California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 29, 2003
Student v. Vacaville Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1423-03, SN-1423-03 · Hearing Officer Terrence B. Ohler
Vacaville Unified's earlier settlement agreement bars Student's claims for two school years; Hearing Officer dismisses those claims before hearing.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Footnote 1 states the order was amended on October 29, 2003, to correct typographical errors. This is an interim order. The hearing on the 2003-2004 issues was to reconvene on October 28, 2003. The prior settled case was SN02-00402/SN02-00504.
Summary
The Student filed for due process against Vacaville Unified School District. The claims said the District denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years, including both extended school years. In April 2002, the Student's mother, who represented the Student herself, had settled an earlier SEHO case at hearing. That agreement released all claims "known and unknown" through the 2002-2003 extended school year. In return, the District funded Lindamood-Bell services up to $11,040, reimbursed $13,500, and promised a minimum offer of services for 2002-2003. The District moved to dismiss all claims from before 2003-2004. Hearing Officer Terrence B. Ohler first ruled that SEHO had jurisdiction to interpret the settlement when it is raised as a defense. After a three-day evidentiary hearing, he found the agreement valid. The release language was plain, and the mother is highly educated. She helped negotiate the terms with a family friend's help and asked that the agreement be placed in the SEHO record. Her fatigue, and her claim that she could not take the document home overnight, did not invalidate it. The District did not breach the agreement. A waiver covering one future school year did not violate public policy. The Hearing Officer dismissed the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 claims. The Student kept the burden of going forward on the 2003-2004 issues.
Why it matters
This ruling shows how SEHO treated a settlement agreement raised as a defense. It decided it had jurisdiction to interpret the agreement and judged the release by the totality of the circumstances. It enforced a waiver covering the next school year. It also held that a parent's fatigue or a short review time alone did not undo a settlement signed at hearing.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue I.A. Whether SEHO has jurisdiction to interpret and construe the parties' April 25, 2002 Compromise and Release Agreement when the District raises it as a defense in a later due process hearing, or whether only the CDE or a civil court may do so (District relied on Wyner v. Manhattan Beach USD)
Wyner did not apply. SEHO has jurisdiction under Education Code section 56501(a) to interpret a settlement agreement raised as a defense to a later due process request.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue I.B. Whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the parent's signing of the Agreement was voluntary, deliberate and informed, given claims of ambiguity, fatigue, denial of a request to take the Agreement home overnight, and pressure
The release language in Section 1.C was not ambiguous, and the parent's fatigue and the claimed denial of overnight review did not invalidate it. The parent negotiated terms and was not pressured, so the Agreement was valid.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue I.C. Whether the District materially breached the Agreement, so that it is forfeited or may be rescinded, by charging $525 of Lindamood-Bell funds to evaluations and a report, and by offering only the 'minimum' services listed in Section 2.G
There was no breach. The evaluations and report properly counted against the $11,040 cap, Section 2.G required only the minimum services, and Section 7 required a material breach before forfeiture.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue I.D. Whether the Agreement's prospective waiver of claims through the 2002-2003 extended school year is enforceable or void as against public policy
No authority shows that a prospective IDEA waiver is void. A waiver covering one future school year is valid, and the District's motion to dismiss all 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 claims was granted.
- District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue II. Whether the burden of going forward should shift to the District for the remaining 2003-2004 issues
The Agreement set the status quo and Student is seeking to change it, so Student keeps the burden of going forward.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- District's motion to dismiss all issues for the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years, including both extended school years, granted. Student's motion to shift the burden of going forward denied.
- By Monday, October 27, 2003, at 1:00 p.m., Student's counsel must fax the District's counsel and SEHO the names and titles of witnesses for the first day of hearing. The parties must be ready to proceed when the hearing reconvenes on October 28, 2003, at 9:30 a.m.
