California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 30, 1996
Student v. Culver City Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1262-95 · Hearing Officer Kathleen S. Chovan
Culver City Unified prevails: ninth grader with very limited school attendance not eligible for special education; nonpublic school request denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
None noted in the decision. It describes prior proceedings: a 1993 student hearing request that was withdrawn, a 1994 District hearing request that was withdrawn, and a 1994 Office for Civil Rights finding that the District complied with federal law.
Summary
A 15-year-old ninth grader's mother filed for a hearing against Culver City Unified School District. She wanted a nonpublic school placement. In 1993 the District had found the student eligible with a specific learning disability in math. After years of disputes and very little school attendance, the District found him no longer eligible in 1995. He began ninth grade in general education. He stopped attending after a January 1996 suspension for fighting. The mother relied on a clinical evaluation by the Reiss-Davis Child Study Center.
The Hearing Officer first had to decide whether the student was eligible. On specific learning disability, she found he had not proved a severe gap between his ability and his achievement. Reiss-Davis did not report standardized ability scores. The court case Larry P. v. Riles may have limited the use of IQ tests for this student. If so, an alternative assessment needed classroom observation and teacher input, and the evaluator obtained neither. Even if a gap existed, the student did not show that his delays came mainly from something other than poor attendance and missed schooling. He also did not show that general education could not meet his needs. On serious emotional disturbance, the Reiss-Davis psychologist herself did not make that diagnosis. The District's educational psychologist found the criteria were not met. Because the student was not eligible, the Hearing Officer did not decide placement and denied the nonpublic school request.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied California's severe-discrepancy test for learning disabilities. A clinical evaluation without classroom observation or teacher input was not enough. Delays caused mainly by chronic absence did not qualify. It also shows that a placement claim was not reached once the student was found not eligible.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 1. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability?
The student did not show a severe ability-achievement discrepancy by standard scores or alternative assessment. He also did not show that his delays were not mainly caused by poor attendance, or that general education could not meet his needs.
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 2. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services as seriously emotionally disturbed?
Although the student may have emotional difficulties, the evidence did not show he met the 5 CCR 3030(i) criteria. His own evaluator did not diagnose serious emotional disturbance.
- Not reachedPlacement and LRE
Issue 3. If STUDENT is eligible for special education services, does STUDENT require a nonpublic school (NPS) placement in order for him to benefit from his education?
Because the student was not eligible, the Hearing Officer did not address placement and denied the request for a nonpublic school. Neither party prevailed on this issue.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Student found not eligible for special education by reason of specific learning disability or serious emotional disturbance; request for nonpublic school placement denied.
Key authorities
Larry P. v. Riles; Education Code section 56337; 5 CCR section 3030(i); 5 CCR section 3030(j); Larry P. Task Force Report (1989)
People named in the decision
- Dr. Dani Levine, private psychologist (fellow in training); assessor and witness for Student, Reiss-Davis Child Study Center
- Don Tessmer, director of Learning Disability Clinic and ADHD Clinic; witness for Student, Reiss-Davis Child Study Center
- Reiss-Davis Child Study Center, private nonprofit treatment center; conducted clinical evaluation and psychotherapy, Los Angeles
- Tamara A. Kaufman, school psychologist; witness for District, Culver City Unified School District
- Amy J. Rudnick, District psychologist; witness for District, Culver City Unified School District
- Barbara Bryant, licensed educational psychologist and educational consultant; witness for District, Culver City Unified School District
- Melony Gingrich, assistant principal; witness for District, Culver City High School
- Ginger Williams, present on behalf of District (role not stated), Culver City Unified School District
- Dr. Vera M. Jashni, deputy superintendent; District representative, Culver City Unified School District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Kathleen S. Chovan, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Culver City, California, on May 7, 1996.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented by his mother, MOTHER. Also present on behalf of Petitioner were two representatives from the Reiss-Davis Child Study Center (Reiss-Davis): Dr. Dani Levine, fellow in training; and Mr. Don Tessmer, director of the Learning Disability Clinic and Attention Deficit and Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) Clinic at Reiss-Davis. Respondent Culver City Unified School District (District) was represented by Dr. Vera M. Jashni, deputy superintendent. Also present on behalf of the District was Ginger Williams.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open to allow Respondent to submit a written closing brief.(Footnote 1) Respondent's closing brief was received on May 10, 1996. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
Witnesses testifying on behalf of Petitioner were MOTHER, STUDENT's mother, and Dr. Dani Levine and Mr. Don Tessmer from Reiss-Davis. The following witnesses testified on behalf of the District: Tamara A. Kaufman, District school psychologist; Amy J. Rudnick, District psychologist; Barbara Bryant, educational consultant for the District; and Melony Gingrich, assistant principal, Culver City High School.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
At the hearing, MOTHER emphasized that Petitioner's issue for hearing was the appropriate placement for him. However, because STUDENT is not currently eligible for special education services, the Hearing Officer must address the issue of STUDENT's eligibility for special education services before addressing the issue of STUDENT's placement.
