California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · September 22, 1999

Student v. Fresno Unified School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 1450-97 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

Fresno Unified, Fresno County Mental Health, and CCS win on all issues over massage therapy, assistive technology, and adaptive PE.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A 17-year-old eleventh grader, represented by her father, filed for due process against Fresno Unified School District, Fresno County Mental Health, and Fresno County's California Children's Services (CCS). She was eligible for special education under serious emotional disturbance, other health impairment, and specific learning disability. A medical condition caused severe swelling of her left arm. She claimed her 1998-1999 program should have included an adaptive PE class, intensive massage therapy, a home computer, and community dance programs. She also sought compensatory education and reimbursement for travel to massage therapy, and said the county agencies had not communicated with her. The Hearing Officer denied all claims. Student's motor skills were age appropriate, and regular PE with consultation from an adaptive PE teacher met her needs. The massage therapy treated a medical condition rather than an educational need. Her worries about attending school were addressed through day-treatment mental health services. CCS had already provided the intensive therapy in summer 1998. Student wrote well and could access her curriculum without assistive technology. The dance programs had no shown link to educational benefit. Student missed school from August to December 1998 despite repeated district outreach. Once she attended, she earned A's and B's and made social progress. The record did not support the communication claims. CCS's motion to be dismissed was denied because it provided services named in her IEP.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO separated medical treatment from related services. Massage therapy for a medical condition was not required because the student did not need it to benefit from her education. The decision also shows SEHO holding that agencies such as CCS are proper parties when they provide services written into an IEP.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue I.A. Was Student entitled to receive adaptive physical education as part of a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year (a class taught by an APE instructor rather than regular PE with APE consultation)?

    Student's gross motor skills were age appropriate; regular PE with APE consultation met her needs, and she was not denied access to PE.

  2. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue I.B. Was Student entitled to receive intensive massage therapy as part of a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year?

    Intensive massage therapy addressed a medical condition, not an educational need; her emotional concerns about school were met through mental health services, so it was not a required related service.

  3. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue I.C. Was Student entitled to receive assistive technology in the form of a computer for use at home as part of a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year?

    Student wrote legibly with good speed and could access her curriculum without a computer, so she did not need assistive technology to benefit from her education.

  4. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue I.D. Was Student entitled to receive extracurricular activities such as "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers" as part of a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year?

    The community dance programs taught dance rather than treating mental health needs; Student showed no link to educational benefit, and her IEP therapy services met her needs.

  5. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue II. Is Student entitled to compensatory education?

    Because Respondents offered and provided a FAPE for 1998-1999 and no grounds were shown for earlier years, compensatory education was denied.

  6. Issue III. Is Student entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to massage therapy from June to August 1998?

    No reimbursement: Student was offered a FAPE in the March 1998 IEP, massage therapy was not a related service, and the parent never consented to the IEP's massage therapy term.

  7. District prevailedImplementation

    Issue IV. Has Mental Health and/or County CCS failed to reasonably communicate with Petitioner regarding the provision of educationally related services?

    The evidence showed CCS and Mental Health responded in a timely way, and no services were denied or delayed because of any communication failure.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of Petitioner's requests for relief were denied.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Todd v. Andrews; Moubry v. Independent School District No. 696; Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Gov. Code 7575; Gov. Code 7586; Education Code 56346

People named in the decision

  • Mark Allen, manager of special education, Fresno Unified School District
  • Colleen Torgerson, program manager for special education, Fresno Unified School District
  • Kathleen Scott, program manager for special education, Fresno Unified School District
  • Steve Fritz, clinical supervisor, Fresno County Mental Health
  • Lola Aguinga, division manager, Children's Mental Health Services (observer), Fresno County Mental Health
  • Joan Claussen, senior health clinician / student's therapist, Fresno County Mental Health
  • Eulalio Castellanos, student's former attorney (witness), Central California Legal Services
  • Dr. Wilfred Derksen (also spelled Derkson), student's former physician (witness)
  • Dr. Charles Witte, lymphedema specialist who evaluated student, Tucson, Arizona
  • Beverly Miller, school nurse, Fresno Unified School District
  • Susan Allen, physical therapist providing massage therapy
  • Jeffrey Ogas, special education teacher, Fulton School
  • Jana Wilkerson, special education teacher, Fulton School
  • Jennifer Jordan, adaptive physical education specialist/assessor, Fresno Unified School District
  • Marty (also Mary) Fuquay, adaptive physical education teacher, Fresno Unified School District
  • Erma Shumway, assistive technology specialist, Fresno Unified School District
  • Janet Koch, special education teacher / home-hospital instructor, Wilson Elementary School, Fresno Unified School District
  • Barbara Thacker, special education teacher / former home-hospital instructor, Fresno Unified School District
  • Cheri (also Chery) McCarter, mental health clinician / ADT-II therapist
  • Erma Jones, clinical supervisor of day treatment programs
  • Ursula Manton, CCS administrator, California Children's Services, Fresno County
  • Sharon Kostuchek, registered nurse, Utilization Review, Fresno County
  • Kathy Gunn, administrative secretary to Gary Carozza, Fresno County Department of Community Health
  • Gary Carozza (also spelled Carroza), official, Fresno County Department of Community Health

