California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 30, 2000

Student v. Santa Barbara Elementary School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 1370-98 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Santa Barbara Elementary must fund 90 hours of tutoring, 30 OT sessions and a $4,310.50 IEE after three years of FAPE denials.

Split decision: student prevailed on 9 of 13 issues (5 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. A prior due process case (SN 618-98) settled in 1998. The District filed its own hearing request (SN 1389-98) on September 30, 1998.

Summary

The parents of an 11-year-old with intellectual disability (then called "mental retardation") and a speech-language impairment filed for due process against Santa Barbara Elementary School District. They challenged her education from kindergarten in 1995 through January 1999, plus the 1999 extended school year (ESY). The Hearing Officer first rejected two District defenses. A 1998 settlement did not release earlier claims. The District also could not escape responsibility through a residency dispute, because it had acted as her district for years. The Hearing Officer found the District denied a FAPE in kindergarten, first grade and second grade. Her IEPs described her placement in confusing, conflicting terms and were not followed. Staff removed her from the longer kindergarten day without an IEP meeting. The District never assessed her fine-motor needs and refused to discuss teaching methods or staff competence at IEP meetings. It also delayed a functional analysis assessment and behavior plan despite repeated aggression, then used techniques state law did not allow. Her IEPs had no self-care goals. Fall 1998 was appropriate except for transportation. The District offered no evidence that its ESY offer was appropriate. The District must pay $4,310.50 for an independent behavior evaluation by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D., repay one-third of the family's private driver costs ($25 per day), and provide 90 hours of one-on-one instruction and thirty 20-minute OT sessions. Requests to remove an administrator from the IEP team, require staff to help with an outside medical evaluation, and award money damages were denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO put the burden of proof on the district under Clyde K. Because the District's assessors never testified, the District lost the IEE claim, and a bare ESY offer failed. It also shows that a settlement without express release language did not bar older claims, and that estoppel defeated a late residency defense.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1a. Was Student offered and/or provided a FAPE during the 1995-1996 school year (kindergarten)?

    FAPE denied: the IEP described placement in conflicting terms, was not implemented as written, staff unilaterally excluded Student from the lengthened kindergarten day without an IEP meeting, and the District never assessed her known fine-motor deficits.

  2. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1b. Was Student offered and/or provided a FAPE during the 1996-1997 school year (first grade)?

    FAPE denied: the IEP was inconsistent and omitted aide services, the District barred discussion of methodology, staff competence and speech services at IEP meetings, did no FAA or BIP despite assaultive behavior, did not assess fine-motor needs, and set no toileting goals.

  3. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1c. Was Student offered and/or provided a FAPE during the 1997-1998 school year (second grade)?

    FAPE denied: the District carried out an unconsented reduction in inclusion and a BIP without written parental consent, limited IEP discussions, delayed the FAA and BIP, used BIP techniques barred by state law, and did not address toileting.

  4. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1d. Was Student offered and/or provided a FAPE during the first half of the 1998-1999 school year (to January 1999)?

    FAPE provided except for transportation: the outdated IEP at the start of the year was a de minimis error and limiting talk of on-site parent involvement was proper, but the transportation offers did not safely address Student's behavior on a dangerous mountain road.

  5. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1e. Was Student offered and/or provided a FAPE during the 1999 extended school year?

    The District offered a special day class placement at Adams Elementary for ESY but presented no evidence that it was appropriate, so it did not meet its burden of proof.

  6. Issue 2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation conducted by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D.?

    The District did not show its 1997 psychoeducational assessment and FAA were appropriate because no assessor testified; it must reimburse $4,310.50 for the IEE and IEP attendance, but not a $200 post-assessment consultation.

  7. Issue 3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred from September 1998 to January 1999 to transport Student to and from school?

    The private driver's services were appropriate, but paying her to be on call all day was not necessary; the parents get one-third of the $75 daily fee ($25 per day) from September 21, 1998, to January 25, 1999.

  8. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue 4. Is Student entitled to compensatory education due to the denial of a FAPE from the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year to January 1999?

    The District owes 90 hours of one-on-one instruction and thirty 20-minute OT sessions; the requested Fast ForWord program was denied as too uncertain to benefit Student.

  9. Student prevailed in partResponsible agency

    Issue 5. Is Student a student residing within the jurisdictional boundaries of the College Elementary School District? If not, what local educational agency bears future responsibility for providing her a FAPE?

    The District is estopped from denying responsibility through 1998-1999 and took responsibility for 1999-2000 under an interdistrict transfer permit; actual residence and later years were not decided.

  10. Issue 6. Does the Special Education Hearing Office have jurisdiction to interpret the restraining order issued against the mother?

    SEHO cannot modify superior court restraining orders, but no genuine dispute existed, so no findings were made; no party prevailed.

  11. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 7. Is it necessary to exclude Diana Rigby from Student's IEP team in order for Student to receive a FAPE?

    A district's choice of IEP representative can be reviewed, but the evidence did not show that Rigby's presence seriously infringed the parents' participation, so her removal was not required.

  12. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 8. Must school staff cooperate in providing the information requested by Karen Davidson, M.D., a developmental and behavioral pediatrician, for the completion of a medical evaluation of Student?

    No authority requires the District to cooperate with an outside medical assessment it had no duty to conduct; the request was denied, although cooperation was encouraged.

  13. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 9. Are Student and her parents entitled to compensatory damages (lost wages, emotional distress, expenses, worsened prognosis, etc.) and punitive damages?

    Dismissed on the first day of hearing because money damages are tort-like and outside the Hearing Office's jurisdiction.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, the District must reimburse the parents $4,310.50 for Dorothy Glover, Ph.D.'s behavioral assessment and her attendance at the January and February 1998 IEP meetings.
  • Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days after receiving the parents' proof, the District must reimburse transportation expenses at $25 per day for every school day between September 21, 1998, and January 25, 1999, on which Shoshona Stokes transported Student to and from school.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 30 calendar days of the decision, unless the parents agree in writing to an extension, the District must convene an IEP meeting to discuss and offer the compensatory education services.
  • Compensatory education. 90 hours of one-on-one instruction by a credentialed special education teacher on academic deficits chosen by the IEP team (80 hours for the failure to provide an FAA/BIP in first and second grade, plus 10 hours for exclusion from the extended kindergarten day). Must be completed by July 1, 2002, unless the parents agree otherwise in writing, with minimal impact on the school day. These hours are in addition to FAPE services for 2000-2001 and 2001-2002.
  • Compensatory education. One 20-minute OT session per week for 30 weeks (30 sessions), without loss of school time, to be completed by July 1, 2002, unless the parents agree otherwise. The District must offer free transportation if the sessions are held somewhere other than the Open Alternative School. These sessions are in addition to OT required for FAPE.

Total: 100 hours of compensatory services; $4,310.50 ordered

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Key authorities

Rowley; Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.; W.G. v. Target Range Sch. Dist.; Burlington; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm.; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist.; County of Orange v. Carl D.; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3001, 3052 (Hughes Bill); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043

People named in the decision

  • Diana Rigby, District director of student services, Santa Barbara Elementary School District
  • Marcia McClish, SELPA director, Santa Barbara County SELPA
  • Bonnie Switack, principal, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Deborah Flores, Ph.D., deputy superintendent, Santa Barbara Elementary School District
  • Dorothy Glover, Ph.D., independent behavioral assessor; expert witness for Student, Behavior Therapy and Learning Center/Autism Partnership
  • Richard Stokes, Ph.D., licensed clinical psychologist, witness for Student
  • Shoshona Stokes, advocate and private transportation provider, family friend
  • Rick Seward, advocate, witness for Student, Alpha Resource Center of Santa Barbara
  • Marc Lerner, M.D., professor of pediatrics, witness for Student, University of California, Irvine
  • Hanne Sohnquist, licensed marriage, family and child therapist, witness for Student
  • Roger Morse, regional center case worker, Tri-Counties Regional Center
  • Doris Karras, Fast ForWord instructor (self-employed), witness for Student
  • Michael Geis, M.D., psychiatrist, witness for Student
  • Pamela Holst, kindergarten general education teacher, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Gwendolyn Phillips, head teacher, Open Alternative School
  • Charlotte Witsoe, school psychologist and regional center vendor psychologist, witness for Student, Riverside Unified School District
  • Karen Davidson, M.D., developmental and behavioral pediatrician
  • Carolyn (Carol) Appleton, first-grade special education teacher, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Carolyn Shaw, first-grade general education teacher, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Margaret (Peggy) Nicholson, kindergarten and second-grade special education teacher, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Yvonne Reijnaert, second-grade general education teacher, Roosevelt Elementary School
  • Mary O'Dell-Doiron, speech and language therapist, Santa Barbara Elementary School District
  • Robert Zitzer, language and speech specialist, Santa Barbara Elementary School District (Open Alternative School)
  • Howard Rothman, Ph.D., school psychologist; conducted 1997 cognitive assessment, Santa Barbara County Office of Education
  • Eve Kelemen, Ph.D., school psychologist and behavior intervention case manager, Santa Barbara Elementary School District
  • Jack Schnel, Ed.D., school psychologist/licensed educational psychologist, District witness, Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District
  • Joe Pompilio, psychologist; conducted 1995 assessment, Santa Barbara County Office of Education
  • Janet Walker, school psychologist; conducted May 1997 psychoeducational assessment, Santa Barbara Elementary School District
  • Kristi McLoughlin, behavioral assessor; conducted October 1997 FAA and BIP
  • Jean Weitensteiner, occupational therapist; conducted 1997 OT evaluation
  • Joanne Singer, Ph.D., behavior consultant retained to train and supervise staff
  • Jeanne Surber, behavioral intervention case manager
  • Mark Tosher, audiologist (named in settlement requests)
  • Sharon Wilcox, speech and language therapist (named in settlement requests)
  • Walter Langford, behaviorist (named in settlement requests)

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in and around Santa Barbara, California, on March 4 and 5, August 24-27, November 8-10, 12, and 18-19, and December 7-10, 1999, and on June 13 and 14, 2000.

STUDENT (the Student) was represented at the hearing by attorney Maureen Graves. Attorney Margaret Oppel and advocate Shoshona Stokes were also present at the hearing on the Student’s behalf on March 4 and 5. Thereafter, MOTHER, the Student’s mother, and attorney Anne Huffman were present on the Student’s behalf and assisted Ms. Graves.

The Santa Barbara Elementary School District (the District) and the Santa Barbara County Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) were represented at the hearing by attorney Sharon Watt from the law firm of Filarsky & Watt. (The District and SELPA will be referred to herein collectively as “the SB Respondents.”(Footnote 1)) Also present were Diana Rigby, the District’s director of student services, and Marcia McClish, the SELPA director. The Santa Barbara County Office of Education (SBCOE) was not represented at the hearing. The College Elementary School District (College ESD) appeared at the hearing on August 24, 1999, through attorney Peter Carton from Schools Legal Service, but chose not to be represented at the hearing on any subsequent hearing dates.

The following witnesses were called by the Student to testify: Diana Rigby; MOTHER; Dorothy Glover, Ph.D., a behavioral consultant with the Behavior Therapy and Learning Center/Autism Partnership; Marcia McClish; FATHER, STUDENT’s father; Richard Stokes, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist; Deborah Flores, Ph.D., the District’s deputy superintendent; Shoshona Stokes; Rick Seward, an advocate from the Alpha Resource Center of Santa Barbara; Marc Lerner, M.D., a professor of pediatrics at the University of California at Irvine; Hanne Sohnquist, a licensed marriage, family, and child therapist; Roger Morse, STUDENT’s case worker at the Tri-Counties Regional Center; Doris Karras, a self-employed Fast ForWord instructor; Michael Geis, M.D., MOTHER’s treating psychiatrist; Pamela Holst, STUDENT’s general education kindergarten teacher at Roosevelt Elementary School (Roosevelt); BROTHER, STUDENT’s twelve-year-old brother; Gwendolyn Phillips, the head teacher at the Open Alternative School (OAS), where STUDENT currently attends; Charlotte Witsoe, a school psychologist with the Riverside Unified School District and vendor psychologist for regional centers; and Karen Davidson, M.D., a developmental and behavioral pediatrician.

The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Marcia McClish; Carolyn Appleton, STUDENT’s first-grade special education teacher at Roosevelt; Carolyn Shaw, STUDENT’s first-grade general education teacher at Roosevelt; Margaret (Peggy) Nicholson, STUDENT’s kindergarten and second-grade special education teacher at Roosevelt; Yvonne Reijnaert, STUDENT’s second-grade general education teacher at Roosevelt; Mary O’Dell-Doiron, a District speech and language therapist at Roosevelt; Robert Zitzer, a District language and speech specialist who served STUDENT at OAS; Howard Rothman, Ph.D., a school psychologist with the SBCOE and licensed educational psychologist in private practice; Eve Kelemen, Ph.D., a District school psychologist and STUDENT’s behavior intervention case manager; and Jack Schnel, Ed.D., a school psychologist with the Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District and licensed educational psychologist in private practice.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES(Footnote 2)

1. Was STUDENT offered and/or provided a free appropriate public education during the following time periods: a. the 1995-1996 school year, b. the 1996-1997 school year, c. the 1997-1998 school year, d. the first half of the 1998-1999 school year (to January 1999), and e. the 1999 extended school year?(Footnote 3)

2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation conducted by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D.?

3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred from September 1998 to January 1999 to transport STUDENT to and from school?

4. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education due to the denial of a free appropriate public education from the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year to January 1999?

5. Is STUDENT a student residing within the jurisdictional boundaries of the College Elementary School District? If not, what local educational agency bears future responsibility for providing her a free appropriate public education?

6. Does the Special Education Hearing Office have jurisdiction to interpret the restraining order issued against MOTHER?

7. Is it necessary to exclude Diana Rigby from STUDENT’s individualized education program team in order for STUDENT to receive a free appropriate public education?

8. Must school staff cooperate in providing the information requested by Karen Davidson, M.D., a developmental and behavioral pediatrician, for the completion of a medical evaluation of STUDENT?

9. Are STUDENT and her parents entitled to compensatory damages for, among other things, lost wages; lost economic opportunities; emotional distress; past and future miscellaneous expenses; worsened lifetime prognosis for STUDENT’s academic, personal, and occupational success; miscellaneous out-of-pocket and opportunity costs related to the denial of a free appropriate public education during her kindergarten through third-grade years; and punitive damages based on reckless or deliberate violations of STUDENT’s right to a free appropriate public education?

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

I. College ESD’s Motion to Be Dismissed

STUDENT has attended District schools since at least the 1995-96 school year. Since about 1996, the family has lived at a residence located at the top of the Santa Barbara Foothills (Foothill residence).(Footnote 4) In about 1998, there arose between the parents and the District a dispute regarding whether the Foothill residence is located within the geographical boundaries of the District or those of the College ESD and, consequently, whether STUDENT is and has been a student for which the District is educationally responsible.

On August 24, 1999, the College ESD made a motion to be dismissed from this proceeding. It made its motion after the College ESD and the District approved and signed an interdistrict transfer permit which provided that STUDENT could attend school in the District during the 1999-2000 school year. The parties agreed that, regardless of the residency dispute, the approval of the interdistrict transfer conferred on the District the responsibility for providing STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1999-2000 school year. The College ESD indicated that, in light of the interdistrict transfer permit, it moved to be dismissed and “would not participate further” in the proceedings unless requested to do so by the Hearing Officer.

The SB Respondents indicated that they had concerns regarding a dismissal of the College ESD because, while the interdistrict transfer permit resolved issues regarding responsibility for the 1999-2000 school year, the permit did not resolve the question of responsibility for the prior years at issue. The SB Respondents contended that STUDENT has been a resident of the College ESD since her family moved to the Foothill residence and that, during those years, the District was only a “service provider” and not the responsible local educational agency (LEA). The Student indicated that she still disputed the District’s position that she was a resident of the College ESD and applied for the interdistrict transfer permit only to settle the issue of the District’s responsibility for the 1999-2000 school year. The Student also argued that, even if the Foothill residence is located within the geographical boundaries of the College ESD, the District is estopped from denying responsibility for the prior years at issue because historically all students residing in and around the Foothill residence have attended District schools and the District acted as STUDENT’s LEA during the years at issue. However, the Student opposed the motion to dismiss College ESD because of the possibility that the Hearing Officer might find that it bore responsibility for past educational services.

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Hearing Officer denied College ESD’s motion to be dismissed. The Hearing Officer stated that, while she was not yet persuaded by the District’s argument that it did not bear educational responsibility for those years during which it served STUDENT as her LEA, she did not want to make a ruling on the issue before allowing the parties an opportunity to present legal authorities and evidence to support their positions. The Hearing Officer ruled that, because the issue of responsibility for the years at issue had not yet been finally resolved, it would be premature to dismiss College ESD. Then, despite being informed that it remained a party and that the hearing would proceed even in its absence, the College ESD chose not to participate further in the hearing unless specifically requested to do so by the Hearing Officer or the participants. The Hearing Officer found no reason to specifically request the participation of the College ESD, but the Hearing Office nevertheless continued to send copies of notices and orders to the College ESD.

II. Limits Imposed on the Parties’ Presentation of Case-In-Chief

At the hearing, the Student presented her case-in-chief first. The Student spent almost the entire two hearing days of August 24 and 25, 1999 questioning MOTHER on direct examination but was unable to complete her direct examination during those two days. On August 26, the Student commenced her direct examination of Dr. Glover. The Student’s direct examination of Dr. Glover was also not completed by the end of August 26.

On August 27, 1999, before witness examination was resumed that day, the Hearing Officer stated on the record that, given the exceptionally slow and protracted presentation of witness testimony thus far and the unusually lengthy witness list submitted by the Student, she had significant concerns about the time required to complete the hearing. The Hearing Officer informed the parties that the interests of judicial economy required that measures be taken to control the number of days necessary to complete the hearing in this matter. The Hearing Officer then informed the parties that a limit would be placed on each parties’ presentation of its case-in-chief, taking into account the amount of evidence presentation required in light of the issues presented for hearing. The Hearing Officer noted that due process hearings require, on average, four to five days to complete. The parties were informed that, given that three school years and one extended school year had been put in issue, as well as some related issues, the parties would each be allotted nine days in which to present their case-in-chief, and that any deviations from this limit would have to be justified by a showing of exceptional circumstances. It was noted that special education due process hearings generally require substantially less time to complete than the eighteen-day limit being placed on the parties in the instant matter.

