California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 23, 2002

Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1207-01 · Hearing Officer Vincent L. Pastorino

Los Angeles Unified must reimburse about $31,274 for private school, aide, therapy, and equipment costs; car seat claim denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 2 of 2 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a 7-year-old boy with cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegia filed for due process against Los Angeles Unified School District. They asked the District for special education in January 2000, but the first IEP meeting was not held until May 23, 2001. In the meantime, they paid for private Montessori schooling, a full-time one-on-one aide, transportation, physical therapy, and special equipment. At the hearing, the District stipulated that it had not offered a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from March 2000 to May 23, 2001. It also agreed to repay tuition, school transportation, and a classroom table and chair.

The District disputed the aide costs. It pointed to missing invoices, cash payments, and checks drawn on a business account. Hearing Officer Vincent L. Pastorino still found the mother's evidence persuasive. The boy could not have attended school without an aide, a District therapist saw the aide, and the pay rate was modest. He awarded $17,700. The District also argued that two weeks of intensive therapy at the Eureca Institute had no school-based focus. The Hearing Officer rejected that argument because a parent's choice need not meet the District's standard. The therapy loosened the boy's arm and hand tone, a step toward his IEP goals. That $3,250 award depends on proof of payment. The Hearing Officer denied the $729 car seat. The family did not show it was used before the May 23, 2001 offer.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied Burlington and Carter when a district delayed an IEP for more than a year. The Hearing Officer accepted imperfect proof of payment for aide services. He held that a parent's private therapy need not match a school-based model to be reimbursable. Items not shown to have been used during the period when FAPE was denied were not reimbursed.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedChild find

    Issue 1. Did the District offer the Petitioner a free appropriate public education for the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001?

    The parties stipulated that the District did not offer a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001. The parents had asked for services in January 2000, but the first IEP meeting was not held until May 23, 2001.

  2. Issue 2. If the Petitioner was denied a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, are the Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement from the District for private school tuition, transportation costs to and from private school, one-on-one aide services, physical therapy, and special equipment?

    The parties stipulated to tuition, transportation, and table-and-chair reimbursement. The Hearing Officer awarded $17,700 for aide services and $3,250 for Eureca Institute therapy, conditioned on proof of payment, but denied the $729 car seat because it was not shown to have been used during the period when FAPE was denied.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. $2,200.00 for the private program at Montessori One, payable to the parents within 30 calendar days (stipulated).
  • Reimbursement. $5,265.00 for the private program at Casa Montessori, payable within 30 calendar days (stipulated).
  • Reimbursement. $1,580.00 for transportation to and from the private schools, payable within 30 calendar days (stipulated).
  • Reimbursement. $17,700.00 for one-on-one aide services from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, payable within 30 calendar days.
  • Reimbursement. $264.00 for transportation to and from the Eureca Institute, payable within 30 calendar days.
  • Reimbursement. $1,015.00 for a classroom table and chair, payable within 30 calendar days (stipulated).
  • Reimbursement. $3,250.00 for April 2001 physical therapy at the Eureca Institute, payable within 30 days after the parents submit a cancelled check or checks totaling that amount (or a bank-verified copy).

Total: $31,274 ordered

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Key authorities

School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist.; Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Rowley

People named in the decision

  • Chrissa Patterson, District physical therapist; witness for District, Los Angeles Unified School District
  • Allyn Shapiro, District administrator for special education reimbursements; witness for District, Los Angeles Unified School District
  • Tonya Gregory, District special education due process office representative, Los Angeles Unified School District
  • Julia Dishdishan, private 1:1 aide (parent-hired), Private
  • Judit Naggy, private 1:1 aide (parent-hired), Private
  • Arieh Levavi, private 1:1 aide (parent-hired), Private
  • Eureca Institute, private intensive physical therapy provider, Private
  • Montessori One, private school, Private
  • Casa Montessori, private school, Private

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Vincent L. Pastorino, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, on May 7, 2002 in Reseda, and on May 8, 2002, in Encino, California.