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Fresno, California, on March 4, 5, 30, and 31, April 1, and May 4, 5, and 6, June 22 and 23, and July 8, 1999. Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by her father, FATHER. Petitioner was present on March 4, 5, 30, 31 and June 22 and 23, 1999. STUDENT's mother, MOTHER, and younger brother and sister were present off and on throughout the hearing. Additionally, Dawn Evans-Saldana, social worker for Child Protective Services of Fresno County, was present to observe the hearing at FATHER's request on May 4 and 6, 1999. Respondent Fresno Unified School District (Fresno USD or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Trevin Sims. Also representing the District was attorney Jonathon Read, who was present on the first day of hearing. Present on the District's behalf was Mark Allen, manager of special education for Fresno USD. Colleen Torgerson, program manager for special education for Fresno USD, was present on March 4, 1999. Kathleen Scott, program manager for special education for Fresno USD, was present at the hearing as the District representative during the morning of March 31, 1999. Respondent Fresno County Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented at hearing by attorneys Juliana Gmur and Heather Kruthers from the Office of the Fresno County Counsel. Steve Fritz, clinical supervisor for Fresno County Mental Health, was present on Respondent Mental Health's behalf on March 4, 1999. Lola Aguinga, division manager for Children's Mental Health Services, was present on March 4, 1999, as an observer. Respondent California Children's Services (CCS), as administered by Fresno County (County CCS), was represented at the hearing by Ms. Gmur and Ms. Kruthers. Respondent CCS was not represented at hearing on the state level. Petitioner STUDENT called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Joan Claussen, senior health clinician for Fresno County Mental Health; Eulalio Castellanos, STUDENT's former attorney from Central California Legal Services; and FATHER, STUDENT's father. Petitioner also testified at hearing on her own behalf. Dr. Wilfred Derksen, STUDENT's former physician, testified by telephone on April 1, 1999. Respondent District called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Beverly Miller, school nurse for Fresno USD; Susan Allen, physical therapist; Jeffrey Ogas, special education teacher for Fulton School; Jennifer Jordan, adaptive physical education teacher; Jana Wilkerson, special education teacher for Fulton School; Erma Shumway, assistive technology specialist; Janet Koch, special education teacher for Wilson Elementary School; Mark Allen, manager of special education for Fresno USD; Marty Fuquay, adaptive physical education teacher; and Cheri McCarter, mental health clinician. Respondent Fresno County Mental Health and California Children's Services called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Ursula Manton, CCS administrator; Sharon Kostuchek, registered nurse from Fresno County Utilization Review; and Kathy Gunn, administrative secretary to Gary Carozza. Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of written closing arguments. Closing arguments from Respondents District, Mental Health, and CCS were received on August 6, 1999. Although Petitioner was granted an extension of the deadline for the submission of closing briefs until August 13, 1999, no brief was received from Petitioner. Thus, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision. PROCEDURAL MATTERS At the beginning of the hearing on March 4, 1999, Respondents District, Mental Health, and County CCS objected to Petitioner's failure to provide them an issue statement within ten days of the hearing. Ms. Gmur and Ms. Kruthers indicated that they received Petitioner's "issue statement" in the form of a two-page handwritten letter from FATHER which lists a number of citations to laws and regulations. Ms. Gmur and Ms. Kruthers asserted that the two-page list of citations, without any other information, gave them no indication as to Petitioner's issues for hearing. Respondents also joined in objecting to Petitioner's failure to provide them evidence five days prior to the hearing. When asked by the Hearing Officer whether Petitioner had provided such evidence, FATHER replied that he had not done so but that he had brought the evidence to the hearing. However, FATHER stated that he had not made copies of Petitioner's evidence for the parties or the Hearing Officer. When asked by the Hearing Officer what remedy Respondents sought for Petitioner's procedural violations, Respondents stated that they sought no remedy other than to have the objections noted for the record. Additionally, Respondents stated that they would like to proceed with the hearing despite the lack of evidence and notification of issues. Furthermore, Respondents reserved their right to object to each piece of documentary evidence Petitioner sought to admit. Petitioner then called Joan Claussen, her therapist, to testify at the hearing. When Petitioner did not have any questions for Ms. Claussen, the Hearing Officer excused the witness. Because Respondents were not provided with copies of the evidence and had no notice of what evidence Petitioner intended to submit, the Hearing Officer adjourned the hearing at 3:00 p.m. to allow the parties to obtain copies of Petitioner's evidence to review prior to the start of the hearing the next day. The District offered to make copies of the evidence, which filled the milk crate in which the evidence was contained. During the second day of hearing, Petitioner called her prior attorney, Eulalio Castellanos, to testify. She also sought to admit items of documentary evidence that were not copied to the parties the previous day. Respondents objected to the evidence because it was not presented five days prior to hearing and because they were not provided with copies. The Hearing Officer did not admit the evidence but allowed Petitioner to make copies of the evidence to submit to Respondents prior to the continued hearing scheduled for three weeks later. Throughout the rest of the days of hearing beginning on March 30, 1999, Petitioner continued to attempt to admit evidence without providing copies to the Respondents and the Hearing Officer. When the Hearing Officer did not admit the evidence because copies were not provided to the parties, FATHER stated that he could not afford to make copies for everyone. On the first day of hearing, CCS and Mental Health made motions to be dismissed as parties, asserting that they were not involved in any of the issues identified by Petitioner. After Petitioner clarified her issues, the motions to be dismissed were denied. On March 16, 1999, by prehearing motion submitted to the Hearing Office, CCS made another motion to be dismissed as a party. CCS contended that the Hearing Office had no jurisdiction to make a binding order against CCS. Special education due process procedures (and jurisdiction) extend to the parent, under some circumstances to the student, and to the public education agency involved in decisions regarding the student. California Education Code  56501(a). "Public agency" is defined as a "district, special education local plan area, or county office ... or any other public agency providing special education or related services." Education Code  56500. Furthermore, pursuant to Government Code Section 7575(a)(1), "the Department of Health Services, or any designated local agency administering the California Children's Services, shall be responsible for the provision of medically necessary occupational therapy and physical therapy...by reason of medical diagnosis when contained in the child's individualized education program." Moreover, Section 7586(a) of the Government Code states that issues regarding a related service or a designated instruction and service shall be resolved through a due process proceeding, and the decision issued from such proceeding shall be binding on the state department or designated local agency having responsibility for providing the services to the student. Finally, subsection (c) of the same government code section