California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 15, 2001

Student v. Orange Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1235-99 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown

Orange Unified must reimburse $8,450 for Lindamood Bell after failing to reassess a student it had exited from special education.

Split decision: student prevailed on 3 of 14 issues (2 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. Footnote 1 says Issue 7 was raised at hearing but was left out of the Hearing Officer's October 2, 2001 order by mistake.

Summary

A 16-year-old with a specific learning disability and ADHD, through his parents, filed for due process against Orange Unified School District. The District exited him from special education in February 1998, during sixth grade, after his three-year reassessment. In seventh grade at Cerro Villa Middle School his grades fell sharply. His parent asked the school counselor about retesting, but no assessment was done. After a May 1999 disciplinary incident, the District sent him home for instruction for the rest of the year. It did not give him the protections owed a student with a disability. In June 1999 the District found him eligible again.

Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown found the 1998 exit technically correct. With extra help from his sixth-grade teacher, he did not need special education then, and he did not qualify as other health impaired. But once his parent raised concerns, the District should have reassessed him, and he was eligible again by January 1999. Because he was not treated as a student with a disability when he was disciplined, he was denied FAPE from May to September 1999. That ended when the District offered in writing to return him to Cerro Villa with resource services. The District's later offers met his auditory processing needs, and the remaining procedural claims failed. The District must pay $8,450 for 130 hours of Lindamood Bell instruction, plus mileage. The parents' private speech and audiology assessments were not reimbursed because they had canceled the District's own assessment.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO handled a parent's informal request to retest a student recently exited from special education. Skipping that reassessment cost the student disciplinary protections. It also shows a Hearing Officer setting compensatory hours by estimating missed resource services, and denying IEE reimbursement when parents canceled the district's own assessment.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 1. Did the District err in exiting Petitioner from special education in February 1998, when in fact he was eligible at that time?

    Using the performance IQ, the student had a severe discrepancy in written expression, but with extra help from his sixth-grade teacher it could be corrected in regular education, so he was not eligible as SLD or OHI in February 1998.

  2. Student prevailedChild find

    Issue 2. After Petitioner was exited from special education in February 1998, should the District have reassessed him and found him eligible again prior to the June 1999 IEP?

    Given his sharp seventh-grade decline and the parent's requests to the counselor, the District should have reassessed him; he would have been found eligible by January 1999, causing a loss of educational opportunity from January to June 1999.

  3. Student prevailed in partDiscipline

    Issue 3. Did the District's disciplinary change of placement in May 1999 constitute a denial of FAPE which continued until Petitioner's placement at Villa Park High School in August 2000?

    The removal for more than ten days without the protections owed a disabled student denied FAPE from May to September 1999; the denial ended when the District clearly offered in writing on September 17, 1999 to return him to Cerro Villa with RSP.

  4. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4a. Failure to articulate a basis for denying Petitioner's eligibility for special education in February 1998

    No violation; the IEP stated the SLD was remediated and needs could be met in regular education, and the student was not eligible then.

  5. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4b. Failure to review Petitioner's goals and objectives at the February 1998 IEP meeting

    No violation; the RSP teacher discussed progress on goals at the meeting.

  6. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 4c. Failure to address Petitioner's eligibility under the category of other health impaired (OHI) in February 1998

    Student was not OHI-eligible in February 1998, so any procedural flaw did not deny FAPE.

  7. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4d. Failure to provide prior written notice of plans to change Petitioner's eligibility in February 1998

    No violation; the team convened to review the triennial assessment and decided eligibility at that meeting.

  8. District prevailedChild find

    Issue 4e. Failure to conduct assessment upon teacher recommendation in October 1998 and March 1999

    The seventh-grade teacher credibly testified that neither a computer-generated diagnostic report nor her memo answering the parent's question was a referral for special education assessment.

  9. Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEDiscipline

    Issue 4f. Beginning on June 12, 1999, failure to correct inappropriate removal of Petitioner from an educational placement upon determination that Petitioner was eligible for special education

    A potential procedural violation in continuing the suspension after the June 11, 1999 eligibility finding caused no loss of educational opportunity because the school year ended days later; the period was already covered under Issue 3.

  10. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 4g. Beginning in February 1998, failure to assess in the suspected disability areas of audiology and speech and language

    The school psychologist reasonably relied on a 1995 speech-language assessment, and the student was not eligible in 1998, so not assessing these areas caused no loss of educational opportunity.

  11. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4h. Failure to ensure parental participation in IEP meetings following June 1999 when requests were made by parents for independent educational evaluations in all areas of suspected disability

    No violation; the parent participated fully and the District agreed to fund all requested assessments.

  12. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 5. From June 1999 until August 2000, did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE by failing to provide an educational program to remediate Petitioner's auditory processing deficits?

    The offer of regular education with one daily RSP period was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit and could address his auditory needs; Lindamood Bell was not shown to be necessary.

  13. Issue 6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for educational therapy and transportation expenses?

    As compensation for the January–September 1999 denial of FAPE, the District must reimburse 130 hours of Lindamood Bell ($8,450) plus mileage, counting only from September 20, 1999 because the parents did not give 10 days' notice; other reimbursement denied.

  14. Issue 7. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by speech and language pathologist Carol Atkins and audiologist JoAnn Hein?

    The parents canceled the District's agreed speech-language assessment, so there was no District assessment to disagree with and no basis for IEE reimbursement.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. District to reimburse the parents $8,450 for the student's first 130 hours of Lindamood Bell Learning Center attendance beginning September 20, 1999, payable within 20 calendar days of receiving the parents' mileage calculation. The Hearing Officer framed the 130 hours as compensation for the January–September 1999 denial of FAPE.
  • Reimbursement. District to reimburse the parents' mileage for transporting the student to Lindamood Bell (Newport Beach) for those 130 hours beginning September 20, 1999, at the District's employee mileage rate, within 20 calendar days of receiving the parents' mileage calculation.

Total: $8,450 ordered

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Burlington; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Alamo Heights Independent School Dist. v. State Board of Education; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. Missouri; Educ. Code § 56337; 5 CCR § 3030(j); Educ. Code § 48915.5; Educ. Code § 56329(b); Educ. Code § 56276

People named in the decision

  • Nancy Shipcott, District director of pupil services, Orange Unified School District
  • William Gee, District special education administrator, Orange Unified School District
  • Ann Schrader, Principal, Villa Park Elementary School, Orange Unified School District
  • Valerie Gotts, School counselor, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • Brent Bailey, Principal, Richland Continuation High School; chair of student placement committee, Orange Unified School District
  • Janet E. Hayes, Assistant principal, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • Christopher Russell, Educational advocate for Student
  • Virginia Russell, Educational consultant for Student's family
  • Doris Stein, District home-hospital teacher, Orange Unified School District
  • Helen S. McCarthy, Teacher, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • Laurel Mullally, School nurse, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • John Meulmester, Teacher, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • Aileen M. Sterling, Principal, Cerro Villa Middle School, Orange Unified School District
  • Jeannette Gardner, Seventh-grade English and history teacher, Cerro Villa Middle School (listed as both former and current teacher), Orange Unified School District
  • Dr. Batia Swed, District school psychologist (1998 triennial assessment), Orange Unified School District
  • Sally Stolte, Former RSP teacher, Villa Park Elementary School, Orange Unified School District
  • Patrick Reagan, Sixth-grade teacher, Villa Park Elementary School, Orange Unified School District
  • Dr. Robert Patterson, Psychologist; District-funded independent educational evaluator; expert witness for Student
  • Angelica Benson, Former clinical director, Lindamood Bell Learning Center, Newport Beach
  • Dr. Ernest Proud, Former District school psychologist, Orange Unified School District
  • Dr. Susan Aronson, Student's private psychologist/therapist
  • Frank Boehler, Director, Office of Child Welfare & Attendance, Orange Unified School District
  • Janet Rohlander, District program coordinator/program specialist, Orange Unified School District
  • Dr. Stanley Walters, Private psychologist; independent psychoeducational assessment (April 1999)
  • Carol J. Atkins, Private clinical audiologist (independent assessment)
  • Joanne M. Hein, Private speech-language pathologist (independent assessment)
  • Lindamood Bell Learning Center, Private provider of one-to-one remedial instruction, Newport Beach, California

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter convened for hearing in Orange, California on August 22, 23 and 24, September 4, 5, 18, 19, 25 and 26, and October 3, 16 and 17, 2001, before Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.

