California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 27, 2001

Student v. Sacramento City Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1278-01 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Sacramento City Unified had no prior knowledge of a disability, so it could discipline an unidentified student like any other student.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a 15-year-old tenth grader at Luther Burbank Senior High School asked for an expedited hearing. They filed on the same day that a Sacramento City Unified School District panel recommended expelling her. She had never been found eligible for special education. The discipline came from an April 20, 2001 school fair. She brought a balloon bearing the names of the Columbine shooters, and two students said she then threatened to "shoot up" the school. The parents argued that the District already knew she had an emotional disturbance, which would give her the discipline and stay-put protections of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Hearing Officer rejected court cases decided before 1997 on stay put and applied the four "basis of knowledge" tests from the 1997 law. First, the mother's spoken comment to a counselor about the student's past was not in writing and did not say she needed special education. Second, her C average, clean discipline record, strong attendance and friendships showed no need for services. One unusual biology essay and the balloon did not show long-term emotional problems, and staff handled the essay responsibly. Third, the parents first asked for an evaluation on June 13, 2001. Fourth, a vice principal's call to the District's psychology supervisor asked for advice on the incident and was not a special education referral. All relief was denied. The decision noted that the requested evaluation must still be done on an expedited basis.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA "basis of knowledge" rule to a student not yet in special education. A parent's concern had to be in writing. Isolated staff worries did not count without signs of long-term problems that affected school performance. Advice calls to staff outside the referral system also did not count.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedDiscipline

    Issue 1. Did the parents express concern in writing to District personnel that the student needed special education and related services before the April 20, 2001 incident that resulted in her expulsion?

    The mother's spoken report to a counselor was not in writing and did not say the student needed special education, so it gave the District no basis of knowledge.

  2. District prevailedDiscipline

    Issue 2. Did the student's behavior or performance show a need for special education and related services before the April 20, 2001 incident?

    A C average, minimal discipline, good attendance, one unusual essay, and the balloon did not show emotional disturbance characteristics over a long period that adversely affected her education.

  3. District prevailedDiscipline

    Issue 3. Did the parents request an evaluation to determine special education eligibility before the April 20, 2001 incident?

    The only evaluation request came on or about June 13, 2001, nearly two months after the conduct.

  4. District prevailedDiscipline

    Issue 4. Did teachers or other District personnel express concern about the student's behavior or performance to the director of special education or other personnel under the District's child-find or special education referral system before the April 20, 2001 incident?

    The vice principal's call to the psychology supervisor asked how to handle the balloon incident. It was not a child-find or special education referral.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's requests for relief were denied. The decision notes that, because an evaluation was requested during the discipline period, the evaluation must be done on an expedited basis, and that the student stays in the placement set by the District, which may include expulsion without services, until the evaluation is finished. This was stated in the analysis, not as a separate order.

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Key authorities

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527; 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i); M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist. (distinguished); Cronin v. Bd. of Educ. of East Ramapo Central Sch. Dist. (distinguished); Richard V. v. City of Medford (distinguished); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)

People named in the decision

  • Robert Gerig, Director of student and family support services, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Jerry Marquart, Ph.D., Supervisor of psychological and social work services; school psychologist; District witness, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Michael O'Leary, Administrator/coordinator for student behavior and placement, Sacramento City Unified School District
  • Carol Mills, High school counselor, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Leise Martinez, Vice principal of pupil services, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Robert Sandoval, Vice principal, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Jeremy Veldstra, Biology teacher, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Bob Statum, High school counselor, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Carol Parham, School psychologist assigned to the school, Luther Burbank Senior High School
  • Alfonso Santos, Advocate for Student
  • Lori Santos, Advocate for Student

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Sacramento, California, on July 5, 6, and 12, 2001.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Steven Royston of the Law Offices of Steven A. Royston. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf were her parents, FATHER and MOTHER, and advocates Alfonso and Lori Santos. Respondent Sacramento City Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Diane Marshall-Freeman from the firm of Girard & Vinson. Also present on the District’s behalf during the first two days of hearing was attorney Anne Sherlock of the same firm and, on the last day of hearing, law clerk Cynthia Smith.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: FATHER, MOTHER, and STUDENT. The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Robert Gerig, the District’s director of student and family support services; Jerry Marquart, Ph.D., the District’s supervisor of psychological and social work services; Michael O’Leary, the District’s administrator/coordinator to student behavior and placement; and Carol Mills, a high school counselor at Luther Burbank Sr. High School.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of the parties’ written closing arguments. After the closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR HEARING(Footnote 1)