states that "[a]ll hearing requests that involve multiple services that are the responsibility of more than one state department shall give rise to one hearing with all responsible state or local agencies joined as parties." As issues for hearing, Petitioner asserted that the frequency of massage therapy designated in her IEP as a related service should have been increased and that CCS failed to communicate with her, which resulted in the denial or delay of her services. Because CCS was the public agency providing the massage therapy for Petitioner, including those services designated in her IEP, and because Petitioner raised issues involving CCS in her special education program, the Hearing Officer denied CCS's motion to be dismissed as a party to the action. On April 1, 1999, the Hearing Officer rested Petitioner's case. After numerous reminders on March 5, 30, 31, and April 1, 1999, to Petitioner to have her witnesses appear for hearing, Petitioner failed to present her witnesses. On March 30, 1999, FATHER stated that he had not called anyone to come to testify at the hearing. Instead, FATHER testified on March 30 and concluded his testimony at the end of the hearing on March 31, 1999. On April 1, FATHER again did not have any witnesses present to testify at hearing. The Hearing Officer allowed FATHER a short break to telephone his witnesses. As a result, Dr. Derkson agreed to testify by phone. After Dr. Derkson's testimony, the Hearing Officer called a lunch break to allow Petitioner another opportunity to present her witnesses for hearing. The Hearing Officer again warned FATHER that it was Petitioner's responsibility to line-up her witnesses and that her case would be rested if she had no additional witnesses to call. Upon returning from lunch, FATHER had not lined-up any additional witnesses. As a result, the Hearing Officer rested Petitioner's case, with the exception of allowing the testimony of STUDENT. Respondents assented to allowing STUDENT to testify at a later date when she was present for hearing. (footnote 1) On May 4, 1999, the seventh day of hearing, Petitioner and her representatives did not appear for the hearing, which was scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. At 10:00 a.m., the Hearing Officer requested the Hearing Office to contact Petitioner. During a telephone conversation with the Hearing Office staff, FATHER stated that he thought the hearing was delayed until early afternoon and that he would be unable to attend the hearing until 2:00 p.m. Respondents agreed to convene the hearing at 5:00 p.m. for two to three hours. The Hearing Office confirmed with FATHER that the hearing would convene at 5:00 p.m. on May 4, 1999. Thus, the hearing was adjourned until 5:00 p.m. that evening. The hearing began at 5:20 p.m., immediately after FATHER appeared. While the District's first witness for the evening was testifying, FATHER left the room. When asked by the Hearing Officer where he was going, FATHER stated, "I'm leaving. I'll handle this somewhere else." A similar incident occurred one month prior, on April 1, 1999. Then, FATHER had also attempted to leave the hearing during testimony of the District's witness. Upon being questioned by the Hearing Officer as to why he was leaving, FATHER stated, "I'm sick of this." In regard to the case, FATHER stated that he did not care what happened to the case. The Hearing Officer then admonished FATHER that the hearing would proceed in his absence if he chose to leave the hearing. After a ten-minute break, FATHER decided to remain at the hearing. Having already been admonished as to the consequences of his decision to leave the hearing, when FATHER left the hearing on May 4, 1999, the hearing proceeded in his absence. Moreover, FATHER failed to attend the hearing for any significant amount of time on May 5 or 6, 1999. Although Petitioner and her father were present at hearing on June 22 and 23, neither appeared for the last day of hearing on July 8, 1999. ISSUES I. Was STUDENT entitled to receive the following services as part of a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year? A. adaptive physical education, B. intensive massage therapy, C. assistive technology in the form of a computer for use at home, and D. extracurricular activities such as "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers"? II. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education? III. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to massage therapy from June to August 1998? IV. Has Mental Health and/or County CCS failed to reasonably communicate with Petitioner regarding the provision of educationally related services? POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES Petitioner STUDENT asserted that her 1998-1999 school year program as set forth in the March 10, 1998 Individualized Education Program (IEP) was inappropriate because it did not provide for: 1) adaptive physical education with an APE instructor, 2) intensive massage therapy at a frequency of three times a day, five to six days a week, for four to six weeks, 3) assistive technology, and 4) extracurricular activities such as "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers." Petitioner claimed that, although adaptive physical education (APE) consultation services is listed in her IEP, she needs to be in a class with an APE instructor rather than a regular physical education instructor. Additionally, Petitioner asserted that she required intensive massage therapy to reduce the swelling in her arm so that she would not be embarrassed when she attended school. Petitioner also contended that she required assistive technology to enable her to type, a skill that she needs because she intends to pursue a career in journalism. Finally, Petitioner contended that she required extracurricular activities to improve her self-esteem. Because, as Petitioner asserted, an appropriate placement would include the services listed above, Petitioner requested that such services be ordered for her. Moreover, Petitioner argued that, because such services have not been provided for her in the past, she has been denied a FAPE and requires compensatory education. She also requested reimbursement for the cost of transportation to her massage therapy sessions. In regard to Respondents Mental Health and County CCS, Petitioner argued that she has had problems communicating with them and that these communication problems resulted in "many delays" in the provision of her services. However, Petitioner failed to identify what communication problems she had and what services were delayed or denied. Respondent District contended that it has "tried to implement the best [placement] possible" for STUDENT. The District argued that STUDENT does not require assistive technology or intensive massage therapy to benefit from her education. Additionally, the District argued that APE is part of STUDENT's March 1998 IEP and has been provided for her. Furthermore, the District asserted that STUDENT does not require "Dance Empowerment" or "Break the Barriers" (footnote 2) as part of her IEP. Thus, it asserted that the March 1998 IEP is appropriate and meets STUDENT's unique and individual needs. Respondents Mental Health and County CCS contended that they have been cooperative with FATHER in the provision of services for STUDENT and that they have not unreasonably delayed or denied such provision of services. BACKGROUND FACTS At the time of the hearing, STUDENT was a seventeen-year-old eleventh-grader who was qualified for special education and related services as a student with a serious emotional disturbance (SED), an other health impairment (OHI), and a specific learning disability (SLD). STUDENT suffers from Proteus Syndrome and severe lymphadema of the left arm, disorders which result in improper lymphatic flow into the body. Due to her medical condition, STUDENT's left arm and hand are severely swollen and her use of the arm and hand is limited. STUDENT has been qualified for special education and related services since 1991. She is also receiving therapy services from Fresno County Mental Health and medical treatment from the California Children's Services. As of the dates of