Petitioner STUDENT (hereinafter referred to as Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Tania Whiteleather and advocate Christopher Russell. Present on STUDENT’s behalf was his grandmother/adoptive mother, GRANDMOTHER. Petitioner’s grandfather/adoptive father, GRANDFATHER, was present on some days of hearing. Respondent Orange Unified School District (hereinafter referred to as Respondent or District) was represented by attorney Cynthia Yount. Present on the District’s behalf at various times were Nancy Shipcott, District director of pupil services, and William Gee, District special education administrator.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: GRANDMOTHER, grandmother/adoptive mother; Ann Schrader, principal of Villa Park Elementary School; Valerie Gotts, counselor at Cerro Villa Middle School (Cerro Villa); GRANDFATHER, grandfather/adoptive father; Brent Bailey, principal of Richland Continuation High School; Janet E. Hayes, Cerro Villa assistant principal; Christopher Russell, educational advocate; Doris Stein, District home-hospital teacher; Helen S. McCarthy, Cerro Villa teacher; Virginia Russell, educational consultant; Laurel Mullally, Cerro Villa school nurse; John Meulmester, Cerro Villa teacher; Aileen M. Sterling, Cerro Villa principal; Nancy Shipcott, District director of pupil services; Jeannette Gardner, former Cerro Villa teacher; Jeanette Gardner, Cerro Villa teacher; STUDENT, student; Dr. Batia Swed, District school psychologist; Sally Stolte, former Villa Park Elementary School teacher; Dr. Robert Patterson, psychologist; Angelica Benson, former clinical

* Please note that the Hearing Office has recently changed its format for numbering cases. The case number now starts with the year the case was filed and is followed by a five-digit reference number. director of Lindamood Bell Learning Center; Dr. Ernest Proud, former District school psychologist; and Dr. Susan Aronson, psychologist.

The District called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Frank Boehler, District’s director of Office of Child Welfare & Attendance; Janet Rohlander, District program coordinator; Patrick Reagan, Villa Park Elementary School teacher; Nancy Shipcott, District director of pupil services.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The parties made oral closing arguments at the hearing on October 17, 2001. Due to Petitioner’s submission of a new documentary exhibit on October 17, the record remained open until October 24, 2001, to allow the District to respond to the new exhibit. On October 24, 2001, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES(Footnote 1)

1. Did the District err in exiting Petitioner from special education in February 1998, when in fact he was eligible at that time?

2. After Petitioner was exited from special education in February 1998, should the District have reassessed him and found him eligible again prior to the June 1999 IEP?

3. Did the District’s disciplinary change of placement in May 1999 constitute a denial of FAPE which continued until Petitioner’s placement at Villa Park High School in August 2000?

4. Did the District commit procedural errors which denied Petitioner a FAPE?

5. From June 1999 until August 2000, did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE by failing to provide an educational program to remediate Petitioner’s auditory processing deficits?

6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for educational therapy and transportation expenses?

7. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by speech and language pathologist Carol Atkins and audiologist JoAnn Hein?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old boy who resides within the boundaries of the District, in Villa Park, California, with his grandparents, who have legally adopted him. STUDENT currently attends tenth grade at the District’s Villa Park High School and is eligible for special education due to a specific learning disability (SLD). He has also been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

For his early years of schooling, STUDENT lived with his biological mother and attended school first in the Placentia Unified School District and later in the Capistrano Unified School District. In the first grade, STUDENT was diagnosed as ADHD and was prescribed Ritalin, although his biological mother later decided to take him off the medication. In May 1994, when STUDENT was eight years and ten months old, he went to live with his grandparents, GRANDPARENTS, who initially obtained temporary legal guardianship of STUDENT. In fall 1994, STUDENT began third grade at the District’s Villa Park Elementary School (VP Elementary). During that semester, STUDENT was again prescribed Ritalin and resumed taking the medication. Also during that time period, STUDENT began seeing a psychologist, Dr. Susan Aronson, who evaluated STUDENT for the court’s review of the GRANDPARENTS’ guardianship of STUDENT After Dr. Aronson evaluated STUDENT, she continued to see him approximately every five to six weeks on an “as needed” basis.

STUDENT struggled with reading in third grade and his grandparents helped him with his homework each evening. In January 1995, GRANDMOTHER asked VP Elementary to assess STUDENT for special education, because of her concerns regarding STUDENT’s difficulties with reading. In February 1995, an initial individualized education program (IEP) team convened and found STUDENT eligible for special education due to an SLD, with a severe discrepancy in the area of written expression and an attentional disorder. The IEP provided for STUDENT to receive resource specialist program (RSP) services for 15% of his school day and to attend his regular education class for the remainder of the day.

STUDENT continued to receive RSP services in fourth and fifth grades at VP Elementary; his fourth- and fifth-grade IEPs specified that his school day would be 10% in RSP, 90% in regular education. (Petitioner’s Exhs. J, L; testimony of Sally Stolte.) During his fourth- and fifth-grade years, STUDENT’s report cards showed letter grades mostly in the C range. (Petitioner’s Exhs. K, N.) The GRANDPARENTS continued to work with STUDENT on his reading and homework each night.

For the 1997-98 school year, STUDENT was in sixth grade in a fifth- and sixth-grade combination class taught by Patrick Reagan. Mr. Reagan felt that STUDENT could handle the regular education classwork without much RSP support, and Ms. Stolte thought that STUDENT appeared to need less RSP support as he progressed through elementary school; thus, STUDENT did not receive much RSP time in sixth grade, although Ms. Stolte consulted with Mr. Reagan regarding STUDENT’s progress. STUDENT’s sixth-grade report card reflected letter grades in the B, C and D ranges. STUDENT’s B grades were in writing and science and his D’s were in math and history/social science, although for the final quarter, STUDENT raised both of those grades to C’s. Also during this time period, the GRANDPARENTS were going through the legal process of adopting STUDENT

In February 1998, in the middle of STUDENT’s sixth-grade year, District staff conducted their triennial reassessment of STUDENT School psychologist Batia Swed found that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between his full-scale IQ and his achievement test scores. When the IEP team convened to discuss the results of the triennial evaluation, the District staff members of the team stated that STUDENT had met his annual goals and objectives, that his SLD had been remediated, and that he no longer was eligible for special education. All members of the IEP team, including GRANDPARENTS, signed the IEP exiting STUDENT from special education.(Footnote 2) (Petitioner’s Exh. Q.) The team agreed that STUDENT was eligible for accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), and agreed that a Section 504 plan would be drafted.

STUDENT completed elementary school at the end of the 1997-98 school year and went on to middle school in fall 1998 at Cerro Villa Middle School (Cerro Villa). STUDENT had a Section 504 plan in place for seventh grade, but did not receive any special education services. STUDENT’s initial seventh-grade progress report in October 1998 did reflect B and C grades, but his subsequent progress reports that year contained several D and F grades. (Respondent’s Exh. 36.) On more than one occasion during December 1998 and January 1999, and again at STUDENT’s Section 504 meeting in February 1999, GRANDMOTHER asked school counselor Valerie Gotts about re-evaluating STUDENT for special education. Ms. Gotts indicated that they should wait and see how STUDENT performed in seventh grade with the accommodations under his Section 504 plan, and noted the good grades on STUDENT’s October 1998 progress report. Ms. Gotts suggested that reassessment was not appropriate given that STUDENT had been assessed earlier that year, and again suggested that they see how STUDENT did with the Section 504 plan. GRANDMOTHER did not voice any objection to this suggestion, and did not insist upon a special education assessment. (Testimony of GRANDMOTHER, Ms. Gotts.)

During this period of seventh grade, reportedly STUDENT was feeling emotional stress and strain, in part due to family issues related to the process finalizing the GRANDPARENTS’ adoption of STUDENT To address these issues, STUDENT’s sessions with his therapist became more frequent and, in April 1999, he began taking prescription anti-depressant medication. (Testimony of Dr. Aronson, GRANDMOTHER.) Also in April 1999, GRANDMOTHER gave Ms. Gotts an independent psychoeducational assessment report of STUDENT by psychologist Stanley Walters, which the GRANDPARENTS had obtained on their own. After discussion with GRANDMOTHER, Ms. Gotts agreed to arrange for a meeting with the school psychologist to review the assessment results and decide whether or not the District should reassess STUDENT for special education. In late April and early May 1999, Ms. Gotts had been in the process of arranging this meeting. (Testimony of Ms. Gotts.)

On May 3, 1999, an incident occurred which resulted in disciplinary action against STUDENT A female student in STUDENT’s third-period class reported to school staff that STUDENT had told her that he was going to kill her and her family, and that he was going to bomb the school. Two other female students alleged that STUDENT had claimed that he was going to bomb the school. Cerro Villa staff contacted the Orange County Sheriff’s Department. The Sheriff’s Department investigated and conducted searches of STUDENT and of the GRANDPARENTS’ home, but did not find any evidence of bomb materials.(Footnote 3) STUDENT acknowledged that he had gotten angry and made the threat against his classmate because she had been pestering him. STUDENT stated that he did not mean what he had said and explained that when he gets angry, he sometimes says and does things he does not intend to say or do. STUDENT steadfastly denied that he had ever made a bomb or planned to bomb the school. (Petitioner’s Exhs. BB-4, EE-4, EE-6.) On May 6, 1999, the District notified the GRANDPARENTS that STUDENT was suspended for three days beginning on May 7, and that they should appear at a student placement committee meeting on May 11. (District’s Exh. 30.) The placement committee is a District panel that determines where to place regular education students who have been referred to the committee due to serious disciplinary incidents. The committee members are administrators from various District schools. Brent Bailey, the principal of a District continuation high school, is the committee chair and a nonvoting member. (Testimony of Brent Bailey.)

