Winston. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Winston for the 1998-99 school year in the amount of $4,920 and for transportation to Winston at the rate of $200 per month. The total amount that Petitioner must be reimbursed for the transportation expenses shall be subject to proof (to be presented to the District) of the specific number of months that STUDENT attended Winston during the 1998-99 school year.ISSUE NO. 3: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999?

The Hearing Officer concluded in Issue No. 1 that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999 ESY. To determine whether STUDENT's parents are entitled to reimbursement for their unilateral placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999, it is necessary to analyze the appropriateness of the Futures program provided by STUDENT's parents.

There is no dispute that STUDENT's learning disability significantly impacted his achievement in written language. STUDENT took a writing workshop course at Futures, which addressed his written language skills, as well as Algebra I. There was also no dispute that, to accommodate his attention problems, STUDENT required individualized instruction in a one-to-one or small classroom setting in those areas in which he had difficulty. According to MOTHER's testimony, STUDENT received one-on-one instruction at Futures. Thus, the evidence established that the program at Futures met his ESY needs. The evidence also established that he benefitted from the program. STUDENT passed both courses, receiving a grade of C+ in the writing workshop course. Additionally, MOTHER testified that she observed STUDENT do very well in the Futures program.

Given the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999. According to the evidence, the parents paid a total of $962.50 in tuition and fees for the Futures program. (Footnote 7) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $962.50 for their placement of STUDENT at Futures for the summer of 1999.

ISSUE NO. 4: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1999-2000 school year?

Petitioner alleged that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year. However, STUDENT had been unilaterally withdrawn by his parents from the District and placed in a private school during the previous school year. When contacted by the District with regard to scheduling an IEP meeting, the parents' attorney informed the District by letter dated February 19, 1999, that the parents declined to meet with the District because the District continued to stand by its previous placement offer. Thus, the evidence established that the District communicated to the parents that special education services continued to be available to STUDENT at the District, but the parents refused to attend an IEP meeting to revise the prior program or develop a new one.

Under these unique circumstances, the District was not required to develop an IEP for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year or to offer him a FAPE tailored to his needs. The overall statutory scheme of IDEA ‘97, especially the notice requirement for unilateral parent placements, embodies the concept that a school district is to be given a legitimate opportunity to offer a student a FAPE for the year initially at issue and every year thereafter before incurring the responsibility for reimbursing a parent for a unilateral private placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10) (1997). Thus, a school district is not required to develop an IEP or make a specific formal offer of FAPE every year for every student who has been unilaterally withdrawn from the district by his or her parents without some indication that the parents are seeking services from the district, even where FAPE had been put in issue in the past. 34 C.F.R., Attachment 1, p. 12601 (1999).

Here, the District attempted to convene an IEP meeting to discuss an independent assessment that the parents had obtained (for which they had not provided the District an assessment report) and discuss STUDENT's IEP. The parents' refusal to attend an IEP meeting and participate in the IEP process thwarted any attempts the District might have made to develop an IEP and offer a placement for the 1999-2000 school year. The parents' refusal to participate effectively tied the District's hands with regard to developing an IEP for the 1999-2000 school year because, while the District technically could have held an IEP meeting without the parents' participation, it would not have had any current information about STUDENT with which to formulate an appropriate IEP since he had been out of the District's programs since June 1998. Additionally, where, as here, a school district is attempting to fulfill the mandates of the IDEA and the parents unreasonably refuse to participate, equitable considerations counsel against the awarding of relief for the parents. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 2005.

Taking these facts together, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not err when it did not develop an IEP for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year and did not deny him a FAPE. None of the authorities cited by Petitioner dictates a contrary result. (Footnote 8)

ISSUE NO. 5: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1999-2000 school year?

In light of the conclusion reached in Issue No. 4 that the District did not have a duty to develop an IEP for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year and that it did not deny him a FAPE, there is no basis upon which to award reimbursement for expenses related to the parents' unilateral placement of STUDENT at Winston for the 1999-2000 school year. Therefore, Petitioner's request for reimbursement is denied.

ISSUE NO. 6: Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained from Mitchel D. Perlman, Ph.D., and Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D.?

A parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation (IEE) performed by a qualified specialist at public expense if (1) the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the educational agency and (2) the educational agency is unable to show that its evaluation was appropriate at a due process hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b) (1999) (former version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b) (1996)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b) (Deering Supp. 1999).

Petitioner argued that STUDENT's parents are entitled to reimbursement for assessments performed by Dr. Mitchel Perlman in May 1998 and Dr. Jacqueline Shohet in November 1998 and May 1999, because the District failed to conduct an appropriate assessment in the spring of 1997 and failed to conduct an assessment in response to the mother's request for an assessment in March 1999. (Footnote 9) Each argument will be addressed in turn.

