California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 8, 2001
Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1274-01 · Hearing Officer Judy F. Hirano
Los Angeles Unified must reimburse $3,500 in private school tuition after failing to implement a student's regular math placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Before the hearing, a May 11, 2001 California Department of Education compliance report found the District out of compliance and ordered an IEP meeting on compensatory services. The decision notes that compliance findings have no preclusive effect on a due process hearing. No remand or later court history appears in the decision.
Summary
A father, representing his son himself, filed against Los Angeles Unified School District. His son had a specific learning disability and attended a learning handicapped special day class at Cohasset Street Elementary School. The student's March 1999 IEP called for him to take math in a regular education class. In fourth grade (1999-2000), the District did not place him in that class until March 2000. While his special day class teacher was on leave in fall 1999, two substitutes without special education credentials taught the class.
Hearing Officer Judy Hirano found that the District denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to carry out the math placement from September 1999 to March 2000. His test scores showed little growth, and in math applications they dropped. She also found a denial of FAPE because uncredentialed substitutes taught the class beyond the 20-day limit in Education Code section 56061, with no approved extension, while the student made only trivial progress. The District won on the textbook claim, because the student received copies of the chapters.
The father had placed his son at Valley Schools, a private school, from September 2000 to February 2001. His lack of advance notice did not bar reimbursement because no one had told him about the notice requirement. Valley's small classes and regular math met the student's needs, and his scores rose. The District was ordered to reimburse $3,500.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated two kinds of failures as denials of FAPE: skipping a mainstream class the IEP required, and using uncredentialed substitutes in a special day class past the statutory limit. It also shows that a parent who was never told about the notice rule could still get private school tuition reimbursed.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue 1a. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year by failing to place him in a regular education math class pursuant to his IEP?
District failed to implement the March 1999 IEP's regular education math placement from September 1999 to March 2000; the math program did not confer educational benefit or meet LRE requirements, denying FAPE.
- District prevailedImplementation
Issue 1b. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year by failing to provide him with a textbook for his math class?
Student received copies of the textbook chapters, and there was no evidence that lacking his own book prevented educational benefit; no denial of FAPE.
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue 1c. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year by using substitute teachers in his special day class, particularly during fall 1999?
Substitutes without special education credentials taught the SDC beyond the 20-day limit of Education Code section 56061 with no approved extension, and the student made only de minimis progress; denial of FAPE to that extent.
- Student prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. If the District failed to provide Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year, is he entitled to reimbursement for the costs of tuition at Valley Schools, a private school, from September 2000 to February 16, 2001?
Parent's lack of advance notice did not bar reimbursement because he was never told of the notice requirement; Valley Schools met the student's needs and conferred benefit, so $3,500 reimbursement was ordered.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 25 calendar days of the decision, District shall reimburse tuition and related expenses (registration and student fees) at Valley Schools from September 2000 to February 16, 2001, in the amount of $3,500.00.
Total: $3,500 ordered
Key authorities
Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Poolaw v. Bishop; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist.; M.C. v. Central Regional School Dist.; School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ.; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist. v. State Board of Educ.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist.; Cal. Educ. Code § 56061
People named in the decision
- Cherie Spamer, principal, Cohasset Street Elementary School, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Michelle Hughes, special education teacher (grades 4-5 learning handicapped special day class), Cohasset Street Elementary School, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Ivan Gonzales, long-term substitute teacher (regular education teacher, no special education credential), Los Angeles Unified School District
- Maria Aguilera, long-term substitute teacher (no special education credential), Cohasset Street Elementary School, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Ms. Tremonti, grade 4 regular education math teacher, Cohasset Street Elementary School, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Martha McMahon, school psychologist intern, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Glenn Fait, hearing officer (observer), California Special Education Hearing Office
- Valley Schools, private school (unilateral placement)
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Judy Hirano, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Van Nuys, California, on September 27 and 28, 2001.
STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented by his father, FATHER. STUDENT was present for a portion of the day on both hearing days. Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Christopher Fernandes from the Lozano Smith law firm. Glenn Fait, hearing officer, was present as an observer on September 27, 2001.
Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: STUDENT, Petitioner; FATHER, Petitioner’s father; Cherie Spamer, principal, Cohasset Street Elementary School (Cohasset); and Michelle Hughes, grades 4 and 5 learning handicapped special day class teacher at Cohasset.
Respondent called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: FATHER, Petitioner’s father; Cherie Spamer, principal at Cohasset; and Michelle Hughes, grades 4 and 5 learning handicapped special day class teacher at Cohasset.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was kept open for the parties to submit written closing arguments. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for a decision. ISSUES(Footnote 2)
1. Did the District deny Petitioner a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1999-2000 school year by:
a. Failing to place him in a regular education math class pursuant to his IEP? b. Failing to provide him with a textbook for his math class? c. Using substitute teachers in his special day class, particularly during fall 1999?
