California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 2, 2002
Student v. Alhambra City Elementary School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1412-02 · Hearing Officer Michael F. Geary
Alhambra City Elementary prevails on all claims; earlier SEHO ruling bars relitigating DTT reduction and class placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Follows a May 30, 2002 Decision by Hearing Officer Van Vu in consolidated Case No. SN01-02591/SN01-02674 finding the December 18, 2001 IEP offered FAPE; the parent stated that decision was being or would be appealed. A Summary Order dated July 10, 2002 had denied the District's first motion to dismiss.
Summary
The parent of an eight-year-old boy eligible for special education based on autistic-like behaviors filed for due process against Alhambra City Elementary School District in June 2002. A few weeks earlier, in the fourth case between these parties, Hearing Officer Van Vu had ruled that a December 2001 IEP offered a FAPE. That IEP placed the student in a SELPA special day class and cut his in-home discrete trial training (DTT) to two hours a day. The parents kept him home-schooled and at a part-time Montessori program. At a June 2002 meeting, the District treated the parent's request as an addendum to the December IEP. It also moved the summer class to McKinley Elementary during renovation. When the parents would not enroll him, the District ended home DTT on June 28, 2002.
Hearing Officer Michael F. Geary dismissed a claim seeking to enforce the earlier decision because it was outside his jurisdiction. He also ruled that a consent claim was barred because it had already been decided. He held the earlier ruling binding unless the parents showed a substantial change in circumstances, and they did not. The addendum format was proper. The team considered the psychologist's progress report and the mother's input. Because the parents turned down a FAPE offer, the District could treat the child as privately placed and stop DTT. Its June 24 letter gave enough notice, and the student received more DTT hours in June than his IEP required. The summer site change did not deny FAPE. All relief was denied.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied res judicata to its own earlier rulings. A parent could not reopen an IEP found to offer FAPE without proof of a substantial change in circumstances. It also shows that a district could stop services after parents turned down a FAPE offer and kept the child in a private or home setting.
Issues and holdings
- Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue Pre-hearing (Petition Issue II). Petitioner's Issue No. II, which by its own terms sought to enforce compliance with the prior Hearing Office Decision of May 30, 2002.
Dismissed on the District's renewed motion because enforcing a prior Hearing Office decision is beyond the Hearing Officer's jurisdiction (Wyner).
Issue Pre-hearing (informed consent claim). Petitioner's claim that the parents did not give informed consent to the proposed placement.
Dismissed as clearly barred by res judicata because it was decided in the prior case between the same parties.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1a. Did the District deny the parents the opportunity to fully participate in the June 7, 2002 meeting by characterizing and administering the meeting as an "addendum" to the December 18, 2001 IEP meeting?
An addendum meeting was appropriate because a December 2001 IEP just found to offer FAPE was in effect, and the meeting covered the ESY issue the parent asked about.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1b. Did the District deny parental participation by failing to appropriately consider information provided by California PsychCare concerning the student's progress?
Dr. Sadeghi presented his progress report and it was attached to the IEP; the team's refusal of the parent's demands does not show the report was not considered.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1c. Did the District deny parental participation by failing to appropriately consider information from the student's mother concerning his progress?
The mother had the chance to give an update and offered little specific information; the team considered what she provided.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 2. Was the District's continued offer of placement and services pursuant to the December 18, 2001 IEP appropriate?
The prior finding that the December 2001 IEP offered FAPE was binding because there was no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances; progress shown was not beyond what was expected.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 3. Did the District fail to give appropriate prior written notice to the parents of the District's intention to terminate DTT services?
The District proposed no change in placement or FAPE, and its June 24, 2002 letter explaining the end of DTT funding was all the notice required.
- District prevailedImplementation
Issue 4. Did the District fail to provide a FAPE by unilaterally terminating DTT services in June 2002 and failing to deliver all of the DTT services to which the student was entitled between May 30, 2002 and June 30, 2002?
Because the parents rejected a FAPE offer and kept the child in home school/private school, the District could treat him as a privately placed student and end DTT; he actually received more DTT hours in June than the IEP required.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue 5. Did the program that the District proposed to deliver for the ESY at McKinley fail to offer a FAPE?
Moving the same SELPA SDC to a nearby campus for ESY because of renovation changed nothing significant; the prior finding that the SDC was appropriate stands.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's claims to relief were denied.