On May 11, STUDENT and his grandparents attended the placement committee meeting. Cerro Villa assistant principal Janet Hayes presented the allegations to the placement committee panel. GRANDMOTHER read to the panel a prepared statement that raised the issue of STUDENT’s ADHD. GRANDMOTHER argued that STUDENT should be allowed to remain at Cerro Villa. At the meeting, the committee members and the GRANDPARENTS eventually reached an agreement that STUDENT would be placed on home instruction for the short-term while the District commenced a special education assessment of him. (Testimony of Mr. Boehler, Dr. Proud, GRANDMOTHER.)

In a letter dated May 12, 1999, Mr. Bailey informed the GRANDPARENTS that the placement committee had decided that STUDENT should remain on home instruction for the rest of the school year and in fall 1999 could enroll in any District middle school except Cerro Villa or El Rancho Middle School. (Petitioner’s Exh. EE-21.) Upon receiving the letter, GRANDMOTHER telephoned the District’s director of Office of Child Welfare & Attendance, Frank Boehler, who had attended the student placement committee meeting and had facilitated the participants’ agreement that STUDENT would be placed on home teaching pending a special education assessment. GRANDMOTHER told Mr. Boehler about the contents of the letter; Mr. Boehler told GRANDMOTHER that he was overturning the placement committee’s decision, and instructed her to enroll STUDENT at Cerro Villa for summer school and the 1999-2000 school year. (Testimony of Mr. Boehler.)

STUDENT received home instruction for the rest of the regular 1998-99 school year. In early June 1999, District staff assessed STUDENT for special education again, concluding that STUDENT had a significant discrepancy between cognition and achievement in the area of reading. Thereafter the IEP team convened and found STUDENT eligible for special education due to an SLD. Regarding placement, the IEP stated that STUDENT had been suspended for the duration of the school year but noted that “he will return next year.” Regarding STUDENT’s special education program and services, the IEP specified that STUDENT would receive RSP for one period each day, five days a week, and would spend the remaining 85.7% of his school time in regular education. (Petitioner’s Exh. HH-1.)

Pursuant to her conversation with Mr. Boehler, GRANDMOTHER enrolled STUDENT in summer school at Cerro Villa, and STUDENT attended summer school there for summer 1999. During that summer, assistant principal Hayes told GRANDMOTHER that STUDENT could not return to Cerro Villa in the fall due to the determination made by the placement committee in May 1999.

The GRANDPARENTS filed for due process hearing in late July 1999. Also during that summer, STUDENT attended Lindamood Bell Learning Center (Lindamood Bell) in Newport Beach, California, for twenty hours per week from July through September 1999. In a letter dated September 10, 1999, the GRANDPARENTS informed the District’s director of pupil services, Nancy Shipcott, that STUDENT had been attending Lindamood Bell since July 1999. The GRANDPARENTS’ letter also indicated that they would wait until the next scheduled IEP meeting on September 17, 1999, to decide on what STUDENT’s placement and program should be for the 1999-2000 school year. (Petitioner’s Exh. QQ.)

At the IEP meeting on September 17, 1999, District program specialist Janet Rohlander indicated that the District’s offer was to place STUDENT in RSP and regular education at Cerro Villa or another District middle school. (Testimony of Ms. Rohlander; Petitioner’s Exh. SS-4.) The GRANDPARENTS requested that STUDENT remain in home teaching and the District’s members of the IEP team agreed to that request. Thus, STUDENT continued to receive home teaching one hour per day, five days a week.

Shortly after the September IEP meeting, the GRANDPARENTS requested via their advocate that the District fund an independent educational assessment of STUDENT by Dr. Robert Patterson. The District agreed to this request and Dr. Patterson assessed STUDENT on November 10, 1999. On November 29, 1999, the IEP team convened; along with the IEP meeting, the parties also participated in mediation. The parties agreed to add regular physical education to STUDENT’s program, 100 minutes per week, to be provided at the GRANDPARENTS’ home. The parties also agreed that the District would provide sensitivity training regarding STUDENT’s situation to Cerro Villa staff, and agreed that the District would arrange for the GRANDPARENTS to visit other District middle school sites. The District continued to offer RSP and regular education classes at a District middle school, while the parents continued to request home teaching. The IEP team agreed to continue STUDENT on home teaching until the next IEP meeting.

The IEP team met again on December 15, 1999, to review Dr. Patterson’s assessment report. Dr. Patterson’s assessment report included his DSM-IV Axis I diagnoses of ADHD, an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and a disorder of written expression. Dr. Patterson found that STUDENT should not have been exited from special education in 1998, that STUDENT was eligible for special education under the category of “other health impaired” (OHI), and that STUDENT should be assessed in the areas of speech/language and audiology. (Petitioner’s Exh. WW; testimony of Dr. Patterson.)

On the basis of Dr. Patterson’s recommendation, the District members of the IEP team agreed to refer STUDENT for a speech/language assessment in the areas of vocabulary, auditory discrimination and language processing. The District offered STUDENT placement in RSP and regular education at Cerro Villa, El Rancho or Santiago middle schools, but GRANDMOTHER declined these offers. (District’s Exh. 47.) GRANDMOTHER and her advocate explained that it would be uncomfortable for STUDENT to return to Cerro Villa after what had happened. The parent requested that STUDENT’s home teaching program continue, and the team agreed to that request. The District also offered to refer STUDENT to Orange County Mental Health for mental health services, but the parent declined that offer.

The District subsequently scheduled a District speech and language pathologist to assess STUDENT on January 6, 2000. On January 5, 2000, the parents’ advocate, Virginia Russell, notified the District’s director of pupil services that the parents wished to cancel that assessment because they would be providing an independent speech and language assessment. (Petitioner’s Exh. ZZ.) Subsequently STUDENT was assessed by clinical audiologist Carol J. Atkins and by speech-language pathologist Joanne M. Hein. Ms. Atkins diagnosed STUDENT as “at risk for central auditory processing disorder,” while Ms. Hein concluded that STUDENT had “a moderate receptive and expressive language disorder .... impairing his communicative functioning, social language skills and academic performance.” (Petitioner’s Exhs. AAA, DDD.) The IEP team met again on February 17, 2000, to review STUDENT’s progress and program. The team reviewed a letter from STUDENT’s therapist, Dr. Aronson, which recommended that STUDENT remain on home teaching. The team members agreed to continue STUDENT’s home teaching program.

For summer 2000, STUDENT returned to Lindamood Bell for twenty hours each week during July and August. On August 7, 2000, the IEP team convened and agreed that STUDENT would attend ninth grade at the District’s Villa Park High School for the 2000-2001 school year. The team agreed that STUDENT’s placement at the high school would include one period of RSP per day and the remaining 83.3% of his school day in regular education. Additionally, the parent requested that STUDENT continue to receive home teaching for two class periods per day, for his most difficult subjects; the team agreed to this request. The team developed and agreed upon STUDENT’s goals and objectives for the 2000-2001 school year. The IEP team met again on August 31, 2000, to develop a transition plan.

STUDENT attended ninth grade at Villa Park High School for the 2000-2001 school year, and has remained there for tenth grade in the 2001-2002 school year. His IEP team has continued to find him eligible for special education due to an SLD, and he has continued to receive one period of RSP and two periods of home teaching per day.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and state law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) FAPE consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. ) “Related services”” means transportation and other developmental, corrective and supportive services as may be required to assist the child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).)

1. Did the District err in exiting Petitioner from special education in February 1998, when in fact he was eligible at that time?

A “child with a disability” is a child with mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments or specific learning disabilities who, by reason thereof, needs instruction, services or both which cannot be provided with modification of the regular school program. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); Education Code § 56026(a) and (b).)

In the present case, there is no dispute that Petitioner has been eligible for special education under the category of specific learning disability (SLD) since June 1999, and no dispute that he was eligible under the same category from February 1995 to February 1998. However, the parties dispute Petitioner’s eligibility from February 1998 until June 1999. The District argues that the IEP team was correct in its decision to exit Petitioner from special education in February 1998, and that it was not obligated to reassess and determine Petitioner eligible for special education prior to the May 1999 reassessment and June 1999 determination of eligibility. In contrast, Petitioner argues that he was eligible under the categories of SLD and other health impairment (OHI) in February 1998 and continued to remain eligible under those two categories through June 1999. This section will examine the decision to exit Petitioner from special education in February 1998. Specific Learning Disability (SLD)

A pupil has a specific learning disability (SLD) which makes him or her eligible for special education and related services when it is determined that a severe discrepancy exists between intellectual ability and achievement in one or more areas relating to oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, math calculation or math reasoning, and where the discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program. (34 C.F.R. § 300.541; Cal. Educ. Code § 56337.)