2. If the District failed to provide Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year, is he entitled to reimbursement for the costs of tuition at Valley Schools, a private school, from September 2000 to February 2001?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a 12-year-old boy who was in foster care until adopted in approximately 1996. He is currently attending grade 6 in the Los Angeles Unified School District (District). He was first found eligible for special education in another school district in November 1993 because of a “mild range of delay.” He entered the District as a first-grader in fall 1996. He was found to meet the eligibility criteria for a speech impairment and started receiving speech and language services. An October 1996 IEP team noted that STUDENT appeared to have a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement because of an auditory processing deficit, including short-term memory and auditory discrimination, and recommended continued special education services. He was placed in a learning handicapped special day class (SDC) at Cohasset Elementary School (Cohasset).
A January 1997 District psychoeducational assessment found that STUDENT had a psychological processing disorder involving conceptualization, expression, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, and sequential memory. Further, a severe discrepancy was found between his ability and achievement in basic reading skills, math, oral expression, and written expression. A January 1997 speech and language assessment report recommended continued speech and language services for articulation and language therapy. A March 1997 IEP team found that he met the specific learning disability (SLD) eligibility criteria and continued to have a speech impairment. The IEP recommended continued SDC placement and weekly speech therapy.
In the second grade and during the beginning part of the 1998-1999 school year, when STUDENT was in grade 3, he continued in an SDC placement, with speech and language services, at Cohasset. In March 1999 he was exited from speech and language services. The March 3, 1999 IEP contains goals and objectives for reading, math, writing, vocational education, and behavior. Cohasset SDC teacher Michelle Hughes testified that the March 1999 IEP applied during the beginning part of STUDENT’s fourth grade year and provided for a regular education math class.(Footnote 3) She testified that she was on leave from September through December 1999, and when she returned, she noticed in January 2000 that STUDENT had not been placed in a regular education math class. She took steps to find him such a class, and he was so placed, although there is disagreement as to when this occurred.
A March 2000 triennial assessment was conducted when STUDENT was in grade 4. On the Matrix Analogies Test, which measures nonverbal concept formation, he achieved a 94 standard score, in the average range. On tests of auditory perceptual skills and auditory sequential memory, he obtained below average scores. In the area of visual-motor integration, he revealed a 4-year delay on one test but obtained a low average score on another test with a more structured format. His scores on the Wide Range Achievement Test-3 and Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA) were below average. His adaptive behavior, expressive and receptive language, and gross motor skills were age-appropriate, and his fine motor skills were adequate. In class he was occasionally off task. He exhibited an auditory processing disorder and a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in reading, written expression, and mathematics application. The report concludes that he continued to meet the SLD eligibility criteria and recommends continuation in an SDC placement and in a general education math class.
An April 11, 2000 IEP states that STUDENT exhibited an auditory processing disorder and a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in basic reading skills, reading comprehension, math reasoning, written expression, and listening comprehension. He continued to be eligible as having an SLD, and his continued placement was an SDC. The IEP contains goals for reading, written language, and math. The IEP states that in March 2000, STUDENT was placed in a regular education math class and would remain in such a math class.
STUDENT’s father testified that toward the end of the 1999-2000 school year, he told the Cohasset principal and STUDENT’s SDC teacher that he was considering placing STUDENT in a private school during the coming school year because of the District’s failure to adhere to the March 1999 IEP by not placing STUDENT in a regular education math class in September 1999. From September 2000 to February 2001, STUDENT attended Valley Schools, a private school. He then returned to the District and attended Anatola Avenue Elementary School (Anatola).
On March 3, 2001, STUDENT’s father filed a compliance complaint with the California Department of Education (CDE) Complaint Management and Mediation Unit. He alleged that the District had failed to place STUDENT in a regular education class beginning in September 1999, as required by his IEP. He requested, among other things, reimbursement for the private school tuition.
An April 24, 2001 report by STUDENT’s SDC teacher at Anatola states that STUDENT entered her class on February 20, 2001, and that he was in a regular education grade 5 math class. The report sets forth STUDENT’s academic assessment results and states that he continued to have difficulty staying on task during instructional time. An April 25, 2001 IEP developed when STUDENT was in grade 5 provides for continued SDC placement. The IEP contains goals and objectives for reading, math, written language, and pre-vocational education. The IEP indicates that he had met his reading and written language goals and objectives and math objectives on his prior IEP but had not met the math goal because he was still performing at the fourth, not fifth, grade level, as called for by the prior IEP.