The parties were informed that a day of hearing would be considered to consist of five hours of testimony, which would exclude time taken for lunch or other breaks and for the discussion of any matters not related to testimony. The parties were also informed that the time allotted for the presentation of a party’s case-in-chief would include the time taken by the other parties to cross-examine witnesses, but that the cross-examination time actually counted against a party’s nine days would not exceed the time deducted for direct examination of that witness. It was explained, however, that regardless of the manner in which the hours were accounted, no time restrictions would be placed on the parties’ ability to cross-examine witnesses.

Thereafter, the Hearing Officer maintained a log detailing the time used by each party for the examination of witnesses. Using the log, the Hearing Officer periodically, and upon the request of either party, alerted the parties of the time remaining for presentation of each party’s case-in-chief.

III. SB Respondents’ Motion for Nonsuit at Conclusion of Student’s Case-In-Chief

On November 18, 1999, at the conclusion of the Student’s presentation of her case-in-chief, the SB Respondents moved for a ruling of nonsuit under Code of Civil Procedure section 581(c). The SB Respondents contended that the burden of proof rested with the Student under Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994), and requested a ruling that the Student had failed to meet her initial burden of proof. The Student opposed the motion.

The Hearing Officer denied the motion for nonsuit. Special education due process hearings are not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and there is no provision which allows parties to make motions for nonsuit in due process hearings. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer was not persuaded that the initial burden of proof on the issues presented for hearing rested with the Student. In fact, as will be discussed further below, the burden to prove compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act at the administrative level has been placed on the local educational agency. Clyde K., 35 F.3d at 1398. Additionally, the Hearing Officer was not persuaded that the testimonial evidence provided thus far mandated findings in the District’s favor.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is an eleven-year-old student who is currently identified as eligible for special education and related services under the categories of language/speech impairment and mental retardation. Her impairments are caused by an unbalanced chromosomal translocation of the thirteenth and fourteenth chromosomes, which has resulted in developmental delays in a number of areas including cognition, speech and language, and social skills.

At the age of seven months, STUDENT was identified as eligible for early intervention services under the category of developmentally delayed/other health impaired by the SBCOE. During her preschool years, she attended the SBCOE’s special education infant program and the Starr King Nursery parent-child workshop, a parent-cooperative nursery school sponsored by the Santa Barbara City College which provides weekly parent-training workshops.

On May 19, 1995, just months before she was scheduled to transition to a kindergarten program, STUDENT was assessed by Joe Pompilio, a psychologist with the SBCOE. Mr. Pompilio assessed STUDENT using the Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI), the Leiter International Performance Scale (LIPS), the California Preschool Social Competency Scale, and the Burks Behavior Rating Scales (BBRS). In his report, Mr. Pompilio concluded that STUDENT’s scores on the foregoing instruments were relatively consistent and reflected delayed development in cognitive functioning and visual-motor processing. He reported that the VMI results indicated a “rather severe problem” in the area of visual-motor development and suggested that some of STUDENT’s individualized education program (IEP) goals be directed to developing skills in this area. He noted that her behavior in the test situation reflected some ability to focus attention and cooperate with externally-imposed, challenging tasks and that her social evaluations documented acceptable social behavior and few behavioral problems. Mr. Pompilio found that, in addition to the area of visual-motor processing, STUDENT would require work in the following areas: fine-motor development, receptive and expressive language, cognitive skills, and social interaction, including involvement in group play.

In the fall of 1995, STUDENT began kindergarten at Roosevelt Elementary School (Roosevelt), a District school. She remained at Roosevelt for the next three years, until April 1998, near the end of her second-grade year. Throughout her years at Roosevelt, STUDENT was placed in the general education program for the majority of the school day and received speech and language (s/l) and adapted physical education (APE) services, as well as special education instruction and instructional aide assistance. Occupational therapy (OT) services were added to her IEP in February of her second-grade year.

Almost from the beginning of STUDENT’s attendance at Roosevelt, tensions arose between MOTHER and the Roosevelt principal, Bonnie Switack, and STUDENT’s special education teachers over issues related to supervision, discipline, toileting, and academic instruction, as well as to the manner in which MOTHER interacted with the school staff. Sometime during STUDENT’s first-grade year, Ms. Switack banned MOTHER from coming onto the Roosevelt campus without express permission from school staff or a scheduled appointment. At the same time that the tensions between the adults were growing, so did STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties. These included aggression towards adults and other students, refusal to comply with adult directives, and difficulty in transitioning back to the classroom from recess. In November 1996, near the middle of STUDENT’s first-grade year, District staff developed a behavior plan to address STUDENT’s difficulties with transitioning back to class from the playground, aggressive behavior, and toileting problems.

In May 1997, near the end of STUDENT’s first-grade year, the District conducted a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT. According to the assessment report prepared by school psychologist Janet Walker, the assessment included a behavior analysis and administration of the following measures: the Differential Ability Scales, Preschool Form (DAS); VMI; a gross motor and fine motor informal screening; Kinetic Family Drawing (KFD); Draw-A-Person; a speech and language evaluation; and the Scales of Independent Behavior. Ms. Walker noted in her report that the parents requested particular teachers in kindergarten and first grade and have “insisted” that STUDENT be fully included in general education classes. Ms. Walker then stated the following:

Standardized assessment measures indicate that STUDENT’s overall cognitive functioning is in the Mentally Deficient range. She is a stronger visual learner than auditory learner. This could be impacted somewhat by possible hearing difficulties. STUDENT’s visual screening was not passed. At this time STUDENT’s verbal expression is stronger than her receptive skills. It is likely that STUDENT does not comprehend at the level one might think based on other strengths. STUDENT’s visual-motor ability is a strength. STUDENT has made notable academic progress this year. [¶] STUDENT’s overall [a]daptive skills are approximately at a four year old level.(Footnote 5) She demonstrates behaviors which are considered ‘[s]erious’ regarding behaviors in which she is hurtful to herself and to others. She also is very powerful in her refusal to follow teacher direction. As a result, STUDENT has been placed on a school-wide behavior plan which addresses these behaviors.

In the summer of 1997, the growing tensions between the adults culminated in the District’s seeking and obtaining from the Santa Barbara County Superior Court three restraining orders against MOTHER. The restraining orders named Ms. Switack, special education teacher Carol Appleton, and District administrator Diana Rigby as the protected persons. The injunctions mandated that MOTHER remain at least one hundred yards away from the three identified protected persons and refrain from communicating with them in any manner, whether directly or indirectly, with the exception that she could attend IEP meetings at their invitation as long as she refrained from communicating with them at the meetings.(Footnote 6)

At about this time, the parents informed the District of their dissatisfaction with the assessment performed by Ms. Walker and requested an independent assessment. On or about September 18, 1997, MOTHER signed agreement to an IEP addendum labeled an “interim agreement.” The agreement stated, among other things, that Kristi McLoughlin would conduct STUDENT’s behavioral assessment, that STUDENT would be referred for an OT evaluation, that Howard Rothman, Ph.D., would perform an independent assessment of STUDENT’s cognitive functioning, and that the District would continue to implement the goals and objectives and behavior plan included in the IEP for the 1996-1997 school year until MOTHER approved new goals and objectives.

In keeping with the agreement, Dr. Rothman performed a cognitive assessment of STUDENT on October 6, 1997. In assessing STUDENT, Dr. Rothman observed her in the school setting, visited the home, interviewed the mother and teachers, and administered the DAS and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Vineland), the Vineland having been filled out by MOTHER and special education teacher Peggy Nicholson. Dr. Rothman offered the following findings in his report:

STUDENT presents a number of developmental delays that are evident in both cognitive assessment and adaptive behavior scale results. Her cognitive abilities range from the high-three to the mid-five year old level.(Footnote 7) ... Her relatively stronger score on the Naming Vocabulary subtest suggests that significantly improved language development is a realistic goal for STUDENT. Articulation is seen as a major barrier slowing down this progress. In this regard, STUDENT continues to need individual and/or small group speech and language instruction to work on this goal. STUDENT’s adaptive behavior skills are generally commensurate with her cognitive profile. [¶] While the full inclusion program may provide STUDENT with many experiences to enhance her social skills and be educated with her non special education peers, small group and individual instruction is also important in addressing her cognitive and academic needs. A balance between the special education and regular education classrooms may be the key to providing the best learning environment for STUDENT.

Shortly thereafter, on October 30, 1997, Ms. McLoughlin completed a functional analysis assessment (FAA) and developed a behavior intervention plan (BIP) for STUDENT. On November 15, 1997, occupational therapist Jean Weitensteiner completed STUDENT’s initial OT evaluation. Ms. Weitensteiner found that STUDENT, a child of eight years and eight months, was demonstrating fine motor/perceptual skills and self-care skills typically seen in children ranging from three years to five years and two months. Ms. Weitensteiner reported that areas of strength were seen in visual-motor and computer skills, but that STUDENT’s involuntary muscle twitches and delayed trunk responses affect her posture and dexterity during writing and fine-motor activities. She also indicated that sensory processing difficulties may be contributing to the adverse behaviors reported in recent testing and could be affecting her abilities within the classroom and with respect to self-care skills. She recommended that STUDENT be provided with OT support within the school setting to assist her in the areas of fine motor/perceptual skills, self care, and sensory motor processing abilities. She also recommended that STUDENT be provided with weighted support at her feet when sitting in raised chairs, in order to support her body during fine-motor activities.

Two months later, Dorothy Glover, Ph.D., completed an independent assessment at the request of the parents. Dr. Glover performed a behavior and skill assessment (i.e., FAA) and prepared a written report dated January 5, 1998. Her report was based on a home visit conducted on November 16, 1997, and a school observation conducted on November 17, as well as interviews with the parents and schools staff. Dr. Glover recommended, among other things, that all school staff playing an active role in STUDENT’s education receive further training in behavioral intervention and discrete trial training; that an expert in applied behavior analysis participate in and supervise interactions with STUDENT both at school and at home to educate school staff and parents; and that a one-on-one aide trained by the applied behavior analysis expert be with STUDENT initially throughout the school day to build compliance, teach new academic, language, and social skills, and help STUDENT generalize skills learned in a one-on-one setting to a group-instruction setting with age-matched peers. Dr. Glover noted that, in the short run, STUDENT’s time in the regular education classroom should be limited until she has the prerequisite skills to benefit from that environment. In late February 1998, the District retained Joanne Singer, Ph.D., to train and supervise school staff working with STUDENT.

On April 14, 1998, after MOTHER had been detained and arrested numerous times for entering the Roosevelt campus (and thus allegedly violated the restraining orders), the parents decided to pull STUDENT out of Roosevelt. In a letter dated April 26, FATHER informed Ms. Switack that STUDENT would remain out of school until his concerns had been adequately addressed, and requested an emergency IEP meeting to address those issues. FATHER requested that the District provide “home-school” packets so that STUDENT would not fall behind in her classwork. The parties were unable to resolve their differences before the end of the 1997-1998 school year, and STUDENT did not return to Roosevelt after April 14, 1998.

On May 5, 1998, the parents filed a request for a due process hearing (SN 618-98). The case was subsequently settled by the parties through a settlement agreement. The District made an offer of settlement in July 1998, which the parents accepted, and the agreement was signed by the parties in early September 1998. The settlement agreement provided, in part, that STUDENT and her BROTHER would be placed at the Open Alternative School (OAS), a District parent-cooperative school, in September 1998.

On September 25, 1998, the District held an IEP meeting. At the meeting, MOTHER indicated her agreement to the OAS placement and her disagreement with the restrictions placed on her involvement with STUDENT’s educational program and the goals and objectives which require her on-site participation. Three days later, on September 28, the parents filed another request for a due process hearing (the instant case, SN 1370-98). The District filed its own request for a due process hearing two days later on September 30 (SN 1389-98).

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Was STUDENT offered and/or provided a free appropriate public education during the following time periods: (a) the 1995-1996 school year, (b) the 1996-1997 school year, (c) the 1997-1998 school year, (d) the first half of the 1998-1999 school year (to January 1999), and (e) the 1999 extended school year?

The Student contended that the District committed numerous procedural and substantive violations which denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-1998 school years and the fall of 1998. The SB Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the District provided STUDENT with a FAPE and that, even if it did not, it cannot be held liable for any failure to provide FAPE during the periods at issue. The SB Respondents argued that the settlement agreement entered into by the parties during the summer of 1998 bars the parents from raising any FAPE claims which arose on or before July 1998. Additionally, the SB Respondents asserted that the District was not STUDENT’s district of residence during the years at issue and, therefore, was not responsible for providing her a FAPE. Before delving into the issues of FAPE, the Hearing Officer will first address the arguments regarding the settlement agreement and residency.

I. 1998 Settlement Agreement

The settlement agreement at issue came about after the parties engaged in mediation on July 13, 1998, with regard to the Student’s prior due process filing, Case No. SN 618-98. Three days after the mediation, through a letter dated July 16, the District made a detailed written offer of settlement, the terms of which it stated were absolutely non-negotiable.(Footnote 8) The District offered STUDENT placement as a third-grade student in one of five selected schools with full-time aide support, a “full” language and speech evaluation with a follow-up IEP meeting to determine if additional speech and language services were required, an audiometric assessment, a re-evaluation of her behavior plan in her new setting, and continued occupational therapist and adapted physical education services pursuant to her IEP. The District indicated that the following provisions would also be part of the agreement: no party would be considered the prevailing party for any purpose whatsoever and each party would bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs. The District’s settlement offer was amended slightly by letter dated July 17, 1998, but the amendment did not change any of the aforementioned terms. The parents accepted this settlement offer by a facsimile transmittal dated July 22, within the deadline set forth in the offer. Accordingly, because all of the terms of the proposed agreement were clearly understandable, the Student’s absolute and unqualified acceptance of the District’s detailed settlement offer resulted in the parties having entered into a binding contract. 1 Witkin, Summary of California Law, §§ 136, 189 (9th ed. 1987). This is true even where, as here, one of the parties intended to later execute a formal writing embodying these terms. Id. at § 136.

However, contrary to the District’s argument, neither the July 16 nor the July 17 version of the District’s settlement offer contained a general release of claims. A general release of claims might have constituted a release of all claims arising before July 1998, whether known or unknown at the time the agreement was signed, subject to Civil Code section 1542.(Footnote 9) An obligation may be extinguished by a release, but a writing must expressly show the intent to extinguish the obligation. Id. at § 893. Here, the only release language contained in the District’s settlement offer was contained in the following sentence: “My clients have authorized me to make the following offer in order to resolve this matter in its entirety.” There is no question that the phrase “this matter” referred to the then-pending due process proceedings identified in the District’s letter (SN 618-98). Noticeably absent from the settlement offer that the parents accepted was any language indicating settlement of any and all obligations, whether raised or not, which arose prior to that date. Furthermore, while neither party presented any evidence with regard to what claims had been raised in SN 618-98, the District’s settlement offer makes it clear that the special education requests made by the parents at the mediation on July 13, 1998, related only to prospective program and assessment issues for the 1998-1999 school year.(Footnote 10) Consequently, based on the present record, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the matter of SN 618-98 dealt with prospective program and assessment issues for the 1998-1999 school year. There is no indication that the parties intended to resolve any and all special education issues regarding STUDENT’s prior school years when they entered into the settlement agreement.(Footnote 11) In light of the foregoing facts, the Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive the District’s argument that the settlement offer accepted by the parents contained a general release of all claims arising prior to July 1998.

The Hearing Officer also finds unpersuasive the District’s argument that the parents subsequently agreed in writing in September 1998 to a general release of claims. The evidence disclosed that, in or about September 1998, the District drafted a written settlement agreement to formalize the terms of the settlement reached in July 1998. While the District’s written settlement agreement did contain new language which could reasonably be construed as a general release of claims,(Footnote 12) neither MOTHER nor her attorney indicated agreement in writing to the newly-added provision. MOTHER’s attorney purposefully crossed out the new provision containing the general release and specifically noted that her signature indicated agreement with all except the general release provision. MOTHER’s signature on the agreement indicated that she agreed with the terms insofar as they were amended by her attorney. Additionally, MOTHER specifically testified at hearing that she did not agree to the general release provision added by the District. As previously mentioned, the Student’s absolute and unqualified acceptance of the District’s detailed settlement offer on July 22 resulted in a final and binding agreement since the terms of the proposed agreement were clearly understandable, regardless of the fact that the District intended to later execute a formal writing. Id. at §§ 136, 189. Consequently, the District’s belated attempt to change the terms of the parties’ final and binding settlement agreement were of no effect since the parents did not agree with the additional term.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents were not barred by the 1998 settlement agreement from raising issues of FAPE for the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-1998 school years in this proceeding.(Footnote 13)

II. Residency

The SB Respondents’ second argument, that the District cannot be held liable for any past denials of FAPE because it was not STUDENT’s district of residence or otherwise responsible for providing her with a FAPE, is equally unpersuasive.(Footnote 14) The Student indicated at hearing that she did not dispute that the voting registrar and county assessor maps, which are normally authoritative as to the question of jurisdictional boundaries, place STUDENT’s residence within the College SD. The Student argued, however, that there are “records” which indicate that the residence is located within SBESD’s boundaries and that the property taxes assessed on the residence are sent, in part, to pay for school services in the SBESD. Regardless of whether STUDENT was or was not a residence of the SBESD during the periods at issue, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that jurisdictional boundaries are the sole indicators of district responsibility, especially where, as here, the District’s actions induced the family into believing that their residence was located in the boundaries of the District.