Did the District have a basis of knowledge, as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8), that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services because of an emotional disturbance (ED) before the behavior of April 20, 2001, which lead to her expulsion from Luther Burbank Sr. High School (Burbank HS)?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old student who has resided within the jurisdictional boundaries of the District since at least her kindergarten year. She is not presently identified as eligible for special education and related services. STUDENT first attended Burbank HS during the 1999-2000 school year as a ninth-grade student. She continued attending Burbank HS for the 2000-2001 school year as a tenth-grade student.

On April 20, 2001, during a school-based arts and communications fair, STUDENT was observed to be in possession of a balloon bearing the names Eric Harris and Dylan Kliebold. At the time, STUDENT was in the cafeteria listening to a music band with other students. The balloon was tied to her backpack, which was sitting on the floor by her feet. Leise Martinez, the vice principal of pupil services at Burbank HS, was informed of the balloon and identified the names written on the balloon as those of the students who had shot numerous other students at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado on April 20, 1999. Ms. Martinez approached STUDENT and popped the balloon with a pencil. Ms. Martinez later escorted STUDENT to Vice Principal Robert Sandoval’s office. In Mr. Sandoval’s office, STUDENT was informed that she would be suspended for three days for, as STUDENT recalls, glorifying and honoring terrorism. STUDENT was told to wait in the in-house suspension room while her grandmother came to pick her up from school.

When her grandmother arrived, STUDENT followed her out of the office. According to two students, while STUDENT was leaving the office, she allegedly stated that she hated terrorists and was going to “shoot up” the school. STUDENT denied making these statements. She asserted that she said she was not a terrorist and was not going to “shoot up” the school. The two other students reported to District personnel that they heard STUDENT say she was going to “shoot up” the school. Because of these alleged statements, STUDENT’s suspension was extended to five days and she was recommended for expulsion.

STUDENT’s suspension was later extended until a formal expulsion hearing could be held. STUDENT has not attended any classes at Burbank HS since April 20, 2001. After a number of delays, an expulsion hearing was finally held on June 13, 2001. The expulsion panel recommended that STUDENT be expelled for the spring semester of the 2000-2001 school year and the fall semester of the 2001-2002 school year, and that she not be allowed thereafter to return to Burbank HS.

That same day, on June 13, 2001, STUDENT’s parents filed a request for a due process hearing challenging the disciplinary actions undertaken by the District. STUDENT’s parents requested that STUDENT be assessed for special education prior to any disciplinary action being taken.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE: Did the District have a basis of knowledge, as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8), that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services because of an emotional disturbance (ED) before the behavior of April 20, 2001, which lead to her expulsion from Luther Burbank Sr. High School (Burbank HS)?

Through this proceeding, Petitioner challenges the District’s actions in expelling her because of conduct that occurred on April 20, 2001 at Burbank HS. Petitioner argues that the District violated her rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by proceeding with the expulsion proceedings and expelling her for the second semester of the 2000-2001 school year and the fall semester of the 2001-2002 school year. Petitioner contends that she was entitled to “stay put” in her then-current educational placement at Burbank HS during the pendency of the due process proceedings. Petitioner cites as authority for her position the following district court cases: M.P. v. Governing Bd. of Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F.Supp. 1044 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Cronin v. Bd. of Educ. of East Rampapo Central Sch. Dist., 689 F.Supp. 197 (S.D. NY 1988); and Richard V. v. City of Medford, 924 F.Supp. 320 (D. Mass. 1996). Petitioner argues that these cases apply notwithstanding the passage of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA, and the implementing regulations issued in 1999, because of the rule of construction contained in 20 U.S.C. §1415(l).(Footnote 2) Petitioner asserts that the foregoing pre-1997 cases constitute “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities” within the meaning of section 1415(l). Petitioner argues that the foregoing cases represent “common law” that affords greater protection to children with disabilities than the IDEA and therefore continue to apply under section 1415(l).