A May 11, 2001 CDE compliance report indicates that the corrected noncompliance allegation was that the District failed to implement the regular education math placement pursuant to the April 11, 2000 IEP.(Footnote 4) The District was found to be out of compliance. A required corrective action was for the District to convene, by June 15, 2001, an IEP meeting to determine if compensatory services were needed. If the parties could not agree, either party could request a due process hearing. On June 12, 2001, STUDENT’s father filed for due process. He requested reimbursement for the cost of private school because of the District’s failure to implement the IEP.
On June 13, 2001, an IEP meeting was held to address the matter of compensatory services.(Footnote 5) According to the IEP, the father stated that STUDENT was not placed in a regular education math class, as called for by the March 8, 1999 IEP. The father also stated that because the SDC teacher was often absent, STUDENT did not receive the necessary assistance to maintain his math skill level and made little academic progress during this time. The father noted that at the private school, STUDENT was in a small-group setting with individualized assistance. The IEP states that in February 2001, STUDENT enrolled at the District’s Anatola Avenue School, where he was placed in a regular education math class. The IEP states that STUDENT’s April 2001 KTEA Math Computation score revealed “significant progress” in this area. The IEP team agreed, however, that STUDENT was entitled to compensatory services and recommended the following: (1) increased math time in class with additional support, as needed; (2) additional homework, at the parent’s request; and (3) after-school tutoring, if available, at the school site.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
ISSUE 1: Did the District deny Petitioner a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1999-2000 school year by:
(a) Failing to place him in a regular education math class pursuant to his IEP? (b) Failing to provide him with a textbook for his math class? (c) Using substitute teachers in his special day class, particularly in fall 1999?
Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as amended in 1997, and state law, students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A free appropriate public education is special education and related services, at no cost to the parents, that are designed to meet the student’s unique needs and are provided in conformity with the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(D), (25). In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court concluded that the IDEA provides such a student with a “basic floor of opportunity” consisting of “access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit.” Id. at 200-01. The special education services furnished need not maximize each child’s potential. Id. at 198-99.
To determine whether the District offered STUDENT a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year, it is necessary to examine the adequacy of the District’s proffered program. Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). To offer a FAPE, the District’s educational program and services must be designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, be reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit, conform to his IEP, and provide all of the above in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89, 202.
Petitioner contends that he was denied a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year, when he was in grade 4, because (1) from September 1999 to spring 2000, the District failed to implement his March 8, 1999 IEP, which called for his placement in a regular education math class; (2) when he was eventually placed in such a math class, he was not provided a textbook; and (3) his special day class (SDC) was taught by several substitute teachers throughout the year, particularly when the SDC teacher was on leave during fall 1999. These contentions will be addressed in turn.
(a) Failure to Implement Regular Education Math Placement Pursuant to the IEP
Petitioner argues that from September 1999 to the middle or end of April 2000, the District failed to implement that portion of his March 8, 1999 IEP which called for his placement in a regular education math class. According to the March 8, 1999 IEP and the testimony of STUDENT’s SDC teacher Ms. Hughes, this IEP provided for his placement in a regular education math class.(Footnote 6) It is undisputed that for part of the 1999-2000 school year, commencing in September 1999, that portion of the March 1999 IEP providing for such a placement was not implemented. The District acknowledges that Petitioner “inadvertently” was not placed in a regular education math class from September 1999 through “approximately December of 1999.” District’s Brief at 2, 4. What is disputed is when STUDENT was eventually placed in a regular education math class in conformity with the IEP. At the hearing, the father testified that the regular education placement occurred in the middle or end of April 2000. In his closing brief, Petitioner states that he was so placed as early as March 2000. Petitioner’s Brief at 1.
Ms. Hughes testified that upon returning from her leave, she became aware in January 2000 that STUDENT had not been placed in a regular education math class pursuant to the March 1999 IEP. She then began looking for a regular education math class for him. The April 11, 2000 IEP states that he was placed in a regular education math class in March 2000. The April 11 IEP further states that the workload in this math class had been “adjusted to fit his needs.” It appears from the April 11 IEP that STUDENT had already been placed in a regular education math class by the time of the April IEP meeting. Moreover, no evidence was presented that STUDENT’s placement did not occur in March 2000, as indicated in the April 11 IEP, and Petitioner acknowledges in his closing brief that his placement could have occurred as early as March 2000.
The Hearing Officer finds, based upon the preponderance of the evidence, that STUDENT’s placement in a regular education math class took place in March 2000. The Hearing Officer finds that from September 1999 to March 2000, the District failed to implement that portion of the March 8, 1999 IEP providing for STUDENT’s placement in a regular education math class.