Petitioner alleged that he has a specific learning disability and both parties presented evidence regarding this issue. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concluded that one issue for hearing was Petitioner's eligibility for special education services based on a specific learning disability.
The Hearing Officer also concluded that a second issue for hearing was Petitioner's eligibility for special education services because of a serious emotional disturbance. The Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner has not alleged that he is seriously emotionally disturbed as the basis for his eligibility for special education services. However, both parties presented evidence regarding STUDENT's emotional state and witnesses for both parties gave their opinion as to whether STUDENT was seriously emotionally disturbed. In addition, Petitioner has alleged that he cannot attend a public school because of his fighting and that a regular education placement cannot meet his emotional needs. Since Petitioner is not currently eligible for special education services, the Hearing Officer concluded that a determination as to whether STUDENT is seriously emotionally disturbed must be made in order to reach Petitioner's issue regarding placement.
ISSUES
1. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability?
2. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services as seriously emotionally disturbed?
3. If STUDENT is eligible for special education services, does STUDENT require a nonpublic school (NPS) placement in order for him to benefit from his education?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is fifteen years old and is not currently eligible for special education services. He is enrolled in the ninth grade at Culver City High School, but has not attended school for most of the 1996 spring semester.
STUDENT moved into the District in 1992 and has attended school on a very limited basis since that time. Because STUDENT had been retained in second grade, he was entering the fifth grade in September 1992, although his chronological peers were in sixth grade. Because of his age, the school recommended that STUDENT be enrolled at Culver City Middle School as a sixth grader, and MOTHER, STUDENT's mother, agreed to this placement. STUDENT was referred for special education services by the school's Child Study Team in April of 1993 based on his difficulties with academics, attendance, and behavior problems including poor attention and excessive aggression. Overall, STUDENT was absent 53 days and was late to school 21 times during the 1992-93 school year. (Dist. Exh. 141)
The District assessed STUDENT and found him eligible for special education services in June 1993 because of a specific learning disability in the area of math, due to a visual perceptual processing disorder. The District offered STUDENT a resource specialist program (RSP) placement for his seventh grade year with resource specialist services for one period per day. He was also offered six weeks of counseling as a related service, at the level of one 30-minute session per week. MOTHER did not accept this placement for STUDENT and filed for a due process hearing in June 1993.
Although MOTHER withdrew the request for hearing in July 1993, she did not allow STUDENT to return to school for his seventh grade year in September 1993. On October 20, 1993, the District agreed to place STUDENT in a Special Day Class (SDC) at Culver City Middle School for the 1993-94 school year in order to get STUDENT back into school. On November 2, 1993, the parties agreed that STUDENT would be placed on home instruction until January 30, 1994.
On January 4, 1994, the IEP team met to discuss STUDENT's placement. The District offered STUDENT a special day class placement at Culver City High School, since MOTHER had raised concerns about the Middle School campus. MOTHER did not consent to this placement and the District provided home teaching to STUDENT. STUDENT did not attend school for the remainder of the 1993-94 school year.