Key authorities
Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District, 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000); Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1983); Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989); D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education, 109 F.3d 896 (3d Cir. 1997); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida System, Inc., 822 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1996); Burger v. Murray County Sch. Dist., 612 F.Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Education Code section 56501(a)
People named in the decision
- Jan Tomsky, District counsel (also represented the District in the prior case and testified about the settlement), Vacaville Unified School District
- Lynda Donahue, Special education director, Vacaville Unified School District
- Dr. Ulrey, Psychiatrist whose recommendations were discussed
- Lindamood-Bell, Private reading and learning program (Berkeley) funded under the settlement, Lindamood-Bell
- Bob Varma, Counsel for Student
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
On September 10, 2003, this matter convened for Hearing. The Vacaville Unified School District (District) orally brought a motion to dismiss STUDENT’s case, except as to those issues related to the 2003-2004 school year. The District argued that the parties’ Compromise and Release Agreement dated April 25, 2002 (Agreement), resolves all issues between the parties through the 2002-2003 extended school year. Petitioner argued that the Agreement does not bar any of his issues, which involved disputes dating back to the 2001-2002 school year. After hearing oral argument from the parties, the Hearing Officer continued the matter for two days and ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issue. Before the Hearing resumed, the District filed with the Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) its written Motion to Dismiss Issues and Establish the Burden of Going Forward, the Petitioner filed an opposition, and the District prepared a reply. The Hearing resumed on September 12, 2003. After hearing additional arguments from both parties, the Hearing Officer conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the scope and enforceability of the Agreement. The parties presented evidence pertaining to the Agreement on September 12, 16, and 17, 2003. Each party also timely submitted a supplemental brief.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The parties settled a previous due process matter, consolidated case number SN02-00402/SN02-00504 (Case One), on April 25, 2002, at hearing. Case One consisted of Petitioner’s due process request filed on February 25, 2002, and the District’s own due process request filed on March 7, 2002. A prehearing conference in Case One was held on April 22, 2002. STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, appeared on behalf of STUDENT, and Ms. Jan Tomsky appeared on behalf of the District. The Hearing Officer presiding in Case One prepared a Prehearing Conference Order on April 23, 2002. On the day of hearing, MOTHER represented STUDENT, and Ms. Tomsky represented the District. The transcript of the proceeding indicates that FAMILY FRIEND 1 and FAMILY FRIEND 2 were also present on behalf of Petitioner, and each identified herself as a family friend of the PARENTS. Ms. Lynda Donahue, special education director for the District, was also present on behalf of the District. After the matter convened, the parties generally agree that the parties broke for settlement discussions sometime before 11:00 a.m. The parties also generally agree that the Agreement was signed sometime after 4:30 p.m. but before 6:00 p.m. On April 26, 2002, the Hearing Officer in Case One signed an Order Regarding Settlement and Dismissal.
MOTHER testified that she first realized there was a potential problem regarding the parties’ respective interpretations of the Agreement when she attended an individualized education program (IEP) meeting on June 4, 2002. She contends the District would not discuss changing STUDENT’s eligibility category, as the District took the position that the Agreement resolved all issues whether specifically stated in the Agreement or not. On June 13, 2002, MOTHER met with Ms. Donahue to discuss costs related to Lindamood-Bell evaluations and a report that Ms. Donahue had ordered, which MOTHER believed should not have been debited against the money allocated for Lindamood-Bell services in the Agreement. (Footnote 2) MOTHER wrote numerous letters to Ms. Donahue expressing her discontent with how the District was interpreting the Agreement.
On June 13, 2003, SEHO received Petitioner’s current request for a due process hearing, including Petitioner’s initial statement of issues. Petitioner’s issues statement continued to be modified through the commencement of Hearing on September 10, 2003. On September 18, 2003, Petitioner presented SEHO and the District with another issues statement. (Footnote 3) The statement reflects that Petitioner is raising issues regarding whether the District provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for each of the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years, including each respective extended school year. In the current Hearing, each party is represented by counsel. Mr. Bob Varma represents the Petitioner, and the District continues to be represented by Ms. Tomsky.
DISCUSSION
The District contends that SEHO lacks jurisdiction to hear disputes over breach or interpretation of the Agreement. Furthermore, if SEHO exerts jurisdiction, the District contends that the Agreement resolves all issues between the parties through the 2002-2003 extended school year. It relies on Section 1.C. of the Agreement, which states: “[t]he parties’ intent in entering into this Agreement is to resolve any and all disputes, causes of action, and claims, known and unknown, concerning STUDENT’s education arising or occurring through the 2002-2003 extended school year.” In light of this provision, the District contends that Petitioner is not permitted to bring any issue to SEHO pertaining to any problem with Petitioner’s education, except for claims arising or occurring on or after the commencement of the 2003-2004 school year.