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified; Levy v. Cohen; J.F. v. School District of Philadelphia; University of Tennessee v. Elliott; United States v. Utah Construction & Mining; 34 C.F.R. 300.403; Cal. Educ. Code 56343; Cal. Educ. Code 56341.1(d)
People named in the decision
- Laurel Bear, Director of pupil services; District representative and witness, Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Frances Stearns, Coordinator of special education; IEP meeting facilitator; witness called by Student, Alhambra City Elementary School District
- Dr. Ali Sadeghi, Licensed clinical psychologist; DTT provider who presented progress report, California PsychCare
- Kathleen Parente, Lead DTT therapist (witness in prior case), California PsychCare
- Leili Zarbakhsh, Licensed educational psychologist (witness in prior case), California PsychCare
- California PsychCare, Nonpublic agency providing DTT services
- Van Vu, Hearing Officer in prior case SN01-02591/SN01-02674, California Special Education Hearing Office
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Alhambra, California, on July 11 and 12, 2002.
STUDENT (hereinafter Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by his mother, Mrs. PARENT. Alhambra City Elementary School District (hereinafter District) was represented by attorney Denise Godfrey of the law firm Lozano Smith. The District was also represented at the hearing by the District’s director of pupil services, Laurel Bear.
Petitioner called the following witnesses: Mr. PARENT, STUDENT’s father; Mrs. PARENT; and Frances Stearns, a coordinator of special education for the District.
The District called the following witness: Laurel Bear.
The oral and documentary evidence was presented at the hearing. Closing arguments of the parties were heard, and the record was closed on July 12, 2002.
BACKGROUND
STUDENT is an eight-year-old boy who resides with his parents within the geographical boundaries of the Alhambra City Elementary School District. He is eligible for special education and related services on the basis of a diagnosis of autistic-like behavior due to delayed oral language and reciprocal social interaction skills and cognitive delays that adversely affect his educational performance. STUDENT is not currently attending a public school. He last attended public school in September and October 2001. According to his parents, STUDENT is schooled at home by his mother and attending a private Montessori school on a part-time basis.
This is the fourth due process matter involving these same parties. The most recent of those prior matters, Hearing Office Case No. SN01-02591/SN01-02674 (consolidated cases), resulted in a Decision rendered by Hearing Officer Van Vu on May 30, 2002, twenty days before the filing of the instant due process matter. It is the District’s position that the prior Decision resolved all of the issues that the Petitioner seeks to relitigate here. The Petitioner argues that the instant case presents new issues relating to a subsequent IEP meeting on June 7, 2002, and to substantially changed circumstances that should have been considered by the IEP team at that meeting.
Hearing Officer Vu convened nine days of hearing, concluding on March 20, 2002. Among the issues addressed at the hearing was whether an IEP developed at a team meeting on December 18, 2001, offered a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT. The hearing officer took testimony from fifteen witnesses, including Mr. and Mrs. PARENT; Kathleen Parente, STUDENT’s lead DTT therapist from California PsychCare (PsychCare); Dr. Ali Sadeghi, licensed clinical psychologist from PsychCare; and Leili Zarbakhsh, licensed educational psychologist from PsychCare.
Hearing Officer Vu closely examined the Individualized Education Plan (IEP) that was developed on December 18, 2001. That IEP offered STUDENT a placement in a special day class (SDC) operated by the special education local plan area (SELPA) at Wilson Elementary School (Wilson) in the San Gabriel School District. The class was described in general terms as serving about twelve students who, like STUDENT, were mildly and cognitively impaired. There were to be one teacher and two aides, none of whom was specifically identified by name or qualifications. In addition, STUDENT was to have various services, including two hours per of day discrete trial training (DTT) for five days per week at home, two hours per week of DTT consultation, and six hours per month of DTT supervision. The December 2001 IEP also provided for an extended school year (ESY). The term of the IEP was to be one year.
Petitioner challenged the December 2002 IEP on the ground that the placement in an SDC was not appropriate. He essentially argued that he was entitled to the placement, program and services that the parties had last agreed to before the December 2001 IEP, including placement in a regular education class with an aide, twenty hours per week of DTT, and seventeen hours per month of DTT consultation.