On May 19, 1994, the United State Department of Education Office for Civil Rights (OCR) responded to a complaint filed by MOTHER which had alleged that the District discriminated against STUDENT by failing to appropriately evaluate him and provide him with an appropriate placement and services. In its response, OCR concluded that the District was in compliance with federal law regarding its evaluation of STUDENT and its placement offers for him. The report determined that MOTHER had prevented the District from provided services to STUDENT by refusing to return STUDENT to school. (Resp. Exh. 108-111)
Because STUDENT had not been attending school, the District filed for a hearing in June 1994. The parties reached an interim agreement in August which stated, in part, that STUDENT would be placed in a special day class for four periods per day with one elective and one physical education class. As part of this agreement, MOTHER and STUDENT agreed to make every effort to ensure that STUDENT attended school every day and that he arrived on time. The parties agreed to hold an IEP meeting in October 1994, with another mediation to follow. (Resp. Exh. 214-15, 217)
STUDENT entered eighth grade in September 1994 in accordance with the mediated agreement, but soon experienced problems with behavior. STUDENT was suspended for three days at the end of September for fighting. During the IEP held on October 12, 1994, MOTHER expressed concerns regarding STUDENT's fighting in school. A goal was written in the area of social adjustment and self help, with the objective that STUDENT would accept appropriate responsibility for his actions and demonstrate appropriate channels for expressing his anger. (Resp. Exh. 12-13) Nevertheless, STUDENT received an in-school suspension for disruptive behavior at the end of October and was suspended for five days in early November for fighting.
At the end of October 1994, MOTHER requested that a complete psychoeducational evaluation be conducted for STUDENT, stating that she believed that he had a learning disability. MOTHER consented to the assessment plan developed by the District and the District began the assessment. The parties agreed during mediation on November 17, 1994, that the District would complete the assessment by January 5, 1995, and an IEP meeting would be held on January 5.
At the end of November, MOTHER removed STUDENT from school because of his fighting. As a result of STUDENT's removal from school, the District was not able to complete its assessment. An IEP meeting was scheduled on December 5, 1994, to discuss MOTHER's request to move STUDENT back to the middle school. MOTHER did not attend the December 5, 1994 IEP and STUDENT's placement remained at the High School. As a result of the disagreements between the parties during the 1994-95 school year, STUDENT did not attend school during his eighth grade year after November 30, 1994.
On January 5, 1995, the IEP team met to review the assessments conducted prior to STUDENT's removal from school. The District determined, based on its assessments, that no severe discrepancy was evident between achievement and ability. They also determined that no processing problem was evident. Noting that the parent had refused to make STUDENT available for complete testing, the District concluded that STUDENT no longer qualified for special education services, and recommended his return to a regular education placement. MOTHER did not sign this IEP, indicating that she wanted to discuss the matter with her advocate. At the mediation held after this IEP, the District, as the petitioner in that proceeding, withdrew its request for hearing in order to pursue other legal options.
Following this IEP, the District attempted to reach an agreement with MOTHER and STUDENT regarding his attendance at school through the School Attendance Review Board process. When the parties did not reach agreement in this forum, the District made a referral to the Los Angeles County District Attorney Truancy Mediation Program, due to STUDENT's serious school attendance problem. The District Attorney's office instructed the parties to complete STUDENT's assessments and to place STUDENT in school following completion of the assessments and an IEP meeting.
During March and April 1995, the District completed its assessment of STUDENT and an IEP meeting was held on May 16, 1995. At that meeting, the District discussed the assessment results and again concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services. The District determined that there was no significant discrepancy between STUDENT's ability and academic achievement. The District also did not find that STUDENT exhibited a processing deficit. MOTHER did not agree with this conclusion and requested on May 19, 1995, that the District complete another assessment of STUDENT. Having just completed its assessment, the District declined to assess STUDENT further at that time.
During the fall of 1995-96 school year, STUDENT's ninth grade year, MOTHER requested testing by the Reiss-Davis Child Study Center, a nonprofit treatment center for emotionally disturbed children in Los Angeles. The staff at Reiss-Davis agreed to assess STUDENT on the condition that STUDENT return to school. STUDENT returned to Culver City High School as a regular ninth grade student in October 1995. MOTHER referred STUDENT for special education services upon his return and she signed the District's proposed assessment plan on October 6, 1995. MOTHER subsequently withdrew her consent for assessment on October 20, 1995 because the Reiss-Davis assessment was reaching completion. (Resp. Exh. 75-77) STUDENT attended school during the fall of 1995, but he had repeated disciplinary referrals for disruptive behavior. In December 1995, MOTHER filed for the hearing in the present case.
Upon his return to school following the December holidays, STUDENT was suspended for four days due to fighting. STUDENT did not return to school following his suspension on January 9, 1996. On January 17, 1996, the parties met in mediation. MOTHER presented the results of the Reiss-Davis evaluation and requested that the District find STUDENT eligible for special education services. She also asked that STUDENT be placed in a small, private school. The parties did not reach agreement at this mediation.