California Code of Regulations, Title 5, section 3030(j) sets forth specific criteria and factors to be considered for determining whether a student has a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes, and whether he or she has a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement. Under section 3030(j)(4), the IEP team is responsible for making a decision as to whether a pupil has a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. The IEP team must take into account all relevant information that is available on the pupil. A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized tests, by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid, or through determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists. The existence of a severe discrepancy cannot be based solely upon a single score or product of scores, test or procedure. (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4).)

Thus, as noted above, under section 56337 and Cal Code of Regs., Title 5, section 3030(j) a pupil is considered eligible for special education with a specific learning disability if:

1. The pupil has a disorder of one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or using language, spoken or written;

2. the pupil has a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the academic areas specified in § 56337(a), and

3. the discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.

Accordingly, this decision will analyze whether STUDENT met these three criteria in February 1998.

Disorder in Basic Psychological Process

For purposes of this subsection, basic psychological processes include “attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization and expressive.” (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(1).) In the present case, the evidence clearly established that STUDENT had an attentional disorder. He has been diagnosed with ADHD and takes medication for this condition. STUDENT’s IEPs from both previous years and subsequent IEPs indicated that STUDENT had a disorder in attentional processing; there is no allegation that this disorder was remediated in February 1998. Thus, STUDENT had a disorder in the basic psychological process of attention.

Severe Discrepancy Between Ability and Achievement

When standardized tests are considered valid for a student, a severe discrepancy is established by the following:

[F]irst, converting into common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the achievement test score and the ability test score to be compared; second, computing the difference between these common standard scores; and third, comparing this computed difference to the standard criterion which is the product of 1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of the distribution of computed differences of students taking these achievement and ability tests (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(4)(A).)

The calculation of this formula has commonly involved interpreting the required difference for a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement standard scores to be at least 22.5 points (1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of 15), adjusted by 4 points, which is one standard error of measurement. This computed difference constitutes a severe discrepancy when “such discrepancy is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments and work samples, as appropriate.” (Id.) Additionally, the discrepancy cannot be primarily the result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. (Title 5 CCR § 3030(j)(5).)

In the present case, there was no allegation or evidence that standardized tests are invalid in measuring STUDENT’s ability or achievement. Therefore, to determine if a severe discrepancy exists, STUDENT’s scores on standardized intellectual testing can be compared with his scores on achievement testing.

To measure STUDENT’s cognitive ability for his February 1998 triennial reassessment, the school psychologist administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition (WISC-III) and demonstrated a verbal IQ of 94, a performance IQ of 115, and a full scale IQ of 104.(Footnote 4) (Petitioner’s Exhs. P-4, GG-2; testimony of Dr. Batia Swed.) STUDENT also took the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT) and three Brigance subtests as measures of his academic achievement. STUDENT scored in the fifth-grade range on the Brigance spelling subtest, and in the sixth-grade range on the Brigance’s reading and reading comprehension subtests. On the WIAT, STUDENT’s standard scores ranged from a high of 108 in comprehension to lows of 87 in spelling and 90 in writing. (Petitioner’s Exhs. P-5, GG-2; testimony of Dr. Swed.)

Dr. Swed testified that, in comparing STUDENT’s WIAT scores to his full-scale IQ score of 104, the results did not produce a significant discrepancy between cognitive ability and achievement. Dr. Swed explained that the general practice is to use a student’s full-scale IQ score in making this calculation, but one might instead use the higher of the verbal and performance IQ scores if the student had a significant processing disorder that had negatively affected the lower score. However, Dr. Swed stated that STUDENT did not have such a processing disorder and thus it was appropriate to use his full-scale IQ in the calculation. Dr. Swed acknowledged that STUDENT’s WISC-III results showed a significant discrepancy between his verbal and performance IQ scores, with the lower verbal IQ indicating a possible language disorder. However, Dr. Swed explained that she did not recommend a speech-language evaluation because STUDENT had nearly the same discrepancy of IQ scores in February 1995, and at that time a speech-language evaluation determined that he did not have a speech-language disorder.

In contrast, Dr. Robert Patterson testified that because of the 21-point discrepancy between STUDENT’s verbal and performance IQs, it was not appropriate to use STUDENT’s full-scale IQ in the SLD calculation.(Footnote 5) Instead, Dr. Patterson explained that the assessor should use the IQ score that best reflects the student’s area of functioning. Dr. Patterson stated that STUDENT’s performance IQ best reflects his functioning because Dr. Patterson’s testing and the subsequent audiological screening by Ms. Atkins indicated that STUDENT had auditory processing difficulties, and those difficulties negatively affected his verbal IQ score.(Footnote 6)

Comparing STUDENT’s performance IQ to his WIAT scores results in severe discrepancies in the areas of writing and spelling. Both Dr. Swed and Dr. Patterson testified that section 56337(a) does not recognize a severe discrepancy in the area of spelling. Regarding the area of writing, Dr. Swed testified that because the WIAT’s writing score includes the student’s spelling score, she instead uses the written expression subtest score for calculation of a severe discrepancy. In contrast, Dr. Patterson explained that, while spelling alone cannot be the basis for finding a severe discrepancy, writing encompasses spelling and therefore spelling should not be entirely excluded when making the calculation. Upon review of section 56337(a), the Hearing Officer concurs that, while a discrepancy only in spelling does not constitute the basis for a severe discrepancy, the term “written expression” is a broad term encompassing all areas of writing. Thus, a severe discrepancy based on the WIAT writing score may be the basis for finding a severe discrepancy in the area of written expression.(Footnote 7)

Other evidence supports Dr. Patterson’s position that STUDENT had a severe discrepancy in the area of written expression. STUDENT’s SAT-9 scores of April 1998 reflect that his only below average score was in language expression, with a score in the 19th percentile. (Petitioner’s Exh. S.) On the SAT-9 one year later, in April 1999, STUDENT scored in the 16th percentile in language expression and the 10th percentile in language mechanics. (Petitioner’s Exh. Z-2.) Moreover, both STUDENT’s February 1997 and June 1999 IEPs state that he had a severe discrepancy in the area of written expression. Considering this corroborating information, it appears unlikely that STUDENT’s severe discrepancy disappeared while he was in sixth grade. The preponderance of the evidence supports Dr. Patterson’s argument that the performance IQ should be used to calculate STUDENT’s severe discrepancy, resulting in a severe discrepancy in the area of written expression.

Discrepancy Cannot Be Corrected Through Regular Instructional Program

While technically STUDENT did not need special education to correct his severe discrepancy in February 1998, those circumstances were due to a unique combination of factors that clearly would not and did not continue when STUDENT moved on to middle school. In February 1998, STUDENT was in his final year of elementary school, in the sixth grade of a fifth/sixth-grade combination class. The teacher did not assign homework to the class, but students were permitted to take classwork home if they had not finished the assignments in class. That teacher, Patrick Reagan, testified that STUDENT could handle the regular sixth-grade classwork that year. Mr. Reagan explained that he often worked with STUDENT after school, and thus STUDENT did not need any additional help from the RSP teacher in order to keep up in class. Mr. Reagan also indicated that STUDENT did not have any greater difficulty with completing tasks and following multi-step directions than the other students in the class had.

STUDENT’s sixth-grade grades were mostly B’s and C’s, even after he was exited from special education in February 1998. While he did have a D in math and two D’s in history/social science, he raised both of those grades up to Cs in the final marking period, which was after he was exited from special education. STUDENT’s SAT-9 scores in April 1998 were also relatively strong, with only one score, language expression, in the below average range, most scores in the average range and two above average scores. (Petitioner’s Exh. S.) Moreover, STUDENT’s RSP teacher, Sally Stolte, testified that STUDENT’s scores on the Brigance tests were at the fifth- and sixth-grade levels. Because of those scores and the reports she received from Mr. Reagan about STUDENT’s classroom performance, Ms. Stolte determined that STUDENT had met his goals and objectives.

Dr. Patterson opined that because STUDENT’s test scores in sixth grade were generally consistent with the average level in sixth grade, the IEP team thus concluded that STUDENT did not need special education. However, Dr. Patterson pointed out, the sharp decline in STUDENT’s scores the following school year indicated that in fact STUDENT did need special education. The confluence of factors during STUDENT’s sixth grade year support Dr. Patterson’s conclusion, given that STUDENT was one of the older students in his combination class, that he had an excellent rapport with his regular education teacher and received additional help from that teacher, and that he had made academic progress in his special education program over the past three years. Thus, Dr. Patterson’s opinion is both supported and persuasive.

Therefore, the IEP team technically did not err when determining that STUDENT no longer qualified as a student with an SLD; as of February 1998, with extra assistance from his sixth-grade teacher, STUDENT had developed his skills to the point where he could make progress in his sixth-grade class without special education services. However, given that an IEP offer is generally made for a one-year period, the IEP team should have considered that STUDENT would soon be progressing to middle school, where a different structure, regular homework and tougher academic demands would almost certainly be more challenging for STUDENT Such factors should have been given particular consideration given that the Villa Park Elementary staff who were part of STUDENT’s IEP team would no longer have regular contact with him once he left elementary school, and thus would not be able to continue to monitor his progress and to recommend reassessment if warranted. In any event, in February 1998, STUDENT’s discrepancy could be corrected through the regular instructional program, and thus he did not have an SLD as defined in Education Code section 56337.