Petitioner asserts that SEHO has jurisdiction to resolve all issues related to the Agreement. Furthermore, Petitioner contends the Agreement does not bar him from raising issues pertaining to whether the District provided him with a FAPE for each of the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years, including each respective extended school year. Petitioner asserts that the settlement discussions leading up to the signing of the Agreement and that Section 2.G. of the Agreement led Petitioner to believe that the program and services for the 2002-2003 school year were not fixed by the Agreement but were left open for the IEP team’s consideration at future meetings. (Footnote 4)
I. The Validity and Enforceability of the Agreement:
A. Jurisdiction:
SEHO’s jurisdiction is defined in California Education Code section 56501(a). (Footnote 5) The District cites Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District, 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that SEHO has no jurisdiction to consider “settlement agreement implementation issues” such as the ones involved here. The District argues that Wyner holds that SEHO has no jurisdiction to determine such issues as whether the settlement agreement is enforceable under generally applicable contract principles or as a waiver of future civil rights or as whether the settlement agreement has been breached. In essence, the District argues that the effect of the Agreement must be determined by the California Department of Education’s (CDE) or by a civil court. (Footnote 6) Under the facts of Wyner, the court was considering SEHO’s jurisdiction with respect to the enforcement of a prior SEHO order. The court did not consider whether SEHO had jurisdiction to consider the force and effect of a settlement agreement as an affirmative defense to a subsequently filed due process hearing, which is the situation in this Hearing. Neither Wyner nor the statute discusses what SEHO’s role should be when a settlement agreement must be interpreted or construed in order for SEHO to hear a dispute identified by the statute. The interpretation or construction of settlement agreements is not a function for which the CDE’s compliance complaint procedure is well suited. (See California Government Code § 7585.) As discussed more fully below, the analysis of a settlement agreement may involve the consideration of many factors. The CDE procedure consists of a review of documents and interviews of the complainant and school district personnel by an investigator. There are no requirements that the compliance decision be based on sworn testimony or that the parties have the opportunity to cross-exam witnesses. CDE’s compliance unit does not adjudicate matters, and, therefore, its conclusions would not resolve the status of a settlement agreement for the purposes of litigation. Furthermore, federal courts have held that civil court is an appropriate forum only after a party has exhausted his administrative remedies. (See W.L.G. v. Houston County Board of Education, 975 F.Supp. 1317, 1328-1329 (M.D. Ala. 1997) and Tyson v. Kanawha County Board of Education, 22 F.Supp.2d 535, 537-538 (S.D. W.Va. 1997).)
Accordingly, unless SEHO exercises jurisdiction in these instances, a party may be forced into an inadequate forum or, alternatively, into a court only to be returned back to SEHO to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, any such bifurcated proceedings, as the District proposes in effect, would cause an inordinate delay in resolving the issues for a due process hearing and, in most cases, lead to a violation of the requirement that a due process hearing result in a written decision forty-five days from the date SEHO receives a request for hearing. (See California Education Code § 56505(f).) The Hearing Officer finds that he has jurisdiction to interpret and construe the Agreement as part of his obligation to resolve disputes pursuant to Education Code section 56501(a).
B. The Totality of the Circumstances:
With respect to the Agreement, the “validity and interpretation of a release of significant federal rights is governed by federal law.” Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1983). It does not appear that Congress has enacted special rules regarding the release of rights related to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). (See Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 88 F.Supp.2d 695, 704 (E.D. Tex. 2000).) Furthermore, the parties have not cited and the Hearing Officer’s has not otherwise located any specific case from either the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court that identifies specific factors for analyzing the waiver of IDEA rights. (Footnote 7) In the Ninth Circuit, the courts generally determine whether a release is voluntary, deliberate and informed by considering, on a case-by-case basis, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. (See Dominguez v. BCW, Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1159 (D.Ariz., 2000), summarizing the approach stated in Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.1989).)
In essence, Petitioner argues that MOTHER’s consent to the Agreement was not voluntary, deliberate and informed because the Agreement was ambiguous, she was too fatigued when she signed the Agreement, and the District pressured her into signing the Agreement. As to ambiguity, MOTHER testified that she thought the Agreement barred all claims to the date of the Agreement and operated prospectively with respect to Lindamood-Bell services. She did not believe Section 1.C. of the Agreement barred Petitioner’s claims regarding FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year. She testified that she believed she did not have the right to waive Petitioner’s claims. In addition, MOTHER testified that she thought the District had accepted the recommendations of Dr. Ulrey, a psychiatrist, given Ms. Tomsky’s alleged comment that the District had essentially accepted his recommendations by agreeing to the Lindamood-Bell services stated in Section 2.A. (Footnote 8) MOTHER testified that she thought the parties would address STUDENT’s classification at the next IEP meeting mentioned in Section 2.G. and that Section 2.G. suggests that Petitioner could reasonably expect more services for the 2002-2003 school year given that it states a “minimum” amount of services as opposed to a maximum. She talked to her husband twice during the day by phone. However, MOTHER testified that she requested to take the Agreement home overnight to review it with her husband, but her request was denied. MOTHER acknowledged that Ms. Tomsky read the Agreement aloud before MOTHER signed it, but she contends she was too tired for it to “register.” She also acknowledged that she should have read the Agreement more carefully. She testified that she assumed that the issues for hearing had been resolved in STUDENT’s favor.