The Hearing Officer finds Petitioner’s arguments in this regard unpersuasive. It is clear from a review of the cases cited that the holdings in those cases were based solely on the courts’ interpretations of the IDEA’s stay put provision as it existed at the time. In this sense, the judicial authorities cited were not “common law” since they were interpreting specific provisions of an enacted statute.(Footnote3) The IDEA’s stay put provision has since been amended to specifically limit the conditions under which a previously unidentified student is entitled to the protections of stay put. The incidents at issue in this case occurred after the passage and effective date of the 1997 amendments. Consequently, the judicial authorities cited by Petitioner clearly do not apply to this matter.

Additionally, even if Petitioner’s argument was meritorious, the Cronin and Richard V. cases were decided in jurisdictions not encompassed within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which California sits, and therefore do not constitute precedential case law. Further, the Cronin and Richard V. cases would not apply to this case on their facts, even if the stay put provision had not been amended in 1997. Cronin involved a student who, unlike STUDENT, had already been identified as a child with a disability at the time the dispute arose between the parties. 689 F.Supp. 197. In Richard V., the court granted the student’s request for a preliminary injunction to keep him at his school, rather than indefinitely suspended, because it found that he had established “a likelihood of success on his claim that the school was obligated under Massachusetts law to have referred [him] ... for evaluation well before the ... incident” for which suspension was sought. 924 F.Supp. at 322. The standards for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are not at issue in this case. Moreover, the Grossmont case would still not control the determination of the issue in this case even if the IDEA had not been amended in 1997. Grossmont was issued by a federal district court, and therefore is not binding authority and has not been followed by the Hearing Office. In fact, if the IDEA had not been amended in 1997, STUDENT presently would have no credible claim for relief under these circumstances.

Because this case involves a disciplinary matter, STUDENT may be entitled to the protections accorded a student identified as a child with a disability pursuant to the 1997 IDEA Amendments. Under federal and State special education law, students found eligible for special education are accorded certain rights in disciplinary matters. Among those rights is the right to a determination of whether the student’s alleged misconduct arose from either a disability or an improper educational placement. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(4); Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.5(a). In 1997, when Congress amended the IDEA, Congress extended the protections afforded to students identified as eligible for special education and related services to students who have not yet been determined to be eligible for special education and related services under limited circumstances. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527. The protections extend to students not previously determined to be eligible for special education services only under the following conditions: (1) the student has engaged in behavior that violated any rule or code of conduct of the school district, and (2) the school district had knowledge, or is deemed to have had knowledge, that the student was a child with a disability “before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(a).

A school district is “deemed” to have had a “basis of knowledge” that a student was a child with a disability when one of the following four conditions is established: (1) the student’s parent has expressed concern in writing to personnel of the appropriate educational agency that the student is in need of special education and related services; (2) the behavior or performance of the student demonstrates the need for such services; (3) the student’s parent has requested an evaluation of the student to determine whether the student is eligible for special education and related services;(Footnote 4) or (4) the student’s teacher, or other personnel of the school district, has expressed concern about the behavior or performance of the child to the director of special education of such agency or to other personnel of the agency in accordance with the agency’s established child-find or special education referral system. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b).

If the school district did not have a basis of knowledge that the student was a child with a disability prior to taking disciplinary measures, the “child may be subjected to the same disciplinary measures as measures applied to children without disabilities who engaged in comparable behaviors.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(d).

The sole purpose of this expedited hearing is to determine whether the District had a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was a student with an emotional disturbance (ED), as alleged by Petitioner, prior to the behavior that occurred on April 20, 2001, that lead to her expulsion. It is not the purpose of this hearing to determine whether STUDENT ultimately meets the underlying eligibility criteria as an ED student.

1. Did STUDENT’s Parents Express Concern in Writing to District Personnel That STUDENT Was in Need of Special Education and Related Services Prior to the April 20, 2001 Incident That Resulted in Her Expulsion?