Other Health Impaired (OHI)

A student meets the eligibility criteria for OHI when the student has:

limited strength, vitality, or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems, including but not limited to a heart condition, cancer, leukemia, rheumatic fever, chronic kidney disease, cystic fibrosis, severe asthma, epilepsy, lead poisoning, diabetes, tuberculosis and other communicable infectious diseases, and hematological disorders such as sickle cell anemia and hemophilia which adversely affects a pupil’s educational performance....such physical disabilities shall not be temporary in nature....

(Title 5 CCR § 3030(f).)

Additionally, as with any special education eligibility category, the student’s impairment must require “instruction, services or both which cannot be provided with modification of the regular education program.” (Education Code § 56026(b).)

Consistent with the discussion above, the evidence indicates that STUDENT was able to function in sixth grade despite his ADHD. STUDENT’s sixth-grade teacher testified that STUDENT could handle the regular sixth-grade classwork and did not have any greater difficulty with completing tasks and following multi-step directions than the other students in the class. On a written classroom behavior checklist that Mr. Reagan answered in 1998, Mr. Reagan gave STUDENT average to good ratings on all behaviors. In particular, Mr. Reagan indicated that STUDENT often followed oral directions well, while only sometimes being fidgety or off-task. (District’s Exh. 15.) Mr. Reagan testified that STUDENT did not have any particular problems with impulsivity and had a normal attention span for a boy that age. Similarly, STUDENT’s elementary school RSP teacher, Sally Stolte, testified that STUDENT did not have much trouble with impulsive behavior and that, with only occasional redirection, STUDENT could finish tasks he had started. Additionally as discussed above, STUDENT’s grades and SAT-9 scores were relatively strong in sixth grade.

Dr. Patterson evaluated STUDENT in November 1999 and found that STUDENT qualified as OHI and had been OHI in February 1998. While Dr. Patterson was a highly knowledgeable and credible witness, he did not have the experience of observing STUDENT in the classroom in sixth grade. Indeed, while Dr. Patterson extensively reviewed STUDENT’s elementary school education records, he acknowledged that the teacher comments on STUDENT’s sixth-grade progress report did not note disruptive behavior, inattentiveness, or other indications of OHI eligibility.

Notably, Dr. Patterson observed STUDENT as an eighth-grader who no longer had the supports of his sixth-grade classroom and had moved on to the less supportive middle school environment. Indeed, STUDENT’s seventh-grade teachers all gave him average to poor ratings on his behavior. (Petitioner’s Exh. EE.) As discussed above, the evidence indicates that in sixth grade STUDENT was able to function despite his disabilities, but that the confluence of factors in sixth grade did not continue once STUDENT went on to seventh grade. In any event, considering only STUDENT’s eligibility in February 1998, the evidence from STUDENT’s regular education teacher and RSP teacher, as well as corroborating evidence regarding his grades and test scores, establish that he was not eligible as OHI in February 1998.

2. After Petitioner was exited from special education in February 1998, should the District have reassessed him and found him eligible again prior to the June 1999 IEP?

State education law requires school districts to establish policies and procedures to locate, identify, and evaluate children within their jurisdictional boundaries who are eligible for special education. (Educ. Code § 56300 et seq.) Each school district is required to establish written policies and procedures for a “continuous child-find system,” and those policies and procedures must include written notification to parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. (Educ. Code § 56301.) All referrals for special education and related services shall initiate the assessment process and must be documented. When an oral referral is made by a parent, the staff of the school district must offer assistance to the parent in making a request in writing. (5 Cal. Code Regs. § 3021(a).) A pupil shall be referred for special educational instruction and services only after the resources of the regular education program have been considered and, where appropriate, utilized. (Educ. Code § 56303.)

The present analysis considers whether the District should have reassessed STUDENT prior to late May 1999 and if so, whether he would have been found eligible. Petitioner has alleged that the District became obligated to conduct a new assessment in late 1998 and early 1999, when GRANDMOTHER raised the issue of reassessment with school counselor Valerie Gotts. Factually, the testimony of GRANDMOTHER and Ms. Gotts are consistent to the extent that both witnesses described how GRANDMOTHER inquired of Ms. Gotts whether STUDENT should be returned to special education. Ms. Gotts testified that she suggested that they wait and see how STUDENT did with his Section 504 plan, noting that STUDENT’s October 1998 progress report reflected good grades. Ms. Gotts testified that GRANDMOTHER agreed with the suggestion of seeing how STUDENT did with his Section 504 plan. Ms. Gotts acknowledged that she never instructed GRANDMOTHER to put the assessment request in writing, but noted that she had reviewed the notice of parent’s rights with GRANDMOTHER. Ms. Gotts testified that if a parent directly stated that he or she wanted special education testing, the school would go ahead and test, whether or not the request was in writing.

In contrast, GRANDMOTHER described how, in December 1998 and January 1999, she asked Ms. Gotts about returning STUDENT to special education because of concerns that STUDENT was struggling academically. GRANDMOTHER testified that she specifically asked for testing, but that Ms. Gotts responded that STUDENT had just tested out of special education in February 1998 and so he would not test as eligible again such a short time later. GRANDMOTHER stated that she eventually arranged for independent testing by Dr. Stanley Walters in April 1999, because she could not obtain special education testing from the District.

As discussed above, the February 1998 IEP team found that, by sixth grade, STUDENT’s SLD had been remediated. However, the favorable factors that had enabled STUDENT to function in regular education in sixth grade did not exist once he began middle school as a seventh-grader in fall 1998.(Footnote 8) On his progress report of December 1998, STUDENT received D’s in English and social studies. His grades declined further as seventh grade progressed, with D’s and F’s in English, social studies, math, computers and exploratory skills. The most frequent teacher comment on his seventh-grade progress reports was “homework/assignments incomplete.” (Petitioner’s Exh. JJ.) In evaluating STUDENT’s performance and behavior in class, his seventh-grade teachers nearly all gave him “average” or “poor” ratings on his classroom preparedness, completion of daily work, turning in homework and test performance. (Petitioner’s Exh. EE-10 to EE-17.) All wrote additional comments with concerns about STUDENT’s behavior and/or performance in class, with three teachers noting their concerns that STUDENT did not turn in homework. Additionally, STUDENT’s scores on the SAT-9 declined sharply, with nearly all scores in the low average to below average range.

Thus, while in sixth grade STUDENT did not meet the requirement of section 56337(c) to be eligible as a student with an SLD, he did meet that requirement in seventh grade. In light of his grades and teacher comments, it is apparent that by December 1998 or January 1999, any severe discrepancy that STUDENT had could not be addressed within the regular education program.

Moreover, while STUDENT’s severe discrepancy was remediated in sixth grade, those circumstances disappeared in seventh grade. When the District eventually reassessed STUDENT in May 1999, he scored 79 on the WJ-R dictation subtest and 84 on the letter-word identification subtest. Both of these WJ-R scores result in severe discrepancies when compared with STUDENT’s full-scale IQ of 104. Given the other evidence regarding STUDENT’s academic decline in seventh grade, it is apparent that, even using the full-scale IQ score, STUDENT likely would have demonstrated a severe discrepancy had he been re-tested earlier that school year.

Additionally, the evidence indicates that STUDENT also may have been eligible as OHI. Dr. Patterson testified extensively regarding how STUDENT’s ADHD had a significant negative impact on STUDENT’s educational performance. Consistent with that finding, STUDENT’s seventh-grade teachers commented that STUDENT often did not pay attention and had to be brought back to task. (Petitioner’s Exh. EE-12, EE-14.)

Thus, the evidence regarding STUDENT’s grades, classroom behavior and standardized test scores establish that he was eligible again for special education by January 1999. Given the IEP team’s decision to exit STUDENT from special education despite knowledge of his severe discrepancy, his history of having an SLD, and his upcoming transition to middle school, the District should have again assessed STUDENT for special education upon prompting from his parent. Because STUDENT would have been found eligible for special education if he had been assessed, the failure to reassess resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to STUDENT from January 1999 until June 1999, when the District again found STUDENT eligible for special education.

3. Did the District’s disciplinary change of placement in May 1999 constitute a denial of FAPE which continued until Petitioner’s placement at Villa Park High School in August 2000?

Both federal and State law provide procedures and standards for imposing discipline on a disabled student. The laws require that if disciplinary action is contemplated for a student with a disability which involves a change of placement for more than ten school days, the disciplinary action cannot be ordered unless the IEP team determines that the disabled student's “conduct was not caused by, or was not a direct manifestation of, the pupil's identified disability” and that “the pupil had been appropriately placed at the time the misconduct occurred.” (Educ. Code § 48915.5(a)(2) and (3).) If the review of the above standards result in a determination that the IEP was deficient, the IEP team “must take immediate steps to remedy those deficiencies.” (34 C.F.R. § 523(f).)