Petitioner STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by attorney Joel Aaronson. Also present on behalf of the Petitioner were his mother, MOTHER, and his father, FATHER. Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (District or Respondent) was represented by attorney Katrina Campbell. Also present on behalf of the District was Tonya Gregory from the District’s office for special education due process.(Footnote 1) The Petitioner called the following witness: MOTHER. The District called the following witnesses: Chrissa Patterson, physical therapist at the District; Allyn Shapiro, District administrator for reimbursements related to special education. Following the receipt of oral and documentary evidence and oral closing arguments, the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES(Footnote 2)

Issue No. 1: Did the District offer the Petitioner a free appropriate public education for the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001?

Issue No. 2: If the Petitioner was denied a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, are the Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement from the District for private school tuition, transportation costs to and from private school, one-on- one aide services, physical therapy, and special equipment?

BACKGROUND

STUDENT, born on [date redacted], has severe orthopedic impairments that adversely affect his educational performance. At all times pertinent to this Decision, STUDENT has been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and spastic quadriplegia. STUDENT has attended private Montessori schools since about 1996. STUDENT’s parents first requested special education services for STUDENT in approximately January 2000. An assessment plan was submitted by the District on January 24, 2000, but the first individualized education program (IEP) meeting was not held until May 23, 2001. STUDENT’s parents assert that, in the interim, they obtained and paid for private services necessary for STUDENT’s education, including private-school tuition, a one-on-one aide, physical therapy, transportation, and special equipment.

STUDENT’s mother testified concerning his unique needs during the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001. Due to his orthopedic impairments, STUDENT was unable to sit independently. Weakness in his neck and trunk muscles caused him to need physical support while sitting. Without proper physical support, STUDENT could suffer injury by slumping out of his chair or by otherwise having his body in awkward positions. Physical support had to be provided in various forms, including the use of pillows, a special chair, and holding STUDENT’s hand. STUDENT could not walk. He could not perform functional tasks with his hands, such as writing, opening books, or feeding himself.

At the May 23, 2001 IEP meeting, STUDENT was determined by the IEP team to be eligible for special education and related services as a child with severe orthopedic impairments. In the May 23, 2001 IEP document, the District offered a program that included classroom support personnel, physical therapy, occupational therapy, adapted physical education, transportation, and assistive technology including special switches to access computers and computer software.

The present request for a due process hearing was filed by the Petitioner on May 31, 2001. In his statement of issues and proposed resolutions, filed nearly one year later on April 15, 2002, the Petitioner alleged that from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, the District failed to provide him with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The Petitioner further alleged that as a remedy for the denial of FAPE to him during that period, his parents are entitled to reimbursement from the District for the cost of his private educational classroom program in the amount of $8,375.00, his one-on-one instructional assistant in the amount of $17,700.00, his occupational and/or physical therapy in the amount of $3,250.00, his special equipment (table, chair, and car seat)

totaling $1,744.00, and transportation. The District did not file a written statement of issues and proposed resolutions.(Footnote 3)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Did the District offer the Petitioner a free appropriate public education for the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001?

Under State and federal law, individuals with exceptional needs have the right to a “free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1400(d), Cal. Educ. Code Sec. 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) means “special education” and “related services” that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(8). The term “special education” means specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parent, to meet the unique needs of individuals with exceptional needs, whose educational needs cannot be met with modification of the regular instruction program, and “related services,” at no cost to the parent, that may be needed to assist these individuals to benefit from specially designed instruction. Cal. Educ. Code Sec. 56031.(Footnote 4)

After this matter convened for hearing, but prior to the commencement of testimony, the parties stipulated that the District failed to offer the Petitioner a FAPE for the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001. The parties further agreed that the provision of a FAPE by the District from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, would have required the same types of services and supports, in general, as were offered by the District in the May 23, 2001 IEP.

Issue No. 2: If the Petitioner was denied a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, are the Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement from the District for private school tuition, transportation costs to and from private school, one-on- one aide services, physical therapy, and special equipment?

When a school District denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is appropriate in light of the purposes of the IDEA. Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of private placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district fails to provide a FAPE and the placement or services are determined to be appropriate under the IDEA. In addition, equitable considerations may be weighed in granting relief, and courts have broad discretion in granting such relief. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 358. Among the factors to consider is the conduct of the parties. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist. (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1486.

The Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). Although courts have recognized that the parent’s placement does not have to meet a standard as high as the school district’s must meet, the parent’s placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).