Following this mediation, the District requested permission to assess STUDENT, indicating that they would confer with the staff at Reiss-Davis regarding the findings in its report. MOTHER signed the District's assessment plan on February 15, 1996, but STUDENT was not attending school at that time. District personnel made repeated attempts to gain access to STUDENT in order to assess him, but STUDENT was not made available for assessment. On April 8, 1996, MOTHER wrote a letter to the Hearing Office indicating that she was withdrawing her consent for assessment. (Resp. Exh. 31).
During February, STUDENT received psychotherapy from Reiss-Davis two times per week, and this therapy involved addressing some of STUDENT's educational needs. STUDENT expressed a discomfort with therapy, however, and he terminated therapy over the objection of his therapist at the end of February. MOTHER also obtained private tutoring for STUDENT for 4 hours per week in English and math on an intermittent basis during the spring semester. However, STUDENT never returned to school during the 1996 spring semester following his five-day suspension on January 9, 1996.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner contends that he is eligible for special education services because of a specific learning disability resulting from a disorder in visual-perceptual processing and an attention deficit disorder. Petitioner alleges that the District has not met his educational or emotional needs in the past, which has resulted in his fighting and being suspended from school. Petitioner also alleges that because of his safety concerns, he has not attended school and, therefore, has received a minimal education for the past several years. Petitioner contends that he requires a nonpublic school placement because he has not been successful in public schools in the past, and his failure to succeed in public schools demonstrates that a public school cannot address his educational, emotional, and attentional difficulties. Petitioner contends that he needs a private school setting which will provide the structure and containment he requires to benefit from his education.
Respondent contends that Petitioner is not eligible for special education services, either because of a specific learning disability or because of a serious emotional disturbance. Respondent contends that there is no evidence that Petitioner has a severe discrepancy between his ability and achievement, nor that Petitioner has a processing deficit. Respondent states that Petitioner needs a regular education placement and that any particular deficits he may have can be corrected in the regular education setting with modifications to the regular education program. Respondent also notes that any educational or emotional difficulties Petitioner may have are most likely a result of his failure to attend school for a substantial period of time over the past several years, in spite of repeated attempts of Respondent to get Petitioner back into school.
Additionally, Respondent contends that Petitioner does not meet the legal definition of a child eligible for special education services due to a severe emotional disturbance. Respondent contends that Petitioner needs to be in school in a regular education school setting. Respondent alleges that Petitioner has the burden of showing that he requires special education services to benefit from his education and that he has failed to meet that burden.
DISCUSSION
1. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability?
According to California Education Code Section 56337, a student is eligible for special education services by reason of having a specific learning disability if all of the following exist:
(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievements in one of more of the following academic areas: (1) oral expression, (2) listening comprehension, (3) written expression, (4) basic reading skills, (5) reading comprehension, (6) mathematics calculation, or (7) mathematics reasoning.
(b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural or economic disadvantages.
(c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.
Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations (CCR) provides further guidance in making the determination of whether a student has a learning disability. When standardized tests are considered to be valid for a specific pupil, a "severe discrepancy" is defined, in terms of standardized test scores, as a difference of greater than 1.5 standard deviations, adjusted by one standard error of measurement, between ability and achievement scores (using a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.) Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(4)(A). When standardized tests are considered invalid for a specific pupil, the discrepancy shall be measured by alternative means as specified on the assessment plan. Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(4)(B). The discrepancy shall not be primarily the result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(5).
In this case, Petitioner had the burden of showing that he was eligible for special education services in ninth grade, since he entered ninth grade as a regular education student. The evidence showed that Petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that he was eligible for special education services because of a specific learning disability for several reasons.
First, Petitioner did not demonstrate that a severe discrepancy exists between his ability and achievement, either by using standardized tests scores or through alternative assessment methods. Petitioner's assessment results from Reiss-Davis did not report standardized ability scores, although Dr. Levine had administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (WISC-III) to STUDENT.(Footnote 2) Dr. Tessmer stated that, based on her testing, she believed that STUDENT has learning deficits. However, she did not testify regarding STUDENT's standardized scores on ability. Therefore, Petitioner did not provide evidence regarding a numerical discrepancy as required under Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(4)(A).
During cross-examination, Dr. Levine acknowledged that an issue exists as to whether school districts can consider the results of intelligence testing for African-American students, based on the precedence of Larry P.(Footnote 3) If, under Larry P., standardized test scores are considered invalid for STUDENT, Petitioner must demonstrate that a severe discrepancy exists between ability and achievement using an alternative assessment method under Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(4)(B).