The District argues that it did not deny STUDENT a FAPE by failing to provide him a regular education math placement because there was no evidence that this omission had an adverse effect on his academic progress in math. SDC teacher Ms. Hughes testified that STUDENT would have suffered no negative impact by not being placed in a mainstream, or regular education, math class because he would have received math instruction in her SDC. However, the District bears the burden to show that its program provided a FAPE, including conferring on Petitioner educational benefit. See Clyde K. v. Puyallup School Dist., No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
STUDENT’s father testified that the students in Ms. Hughes’ SDC worked on a lower level of math than the level that is covered in a regular education class and that the reason that STUDENT’s grade 4 math assessment score was not at grade level was that he had not been placed in a regular education math class until the middle of the year. According to the father, STUDENT’s math computation score showed only a two months’ growth from March 1999 to April 2000.
STUDENT’s KTEA math GE scores (set forth in the March 8, 1999 and April 11, 2000 IEPs) for March 1, 1999, and February 25, 2000 (District’s Exhibit 88), respectively, were as follows: Mathematics Computation, 2.0; 2.2; Mathematics Applications, 2.4; 1.1. The February 2000 scores reflect a two months’ growth in math computation and over one year’s decline in math applications from the previous year.
The District argues that the lower February 2000 scores do not in fact reflect STUDENT’s actual level of classroom performance and thus do not constitute evidence of a negative impact on his academic progress. Ms. Hughes testified that she administered the KTEA to STUDENT in 2000. She testified that although the KTEA is a valid test, the results are not always accurate because a child sometimes may be able to do better in class than on the test. She also testified that STUDENT had an attention problem, and if he had difficulty maintaining his attention during the testing, that would have affected his test score. She further testified, however, that she could not recall whether STUDENT had difficulty with attention during the 2000 testing.(Footnote 7)
Ms. Hughes’ general testimony about STUDENT’s attention problem and his scores not accurately reflecting classroom performance could, in fact, apply to his KTEA scores for any of the three years for which the scores were produced. Therefore, without evidence that STUDENT had difficulty with attention and concentration during the February 2000 KTEA administration and absent any other evidence to the contrary, the Hearing Officer finds that the 2000 KTEA scores are valid and reliable test results. Moreover, STUDENT’s grade 4 report card reveals the following math achievement grades for the first to third trimesters, respectively: 3; 2; 2. (The number 3 indicates proficiency, that is, meets grade-level standards; 2 indicates partially proficient.) Ms. Hughes testified that grades in an SDC reflect the modified work required of SDC students. STUDENT’s grades during the first two trimesters, ending on March 4, 2000, essentially reflect his achievement in the SDC. Thus, the 2 grade for the second trimester appears to be consistent with the low February 2000 KTEA math scores. The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s math program actually provided to STUDENT from September 1999 to March 2000 failed to bestow upon him educational benefit.
In addition, Ms. Hughes testified that the purpose of “mainstreaming” in an academic subject is that the student is working at grade level in that subject. Mainstreaming has been defined as “educating handicapped children alongside nonhandicapped children in a regular educational environment.” Poolaw v. Bishop, 67 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1995).
Special education law requires that a child be educated in the least restrictive environment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. The IDEA mandates that a special education student be educated with nondisabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate and that removal from the regular education environment occur only when the “nature or severity of the disability of the child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 & n.24.
From September 1999 to March 2000, STUDENT was in an SDC rather than in a regular education math class with nondisabled peers, as the March 8, 1999 IEP required. The math program the District provided him during this period failed to meet his math needs as determined by the IEP team, to confer educational benefit, and to conform to the IEP; it also was not the least restrictive environment to meet his needs. The result was the denial of a FAPE.
(b) Failure to Provide a Math Textbook
Petitioner asserts that he was denied a FAPE when he finally was placed in a regular education math class because he was not given his own math book. His SDC teacher, Ms. Hughes, testified that there were not enough books for all of the students in the regular education math class and that she provided him with copies of the chapters in the math book.
Ms. Hughes testified that learning from copies of the book chapters would be the same as learning from the book itself, and having copies was, in fact, better than a book because a student could write on the copies, unlike a textbook. She also testified that generally, textbooks had to remain at school, whereas the copies could be taken home. STUDENT’s father testified that he asked for a copy of the math book at a meeting with the school principal so that he could help STUDENT at home with the math assignments. It appears that he did at some point obtain a book to assist STUDENT with the assignments at home. There is no evidence that because STUDENT did not have his own math textbook, his program failed to bestow on him educational benefit, since he did receive copies of the textbook chapters. There is no allegation that he did not receive these copies in timely fashion or that he was somehow otherwise prevented from learning the material or completing the assignments because he did not have his own book. While it may have been optimal for STUDENT to have his own math book, a FAPE does not require the best education available. Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d at 1314. The District’s failure to provide STUDENT with his own textbook in the regular education math class did not result in the denial of a FAPE.(Footnote 8)
(c) Use of Substitute Teachers in the Special Day Class
Petitioner contends that the District denied him a FAPE by using several substitute teachers in his special day class (SDC) throughout the year, particularly when the SDC teacher was on leave during fall 1999. He claims that he did not receive the instruction and assistance he required.