According to the IEP documents, Dr. Sadeghi agreed with the District’s recommendation for a reduction of DTT services. Dr. Sadeghi and Leili Zarbakhsh testified that they did not oppose the recommended reduction of DTT services so long as STUDENT was in an appropriate classroom placement. All of the other team members present also agreed with the SDC placement and the reduction of DTT services.
The hearing officer found that STUDENT’s unique needs required a program that would provide individualized instruction while addressing his distractability and the behaviors that interfered with learning. She also found that STUDENT needed designated instruction and services (DIS) to assist with his difficulties with language, occupational therapy (OT) and social interaction. Hearing Officer Vu decided that the December 18, 2001 IEP met STUDENT’s needs and offered him a free, appropriate public education (FAPE). She rejected STUDENT’s claim that the SDC was not an appropriate placement and that he needed more DTT services. All of STUDENT’s claims to relief were denied.
On May 9, 2002, STUDENT’s mother requested that an IEP meeting be convened to “determine the ESY and DIS services” for STUDENT. That meeting was held on June 7, 2002, just days after the parties received Hearing Officer Vu’s Decision. Mrs. PARENT came to the IEP meeting with a seven-page typewritten statement. In that statement she requested that STUDENT be placed in a regular education classroom for ESY and for the 2002-2003 year and that he continue to receive twenty hours of direct DTT services per week, both of which had been denied by Hearing Officer Vu. Most of the statement was an argument against the prior Decision. It had little to do with the determination of ESY and services that STUDENT would receive during the summer program.
The meeting was characterized by the District facilitator, Ms. Stearns, as an “addendum” to the December 18, 2001 IEP that had just been found to offer a FAPE to STUDENT. Mrs. PARENT vigorously objected to this characterization, insisting that she had requested an IEP meeting and not an addendum meeting. She challenged the qualifications of Ms. Stearns to speak for the District and throughout the meeting questioned the right of Ms. Stearns to participate in the discussion. Mrs. PARENT stated repeatedly throughout the meeting that the recent Decision by Hearing Officer Vu was being or would be appealed. She reiterated the substance of her typewritten statement and continued to resist the suggestion that STUDENT’s placement would be as described in the December 18, 2001 IEP. Mrs. PARENT stated at the meeting that she and her husband agreed only to the May 2001 IEP and to the goals and objectives set forth in that document.
Dr. Sadeghi was present at the meeting and presented, in abbreviated form, his progress report for STUDENT covering the period February through May 2002. A copy of the written report of this progress was attached to the IEP. After a recitation of the DTT services provided for in the December 18, 2001 IEP, the doctor noted only that STUDENT may not need all of the consultation time allowed by the IEP. Mrs. PARENT’s response was to state that she disagreed with the doctor and believed that STUDENT should get the amount of DTT consultation time called for by the March 2001 IEP.
It was at the June 7, 2002 IEP meeting that the District first disclosed to Mrs. PARENT the temporary relocation of the SELPA SDC from the Wilson campus to the nearby McKinley Elementary School (McKinley) campus for the ESY program only. There was little discussion at the meeting regarding this change. Most of the substantive discussion was about the parents’ view that STUDENT’s progress required that the District agree to provide the placement and services that STUDENT had been unable to get through the last due process hearing and Decision. Mrs. PARENT continued to raise many of the objections that Hearing Officer Vu had disposed of in her Decision. Ultimately, the meeting ended with the District offering to implement the December 18, 2001 IEP, with the only change being the temporary relocation of the SELPA SDC from the Wilson campus to the McKinley campus for the ESY only. Mrs. PARENT remained constant in her refusal to agree to the placement and program already found appropriate by Hearing Officer Vu.
STUDENT was not enrolled by his parents in the offered program. The District took the position that by failing to enroll in the District’s program, STUDENT became a private school child with a disability and, as such, not entitled to the services that he would receive as a student in the District’s program. The District communicated this position to STUDENT’s parents by letter dated June 24, 2002. That letter advised STUDENT’s parents that the DTT services that were then being provided in the home would end effective June 28, 2002, unless the parents informed the District that they would allow it to implement the December 18, 2001 IEP. Mr. and Mrs. PARENT did not agree to allow the District to implement the IEP. On June 26, and again on June 28, 2002, Mrs. PARENT wrote to the District to complain that the DTT services had already been interrupted due to an error by Ms. Stearns and to insist that the DTT services not be interrupted again as threatened. She did not agree to accept implementation of the December 2001 IEP and continued to argue that STUDENT was entitled to twice the amount of DTT services offered in the December 2001 IEP.