The Hearing Officer finds that Section 1.C. is not overly vague or ambiguous. The Section does not use legalese, except perhaps with respect to the term “causes of action.” However, the Section also includes words such as resolving “all disputes” and “claims” which would enable a layperson to understand that the Agreement seeks to resolve all disagreements between the parties. MOTHER’s ability to understand the language of the Section is also greater than an average reader’s understanding given her extensive educational background, which includes a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree in political science and a master’s of business administration. MOTHER acknowledged that there was discussion during the day that the District was seeking to resolve the 2002-2003 school year in addition to the issues Petitioner had raised. Furthermore, Ms. Tomsky testified that barring claims through the stated time frame was talked about over and over again and that it was the “theme of the day” from the District’s perspective.
Although Section 2.G. states that the program, placement, and services listed there for the 2002-2003 school year would be offered “as a minimum,” Ms. Tomsky testified that this phrase was inserted at Petitioner’s request to enable the IEP team to offer more services if the team so chose. Ms. Tomsky’s testimony was undisputed, and MOTHER acknowledged that the District did not promise that any additional services would be provided. Furthermore, Section 3 of the Agreement specifically states that the party’s execution of the Agreement “is free and voluntary” and that “in executing this Agreement, he [sic.] has not relied on any inducements, promises, or representations other than those stated in this Agreement.” The Hearing Officer finds that Section 2.G. does not render the meaning of Section 1.C. ambiguous.
Petitioner contends, in essence, that MOTHER’s alleged inability to bring the Agreement home overnight and her fatigue late in the day provide a legal justification for avoiding the specific terms of the Agreement that Petitioner dislikes such as Section 1.C. (Footnote 9) On the other hand, the District’s witnesses strongly contested MOTHER’s claim that she asked to take the Agreement home. The District’s representative, Ms. Donahue, also testified that she would not have objected to MOTHER taking the Agreement home if such a request had been made.
Generally speaking, the law favors settlement. (See U.S. v. McInnes, 556 F.2d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1977) [“[w]e are committed to the rule that the law favors and encourages compromise settlements.”]. (Footnote 10) Even if the Hearing Officer assumes that the District would not permit MOTHER to take the Agreement home overnight and that MOTHER was fatigued, he is not convinced that these alleged facts deserve significant weight. Absent specific legal authority, the Hearing Officer is not prepared to hold that one party is required to permit the other to bring a settlement agreement home overnight in order for the Agreement to be enforceable. The IDEA statutes do not contain such a provision. Such a rule could cause great inconvenience and expense to school districts and parents by requiring them to re-attend the hearing the following business day and could, ultimately, undermine the public policy favoring settlements. (Footnote 11)
As to MOTHER’s fatigue in particular, MOTHER testified that she was fatigued when the Agreement was reached not only because the Hearing Officer in Case One had required that she submit her views in writing that morning but also because of her neuromuscular disease. (Footnote 12) She indicated that FAMILY FRIENDS attended the hearing to help ask questions of witnesses, which MOTHER had scripted, in the event MOTHER became too fatigued. FAMILY FRIEND 1 did not participate in the settlement discussions, but FAMILY FRIEND 2 did. The evidence does not demonstrate that FAMILY FRIEND 2 was acting fully in an educational advocate role as she did not participate in the prehearing conference or prepare Petitioner’s case for hearing. (Foonote 13) Nevertheless, FAMILY FRIEND 2 acknowledged that she acts as an educational advocate in Southern California. Furthermore, in the month before the hearing, the evidence demonstrated that FAMILY FRIEND 2, in her capacity as an educational advocate, attended an IEP meeting and a mediation related to Petitioner and Case One.