The parties stipulated that the Petitioner was denied a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001. The remaining matters to be decided at the hearing involved the Petitioner’s request to have his parents reimbursed by the District for the cost of privately provided services. Each part of the reimbursement request is listed and discussed below.

Private school tuition and associated transportation costs.

The Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition and associated transportation costs during the period that the District had failed to offer a FAPE. After this matter convened for hearing, but prior to the commencement of testimony, the parties stipulated that the Petitioner was entitled to tuition reimbursement in the amount of $2,200.00 for his private educational program at Montessori One, tuition reimbursement in the amount of $5,265.00 for his private educational program at Casa Montessori, and reimbursement in the amount of $1,580.00 for transportation costs arising from the Petitioner’s attendance at the above-named private schools.

One-on-one aide services.

The Petitioner asserts that from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, he required the services of a one-on-one aide at school and also while being transported to and from school. The Petitioner asserts that his parents paid $17,700 for the services of a one-on-one aide rendered during that period. The District stipulated at the hearing that a one-on-one aide was necessary. However, the District disputes whether one-on-one aide services were actually rendered and also whether payment for aide services was made.

STUDENT’s mother testified that commencing several months prior to March 2000, she had hired and used the services of Julia Dishdishan as STUDENT’s one-on-one aide to assist STUDENT while he attended school. Julia’s duties included assisting STUDENT with activities such as sitting in class without slumping out of his chair, carrying and using his books and classroom materials, feeding, and access to restroom facilities. She also assisted with transporting STUDENT to and from school. Julia worked from about 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m., 5 days per week. STUDENT’s mother testified that she paid Julia $1,200.00 per month for March, April, May, June, and July 2000. She produced cancelled checks to verify the amounts paid from March through June. She testified that for July she had, at Julia’s request, paid her $1,200.00 in cash. She testified that she believes Julia moved out of the country shortly after July 2000.

STUDENT’s mother testified that Judit Naggy replaced Julia and was STUDENT’s one-on-one aide from August 2000 through January 2001. She testified that she paid $1,200.00 for August and that $800.00 of that amount was paid in cash. She produced cancelled checks in the amounts of $400.00 for August, $1,200.00 for September, and $1,500.00 each for October, November, and December. She testified that she paid $1,500.00 in cash for January 2001. Judit left without giving notice, and her whereabouts are unknown to STUDENT’s parents. STUDENT’s mother also testified that Arieh Levavi was hired as STUDENT’s aide in March 2001. She testified that he has provided services from March 16, 2001, through the present. Cancelled checks were produced to show that Arieh was paid on a weekly basis from March 16, 2001, through June 1, 2001 at a rate of $400.00 per week, except for two payments of $500.00.

The District asserts that the Petitioner has failed to prove that one-on-one aide services were actually rendered by above-named persons or that payment was made. In support of its position, the District has pointed to several undisputed facts. First, none of the three aides provided written invoices for their alleged services. Second, the cancelled checks produced by the Petitioner were written on an account from the family business, and the family business had several employees. Third, the memo line on all but one of the checks was left blank at the time the checks were written. After the Petitioner was represented by counsel, his attorney instructed the mother to insert the word “Aide” on the memo line, and the mother complied. On the one check that did have a timely entry on the memo line, the entry indicated that the payment was for a service related to the family dry cleaning business. Fourth, some of the payments were in cash. On the basis of the above, the District asserts that the evidence of payment is unreliable and, likewise, evidence that the alleged aide services were even rendered at all is unreliable. The District presented testimony from its reimbursement administrator, Ms. Shapiro, who stated that to prevent fraud and to protect public funds, the District routinely denies requests for reimbursement unless those requests are supported by (a) written invoices from the providers showing the dates and/or hours of service and the amount charged and (b) written proof of payment in the form of cancelled checks or other written verification of payment.