Petitioner argued that there was substantial compliance with the provision regarding parental expression of concern. Petitioner cited the testimony of MOTHER and high school counselor Carol Mills. Both MOTHER and Ms. Mills testified that shortly before the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year, MOTHER told Ms. Mills that STUDENT had been sexually molested. Petitioner contended that the fact that MOTHER’s communication was not in writing does not preclude a finding that the District had a basis of knowledge, because the District’s annual notice of parent rights and responsibilities does not require that parental concern be expressed in writing. Petitioner also argued that all child molestation discoveries by school district personnel should result in a referral for a special education assessment. The Hearing Officer does not find either of Petitioner’s arguments persuasive.

First, the determination of whether the District had “a basis of knowledge” in this case is governed by the IDEA, not District policy. The IDEA expressly requires that, to constitute “a basis of knowledge,” an expression of parental concern must have been communicated in writing. The requirement that the concern be expressed in writing is waived only where the parent did not know how to write or had a disability that prevented her from making a written statement.(Footnote 5) 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i), 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b). There was neither argument nor evidence that STUDENT’s mother was illiterate or had a disability that prevented her from being able to express her concern in writing. Additionally, even if it were true that the District could waive the requirement that the parental concern be expressed in writing, nowhere in the District’s 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 annual notices of parent rights and responsibilities, both of which were submitted into evidence, is it stated that an oral expression of parental concern may constitute “a basis of knowledge” under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B).(Footnote 6) In fact, the District’s annual parent rights notices do not address the issue of the circumstances under which the District would be determined to have a basis of knowledge under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B).

Secondly, MOTHER’s act of informing Ms. Mills about STUDENT’s past history of molestation was not an expression of concern sufficient to constitute a basis of knowledge under section 1415(k)(8)(B)(i). “[T]he statute makes clear that the parental expression of concern must include enough information to indicate that their child is in need of special education and related services.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, § 300.527; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i). Here, STUDENT’s mother simply told Ms. Mills that STUDENT had been molested and did not indicate a concern that STUDENT might have significant emotional problems or might otherwise be in need of special education and related services. In fact, according to the testimony of MOTHER and Ms. Mills, MOTHER told Ms. Mills that although STUDENT had received some therapy in the past to address the molestation issue, neither STUDENT nor her parents felt that she required counseling at the time. Further, MOTHER gave no indication that the molestation was affecting STUDENT’s behavior or performance in school.

Petitioner’s argument that all reports that a child has been molested should result in a referral for a special education assessment is without merit. The special education and related services required by the IDEA are designed to assist a child with a disability to learn and progress in his or her education. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 300.26, 300.24. Therefore, unless a previous molestation is presently affecting a child’s ability to benefit from his or her education, a school district is not required to provide the child with special education and related services. Further, in this case, the District was informed that STUDENT had already received therapy to deal with the molestation, and that neither STUDENT nor her parents considered there to be a present need for further counseling. Under such circumstances, it would be absurd to require a school district to investigate further without some indication that the child was suffering from an emotional disturbance. As established by the testimony of Jerry Marquart, Ph.D., who has been a school psychologist for at least thirty-three years, not all children who have been molested require special education and related services in order to benefit from their education. Dr. Marquart explained that each person has his or her own unique personality dynamics and temperament which affect the way the person copes with the occurrence of a traumatic event such as molestation. According to Dr. Marquart, some people need assistance when traumatic events occur, while others are able to deal with those events themselves and move on. Dr. Marquart testified that a child who has been molested in the past may not necessarily have an emotional disturbance that would require the provision of special education and related services. The Hearing Officer finds Dr. Marquart’s testimony in this regard persuasive. Petitioner did not provide any evidence to the contrary.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not have a basis of knowledge due to an expression of parental concern under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i).

2. Did STUDENT’s Behavior or Performance Demonstrate a Need for Special Education and Related Services Prior to the April 20, 2001 Incident That Resulted in Her Expulsion?