On June 20, 2002, STUDENT filed the instant request for due process.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
On July 5, 2002, the District made a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s claims. The District argued that the issues had previously been decided in the Petitioner’s last case (Case No. SN01-02591/SN01-02674), which had resulted in a Decision rendered by the Hearing Office on May 30, 2000 and that the claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a component of the doctrine of res judicata. As to Petitioner’s Issue II, the District also argued that the issue was not within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office to decide in that Petitioner was seeking only to compel compliance with a prior Decision of the Hearing Office. A hearing officer denied the District’s motion to dismiss by Summary Order dated July 10, 2002.
The District renewed its motion on the first day of hearing. Argument was heard from the parties and the matter was taken under submission. The Hearing Officer granted the motion in part by dismissing Petitioner’s Issue No. II, which by its own terms sought to enforce compliance with the prior Decision, a matter that was beyond the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer to decide. Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District, (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1026. A ruling on the motion to dismiss the other issues was deferred pending further inquiry by the Hearing Officer.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parties from relitigating an issue that has been finally determined in prior litigation. Application of the doctrine requires that the issue presented for adjudication be the same one that was decided in the prior action, that there be a final judgement on the merits in the prior action, and that the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party to the prior action. Levy v. Cohen, (1977) 19 Cal. 3d 165, 171.
In J.F. and N.F., etc. v. School District of Philadelphia, etc. ( D.C. PA 2000) 32 IDELR 93, the court states its analysis of the need for such application to special education due process hearings, in part, as follows:
The Supreme Court has explained that giving preclusive effect to the findings of an administrative agency serves the underlying purposes of issue preclusion which include "both the parties, interest in avoiding the cost and vexation of repetitive litigation and the public's interest in conserving judicial resources." University of Tenn. v. Elliott, (1986) 478 U.S. 788, 798. The Court has also held that "[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., (1966) 384 U.S. 394, 422.
The Hearing Office has long applied the doctrine of res judicata to its own decisions. The doctrine serves the legitimate purpose of curtailing multiple actions between the same parties on the same issue and thus avoiding unnecessary effort by and expense to the parties and to the tribunals to which the issues are presented. Once litigated and finally determined between the parties, an issue should be laid to rest.
There is no doubt that the parties here are the same and that they had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues in the prior matter. Numerous witnesses were called to testify under oath. Voluminous documentary evidence was admitted and considered. Hearing Officer Vu rendered a thirty-eight page Decision that contained specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. That Decision was the final administrative determination and binding on the parties. California Education Code Section 56505(g). The doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel applies under these circumstances. Reconsideration of an issue or issues previously determined by Hearing Officer Vu would be justified only by evidence that clearly demonstrated that there was a substantial change of circumstances that was sufficient to have warranted reconsideration of the issue or issues by the IEP team.
The Hearing Officer inquired further regarding the evidence that Mrs. PARENT proposed to offer in support of the remaining issues. Mrs. PARENT assured the Hearing Officer that it was not her intent to again litigate any issue decided by Hearing Officer Van Vu and that she had new evidence to support Petitioner’s remaining issues. After a discussion of the evidence upon which Petitioner would base his various claims, the Hearing Officer dismissed Petitioner’s claim that the parents did not give informed consent to the proposed placement on the ground that this claim was clearly barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The District’s motion to dismiss the remaining issues was denied. After hearing the Petitioner’s description of the evidence and considering whether the Petitioner’s claims that were not barred by res judicata might be more appropriately dealt with through a compliance complaint, the Hearing Officer determined that in this particular case the remaining issues would be more effectively and efficiently addressed by a hearing of the evidence and a ruling based on that evidence.
ISSUES
1. Did the District deny STUDENT’s parents the opportunity to fully participate in the meeting on June 7, 2002, by:
(a) Characterizing and administering the meeting as an “addendum” to the December 18, 2001 IEP meeting; (b) failing to appropriately consider information provided by California PsychCare concerning progress made by STUDENT; and (c) failing to appropriately consider information from STUDENT’s mother concerning progress made by STUDENT?
2. Was the District’s continued offer of placement and services pursuant to the December 18, 2001 IEP appropriate?
3. Did the District fail to give appropriate prior written notice to STUDENT’s parents of the District’s intention to terminate DTT services to STUDENT?