In this particular case, the Hearing Officer finds the proof presented by the Petitioner to be persuasive. STUDENT’s regular attendance at private school during the applicable time period is undisputed. The Hearing Officer is impressed by the fact that given STUDENT’s severe orthopedic impairments, his attendance at private school without a full-time one-on-one aide would have been highly problematic, if not impossible. STUDENT, at the age of about 7 years, reliant upon use of a wheelchair and unable to walk or use his hands, would have been unable to get to school, unable to go to his classroom, unable to open his books, unable to feed himself, unable to sit throughout the day without slumping out of his chair, and unable to attend to his personal maintenance. The evidence showed that STUDENT benefitted from his private school program--his reading and math skills have been assessed by the District at substantially above his grade level. It would be unreasonable to conclude that STUDENT could have attended and benefitted from the private school without a one-on-one aide. Furthermore, Ms. Patterson, the District physical therapist who assessed STUDENT, testified that she observed STUDENT in his private school on at least one occasion during the applicable time period and that she saw STUDENT’s aide. The Hearing Officer is satisfied that the private one-on-one aide services were rendered as the Petitioner has alleged.

Regarding payment for the one-on-one aide services, the Hearing Officer notes that the rate of pay for the aides computes to the very modest amount of approximately $10.00 per hour, raising no indication that the Petitioner is attempting to overreach on the reimbursement claim. With respect to the lack of invoices, the District’s witness, Ms. Shapiro, agreed that STUDENT’s parents were not given notice of the District’s policies regarding the required documentation for reimbursement. Regarding cash payments, the alleged cash payments made without a corresponding check were infrequent, and they were made for amounts and at intervals consistent with the payments by check. Finally, with respect to the checks being written from the business account and having irregularities in the memo field, it is not the function of the Hearing Office to audit the family’s business-accounting or check-writing practices. The Hearing Officer is satisfied that the amounts claimed by the Petitioner were in fact paid to Julia, Judit, and Arieh for one-on-one aide services that enabled STUDENT to attend and receive educational benefit at the private school from March 2000 to May 23, 2001.

The Hearing Officer finds that the Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $17,700.00, representing the amounts paid by his parents for one-on-one aide services from March 2000 to May 23, 2001.(Footnote 5)

Physical therapy.

The Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $3,250.00 for physical therapy obtained at the Eureca Institute in April 2001, in addition to the associated transportation costs. The District does not dispute that the Petitioner required services in the nature of physical therapy. However, the District asserts that the therapy received by the Petitioner at the Eureca Institute was inappropriate for purposes of reimbursement because the therapy neither addressed his needs nor provided him with educational benefit. The District further asserts that the correct cost of the therapy was not proven. During the course of the hearing, the parties stipulated that if the Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for the cost of therapy services at the Eureca Institute, the transportation costs associated with those services would total $264.00.

STUDENT’s mother testified that she sent him to therapy at the Eureca Institute to address his muscle tone problems, including the lax tone in his neck and trunk that adversely affected his ability to sit or stand without slumping, and the spasticity that caused his hands to be flexed and his arms to be flexed at the elbow. She testified that the therapy STUDENT received at the Eureca Institute was consistent with the physical therapy goals and objectives that were later written into the May 23, 2001 IEP, including being able to tolerate sitting in an adapted chair for 30 minutes to allow for improved motor control and posture to perform table-top activities, tolerating standing in an adapted stander for 20 minutes to improve upright posture and allow for independent standing for classroom/playground activities, and accessing his computer with a single switch with minimal assistance. STUDENT’s mother testified that to manipulate a single-switch computer controller, he needed to be able to lax the tone in his hands. She testified that the therapy at the Eureca Institute was given 4 hours per day, 5 days per week, from April 9 through 23, 2001. She had arranged for the therapy to be given in conjunction with his week of spring break from school. She testified that during the two-week therapy period, the Eureca Institute targeted STUDENT’s muscle tone and she was “amazed” at how quickly STUDENT improved. She testified that before the therapy, STUDENT’s arms were predominantly flexed at the elbow. The therapy allowed him to have his arms extended and relaxed. The therapy also enabled him to lax the tone in his hands. She testified that even through the present time, STUDENT’s hands and arms have remained looser as a result of the therapy at the Eureca Institute. She testified that his ability to walk and sit were improved by the therapy, with his upper body and head control significantly improved.

The therapy records from the Eureca Institute are consistent with the testimony of STUDENT’s mother. The discharge summary dated April 20, 2001, states that “STUDENT initially held his arms in a flexed position at all times, now he can hang them down by his sides at ease on command, and his hands stay open most often.” The discharge summary also states that STUDENT was able to straighten his back with better trunk control and that his neck control was improved.