Petitioner contended that her behavior or performance prior to the incident for which expulsion was sought provided the District with a basis of knowledge that she was a child with a disability. Petitioner specifically focused her arguments on a biology assignment on February 20, 2001, in which she had written about being a fly, and her possession of a balloon with the names of the Columbine High School shooters on the second anniversary of those shootings on April 20, 2001. Petitioner also cited other, more general issues regarding her behavior and demeanor in school prior to April 20, 2001. The District argued that neither STUDENT’s behavior nor performance in school prior to April 20, 2001 indicated that she was a child with a disability prior to the incident for which she was expelled. The District also asserted that STUDENT’s possession of the balloon on April 20, 2001, was part of the reason she was expelled and cannot be considered in determining whether the District had a basis of knowledge.

The behavior or performance of a child sufficient to confer a basis of knowledge on a school district must be tied to characteristics associated with one of the disability categories identified in the definition of child with a disability. 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12628. This removes unnecessary uncertainty about the type, severity, or degree of behavior or performance intended to provide a school district with a basis of knowledge. Id. Here, Petitioner alleged that her behavior or performance provided the District with a basis of knowledge that she was a child with an emotional disturbance (ED).

To qualify for special education under the category of ED,(Footnote 7) a student must exhibit one or more of the following characteristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects educational performance:

(1) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health factors; (2) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with peers and teachers; (3) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances exhibited in several situations; (4) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or (5) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or school problems.

34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). The term ED does not, however, apply to students who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that they have an emotional disturbance. 34 C.F.R. §300.7(c)(4)(ii); see Cal. Educ. Code § 56441.11(c)(C).

In reviewing STUDENT’s educational performance, it is noted that in the two years STUDENT had been attending Burbank HS, her academic grade point average (GPA) fluctuated between 1.8 and 2.4, for an overall academic GPA of 2.00. With this GPA, STUDENT was ranked 331 out of 604 students. During the first semester of her tenth-grade year, STUDENT earned C’s in all her classes except World History 2, for which she received a B, and Biology 1, which she failed. Prior to April 20, 2001, STUDENT had no discipline record except for one incident on May 18, 2000, near the end of her ninth-grade year, when she wrote on a desk and received an in-house suspension. STUDENT’s attendance record at Burbank HS has been commendable, with only one excused absence during her tenth-grade year. STUDENT testified that she likes school, has some friends at school, and was able to form a relationship of trust with a couple of her teachers at Burbank HS. None of the foregoing facts demonstrated that the District would have had a basis of knowledge on April 20, 2001, that STUDENT was a child with an emotional disturbance.

Petitioner argued that the District should have had a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a child with ED because of, among other things, a biology assignment completed on February 20, 2001. According to STUDENT, the assignment had been to choose an animal and write a paragraph as if the student were that animal. STUDENT had chosen to write a paragraph about being a fly and wrote the following:

I would want to be a fly. A ugly dirty little fly that sits on a dead rat. Then I could fly around all day and get on peoples nerves when I stand on their clothes. Maybe if I’m lucky I might get caught in a spider’s web and then it would kill me then that would be the end of the fly. Also to be a fly would mean I could truly be a surfacing maggot. I would want to be a fly just to see what it’s like to fly around and what not. Maybe I would get hit by a car. I just think being a fly would be nice.

STUDENT testified that her biology teacher, Jeremy Veldstra, read her paper and then asked her for the name of her high school counselor. According to the testimony of STUDENT and her father, at about that same time, STUDENT’s father had a meeting scheduled with her high school counselor, Bob Statum, to discuss her schedule for the next school year and possible tutoring. FATHER and STUDENT testified that at the meeting Mr. Statum asked STUDENT why she had chosen to be a fly. STUDENT testified that she told Mr. Statum that she picked to be a fly as a joke because her on-screen internet name is “Surfacing Maggot” and maggots turn into flies. STUDENT explained to Mr. Statum that she is a fan of a music group called Slipknot, that Slipknot calls its fans “maggots,” and that “Surfacing” is the name of one of the tracks on Slipknot’s album. According to STUDENT and FATHER, Mr. Statum then asked STUDENT whether she had ever considered committing suicide, to which STUDENT answered no. FATHER testified that he also had a meeting with Mr. Veldstra during which Mr. Veldstra raised the topic of the biology assignment as a matter of concern.