In support of his first argument regarding the appropriateness of the District's assessment, Petitioner contended that the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected or known disability, as required by Education Code § 56320(f). No persuasive evidence was presented to support this contention. Dr. Shohet, Petitioner's expert witness, reviewed the reports generated from the District's assessment of STUDENT in the spring of 1997 and found fault only with the speech and language assessment. Dr. Shohet's criticisms of the speech portion of the assessment were unconvincing because, as she readily admitted, she is not a speech therapist and issues regarding speech and language testing are outside her area of expertise. In fact, she testified that it was difficult for her to understand the different measures used by the speech therapist to assess STUDENT's speech and language skills and the meanings of the different scores. For these reasons, her testimony is given very little weight in this regard. In contrast, the evidence established that the District's assessment of STUDENT in the spring of 1997 met the applicable requirements of law and was appropriate. For instance, the District assessed STUDENT in all areas related to the suspected disability by administering, among other things, intellectual functioning and academic achievement testing, a speech and language assessment, various attention measures, and motor integration tests. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(f) (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). The District also used multiple procedures, not just a single procedure, for determining an appropriate educational program. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(d) (1996); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e). For these reasons, the evidence established that the District performed an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in the spring of 1997.

However, the Hearing Officer agrees with Petitioner's argument that reimbursement is warranted because the District did not assess STUDENT when his mother requested an assessment in March 1998. A school district is required to reassess a student with disabilities whenever, among other things, a parent requests a reassessment. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56381(a) (Deering Supp. 1999). State law requires that, whenever an assessment is to be conducted, the parent be given in writing a proposed assessment plan within fifteen days of the referral for assessment and that the assessment be conducted and an IEP meeting be held within fifty days of receipt of the parent's consent for assessment, unless the parent agrees in writing to an extension of either of the time lines. (Footnote 10) Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321(a), 56344 (Deering Supp. 1999). Here, the evidence indicated that STUDENT's mother faxed to the District a request for an assessment of STUDENT's progress on March 10, 1998. Consequently, the District should have given the parents a proposed assessment plan by March 25. Instead, having had no response from the District, MOTHER again wrote to the District on March 30 indicating that she wanted STUDENT reassessed. The District (through Ms. Kruse-Morgan) finally responded to MOTHER's request on April 1 but, rather than giving her a proposed assessment plan, Ms. Kruse-Morgan wrote the following to the PARENTs:

As regards testing, STUDENT's most recent test scores fall between a seventh and tenth grade level. His lowest test score, at a 5.2 grade level in dictation, is a direct result of his dysgraphia and dyslexia. I am not sure testing would be indicated except in areas where he was low, and I understood his dysgraphia to be the decisive factor in that result. His grades this academic school year indicated that STUDENT is struggling to master some of the new concepts. In health, however, his behavior has not been attentive, as observed by the collaborative RSP teacher, Mrs. Bailey, who is with him that period.

The District never subsequently assessed STUDENT.

The District's response to MOTHER's repeated requests for an assessment was inadequate. The District neither agreed to assess nor refused to assess STUDENT, leaving the parents' request for assessment unanswered. Moreover, even if authority existed that allowed the District to refuse to assess upon some good grounds, the reasons given above by Ms. Kruse-Morgan do not represent valid reasons for a school district to refuse to assess. STUDENT's low scores were the crux of the parents' concerns, along with the poor grades he had been receiving in his classes. The District's program was meant to improve the low scores and improve they should have, dysgraphia or no. Thus, the parents made a reasonable request for an assessment to determine progress and the District improperly failed to assess.

Therefore, given the District's improper failure to assess, the parents are entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (1997); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. The parents procured the services of Dr. Perlman in May 1998 to provide some insight into STUDENT's academic progress. Dr. Perlman is a licensed clinical psychologist and a member of the American Psychological Association, and was thus qualified to assess STUDENT's progress.

For these reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred for Dr. Perlman's assessment. Petitioner submitted a receipt from Dr. Perlman for the total amount of $900. The total included $600 for administering and scoring tests, $150 for reviewing STUDENT's file, and $150 for consulting with the parents' attorney. While the amounts incurred for testing and reviewing the file were reasonably related to Dr. Perlman's assessment, the amount incurred for his consultation with the parents' attorney is not. The consultation occurred over four months after Dr. Perlman completed his assessment and therefore was not a necessary component of the assessment. Furthermore, Petitioner has provided no authority, and the Hearing Officer is not aware of any, which entitles the parents to reimbursement for expenses incurred for a psychologist's consultation with an attorney after the assessment has already been completed. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Perlman's assessment in the amount of $750, which excludes the portion charged for his consultation with the parents' attorney.