The District’s physical therapy expert, Ms. Patterson, was familiar with STUDENT, having assessed him in April and November 2000. She testified that before a therapist could develop a plan that would actually benefit STUDENT in his educational performance, classroom observation would be essential. She noted that no classroom observations were performed by the staff at the Eureca Institute. She testified that the written goals for STUDENT’s therapy at the Eureca Institute, i.e. decreasing his tone and increasing his strength as seen through functional activities, state nothing regarding how meeting those goals would help STUDENT to function in school. She testified that the intensive therapy modalities used at the Eureka Institute were not consistent with the intensity of therapy or the therapy modalities that she would use in a “school-based model.” She testified that because the discharge summary did not indicate how STUDENT’s areas of improvement would affect his performance at school, no significant functional gains for STUDENT were identifiable from STUDENT’s course at the Eureca Institute. She also testified that she could not state there was a functional improvement in STUDENT unless she saw him actually doing a functional activity. For example, regarding the assertion by STUDENT’s mother that he was now able to sit and have his arms relaxed with a decrease in hand and arm spasticity, Ms. Patterson testified that it was still unknown whether STUDENT could now use his hand to press a computer button. She stated that using his hand could cause his tone to increase, thereby restoring the spasticity in his hand and impairing his ability to press a computer button.

For purposes of reimbursement, the law does not require that the private services or placement chosen by the parent be the exact proper placement or services under the IDEA. Courts have recognized that the parent’s placement does not have to meet a standard as high as the school district’s must meet, although the parent’s placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit.

The District’s position that no functional gains applicable to STUDENT’s performance in school were identifiable from his therapy at the Eureca Institute is contrary to both the law and the evidence. The District has ignored the fact that long-term goals are often achieved by a student progressing through a series of incremental steps. Reaching annual goals by progressing through a series of short-term objectives is one of the basic principles of IEP development, as specified in Sec. 56345(a)(2) of the California Education Code. For example, the evidence showed that STUDENT needed to reduce the spasticity and flexion problems in his arms and hands before he would be able to control a computer by manipulating a single switch. The Eureka Institute program did enable STUDENT to lax the tone in his hands, something he had previously been unable to do. Whether the therapy at the Eureca Institute brought STUDENT to a level of improvement that enabled him to actually manipulate a computer switch is not the applicable test for determining whether the program at the Eureca Institute provided STUDENT with educational benefit. Regardless of whether STUDENT was able to manipulate a switch upon his discharge from the Eureka Institute, the improvement that STUDENT demonstrated from the Eureca Institute program was a significant and necessary step that brought him substantially closer to reaching the longer-term educational goal of being able to control a computer by hand through the manipulation of a single switch.

The argument by the District that the Eureca Institute program would not have been appropriate in a school-based setting or to meet FAPE requirements is premised upon a misstatement of the law. STUDENT was in the Eureca Institute program because the District had offered him no program whatsoever through April 2001. For purposes of reimbursement when FAPE has been denied, the private services obtained by parents do not have to meet a standard as high as what the school district’s must provide. The Eureca Institute program addressed STUDENT’s needs regarding his muscle tone impairments, and his improvement brought him closer to being able to eventually achieve the physical therapy goals and objectives that were later written into the May 23, 2001 IEP.

The Hearing Officer finds that the physical therapy services rendered to STUDENT at the Eureka Institute addressed his therapy needs and provided him with educational benefit. Therefore, the Petitioner’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of those services. As proof of payment to the Eureca Institute, the Petitioner produced a written receipt. The receipt indicates on its face that a check was received on April 9, 2001, for the April sessions, and that the amount paid was $3,250.00. The mother testified that $3,250.00 was paid. The $3,250.00 figure is handwritten above a crossed-out figure of $6,500.00. The altering of the document raises a question regarding how much was actually paid. The check was not offered as evidence. The

Petitioner shall be entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $3,250.00 upon production to the District of a corresponding cancelled check or checks totaling that amount.

Special equipment.