4. Did the District fail to provide a FAPE to STUDENT by unilaterally terminating DTT services in June 2002 and failing to deliver all of the DTT services to which STUDENT was entitled between May 30, 2002, and June 30, 2002?
5. Did the program that the District proposed to deliver to STUDENT for the ESY at McKinley fail to offer a FAPE?
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
The Petitioner contends that there was a substantial change in circumstances that required the IEP team to reconsider issues that had already been litigated before and decided by Hearing Officer Vu. He alleges that if the IEP team had properly considered the evidence of his progress, it would or should have recommended a return of DTT service levels to what had been agreed upon prior to the December 2001 IEP. Petitioner claimed that these higher levels of service were necessary to facilitate his transition back to the public school environment and to enable him to continue to benefit from his education.
The District contended that there were no changed circumstances that could be reasonably relied upon to disturb the Decision by Hearing Officer Vu. In addition, the District asserted that the claims made by Petitioner are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel and that he sought in this case to enforce the prior decision and order rendered on May 30, 2002, by Hearing Officer Vu, which is a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), and State law require that students with disabilities be offered a FAPE in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”). 20 U.S.C. Sections 1400 (d) and 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code Sections 56000 and 56031. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parents or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(8).
In its seminal decision regarding interpretation and application of the IDEA, the United States Supreme Court addressed the requirements of procedural and substantive FAPE in Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et .al. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176. The Court held that “a "free appropriate public education" consists of educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the disabled child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child "to benefit" from the instruction.” Id. at 188-189. The IDEA does not require that the states “maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided non-handicapped children.” What is required is that the student be provided with access to a FAPE which is “sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child.” Id. at 200-201.
In Rowley, the court also recognized that the IDEA reflects the desire of Congress to ensure that there are procedural protections afforded the student and parents which will allow for effective participation in the IEP process. The Court notes that parents can be the most ardent advocates for their children, and that their full participation can be the best way to ensure that all appropriate services are being offered to the handicapped child. The FAPE analysis must be two-pronged. First, the Hearing Officer must determine whether the District complied with the procedural requirements of the IDEA which are designed to allow and encourage the full participation of the parents. It is clear that not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of FAPE. Any procedural flaw must result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process to result in the denial of a FAPE. Second, the Hearing Officer must look at the IEPs which were a result of those procedures to determine whether the placement and services were reasonably calculated to provide the required educational benefit to the student. 458 U.S., at 206-207; See also: W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-1484. The District has the burden of proof on both prongs of the analysis. Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3, (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1396, 1398.
Issue No. 1: Did the District deny STUDENT’s parents the opportunity to fully participate in the meeting on June 7, 2002?
An IEP team is required to meet at least annually to review the IEP, including the appropriateness of the placement, and the student’s progress toward goals and objectives. Calif. Educ. Code § 56343(d). The team is also required to meet when the student demonstrates a lack of anticipated progress. Calif. Educ. Code § 56343(b). In addition, the IEP team is required to meet when the parent or teacher requests a meeting to develop, review or revise the IEP. Calif. Educ. Code § 56343(c).
When a review of an IEP does occur, the IEP team is required to revise the IEP as appropriate to address matters, including a lack of student progress toward goals and objectives, information about the student provided by the parents, the student’s strengths and anticipated needs, and the concerns of the parents for enhancing the education of the student. Calif. Educ. Code § 56341.1(d).
The evidence showed that Mrs. PARENT requested that an IEP meeting be convened to determine the ESY and DIS. However, the audio tape of the IEP meeting and the other evidence describing what occurred there showed that Mrs. PARENT actually wanted a review of the IEP of December 18, 2001, and an opportunity to demonstrate that it was no longer appropriate, in spite of the recent finding to the contrary by Hearing Officer Vu.
Under the particular circumstances of this case, where an Hearing Office decision has determined that an IEP offered or provided a FAPE to a student, the requirement that an IEP team meeting be convened at the request of the parent to review or revise the IEP must be tempered by common sense and the recognition that the doctrine of res judicata is appropriately applied to administrative determinations by the Hearing Office. If an IEP team meeting is convened in this kind of situation, the IEP team should determine whether the information provided by the parents and other team members establishes a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant review of or alterations to the IEP. If a substantial change of circumstances is found to exist, further inquiry by the team into the elements of the IEP may be warranted. If no substantial change of circumstances is found to exist, further inquiry may not be required. The dispute might be appropriately referred to the Compliance Unit for resolution.