the hearing, STUDENT was attending an adolescent day treatment program at Fulton School. During the 1996-1997 school year, STUDENT was in the ninth grade. Initially, she was placed in a special day class at Bullard High School. However, during the fall of 1996, STUDENT was hospitalized on numerous occasions due to infections in her left arm. While at the hospital, STUDENT became depressed and developed suicidal tendencies. After a nurse observed her holding a broken thermometer and threatening to ingest the mercury within the thermometer, STUDENT was placed on 24-hour watch. As a result of her numerous hospitalizations, STUDENT missed most of the fall semester at Bullard High School. Shortly after her final release from the series of hospitalizations during this time, STUDENT's IEP team agreed to place her at the Adolescent Day Treatment II (ADT-II) program, where she was to receive intensive mental health therapy services. (footnote 3) STUDENT was also provided home/hospital instruction from a special education instructor for an hour and a half each day to satisfy the academic component of her educational program. During the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT continued to attend the ADT-II program. Pursuant to her August 38, 1997 IEP, STUDENT's home instruction was reduced to three hours per week (i.e., two sessions at one hour and a half each). STUDENT's home/hospital instruction was provided by Barbara Thacker, special education teacher. According to her fall 1997 semester report card, STUDENT did a minimum of her work and her attendance to the home/hospital instruction was irregular. During the eleven-week grading period, STUDENT only attended twelve of her hour and a half sessions. As a result, she earned all D's on her report card. Ms. Janet Koch replaced Ms. Thacker as STUDENT's home-hospital instructor at this time. On March 10, 1998, STUDENT's IEP team met to determine her placement for the rest of the 1997-1998 school year and for the 1998-1999 school year. At the IEP meeting, the District members of the team recommended an extensive program for STUDENT which included a transition from the ADT-II to ADT-I program, consultation from an adaptive physical education instructor, continued home instruction until she transitioned to ADT-I or Bullard High School, occupational therapy, counseling and mental health services, and consultations with the school nurse. Both FATHER and STUDENT's attorney, Eulalio Castellanos, declined to sign the IEP at that time. On April 21, 1998, the IEP was amended by the District to include massage therapy in STUDENT's placement. As stated on the IEP, the "District agrees to add massage therapy 1x a week direct services (20-30 minutes)." Finally, on July 21, 1998, FATHER signed and consented to the March 1998 IEP "except as to issues regarding the frequency of massage therapy, damages, and reimbursement." Also during this time, STUDENT's family continued to seek treatment for her Proteus Syndrome. STUDENT's doctors, including her physician, Dr. Wilfred Derkson, believed that her arm should be amputated, for fear that her lymph would become infected and the infection would spread to her blood system and kill her. Because of STUDENT's family's adamant opposition to an amputation, Dr. Derkson sent STUDENT to Tucson, Arizona, to be assessed by Dr. Charles Witte, the country's leading expert on the treatment of lymphadema. Based on his evaluation of STUDENT on May 4, 1998, Dr. Witte recommended that she be provided intensive massage therapy at a frequency of 2-3 times a day for 5-6 days a week for 4-6 weeks. The treatment Dr. Witte recommended included massage therapy and specialized wrapping of her left shoulder, arm and hand. Dr. Witte also indicated that STUDENT's therapy of bandage-wrapping needed to be maintained at home on a daily basis and that she needed to wear a compression stockinette on her arm and hand. In June 1998, more than one month after Dr. Witte's evaluation, California Children's Services provided STUDENT with intensive massage therapy at the frequency prescribed by Dr. Witte. STUDENT's massage therapy was administered by Susan Allen, physical therapist, under the supervision of Dr. Derkson. According to Susan Allen, she provided STUDENT with intensive massage therapy at a frequency of two times a day for six weeks, then one time a day for an additional six weeks. On September 1, 1998, STUDENT's therapy was then decreased to one time a week for maintenance of the arm. Following the intensive therapy provided by Ms. Allen, STUDENT's arm size had decreased by 25 centimeters (measured at various points up her arm), she had less pain, and she could move and use her arm better. However, when the frequency of the massage therapy was reduced to one time a week, STUDENT appeared for some appointments but stopped coming to therapy altogether in November of 1998. STUDENT's home maintenance of her arm (i.e., wrapping her arm and wearing the compression sleeve) was also inconsistent. The 1998-1999 school year was scheduled to begin on August 21, 1998. However, STUDENT did not start attending school at this time. Between August and December, when STUDENT finally started attending school, various District and Mental Health personnel made numerous attempts to have her attend school. Chery McCarter, STUDENT's therapist at the ADT-II program, testified that she made at least seven telephone calls and two visits to the PARENTS' home regarding STUDENT's being out of school. Additionally, Beverly Miller, school nurse, made numerous phone calls, wrote letters, and visited the PARENTS' home to discuss with STUDENT and her parents the issue of transitioning her back to school. Additionally, Erma Jones, clinical supervisor of the day treatment programs, spoke to FATHER in early September and suggested the possibility of gradually transitioning STUDENT back to school for part of the school day. According to STUDENT and her father, she did not attend school during this time because she was uncomfortable with the bulkiness of the bandages on her arm and she was apprehensive about starting a new educational program. While attempts by the District and Mental Health were being made to have STUDENT attend school, the District provided STUDENT with home/hospital instruction with Janet Koch. According to Ms. Koch, she had made attempts to set up home instruction with STUDENT as early as October 5, 1998, when it was clear that she was not attending school. However, Ms. Koch testified that STUDENT's parents did not respond to her contacts to set up home/hospital instruction. Additionally, after arrangements were made for home/hospital instruction to be provided, home/hospital instruction was sometimes not provided because Ms. Koch would arrive at the home only to find that there was no one there or she would be unable to enter the home to provide instruction because no adult was present. The home/hospital instruction STUDENT was being provided at this time included instruction in English, math, world history, science,journalism, and art. Ms. Koch testified that STUDENT's curriculum was based on requirements for graduating from Bullard High School, where STUDENT attended briefly during the fall of her ninth grade year. Additionally, Ms. Koch testified that STUDENT's curriculum was set at an eighth grade level, where she was functioning. Despite problems with providing her with home instruction, STUDENT earned four C's, a C+ and, an A on her fall quarter progress report and all A's and B's on her fall semester report card. (footnote 4) Ms. Koch noted on her progress report that STUDENT was able to complete her assignments. On December 3, 1998, FATHER toured the ADT-II program. Then, on December 11, 1998, STUDENT began school. Once STUDENT entered school full-time at the ADT-II program, the District sought to implement her March 1998 IEP, which had been signed by FATHER in July. As indicated above, FATHER agreed with the IEP, except for the frequency of massage therapy recommended by the District members of the IEP team. The District members of the team offered STUDENT massage therapy at a frequency of one time per week. Such recommendation was made prior to Dr. Witte's evaluation. However, by the time FATHER signed the IEP, STUDENT had already been receiving Dr. Witte's recommended intensive massage therapy for about one month as provided by CCS. According to Beverly Miller, the District required a doctor's prescription for STUDENT's massage therapy (to be provided one time per week) before the District could begin the therapy. No such prescription was provided to the District until February 1999. (footnote 5) Then, on March 2, 1999, the IEP team convened for STUDENT's annual review. At the IEP meeting, the District members of the team offered STUDENT the same placement from the March 1998 IEP, except that massage therapy was clarified as being offered by CCS and not the District. FATHER did not consent to the March 1999 IEP. On March 4, 1999, the due process hearing in this matter began. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Is STUDENT entitled to receive the following services as part of a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year? Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C.  1400; Education Code  56000. The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student's individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C.  1401(a)(18). "Special education" is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C.  1401(a)(16). The term "related services" includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C.  1401(17). California Education Code  56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California's term for related services, shall be provided "when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program." To determine whether the Respondents provided STUDENT a free appropriate public education, one must focus on the adequacy of Respondents' program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F. 2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that the student's individualized educational program (IEP) must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student's abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a "basic floor of opportunity" that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley, 458 at 207-208. Thus, if the District's program reflected STUDENT's needs, provided some benefit, and comported with his IEP, the District provided a FAPE, even if the parents preferred another program and even if the parents' preferred program would have resulted in greater educational benefit. To summarize, under the IDEA and Rowley, Respondents' proposed program must have met the following three requirements in order to have constituted an appropriate educational program: (1) been designed to meet STUDENT's unique needs, (2) been reasonably calculated to provide her with some educational benefit, and (3) comported with her IEP. A. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique needs The first step in this analysis is to determine what STUDENT's unique and individual needs were during the 1998-1999 school year. It is undisputed that STUDENT was qualified for special education and related services as a student with an SLD and a severe emotional disturbance. Accordingly, the parties agree that STUDENT required specialized academic instruction to address her specific learning disabilities in the areas of math and reading comprehension, and mental health services to meet her psychological and emotional needs. The parties also generally agree that the services listed in the IEP were designed to meet these academic and mental health needs. STUDENT was also qualified for special education and related services as a student who was "other health impaired" due to the disability in her left arm. In light of the condition of her left arm, the parties agree that STUDENT required nursing consultation to monitor her physical health. Petitioner made two contentions at hearing regarding whether her educational program was designed to meet her unique and individual needs. First, she argued that her adaptive physical education services were inadequate to meet her needs. Second, she argued that her IEP did not provide for intensive massage therapy, assistive technology, and participation in community activities, all related services that she required to benefit from her education. With regard to Petitioner's first contention, the parties generally agree that STUDENT needed some form of adaptive physical education in her educational program. However, Petitioner asserted that she needed to be placed in an adaptive physical education class taught by an APE instructor. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that STUDENT was able to function within a regular physical education class with modifications as determined through consultations with an APE teacher. The evidence established that STUDENT could, in fact, function in a regular education classroom with minor modifications. Jennifer Jordan, the APE specialist who assessed STUDENT, testified that STUDENT's gross motor abilities were age appropriate. She also stated that STUDENT qualified for APE based on her medical condition and that she needed to be directed into appropriate activities given her condition. However, STUDENT did not require assistance with her motor abilities. Additionally, Jeffrey Ogas and Jana Wilkerson, STUDENT's teachers, testified that STUDENT was able to participate with the other students during physical education, that she was quite adept at volleyball, and that she would not allow anyone to help her as she participated in physical education. Moreover, Mary Fuquay, APE instructor, testified that STUDENT did not require many modifications to perform in her physical education program. Rather, STUDENT's modifications were primarily to avoid or minimize situations where she could hurt or infect her arm. Ms. Fuquay also testified that she was scheduled to be available for consultation with STUDENT's teacher every Friday morning. She also consulted with STUDENT on how to have a more successful volleyball serve and how to shoot baskets better, and she told STUDENT that she could ask for a runner in softball if her foot hurt. (footnote 6) Finally, STUDENT testified at hearing that she was able to participate in the various physical education activities, and that, in some situations, she could play better than other non-physically disabled students in her class. Based on the above, STUDENT's placement in the regular physical education class with APE consultation was appropriately designed to meet her needs. Petitioner's second contention centered on whether, based on her mental and physical health needs, STUDENT required certain related services to benefit from her education. Petitioner argued that she required intensive massage therapy at a frequency recommended by Dr. Witte (footnote 7), assistive technology to aid in her use of a computer, and extracurricular activities such as "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers." Whether any of these services were related services that STUDENT required to benefit from her education will be addressed below. 