Finally, there are no grounds upon which to award reimbursement for Dr. Shohet's educational assessments in December 1998 and May 1999. As discussed earlier, the District's assessment in the spring of 1997 was appropriate. Apart from the parent's request for a reassessment in March 1998, the District was not under an obligation to reassess STUDENT until the spring of 2000. Petitioner has already been awarded relief for the District's failure to reassess in March 1998 in the form of reimbursement for Dr. Perlman's assessment, which was obtained shortly after the parent requested a reassessment and which was meant to assess STUDENT's academic progress. Given that no showing was made to substantiate Petitioner's claim for reimbursement for Dr. Shohet's assessments, Petitioner's request for reimbursement for Dr. Shohet's assessments is hereby denied.

ORDER

1. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this decision, the Capistrano Unified School District shall reimburse the parents of Petitioner STUDENT the following amounts, which total $6,632.50:

a. $4,920.00 for tuition and fees related to STUDENT's placement at the Winston School for the 1998-99 school year;

b. $962.50 for tuition and fees related to STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999; and c. $750.00 for the educational assessment performed by Mitchel Perlman, Ph.D., in May 1998.

2. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of proof from the parents of the months that the Winston School was in session during the 1998-99 school year, the Capistrano Unified School District shall reimburse the parents for monthly train passes at the rate of $200 per month. This amount represents transportation expenses incurred due to STUDENT's placement at the Winston School during the 1998-99 school year.

3. Petitioner's remaining claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-99 school year, including the 1999 extended school year? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

2. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1998-99 school year? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

3. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement at Futures High School during the summer of 1999? * Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

4. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1999-2000 school year? * The District prevailed on this issue.

5. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for STUDENT's placement, including tuition and transportation, at the Winston School during the 1999-2000 school year? * The District prevailed on this issue.

6. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for assessments they obtained from Mitchel D. Perlman, Ph.D., and Jacqueline Shohet, Ph.D.? * Petitioner prevailed with respect to Dr. Perlman's assessment, and the District prevailed with respect to Dr. Shohet's assessments.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i) (Deering Supp. 1999).

Date: January 21, 2000 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The issues listed here differ slightly in numbering and wording from those noticed by Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis, and to reflect the discussion held on the first day of hearing between the parties and the Hearing Officer with regard to the issues for hearing. Of note, Petitioner specifically confirmed on the first day of hearing that the FAPE issues presented for hearing involved only the 1998-99 and 1999-2000 school years and the 1999 extended school year (ESY). However, Petitioner's written closing brief stated that the issues presented for hearing included the issue of FAPE for the 1997-98 school year and the 1998 ESY. Because no notice was given to the District that the issues for hearing included FAPE for the 1997-98 school year and the 1998 ESY, these issues will not be adjudicated in this decision. However, as will be seen in the discussion of Issue Nos. 1-3, FAPE issues for the 1997-98 school year and the 1998 ESY need not be resolved in light of the conclusions reached herein.

2. He noted that the current test data was not consistent with a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) but that an ADHD diagnosis could not be ruled out.

3. In 1997, the IDEA was amended (IDEA ‘97). Most of the provisions of IDEA ‘97 became effective on June 4, 1997; others became effective January 1, 1998, or July 1, 1998. Thereafter, changes were made to a number of State code provisions, and new federal regulations were issued to reflect the mandates of IDEA ‘97. Senate Bill No. 1686, which became effective January 1, 1999, amended various State statutes relating to special education. The Department of Education issued new regulations to accompany IDEA ‘97 on March 12, 1999. While IDEA ‘97 did not alter the general standards reflected in the IDEA, the Hearing Officer will apply the law and regulations that were in effect at the time the disputed events occurred, in compliance with the general rules against the retroactive application of laws. Landgraff v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).

4. The District neither argued nor contended that the parents failed to give adequate written notice of their intent to unilaterally place STUDENT in accordance with IDEA ‘97. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (1997).

5. No other information, apart from its location on the CVHS campus, was provided about the proposed ESY program, such as the frequency and type of services, subjects proposed, or personnel who would have been involved.

6. Dr. Shohet is a licensed educational psychologist in private practice and a retired school psychologist. She assessed STUDENT in December 1998 and May 1999 at the request of the parents.

7. No evidence was submitted regarding any transportation expenses incurred in relation to the placement at Futures.

8. In fact, none of the authorities cited was on point.

9. The District's assertion that Petitioner's reimbursement claim must fail because the parents never indicated disagreement with the District's assessment is without merit. It is clear from the allegations made during these proceedings that the parents disagreed with the District's assessment and thought it was inappropriate. While it might have been helpful, the parents were not required to have expressed their disagreement to the District, either explicitly or implicitly, prior to filing a request for these proceedings in order to raise a viable claim for reimbursement. See 34 C.F.R. §300.502(b)(4) (1999).

10. The modified assessment provisions in IDEA ‘97, which allow for assessment by review of existing data in appropriate circumstances, became effective in June 1997 but had not yet been incorporated into State law. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c) (1997). Even if applicable, however, there was no evidence that the District met IDEA ‘97's assessment provisions. No evidence was presented that the IEP team met to determine if additional assessment data was needed, as required by the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1) (1997).