During the period from September to December 1999, when SDC teacher Ms. Hughes was on maternity and then family care leave, two long-term substitute teachers (Ivan Gonzales and Maria Aguilera) taught her SDC. Testimony of Cherie Spamer. Cohasset principal, Ms. Spamer, testified that when Ms. Hughes resumed teaching her SDC, Ms. Hughes was absent once for several days with a bad flu and twice for child care for two to three days each time. Ms. Hughes testified that upon her return to teaching, she had gall bladder surgery and some other absences from teaching, and that she generally used Ms. Aguilera as a substitute teacher in her absence, for consistency.
California special education law requires that an SDC be taught by a teacher who holds an appropriate special education credential and who possesses the necessary competencies to teach the students assigned to her class. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3053(c). Regarding substitute teaching, California Education Code Section 56061 states in pertinent part:
A person holding a valid credential authorizing substitute teaching may serve as a substitute for the appropriately credentialed special education teacher as follows: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) and (c), the employer shall not employ an inappropriately credentialed substitute teacher for a period of more than 20 cumulative school days for each special education teacher absent during each school year. (b) Upon application by the district or county office, the superintendent may approve an extension of 20 school days in addition to those authorized by subdivision (a). (c) Only in extraordinary circumstances may [an] additional number of days be granted beyond the 40 school days provided for by subdivisions (a) and (b). Such additional days shall be granted in writing by the superintendent. . . .
Ms. Hughes testified that she possessed a bachelor’s degree in child development, a master’s degree in special education, and a learning handicapped special education credential. The principal, Ms. Spamer, testified that she selected the substitute teachers for the special education classes and that Mr. Gonzales and Ms. Aguilera were regular education teachers who had no special education credentials.(Footnote 9) By not having a credential to teach an SDC, both were “inappropriately credentialed” substitute teachers.(Footnote 10)
According to Ms. Spamer, Mr. Gonzales substituted for Ms. Hughes for two months, and Ms. Aguilera also substituted for approximately two months, until Ms. Hughes returned from her leave just before the Christmas vacation in December. No evidence was presented that after the initial 20 cumulative school days that an inappropriately credentialed substitute teacher was employed to substitute for Ms. Hughes, the superintendent approved an application by the District for an extension of an additional 20 school days. There was also no evidence that because of extraordinary circumstances, the superintendent granted in writing an additional number of days beyond 40 school days of employment of an inappropriately credentialed substitute teacher. Cal. Educ. Code § 56061. Absent such evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that after the initial 20 cumulative school days of substitute teaching by an inappropriately credentialed substitute teacher in fall 1999, STUDENT’s SDC was taught by a teacher without an appropriate special education credential, in violation of Section 56061 and California Code of Regulations, title 5, Section 3053(c).
The District argues that the use of substitute teachers did not cause the denial of a FAPE because there was no indication that STUDENT required consistency in teachers any more than other students, and the substitute teachers who taught in Ms. Hughes’s absence were qualified and experienced. STUDENT’s SDC teacher, Ms. Hughes, testified that consistency in teachers was not one of STUDENT’s unique needs. However, the March 8, 1999 IEP indicates that during the third grade, STUDENT’s father expressed a concern that it was difficult for STUDENT to have a number of substitute teachers in the class. STUDENT testified that when Ms. Hughes was absent, it was confusing because there were “so many teachers,” and Ms. Hughes helped the students a lot. He recalled having at least four different substitute teachers during the school year. Ms. Hughes testified that it would not matter whether a substitute or regular teacher taught her class, as long as the teacher followed the lesson plans. She also testified, however, that during her leave, she could not say if the substitute teacher followed the lesson plans but that upon returning from her leave, she left lessons plans for the substitute teacher if she was absent.
One apparent consequence of having substitute teachers during fall 1999 was that STUDENT’s IEP was not implemented to the extent that it called for a regular education math placement. Ms. Hughes testified that the substitute teacher has the responsibility to read a student’s IEP, which she keeps in her substitute teacher’s file, but that she did not know if the substitute teachers read STUDENT’s IEP because she was not there.
By recommending an SDC placement for STUDENT, the IEP team implicitly recognized his need for a teacher qualified to teach the special education students in an SDC. The Section 56061 limitation on substitute teaching by inappropriately credentialed substitute teachers undoubtedly was intended to provide, to the extent feasible, special education instruction by a teacher with the necessary qualifications.
Moreover, as discussed above, STUDENT’s February 2000 KTEA math results reflected a paltry gain, and even regression. His February 2000 KTEA GE scores in the other academic areas (with his March 1999 scores set forth in parentheses for comparison) were as follows: Reading Decoding, 2.0 (1.6); Reading Comprehension, 1.6 (1.5); and Spelling, 1.9 (1.6). These results reveal only slight gains over the previous year. In a program taught for a substantial portion of the intervening period by inappropriately credentialed substitute teachers, STUDENT derived merely de minimis educational benefit. De minimis benefit or trivial advancement does not satisfy the Rowley requirement of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998); M.C. v. Central Regional School Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 866 (1996).