Guidance on the conduct of alternative assessments was provided in a report from the Larry P. Task Force, which was an advisory report presented to the California Department of Education in 1989.(Footnote 4) In this report, the Task Force describes the type of information which must be considered in making an alternative assessment regarding the discrepancy between a child's ability and achievement. The report emphasizes that the child's classroom performance must be considered, including consultation with the classroom teacher and observation of the child's classroom performance during formal and informal activities.(Footnote 5)
In this case, Petitioner did not provide evidence regarding STUDENT's performance in the classroom to support a finding that STUDENT exhibits a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. Dr. Levine testified that she read the assessment reports from the District as part of her assessment, but that she did not consult with District staff during her assessment, nor did she observe STUDENT's classroom performance. Dr. Levine stated that she did not attempt to consult with the District because STUDENT had not been attending school prior to her assessment. Dr. Levine also acknowledged that the evaluation as to whether a child has a learning disability for clinical purposes is different than the determination which must be made by the school district for purposes of providing education services. Dr. Levine stated that she had conducted a clinical evaluation of STUDENT.
MOTHER also testified that STUDENT had difficulties in school. However, most of her testimony centered on the fact that STUDENT was fighting in school rather than on facts regarding STUDENT's learning difficulties. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement under the alternative assessment requirement.(Footnote 6)
However, even if Petitioner had demonstrated that he exhibits a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement, the evidence showed that STUDENT has had limited school experience and poor attendance. As noted above, there is no dispute in this case regarding the fact that STUDENT has missed a substantial amount of schooling over the last three years.
MOTHER testified that STUDENT received little schooling during sixth grade, did not attend school in seventh or eighth grade, and attended school for only a few weeks in ninth grade.(Footnote 7) In fact, in Petitioner's referral for special education services in October 1995, MOTHER states, "[STUDENT] has never been in school long enough to grow academically." (Resp. Exh. 77) Dr. Levine testified that she was aware that STUDENT's attendance had been erratic since fourth grade, and she acknowledged that poor attendance would impair a child's performance. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Petitioner's delays(Footnote 8) are not primarily a result of limited school experience or poor school attendance, as required by Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(5).
Finally, Petitioner did not demonstrate that his needs cannot be met through regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program, as required by Education Code section 56337(c). The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner's minimal school attendance over the past three years has limited the District's ability to make any modifications necessary to meet his needs. In addition, Melony Gingrich, assistant principal at Culver City High School, testified that STUDENT's academic, social, and emotional needs could be met in a regular education placement at Culver City High School and that one of STUDENT's primary needs was to regularly attend school.
Although MOTHER testified that a regular education placement was not appropriate for STUDENT, her reasoning was primarily based on STUDENT's history of fighting in school. While STUDENT's behavior in school is relevant for purposes of determining his eligibility as seriously emotionally disturbed (see below), the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT's history of fighting does not, by itself, demonstrate that STUDENT's academic needs cannot be met through modifications of the regular education program, for purposes of determining that STUDENT has a specific learning disability.
In conclusion, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he exhibits a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. In addition, even assuming that such a discrepancy existed, Petitioner has not demonstrated that any discrepancy or delays in his achievement are not primarily a result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. Petitioner also has not demonstrated that his needs cannot be met within the regular education program. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner is not eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability.
2. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services as seriously emotionally disturbed?
Under California law, a student is eligible for special education services because of a serious emotional disturbance if the student exhibits one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree, and these characteristic(s) adversely affect educational performance:
(1) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory or health factors;
(2) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers;
(3) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances exhibited in several situations;
(4) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression;
(5) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.
Title 5 CCR Section 3030(i).
During her October 1995 assessment of STUDENT, Dr. Levine administered various tests to evaluate STUDENT's social and emotional condition. Dr. Levine testified that the results of her testing showed that STUDENT had an introverted style and was uncomfortable with social situations and intimacy. She stated that his self-esteem was low and that he may have difficulty coping with social situations. She testified that his results were marginal for meeting the criteria for depression based on the Rorschach Inkblot Test. Dr. Levine stated that STUDENT had emotional difficulties which may interfere with his ability to learn, and she recommended psychotherapy. Although Dr. Levine also recommended a private school placement based on STUDENT's emotional needs, she stated that she did not diagnose STUDENT to be seriously emotionally disturbed.