The family moved to their current residence (the Foothill residence) in about 1996, but no question arose as to whether STUDENT resided within the District’s boundaries until the summer of 1998 when MOTHER submitted herself as a candidate for its school board. According to MOTHER’s unrefuted testimony, until that time, STUDENT and the neighborhood children all attended school within the District and the families in the neighborhood were registered to vote in the District’s school board elections. Furthermore, even after the dispute arose as to whether STUDENT actually resided in the District, the District continued to be the sole local education agency (LEA) serving STUDENT educationally.

Under the unique circumstances of this case, the Hearing Officer finds that the District is estopped by its own representations from denying that it was the responsible LEA during the periods at issue. Estoppel by representation arises when a party, by acts, representations, admissions, or silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he or she will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. Black’s Law Dictionary 902 (abridged 6th ed. 1991); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 623 and County of Orange v. Carl D., 76 Cal. App. 4th 429, 438-440, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1999). Here, the District through its actions induced the parents to believe that they resided within its boundaries and that it was the LEA responsible for providing STUDENT with an education. In reliance on District’s acts and representations, the parents looked to the District to provide STUDENT with an education during the periods at issue and did not seek services from any other school district. Moreover, the District was the sole LEA providing educational services to STUDENT during the periods at issue. To now allow the District to assert that it was not the responsible LEA during those periods when STUDENT resided at the Foothill residence would severely prejudice STUDENT and her family. For these reasons, the District is estopped from asserting that it was not the LEA responsible for providing STUDENT with a FAPE during the periods in question.

III. Provision of a FAPE

Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State education law, students with disabilities have the right to a FAPE in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56000, 56031. A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the student’s individualized education program (IEP).(Footnote 15) 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. Id. The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit. Id. at 207. The school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).

A. 1995-1996 School Year – Kindergarten

The Student contended that the District committed numerous procedural and substantive violations during STUDENT’s kindergarten year which resulted in a denial of FAPE. Among other things, the Student asserted that STUDENT’s transition IEP was confusing and contained conflicting provisions with regard to the amount of inclusion in the general education program, making it impossible for the parent and staff to understand what program was supposed to be provided and resulting in inconsistent implementation of the IEP. The Student also asserted that the principal unilaterally decided, without consulting the IEP team, that STUDENT would not participate in the extended school day when the kindergarten school day was lengthened in the second semester. Finally, the Student contended that the District improperly failed to assess STUDENT’s fine-motor needs even though she was not on track to meet her goals and objectives.

1. Compliance with Procedural Safeguards

First, a student with exceptional needs is entitled to an IEP which describes the specific special educational instruction and related services required by the student and the extent to which the student will participate in the regular education program. 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(3) (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3)-(4). The IEP must state the amount of services to be provided so that the level of the agency’s commitment of resources will be clear to parents and other IEP team members. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 51 (1992). Specifically, the amount of time to be committed to each of the various services must be stated in the IEP in a manner that is clear to all who are involved in both the development and implementation of the IEP. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 51 (1992). An LEA must provide special education and related services to a student with exceptional needs in accordance with his or her IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c). Failure to do so constitutes noncompliance with the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 45 (1992).

There was no dispute that the transition IEP in effect at the beginning of STUDENT’s kindergarten year was the IEP dated June 7, 1995. The IEP described the following program and services for STUDENT: special day class (SDC) daily, thirty minutes of (collaborative) itinerant severely handicapped (SH) specialist/SDC services two times per week, and DIS speech-language services in two thirty-minute sessions per week.(Footnote 16) It also stated that she would participate in the regular education program, with special education support and supervision, during eighty percent of the school day. Specifically, the IEP noted that she would spend sixty minutes per day in the regular kindergarten program for academics with instructional support and supervision from special education staff and thirty minutes per day in the nonacademic activities of lunch and recess with the regular education program, and that she would participate in school-wide events and activities as appropriate. Handwritten into the IEP were the following comments:

STUDENT will participate 100% of time in special education/instructional program. While she may be included in a regular kindergarten classroom, she will be under the direct supervision of the special education teaching staff who will be responsible for not only supervising STUDENT’s instructional program, but for modifying materials and curriculum, as necessary.

A plain reading of this IEP fails to communicate what STUDENT’s educational program was supposed to be in her kindergarten year. The designations of services, both in terms of type and amount, are confusing and inconsistent with one another. On the one hand, the IEP states that STUDENT was to be placed in an SDC daily with one hundred percent of her time in a “special education/instructional program.” On the other hand, it indicates that she is to spend eighty percent of her school day in the regular education program. Ms. Rigby and Ms. McClish testified that the SDC designation was used because the IEP was describing a full inclusion placement with special education support for more than half the school day. However, this explanation is unconvincing and does not establish that the IEP was written in a manner that would give the parents notice of what program was to be provided given that the designation of SDC (or “special classes”) is used in the law to refer to classes outside the regular education program. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(b)(1) (1992); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56364-56364.2. Additionally, the IEP indicated that STUDENT would participate in the regular education program during eighty percent of the school day but, on the same page, also provided that she would spend sixty minutes in the academic portion and thirty minutes in the nonacademic portion, for a total of ninety minutes. According to Ms. Rigby and MOTHER, the kindergarten school day lasted approximately 180 minutes; however, the sixty- and thirty-minute designations totaled only fifty percent of the school day. Given these inconsistent provisions and the designation of an SDC placement, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that this IEP informed the parents or those working with STUDENT in the educational setting that she was to be a fully included student with special education support.

Thus, it is not surprising that the parent and school staff would now have inconsistent recollections of what STUDENT’s educational program was supposed to be during her kindergarten year. MOTHER testified that, based on the discussion at the IEP meeting, she understood STUDENT would spend eighty percent of the school day in the general education program, with special education support, and twenty percent receiving speech and language services. STUDENT’s special education teacher that year, Peggy Nicholson, testified that STUDENT was supposed to be fully included during her kindergarten year.(Footnote 17) Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP failed to state the special education instruction and services and the amount of time to be committed to each of the various services in a manner that was clear to the parents and others involved in the development and implementation of the IEP, as required. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 51 (1992).

The Hearing Officer also finds that, even if the IEP could reasonably be read to describe an inclusion placement for eighty percent of the school day (or fifty percent of the school day), the District failed to provide special education and related services to STUDENT in accordance with the IEP. 34 C.F.R. § 300.350 (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(c). According to the testimony of regular education teacher Pamela Holst and Ms. Nicholson, STUDENT was, for the most part, fully included in the regular education program in Ms. Holst’s class during her kindergarten year. Even Ms. Rigby admitted that she did not know why the IEP stated eighty percent inclusion in the regular education program when STUDENT was actually fully included. Further, even assuming that the IEP team agreed to a full inclusion placement for STUDENT with special education support throughout the day and that this could be discerned from the IEP document, the testimony of Ms. Holst establishes that STUDENT received special education services on a pull-out basis during the first month of the year, a practice which continued occasionally thereafter, and that she did not receive special education support in the regular education classroom until about November. MOTHER’s testimony is consistent with Ms. Holst’s testimony in this regard. Additionally, even though Ms. Nicholson testified that she coordinated with the classroom teacher to provide STUDENT the appropriate support in the classroom, Ms. Holst credibly testified that she did not interact with Ms. Nicholson during the course of STUDENT’s kindergarten year. Moreover, Ms. Nicholson’s testimony established that, even when special education support was being provided in the regular education classroom, it was unilaterally discontinued at times. For example, Ms. Nicholson testified that special education support was withdrawn when the classroom teacher requested it. Changes in the amount of services listed in the IEP cannot be made without holding another IEP meeting. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 51 (1992). There is no dispute that, given STUDENT’s behavioral issues and cognitive deficits, she required special education support in the classroom. The evidence failed to establish, however, that she received the placement developed by the IEP team or the support she required to benefit from the regular education class.

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to ensure that STUDENT’s IEP for her kindergarten year included a clear and concise statement of her educational program and failed to provide her a program in accordance with the IEP (or even the parties’ understanding of the IEP). This violation, while procedural in nature, affected the manner in which STUDENT’s program was implemented and seriously infringed the parents’ right to participate meaningfully in the development of the IEP.

With respect to the Student’s second argument, the evidence established that, starting January 15, 1996, the regular education program for kindergarten students was extended by 1.5 hours every Wednesday and Thursday. Ms. Nicholson testified that the lengthened school days provided the kindergarten students with more instruction and were intended to help prepare them for a longer school day. She also testified that these lengthened school days were generally accepted by parents, but parents could choose not to have their children participate in the additional 1.5 hours. According to MOTHER and Ms. Nicholson, MOTHER consistently requested that STUDENT be able to participate in the regular education program just like the other students and that STUDENT be allowed to attend the extended school day. Despite this, MOTHER’s unrefuted testimony established that, even though no IEP meeting was convened to discuss STUDENT’s ability to participate in the extended school day, she was informed by Ms. Nicholson that staff had decided STUDENT would receive only an additional half hour of instruction and that she would have to spend the half hour in Ms. Nicholson’s room and not the regular education classroom. MOTHER also testified that, from the very beginning, school staff had problems getting STUDENT to transition to Ms. Nicholson’s room for the additional half hour and that, by February 8, STUDENT had such difficulties with the transition that MOTHER was informed that STUDENT could no longer attend school for the extended day. At a meeting convened on March 6, 1996, to review STUDENT’s progress, MOTHER reiterated her request that STUDENT be allowed to attend the extended day program.(Footnote 18) Only then were the members of STUDENT’s IEP team given an opportunity to discuss her ability to participate in the extended day program with her peers. School staff did not allow STUDENT to attend school for the same length of time as her typically developing peers until late April 1996, when there were only six weeks of school remaining.

Ms. McClish correctly testified that school districts are prohibited from providing special education students with a shorter school day than their regular education peers, unless the IEP team has agreed that a shorter school day is appropriate. The IDEA requires that students with disabilities be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, with students who are nondisabled and that removal from the regular educational environment occur only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b) (1992). To this end, even when a student is placed in a special class or center because of his or her disability, he or she must still be provided with a program for at least the same length of time as the regular school day for his or her chronological peer group, unless the IEP team has determined that the student cannot function for the entire length of a regular school day and when it is so specified in the IEP. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3053. Here, the District unilaterally denied STUDENT the opportunity to participate in a lengthened school day, which was available to her nondisabled peers, without the benefit of an IEP meeting and without taking into consideration the parents’ input. Moreover, at no time did the IEP team make a determination that STUDENT could not function for the additional 1.5 hours or make any statements to this effect in her IEP. Additionally, no evidence was presented at hearing that STUDENT could not function for the additional 1.5 hours like her typically developing peers.

As mentioned previously, changes in the amount of services listed in the IEP cannot be made without holding another IEP meeting. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 51 (1992). During STUDENT’s kindergarten year, significant decisions about her educational program were made unilaterally by the District without even the semblance of IEP team input. The Hearing Officer finds that this disregard for the IEP process and lack of consideration for parental input was a violation of the IDEA’s procedural safeguards. 2. Substantive Appropriateness

The Hearing Officer also finds that the evidence supports the Student’s final contention regarding STUDENT’s fine-motor needs. To be substantively appropriate, a special education program must be designed to meet the student’s unique educational needs. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208. An IEP is an educational package which must target all of a student’s unique educational needs, whether academic or nonacademic. Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1993). The term “unique educational needs” is to be broadly construed and includes the student’s academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical, and vocational needs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 410, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2088, 2106). Here, the then most-current assessment, which was performed by SBCOE psychologist Joe Pompilio in May 1995, indicated that STUDENT had fine motor deficits which needed to be addressed. Mr. Pompilio had administered the Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI) to STUDENT and found that she was functioning at less than half the functional level expected for her age. Specifically, he reported that, according to the test manual, STUDENT’s VMI results indicated an age equivalence of approximately two years, nine months, at a time when STUDENT was six years and two-months old. He concluded that the VMI indicated a “rather severe problem” in the area of visual-motor development and recommended that some of STUDENT’s IEP goals be directed to developing these skills. Additionally, the meeting summary notes from the IEP meeting held on June 7, 1995, indicate that the team found that STUDENT’s fingers sometimes became sore and she was unable to perform some fine-motor tasks. Further, at a meeting held on March 6, 1996, District staff noted that STUDENT was not yet ready for a program that focused heavily on academics because, in part, her fine-motor skills were a “relative weakness” for her. The existence of fine-motor deficits was confirmed by Ms. Nicholson’s testimony. According to Ms. Nicholson, STUDENT had difficulty with fine-motor tasks and, because of this, it was difficult for her to meet a number of her goals and objectives.

Finally, when STUDENT was eventually assessed by occupational therapist Jean Weitensteiner in late 1997, she was found to be demonstrating fine-motor/perceptual and self-care skills three to five years below her chronological age. Ms. Weitensteiner reported that STUDENT exhibited involuntary muscle twitches and delayed trunk responses, which affect her posture and dexterity during writing and fine-motor activities. She recommended that the District provide STUDENT with occupational therapy in the school setting to assist her in the areas of fine-motor/perceptual skills, self-care skills, and sensory motor processing abilities. MOTHER credibly testified that the fine-motor difficulties and tonal differences observed by Ms. Weitensteiner in 1997 were also observable during the kindergarten year. This was corroborated by the unrebutted testimony of psychologist Dorothy Glover, Ph.D. Dr. Glover testified that she has worked with students with similar fine-motor/perceptual difficulties and that the difficulties usually arise earlier than the second grade, unless the child has experienced some sort of physical trauma. She testified that, because STUDENT did not experience any significant physical trauma between kindergarten and second grade, she believed that such difficulties arose earlier than 1997.

While the findings of the 1997 OT assessment do not conclusively establish that STUDENT would have qualified for OT during kindergarten had she been assessed at that time, when viewed in conjunction with the known indications of fine-motor difficulties during the kindergarten year, it does establish that STUDENT had noticeable fine-motor difficulties which were interfering with her ability to meet her goals and objectives and that at least she should have been assessed by an occupational therapist in kindergarten. School districts are required to assess students with disabilities in all areas related to the suspected disability including, where appropriate, motor abilities. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(f) (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). Having failed to evaluate STUDENT’s fine-motor/perceptual deficits during her kindergarten year or provide her with OT, the District failed to prove that it provided STUDENT a program designed to address her unique needs which was reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit, as required by the IDEA.

***

Taken together, the District’s violations of both procedural and substantive requirements during STUDENT’s kindergarten year denied STUDENT a FAPE. The District’s significant procedural violations seriously infringed the parents’ opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP process and resulted in a loss of educational opportunity for STUDENT. The District’s substantive violation resulted in a program which failed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs and interfered with her ability to benefit educationally from her program. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 1995-1996 school year.

B. 1996-1997 School Year – First Grade

The Student contended that the District committed a multitude of procedural and substantive violations during STUDENT’s first-grade year which resulted in a denial of FAPE. Among other things, the Student asserted that, as with the IEP in effect during kindergarten, the IEP in effect during STUDENT’s first-grade year failed to provide a clear description of STUDENT’s intended program to the parents or District staff. Additionally, the Student asserted that the District improperly failed to hold IEP meetings and often limited the topics for discussions at IEP meetings. With regard to substantive matters, the Student contended that the District inadequately addressed serious maladaptive behaviors; developed a behavior plan without the benefit of a functional analysis assessment (FAA) and thereafter inconsistently implemented it; continued to ignore STUDENT’s need for an occupational therapy assessment despite continuing fine-motor needs; and improperly failed to address STUDENT’s self-care needs. Each argument will be addressed in turn.

1. Compliance with Procedural Safeguards

First, there was no dispute that the IEP in effect at the beginning of STUDENT’s first-grade year was developed by the IEP team at a meeting held on September 6, 1996. This IEP, as well as the others developed during the course of that year, described STUDENT’s program as follows: SDC daily, speech-language services in two twenty-minute sessions per week, and adaptive physical education (APE) one time per week for thirty minutes.(Footnote 19) Her IEPs also stated that she would receive special education support in the regular classroom for math, reading, and language and participate in the regular education program during forty-nine percent of the school day. Specifically, the IEPs noted that she would spend 240 minutes per day in the regular education program for academics (listed as reading, math, language, arts, science, and social studies) and 95 minutes per day in the nonacademic activities (listed recess, lunch, physical education, assemblies, art, and music), for a total of 335 minutes in the regular education program.

Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that the IEP itself was internally inconsistent. STUDENT’s first-grade regular education classroom teacher, Carolyn Shaw, testified that the school day began at 8:00 a.m. and ended at 2:10 p.m., for a total of 370 minutes. Accordingly, participation in the regular education program for 335 minutes out of a 370-minute school day would result in 90% participation in the regular education program, not the 49% designated on the IEP. Additionally, as with the kindergarten IEP, the designation of placement in an “SDC” was inconsistent with the amount of inclusion in the regular education program designated in other parts of the IEP, as well as with the parents’ and staff members’ understanding that STUDENT was to be fully included in the regular education program. Further, although not discernable from the IEP, according to the testimony of STUDENT’s teachers, her program actually consisted of a full inclusion placement for the entire school day with individual aide assistance during the academic portions. If modifications to the regular education program (i.e., supplementary aids and services) are necessary to ensure the student’s participation in that program, the modifications must be identified and described in the student’s IEP. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 48 (1996) (now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii) (1997)); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). Since the IEP is the only available vehicle through which most staff working with a fully included student will learn of the modifications that were determined necessary by the IEP team, this is an important requirement that helps to ensure consistent implementation of an appropriate program for the student. It also ensures that the parents are given a clear idea of what program they are agreeing to and what program the school district intends to implement for their child. Here, there is no dispute that STUDENT required and received individual aide assistance in the regular education program during the academic portions of the school day. However, nowhere in the IEP is there an indication that STUDENT would be receiving aide services.

Given the IEP’s inconsistent provisions, designation of an SDC placement, and failure to indicate that STUDENT would be receiving aide services, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s IEP for the first grade failed to inform the parents or those working with STUDENT in the educational setting what her educational program was intended to be, as required by State and federal law. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(3) (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3)-(4).