In the present case, Petitioner was suspended from school beginning Friday, May 7, 1999, through the end of the regular school year in June 1999, which was a disciplinary change of placement of more than ten days. As discussed above, the District should have assessed STUDENT and found him eligible for special education prior to that time. Accordingly, failure to provide Petitioner with the protections available to a disabled student constitutes a procedural violation. Indeed, Petitioner was not receiving special education services and thus not appropriately placed at the time the misconduct occurred. Therefore, the procedural violations resulted in a loss of educational opportunity and constituted a denial of FAPE.

However, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, that denial of FAPE did not continue until August 2000. On June 11, 1999, the IEP team members agreed that STUDENT would return to Cerro Villa in fall 1999, and would receive RSP services beginning at that time. While Mrs. Hayes told GRANDMOTHER during a conversation that STUDENT could not return to Cerro Villa in the fall, the IEP team confirmed its earlier offer at the IEP meeting on September 17, 1999. (Petitioner’s Exh. SS-1, SS-4; testimony of Ms. Rohlander.) After the GRANDPARENTS told the IEP team that STUDENT would not feel comfortable returning to Cerro Villa, the team offered the alternative of placing STUDENT at another District middle school. (See, e.g., Petitioner’s Exh. XX-1.) In any event, the disciplinary change of placement had terminated at least by September 17, 1999, and STUDENT could have returned to Cerro Villa and received special education services there.

It should be emphasized that the offer of placement at the Cerro Villa campus in particular is significant because it terminated the disciplinary change of placement indicated by the student placement committee in their letter dated May 12, 1999. Given the finding that STUDENT was eligible for special education as of June 1999, it is likely that he had been eligible at the time of the incident on May 3, 1999. Thus, in order to continue the disciplinary change of placement, the IEP team would have been obligated to conduct a manifestation determination and placement review pursuant to State and federal law. Instead, the IEP team’s offer to place STUDENT back at Cerro Villa terminated the disciplinary change of placement, so the manifestation determination and placement review were no longer required.

Despite the IEP team’s offers to return STUDENT to Cerro Villa, as well as the subsequent offers to place STUDENT at another District middle school, the GRANDPARENTS made the decision to keep STUDENT out of public school for the 1999-2000 school year. The District’s failure to provide procedural protections for a student subject to discipline terminated upon the District’s offer to return STUDENT to Cerro Villa as a special education student. While this offer may have been unclear to the GRANDPARENTS over the 1999 summer due to Mrs. Hayes’s statements, the District made a clear written offer again on September 17, 1999. (See Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).) In light of all factors, the Hearing Officer concludes that the denial of FAPE ended in September 1999.

Moreover, nearly all of the circumstances cited by the GRANDPARENTS and STUDENT’s therapist for keeping STUDENT out of Cerro Villa would have occurred even if the District had never exited STUDENT from special education and had provided STUDENT with all procedural protections available to a special education student. GRANDMOTHER and Dr. Aronson both explained that STUDENT would not feel comfortable returning to Cerro Villa, for reasons including that everyone there knew of the bomb allegations and because STUDENT resented that his accusers had not been punished even though they had lied about the bomb allegations. Yet even if the District had recognized STUDENT’s special education status and conducted the requisite manifestation determination, special education law would not have required the District to punish STUDENT’s accusers, nor would it have prevented students’ gossip about the allegations. Likewise, had STUDENT received all procedural protections, the District would nevertheless have had the authority to contact the police to investigate the allegations, and his special education status would not have affected the police investigation or subsequent juvenile criminal proceedings.(Footnote 9) The procedural protections for a special education student subject to disciplinary change of placement affect only the District’s ability to impose a disciplinary change of placement, not the authority to investigate allegations or the decision to seek disciplinary action. Accordingly, the denial of FAPE did not cause the circumstances resulting in the GRANDPARENTS’ decision not to return STUDENT to Cerro Villa for the 1999-2000 school year.

Thus, the District’s failure to provide STUDENT’s procedural protections caused a denial of FAPE from May to September 1999 only.

4. Did the District commit procedural errors which denied Petitioner a FAPE?

The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207.) Regarding procedural protections, the Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 205-206.)

Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents’ participation in the IEP process. (Id.) Thus, the courts have created a two-prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parents’ participation in the IEP process.

In the present case, Petitioner raised numerous procedural claims, several of which are addressed in other portions of this decision. To the extent that Petitioner’s allegations are addressed in other parts of this decision, they may not necessarily be revisited in this section.(Footnote 10) Regarding the remaining allegations, the Hearing Officer finds no procedural errors which denied Petitioner a FAPE. The basis for those findings is as follows:

(a) failure to articulate a basis for denying Petitioner’s eligibility for special education in February 1998

Because Petitioner was not eligible for special education in February 1998, Petitioner had no right to receive a FAPE at that time; thus any procedural violation would not prejudice the student and would not constitute a denial of FAPE. In any event, there is no indication of a procedural violation. The first page of the February 1998 IEP stated that the basis for exiting STUDENT was that his SLD had been remediated, and the second page stated that STUDENT’s needs could be met in the regular education program. (Petitioner’s Exhs. Q-1, Q-2.) The third page contains the WIAT test results which were the basis for the finding that the severe discrepancy had been remediated. (Petitioner’s Exh. Q-3.) Moreover, the IEP team based its decision on the findings of the February 1998 triennial assessment, which was provided to the parent and other IEP team members.

(b) failure to review Petitioner’s goals and objectives at the February 1998 IEP meeting Because Petitioner was not eligible for special education in February 1998, Petitioner had no right to receive a FAPE at that time; thus any procedural violation would not prejudice the student and would not constitute a denial of FAPE. In any event, there is no indication of a procedural violation. RSP teacher Sally Stolte described in her testimony how, at the IEP meeting, she discussed STUDENT’s progress on his goals and objectives contained in Petitioner’s Exh. M.

(c) failure to address Petitioner’s eligibility under the category of other health impaired (OHI) in February 1998

Because Petitioner was not eligible for special education in February 1998, Petitioner had no right to receive a FAPE at that time; thus any procedural violation would not prejudice the student and would not constitute a denial of FAPE. In any event, there is no indication of a procedural violation. In any event, given that STUDENT was not eligible as OHI in February 1998, any procedural violation would not have denied Petitioner an educational opportunity or seriously interfered with parental participation in the IEP, and thus would not rise to the level of denial of FAPE.

(d) failure to provide prior written notice of plans to change Petitioner’s eligibility in February 1998

Because Petitioner was not eligible for special education in February 1998, Petitioner had no right to receive a FAPE at that time; thus any procedural violation would not prejudice the student and would not constitute a denial of FAPE. In any event, there is no indication of a procedural violation. By all accounts, the IEP team convened to review and discuss the results of the triennial assessment; at that meeting, the team members concluded that STUDENT was no longer eligible for special education.

(e) failure to conduct assessment upon teacher recommendation in October 1998 and March 1999

There is no indication of a procedural violation. Regarding a diagnostic test administered by STUDENT’s seventh-grade English and history teacher in October 1998, that teacher testified that she did not intend the computer-generated comments in the assessment report to be a recommendation for a special education assessment of STUDENT (See Petitioner’s Exh. V.) Mrs. Gardner described in detail how she did not use the STAR diagnostic report as a special education referral tool.

Similarly, regarding a memo that Mrs. Gardner wrote to GRANDMOTHER in March 1999, Mrs. Gardner detailed how her written comments about RSP were in answer to a question she received from GRANDMOTHER. Mrs. Gardner explained that GRANDMOTHER had asked about whether STUDENT should go back into RSP, and Mrs. Gardner wrote in reply that RSP was one option that STUDENT could use. (See Petitioner’s Exh. Y.) Mrs. Gardner testified that she had not made any determination that STUDENT needed RSP or should be assessed for special education and that, in fact, she thought that STUDENT’s ability and performance were average within that class. Thus, the evidence establishes that Mrs. Gardner did not recommend special education assessment of STUDENT in October 1998 or March 1999. (f) beginning on June 12, 1999, failure to correct inappropriate removal of Petitioner from an educational placement upon determination that Petitioner was eligible for special education

Here Petitioner raises a potential procedural violation but Petitioner did not suffer any loss of educational opportunity, and thus these facts do not constitute a denial of FAPE. The IEP team found STUDENT eligible for special education on June 11, 1999, and the IEP document stated that STUDENT remained suspended for the rest of the school year. Yet arguably under Education Code section 48915.5, once the District knew that STUDENT had been eligible for special education at the time the offense occurred, it could not continue the suspension without first determining that the offense was not a manifestation of STUDENT’s disability and that STUDENT had been appropriately placed at the time the offense occurred.