Characterizing and administering the meeting as an “addendum” to the December 18, 2001 IEP
There was no evidence offered by the Petitioner to support the claim that STUDENT was denied the benefits of a regular IEP team meeting by virtue of the characterization and administration of the June 7, 2002 meeting as an addendum meeting. On the contrary, all of the evidence, including the audiotape of the meeting, demonstrated that the meeting appropriately covered the issue for which it had been requested by Mrs. PARENT: ESY services for STUDENT. In addition, the team allowed Dr. Sadeghi to present his report on the progress made by STUDENT and allowed Mrs. PARENT to state her position regarding the offered program.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s decision to characterize and administer the June 7, 2002 IEP meeting as an addendum meeting was appropriate under the circumstances. There was an operable IEP in effect at the time that the meeting took place. Hearing Officer Vu had just days before determined that the December 2001 IEP was appropriate and offered a FAPE to STUDENT. That IEP included ESY services and was to operate for approximately six more months, absent an agreement otherwise between the parties. STUDENT had not been in a District program for over seven months and had not been formally evaluated since the evaluations that Hearing Officer Vu found appropriate. A request from Mrs. PARENT to convene an IEP meeting to determine ESY and DIS was appropriately treated as a request for a meeting to discuss the details of the program already provided for in the operable IEP. It was reasonable for the District to conclude that an addendum to that IEP was all that would be required. It was all that was required.
Failing to appropriately consider information provided by Dr. Sadeghi
There was no evidence offered by Petitioner that showed that the progress report presented by Dr. Sadeghi at the IEP meeting was not fairly considered by the team members. On the contrary, the evidence showed that the doctor was allowed to present an oral summary of his progress report. A copy was attached to the IEP meeting summary. The only “evidence” relied upon by Petitioner in this regard was the failure of the District members of the team to accede to Mrs. PARENT’s demands for a different program and placement. Her reliance on the outcome of the meeting is misplaced. The Hearing Officer finds that the IEP team did properly consider the report of Dr. Sadeghi.
Failing to appropriately consider information provided STUDENT’s mother
There was also no evidence that the IEP team failed to consider information supplied by Mrs. PARENT regarding progress made by STUDENT. Mrs. PARENT was offered the opportunity to provide an update on STUDENT. A review of the IEP documents and the audio tape of the proceeding shows that there was little, if any, specific information given by Mrs. PARENT to the team except that contained in her typewritten statement that was attached to the IEP documents. Aside from general references to STUDENT’s “progress,” the only specific information contained there was Mrs. PARENT’s statement that “STUDENT has mastered all of his kindergarten readiness skills, can talk and work independently and works well in the inclusion classroom.” The update presented at the meeting consisted principally of the report of Dr. Sadeghi.
Petitioner’s argument that the IEP team did not consider the information supplied by his mother finds no support in the record. It appears from the evidence that the team considered the little information provided by Mrs. PARENT. The fact that it did not result in the action desired by her is explainable on other bases, as discussed below.
Issue No. 2: Was the District’s continued offer of placement and services pursuant to the December 18, 2001 IEP appropriate?
It has been determined by Hearing Officer Vu that the District’s offer contained in the December 18, 2001 IEP was an offer of a FAPE. That finding is binding on these parties unless there was a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to have required the IEP team to review and modify the IEP at its meeting on June 7, 2002. There was no evidence of a substantial change of circumstances presented at either the IEP meeting or at the hearing in this case.
There is a clear indication in the record that Mrs. PARENT wanted to use the June 7, 2002 IEP meeting as a platform from which to launch her attack on the Decision of Hearing Officer Vu. Most of her written and oral statements presented at the meeting dealt not with a concern for the specifics of the ESY program for STUDENT, but with the parents’ dissatisfaction with the outcome of the prior hearing. Mrs. PARENT repeatedly stated an intention to appealthat prior Decision and frequently demanded changes to STUDENT’s IEP that were inconsistent with the Decision rendered days before by Hearing Officer Vu.