Only MOTHER can know whether she was too tired to fully comprehend the Agreement as well as she would have liked. She, of course, could have guarded against that concern by refusing to sign the Agreement that day. MOTHER acknowledged that she did not request a continuance of the matter, and the transcript of hearing in Case One does not reflect that she was in any way dissatisfied with the Agreement. In fact, when the parties came back on the record to announce the settlement, MOTHER not only confirmed that the parties had reached an agreement and desired to dismiss Case One, but also, she specifically requested that the Agreement be made a part of SEHO’s record. (Footnote 14) These actions indicate that MOTHER was fully involved even at the end of the day, and they do not suggest to either the District or to the Hearing Officer in Case One that she was too tired to understand the Agreement. The Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER was not so greatly fatigued as to invalidate the Agreement. (Footnote 15)
With regard to Petitioner’s claim that MOTHER felt “pressured” to sign the Agreement, the circumstances do not otherwise indicate that MOTHER signed the Agreement under duress or that the District coerced MOTHER into signing the Agreement. Petitioner has not shown that serious negative consequences would have resulted if MOTHER did not sign the Agreement. If MOTHER chose not to sign, the matter would have proceeded to hearing late in the day where she would have had the assistance of FAMILY FRIENDS. (Footnote 16) MOTHER acknowledged that Ms. Tomsky read the Agreement aloud, and there is no dispute that MOTHER had the opportunity to ask questions about it. Although not acting in an educational advocate capacity per se, FAMILY FRIEND 2 also reviewed the Agreement with MOTHER and was a resource available to MOTHER throughout the settlement discussions. The fact that the parties engaged in negotiations for several hours belies the notion that this was a one-sided document foisted upon MOTHER by the District.
The parties dispute whether there was more than one draft of the Agreement. Even if the Agreement was the only draft of the settlement document that was presented to MOTHER for review, MOTHER had input with respect to the terms of the Agreement. For example, Ms. Tomsky credibly testified that the phrase “as a minimum” stated in 2.G. was specifically included at MOTHER’s or FAMILY FRIEND 2 request. MOTHER consciously decided what amount of money she would accept as reimbursement for educational expenses incurred on STUDENT’s behalf, which is stated in Section 2.D. (Footnote 17) Furthermore, MOTHER testified that it took her a long time before agreeing to the provision that Lindamood-Bell services would be provided in Berkeley (see Section 2.A.) instead of Sacramento and that she discussed this arrangement by phone with her husband, who approved of the Berkeley location, before signing the Agreement. The fact that there is no provision in the law that would require the District to offer Lindamood-Bell services at all buttresses the conclusion that MOTHER was able to effectively negotiate provisions favorable to Petitioner.
The Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner and his parents have received substantial benefit from the Agreement. MOTHER acknowledged that the District has paid the $11,040 promised in Section 2.A. (although contesting how $525 of that amount was spent) and the $13,500 promised in Section 2.D. In addition, the District spent an additional $10,000 in transportation expenses. (Footnote 18) MOTHER indicated that Petitioner did not wish to return consideration to the District in the event the Agreement was found to be “null and void.” (Footnote 19)
In sum, the totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that MOTHER’s execution of the Agreement was voluntary, deliberate, and informed and that the Agreement is, therefore, valid. Petitioner’s claims that the Agreement is ambiguous, that MOTHER was too fatigued, and that MOTHER felt pressured are not substantiated and do not alter the conclusion that the Agreement is valid.
C. The Alleged Breach of the Agreement by the District:
With respect to the District’s alleged breach of the Agreement, “a partial failure of consideration justifies rescission only if the failure is `"material," or go[es] to the "essence" of the contract.’ (Citations.) Thus, the right to rescind a particular contract `depends upon the gravity of the breach’ relied on to justify the rescission.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida System, Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 840 (9th Cir. 1987). A national treatise states that in “order to justify rescission of a contract, there must be a material breach affecting a substantial or essential part of the contract or substantial nonperformance, but a casual, technical, or unimportant breach is not enough.” 17B Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts § 468 (footnotes omitted). “The general rule is that rescission will not be permitted for a breach which is incidental and subordinate to the main purpose of contract, … , but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in making the agreement, or those which constitute a vital breach.” (Id., footnotes omitted.) On the basis of Section 7 of the Agreement, Petitioner contends that any breach of the Agreement by the District, “no matter how small or big,” results in a total forfeiture of all consideration paid by the District. (Footnote 20) Petitioner contends that the District breached Section 2.A. of the Agreement by improperly allocating $525 of the $11,040 to evaluations and an optional report instead of instruction related services. In addition, although Petitioner concedes that the District did in fact provide an offer for the 2002-2003 school year that listed the minimum services stated in Section 2.G. of the Agreement, he contends that the District did not do anything more and that more was contemplated by the parties.