Barbara Bryant, a licensed educational psychologist providing psychological services to the district, also testified regarding STUDENT's eligibility as seriously emotionally disturbed. Ms. Bryant stated that she reviewed STUDENT's records, including the Reiss-Davis report, and concluded that nothing in STUDENT's record indicates that he meets the criteria for seriously emotionally disturbed under California law. Ms. Bryant stated that STUDENT's needs in a school setting overall are difficult to determine, however, because he has not attended school on a consistent basis.
MOTHER testified that STUDENT has problems attending school because of his fighting, his communication problems, and his emotional needs. However, she did not allege that STUDENT was seriously emotionally disturbed. Based on the above evidence, the Hearing Officer concludes that although STUDENT may have emotional difficulties, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he requires special education services based on a serious emotional disturbance.
3. If STUDENT is eligible for special education services, does STUDENT require a nonpublic school (NPS) placement in order for him to benefit from his education?
The Hearing Officer has concluded above that STUDENT is not eligible for special education services because of a specific learning disability or a serious emotional disturbance. Therefore, the Hearing Officer cannot address the issue of Petitioner's educational placement.
ORDER
(1) STUDENT is not eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability or a serious emotional disturbance.
(2) Petitioner's request for a nonpublic school placement is denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
(1) Is STUDENT eligible for special education services by reason of a specific learning disability?
Respondent prevailed on this issue.
(2) Is STUDENT eligible for special education services by reason of a serious emotional disturbance?
Respondent prevailed on this issue.
(3) If STUDENT is eligible for special education services, does STUDENT require a nonpublic school (NPS) placement in order for him to benefit from his education?
Neither party prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: May 30, 1996 ________________________________ Kathleen Chovan, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES
1. MOTHER elected to present an oral closing statement at the hearing on May 7, 1996, but did not object to District submitting a written closing brief.
2. The WISC-III is a standardized test of intelligence.
3. STUDENT is an African-American student. In 1979, the federal district court ruled in Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F.Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979), judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part by Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) that standardized individual intelligence quotient ("I.Q.") tests could not be used to identify African-American children as "Educable Mentally Retarded" (EMR) or a "substantially equivalent category." Because the state of California has abolished the EMR category, the district court has ordered supplemental proceedings in Larry P. to hear evidence as to the meaning of the term "substantial equivalent" in this context. As of this date, however, the district court has not defined the term "substantial equivalent." Therefore, the extent to which the prohibition against intelligence testing under Larry P. applies to a student such as STUDENT has not been clarified by the district court. The Hearing Officer notes, however, that neither party argued that STUDENT qualified for special education services based on a below average general intellectual functioning.
4. Larry P. Task Force, "The Larry P. Task Force Report. Policy and Alternative Assessment Guideline Recommendations," Resources in Special Education, 1989.
5. Larry P. Task Force Report, page 54.
6. Although the Task Force Report is only an advisory document, the Hearing Officer notes that the Report's requirement that the child's classroom performance be considered is consistent with the alternative evaluation which the IEP team may conduct under Title 5 CCR Section 3030(j)(4)(C) if a discrepancy is not found by following the procedures designated under Title 5 CCR Sections 3030(j)(4)(A) or (B), as outlined above.
Under 3030(j)(4)(C), an IEP team may find that a severe discrepancy exists between ability and achievement as a result of a disorder in one or more basic psychological processes without finding a discrepancy under 3030(j)(4)(A) or (B), but the team must consider information provided by the student's present teacher and evidence of the student's performance in the regular and/or special education classroom obtained from observations, work samples, and group test scores. Based on this alternative IEP team procedure, the Hearing Officer concludes that the student's actual performance in a classroom setting is critical information in determining whether a severe discrepancy exists between ability and achievement, especially when standardized test scores are not available.
7. The Hearing Officer notes that the evidence showed that STUDENT received home instruction for much of the 1993-94 school year because the parties could not agree on a special education placement for STUDENT in school. However, neither party argued that this placement was appropriate for STUDENT or that he made substantial progress during this placement.
8. The Hearing Officer acknowledges that STUDENT's achievement scores in the Reiss-Davis report indicate that he is not at the ninth grade level for any subject. The issue in this case, however, is whether STUDENT's achievement scores demonstrate that STUDENT has a specific learning disability or whether they are a result of STUDENT's failure to attend school for much of the last three years.