Mrs. PARENT pointed to the oral and written reports of Dr. Sadeghi in support of her claim that STUDENT had made significant progress that demanded consideration, but the reports covered the period “February 2002 - May 2002,” and there was nothing in them to evidence the kind of changed circumstances that would require an update or change to the IEP. In fact, the reports show only that STUDENT made progress over a period of months. There was nothing in the evidence to even suggest that STUDENT made more progress than was anticipated or such progress that the goals and objectives contained in the December 2001 IEP were no longer appropriate. On cross-examination, Mrs. PARENT admitted that much of the progress that STUDENT had made had been in evidence in the prior hearing and deemed insufficient to support STUDENT’s similar claims for relief in that case. Even Dr. Sadeghi, who was at the June 7, 2002 IEP meeting, did not suggest that he disagreed with the implementation of the December 2001 IEP. The one time when he expressed his opinion that STUDENT might need less supervision services than called for by that IEP, Mrs. PARENT was quick to distance herself from that opinion.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s continued offer of placement and services pursuant to the December 18, 2001 IEP was appropriate.
Issue No. 3: Did the District fail to give appropriate prior written notice to STUDENT’s parents of the District’s intention to terminate DTT services to STUDENT?
Districts are required to give written prior notice to the parents of the child whenever they propose to initiate or change, or refuse to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.503. Such notice provides the parents with information that can help them to make informed decisions about their child’s education. The notice is also important in that it helps ensure that there is a clear record of what placement, services and assistance were offered to the student and when they were offered. Union School Dist. v. B. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F. 3d 1519, 1526.
In this case, the District did not propose to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of STUDENT or the provision of a FAPE to him. It proposed to implement the IEP that had just been found to offer a FAPE. Nevertheless, the District did give notice of its intention to terminate funding for DTT services and the reason for that termination in its letter to STUDENT’s parents of June 24, 2002. It informed them that the delivery of services pursuant to the December 2001 IEP would continue if STUDENT enrolled in the District’s program. There was no legal requirement that the District provide any other notice. Issue No. 4: Did the District fail to provide a FAPE to STUDENT by unilaterally terminating DTT services in June 2002 and failing to deliver all of the DTT services to which STUDENT was entitled between March 1, 2002 and June 30, 2002?
Termination of DTT services on June 28, 2002
There is no dispute that the District did terminate DTT services effective June 28, 2002. Petitioner argues that the DTT services should never have been terminated because the parties agreed that the services were necessary. The District states that it terminated the DTT services because STUDENT’s parents declined to enroll him in the District’s program as described in the December 18, 2002 IEP. The District contends that because the program was found to offer a FAPE to STUDENT, it was only obligated to deliver special education and related services to STUDENT if he actually enrolled in the program. It further contends that because STUDENT’s parents chose not to enroll STUDENT in the District’s program, it was entitled to consider STUDENT to be a unilaterally placed private school student to whom it owed no duty to provide a particular special education program or related services.
The Code of Federal Regulations separates the rights and duties of local agencies and parents in situations where the parents have enrolled their child in a private school without a public agency placement or referral. C.F.R. § 300.403; §§ 300.450-300.487. Section 300.403(a) makes clear that a LEA is not required to pay for the cost of special education and related services if the LEA offered FAPE and the parents elected to place a child in a private school. This regulation reiterates the statutory requirement stated in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).
Mrs. PARENT testified that STUDENT is home schooled by her and attends a Montessori school on a part-time basis. He has been so placed by his parents since he was withdrawn for the District’s program on October 23, 2001, despite the determination by Hearing Officer Vu that the District has made a FAPE available to STUDENT. Under the circumstances, it was appropriate for the District to consider STUDENT to be a unilaterally placed private school student. As such, the District had no duty to continue to provide the DTT services. The District offered a FAPE to STUDENT. His parents declined to accept it. By doing so, STUDENT’s parents empowered the District to terminate DTT services to their son.
Failure to deliver all DTT services between May 30, 2002 and June 30, 2002
Petitioner contends that he is owed DTT direct services because the District failed to deliver all of the services to which he was entitled between May 30 and June 30, 2002. The District asserts that it was not required to provide any services to STUDENT during this time because he was then properly considered to be a unilaterally placed private school student. Nevertheless, the District concedes that it did undertake to provide the DTT services called for by the December 2001 IEP as an accommodation to STUDENT and with the hope, if not the expectation, that he would enroll in the District’s program and thus be entitled to a continuation of the services through the ESY.