Initially, the Hearing Officer finds that the law generally applicable to rescission is not altered by Section 7 of the Agreement. The Agreement does not state that any breach, no matter how small, would result in a forfeiture of all consideration or of the contract itself. For example, it would make no sense to construe this provision to mean that the District’s failure to pay $1 owed under the Agreement resulted in a total forfeiture of the other $34,539 or more paid pursuant to the Agreement. A fair reading of the Agreement is that only a material breach of “any portion” of the Agreement would result in forfeiture of all consideration.
As to the $525, MOTHER testified that $400 went toward routine evaluations that Lindamood-Bell staff members perform before and after rendering instructional services to students and that $125 went toward an optional report that the District ordered. Section 2.A. mentions Lindamood-Bell “services” without specifying what types of expenses were included. Yet, the evaluations are an integral part of Lindamood-Bell’s program in that they measure a student’s progress, the report appears related to the evaluations, and Section 2.A. clearly caps the District’s liability at $11,040. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that these expenses are properly included within the $11,040 promised and paid by the District. As to the “minimum” offer stated in Section 2.G., one cannot conclude that the District is in breach of the Agreement merely because it did not do more than what is stated within the Agreement’s four corners. In fact, MOTHER testified that the District did not make any promises to do anything more than what was stated in Section 2.G. In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no breach of the Agreement.
D. The Agreement’s Prospective Nature:
Section 1.C. of the Agreement sought to bar all claims through the end to the 2002-2003 extended school year. Therefore, the Agreement has prospective application from the date the Agreement was signed on April 25, 2002, through the end of the following extended school year. The Hearing Officer has previously concluded that Section 1.C. was not unduly vague or ambiguous. As to whether the provision violates public policy, at least one court addressing a special education settlement has upheld a prospective settlement agreement, although it was careful to limit its holding. (See D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education (3rd Cir., 1997) 109 F.3d 896. ) (Footnote 21) Courts are reluctant to void a contract on public policy grounds absent an express legislative declaration, and this reluctance should apply, perhaps to an even greater extent, to administrative tribunals. “Anything which has a tendency to injure the public welfare is, in principle, against public policy. But to determine what contracts fall into this vague class is exceedingly difficult. It has been frequently observed that the question is primarily for the Legislature, and that, in the absence of a legislative declaration, a court will be very reluctant to hold the contract void.” 1 Witkin, Summary of California Law (9th Edition), Contracts, § 462 (citing numerous cases and treatises). Likewise, a national treatise states that the “courts are averse to holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy unless their illegality is clear and certain. Thus, it is said that the power of the courts to declare a contract void as against public policy must be exercised with caution and only in cases that are free from doubt.” 17A American Jurisprudence 2d, Contracts, § 26. Given a lack of authority indicating that prospective waivers under IDEA are void or voidable and the fact that parents and school districts routinely arrive at settlements over special education services that are to be provided the following school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the Agreement is valid. (Footnote 22)
II. The Burden of Going Forward:
On the first day of Hearing, Petitioner made an oral motion to change the burden of going forward to the District if the Hearing Officer granted the District’s motion to dismiss the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years. While the Ninth Circuit has determined that the school district has the burden of proof regarding special education matters (see Seattle School Dist., No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir. 1996)), SEHO has continued to follow the general rule that the party seeking to change the status quo bears the burden of going forward. (See Burger v. Murray County Sch. Dist., 612 F.Supp. 434 (N.D. Ga. 1984).) This approach reflects the fact that the party seeking to change the status quo is in a better position to present his case. In this case, the Agreement set the status quo. Section 2.G. of the Agreement indicates that the services mentioned in that paragraph shall constitute Petitioner’s last agreed-upon and implemented placement for the 2003-2004 school year, unless the parties otherwise agree in a subsequent IEP meeting, which they did not. Petitioner is the party seeking to change the status quo by requesting additional and different services as compared to those stated in the Agreement.
ORDER
1. The District’s motion to dismiss all issues pertaining to the 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 school years, including each respective extended school year, is granted.
2. Petitioner’s motion to shift the burden of going forward is denied.
3. On or before Monday, October 27, 2003, at 1:00 p.m., Petitioner’s counsel shall inform the District’s counsel and SEHO by facsimile of the names and titles of witnesses he intends to call on the first day of hearing.