1. Intensive massage therapy Petitioner asserted that she required massage therapy at a frequency of 2-3 times a day for 5-6 days a week for 4-6 weeks to benefit from her education. Petitioner claimed that such intensive massage therapy would have decreased the size of her left arm and increased its mobility. Thus, with an arm that looked closer to the size of her right arm, Petitioner would have been less self-conscious and more willing to attend school. Respondents disputed that the massage therapy is a related service because STUDENT did not need the massage therapy to benefit from her education. At hearing, Petitioner presented evidence that complications with her left arm due to her Proteus Syndrome and lymphadema required that she be hospitalized and miss school on numerous occasions during prior years. STUDENT and her father also testified that she did not attend school from August to December of 1998 because she was embarrassed by the size of her arm and was apprehensive about entering a new school environment. Although STUDENT has many emotional issues regarding her arm that needed to be addressed, the evidence established that she did not require massage therapy to benefit from her education. As was noted above, STUDENT was offered and provided individual and group therapy to address her psychological and emotional issues, including those that relate to her poor self-image and apprehension about attending school. Additionally, as will be discussed below, STUDENT was provided with the intensive massage therapy in accordance with Dr. Witte's recommendations by CCS from June to August 1998. Although STUDENT was already provided the massage therapy prior to the start of the 1998-1999 school year, she still refused to attend school for most of the fall semester. According to Dr. Derkson, the massage therapy would only partially decrease the size of her arm and slightly improve the mobility of the arm, but would not return the arm to its normal size and function. Furthermore, Dr. Derkson testified that he and his colleagues recommended that the arm be amputated and that it will likely still require amputation despite the provision of the massage therapy. The Hearing Officer notes that, although Petitioner argued that she required intensive massage therapy for a period of six weeks, she in fact was requesting the provision of massage therapy for an indeterminant period of time. According to Susan Allen, STUDENT was offered massage therapy twice a day for five days a week for six weeks in conformance with Dr. Witte's recommendations. However, FATHER argued that Dr. Witte's regimen of massage therapy was not provided because he was unable to take STUDENT to a number of her sessions. Thus, according to FATHER, because he was unable to take STUDENT to her therapy, CCS did not provide such therapy. Evidence was also provided at hearing that STUDENT was offered "Handy-Ride" (subsidized transportation to her massage therapy) but that she did not take advantage of the offer. Finally, both Dr. Witte and Dr. Derkson recommended that STUDENT maintain the gains to her arm made from the intensive massage therapy by continuing the bandage wrapping at home and by wearing the required compression garments on her arm and hand. STUDENT, Ms. Allen, and Ms. Miller all testified that such home maintenance was not consistently followed and the compression glove was rarely worn. Moreover, CCS offered massage therapy at a frequency of once a week (after the six weeks of intensive massage therapy had already been provided) to maintain the condition of the arm, but it was refused by the PARENTS. Therefore, the PARENTS were perpetuating a situation in which STUDENT's needs would never be met as a result of their own actions. In summary, STUDENT's issues relating to attending school with an enlarged, partially functional arm was appropriately addressed with mental health services. Additionally the massage therapy, as recommended by Dr. Witte, was designed to forestall the amputation of STUDENT's arm, not to enable her to physically attend school. As such, the condition of STUDENT's arm was a medical condition that does not, by itself, prevent her from getting an education. Therefore, STUDENT's massage therapy was provided for reasons effectively unrelated to her education. Because there was no persuasive evidence that the physical condition of STUDENT's arm prohibited her from benefitting from her education, it is found that the intensive massage therapy was not a related service that was required to be included in her educational program. 2. Assistive technology Petitioner asserted that she required assistive technology because the Proteus Syndrome and lymphadema in her left arm hinders her ability to type on a keyboard. Thus, she argued that she needed assistive technology to enable her to type proficiently and to use a computer, which are skills she needs to reach her aspiration of becoming a journalist. Petitioner requested that she be provided a laptop computer for home use, voice recognition software, and an adapted keyboard for use with her right hand. The District, on the other hand, argued that STUDENT was able to write legibly with her right hand and that her current curriculum did not require that she learn to type on a keyboard or use a computer. Accordingly, the District contended that it was not required to provide STUDENT with assistive technology as a related service because she did not require it to benefit from her education. The evidence established that STUDENT did not need assistive technology to benefit from her education during the 1998-1999 school year. Erma Shumway, assistive technology specialist for Fresno USD, testified at hearing that she interviewed STUDENT's teacher, Janet Koch, who reported that there were no areas in STUDENT's curriculum which she could not access due to the limited use of her left arm. Additionally, Ms. Shumway procured writing samples from STUDENT and determined that STUDENT wrote with good speed and clarity. As a result, Ms. Shumway concluded that STUDENT did not need assistive technology to benefit from her education, but that she may need assistive technology should her future curriculum require that she be able to type or use a computer. Similarly, STUDENT's teachers, Jeffery Ogas and Jana Wilkerson, both testified that STUDENT did not need assistance with writing. Specifically, Ms. Wilkerson testified that STUDENT wrote well, had good penmanship, and that her inability to type with both hands did not affect her ability to function adequately within her curriculum. Finally, FATHER himself testified that STUDENT was able to complete her homework and school work without a computer and that assistive technology in the form of computer equipment would serve mainly to motivate STUDENT to do her work. Based on the above, it is found that STUDENT did not need assistive technology as a related service during the 1998-1999 school year. (footnote 8) 3. Extracurricular activities such as "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers" Finally, Petitioner asserted that she required enrollment in programs like "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers" to benefit from her education. (footnote 9) According to Petitioner, taking part in such activities would increase her self-confidence, would motivate her to perform well in school, and would lessen her depression. The Respondents dispute that STUDENT required such activities to benefit from her education and asserted that such programs are not services over which Respondents have any control. It is undisputed that STUDENT requires mental health and counseling services to address her depression, suicidal tendencies, and fear of social interactions. Accordingly, STUDENT's March 1998 IEP allowed for placement at the ADT-II program, where she would receive individual and group therapy to address her specific psychological and emotional issues. Although "Dance Empowerment" and "Break the Barriers" are programs of which Petitioner desires to take advantage, such programs focus on the instruction of dance rather than the treatment of her mental health needs. Thus, Petitioner did not establish a nexus between the services and why she required them to achieve educational benefit. Therefore, enrollment in such programs was not a related service that STUDENT required in her educational placement. Rather, the therapy services as provided for in STUDENT's March 1998 IEP were services designed to meet her unique and individual educational needs. In conclusion, the services in STUDENT's March 1998 IEP were designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs. Furthermore, STUDENT did not require intensive massage therapy, assistive technology, and enrollment in "Dance Empowerment" or "Break the Barriers" to benefit from her education. B. Provide STUDENT with some educational benefit During the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT did not begin attending school until mid December of 1998. Pursuant to her March 1998 IEP, STUDENT was to transition to the ADT-I program from the ADT-II program during this school year. However, rather than allow for a gradual transition, FATHER chose to allow STUDENT to enter the 1998-1999 school year full time in the ADT-I program. Additionally, because Respondents were not clearly notified