Secondly, the evidence also demonstrated that the District improperly limited the parents’ ability to meaningfully participate in the IEP process. Parents are required members of a student’s IEP team and have the right to participate in meetings related to recommendations and program planning, as well as to present information to the IEP team. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(f). In this role, parents are expected to be equal participants along with school personnel in developing, reviewing, and revising the student’s IEP. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 26 (1996). This is an active role in which the parents may participate in the discussion about the student’s needs for special education and related services and join with the other participants in deciding what services the agency will provide the student. Id. MOTHER testified that, during STUDENT’s first-grade year, she was expressly disallowed from discussing particular issues at IEP meetings, including her concerns about the methodology used by staff with STUDENT, the competency of certain personnel working with STUDENT to implement her IEP, and her request for increased speech-language services. The District did not offer any evidence to refute MOTHER’s testimony in this regard. Additionally, MOTHER’s testimony was supported by the parents’ written transcripts of the IEP meetings held that year.

While methodology questions ultimately lie within the province of state and local education agencies, the act of choosing the educational method most suitable to a student’s needs is to be done “in cooperation” with the student’s parents. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. The District’s failure to allow the IEP team to discuss MOTHER’s concerns in this regard, despite repeated attempts to raise the issue in and outside of IEP meetings, violated her right to meaningfully participate in the IEP process. Further, the District should have allowed MOTHER to raise in IEP meetings issues of personnel competency given that lack of competency could affect the proper implementation of STUDENT’s IEP or otherwise deny her right to a FAPE. With regard to increased speech services, the evidence showed that MOTHER attempted to raise this issue during a meeting held on April 30, 1997, which had been noticed to discuss transportation issues. Even though STUDENT’s speech therapist was present at the meeting, District personnel refused to discuss MOTHER’s request for increased speech services and told her that she could request another IEP meeting to have her request discussed. Even though MOTHER then indicated that she wanted to have an IEP meeting to discuss her speech therapy request, District personnel did not notify her of the need for a written request, as required by Education Code section 56343.5, or convene an IEP meeting within thirty days of the oral request. The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to allow the IEP team to discuss issues properly raised by MOTHER seriously infringed her opportunity to participate in the IEP process. W.G., 960 F.3d at 1484.

2. Substantive Appropriateness

With regard to substantive appropriateness, as mentioned earlier, to be substantively appropriate, a special education program must be designed to target all of a student’s unique educational needs, whether academic or nonacademic. Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1089. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to address a number of STUDENT’s unique needs during the first grade and was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.

First, the evidence established that the District did not conduct an FAA or develop a proper behavioral intervention plan (BIP) during the first-grade year despite STUDENT’s repeated and serious behavior issues. An LEA is required to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP satisfying the requirements of State law whenever a special education student exhibits “serious behavior problems” which significantly interfere with the implementation of the goals and objectives contained in the student’s IEP. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(f). The phrase “serious behavior problems” is defined as behaviors that are self-injurious, assaultive, or cause serious property damage and other severe behavior problems that are pervasive and maladaptive for which instructional and/or behavioral approaches specified in the student’s IEP are found to be ineffective. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(y) (1996) (current version at § 3001(aa) (1999)).

The testimony and documentary evidence showed that STUDENT engaged in assaultive behaviors on numerous occasions during her first-grade. Ms. Shaw testified that STUDENT had to be closely supervised during recess because she had a “biting habit.” The daily communication book kept that year by school staff, which Ms. Shaw described as “quite accurate,” detailed incidents of STUDENT biting, choking, and kicking students and staff as early as September 26, 1996. year. Specifically, STUDENT bit, hit, and kicked other students and staff members, and her propensity to assault others was well known to staff. For instance, an entry dated September 26 indicated that STUDENT had choked and bit the student chosen to assist her in transitioning from the playground to the classroom after recess. Additionally, an entry dated the next day indicated that STUDENT scratched a student when reminded that she needed to leave the playground. Then, according to the communication book, on December 2, STUDENT twice bit a substitute teacher on the arm and tore the substitute teacher’s blouse with her teeth. In February, this aggressive behavior seemed to escalate when, within the space of four days in early February, STUDENT bit and kicked students and staff on three separate occasions. Moreover, in an assessment report completed by school psychologist Janet Walker in May 1997, Ms. Walker reported that STUDENT “has hit, bit, kicked and scratched and spit on her peers in incidents over the past two years. Ms. Walker found that these behaviors were “serious behavior problems” as defined in the Education Code and were interfering with academic learning. None of the parties refuted Ms. Walker’s conclusions in this regard at hearing. Based on the clear indications of repeated assaultive behavior, there is no doubt that the District should have conducted an FAA and developed a BIP in accordance with State law as early as October 1996. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(f).

By November 1996, the District had developed a behavior plan for STUDENT based on, among other things, “problems with STUDENT hitting and biting her peers when they encourage her to return to class.” However, the plan was neither based on an FAA, developed at an IEP meeting, nor included in the IEP, as required by law. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, §§ 3001, 3052. The importance of an FAA in developing a BIP cannot be ignored. An FAA is a detailed information-gathering process which, under State law, must be conducted by or under the supervision of a person with documented training in behavior analysis with an emphasis on positive behavioral interventions. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3052(b). Completion of an FAA must include systematic observations of the targeted behaviors, the immediate antecedents, and the consequences; an ecological analysis of the settings in which the behavior occurs most frequently; a review of records for health and medical factors which may influence behaviors; and a review of the history of the behavior, including the effectiveness of previously used behavioral interventions. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3052(b)(1). There was no evidence that any of these procedures were followed before the behavior plan was developed for STUDENT.(Footnote 20) Moreover, the District’s behavior plan failed to meet any of the requirements for a BIP, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(f), and contained clearly inappropriate interventions. For example, the behavior plan stated that if STUDENT hurt another student or staff member by biting and scratching, she was to be sent home for the remainder of the day. Rather than being an effective behavior management tool for STUDENT, the evidence showed that STUDENT generally enjoyed being at home and/or with her mother more than being at school. Additionally, behavioral interventions must be implemented in a manner that ensure a student’s right to placement in the least restrictive educational environment, as outlined in the IEP, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(d), not in a manner that ensures loss of educational opportunities. Sending a student home for exhibiting an unwanted behavior would not, in any sense, ensure the student’s right to placement in the least restrictive educational environment.

The evidence clearly established that the District’s failure to properly address STUDENT’s assaultive behaviors during the first grade put all children and staff involved in her program in physical jeopardy. The legislature has expressed in no uncertain terms the State’s intent that all children be provided with appropriate and meaningful educational programs in safe and healthy environments. Cal. Educ. Code § 56520(a)(1). Furthermore, the District’s failure in this regard left the staff working with STUDENT ill-equipped to handle the aberrant assaultive behaviors that STUDENT exhibited and, as a result, staff members at times used intervention techniques at odds with the State’s clear directive for only positive behavioral interventions. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56520(a); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(d). For example, there was no dispute that on April 28, 1997, a staff member hit STUDENT on her bottom when she would not comply with an adult directive. There was conflicting testimony with regard to how hard STUDENT was hit but, nevertheless, the law is clear that behavior interventions used by school personnel shall not include those intended to cause pain or trauma, such as hitting. Cal. Educ. Code § 56520(a)(3). In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District improperly failed to consider and address the serious maladaptive behaviors STUDENT exhibited during the first grade by failing to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP.(Footnote 21)

Second, as with the kindergarten year, STUDENT’s classroom teacher testified that she was aware STUDENT had considerable fine-motor deficits. Ms. Shaw testified that STUDENT had limited small muscle coordination and therefore writing was difficult for her. She also testified that she never thought about referring STUDENT for an OT assessment, because STUDENT had disabilities and she expected that STUDENT would progress more slowly than other children. The assessment performed by Ms. Walker in May 1997 indicated that STUDENT was consistently performing in fine-motor tasks at levels expected of four- to five-year-old children when she was chronologically eight years old. As with the kindergarten year, the staff’s awareness of STUDENT’s considerable fine-motor difficulties and the findings of the 1997 OT assessment establish that STUDENT should have, at the least, been assessed by an occupational therapist during her first-grade year. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(f) (1992); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). Having failed to evaluate STUDENT’s fine-motor deficits during her first-grade year or provide her with OT, the District failed to establish that it provided STUDENT a program designed to address her unique needs, as required by the IDEA.

Finally, the testimony provided in this case made it clear that STUDENT had serious toileting issues during her first-grade year. Ms. Shaw and Ms. Appleton both testified to numerous incidents of STUDENT urinating and defecating in her pants during the course of the school year. Ms. Shaw testified that STUDENT never alerted her to a need to go the restroom. The teachers’ testimony in this regard is corroborated by the daily communication book, which indicated frequent toileting accidents, and the behavior plan developed by the District in November 1996, which noted that STUDENT had defecated in her pants several times in the preceding weeks. Additionally, Ms. Walker’s assessment in May 1997 found that STUDENT’s personal living skills, including her toileting skills, were equivalent to a three-year-old child’s even though she was eight years old at the time. Despite these indications of significant self-care issues, STUDENT’s IEP failed to include any services, specialized instruction, or goals and objectives to address toileting issues. While the behavior plan did marginally address toileting,(Footnote 22) it was not incorporated into her IEP and, as written, could not serve the same ends as goals and objectives. The statutory requirements for including annual goals and short-term instructional objectives and for having at least an annual review of the IEP is to provide a mechanism for determining (1) whether the anticipated outcomes for the student are being met and (2) whether the placement and services are appropriate to the student’s special education needs. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 37 (1996). In essence, the goals and objectives provide a way for the student’s teacher(s) and parents to be able to track the student’s progress in special education. Id. The District’s failure to develop any goals and objectives with regard to toileting denied the IEP team a mechanism by which to track STUDENT’s progress, or lack thereof, and constructively evaluate the efficacy of its program in addressing her needs in this area.. Not surprisingly then, according to Ms. Nicholson’s testimony, STUDENT’s toileting difficulties continued into the second grade.

***

In light of the foregoing procedural and substantive violations committed by the District during STUDENT’s first-grade year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 1996-1997 school year.

C. 1997-1998 School Year – Second Grade

With regard to the 1997-1998 school year, the Student argued that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by committing a number of procedural and substantive violations. Among other things, the Student asserted that the District improperly implemented the IEP in effect at the beginning of the year; implemented the BIP developed in late October 1997 without parent permission and failed to convene an IEP meeting to discuss the BIP until February 1998; and limited the IEP team’s ability to discuss educational issues. With regard to substantive matters, the Student contended that the District failed to address STUDENT’s serious behavior issues adequately or timely; appropriately address STUDENT’s self-care needs, attention problems, and compliance issues; and provide her with adapted materials. Each argument will be addressed in turn.

1. Compliance with Procedural Safeguards

First, according to the testimony of MOTHER and STUDENT’s second-grade teachers, the IEP in effect at the beginning of the 1997-1998 school year was the first-grade IEP dated September 6, 1996. While the District had held an IEP meeting at the beginning of the second-grade year on September 3, 1997, MOTHER did not give her consent for the new IEP to be implemented at that time.(Footnote 23) The Hearing Officer previously examined the IEP dated September 6, 1996, and found that it was internally inconsistent, as well as misleading and inaccurate in its description of the program agreed to by the IEP team and thereafter implemented. These findings apply equally with regard to the IEP’s application for STUDENT’s second-grade year.(Footnote 24) Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the IEP developed on September 3, 1997, proposed a significant reduction in the amount of inclusion in the regular education program. It described the District’s proposed program as follows: SDC with the related services of speech-language services and APE and participation in the regular education program during forty-four percent of the school day, specifically described as sixty minutes per day in the regular education program for science and social studies and 101 minutes per day in nonacademic activities. However, because the parent did not agree to the District’s proposed program, it should not have been implemented until written consent could be obtained. Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(a). Unfortunately, this was not the case. According to the testimony of STUDENT’s second-grade special education teacher, Ms. Nicholson, and regular education teacher, Yvonne Reijnaert, STUDENT spent approximately two hours each day in the SDC during the year and was not fully included as she was in the first grade, even though the same IEP was in effect. This lead to much confusion for the parent who, in countless entries in the daily communication book, asked whether Ms. Nicholson or Ms. Reijnaert, or both, were STUDENT’s teacher(s) and what STUDENT’s daily schedule was. The parent did not provide written consent for the new program to be implemented until early March 1998.

Second, with regard to the FAA and BIP, the evidence disclosed that an FAA was conducted and a BIP developed by Kristi McLoughlin in late October 1997. The BIP was then immediately implemented, according to the testimony of Ms. Reijnaert and Ms. Nicholson. However, neither the FAA nor the BIP had been reviewed by the IEP team by that time and the parents had not given their written consent to its implementation. In fact, the FAA and BIP were not reviewed by the IEP team until early 1998,(Footnote 25) and written parental consent was not given until March 2, 1998. As mentioned earlier, an LEA may implement only those portions of an IEP for which it has received written parental consent. Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(a). The District’s actions in implementing a BIP without written parental consent violated this provision and infringed on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the development of the IEP.

Third, with regard to the Student’s contention that the District limited the IEP team’s ability to discuss educational issues, as mentioned previously, parents are required members of a student’s IEP team and have the right to participate in meetings related to recommendations and program planning, as well as to present information to the IEP team. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(f). Parents and school personnel are expected to be equal participants in developing, reviewing, and revising the student’s IEP. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 26 (1996). Here, the testimony and documentary evidence establish that this did not occur in this case. Topics for discussion at IEP meetings were improperly limited by the District. For instance, the District expressly foreclosed any discussions about methodology and staff competency. MOTHER’s unrebutted testimony established this, as well as the transcript of the IEP meeting held on May 19, 1998. During the May IEP meeting, in response to the parent’s questions about reinforcers used by staff, the parent was specifically told that issues regarding methodology and “what the staff did” would not be discussed because “[t]hat’s not the purpose of an IEP meeting.” As noted previously, while methodology questions ultimately lie within the province of state and local education agencies, the act of choosing the educational method most suitable to a student’s needs is to be done “in cooperation” with the student’s parents. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207. Consequently, the methodology used with a student is an appropriate topic for the IEP team to discuss. Further, parent concerns about whether the IEP is being properly implemented are also within the purview of IEP team. The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to allow the IEP team to discuss issues properly raised by MOTHER seriously infringed her opportunity to participate in the IEP process.(Footnote 26) W.G., 960 F.3d at 1484.

2. Substantive Appropriateness

With regard to substantive appropriateness, the Hearing Officer has already found that STUDENT exhibited “serious behavior problems” which significantly interfered with the implementation of her goals and objectives during the first-grade year. These behaviors continued into her second-grade year. According to the daily communication book, there were numerous incidents of aggression during the second-grade year. For example, on September 18, 1997, STUDENT tried to hit the classroom teacher and bite the special education teacher during a transition after recess. Six days later, on September 24, STUDENT hit an instructional assistant (IA) in her abdomen. In October, there were three separate incidents in which STUDENT struck out at, pinched and hit, and threw milk on IAs. However, because the District had failed to perform an FAA or develop a BIP earlier despite its knowledge of STUDENT’s history of assaultive behavior, there was no BIP in place during the beginning of the second-grade year to address STUDENT’s assaultive behavior. The FAA report and BIP developed by Ms. McLoughlin were not completed until October 30, 1997, and there was no IEP meeting scheduled to review the FAA and BIP until November 5, 1997.(Footnote 27) Therefore, even if the assessment and review process had gone forth as scheduled by the District, STUDENT still did not have a BIP available for her until November 1997.(Footnote 28) The District’s failure to have an appropriate BIP in place in a timely manner resulted in the implementation of a program not designed to address all of STUDENT’s unique educational needs. The District’s failure in this regard also resulted in the continuation of maladaptive behaviors which significantly interfered with STUDENT’s ability to benefit from her education and, therefore, without an appropriate BIP, the District’s program was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT educational benefit. Additionally, even if the BIP thereafter developed by the District was effective for reducing STUDENT’s aggressive behaviors, the evidence established that it was not adequate to address her significant attention and compliance issues. There is no question that STUDENT had significant difficulties complying with adult directives, attending to task, and transitioning between classes and the playground in accordance with her schedule. Ms. Reijnaert testified that STUDENT sometimes did not participate in activities with the other students, was not always compliant with the IA’s directions, and had difficulty staying on task. Ms. Nicholson testified that STUDENT was very “volitional” and complied with her directions only fifty to seventy percent of the time. All agreed that STUDENT’s off-task and noncompliant behavior interfered with her ability to benefit from her educational program. According to testimony and the daily communication book, the staff’s reaction to STUDENT’s noncompliant and off-task behavior was to repeat the direction or prompt and, if STUDENT still failed to comply or attend to the task, either ignore her, allow her to choose another activity (regardless of what the rest of the class was doing), or allow her to sit and do nothing as long as she was quiet and did not disrupt the class. STUDENT’s difficulties with compliance and attention to task were addressed in Ms. McLoughlin’s FAA and BIP. However, according to Dr. Glover, the BIP failed to appropriately address these problems.

Dr. Glover was the only witness who testified as to the appropriateness of the BIP developed by Ms. McLoughlin. Dr. Glover’s testimony established that she had the necessary qualifications and experience to offer an expert opinion as to the adequacy of the BIP. She has a bachelor’s and master’s degree in psychology and a doctorate in learning and behavior psychology. According to Dr. Glover, she has conducted hundreds of independent educational evaluations for parents and school districts. For the past four years, she has been a postdoctoral research fellow with the department of pediatrics at the University of California, Los Angeles School of Medicine, and a clinical associate with the Autism Partnership. In the past, she worked as a behavior therapist with the Behavior Therapy & Learning Center and as an associate director of research and staff development with the developmental disabilities division of Straight Talk, Inc., a residential program for developmentally disabled adults with severe behavior problems. Dr. Glover assessed STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties in late 1997. Her assessment included a review of assessment and other educational records, observations in the home and school settings, and interviews with the parents and school staff (including Ms. McLoughlin).