However, by itself, the District’s failure to provide these procedural protections after finding STUDENT eligible did not constitute a denial of FAPE, since the school year ended just a few days after the June 11 IEP meeting. Indeed, there likely would not have been time to conduct the manifestation determination and review prior to the end of the school year. Regarding summer school, as discussed above, STUDENT was able to attend Cerro Villa for summer 1999. In any event, this decision’s discussion in Issue No. 3 already determined a denial of FAPE for the period from May to September 1999 based on the failure to provide procedural protections to a student with a disability.

(g) beginning in February 1998, failure to assess in the suspected disability areas of audiology and speech and language

A school district’s assessment of a student must assess the pupil “in all areas related to the suspected disability including, where appropriate, health and development, vision, hearing, motor abilities, language function, general ability, academic performance, self-help, orientation and mobility skills, career and vocational abilities and interests, and social and emotional status.” (Educ. Code § 56320(f).)

Petitioner alleges that, as of February 1998, the District should have assessed STUDENT in the areas of audiology and speech/language. There is no allegation that STUDENT was eligible for special education under the category of speech and language disorder, but rather that STUDENT was eligible as SLD or OHI but had language and audiology needs. As will be discussed under Issue No. 7, in December 1999, the District agreed to the parents’ request to assess STUDENT in those areas, so the present issue pertains only to the time period between February 1998 and December 1999.

Dr. Swed testified that after reviewing STUDENT’s test scores in February 1998, she considered referring STUDENT for testing by a speech/language pathologist because the significant discrepancy between his verbal and performance IQ scores suggested language impairments. However, Dr. Swed explained that she decided not to make that referral because STUDENT had obtained similar IQ scores in February 1995 and had been referred for a speech/language evaluation which “ruled out language deficits.” (Petitioner’s Exh. P-6; testimony of Dr. Swed.) In essence, Dr. Swed concluded that speech/language and audiology had been ruled out as areas of suspected disability based on the earlier speech/language assessment results.

While Dr. Swed’s determination was not entirely unreasonable, the Hearing Officer considers that special education law requires reassessment every three years precisely because children’s disabilities and needs change over time. Dr. Patterson testified that a speech/language assessment would have been appropriate in 1998, given the significant discrepancy between STUDENT’s verbal and performance IQ scores, although Dr. Patterson acknowledged that whether or not it was appropriate to rely on the 1995 speech/language assessment results depended on whether STUDENT was having difficulties with auditory processing, such as following directions. STUDENT’s sixth-grade teacher testified that he did not notice STUDENT exhibiting any particular difficulty with following directions. Thus, Dr. Swed may have been correct that speech/language and audiology were not suspected areas of disability at that time.

In any event, given that the IEP team found STUDENT ineligible in February 1998 because he no longer needed special education in sixth grade, the District’s failure to reassess in these areas did not affect the outcome of the IEP. Additionally, as noted previously in this section, a student not eligible for special education has no right to receive a FAPE. The decision not to reassess in speech/language and audiology did not actually cause a loss of educational opportunity, and thus was not a denial of FAPE.

(h) failure to ensure parental participation in IEP meetings following June 1999 when requests were made by parents for independent educational evaluations (IEEs) in all areas of suspected disability

There is no indication of a procedural violation. By all accounts, the parent was able to participate fully in the 1999 IEP meetings, and there was no evidence of any interference whatsoever with that right. Moreover, the District agreed to fund all requested assessments. (Petitioner’s Exhs. TT, ZZ.)

5. From June 1999 until August 2000, did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE by failing to provide an educational program to remediate Petitioner’s auditory processing deficits?

The standard for determining whether a local educational agency's provision of services substantively offered a FAPE for STUDENT involves the following three factors: whether the services were designed to address STUDENT's unique needs; whether the services will provide educational benefit to him; and whether the services conformed to his IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.)

In Rowley, the Supreme Court decided the appropriate level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that “the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200.) Moreover, as long as a school district provides an appropriate education, methodology is left up to the school's discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208.)

In the present case, Petitioner argues that the District failed to provide an appropriate educational program to remediate STUDENT’s auditory processing deficits from June 1999 to August 2000. For the 1999-2000 school year, the District offered STUDENT placement in a regular education program with one class period (45 minutes) of RSP each school day. (Petitioner’s Exhs. HH, SS.) To determine STUDENT’s unique needs related to auditory processing, the Hearing Officer considers that clinical audiologist Carol Atkins concluded that STUDENT was “at risk for central auditory processing disorder.” (Petitioner’s Exh. AAA-3.) However, STUDENT’s sixth-grade teacher testified that STUDENT did not have particular difficulty following oral directions in the classroom. Similarly, STUDENT’s seventh-grade English and history teacher testified that STUDENT participated in class discussions and learned the material discussed during class.(Footnote 11) (Testimony of Ms. Gardner.)

In light of all circumstances, the evidence indicated that STUDENT’s auditory needs could have been addressed within RSP and regular education, and the District’s offer of regular education and RSP was reasonably calculated to result in educational benefit. Dr. Patterson testified to his opinion that STUDENT could return to a regular education campus and would likely benefit from RSP services. While Dr. Patterson acknowledged that STUDENT had received some benefit from attending Lindamood Bell, he did not indicate that STUDENT needed Lindamood Bell or any similar multidisciplinary instructional program. Moreover, the Hearing Officer considers that STUDENT had gained educational benefit in a regular education placement with RSP services over the course of his later elementary school years, such that he was at or near grade level in most subjects by sixth grade. (Petitioner’s Exhs. P-5, T; testimony of Mr. Reagan, Ms. Stolte, Dr. Patterson.)

Given that the District’s offer was not implemented during the time period in question, there is no issue regarding whether the services conformed to STUDENT’s IEP. Thus, regarding STUDENT’s auditory processing needs, the District’s offer was designed to meet those needs and allow STUDENT to receive educational benefit. Accordingly, regarding STUDENT’s auditory processing needs, substantively the District offered STUDENT a FAPE from June 1999 to August 2000.

6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for educational therapy and transportation expenses?

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the school district failed to provide. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(1997).) However, parents are not required to have procured an exact proper placement under IDEA in order to be entitled to reimbursement. (Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1986) 79 F.2d 1153, 1161.) The parents may receive reimbursement so long as their placement met the student’s unique needs and provided the student with educational benefit. (Id.)

In addition, equitable considerations may be weighed in granting relief and courts have broad discretion in granting such relief. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 358; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496. Court decisions subsequent to Burlington also have extended relief in the form of compensatory education to students who have been denied a FAPE. (See, e.g. Lester H. v. K. Gilhool and the Chester Upland School District (3d. Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 865; Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 749.) Compensatory education is an equitable remedy wherein “appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the Petitioner is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” (Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497.)

The GRANDPARENTS seek reimbursement for STUDENT’s attendance at Lindamood Bell Learning Center beginning with a Lindamood Bell assessment on June 21, 1999. STUDENT attended Lindamood Bell for approximately twenty hours a week from July to November 1999, with only a few weeks’ attendance of twelve or sixteen hours instead of twenty. (Petitioner’s Exh. HHH.) STUDENT resumed attending Lindamood Bell in July and August 2000, again for twenty hours a week. While at Lindamood Bell, STUDENT received one-on-one instruction in areas including visual imagery, math, writing, reading and pronouncing words, and areas related to auditory and language processing. (Testimony of Angelica Benson, STUDENT.)

The evidence established that STUDENT benefitted from his attendance at Lindamood Bell. Lindamood Bell’s testing of STUDENT showed increased scores in several areas. (Petitioner’s Exhs. UU, FFF.) Dr. Patterson explained that even though some of those test scores showed decline, overall STUDENT benefitted from Lindamood Bell. GRANDMOTHER testified that STUDENT improved his writing and ability to get assignments done after

Lindamood Bell. STUDENT himself testified that he is better able to write a paragraph than he was before he attended Lindamood Bell. STUDENT also testified that Lindamood Bell increased his confidence in his schoolwork.

In the present case, STUDENT should have been found eligible for special education by January 1999, although in fact that did not occur until June 1999. The denial of FAPE during this period led to the District’s failure to provide STUDENT with the procedural protections provided to a special education student subject to discipline. Because STUDENT did not receive those procedural protections, he was denied a FAPE from May to September 1999, at which time the District clearly terminated STUDENT’s disciplinary change of placement. Thus, in total, the denial of FAPE lasted from January to September 1999, while STUDENT’s placement at Lindamood Bell was from July to November 1999, and July and August 2000.