The Hearing Officer finds that to the extent that STUDENT received instruction in his SDC from inappropriately credentialed teachers for over the permissible statutory time limit, absent proof to the contrary, he was denied a FAPE.
ISSUE 2: If the District failed to provide Petitioner a FAPE during the 1999-2000 school year, is he entitled to reimbursement for the costs of tuition at Valley Schools, a private school, from September 2000 to February 16, 2001?
Petitioner seeks reimbursement for the costs of tuition and related fees in the amount of $3500 incurred at Valley Schools, a private school, from September 2000 to February 16, 2001. The District argues that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for these costs because the parent failed to give the requisite ten days’ notice of his intent to seek reimbursement prior to the unilateral placement at Valley Schools.(Footnote 11)
The amount of reimbursement for a private school placement may be reduced or denied if, either at least 10 business days prior to removing the child from the public school, or at the most recent IEP meeting that the parents attended prior to removing their child from the public school, the parents did not inform the District that they were rejecting the District’s proposed placement, including stating their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in a private school at public expense. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I); Cal. Educ. Code § 56176(a), (b). However, the amount of reimbursement may not be reduced or denied for failure to so notify the District if the parent was not notified of the reimbursement notice requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(IV).(Footnote 12)
Petitioner’s father testified that at a mediation on July 31, 2001, he requested tuition reimbursement and was told that to obtain reimbursement, he needed to have given notice to the District prior to the unilateral placement at a private school. In its closing brief, the District asserts that “Mr. PARENT was made aware of this [notice] requirement as far back as March of 2001, possibly earlier.” However, the parent was entitled to be informed of this requirement before, not after, the unilateral placement in September 2000. No evidence was presented that the parent was so informed.(Footnote 13) Therefore, the parent’s failure to give notice of his intent to seek reimbursement for the unilateral placement at Valley Schools should not preclude his recovery of such reimbursement if otherwise appropriate.
When a school district has denied a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to appropriate relief in light of the purposes of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i); School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374 (1985). A hearing officer may require the District to reimburse the parents for the cost of a private school placement if the hearing officer finds that the District failed to provide the child a FAPE in a timely manner prior to enrollment at the private school, and the private placement is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. To be appropriate, the private placement must be designed to meet the child’s unique needs and to provide him with educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-89. The Burlington rule does not limit reimbursement only to a private placement selected by the parent that is the “exact proper placement” under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Indep. School Dist. v. State Board of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).
The Hearing Officer found that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE from September 1999 to March 2000 because the program it provided failed to meet STUDENT’s math needs; to bestow educational benefit in math, reading, and spelling; to conform to the math mainstreaming portion of the IEP; and to provide math instruction in the least restrictive environment. Because of the denial of a FAPE, STUDENT displayed marginal progress in math, reading, and spelling. The question then is whether the unilateral placement at Valley Schools (Valley) was appropriate under the IDEA.
The District argues that the father’s description of the accelerated grade 5 academic curriculum at Valley undermines the appropriateness of the private school for STUDENT, given his low average cognitive range and severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in reading, written language, and mathematical application, as found in the March 2000 psychoeducational assessment.(Footnote 14)
STUDENT’s father testified that during the fall 2000 semester, the school work at Valley was at the fifth, sixth, and seventh grade level, and that at the beginning of the second semester, eighth grade level work was begun. STUDENT testified that, at first, Valley was more difficult than Cohasset, partly because of new courses, but that the work got easier as he went along. According to him, he learned to work in class and to learn what the teacher was teaching. He testified that he had a lot of homework, and he would do some of it at school and the rest at home, with assistance from his father and other relatives. He further testified that the work in the math class was pretty hard, but some of it (like fractions) was similar to the work in Ms. Tremonti’s grade 4 regular education math class at Cohasset. He testified that, at Valley, he learned to do the rest of the fractions and was able to do the work in the math class.
STUDENT also testified that his class at Valley, with 11 students, was smaller than Ms. Hughes’ SDC.(Footnote 15) If he needed help in class, he would raise his hand, and the teacher would help him. He recalled getting 2 A’s for being excellent in class, that is, raising his hand, being respectful to the other students, and not talking, and a C in writing skills. He stated that he also made new friends.
The April 11, 2000 IEP states that among the instructional accommodations STUDENT needed to help him progress in the general education curriculum was small-group instruction. From STUDENT’s testimony, the small class size at Valley met his need for small-group instruction. Ms. Hughes testified that he also needed one-on-one assistance to complete his work, and it appears that he was able to obtain assistance from the teacher, when necessary, by raising his hand. The math program also met his need for regular education math instruction, as determined by the IEP team at Cohasset in March 1999 and again in April 2000.