While the foregoing facts establish that STUDENT’s biology teacher and high school counselor considered it unusual for a high school student to write about being a fly, the fact that this one writing assignment raised concerns does not support a finding that STUDENT’s behavior or performance in school indicated a need for special education and related services. Specifically, a single incident of a writing which was apparently considered inappropriate by a couple of staff members does not represent a characteristic which existed over a long period of time, as required by the definition for ED, especially since this writing occurred only two months before the arguably inappropriate behavior of April 20, 2001, when STUDENT wrote the names of the Columbine High School shooters on her balloon. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4)(i); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). Moreover, there was no indication that either Mr. Veldstra or Mr. Statum believed that whatever inappropriate behavior or feelings prompted STUDENT to write about being a fly adversely affected her educational performance, which is also a requirement to qualify as ED. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4)(i); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). Furthermore, if a school district responsibly addresses the behavior or performance of a child, the school district’s knowledge of that behavior or performance does not preclude it from subjecting the child to the same disciplinary measures applied to children without disabilities who engage in comparable behaviors. 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12629. Here, when Mr. Veldstra became concerned about the content of STUDENT’s writing, he promptly discussed the matter with STUDENT’s father and forwarded the writing to STUDENT’s high school counselor, who also discussed the matter with STUDENT and her father. Thus, the evidence showed that Mr. Veldstra responsibly dealt with the concern he had about the content of one of STUDENT’s assignments by alerting her counselor, as well as her father. The evidence also showed that Mr. Statum acted responsibly by raising the concern with STUDENT’s parent and asking STUDENT questions to explore her reasons for writing about being a fly.

With regard to Petitioner’s contention that STUDENT’s possession of a balloon with the names of the Columbine High School shooters gave the District a basis of knowledge, the Hearing Officer is equally unconvinced. Assuming, without deciding, that the balloon incident was not part of the reason for STUDENT’s expulsion, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no indication that STUDENT’s acts in this regard were the result of a serious emotional disturbance that existed over a long period of time, even when considered in conjunction with the biology assignment written two months prior, in which she wrote about being a fly. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). Additionally, there was no evidence that such behavior resulted from an emotional disturbance that adversely affected her educational performance, as required by the ED definition. 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). Her act of writing the names of the Columbine High School shooters on a balloon at school may arguably have been inappropriate behavior, but her act of writing the names and possession of the balloon in no way affected her ability to benefit from her instruction or participate in the general education program. According to the available evidence, at the time of the balloon incident, STUDENT was listening to the music band that was playing during the fair, along with other students, and then continued to attend appropriately to the fair and the remainder of the school day before being escorted to the discipline office during fifth period. Furthermore, her act of writing the names and possession of the balloon did not constitute part of a distinguishable pattern of misconduct or inappropriate behavior that should have alerted school authorities that she might be a child with an emotional disturbance. Finally, Petitioner asserted that STUDENT’s other, more general behavior and demeanor in school prior to April 20, 2001 provided the District with a basis of knowledge that she was a child with a disability. Petitioner cited the District’s transcript of the expulsion hearing held on June 13, 2001, and FATHER’s testimony regarding statements made by Mr. Veldstra to support her position. Ms. Martinez was not called to testify at the instant due process hearing. According to the transcript of the expulsion hearing, Ms. Martinez testified that, prior to the balloon incident on April 20, 2001, she had noticed STUDENT on a couple of occasions with a Chucky doll from the Child’s Play horror movies and that she had a “very withdrawn aspect.” Additionally, FATHER testified that, during his conversation with Mr. Veldstra, Mr. Veldstra commented that he was concerned about some of STUDENT’s expressions in class, the music she listened to, the way she dressed, the way she wore her hair, and the students she associated with in the classroom. While the comments by Ms. Martinez and Mr. Veldstra represent general concerns of school staff regarding a student, there was no evidence that either Ms. Martinez or Mr. Veldstra expressed any concerns related to STUDENT’s ability to benefit from instruction, follow school rules, or otherwise participate in the general education curriculum. In other words, there was no evidence that STUDENT expressed or exhibited inappropriate behaviors or feelings over a long period of time which adversely affected her educational performance.(Footnote 8) See 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(4); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(i). At the time of the April 20, 2001 incident, STUDENT had a “C” average, a nearly nonexistent discipline record, excellent attendance, friendships with other students, and a comfortable relationship with at least some of her teachers.