With regard to the BIP developed in October 1997, Dr. Glover testified that it was not sufficient to address STUDENT’s behavioral problems because it failed to address any of the underlying deficits which precipitated the maladaptive behaviors such as the lack of teacher direction to transition. She stated that it was inadequate because it failed to include any components aimed towards training staff on how to appropriately manage and change STUDENT’s maladaptive behaviors. For example, Dr. Glover testified that the BIP’s indication that, if STUDENT refused to comply with a directive, the IA was not to pressure or provoke her failed to provide STUDENT with any consequences for her refusal to comply and was not designed to increase STUDENT’s compliant behaviors. Dr. Glover testified that such a technique would only teach STUDENT that she does not have to comply with adult directives because there are no consequences for not complying. Dr. Glover stated that, during her day-long observation of STUDENT in her school setting in late 1997, she frequently saw the IA give STUDENT an instruction which STUDENT ignored and the IA then drop the instruction. She testified that there were very few attempts to engage STUDENT actively in desired tasks, such as by the use of situational prompting by which the student is prompted by being seated next to a peer or by placing a paper in front of her. The District did not provide any evidence to refute Dr. Glover’s testimony in this regard.(Footnote 29)

Additionally, the Hearing Officer notes that the District’s BIP contained several interventions which contravened the requirements set forth in State law. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3052. For example, the BIP included the following recommended intervention techniques:

3. If STUDENT does not comply with the direction, the teacher or instructional assistant may repeat the direction. If STUDENT does not comply after three repetitions, or 5 minutes, the teacher will continue the activity with the class. The instructional assistant will keep a neutral expression and monitor STUDENT, however she will ignore her attempts for attention.

4. The instructional assistant will check for compliance at three minute intervals by saying, ‘show me that you are ready.’ STUDENT may respond with a verbal indication of readiness or complete the requested action/task. If she is not ready, she will remain away from the group.

State law provides that, when one of the targeted behaviors occurs, one of the positive response options may be to ignore the behavior; however, in doing so, the student may not be ignored. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3052(e)(1). Instead, the student should be redirected to an activity, provided with feedback, and/or have his or her message acknowledged (e.g., “You are having a hard time with your work”). Id. The above-referenced techniques contained in the District’s BIP for responding to STUDENT’s noncompliant behavior ignore the behavior but, at the same time, also ignore STUDENT and isolate her from the rest of the class. The techniques also cause STUDENT’s noncompliant behaviors to result in wasted instructional and socialization opportunities. The evidence disclosed that this is exactly what happened in the classroom. The Hearing Officer finds that these techniques are expressly disallowed by State law and did not appropriately address STUDENT’s needs in the areas of compliance and attention. The Hearing Officer also finds that the District failed to address STUDENT’s behavioral issues in a timely and appropriate manner, and that this failure resulted in a program that was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.

Finally, as with the first-grade year, the evidence indicated that STUDENT continued to have toileting issues during her second-grade year. Ms. Nicholson’s testimony and the daily communication book show that STUDENT had numerous toileting accidents during the course of the year, as well as episodes that were referred to as “hygiene issues” (e.g., a failure to wipe and wash hands properly after a trip to the bathroom). Additionally, as mentioned before, Ms. Walker’s assessment in May 1997 found that STUDENT’s personal living skills, including her toileting skills, were equivalent to a three-year-old child’s even though she was eight years old at the time. Despite these indications of significant self-care issues, the IEP developed by the District at the beginning of STUDENT’s second-grade year failed to include any services, specialized instruction, or goals and objectives to address toileting issues. Not until late February 1998 did the District propose goals and objectives to address self-care issues.

However, by February 1998 STUDENT was almost nine years old and still having toileting accidents at school. School staff claimed that they encouraged STUDENT to tell them when she needed to go to the bathroom and would reward her when she did, but this technique had been used since kindergarten and its effectiveness was doubtful since STUDENT continued to have toileting accidents well into the second grade. Furthermore, there was no evidence that STUDENT’s rate of informing staff of her toileting needs had increased significantly since kindergarten. Ms. Reijnaert testified that STUDENT never had a toileting accident in her classroom, but this seems due to the fact that she had scheduled frequent trips to the bathroom for STUDENT, which many times were found to be unnecessary since STUDENT did not need to use the bathroom. This technique, while effective for preventing toileting “accidents,” did not teach STUDENT appropriate toileting behavior and was arguably wasteful of instructional and socialization opportunities. With so many years of ineffective teaching strategies, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should have included in the FAA and BIP an examination of STUDENT’s toileting behavior and interventions with which to address it, as the toileting issues were pervasive and maladaptive. This the District did not do. Not surprisingly then, according to Ms. Nicholson’s testimony, STUDENT failed to meet her self-care objective by the time she stopped attending Roosevelt during her second-grade year.(Footnote 30)

***

In light of the foregoing procedural and substantive violations committed by the District during STUDENT’s second-grade year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 1997-1998 school year.

D. First Half of the 1998-1999 School Year (Sept. 1998 to Jan. 1999) – Third Grade

With regard to the period of September 1998 to January 1999, the Student contended that the District denied her a FAPE by committing the following procedural violations: refusing the parent an opportunity to visit the proposed school site, failing to have an IEP in effect at the beginning of the year that reflected the agreed-upon placement, precluding the IEP team from discussing particular educational issues, and insisting that the parents communicate with District personnel through counsel. The Student argued that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE substantively by excluding the parent from the school site even though it was a parent-cooperative school, refusing to allow school staff to cooperate in an assessment conducted by STUDENT’s pediatrician, and failing to offer appropriate transportation.(Footnote 31) Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.

1. Compliance with Procedural Safeguards

First, the Student contended in her closing brief that the parent was not allowed an opportunity to visit the OAS school site prior to STUDENT’s placement there. However, there is no testimony in the record to support this contention or to indicate how the District interfered with the parent’s ability to visit the site. What is apparent in the record is that a restraining order had been issued to “protect” Ms. Rigby from MOTHER and that there was substantial confusion about what workplace site(s) the restraining order covered.(Footnote 32) The parents’ confusion regarding the parameters of the restraining orders was justified; apparently, an assistant district attorney informally advised the parties that he interpreted the restraining order issued to protect Ms. Rigby as applying to all District schools, including OAS. There is simply no evidence, however, that the District itself denied MOTHER an opportunity to visit the site. Instead, it was the parents’ and their counsel’s unclear understanding of the parameters of the restraining order that effectively prevented the parent from visiting the OAS site. Furthermore, there is no question that FATHER remained free to visit the OAS site and that the parents approved of the site based on the knowledge they had about OAS.

Second, the evidence did establish that the District failed to have an IEP in effect at the beginning of the year that reflected the placement agreed to and implemented by the parties. The school year started on September 8, 1998, and the District held the first IEP meeting of the year on September 25, 1998.(Footnote 33) Consequently, when the school year began, the most recent IEP was from the prior year. As noted previously, the IEPs from STUDENT’s second-grade year described her placement as the following: SDC daily with participation in the regular education program during forty-four percent of the school day. There was no dispute that OAS does not have an SDC, and that STUDENT was fully included in the regular education program at OAS pursuant to the parties’ 1998 settlement agreement. Thus, STUDENT did not begin her placement at OAS with an IEP that correctly reflected her placement. However, only a little over two weeks passed before the District developed an IEP which did correctly reflect STUDENT’s placement at OAS. Moreover, STUDENT’s placement at OAS was pursuant to a written settlement agreement which spelled out the aide services STUDENT would receive, as well as the related services of OT and APE. Additionally, the settlement agreement provided that the BIP and the staff’s need for behavior specialist consult services would be reviewed once STUDENT was placed in the new educational setting. The District drafted a proposed assessment plan on September 16, 1998, to conduct the behavior-related reviews. Despite the short delay in drafting a new IEP, there is no dispute that the parents, as well as the staff working with STUDENT, were fully aware that STUDENT was to be fully included with aide assistance and related services and that this was the placement implemented. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to have an IEP in effect at the beginning of the year which correctly reflected STUDENT’s placement was a de minimus violation which did not prejudice STUDENT’s right to a FAPE.

With regard to the IEPs dated September 1998 and earlier, the Student argued that they were incomplete because they failed to include the consultation and staff training services of Dr. Joanne Singer, who had started to work with STUDENT in March 1998 at Roosevelt. The Student argued that Dr. Singer’s services should have been included on STUDENT’s IEP and that, because they were not, the services failed to “follow” STUDENT to her OAS placement. The Hearing Officer does not find this argument persuasive. Initially, it is noted that Dr. Singer’s services were obtained in March 1998 following the recommendations of Dr. Glover, who had observed the Roosevelt staff working with STUDENT and found that the staff were not appropriately managing STUDENT’s behavior. Thus, Dr. Singer’s services were found necessary because of the staff at Roosevelt who were working with STUDENT. There was no evidence to show that staff training was required no matter where and with whom STUDENT was placed, or that staff at OAS were improperly managing STUDENT’s behavior and required such services.(Footnote 34) In fact, the Student did not dispute that the OAS staff was properly managing STUDENT’s behavior and the parents repeatedly testified that they were generally very happy with the OAS staff and their treatment of STUDENT. Moreover, even if behavior specialist services were required at OAS, the evidence indicates that Jeanne Surber, STUDENT’s behavioral intervention case manager, was monitoring STUDENT’s behavior at OAS since the beginning of the year. This is evidenced by a behavior intervention plan update Ms. Surber prepared for the September 25, 1998 IEP meeting. There has been neither evidence nor argument to suggest that Ms. Surber was not competent to address STUDENT’s behavior needs at OAS. Consequently, even if Dr. Singer’s services should have been on STUDENT’s previous IEPs, there was no showing that STUDENT was prejudiced during the first half of her third-grade year by the District’s failure to include Dr. Singer’s services on the IEPs.

Third, with regard to the Student’s contention that the District precluded the IEP team from discussing particular educational issues, the evidence disclosed a marked difference between the IEP meetings conducted during the first half of the third-grade year and the earlier IEP meetings. The Student’s assertion that the District improperly precluded the team from discussing issues, such as on-site parent involvement and transportation, was not supported by the evidence. The testimony and IEP-meeting transcripts submitted by the parties indicate that the District made concerted efforts during the IEP meetings held on September 25 and November 13, 1998, to allow the parent a full opportunity to express her concerns. Additionally, at those meetings, the parents and the attorneys were not the only persons participating in the discussions. The teachers and service providers all contributed valuable information to the discussions and were “equal participants,” along with the parent, as required by the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 26 (1996). Furthermore, the District willingly engaged in discussions regarding methodology with the parents during the meetings, including discussions regarding zoophonics instruction.

The District did foreclose the parent from raising at the IEP meetings the issue of parent participation in the OAS program. However, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s actions in this regard were proper. The District foreclosed the discussion of on-site parent participation on the ground that the restraining orders issued against MOTHER controlled the issue, not the IEP team, and that the restraining orders were out of the District’s control. The Hearing Officer declines the Student’s invitation to second-guess the District’s actions and motives in obtaining the restraining orders. Restraining orders, particularly as they relate to public employees, serve an important purpose and the protection and peace of mind that they can afford are not to be underestimated. In this case, there is no question but that the restraining orders issued against MOTHER were lawfully and properly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is not for this forum to question whether the court should have issued the restraining orders. The fact remains that they existed during STUDENT’s third-grade year and that the restraining orders, and not the IEP team, controlled whether MOTHER could participate in STUDENT’s educational program at OAS. Consequently, the District’s refusal to discuss on-site parent participation within the context of IEP meetings was proper and did not deny the parent an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the IEP formulation process.

Fourth, although the District later required the parents to communicate with it through counsel,(Footnote 35) there is no evidence that this was the case during the period put at issue in this proceeding. Additionally, there were several indications in the record that, during the period of September 1998 to January 1999, the parties at times communicated directly with each other. For instance, the Student submitted as evidence a transcription of a phone message left by Ms. McClish for MOTHER on September 18, 1998, in which Ms. McClish mentioned various transportation offers. Moreover, there was no indication that the parents were prohibited during this time from communicating directly with the school-site staff involved in implementing STUDENT’s educational program. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary, including the entries contained in the daily communication book maintained between school staff and the parent during the first half of STUDENT’s third-grade year.

2. Substantive Appropriateness

With regard to issues of substantive appropriateness, the Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the Student’s argument that STUDENT was denied a FAPE because MOTHER was not allowed to participate in the implementation of STUDENT’s educational program or to otherwise volunteer in the classroom, as other students’ parents were permitted to do. Contrary to the Student’s argument, the IDEA ensures the parent a right to participate in the formulation of the IEP, not to participate in the child’s daily educational program. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Additionally, there was neither evidence nor argument to suggest that MOTHER’s presence on campus was necessary for STUDENT’s IEP to be implemented, for STUDENT to meet any of her goals and objectives, or for STUDENT to receive educational benefit from her program. Contrary to the Student’s arguments, the fact that STUDENT was placed at a parent-cooperative school does not alter this analysis. There is no question that the placement called for in STUDENT’s IEP was implemented: she was fully included in a regular education class at OAS with support throughout the day by an instructional assistant. Nowhere in the IEP does it require placement at OAS to include time for the parent to volunteer in the classroom. Moreover, the requirements that LEAs provide a “full educational opportunity” and “equal opportunity for participation” apply to the rights of the students themselves to participate, not the parents. There is simply nothing in federal or State law that entitled MOTHER to on-site participation in her daughter’s educational program. Absent such authority, the Hearing Officer refuses to find that the District’s “prohibition” on MOTHER’s ability to volunteer in STUDENT’s classroom violated STUDENT’s right to a FAPE.

Additionally, with regard to the Student’s argument about cooperation with the pediatrician’s assessment, the Hearing Officer is not aware of any authority, and the Student failed to present any, which required the District to cooperate in the conduct of an outside medical assessment. The Student argued that an assessment by STUDENT’s pediatrician, Karen Davidson, M.D., was being sought to address educational issues, including whether there was a medical cause for STUDENT’s behavioral problems at school and whether medication might be useful in reducing STUDENT’s maladaptive behaviors. The Student’s argument appeared to suggest that Dr. Davidson would assess areas that the District should have assessed.

While an LEA is required to provide medical services for diagnostic and evaluation purposes, it is only required to do so when such services are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). “Medical services” is defined as services provided by a licensed physician to determine a student’s medically related disability that results in the student’s need for special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4) (1996) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(4) (1999)). The Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the District’s argument that this provision requires medical evaluations only when the student is initially being assessed to determine his or her eligibility for special education. However, the Hearing Officer is also not persuaded by the Student’s argument that the District had a duty under these circumstances to either conduct a medical evaluation itself or allow staff to cooperate in the medical evaluation being conducted by Dr. Davidson. The Student cited issues of behavior and attention which might be medical in origin or addressed by medication, the possibility of seizures indicated by occasional “staring spells,” and the mother’s concerns regarding falls from playground structures. As previously mentioned, the District assessed STUDENT’s behavioral and attention issues through the FAA conducted by Ms. McLoughlin and the later FAA updates by Ms. Surber. The possibility that STUDENT’s behavioral and attention difficulties might have medical origins or be positively influenced by medication is too speculative a basis upon which to place an obligation on the District to assess or, in this case, cooperate with an outside medical assessment. The same may be concluded with regard to the suspected seizures, which, in fact, were effectively ruled out later through a neurological assessment in January 2000, and also with regard to the falls from playground structures. Moreover, a medical evaluation addressing the issues cited by the Student would not serve to determine STUDENT’s medically related disability “that results in [her] need for special education and related services”; this has already been determined to be mental retardation.

With regard to the Student’s argument regarding transportation, the Hearing Officer notes that transportation is a related service which must be provided if necessary for a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). “Transportation” may include travel to and from school and specialized equipment (such as special or adapted buses, lifts, and ramps), if such equipment is required to provide special transportation for a child with a disability. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(14) (1996) (current version at § 300.24(b)(15)). The appropriate mode of transportation will depend on the student’s unique needs. See 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, Attachment 1, § 300.24.

Here, there is no dispute that STUDENT required transportation to OAS to benefit from her education. For the first half of the 1998-1999 school year, the District made various offers for transportation. At the IEP meeting held on September 25, 1998, and by letter dated September 30, 1998, the District offered the following three transportation options: (1) station-to-station service (i.e., transportation to and from designated pick-up and drop-off points) by a school bus, (2) door-to-door transportation by a car, and (3) mileage reimbursement. At the IEP meeting held on November 13, 1998, and by letter dated November 20, 1998, the District expanded its offers to include door-to-door service by a “special education mini bus,” station-to-station service by a private transport company vehicle, the provision of an aide to ride the bus or private vehicle with STUDENT, and allowing MOTHER to ride the bus or private vehicle with STUDENT. The Student contends that none of these offers was appropriate given STUDENT’s behavioral issues, including her difficulty complying with adult directives and propensity to strike out physically.

The first problem with the District’s offers for transportation is that none was made before the school year began on September 8, 1998. The first time the District offered transportation for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year was on September 25, 1998. Before that time, the obligation to transport STUDENT to school fell on the parents and, according to the parents’ testimony, FATHER transported STUDENT to school during the first two weeks of school (approximately September 8 to 18). There is no evidence that FATHER was reimbursed for his mileage in providing this transportation. Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds that, even after the District offered the parents transportation, the transportation offers were inadequate to meet STUDENT’s needs given the various safety and behavioral issues apparent in transporting STUDENT.

The parents’ unrebutted testimony established that, during the first half of STUDENT’s third-grade year, they lived on a mountaintop and that transporting STUDENT to OAS required traversing a winding mountain road without guardrails. The parents testified to the perilous road conditions that often exist on the road, especially in winter when rocks and boulders wash up on the road or fog reduces visibility, and to the fatal accidents which had occurred on the road. Additionally, there was no dispute that STUDENT continued to display noncompliant and aggressive behaviors towards adults associated with the school setting during the first half of the 1998-1999 school year. For example, Ms. Surber’s BIP update dated September 25, 1998, notes that at OAS STUDENT continued to have episodes of noncompliance and aggression, primarily towards adults and when asked to do something she did not want to do.(Footnote 36) There was also no dispute that STUDENT had a history of noncompliance and transition difficulties associated with leaving her mother’s car in the morning to go into the school. The evidence indicated that, during STUDENT’s second-grade year, STUDENT’s morning transition into the school, during which MOTHER was not allowed to get out of her car because of the restraining orders, would take from five to thirty minutes, and sometimes resulted in STUDENT is being physically forced to leave the car. Furthermore, according to Shoshona Stokes, the advocate and family friend who transported STUDENT to and from school from September 1998 to January 1999, STUDENT was often noncompliant while being transported to school. Ms. Stokes testified that, despite her usually warm relationship with STUDENT, STUDENT sometimes did not want to be transported to school by her and would physically resist by, among other things, kicking and hitting.