4. The parties shall be fully prepared to proceed with the Hearing when it reconvenes on October 28, 2003, at 9:30 a.m.
Dated: October 29, 2003 ______________________________________Terrence B. Ohler, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office
The Order was amended on October 29, 2003, to correct typographical errors.
2 Lindamood-Bell is a private organization that has developed special programs aimed at improving students’ academic skills.
3 The statement omits issues relating to the 2003-2004 school year, but Petitioner has since provided an issues statement for that year as well.
4 Section 2.G. of the Agreement states: “[p]rior to the end of the 2001-2002 school year, the District agrees to convene (and the parties agree to meet) in an IEP meeting, during which the District shall make an offer of program, placement, and services for the 2002-2003 school year. That offer shall include, as a minimum, direct resource specialist services for one period per day, five days per week; consultation from the resource specialist for fifty (50) minutes per week; and occupational therapy consultation for sixty (60) minutes per month. In the event of a disagreement between the parties regarding STUDENT’s program, placement, and services for 2003-2004 school year, the services offered by the District and agreed-to by the Parent pursuant to this paragraph shall constitute STUDENT’s last agreed-upon and implemented placement (unless the parties have agreed otherwise in a subsequent IEP meeting).”
5 California Education Code section 56501(a) states: “[t]he parent and the public education agency involved may initiate the due process hearing procedures prescribed by this chapter under any of the following circumstances: (1) There is a proposal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child. (2) There is a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child. (3) The parent refuses to consent to an assessment of the child. (4) There is a disagreement between a parent or guardian and a district, special education local plan area, or county office regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, including the question of financial responsibility, as specified in subsection (b) of Section 300.403 of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations.”
6 The District acknowledges that SEHO has jurisdiction to determine whether a settlement agreement exists that would bar claims raised in a subsequent due process hearing. However, it contends that SEHO’s analysis must be limited to a review of the settlement agreement itself. The District’s position appears contradictory. While arguing that SEHO has jurisdiction to find that the Agreement is a bar to certain issues, it denies that SEHO has jurisdiction to perform the functions necessary to make such a finding such as interpreting the Agreement, construing the Agreement, or considering the underlying facts relevant to the Agreement’s validity.
7 While the case of W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3rd Cir. 1995) (Matula) and its enumerated factors are informative and persuasive in limited part, Matula is not binding authority in the Ninth Circuit, and its list of factors is not controlling. The Hearing Officer notes that a more recent Third Circuit case, D.R. v. East Brunswick Board of Education 109 F.3d 896 (3rd Cir. 1997), makes no reference to the factors identified in Matula.
8 Section 2.A. of the Agreement states: “[t]he parties agree that STUDENT will be placed in the Berkeley Lindamood-Bell program for Summer, 2002, and for one follow-up (two week) session during the 2002-2003 school year (if the Lindamood-Bell program staff determines the follow-up placement is appropriate). The District agrees to fund these services as determined to be appropriate by the Lindamood-Bell program in an amount not to exceed $11,040.”
9 Petitioner’s legal position is in conflict. On the one hand, he raises concerns that would have the effect of invalidating the Agreement in total. On the other hand, he wants to benefit from certain provisions in the Agreement by, for example, keeping the consideration paid to him. MOTHER testified that Petitioner does not wish to return consideration to the District in the event the Agreement was found to be “null and void.” The Hearing Officer notes that return of consideration is often required as a condition of granting rescission. (See California Civil Code sections 1691-1693.)
10 One of the policy reasons favoring settlement is that settlements relieve the burden on courts. (See Dawson v. U.S., 68 F.3d 886, 897 (5th Cir. 1995): “[e]arly settlement of cases is an extremely laudable goal, which federal judges have considerable power to encourage and facilitate, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, and which is essential to controlling the overcrowded dockets of our courts.”) Likewise, settlements play an important role in controlling SEHO’s docket. During fiscal year 2002-2003, over 94% of the requests for due process hearing were settled through mediated agreements, settlement agreements, or other resolutions without a decision being rendered (i.e., 2,643 out of 2,799 matters). This is a fairly standard percentage of cases resolved for the past fourteen years. Also during fiscal year 2002-2003, over 52% of the matters that reached hearing settled before a decision was rendered (i.e., 169 out of 325 matters). Settlements are often reached on the afternoon of the first day of a mediation or of a due process hearing.