In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s behavior and performance prior to the incident on April 20, 2001, did not provide the District with a basis of knowledge that she was a child with a disability.

3. Did STUDENT’s Parents Request an Evaluation to Determine Whether She Was Eligible for Special Education and Related Services Prior to the April 20, 2001 Incident That Resulted in Her Expulsion?

There is no allegation that the parents requested an evaluation for STUDENT prior to the alleged misconduct. There was evidence of only one instance when STUDENT’s parents requested that an evaluation be performed and that occurred on or about June 13, 2001, nearly two months after the alleged misconduct.(Footnote 9) Accordingly, the District did not have a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a child with a disability on April 20, 2001, because of a parent request for an evaluation.

4. Did STUDENT’s Teachers or Other District Personnel Express a Concern About Her Behavior or Performance to the Director of Special Education or Other District Personnel in Accordance With the District’s Established Child-Find or Special Education Referral System Prior to the April 20, 2001 Incident That Resulted in Her Expulsion?

Petitioner argued that the District had a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a child with a disability because Ms. Martinez contacted Dr. Marquart after the balloon incident and before the alleged threats on April 20, 2001. The District contended that Ms. Martinez’s contact with Dr. Marquart was not to express concern in accordance with the child-find or special education referral system.(Footnote 10)

According to Dr. Marquart’s testimony, Ms. Martinez called him shortly after the balloon incident to inquire as to whether it was proper to allow STUDENT to return to class. Dr. Marquart testified that Ms. Martinez did not mention a need for psychological services or a special education referral, or any concern that STUDENT might be a child with a disability requiring special education and related services. Dr. Marquart testified that he advised Ms. Martinez that STUDENT should be removed from her class and brought into the office, with the appropriate follow-up action to be determined by the school staff. According to Ms. Martinez’s testimony during the expulsion hearing, she called Dr. Marquart because she could not contact Burbank HS’s assigned school psychologist, Carol Parham. Dr. Marquart testified that he often receives inquiries from school staff about how to respond to situations in the school setting, and that many of those inquiries do not involve special education referrals or concerns that a child may be a child with a disability requiring special education and related services.

The evidence in this case established that Ms. Martinez’s call to Dr. Marquart on April 20, 2001, was one of those inquiries that was not made in relation to special education concerns. A school district is not held to have a basis of knowledge that a child was a child with a disability merely because the child’s teacher or another staff member expressed concern about the child’s behavior or performance unrelated to whether the child had a disability requiring special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12629. While Ms. Martinez’s statements during the expulsion hearing suggest that she had some concerns regarding STUDENT’s psychological well-being, there is no evidence that her contact with Dr. Marquart on April 20, 2001, was an expression of concern in accordance with the District’s child-find or special education referral system, as required to constitute a basis of knowledge. In fact, there was no evidence presented that Ms. Martinez had any educational concerns regarding STUDENT. Specifically, Ms. Martinez did not communicate any concerns regarding STUDENT’s overall educational conduct on school grounds or overall performance as a student.

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not have a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a child with a disability because of a teacher or other staff member’s expression of concern in accordance with the child-find or special education referral system.

* * * * *

In summary, the District did not have a basis of knowledge that STUDENT was a child with a disability prior to the incident on April 20, 2001, which lead to her expulsion. Therefore, the District was entitled to take the same disciplinary measures against STUDENT that would be applied to children without disabilities who engaged in comparable behaviors. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(C)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(d)(1). However, because a request for an evaluation was made during the time period in which STUDENT was subjected to disciplinary measures, the evaluation must be conducted in an expedited manner. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(d)(2)(i). In this context, the term “expedited” means that the evaluation should be conducted “in a shorter period of time than a normal evaluation.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12455. In the absence of a basis of knowledge, STUDENT is to remain in the educational placement determined by District authorities until the evaluation is completed, which may include suspension or expulsion without educational services. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(d)(2)(ii). This decision is not intended to in any way address whether STUDENT is ultimately a child with an emotional disturbance or otherwise eligible for special education and related services.