Mrs. PARENT was not sure when the services were not delivered and was unable to show the amount of time allegedly lost. The District produced records showing what was billed by PsychCare between June 1 and June 28, 2002. It appears from these records that the provider continued to deliver the services at the rate of four hours per day rather than the two hours per day specified in the IEP. Those services were delivered only four days per week, but still at a weekly rate greater than called for by the IEP. By June 21, 2002, the last day for which direct DTT services were billed, a total of forty-eight hours had been provided. That was eight hours more than the amount of services specified in the IEP. According to the testimony of Mrs. PARENT, additional services were delivered after June 21, 2002, for which the provider did not bill the District. STUDENT actually received more hours of direct DTT services in June 2002 than his then operable IEP required. Even if this were not the case, there was no attempt by Mrs. PARENT to show how STUDENT has been damaged by a loss of DTT services. The Hearing Officer encouraged Mrs. PARENT to call Dr. Sadeghi to provide testimony in support of STUDENT’s claims. She declined to do so.
The Hearing Officer finds that the termination of DTT services by the District in response to the failure by STUDENT’s parents to enroll STUDENT in the District’s program was a proper exercise of its right to deem STUDENT to then be a unilaterally placed private school student. The Hearing Officer also finds that there was no failure by the District to fulfill an obligation to deliver DTT services to STUDENT after May 30, 2002.
Issue No. 5: Did the program that the District proposed to deliver to STUDENT for the ESY at McKinley fail to offer a FAPE?
The unrefuted testimony by District employees was that the SELPA SDC class that met at Wilson during the regular school year was to meet at McKinley during the ESY only. The change was required to accommodate renovation at Wilson. Everything about the class that had been found by Hearing Officer Vu to be appropriate was to remain unchanged in any significant respect. Testimony established that the McKinley campus was within a few minutes of the travel time from STUDENT’s home to Wilson. There was no evidence of a substantial change in circumstances that should have caused the IEP team to change the recommended placement, program, or services for STUDENT. There was nothing to weigh against application of the doctrine of res judicata to the determination by Hearing Officer Vu concerning the appropriateness of the SDC placement, whether at Wilson or McKinley. Her finding stands.
ORDER
All of the Petitioner’s claims to relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:
The District prevailed on all issues.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. California Education Code Section 56505(i).
Dated: August 2, 2002 Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. STUDENT’s parents chose not to attend this IEP meeting. Hearing Officer Vu found that it was properly convened and conducted in their absence.
2. This was the only mention of an IEP of this date.
3. All references to the prior“Decision” are to this decision by Hearing Officer Van Vu.
4. A number of factors were considered in deciding to adjudicate this matter, including that Petitioner was not represented by an attorney, that some weighing of evidence would be required, and that the Hearing Officer was ready to hear evidence immediately, so the matter would be resolved without unnecessary delay. However, in other cases, including other cases between these same parties, similar pleas that issues are barred by the doctrine of res judicata will likely be dealt with more summarily. If an issue has already been decided between the parties, it will not be heard again absent evidence of a substantial change of circumstances. Disputes regarding adherence to prior governing orders or decisions will be referred to the California Department of Education’s Complaints Management and Mediation Unit (Compliance Unit).
5. STUDENT initially wanted the Hearing Officer to determine that he was entitled to a remedy for DTT hours due but not delivered from March 1, 2002. The Hearing Officer ruled that the delivery of such services before the effective date of Hearing Officer Vu’s order was governed by the prior stay put order and a matter for the Compliance Unit.
6. While the Petitioner made many factual claims and arguments about what was wrong with his placement and program, his primary concern appeared to be the reduction in DTT services.
7. It is questionable that this request alone would have been enough to require an IEP meeting. The District might have responded to the parents’ inquiries is a less formal context.
8. The question of whether there was evidence of a substantial change of circumstances will be discussed below.
9. It was only out of an abundance of caution that the Petitioner’s claims based upon an alleged change of circumstances were not dismissed.
10. The Hearing Officer makes no finding regarding whether STUDENT’s parents have been in compliance with the compulsory education laws of this State.
11. In fact, the ratio of staff to students was considerably more favorable according to the June, 2002 IEP.
12. Mrs. PARENT stated on several occasions that she will continue to file due process matters. Parental advocacy on behalf of one’s child is to be encouraged. Parental abuse of the procedural protections afforded to students and their parents under the IDEA and State law can jeopardize the child’s educational opportunities and expose the parents to sanctions. It will be discouraged.