11 Such a rule could have the unintended consequence of causing school districts to refuse to engage in settlement discussions on the day of hearing for fear that they would be required to incur the expense of coming back to hearing the following day. Naturally, such a rule would also impact the scheduling of witnesses. In effect, such a rule would likely decrease the number of settlements reached on the first day of hearing or thereafter.
12 At the prehearing conference in Case One, the presiding Hearing Officer ordered the parties to prepare written statements pertaining to whether the statute of limitations barred certain claims. MOTHER testified that she suffers from Dysimmune Dyschwannian Polyneuropathy, which causes her to become fatigued easily. Ms. Donahue testified that she generally knew before the date of settlement that MOTHER’s condition caused her to become fatigued. 13 FAMILY FRIEND 2 wrote a letter to SEHO dated March 25, 2002, indicating that she was not representing Petitioner at hearing. FAMILY FRIEND 2 testified that she had never represented anyone at a due process hearing and did not feel qualified to do so.
14 The portion of the transcript relating to MOTHER’s request states:
Hearing Officer: Okay and it is do you want to put a copy of the agreement in the file or or not. Ms. Tomsky: I actually don’t, it’s the party’s confidential agreement and I don’t want to put it on the record. Hearing Officer: Okay, it could be put in the case file, it would not be anything public but – uh – do you prefer not to then? PARENT: Ms. Tomsky could you please elaborate on why you would like it to not be part of the file – I mean all of these records are confidential anyway. Ms. Tomsky: Well I just see, I don’t see the purpose for it, and I guess I have no particularly – it’s actually fine, if you have a feeling that you’d like it to be part of the record, that’s fine. PARENT: I for record purposes I’d like it to be included as part of the record.
Hearing Officer: Okay, it will just be placed in the case file and it won’t be circulated or anything like that it will be confidential. (Student’s Exhibit 1292, line 20, through Student’s Exhibit 1293, line 7.)
15 However, even if the Hearing Officer assumes MOTHER was very fatigued, this does not appear to be a recognized basis for setting aside agreements. (See Coleson v. Inspector General of Dept. of Defense, 721 F.Supp. 763, 769 (E.D.Va.,1989): “[t]he Court has grave doubts as to whether this `mental exhaustion’ alleged by the plaintiff could provide the basis for relief from the agreement, even if accompanied by appropriate proof.”) A party’s fatigue is inherently subjective and difficult to objectively assess. Permitting one party’s fatigue to be the basis for setting aside an agreement would inject great uncertainty into the finality of settlement agreements, minimize the other party’s ability to rely upon the agreement, and ultimately frustrate the public policy favoring settlements.
16 The Hearing Officer in Case One indicated in the Prehearing Conference Order in Case One that both FAMILY FRIENDS would be permitted to assist MOTHER at the hearing so long as only one person questioned any given witness.
17 Section 2.D. of the Agreement states, “[w]ithin sixty (60) days of the full execution of this Agreement, the District agrees to reimburse Parent in the amount of $13,500 for educational costs incurred.” MOTHER testified that she believed her and her husband’s claim was worth approximately $27,000 but that “we agreed to settle for this $13,500 amount.”
18 These expenses related to transporting Petitioner to Lindamood-Bell. The Agreement states that the District would pay for certain transportation expenses, but the parties orally modified this provision to accommodate practical problems with the provision. The Agreement’s transportation provisions are not in dispute.
19 Again, the Hearing Officer notes that return of consideration is often required as a condition of granting rescission. (See California Civil Code sections 1691-1693.)
20 Section 7 of the Agreement states: “[t]his Agreement contains the entire Agreement between the parties. A breach of any portion of this Agreement shall be considered a breach of the whole Agreement. Should either party breach any portion of this Agreement, the breaching party shall forfeit any and all consideration promised or received under the terms of this Agreement.”
21“[W]e emphasize that our holding is limited to the facts of this case and should not be read to extend beyond this case and this agreement.” D.R., 109 F.3d at 898. 22 By its very nature, special education involves agreements about the future. Through the IEP process, IDEA law anticipates that a student’s parent/s and a school district will arrive at an agreement regarding a student’s special education program. (See California Education Code section 56346(a) [parental consent required before a special education program can be implemented].) The IEP document must include goals and objectives, which, by definition, are prospective in nature. 20 U.S.C. section 1414(d)(1)(A). Generally speaking, an IEP must be prepared at least annually. California Education Code section 56343. Presumably, an agreement that seeks to release a student’s IDEA rights for a period extending beyond the student’s next school year should be more strictly scrutinized than one, such as here, that only releases one prospective year.