Given all these circumstances, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was required to take measures, but did not, to ensure that the transportation was reasonably safe given STUDENT’s propensity to be physically aggressive and noncompliant, especially when expected to go to school. As mentioned previously, the severity of STUDENT’s aggressive and noncompliant behaviors required the development of a BIP. While the District did develop a BIP for the third-grade year, the BIP did not address any issues related to transportation. Additionally, the District’s transportation offers did not include anything to make the proposed ride down a winding and perilous mountain road safe (e.g., measures to protect the driver from any attempts by STUDENT to be physically aggressive or otherwise distract the driver, thereby endangering both STUDENT and the driver).(Footnote 37) While the District’s option of having a bus or car meet MOTHER at the bottom of the mountain and then transport STUDENT to school might resolve the safety issues surrounding the mountain road, it put an obligation on the parents to provide part of the transportation and was therefore inappropriate.(Footnote 38) Additionally, the District’s offer to provide an IA during the transportation of STUDENT was not made until November 13, near the end of the first half of the school year, and did not include any indication of the training or experience the IA would possess to safely handle behavioral difficulties such as those STUDENT displayed. The Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive Ms. Rigby’s unsupported and conclusory statements that the District had transported students with comparable behavior issues up the same (or a similar) mountain in the past. Ms. Rigby did not substantiate her statement by offering any facts with regard to those students’ behavior issues or the specific transportation arrangements implemented. In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT appropriate transportation services to address her unique needs from September 1998 to January 1999.

***

Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District provided STUDENT with a FAPE from September 1998 to January 1999, except to the extent that it failed to offer her appropriate transportation services.

E. 1999 Extended School Year

The Student contended that, with respect to the 1999 extended school year (ESY), the District violated the IDEA by failing to offer her an appropriate ESY program. At an IEP meeting held on July 2, 1999, the District offered STUDENT the following for the 1999 ESY: an SDC placement at Adams Elementary School for four weeks (four hours per day) with one-to-one aide services, four thirty-minute speech-language sessions per week, one thirty-minute APE session per week, and two OT sessions per week totaling seventy-five minutes. The parent did not agree to this recommended placement. MOTHER indicated at the meeting that she disagreed with the proposed ESY services because STUDENT has had “extreme” problems transitioning to new environments and she did not believe that a short-term placement was “educationally advisable.”

Extended school year (ESY) programming is educational programming that extends instruction beyond the normal school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992). In California, a school district is required to provide a special education student with ESY programming when the student requires special education and related services in excess of the regular academic year or the IEP team has determined the need for ESY programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043; compare with 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(2). Section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations defines such students in the following manner:

Such individuals shall have handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of the pupil’s educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, rendering it impossible or unlikely that the pupil will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition.

There is no dispute that STUDENT’s needs entitled her to an ESY program during the summer of 1999. There is also no dispute that the District offered STUDENT placement at Adams for the 1999 ESY. However, nothing was introduced into evidence, either through documents or testimony, to establish that the District’s proposed placement at Adams was appropriate for STUDENT. As indicated previously, the school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K., 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the District made an offer of ESY programming but failed to produce any evidence at hearing to establish its appropriateness. For instance, no evidence was introduced to rebut any of the Student’s allegations regarding the inability of the Adams placement to address STUDENT’s behavioral issues. Additionally, there is no indication in the record of what qualifications and experience either the SDC teacher or the one-on-one aide possessed to address STUDENT’s behavioral issues. The District also failed to rebut MOTHER’s allegation that the Adams campus did not have a gate and was located on a busy thoroughfare, making it an unsafe environment for STUDENT given her propensity to elope. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to meet its burden of proving that it offered STUDENT an appropriate program for the 1999 ESY.

*****

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-1998 school years and the 1999 ESY. The Hearing Officer finds that the District provided STUDENT a FAPE from September 1998 to January 1999, except to the extent that it failed to offer her appropriate transportation services.

ISSUE NO. 2: Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation conducted by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D.?

A parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation (IEE) performed by a qualified specialist at public expense if (1) the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the educational agency and (2) the educational agency is unable to show at a due process hearing that its evaluation was appropriate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b). In this case, the parents obtained an IEE by Dr. Glover in late 1997 after they expressed disagreement with the assessment performed by Ms. Walker in spring 1997. The Student contended that the assessment performed by Ms. Walker failed to meet the requirements of law and was inappropriate because, among other things, it failed to contain an FAA and included a number of unsupported and erroneous assumptions about STUDENT’s social-emotional functioning. The evidence supports the Student’s contention in this regard.

The first criterion was clearly met in this case. There is no dispute that the parent indicated disagreement with Ms. Walker’s assessment at the time it was performed. In fact, the parent’s disagreement led to a subsequent agreement between the parties that the District would arrange for further testing in the areas of psychomotor and intellectual development and conduct an FAA. The Hearing Office is not persuaded by the District’s argument that this agreement for further testing somehow waived the parents’ right to seek an IEE at public expense, especially where, as here, it was not shown that the further testing was appropriate. (The appropriateness of the further testing the District conducted in the fall of 1997 will be discussed shortly.)

As discussed in Issue No. 1, the evidence disclosed that the District did have an obligation to conduct an FAA by the spring of 1997 given STUDENT’s maladaptive and assaultive behaviors. Despite this, Ms. Walker’s assessment failed to include an FAA. Additionally, Ms. Walker’s assessment, particularly in the area of social-emotional functioning, contained conclusions with no indication that they were supported by any empirical or test data. Specifically, Ms. Walker’s assessment report contained the following statements: “STUDENT’s behavior is reflective of conditions outside of school. If things are going well STUDENT’s behavior is very good. When there are upsets at home STUDENT’s behavior deteriorates.” According to the parents, however, Ms. Walker did not speak with either of the parents or administer any information-gathering measure in order to support her conclusion that any correlation existed between events at home and STUDENT’s behavior at school.

Finally, and most importantly, despite the clear mandate of federal and State law that a parent will be reimbursed for an IEE unless the school district can show at a due process hearing that its assessment was appropriate, the District failed to produce any evidence to establish the appropriateness of either Ms. Walker’s assessment in spring 1997 or the subsequent FAA conducted by Ms. McLoughlin in October 1997. Neither Ms. Walker nor Ms. McLoughlin testified at the hearing about their assessments, and the District did not offer testimony from any other witness with the necessary qualifications and experience to substantiate its assertion that Ms. Walker’s and Ms. McLoughlin’s assessments were appropriate. Only the written assessment reports were admitted into evidence. Regardless of whether or not the reports would be admissible in civil actions, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3082(b),(Footnote 39) the reports standing alone do not provide persuasive evidence that the District’s assessments were appropriate. Many questions go unanswered when the assessor, or someone else with the proper qualifications, is not presented to establish the appropriateness of the assessments. Assessment reports fail to provide sufficient information to establish an assessment’s appropriateness in accordance with Education Code section 56320. For instance, in this case, the assessment reports do not indicate what education and experience Ms. Walker had in performing psychoeducational assessments by the spring of 1997, what education and experience Ms. McLoughlin had in performing FAAs by October 1997, how either assessment was performed, the testing conditions under which the assessment results were obtained, and whether either assessment met the other requirements contained in section 56320. Given this dearth of evidence, no other conclusion is possible except that the District failed to establish the appropriateness of its assessment at hearing.

In contrast, evidence was presented to establish that Dr. Glover was sufficiently qualified and experienced and that she conducted an educational evaluation for STUDENT in late 1997. As discussed in detail in Issue No. 1, Dr. Glover has a number of degrees in psychology and extensive experience in conducting educational evaluations and otherwise working with disabled children with behavioral difficulties. Additionally, Dr. Glover’s assessment of STUDENT was clearly educational in nature as her focus was the behavioral difficulties STUDENT was experiencing in the school setting. Her assessment included a review of assessment and other educational records, observations in the school setting and home, and interviews with school staff (including Ms. McLoughlin) and the parents.

In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to show that it conducted an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in 1997. Consequently, the PARENTS are entitled to reimbursement from the District for expenses related to Dr. Glover’s behavioral assessment. The Student introduced into evidence billing statements from Dr. Glover which listed the following expenses, totaling $4,510.50:

Date Description Amount 11/16/97, 11/17/97 Observation with related travel $1300.00 1/9/98, 1/11/98 Consultation, IEP with related travel 965.00 1/11/98 Report writing 1200.00 2/22/98 Consultation 200.00 2/23/98 IEP with related travel 845.50

The Hearing Officer finds that expenses related to Dr. Glover’s observations on November 16 and 17 ($1,300.00) are recoverable because they were shown to be necessary for the conduct of the assessment. Similarly, because it is necessary for the assessor to prepare an assessment report for the IEP team’s review (see Cal. Educ. Code § 56327), the expense incurred on January 11 to write the report ($1,200.00) is also recoverable. Additionally, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the expenses incurred in having Dr. Glover attend the IEP meetings held in January and February 1998 ($1,810.50). According to Dr. Doyle’s testimony, her assessment report and recommendations were reviewed at both IEP meetings. Since there was no showing that the District’s behavioral assessments were appropriate, it was proper under the circumstances to have Dr. Glover attend the IEP meetings to present her findings and recommendations to the IEP team. When an IEP team convenes to review an assessment for purposes of developing, reviewing, or revising an IEP, the LEA must ensure that a person is present at the meeting who has conducted an assessment of the student or who is knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used to assess the student and is familiar with the results of the assessment. Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(d). There was neither evidence nor argument to establish that any other members of the IEP team present at the January and February 1998 IEP meetings were both knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used and familiar with the results of the assessment. Therefore, the expenses related to having Dr. Glover attend the IEP meetings to review her assessment with the IEP team were both reasonable and necessary and should be reimbursed.

However, the Student provided no authority, and the Hearing Officer is not aware of any, which entitles parents to reimbursement for expenses related to an independent assessor’s consultation with, presumably, the parents and/or attorney after the assessment’s completion and when unrelated to an IEP meeting. Therefore, reimbursement for the consultation expenses incurred on February 22, 1998 ($200) is denied.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer awards the Student reimbursement for expenses related to Dr. Glover’s behavioral assessment and her attendance at the IEP team meetings in the amount of $4,310.50.

ISSUE NO. 3: Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred from September 1998 to January 1999 to transport STUDENT to and from school?

Parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they procured for their child if the school district failed to provide appropriate services, and the services provided by the parents were appropriate under the IDEA. See School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985). During the discussion of Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer concluded that the District failed to offer STUDENT transportation services that would meet her needs during the period September 1998 to January 1999. Thus, the parents may be entitled to reimbursement if the transportation services they procured were appropriate under the IDEA.

The Student contended that the parents should be reimbursed for the “extraordinary” expenses they incurred to pay Shoshona Stokes, an advocate and family friend, to transport STUDENT to and from school during this period. According to the parents’ testimony, the father transported STUDENT to school during the first two weeks of school, i.e., approximately September 8 to 18. FATHER was thereafter unable to transport STUDENT due to work obligations, but the family was afraid to have MOTHER transport STUDENT because of the restraining order and the possibility of arrest, given the district attorney’s interpretation that the restraining order encompassed the OAS campus. Beginning approximately September 21, the parents arranged to have Ms. Stokes provide transportation services.

The arrangement was that MOTHER would drive STUDENT from their home to a restaurant near the OAS campus for breakfast, Ms. Stokes would meet them at the restaurant while STUDENT was eating, and then Ms. Stokes would take STUDENT on the remaining five- to six-minute drive to OAS, where a staff member would meet the car and escort STUDENT into class. The arrangement also provided that Ms. Stokes would be available for any necessary transportation throughout the school day, such as picking up STUDENT for doctor’s appointments or when the school called for her to be picked up due to illness or an accident, and for bringing STUDENT’s work and other necessary papers to and from OAS. Ms. Stokes was paid seventy-five dollars per day for providing services pursuant to this arrangement. According to an invoice submitted by Ms. Stokes, this arrangement lasted until January 25, 1999.

The Student argued that the unusually high payments made to Ms. Stokes were necessary to ensure her availability for the entire school day. The Student contended that Ms. Stokes’ availability for the entire school day was required because she brought STUDENT’s work and other papers (including questionnaire forms from Dr. Davidson) to and from school, when necessary. The Student also contended that there were instances in which the school called the parents to pick STUDENT up from school due to emergencies. MOTHER cited three instances during this period when the school called her to have someone pick STUDENT up because she had become ill or fallen from a playground structure. MOTHER also cited one instance in which Ms. Stokes was not available during an emergency, and she “snuck” onto the campus herself and picked STUDENT up. This did not result in an arrest. The Student also argued that the high payments were necessary because of Ms. Stokes’ qualifications and relationship with STUDENT. Ms. Stokes testified that she has a master’s degree in counseling and psychology, experience working with children with mental retardation, and training in behavior intervention techniques, all of which helped her deal with STUDENT’s behavioral issues. Ms. Stokes also testified that she had a warm personal relationship with STUDENT as a family friend, which helped her to get STUDENT to comply.

Additionally, according to Ms. Stokes’ testimony, transporting STUDENT to school was no simple matter. Ms. Stokes testified that STUDENT was often compliant about leaving the car to go into class but was sometimes oppositional and stubbornly refused. Ms. Stokes testified that, when STUDENT was oppositional, a significant amount of time was required to convince STUDENT to leave the car and that it once required an hour and fifteen minutes to coax STUDENT to get out of the car and go into class. She also testified that STUDENT was, at times, physically assaultive with her or school staff (e.g., through kicks and hits) when forced to separate from her mother or leave the car and go into the school. Ms. Stokes stated that she sometimes used behavioral intervention techniques with STUDENT. According to Ms. Stokes, among the intervention techniques she found successful with STUDENT were scripting to inform STUDENT about what was to occur, physical and verbal prompts, and rewards with motivators.

The Hearing Officer finds that the transportation services provided by Ms. Stokes to and from school were necessary because the District failed to offer appropriate transportation services for STUDENT. The Hearing Officer also finds that Ms. Stokes was able to provide the transportation services that the District should have provided for STUDENT. Through her training and experience with children with mental retardation and behavior problems, Ms. Stokes was able to address STUDENT’s unique behavioral needs, as discussed above.

However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that it was necessary to pay Ms. Stokes to be on call during the entire school day. While Ms. Stokes did assist in transporting STUDENT’s work, as well as other papers, to and from school, this task could have been achieved during those times she dropped off STUDENT or picked her up from school. She was met by school staff in the morning during drop-off and in the afternoon during pick-up, and no persuasive reasons were offered to establish why the foregoing items could not have been exchanged between Ms. Stokes and school staff during those times. Furthermore, the need to have STUDENT picked up from school for doctors’ appointments did not justify paying Ms. Stokes to be available all day, every day, regardless of whether or not there was a scheduled doctor’s appointment that day. Pick up services for doctors’ appointments could have been specifically arranged for those days when STUDENT actually had one scheduled. Finally, MOTHER testified that on only three occasions during the period of September 1998 to January 1999 did the school ask that STUDENT be picked up early because of illness or other reasons. The necessity of having STUDENT picked up during such instances was too negligible to justify paying Ms. Stokes to be available throughout the course of every school day. Moreover, the evidence disclosed that MOTHER herself was able to come onto campus when summoned by school staff for reasons of illness or injury.

Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the transportation services provided by Ms. Stokes during the period of September 21, 1998, to January 25, 1999. However, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the full amount paid to Ms. Stokes because a portion of the fees charged was to ensure that Ms. Stokes was available throughout the course of every school day. Given Ms. Stokes’ qualifications to address STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties and the time expended in transporting STUDENT in light of her compliance issues, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for a third of the expenses they incurred to have Ms. Stokes transport STUDENT to and from school, or twenty-five dollars per day. Reimbursement of one-third of the transportation expenses represents a rough approximation of that amount of the fees charged to transport STUDENT to and from school in the mornings and afternoons, during which time Ms. Stokes provided her expertise in dealing with STUDENT’s behavior issues. The District shall reimburse the parents for transportation expenses at the rate of twenty-five dollars per day for every school day between September 21, 1998, and January 25, 1999, during which Ms. Stokes provided STUDENT transportation to and from school.

ISSUE NO. 4: Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education due to the denial of a free appropriate public education from the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year to January 1999?

When a school district denies a special education student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 374, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief which may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). Compensatory education does not, however, necessarily involve an obligation to provide day-for-day or session-for-session replacement for opportunity or time missed. Id. at 1497. The purpose of compensatory education is to “ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of IDEA.” Id.

In Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer concluded that the District committed a number of procedural and substantive errors which resulted in the denial of a FAPE during the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-1998 school years and the 1999 extended school year. STUDENT is clearly entitled to compensatory education because of these denials of FAPE. The only remaining question, then, is the appropriate type and amount of compensatory education.

The parties provided little information upon which to base a detailed award of compensatory education. The Student requested compensatory education, and specifically requested that STUDENT be provided with the Fast ForWord training program, but offered little else with regard to the services and/or instruction needed to make up for lost educational opportunity. Instead, apart from the request for Fast ForWord, the Student requested that the Hearing Officer award compensatory education and allow the IEP team to determine the type of compensatory education that the District should provide. In light of the paucity of the record in this regard, the Hearing Officer can make some determinations regarding the proper type and amount of compensatory education necessary based on the information presented but the details will necessarily have to be worked out by the IEP team.