Moreover, the educational program at Valley provided educational benefit. A comparison of STUDENT’s KTEA GE scores for March 1, 1999; February 25, 2000; and April 17, 2001 (District’s Exhibit 27) reveals the following:
3/1/99 2/25/00 4/17/01
Reading Decoding 1.6 2.0 2.5 Reading Comprehension 1.5 1.6 2.4 Math Computation 2.0 2.2 3.9 Math Applications 2.4 1.1 1.9 Spelling 1.6 1.9 2.6
In contrast to the negligible growth between the 1999 and 2000 testing, his 2001 scores showed a substantial increase in all tested areas, most notably, 8 months’ growth in reading comprehension and math applications and 1 year, 7 months’ growth in math computation.
Ms. Hughes testified that the increase in the 2001 scores could be attributed to a variety of factors. STUDENT was in a regular education math class at Cohasset for approximately 2 to 3 months at the end of the 1999-2000 school year and at Anatola for approximately 2 months before the April 2001 KTEA re-testing. However, for approximately 6 months, from September 2000 through mid-February 2001, he attended Valley. Because he was at Valley for a substantial portion of the period between the 2000 and 2001 KTEA administrations, it appears more likely than not that the increase in scores is attributable at least in part to his education at Valley.
Moreover, although Ms. Hughes testified that STUDENT had a problem with attention and focus in class, STUDENT testified that at Valley, he learned to work in class and to learn what was being taught. He testified that he learned more at Valley than he did at Cohasset. Ms. Hughes also testified that STUDENT had a behavior problem with other students in the class, involving being mean, name-calling, and arguing. However, according to STUDENT’s testimony, at Valley, he was respectful to other students and did not talk in class. The Hearing Officer found his testimony to be forthright and credible. The Hearing Officer finds that he obtained educational benefit at Valley in his areas of need related to academics, attention and concentration, and behavior.
The District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE during a portion of the 1999-2000 school year. The program at Valley met STUDENT’s needs for small-group instruction, individual assistance, and a regular education math class. Moreover, the program at Valley was also reasonably calculated to, and did, bestow benefit upon him. Therefore, although Valley was not a state-certified school providing a special education program, it provided an appropriate program for STUDENT under the IDEA. Consequently, his parent is entitled to reimbursement for the costs of his tuition and related expenses (registration and student fees) at Valley from September 1999 to February 16, 2001, in the amount of $3500.00.(Footnote 16) See Petitioner’s Exhibit 2.
ORDER
1. Within twenty-five calendar days of the date of this decision, the District shall reimburse Petitioner for the costs of tuition and related expenses (registration and student fees) at Valley Schools from September 2000 to February 16, 2001, in the amount of $3500.00. (See Petitioner’s Exhibit 2.)
2. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
Petitioner prevailed on these issues: Sub-issues 1(a) and 1(c); Issue 2. Respondent prevailed on these issues: Sub-issue 1(b).
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).
Dated: November 8, 2001 ____________________________________ Judy F. Hirano, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
FOOTNOTES
1. Please note that the Hearing Office has recently changed its format for numbering cases. The case number now begins with the year the case was filed and is followed by a five-digit reference number. 2. The issues have been clarified and their order changed to facilitate the analysis. 3. Ms. Hughes testified that Section J of the March 8, 1999 IEP, entitled “Provision for Transition to Regular Class Program,” indicates that STUDENT was to be in regular education math. According to her, the line crossing out the word “regular” in this section (with the handwritten notation “sp. ed.” in its place) was in error. 4. The May 11, 2001 compliance report was attached to the father’s due process hearing request filed in June 2001. However, at the hearing, the father clarified that at issue was the failure to implement the March 8, 1999, not the April 11, 2000, IEP during the 1999-2000 school year. His testimony was that STUDENT was in fact placed in a regular education math class by at least April 2000 and for the remainder of the 1999-2000 school year. It is noted that a CDE compliance report’s findings and conclusions do not have collateral estoppel or res judicata effect in a due process hearing. Following a complaint investigation, a party may still pursue a due process hearing on the same issues, and the hearing decision will prevail over a conflicting compliance report determination. Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist., 57 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1065 (D. Ore. 1999) (discussing OSEP policy letter); see SEHO Order, Fremont Unified School Dist. v. Student, Nos. SN 793-00/1770-00 (Nov. 13, 2000). 5. In the compliance complaint, the father also had requested regular assessment of STUDENT’s learning; in-class assistance from a teacher’s assistant on a regular basis, as needed; and after-school tutoring in reading, math, social studies, and history. At the hearing, the father stated that at the June 13, 2001 IEP meeting, the parties had come to an agreement on these additional remedies and that they were thus not in dispute. 6. The March 1998 and March 1999 IEPs indicate that STUDENT’s KTEA GE math scores during grades 2 and 3, respectively, were Math Computation, 2.5, 2.0; and Math Applications, 1.9; 2.4. According to the March 1999 IEP, the IEP team determined that STUDENT was working at grade level in math and should be placed in a regular education math class. 