The Petitioner alleged that his parents were entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $1,744.00 for the cost of an orthopedic positioning car seat and a classroom table and chair. After the hearing commenced, but prior to the receipt of testimony, the parties stipulated that the Petitioner’s parents were entitled to $1,015.00 as reimbursement for the cost of a classroom table and chair. No agreement was reached regarding the reimbursement claim for an orthopedic positioning car seat. The Petitioner asserts that the car seat was necessary for transporting him due to his severe orthopedic impairments and that the cost of the car seat was $729.00. The District asserts that the car seat is not an appropriate item for reimbursement because the car seat was necessary whenever the Petitioner was transported to noneducational activities. The District also disputes whether the car seat was actually received and used prior to March 23, 2001.

STUDENT’s mother testified that in May 2001 she asked her husband to place an order for the orthopedic positioning car seat. As evidence that the car seat had been purchased by his parents, the Petitioner submitted a credit card activity statement for May 2001. The statement showed that the posting date for the car seat purchase was May 21, 2001. The District’s program offer was made two days later at the May 23, 2001 IEP meeting. For purposes of the present case, the Petitioner does not dispute that the May 23, 2001 program offer constituted an offer of FAPE. STUDENT’s mother testified that she did not know when the car seat was actually received or when STUDENT began using it. She could only speculate as to whether the car seat was actually received and used prior to May 23, 2001.

The Petitioner has failed to establish that the orthopedic positioning car seat was received and used during some or any portion of the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001 during which FAPE was denied. Therefore, the question of whether use of the car seat for noneducational purposes rendered it an inappropriate item for reimbursement is moot. The Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of the cost of the orthopedic positioning car seat is denied.

ORDERS

1. Within 30 calendar days from the date of this Decision, the District shall reimburse the Petitioner by paying the following amounts to the Petitioner’s parents:

(a) $2,200.00 for the Petitioner’s private educational program at Montessori One, (b) $5,265.00 for the Petitioner’s private educational program at Casa Montessori, (c) $1,580.00 for transportation costs arising from the Petitioner’s attendance at the above-named private schools, (d) $17,700.00 for one-on-one aide services, (e) $264.00 for transportation costs arising from the Petitioner’s attendance at the Eureca Institute, (f) $1,015.00 for a classroom table and chair.

2. Within 30 days after submitting a cancelled check or checks totaling $3,250.00 as confirmation of payment by the Petitioner’s parents to the Eureca Institute in April 2001, the District shall reimburse to the Petitioner’s parents the sum of $3,250.00. In the event that the original cancelled check cannot be found, then a verified copy produced by the bank or financial institution upon which the check was issued shall suffice.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code Sec. 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided.

Issue No. 1: Did the District offer the Petitioner a free appropriate public education for the period from March 2000 to May 23, 2001? After the hearing convened, but prior to the commencement of testimony, this issue was resolved in favor of the Petitioner by stipulation of the parties.

Issue No. 2: If the Petitioner was denied a FAPE from March 2000 to May 23, 2001, are the Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement from the District for private school tuition, transportation costs to and from private school, one-on-one aide services, physical therapy, and special equipment? After the hearing convened, but prior to the commencement of testimony, portions of this issue were resolved in favor of the Petitioner by stipulation of the parties. The remaining portions of this issue were submitted to the Hearing Officer for decision, and the Petitioner prevailed on the matters of reimbursement for one-on-one aide services and reimbursement for physical therapy. The District prevailed on the matter of the orthopedic positioning car seat.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code Sec. 56505(i).

Dated: May 23, 2002 ____________________________________ Vincent L. Pastorino, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

FOOTNOTES

1. Ms. Gregory was not present on the second day of hearing, and Ms. Campbell affirmed that she had the authority to proceed on that day without the presence of a District employee.

2. Portions of the issues presented for hearing by the Petitioner were resolved by stipulation of the parties prior to the commencement of testimony. For purposes of clarification and analysis, the issues listed here differ slightly in wording from the issues as stated by the Petitioner.

3. On April 29, 2002, the District filed a document entitled “Statutory Offer to Compromise.”

4. The parameters for adequacy of a student’s IEP are set forth in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). The United States Supreme Court determined that the student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student’s abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide some educational benefit to the student. Rowley, at 207-208.

5. The evidence showed that the parents paid $17,800.00 through the pay period ending on May 24, 2001. The Hearing Officer has deducted $100.00 from that amount to account for the day of services rendered after the May 23, 2001 IEP offer and to avoid exceeding the amount claimed in the Petitioner’s statement of issues and proposed resolutions dated April 15, 2002.