First, because no other compensatory education was suggested by any of the parties, it is appropriate to evaluate whether STUDENT should be provided with the sole specific compensatory education remedy requested by the parents. Literature from the Scientific Learning Corporation, the developers of the Fast ForWord training program, describe it as a program developed for children with language and reading problems, particularly those who have difficulty processing what they hear. The literature also provides the following information about the Fast ForWord program:

Fast ForWord is a patented Internet and CD-ROM-based training program for individuals with language and reading problems. An intensive series of adaptive, interactive exercises using acoustically processed speech and speech sounds, Fast ForWord stimulates rapid language skill development as children learn to distinguish the various components of language sounds. Improvements include gains in language and reading skills, such as auditory processing speed, working memory, phonological awareness, listening and reading comprehension, syntax and grammar.

The only witnesses who offered some informed testimony on the appropriateness of the Fast ForWord program for STUDENT were Doris Karras, a self-employed Fast ForWord instructor, and Robert Zitzer, the District speech and language specialist serving STUDENT at OAS. Based on the testimony of Ms. Karras and Mr. Zitzer and the literature submitted, the Hearing Officer finds that it is uncertain whether STUDENT could benefit from the Fast ForWord program. Both Ms. Karras and Mr. Zitzer testified that the developers of the program stated that the program was designed for children with normal intelligence. Ms. Karras, who went through the training required to administer the program, testified that she was told by the trainers that the program had poor outcomes for children with mental retardation (those with intelligence quotients of fifty or lower). Although Ms. Karras and Mr. Zitzer indicated that the program is starting to be used with children suffering from pervasive developmental disorder and autism, both of which are frequently associated with intelligence quotient scores in the mentally retarded range, the effectiveness of the Fast ForWord program for children with such cognitive deficiencies is unclear. Ms. Karras testified that she had success with one mentally retarded child with the program, but that the only other mentally retarded child she trained with the program was not able to benefit.

There is also some concern about STUDENT’s ability to attend sufficiently to be able to benefit from the program. The Fast ForWord program is a four- to eight-week program which must be administered one hundred minutes per day, five days per week. It is an intense program that requires a certain level of attentiveness from the child. While the evidence established that STUDENT enjoys working with the computer and is often readily engaged in computer games, there is little evidence to support the proposition that she would remain engaged in a particular computer program over such an extended period of time, especially in light of the intensity of the program. Moreover, her computer use is not often monitored and no real requirements are made that she continue with certain programs. Instead, STUDENT is often left to choose what she wants to do on the computer. Such free choice would not be available during the administration of the Fast ForWord program. Additionally, while Ms. Karras’s pretesting of STUDENT on the Fast ForWord program showed that she could attend for the first two hours of the program, this is no guarantee that STUDENT would not quickly lose interest when asked to work on the program over a greater number of sessions. This was true with Mr. Zitzer’s administration of the Earobics program. According to Mr. Zitzer, STUDENT readily engaged in the Earobics program during the first few sessions but then began to refuse to participate further, even when incentives were offered.

Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that it is too uncertain that STUDENT could benefit from the Fast ForWord program and declines to order the District to provide it as a compensatory education remedy.(Footnote 40) Instead, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP team, as the group of individuals most familiar with STUDENT’s present functioning and needs, is in the best position to determine what compensatory education remedies should be provided to STUDENT to make up for the lost educational opportunities in her kindergarten, first-grade, and second-grade years. The team shall determine the nature, frequency, and duration of the specific compensatory education remedies to be provided in conformance with the following guidelines.

Because the District failed to conduct an FAA and develop a BIP to address STUDENT’s serious maladaptive behaviors during the first and second grades and, instead, allowed the maladaptive behaviors to interfere with STUDENT’s ability to benefit from her education, it shall provide as compensatory education a total of eighty hours of one-on-one instruction by a credentialed special education teacher to address STUDENT’s academic deficits.(Footnote 41) In addition to the eighty hours, ten hours of one-on-one instruction shall be added in order to redress the District’s unilateral exclusion of STUDENT from the extended days provided to all other kindergarten students during the second half of STUDENT’s kindergarten year. This amount of one-on-one instruction should be sufficient to make up for the educational opportunity that was lost during the last few years while STUDENT was denied educational opportunity by the District. The specific academic deficits to be addressed by the one-on-one instruction shall be determined by the IEP team, as shall the frequency and duration of the instruction. All ninety hours must be completed no later than July 1, 2002, unless the parents agree otherwise in writing, and shall be implemented in such a manner that they have minimal impact on STUDENT’s school day and ability to participate in the regular education program. For instance, the IEP team may consider providing the one-on-one instruction after the conclusion of the regular school day or in small instructional units lasting less than thirty or forty minutes.

The Hearing Officer also finds that an award of compensatory education in the form of OT is necessary to help STUDENT overcome lost educational opportunity. In Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer found that the District improperly failed to assess and/or address STUDENT’s fine-motor deficits during kindergarten and first grade. Although the record is otherwise limited with regard to this issue, looking at the record as a whole, the Hearing Officer finds that an award of thirty twenty-minute OT sessions is reasonably calculated to provide sufficient services to enable STUDENT to progress to the level of motor development she would have attained had the appropriate services been provided in a timely manner. Absent written agreement by the parents otherwise, the District shall provide STUDENT one twenty-minute OT session per week (for a total of thirty sessions) to work on the OT goals and objectives set forth in her IEP, as well as any other goals and objectives which the IEP team agrees to implement. These sessions shall be provided in a manner that does not cause STUDENT to lose any time from school, unless the parents agree otherwise in writing, and shall be completed no later than July 1, 2002. The District shall also offer to provide, at no cost to the parents, any necessary transportation to and from the sessions, if the sessions are provided at a site other than OAS. Finally, the Hearing Officer notes that, to truly constitute compensatory education, the District must provide STUDENT with the aforementioned compensatory education services in addition to any academic instruction or OT services that the IEP team finds necessary to address her unique needs and provide her a FAPE during the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 school years.

ISSUE NO. 5: Is STUDENT a student residing within the jurisdictional boundaries of the College Elementary School District? If not, which local educational agency bears future responsibility for providing her a free appropriate public education?

Issue No. 5 was raised by the parties as an issue for hearing during the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. During the preceding discussion regarding Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer found that the District would be the LEA liable for any denials of FAPE during the 1998-1999 school year, regardless of the question of residency, because the District acted as STUDENT’s district of residence and caused the parents to rely on its actions in this regard. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the District assumed responsibility for the 1999-2000 school year when the parents applied for and the districts approved an interdistrict transfer permit on August 24, 1999. The permit provided that STUDENT could attend a District school during the 1999-2000 school year. The parties agreed that, regardless of the residency dispute, the approval of the interdistrict transfer conferred on the District the responsibility for providing STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1999-2000 school year. Consequently, given the finding regarding the 1998-1999 school year and the approval of the interdistrict transfer permit for the 1999-2000 year, the issue of which LEA was STUDENT’s district of residence during those years need not be adjudicated in this proceeding.(Footnote 42)

Because the issues of residency and future responsibility were filed by the parties during the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years, the Hearing Officer declines to make any determinations of LEA responsibility for any subsequent years. Subsequent years were not specifically put in issue by the parties. Additionally, the factors necessary to determine responsibility for the indefinite future are too speculative to form the basis of a ruling.

ISSUE NO. 6: Does the Special Education Hearing Office have jurisdiction to interpret the restraining order issued against MOTHER?

This issue was presented for hearing by the District. The District indicated that it believed the Student was requesting relief which would require the Hearing Officer to interpret and/or modify the restraining orders which had been issued against MOTHER. The District argued that, insofar as the restraining orders related to issues of FAPE, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to modify or interpret the restraining orders, which had been lawfully issued by a state superior court.

The Hearing Office does not have the authority to alter, modify, or otherwise change the restraining orders lawfully issued against MOTHER. However, there was no indication during the course of the hearing that there was a genuine dispute between the parties with regard to the Hearing Officer’s authority in this regard. Therefore, the Hearing Officer declines to make any findings with regard to this issue.

ISSUE NO. 7: Is it necessary to exclude Diana Rigby from STUDENT’s individualized education program team in order for STUDENT to receive a free appropriate public education?

The Student argued that, given the hostile relationship between the parents and Diana Rigby, it is necessary to exclude Ms. Rigby from participating as a member of STUDENT’s IEP team in order for her to receive a FAPE. The Student also argued that Ms. Rigby’s exclusion from the IEP team is necessary because she failed to ensure that the requirements of the IDEA were met, obstructed the IEP team members from acting as equal participants in the IEP process, infringes on the parents’ right to equal participation in the IEP process because the restraining order prohibits the mother from communicating with her, and has a conflict of interest due to the civil litigation filed against her by the parents.(Footnote 43) On the other hand, the District contended that the Hearing Officer is without power to exclude Ms. Rigby from the IEP team because the District has discretion to decide which administrators will be part of a student’s IEP team and her presence on the team did not deny STUDENT a FAPE. The District also argued that Ms. Rigby is a necessary part of the IEP team as she is the only staff member with the authority to commit District resources.

Included in a disabled student’s right to a FAPE is an entitlement to certain procedural protections during the process of developing the student’s IEP. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1483. Among the most basic of these procedural protections is the right to have specified people present at IEP meetings convened to discuss IEP development and placement issues. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b). Parents are among the specified people who must be included in these meetings. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b)(3). Also included, however, is a representative, other than the student’s teacher, who has been designated by the administration and is knowledgeable about the general curriculum and the LEA’s available resources and qualified to provide or supervise the provision of special education to students with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b)(1). The LEA is entitled to determine which specific staff member will serve as its representative in a particular IEP meeting, as long as the individual meets the requirements of law. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, Appendix A, Q. 5.

The Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the District’s argument that a school district’s exercise of its discretion to decide which specific staff member will serve as its representative at a child’s IEP meeting is never reviewable. A school district may not exercise its discretion in a manner that would, for example, seriously infringe on a parent’s right to participate in the IEP process. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484. Where a school district’s choice of a specific staff member does result in a serious infringement of a parent’s right to participate, whether or not through the fault of the staff member, hearing officers should and have reviewed the school district’s selection in light of a parent’s right to participate. STUDENT v. Calaveras Unified Sch. Dist., 29 IDELR 1099 (Ca. SEHO 1998); In the Matter of a Child with Disabilities, 19 IDELR 86 (NH 1992); compare with Board of Educ. of Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 938 F.2d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding it permissible to consider parental hostility to IEP as part of prospective evaluation of placement’s expected educational benefits). However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the present record that the District’s choice to have Ms. Rigby as a part of STUDENT’s IEP team seriously infringes on the parent’s right to participate.

Initially, it is acknowledged that some ill feelings exist between MOTHER and Ms. Rigby. Steps were taken during the summer of 1997 to secure a restraining order to “protect” Ms. Rigby from MOTHER based on what was perceived to be threatening behavior from MOTHER. The parents also filed a civil lawsuit specifically naming Ms. Rigby, among others, in or about early 1999 for alleged violations of civil rights and other laws. Additionally, it was clear from the evidence that MOTHER and Ms. Rigby have some opposing views on how STUDENT should be educated, including the methodologies which should be used and the importance of having MOTHER participate in classroom activities. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded, however, that these considerations necessitate the removal of Ms. Rigby from the IEP team.

Despite the extraneous events between MOTHER and Ms. Rigby, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Ms. Rigby has conducted herself in anything other than an appropriate, professional manner in STUDENT’s case. Although MOTHER’s and Ms. Rigby’s sometimes conflicting educational beliefs have led to some disagreements at IEP meetings, lack of full agreement at IEP meetings does not amount to a denial of FAPE on procedural grounds. And, in fact, the IEP team has often been able to come to agreement on the major aspects of STUDENT’s program, including placement and services, with Ms. Rigby on the IEP team. More importantly, the transcripts of STUDENT’s more recent IEP meetings, which were introduced into the record by the Student and the SB Respondents, show that MOTHER has been given full and fair opportunities to discuss educational concerns and participate as an “equal” member of STUDENT’s IEP team.

While the Hearing Officer did find in Issue No. 1 that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during her kindergarten, first-grade, and second-grade years, there is nothing to suggest that these denials were somehow the result of Ms. Rigby’s presence on STUDENT’s IEP team or that she has ever intended, by word or deed, to deny STUDENT a FAPE or intends to do so in the future.(Footnote 44) While there are concerns that Ms. Rigby might have prevented staff members, either by specific direction or unconscious signals, not to participate in IEP team discussions about certain issues in the past, it is hoped that the findings in this decision will persuade her to allow staff members the unfettered ability to act as they were intended at STUDENT’s IEP meetings, i.e., to act as full and equal members of STUDENT’s IEP team in the discussion of STUDENT’s program and educational needs. Furthermore, it is noted that the restraining orders issued in September 1997 were set to expire in September 2000. There was no indication at hearing that the District intended to seek an extension of the restraining order protecting Ms. Rigby, and thus no indication that MOTHER’s ability to communicate directly with Ms. Rigby would be impeded in the future.

Finally, the Student has merely alleged, without support, her contention that the pending civil litigation renders Ms. Rigby unsuitable for STUDENT’s IEP team. There is no credible evidence to suggest that the decisions that Ms. Rigby has made in her role as the District representative on STUDENT’s IEP team have been adversely influenced by the pending civil litigation. If staff members were excluded from IEP teams simply because parents named them in civil litigation, without any evidence that the pending civil litigation was adversely affecting the members’ ability to act in STUDENT’s best interests and in compliance with the law, parents could very easily control the composition of a child’s IEP team by this procedural maneuver. The IDEA obviously did not intend to grant parents this unbounded ability to control the specific staff members included on a child’s IEP team. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, Appendix A, Q. 5. Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District is not required to appoint someone other than Ms. Rigby to act as the District representative at STUDENT’s IEP meetings.(Footnote 45)

ISSUE NO. 8: Must school staff cooperate in providing the information requested by Karen Davidson, M.D., a developmental and behavioral pediatrician, for the completion of a medical evaluation of STUDENT?

As stated in the discussion of Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer is not aware of any authority, and the Student failed to present any, which requires the District to cooperate in the conduct of an outside medical assessment. While Dr. Davidson’s assessment may have implications for the educational setting, no evidence was presented to establish that the District was or is obligated to conduct the medical assessment proposed by Dr. Davidson. In the absence of an obligation to assess medically, there remains no authority upon which to issue an order that the District allow school-site staff to provide information for Dr. Davidson’s assessment. Therefore, the Student’s request that the Hearing Officer order the District to allow school staff to cooperate in providing information requested by Dr. Davidson is denied.

With this said, in the best interests of STUDENT, the Hearing Officer strongly encourages the District to cooperate with Dr. Davidson in her assessment. From Dr. Davidson’s testimony, it appears that the assessment may have positive implications for STUDENT in the school setting and may serve to address some real health concerns.

ISSUE NO. 9: Are STUDENT and her parents entitled to compensatory damages for, among other things, lost wages; lost economic opportunities; emotional distress; past and future miscellaneous expenses; worsened lifetime prognosis for STUDENT’s academic, personal, and occupational success; miscellaneous out-of-pocket and opportunity costs related to the denial of a free appropriate public education during her kindergarten through third-grade years; and to punitive damages based on reckless or deliberate violations of STUDENT’s right to a free appropriate public education?

This issue was dismissed by the Hearing Officer on the first day of hearing. As noted at that time, compensatory money damages are tortious in nature and outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. The Student did not present the Hearing Officer with any authority to the contrary. Consequently, this issue was dismissed and will not be adjudicated in this forum.

ORDER

1. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this decision, the Santa Barbara Elementary School District shall reimburse the parents for expenses related to the behavioral assessment conducted by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D., and her attendance at the IEP team meetings in the amount of $4,310.50.

2. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of proof from the parents, the Santa Barbara Elementary School District shall reimburse the parents for transportation expenses at the rate of twenty-five dollars per day for every school day between September 21, 1998, and January 25, 1999, during which Shoshona Stokes provided STUDENT transportation to and from school.

3. Within thirty calendar days of the date of this decision, unless the parents agree in writing to an extension, the Santa Barbara Elementary School District shall convene an individualized education program (IEP) team meeting to discuss and offer STUDENT compensatory education services in compliance with the following:

a. The District shall offer to provide a total of ninety hours of one-on-one instruction by a credentialed special education teacher to address STUDENT’s academic deficits. The specific academic deficits to be addressed by the one-on-one instruction shall be determined by the IEP team, as shall the frequency and duration of the instruction. All ninety hours shall be completed no later than July 1, 2002, unless the parents agree otherwise in writing, and shall be implemented in such a manner that they have minimal impact on STUDENT’s school day and ability to participate in the regular education program. For instance, the IEP team may consider providing the one-on-one instruction after the conclusion of the regular school day or in small instructional units lasting less than thirty or forty minutes.

b. The District shall also offer to provide STUDENT one twenty-minute OT session per week for thirty weeks, unless the parents agree otherwise in writing, to work on the OT goals and objectives set forth in her IEP, as well as any other goals and objectives which the IEP team agrees to implement. These sessions shall be provided in a manner that does not cause STUDENT to lose any time from school and shall be completed no later than July 1, 2002, unless the parents agree otherwise. The District shall also offer to provide, at no cost to the parents, any necessary transportation to and from the sessions, if the sessions are provided at a site other than OAS.

c. The District shall provide STUDENT with the compensatory education services designated in paragraphs (a) and (b) above in addition to any academic instruction or OT services that the IEP team finds necessary to address her unique needs and provide her a FAPE during the 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 school years.

4. The Student’s remaining claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:

1. Was STUDENT offered and/or provided a free appropriate public education during the following time periods: (a) the 1995-1996 school year, (b) the 1996-1997 school year, (c) the 1997-1998 school year, (d) the first half of the 1998-1999 school year (to January 1999), and (e) the 1999 extended school year? ** The Student prevailed on this issue with respect to the 1995-1996, 1996-1997, and 1997-1998 school years and the 1999 extended school year. The Santa Barbara Elementary School District prevailed on this issue with respect to the first half of the 1998-1999 school year, except with regard to the issue of transportation, on which the Student prevailed.