ORDER

All of Petitioner’s requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: Respondent Sacramento City Unified School District prevailed on the only issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: July 27, 2001 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated that April 20, 2001 was the date of the conduct that led to STUDENT’s suspension and ultimate expulsion. Emotional disturbance was the only potential basis of special education eligibility raised by Petitioner at the hearing Footnote 2: Section 1415(l) states:

Nothing in this part shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this part, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this part.

Footnote 3: Black’s Law Dictionary defines the phrase “common law” as follows, in pertinent part:

As distinguished from statutory law created by the enactment of legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England. In general, it is a body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as distinguished from legislative enactments. ... It consists of those principles, usage and rules of action applicable to government and security of persons and property which do not rest for their authority upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature.

Black’s Law Dictionary 189 (6th ed. 1991) (emphasis added).

Footnote 4: California uses the word “assessment” to refer generally to what the IDEA terms “evaluation.” Footnote 5: Petitioner also argued that the requirement for a writing should be waived in this instance because the parents had not been advised that an expression of concern had to be made in writing to constitute a basis of knowledge under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i). Petitioner provided no authority for her position in this regard. Moreover, unlike other provisions of the IDEA, like that contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv)(IV), the IDEA does not mandate that parents be informed of the requirement for a written expression of concern under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B)(i) in order for the provision to apply. Consequently, the requirement for a written expression of concern applies regardless of whether the parents were informed of this specific requirement. Footnote 6: The 1999-2000 version of the District’s parent rights notice states, in pertinent part: “In accordance with federal and state laws, the district will not discriminate against an individual with disabilities as far as involvement in programs and activities and in the use of facilities. If your child needs special accommodations, please contact the school or district office.” The notice also states the following under the heading “Pupil with Exceptional Needs”:

The district is included in the Sacramento County Special Education Local Plan Area (“SELPA”). Pupils with exceptional needs, as defined by Education Code §56026, have a right to a free, appropriate public education. If you believe your child is in need of special education services, contact your school principal or Sacramento County Office of Education at (916) 228-2446.

The District’s parent rights notice for the 2000-2001 school year contains essentially the same language. Footnote 7: This category was formerly known as “seriously emotionally disturbed.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (1997). Footnote 8: Further, because Mr. Veldstra did not testify at the hearing, the statements attributed to him by FATHER constitute hearsay insofar as Petitioner presented them in an attempt to establish that STUDENT was exhibiting ED characteristics in the school setting. Pursuant to section 3082(b) of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations, hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence but is not sufficient in itself to support a finding, unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Because FATHER’s testimony regarding the foregoing statements allegedly made by Mr. Veldstra would not be admissible over objection in civil actions, it may not be used to establish the truth of the matters therein stated, such as that STUDENT expressed inappropriate feelings in class. Insofar as Petitioner failed to present any non-hearsay evidence to supplement the testimony at issue, the foregoing hearsay evidence is insufficient to support a finding that STUDENT expressed or exhibited inappropriate behaviors or feelings in class. 5 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3082(b). Footnote 9: While the parents’ request was for an evaluation under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the District construed the parents’ request as an evaluation for special education services, as well as for section 504 services, and have submitted an assessment plan to the parents for their consideration. Footnote 10: The District also contended that Ms. Martinez’s contact with Dr. Marquart may not be considered in determining whether the District had a basis of knowledge because it occurred after the behaviors for which STUDENT was expelled. The evidence presented at hearing, however, was to the contrary. The transcript of the expulsion hearing and Michael O’Leary’s testimony established that the balloon incident was not part of the basis upon which the District sought to expel STUDENT or part of the reason for which the expulsion panel recommended expulsion. For example, during the expulsion hearing, Ms. Martinez and Vice Principal Robert Sandoval repeatedly commented that STUDENT was only suspended for the balloon incident and that the expulsion proceedings were based solely on the alleged threats to “shoot up” the school. Additionally, according to the transcript of the expulsion hearing, the expulsion panel deliberated and concluded that the testimony of the students that STUDENT made threats to “shoot up” the school compelled a recommendation for expulsion. The panel specifically excluded the balloon incident in making its expulsion recommendation. Mr. O’Leary’s testimony confirmed this.