that STUDENT would not be attending school, they were unable to provide home hospital instruction services until November 1998. STUDENT began school a month later in December. Although STUDENT made little, if any, academic progress from August to December due to her absence from school, her educational program was designed to provide her with educational benefit. STUDENT entered her eleventh grade year with significant disabilities. To address her self-confidence issues, depression, and apprehension about social interactions and entering new environments, STUDENT was offered individual and group therapy. Goals and objectives were also developed to increase her self-esteem and ability to interact in social situations. To address her learning disabilities, she was placed in special day classes where she would receive assistance with reading comprehension and math computation skills. Finally, to address her physical disabilities, she was offered nurse consultation services to monitor her health and APE consultation services to prevent injury during physical education. Each of these services were offered to enable STUDENT to benefit from her education, but she did not take advantage of them. Once STUDENT attended the ADT-I program at Fulton School, she was able to make progress in her educational placement. Jeffry Ogas, STUDENT's teacher, testified that she was "very bright" academically, was a "good student," asked intelligent questions during class, participated regularly, and had no problems turning in assignments. Similarly, STUDENT's other teacher, Jana Wilkerson, testified that STUDENT was able to perform at the same level as the other students in her class. Furthermore, Ms. Koch, STUDENT's home instruction teacher who continued to tutor STUDENT through the end of her first semester in the ADT-I program, testified that STUDENT had progressed academically. She stated that it was clear to her, upon working with STUDENT on her school assignments, that STUDENT understood her assignments and could process what she had learned. During this time, STUDENT earned all A's and B's on her report card as compared to D's from the prior year. The evidence also established that STUDENT was able to make progress emotionally. Mr. Ogas and Ms. Wilkerson both testified that when STUDENT first entered the program in December, she appeared withdrawn and shy and she sat apart from other students. Additionally, they testified that STUDENT was able to interact socially with her peers and had made friends. Ms. Wilkerson also stated that STUDENT appeared to be a "leader," in that she would initiate activities and conversation with her peers. STUDENT also testified that she felt comfortable talking with her peers. Based on the foregoing, it is found that STUDENT's placement was designed to, and in fact did, provide her with adequate educational benefit during her 1998-1999 school year. (footnote 10) C. Comport with STUDENT's IEP When the 1998-1999 school year began in August of 1998, STUDENT did not attend school. There was substantial evidence that the Respondents made numerous attempts to get STUDENT to attend school. Both Beverly Miller, the school nurse, and Chery McCarter, STUDENT's therapist, visited the PARENTS' home to discuss ways for STUDENT to attend school. STUDENT was also offered the opportunity to transition into school slowly by attending only part of the school day in the beginning. However, despite Respondents' attempts to have STUDENT attend school to receive her mental health services and academics, her parents wanted her to remain out of school for the entire first half of the school year. Therefore, Respondents were unable to implement STUDENT's March 1998 IEP during this time. Once STUDENT finally began attending school in mid-December of 1998, Respondents were able to implement her March 1998 IEP. Petitioner asserted that when she was in the ADT-I program, Respondents denied her access to physical education by forbidding her to participate. Petitioner also contended that Respondents failed to provide the high school staff and her classmates with disability awareness training as is set forth in her IEP. There is no evidence that STUDENT was ever denied access to her physical education program. Although STUDENT testified that she was not allowed to participate in physical education, she also stated that she was unable to participate due to pain in her foot. Similarly, Mr. Ogas testified that STUDENT was never told that she could not participate but that she did sit out of activities due to medical reasons and her doctor's orders. He also stated that STUDENT chose not to participate when she first began the program, but as she became more familiar with her peers and the staff, she participated more. Because there is no indication that STUDENT was denied access to her physical education program and such program was offered to her, it is found that this part of her educational placement comported with her IEP. With regard to disability training for staff and STUDENT's peers, Respondents presented no evidence that such training was provided. However, there is also no evidence that STUDENT was denied educational benefit assuming, arguendo, that this training was not provided. Ms. Wilkerson testified that she observed STUDENT to be a "leader" among her peers. She testified that STUDENT had made friends and was able to interact with her peers. Additionally, there was evidence that the therapists and teachers were working with STUDENT on ways to disclose to her peers information about her condition. Finally, STUDENT herself testified that she was not teased by her peers. Thus, Petitioner was not prejudiced by any failure to provide the disability training to Fulton staff and STUDENT's peers. Based on the above, and because Petitioner made no other significant or relevant arguments with regard to Respondent's failure to implement her IEP, it is found that Petitioner's placement generally comported with her IEP.Additionally, any failure to provide disability awareness training to the staff and peers did not prejudice Petitioner's ability to benefit from her education. In summary, because STUDENT's 1998-1999 placement was designed to meet her needs, was calculated to provide her with educational benefit, and comported with her IEP, STUDENT was provided a FAPE during this time. II. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education? Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational authority has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir, 1991). "The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services." Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F. Supp. 867 (8th Cir.1996). It was determined above that Respondents offered and provided STUDENT with a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year. Furthermore, Petitioner did not allege, nor did she establish, any credible grounds for why she should be entitled to compensatory education for prior years. Therefore, the request for compensatory education is denied. III. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to massage therapy from June to August 1998? Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985); Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir 1994). Petitioner contended that Respondents failed to provide transportation for her and her parents to attend her massage therapy sessions from June to August 1998. However, STUDENT is not entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to massage therapy for three reasons. First, she is not entitled to reimbursement for services because she was not denied a FAPE at that time. As was found above, Respondents offered STUDENT a FAPE in the March 10, 1998 IEP(footnote 11). Second, it was also found above that the massage therapy is not a related service that STUDENT required to benefit from her education. Because the massage therapy is not a special education service, the District had no responsibility over such therapy. Finally, the District was not responsible for providing STUDENT with massage therapy one time a week as was stated on her March 1998 IEP because such services were never agreed to by FATHER. Pursuant to Education Code Section 56346(a), only the portions of the IEP to which the parent has consented will be implemented. If the District determines that the services not consented to are necessary for the student to benefit from her education, the District may request a due process hearing on that issue. Education Code  56346(b). Because such services were not consented to by FATHER, and because the District did not determine that STUDENT required the massage therapy to benefit from her education, the District had no responsibility to implement provision of massage therapy. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's request for reimbursement is denied. IV. Has Mental Health and/or County CCS failed to reasonably communicate with Petitioner regarding the provision of educationally related services? At hearing, Petitioner's father made general allegations that Mental Health and CCS failed to reasonably communicate with Petitioner regarding the provision of educationally related services and that such failure to communicate resulted in a delay in services for her. The evidence, however, established the contrary. On cross-examination, FATHER could not identify situations in which STUDENT's services were unreasonably delayed or denied due to Respondents' failure to communicate with her in a timely manner. Without any explanation or supporting details, Petitioner argued that she believed CCS was unreasonably delaying the provision of massage therapy, that Mental Health failed to respond to FATHER's request for her records, and that Mental Health failed to respond to his complaints about STUDENT's counseling services. Ursula Manton, CCS administrator, testified at hearing in response to FATHER's broad statement that STUDENT should been provided with massage therapy in accordance with Dr. Witte's recommendations at some earlier point in time. She testified that STUDENT's massage therapy is not a medical service and required approval by various agencies at the state level before it could be provided to STUDENT through the county CCS office. Susan Allen testified that STUDENT was receiving massage therapy even prior to Dr. Witte's evaluation in May 1998. She also testified that STUDENT received Dr. Witte's recommended intensive massage therapy a month after the evaluation was completed. By all indication, CCS responded to Petitioner's request for massage therapy in a timely manner. Additionally, it was found above that Petitioner was not entitled to massage as part of her educational program and, thus, any delays in the provision of such services is not a special education inquiry. With regard to FATHER's request for STUDENT's mental health records, FATHER admitted on cross-examination that he had received letters from the Fresno County Counsel's office denying his request for such records. FATHER also claimed that he made numerous requests to meet with Gary Carroza, from the Fresno County Department of Community Health, to discuss the release of STUDENT's mental health records but that his requests were never answered. However, Kathy Gunn, secretary for Mr. Carroza, testified that she immediately attempted to set up an appointment for FATHER with Mr. Carroza when FATHER requested one. She also testified that during her contacts with FATHER, FATHER stated that he could not make the appointment dates she offered, but he also refused to choose an appointment date and time that was more convenient for him to meet with Mr. Carroza. Although STUDENT arguably may have been entitled to her mental health records as part of her special education records pursuant to Education Code Section 56504, she was not prejudiced at hearing by any failure to provide her with such records as such failure does not affect the resolution of the stated issues in this case. Finally, Petitioner asserted that Mental Health did not respond to her complaints about the adequacy of the counseling services she was receiving. During the end of August and mid-September 1998, FATHER filled out complaint and grievance forms which indicate that he was dissatisfied with STUDENT's mental health services and that he desired the appointment of a different mental health team for STUDENT. In response, Sharon Kostuchek, a registered nurse from Fresno County Utilization Review, testified that Mental Health assigned a different mental health team and counselor for STUDENT shortly after one was requested by her father. Based on the above, the evidence established that Respondents did not fail to communicate with Petitioner or that any failure to communicate with her resulted in the denial or delay of her services. In summary, no persuasive evidence exists that indicates that Respondents denied or delayed services to STUDENT due to any failure to communicate with her in a timely manner. ORDER All of Petitioner's requests for relief are denied. PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE Pursuant to Education Code  56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: Respondents prevailed on all the issues adjudicated. RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code  56505(i). DATED: September 22, 1999 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnotes: 1)STUDENT testified on her own behalf on June 22 and 23, 1999. 2)Both FATHER and Mark Allen testified that "Break the Barriers" was a dance program aimed at abled and disabled individuals which was offered in the community. Admission into "Break the Barriers" is based on an application process. Mr. Allen also testified that "Break the Barriers" is not part of a school district program and that the District has no control over such program. None of the Respondents knew the nature of the"Dance Empowerment" program. FATHER also provided no clear information regarding such program. 3)The Adolescent Day Treatment II (ADT-II) program offers an intensive mental health therapy component and no academics. Adolescent Day Treatment I (ADT-I) is a separate program that provides both mental health services and academic instruction. 4)STUDENT's school year was divided into three semesters: fall, winter, and spring. Each semester was then divided into two grading periods called "quarters." STUDENT's absences during the first quarter of her fall semester were excused for medical reasons. Thus, STUDENT's fall semester grades only reflect work completed during the second quarter of the fall semester. Neither parties provided STUDENT's complete academic grades or scores from standardized testing. 5)Through the dates of the hearing, no massage therapy has been provided to STUDENT after the PARENTS stopped taking her to the therapy provided to her by CCS in October 1998. 6)STUDENT's problem with infections in her foot is unrelated to the condition of her left arm. In prior years, the infections in the foot led to amputation of four of her toes. 7)Petitioner's positions regarding her massage therapy were conflicting and often confusing. Although, at hearing, Petitioner was requesting intensive massage therapy for a period of six weeks, such therapy had already been provided from June to August of 1998. Thus, as will be discussed below, Petitioner, in effect, contended that she required the intensive massage therapy indefinitely. 8)Although it was found that STUDENT did not need assistive technology to benefit from her education, the District has provided STUDENT with access to an adapted right-handed keyboard in the classroom. FATHER also testified that STUDENT has a computer at home. 9)Such programs are available to STUDENT in the community, but neither she nor her parents have submitted an application for her enrollment. Although FATHER claimed that he could not afford to enroll STUDENT in such programs, STUDENT receives a monthly Social Security Income stipend, which allows for use for such activities. 10)To the extent progress was limited, this limitation was due to a failure of STUDENT's parents to send her to school. 11) Because the March 1998 IEP covered the 1998 summer months, and because no evidence was presented that STUDENT's needs changed from March 1998 to the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year, it is found that STUDENT was offered a FAPE during this time.