2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation conducted by Dorothy Glover, Ph.D.? ** The Student substantially prevailed on this issue.

3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred from September 1998 to January 1999 to transport STUDENT to and from school? ** The Student prevailed on this issue to the extent that reimbursement for one-third of the expenses incurred for transportation was awarded.

4. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education due to the denial of a free appropriate public education from the beginning of the 1995-1996 school year to January 1999? ** The Student substantially prevailed on this issue.

5. Is STUDENT a student residing within the jurisdictional boundaries of the College Elementary School District? If not, what local educational agency bears future responsibility for providing her a free appropriate public education? ** The Student prevailed on this issue to the extent it was adjudicated, which was up to the 1999-2000 school year.

6. Does the Special Education Hearing Office have jurisdiction to interpret the restraining order issued against MOTHER? ** None of the parties prevailed on this issue.

7. Is it necessary to exclude Diana Rigby from STUDENT’s individualized education program team in order for STUDENT to receive a free appropriate public education? ** The Santa Barbara Elementary School District prevailed on this issue.

8. Must school staff cooperate in providing the information requested by Karen Davidson, M.D., a developmental and behavioral pediatrician, for the completion of a medical evaluation of STUDENT? ** The Santa Barbara Elementary School District prevailed on this issue.

9. Are STUDENT and her parents entitled to compensatory damages for, among other things, lost wages; lost economic opportunities; emotional distress; past and future miscellaneous expenses; worsened lifetime prognosis for STUDENT’s academic, personal, and occupational success; miscellaneous out-of-pocket and opportunity costs related to the denial of a free appropriate public education during her kindergarten through third-grade years; and to punitive damages based on reckless or deliberate violations of STUDENT’s right to a free appropriate public education? ** Respondents in SN 1370-98 prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Date: November 30, 2000 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: Ms. Watt represented the SB Respondents. Consequently, Ms. Watt’s arguments and presentation of evidence will be treated as submitted on behalf of both the District and SELPA. However, the Hearing Officer notes that the educational program and services at issue were provided to STUDENT by the District and that the District was the party acting as her district of residence. No evidence was presented to establish that the SELPA had contracted for or assumed any educational responsibility for STUDENT during the years at issue, such as through an interagency SELPA agreement or by acting as her district of residence.

Footnote 2: The issues listed here differ slightly in numbering and wording from those noticed by the parties before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis.

Footnote 3: In their closing brief, the SB Respondents stated that on the third day of hearing the Student identified the question of whether STUDENT was provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1999-2000 school year as an additional issue for hearing. FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year was not, however, an issue for hearing. A review of the Student’s issue statements and the audiotapes from the hearing confirm this. The Student’s final issue statement, which was dated August 13, 1999, does not identify FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year as an issue. (Incidentally, the Student’s written closing brief also does not identify FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year as an issue.) The audiotape from the third day of hearing, August 24, 1999, reveals that, during a discussion of the Student’s August 1999 issue statement, the Student specifically stated that she had no dispute about the provision of a free appropriate public education for the 1999-2000 school year, except to the extent that she was questioning whether Ms. Rigby should be a continuing part of STUDENT’s individualized education program (IEP) team, as delineated in Issue No. 8 below. Accordingly, the question of whether FAPE was provided and/or offered for the 1999-2000 school year will not be adjudicated in this Decision, except to the extent that it requires a determination of the propriety of Ms. Rigby’s role on the IEP team.

Footnote 4: According to MOTHER’s testimony, the family first leased the residence in August 1987 and has continued to maintain a lease on the property since that time, despite their purchase and habitation of a house in downtown Santa Barbara from 1991 to 1996.

Footnote 5: She was eight years and two months old at the time of the assessment.

Footnote 6: The Superior Court issued temporary restraining orders and an order to show cause on August 29, 1997. On September 23, 1997, the temporary restraining orders became permanent injunctions after a hearing was held on the order to show cause. The injunctions issued on September 23 state that MOTHER must not threaten, alarm, annoy, or harass any of the protected persons. Specifically, the injunctions state that she must not threaten, strike, make contact with, keep under surveillance, follow, telephone, or send messages to any of the protected persons. She is also restrained from blocking the movement of any of the protected persons in public places or thoroughfares, or in their places of work, and from coming within one hundred feet of any of the protected persons, their residences, or their places of work. A specific exception was made for “properly convened” IEP meetings at the invitation of a protected person, provided that MOTHER does not engage in any of the activities described earlier. The injunctions were set to expire on September 23, 2000.

Footnote 7: STUDENT was eight years and seven months old at the time of the assessment.

Footnote 8: The letter stated: “My clients have ... asked me to convey to you in the strongest terms possible that none of the terms of this agreement are negotiable. This offer of settlement may be accepted or denied in its entirety, however, my clients are not willing to negotiate either the individual terms of the offer, nor the language contained in the offer.”

Footnote 9: Civil Code section 1542 states, “A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with the debtor.”

Footnote 10: In its letters of settlement, the District stated its understanding of the parents’ requests at mediation to be the following: (1) that STUDENT and her brother be allowed to attend OAS; (2) that a one-to-one aide be provided at OAS; (3) that a private speech and language therapist conduct an assessment of STUDENT; (4) that audiologist Mark Tosher perform an audiometric assessment for STUDENT; (5) that speech and language therapist Sharon Wilcox provide two to four hours of services per week for STUDENT; (6) that behaviorist Walter Langford provide one to three hours of services for STUDENT; (7) that OT and APE be provided to STUDENT pursuant to her February 1998 IEP; (8) that school psychologist Christie McLaughlin continue providing services to STUDENT; (9) that the injunction against MOTHER be dissolved; (10) that the District implement the conflict resolution plan written by psychologist Richard Stokes, Ph.D., and his wife, Shoshona Stokes; (11) that Ms. Rigby not be allowed to attend STUDENT’s IEPs or other meetings; and (12) that the District ask the district attorney’s office to halt the pending criminal prosecutions of MOTHER for alleged violations of the restraining orders.

Footnote 11: While the District’s settlement offer also provided that each party would bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs and that no party would be considered the prevailing party for any purpose whatsoever, these provisions simply related to the previously-stated intention that the settlement would resolve the due process matter of SN 618-98. Additionally, like the previously-stated intention that the settlement was to resolve the due process matter of SN 618-98, the two aforementioned provisions did not indicate that the offer was expressly intended to release any and all claims arising prior to July 1998.

Footnote 12: The District’s written settlement agreement set forth all the provisions contained in its original settlement offer but contained the following new provision: “This agreement settles any and all claims to date regarding the identification, evaluation, educational placement, and provisions of a free, appropriate public education for STUDENT by the Santa Barbara City Schools.”

Footnote 13: The District did not argue that the settlement agreement precluded the parents from raising any of the issues presented for hearing that related to the 1998-1999 school year. Absent such an argument and without any further evidence of the issues involved in SN 618-98, the Hearing Officer declines to find that the parents were barred from raising the issues presented for hearing that relate to the 1998-1999 school year.

Footnote 14: Despite the Hearing Officer’s indication at hearing that the District would have to submit authorities to support its argument, the District failed to submit any authorities at hearing or in its written closing brief. In fact, the District does not even mention this argument in its closing brief, suggesting that it may have abandoned this particular argument.

Footnote 15: “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a student to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).

Footnote 16: On January 12, 1996, adapted physical education (APE) services were added to STUDENT’s IEP.

Footnote 17: STUDENT’s regular education teacher, Pamela Holst, testified that she did not even know during STUDENT’s kindergarten how much time STUDENT was supposed to spending in her classroom.

Footnote 18: This meeting was not noticed nor convened as an IEP meeting, but appears to have included all the necessary IEP team members.

Footnote 19: Later, SH itinerant specialist services were added to STUDENT’s IEP.

Footnote 20: Although the plan did include a list of the interventions which had been attempted thus far, there was no analysis of the effectiveness of the interventions.

Footnote 21: The District did conduct a “behavior analysis” in May 1997, but the analysis was completed with less than a month remaining in STUDENT’s first-grade year and was not reviewed by the IEP team until her second-grade year. Accordingly, because the “behavior analysis” did not affect any events during the first-grade year, it will not be considered with regard to the first-grade year. Additionally, there was neither evidence nor argument that the “behavior analysis” was intended to be an FAA, met the statutory requirements for an FAA, or resulted in the development of a BIP.

Footnote 22: The behavior plan simply noted that STUDENT had defecated in her pants several times during the preceding weeks, that her teacher was taking her on bathroom breaks two times per day, and that she should be rewarded for informing staff of her need to go to the restroom.

Footnote 23: An interim agreement signed by the parent on September 19, 1997, did settle some issues which had been raised at the IEP meeting but still did not provide consent for the proposed IEP changes. In fact, the interim agreement specifically stated that the parties agreed that the District would continue to implement the goals and objectives and behavior plan developed for the 1996-1997 school year, until new goals and objectives were approved by the parent. Another IEP meeting was not convened again until February 23, 1998.

Footnote 24: According to STUDENT’s regular education teacher that year, Yvonne Reijnaert, and a written schedule developed by District staff, the school day lasted approximately six hours, about the same amount of time as during the 1996-1997 year.

Footnote 25: MOTHER had requested that the IEP meeting be postponed until the second semester so that the assessment the parents were obtaining from Dr. Glover could be completed and available for the IEP team to review.

Footnote 26: On a related note, the evidence introduced with regard to the IEP meetings held during the 1997-1998 year raise some real concerns with regard to the nature of the IEP meetings being held for STUDENT. The evidence disclosed that the IEP meetings were calendared around, and occasionally delayed because of, the attorneys’ schedules. It also was evident that the attorneys strongly directed the discussions at IEP meetings and that school staff working with STUDENT did not act as “equal participants” in the IEP meetings. Neither State nor federal law identifies a party’s attorney as a required member of a child’s IEP team. More importantly, the IDEA envisions that districts and parents will work cooperatively in a partnership designed to benefit the child. In California, the Legislature has expressly indicated its intent that IEP meetings be nonadversarial and “convened solely for the purposes of making educational decisions for the good of the individual with exceptional needs.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(h). The testimony of the witnesses made it clear that this is not the case here. The IEP meetings held for STUDENT have been adversarial and, at times, hostile, with a clear demarcation between parent and District interests and a greater focus on the adults’ relationships with each other than on the needs of STUDENT.

Footnote 27: As noted earlier, this IEP meeting was continued at MOTHER’s request.

Footnote 28: Dr. Glover testified that the BIP, as written, was likely to be effective in reducing STUDENT’s aggressive behavior and that it apparently did, according to her conversations with school personnel.

Footnote 29: The District did eventually hire a consultant to provide the staff with training on how to work with STUDENT. Dr. Joanne Singer started training the staff working with STUDENT in or about March 1998.

Footnote 30: STUDENT’s IEP indicates that her present level of performance in the appropriate care of hygiene in February 1998 was sixty percent. The listed objective was that by June 1998 STUDENT would “demonstrate appropriate care of personal hygiene” eighty percent of the time. However, according to Ms. Nicholson’s testimony, by mid-April 1998 (when her parents unilaterally withdrew her from Roosevelt), STUDENT was demonstrating appropriate care of personal hygiene only forty to fifty percent of the time and this level was achieved only with adult prompts.

Footnote 31: Although not put in issue specifically in this proceeding, the evidence disclosed that a significant number of OT sessions were missed during the first half of the school year. Ms. McClish testified that this was because the SELPA, which had previously provided OT to its students through nonpublic agencies, decided to furnish OT through its own employees beginning with the 1998-1999 school year. According to Ms. McClish, the SELPA encountered some difficulty filling the occupational therapist positions at the beginning of the year. Ms. McClish’s unrebutted testimony established that STUDENT’s missed OT sessions were being made up.

Footnote 32: This confusion was resolved on January 22,1999, when the Superior Court issued an order modifying the injunctions issued against MOTHER. The Court modified the injunctions to provide that MOTHER would not come within thirty yards of the protected persons or their “regularly assigned” workplaces, except by invitation. The Court also modified the injunctions to expressly allow MOTHER to come onto the OAS campus, provided that she maintain a twenty-yard buffer between herself and Ms. Rigby should Ms. Rigby be present on campus.

Footnote 33: On a related note, the Student also contended that the District failed to convene an IEP meeting within thirty days of the parents’ request for an IEP meeting, which was made in early August 1998. The Hearing Officer notes that, while an LEA must convene an IEP meeting within thirty days of a parent’s request, this time is tolled for days in July and August. Cal. Educ. Code § 56343.5. Consequently, the District’s act in convening an IEP on September 25 met the requirements of section 56343.5.

Footnote 34: Additionally, a review of the transcripts of the IEP meeting held on September 25, 1998, shows that, while OAS staff implemented the BIP developed in late 1997 at the beginning of STUDENT’s third-grade year, the staff specifically did not use the recommended technique of “ignoring” STUDENT when she refused to comply. According to Jeanne Surber, the behavioral intervention case manager, staff members gave STUDENT a number of “forced” choices from which she was supposed to pick. If she did not want to engage in either, she was being trained to either pick one of the choices or refuse the activities in an appropriate manner (e.g., by saying “no”), rather than aggressing at staff or other students. Ms. Surber indicated that STUDENT was always to be engaged in some meaningful activity.

Footnote 35: Ms. McClish testified that at some point she informed MOTHER that, during the pendency of the due process proceedings, MOTHER was not to contact her regarding STUDENT’s educational issues and that all discussions had to take place through their attorneys. Ms. McClish explained that it became her practice not to directly respond to communications received by MOTHER during this period, but to refer the communication to the SB Respondents’ attorney for a response. Ms. McClish did not specify when this prohibition was communicated to MOTHER. However, as will be explained shortly, there was no indication that it was in effect during the first half of the 1998-1999 school year. Nevertheless, insofar as this was ever a policy of the SB Respondents, it raises some real concerns. A child’s education is certainly not “free” if a parent is forced to communicate with members of the IEP team through an attorney. This is likely to be a costly, as well as inefficient, method for discussing educational issues. Additionally, LEAs are required to continue to provide the student with a FAPE and meet all of the procedural requirements that this requires even during the pendency of due process proceedings, including allowing the parent an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the IEP formulation process. It is doubtful that requiring a parent to use an attorney to communicate with members of his or her child’s IEP team would satisfy the procedural safeguards of the IDEA.

Footnote 36: In her update report, Ms. Surber defined “aggression” as any attempt at or contact by hitting, kicking, pinching, scratching, or biting an adult or peer. She defined “noncompliance” as any incident of refusal to follow teacher directives when STUDENT is without response after five minutes.

Footnote 37: According to MOTHER, the road was “fixed” in June 1999, and is now a less dangerous road to drive. Because transportation after January 1999 is not at issue in this proceeding, this decision is in no way meant to address how transportation should be provided to STUDENT following June 1999.

Footnote 38: The parents did not indicate that they would never accept someone else driving down the mountain road, only that the options presented did not adequately address their safety concerns. The Hearing Officer finds that those safety concerns were well-founded and reasonable. In any case, an LEA is not relieved of its responsibility to make an appropriate offer of necessary transportation services even if the parents indicate unwillingness to accept such services. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).

Footnote 39: Section 3082(b) provides that hearsay evidence is admissible in due process hearings, but only to supplement or explain other evidence. Hearsay evidence is not sufficient in itself to support a finding, unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3082(b).

Footnote 40: This finding in no way, however, forecloses the IEP team from agreeing to provide the Fast ForWord program as a part of STUDENT’s education program or as a form of compensatory education.

Footnote 41: Although one-on-one instruction is not necessarily required for STUDENT to receive a FAPE, according to the testimony of her former teachers, it is the most efficient delivery method for providing remediation of academic skills and, therefore, the best way not to consume too much of STUDENT’s school day in trying to make up for past denials of FAPE.

Footnote 42: And, in fact, insufficient evidence was introduced during the course of the instant proceedings for the Hearing Officer to make a reasoned decision regarding the issue of which LEA was the district of residence. The SB Respondents had not yet offered any testimony regarding LEA responsibility by August 24, 1999, and, following the approval of the interdistrict transfer permit, none of the parties presented any further evidence regarding this issue. Instead, both the Student and the SB Respondents, the only parties who presented testimony during the course of the hearing, acted as if the issue of future responsibility had been settled with the approval of the permit.

Footnote 43: The Student also contended that Ms. Rigby violated STUDENT’s privacy rights under the Family Educational Rights Privacy Act (FERPA) by disclosing educational records to the district attorney’s office in connection to the restraining orders without the parents’ permission. However, the Hearing Office is without authority to adjudicate matters arising out of FERPA violations. A separate hearing process is provided for the adjudication of alleged FERPA violations. 34 C.F.R. § 300.568 et seq.

Footnote 44: Ms. Rigby did not begin attending STUDENT’s IEP meetings until about September 1997 when STUDENT was in the second grade.

Footnote 45: While the IEP team’s difficulties in the past have not risen to the level of a denial of FAPE because of Ms. Rigby’s presence on the team, it nevertheless appears that Ms. Rigby’s presence on the team might have hindered the IEP team’s effectiveness to a degree. The personal and legal issues between MOTHER and Ms. Rigby certainly did not contribute to the nonadversarial atmosphere envisioned by special education law, Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(h), and may have, at times, diverted the focus of IEP team discussions away from STUDENT’s educational needs to the problematic relationship between the adults. Additionally, the trust and mutual respect required for an IEP team to work as an effective collaborative unit, in the best interests of the child with special needs, would very likely be promoted were Ms. Rigby to choose to appoint another staff member to fulfill the role of District representative at STUDENT’s future IEP meetings. Consequently, the Hearing Officer strongly encourages the District to review its decision to include Ms. Rigby in STUDENT’s IEP team in light of the fact that the parents find it difficult to work with her. Regardless of the source or reasonableness of the parents’ hostility towards Ms. Rigby, the fact remains that the parents’ participation is mandated under the law while Ms. Rigby’s is not. The fact also remains that, like other considerations under the IDEA, the District’s decisions in this regard should be counseled by what would be in the best interests of the child.