The denial of FAPE from January to June 1999 primarily resulted in STUDENT’s not receiving RSP services that he needed, and thus struggling in seventh grade. The denial of FAPE from May to September 1999 resulted in STUDENT being removed from school and receiving home teaching for approximately the last month and a half of seventh grade, and the first few weeks of eighth grade. Because STUDENT did not begin attendance at Lindamood Bell until July 1999, Lindamood Bell did not primarily replace STUDENT’s education that year. Rather, the GRANDPARENTS used Lindamood Bell largely to compensate for STUDENT’s academic needs that year. To determine the amount of services that would compensate STUDENT for the denial of special education services from January to September 1999, the Hearing Officer considers that, while not exactly equivalent, RSP and Lindamood Bell services both consist of remedial, one-to-one instruction. In light of the evidence regarding STUDENT’s ADHD and SLD, and considering that STUDENT would have received approximately 45 minutes of RSP services per school day, the Hearing Officer finds that 85 hours of Lindamood Bell services in 1999 is a reasonable approximation of the amount of one-on-one instruction that STUDENT would have received had he received RSP services during the regular school year from January to September 1999. Considering also that STUDENT’s academic needs may have become more severe due to the lack of special education services from January to September 1999, and also considering STUDENT’s removal to home teaching, a total of 130 hours of Lindamood Bell services is sufficient to compensate STUDENT for the denial of FAPE which occurred from January to September 1999.

Additionally, the District argues that it should not be ordered to reimburse the GRANDPARENTS for Lindamood Bell because they failed to give ten days’ notice of their unilateral placement of STUDENT at Lindamood Bell. Both State and federal law specify that reimbursement paid to parents of a child with a disability for costs of a private school may be reduced or denied if the parents did not inform the school district at least ten business days prior to the placement and did not inform the school at the most recent IEP team meeting prior to the placement. (20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C); Educ. Code § 56276.)

In the present case, the GRANDPARENTS had notice of their parental rights, including notice of their obligation to provide ten days’ notice of unilateral placement. (District’s Exh. 58.) The GRANDPARENTS informed the District about STUDENT’s attendance at Lindamood Bell in a letter dated September 10, 1999. (Petitioner’s Exh. QQ.) The letter indicated that STUDENT had been attending Lindamood Bell since July 1999.(Footnote 12) Given the lack of notice of unilateral placement, this decision will not award reimbursement for Lindamood Bell services that the GRANDPARENTS provided prior to September 20, 1999, which is ten days after the written notice. However, given that STUDENT received over 130 hours of Lindamood Bell in the three-month period after that date, this determination regarding notice of unilateral placement does not result in an actual reduction of relief awarded.

Thus, the District shall reimburse the GRANDPARENTS for the first 130 hours of STUDENT’s Lindamood Bell attendance beginning September 20, 1999. According to the Lindamood Bell invoice, the 130 hours of Lindamood Bell cost $8,450, and the District shall reimburse the GRANDPARENTS in that amount.

The GRANDPARENTS also request reimbursement for their cost of transporting STUDENT to Lindamood Bell in Newport Beach from their home in Villa Park. Transportation is a related service that must be provided if necessary for a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) There is no dispute that transportation was required for STUDENT’s attendance at Lindamood Bell in 1999. Thus, consistent with the award set out above, the District shall reimburse the GRANDPARENTS for their mileage costs beginning September 20, 1999, for STUDENT’s attendance of 130 hours at Lindamood Bell. This reimbursement shall be at the standard rate that the District reimburses its employees for mileage. 7. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by speech and language pathologist Carol Atkins and audiologist JoAnn Hein?

Special education students must be reassessed every three years, “or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the pupil’s parent or teacher requests a new assessment and a new [IEP] to be developed.” (Education Code § 56381.) When a parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the public educational agency, the parent has the right to an independent assessment from qualified specialists at public expense unless the educational agency is able to demonstrate at a due process hearing that its assessment was appropriate. (Education Code § 56329(b).)

In the present case, at the IEP meeting on December 15, 1999, the IEP team agreed to refer STUDENT for a speech/language assessment in the areas of vocabulary, auditory discrimination and language processing. (Petitioner’s Exh. YY; testimony of Ms. Shipcott.) The speech and language pathologist was subsequently scheduled to conduct the assessment of STUDENT on January 6, 2000. (Petitioner’s Exh. ZZ.) On January 5, 2000, Petitioner’s educational consultant, Virginia Russell, notified the District’s director of pupil services that the GRANDPARENTS were canceling that assessment and would be obtaining an independent speech and language assessment. (Id.)

Pursuant to Education Code section 56329(b), the parents must disagree with the public agency’s assessment in order to seek reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation (IEE). Here, the District agreed to conduct the assessment. Due solely to the parents’ choice, the District’s assessor was not given the opportunity to assess and, therefore, there was no public agency assessment with which the parents could disagree. Had the parents wished to obtain reimbursement for their IEEs, they should have permitted the District’s assessor to conduct the requested assessment and then obtained IEEs if they disagreed with the District’s assessment. While the parents were free to seek their own assessments without the District’s involvement, there is no legal basis for awarding reimbursement for those independent assessments.

ORDER

The GRANDPARENTS shall submit to the District calculation of their mileage for their transportation of STUDENT for the first 130 hours of his Lindamood Bell attendance beginning September 20, 1999. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of this information, the District shall reimburse their transportation costs at the rate the District reimburses its own employees for mileage. Also at that time, the District shall reimburse the GRANDPARENTS in the amount of $8,450, for STUDENT’s attendance of 130 hours at Lindamood Bell. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

1. Did the District err in exiting Petitioner from special education in February 1998, when in fact he was eligible at that time?

The District prevailed on this issue.

2. After Petitioner was exited from special education in February 1998, should the District have reassessed him and found him eligible again prior to the June 1999 IEP?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue, to the extent that the Hearing Officer found that the District should have assessed Petitioner and found him eligible again by January 1999.

3. Did the District’s disciplinary change of placement in May 1999 constitute a denial of FAPE which continued until Petitioner’s placement at Villa Park High School in August 2000?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue regarding the period from May to September 1999. The District prevailed on this issue regarding the period from September 1999 to August 2000.

4. Did the District commit procedural errors which denied Petitioner a FAPE?

The District prevailed on this issue.

5. From June 1999 until August 2000, did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE by failing to provide an educational program to remediate Petitioner’s auditory processing deficits?

The District prevailed on this issue.

6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for educational therapy and transportation expenses?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that he is entitled to his expenses for attendance at Lindamood Bell for 130 hours in 1999. The District prevailed to the extent that Petitioner was not awarded further reimbursement for his placement at Lindamood Bell.

7. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for assessments conducted by speech and language pathologist Carol Atkins and audiologist JoAnn Hein?

The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: November 15, 2001 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: For purposes of clarity and organization, the Hearing Officer has made revisions to the issue statement, including rephrasing and addressing Issue No. 2 as its own issue rather than as a sub-issue of Issue No. 4. Additionally, Issue No. 7 was raised at hearing but inadvertently omitted from the Hearing Officer’s order dated October 2, 2001.

2. Although she marked the box on page 1 of the IEP indicating that she consented to the IEP, GRANDMOTHER testified that she voiced her doubts to the school psychologist and the RSP teacher. Those staff members testified that they did not recall GRANDMOTHER or anyone else at the meeting disagreeing with the decision to exit STUDENT from special education. (Testimony of Dr. Swed, Anne Schrader, Sally Stolte.)

3. Reportedly the juvenile criminal proceedings eventually resulted in a sentence of community service for the threat STUDENT made to his classmate.

4. These scores were similar to STUDENT’s WISC-III scores from 1995, when he scores a verbal IQ of 90, a performance IQ of 112 and a full scale IQ of 100. Additionally, Dr. Walters’ assessment report of April 1999 indicated STUDENT tested at a verbal IQ of 104, performance IQ of 115 and a full scale IQ of 109.

5. Dr. Patterson stated that authorities in the field, including Jerome Sattler and the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP), take the position that it is inappropriate to use a student’s full-scale IQ when there is a large discrepancy between the verbal and performance IQ scores. Additionally, the Hearing Officer notes that position generally reflected in Kaufman, Intelligent Testing With The WISC-III, (1994), pp. 102, 153.

6. In his testimony, Dr. Patterson acknowledged that STUDENT’s scores on the Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (CTONI) were not inconsistent with STUDENT’s verbal and full-scale IQ scores.

7. There is no reason to believe that the Legislature intended that the term “written expression,” as used in section 56337(a), was meant to refer only to the WIAT written expression score, to the exclusion of the WIAT writing score.

8. At least a portion of STUDENT’s academic decline appears due to emotional stress that affected his attitude and motivation.

9. Several witnesses testified that, due to the events at Columbine High School in April 1999, school officials’ concerns were heightened regarding any allegations of bombs. However, Cerro Villa school principal Aileen Sterling credibly testified that the school administration would respond to the bomb allegations today the same way they responded in May 1999.

10. In particular, Petitioner’s allegations regarding denial of procedural protections in May 1999 are encompassed within the discussion under Issue no. 3.

11. Rather, Mrs. Gardner’s testimony indicated that STUDENT’s main academic problems in her class were staying on task and turning in assignments.

12. At hearing, Petitioner argued that STUDENT risked immediate harm if he was not placed at Lindamood Bell in July 1999, and thus his placement fell under an exception to Education Code 56276. There is no evidence whatsoever to support this contention.