7. The psychoeducational assessment report indicates that on March 8 and 14, 2000, when Martha McMahon, school psychologist intern, administered psychological and other tests, STUDENT had difficulty maintaining concentration but that physical prompts helped him to return to the task at hand. The report says nothing about STUDENT’s concentration during the February 25, 2000 KTEA administration by Ms. Hughes (District’s Exhibit 88). 8. The Hearing Officer does not determine whether, in other circumstances, the failure to provide a special education student with his own textbook may not lead to the denial of a FAPE. 9. California Education Code Section 56062 provides that the employer shall use the following priorities in placing substitute teachers in special education classes: a substitute teacher with the appropriate special education credential, any other special education credential, and a regular teaching credential. 10. No direct evidence was presented that either Mr. Gonzales or Ms. Aguilera had a valid credential authorizing substitute teaching. However, Mr. Gonzales was a teacher at a year-round school who substituted for Ms. Hughes during the time he was “off-track” and on vacation, and then returned to his regular teaching position. Ms. Aguilera frequently served as a substitute teacher at Cohasset. Testimony of Cherie Spamer. Because Mr. Gonzales was a regular teacher and Ms. Aguilera appeared to be a regular substitute teacher, they at least appeared to have the qualifications to hold a valid substitute teaching credential. 11. The District also argues that if it failed to provide a FAPE, it has provided sufficient compensatory services because the compensatory services recommended by the June 2001 IEP team fully complied with the corrective action required by the May 11, 2001 CDE compliance report which addressed the issues raised in this due process hearing (with the exception of the lack of math textbook). However, as the District notes, the CDE did not order tuition reimbursement but did state that if the parties could not agree on compensatory services, either party could file for due process. The father testified that at the June 2001 IEP meeting, he requested tuition reimbursement but was told that such a request could not be addressed at an IEP meeting and that he would need to proceed with a due process hearing on the matter. The father sought a compensatory remedy by enrolling STUDENT in a private school in September 2000, before the CDE compliance unit ordered the District to take corrective action and the District, in response, offered compensatory services in June 2001. The father sought missing or inappropriate services, as he was entitled to do. Therefore, the fact that the District subsequently offered compensatory services does not preclude the father from seeking in a due process hearing reimbursement for the private school tuition. 12. The IDEA specifically requires that the copy of the procedural safeguards which must be given to the parents of a child with a disability upon, among other things, notification of an IEP meeting, must include notice of the requirements for unilateral private placement by the parents at public expense. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(2)(H). Unlike Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(IV) (its IDEA counterpart), California Education Code Section 56177(d) provides that reimbursement for a parent’s unilateral private placement may not be reduced or denied because the parents failed timely to give to the District the requisite notice of the intent to seek reimbursement if the parent did not receive notice of the due process hearing rights under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 56500). Chapter 5, dealing with procedural safeguards, sets forth due process hearing rights but says nothing about notifying the parents of the requirements for reimbursement for a unilateral private placement. The federal statute requiring that the parents be specifically notified of the reimbursement notice requirement appears to be more protective of parents’ rights and governs here. Cf. Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 965 (1994) (state procedures that impose a greater duty to educate children with disabilities, if not inconsistent with federal standards, are enforceable under the IDEA). 13. Several days before the hearing, the father had faxed to the attorney for the District two copies of the same letter from the father to principal Ms. Spamer, one dated August 11, 2000, and the other dated August 11, 2001. In the letter, he states that because of the school’s failure to implement the mainstreaming portion of STUDENT’s IEP, he had decided to send STUDENT to a private school in the coming school year. The District persuasively argues that the letter with the 2000 date should not constitute the requisite notice of an intent to seek reimbursement for a unilateral placement because Ms. Spamer testified that she did not receive the letter, and the father failed to provide a plausible explanation for the different dates on the letter. Given the uncertainty regarding the letter, the letter is also not persuasive evidence that the father had knowledge of the notice requirement prior to the September 2000 unilateral placement at a private school. 14. The District also asserts that Valley Schools is not certified by the State of California to provide special education to students with disabilities. However, reimbursement is not barred for this reason. See Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993). 15. Ms. Hughes could not recall the number of students when STUDENT was in her SDC but testified that the average size of the SDC was 12 to 15 students and that she had 2 aides when STUDENT was in her class. 16. Neither party raised the question of whether the District offered a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year and whether Valley offered not only compensatory education but also a FAPE during this school year. Therefore, this decision does not address these matters.
