California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 28, 1998

Student v. Conejo Valley Unified School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 1511-98 · Hearing Officer Glenna Eubank deCamara

Hearing Officer finds student lives mainly with father inside Conejo Valley Unified, so Conejo must educate him.

Student prevailed on all issuesVanaman German LLP represented the student

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. The decision mentions that a stay put order was obtained earlier in the case. The father testified that a modified custody order naming him as primary custodial parent was issued while the hearing was taking place.

Summary

An eight-year-old boy eligible for special education as other health impaired attended Conejo Valley Unified's Ladera Elementary School on an interdistrict transfer from Simi Valley Unified. A 1997 mediation agreement said his placement would return to Simi Valley for 1998-99 unless the family moved into Conejo. His parents later separated. His mother stayed in Simi Valley and his father moved into Conejo. In June 1998, Conejo accepted the father's proof of residency. Early in the next school year, it came to suspect the student really lived with his mother. Conejo hired a private investigator and told the mother to enroll him in Simi Valley. The student and the District each filed for a hearing on residency, and the cases were consolidated.

The Hearing Officer held that residency is decided as of the present. It is not fixed when school starts or when a hearing request is filed, because Education Code 48200 uses the present tense. The evidence suggested the student lived mainly with his mother in September. By October 1998, however, credible testimony from the father and three neighbors showed he spent most nights with his father. District staff saw only who picked him up after school, and the investigator formed no opinion. A joint custody order naming the mother as primary physical custodian did not control where the child actually lived. The Hearing Officer ordered Conejo to take responsibility for educating the student.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO decided residency for a child of separated parents with joint custody. The Hearing Officer looked at where the child actually lived at the time of the hearing. A "primary custody" label in a joint custody order did not decide the question, and evidence about who picked the child up after school carried little weight.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedResponsible agency

    Issue 1. Is Student a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District?

    Residency is decided as of the present. By October 1998 the student lived mainly with his father inside Conejo's boundaries, so he is a Conejo resident; a joint custody order naming the mother as primary physical custodian did not control.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Order declaring the student a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District and directing the District to take responsibility for his education.

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Key authorities

Union School Dist. v. Smith; In re Gi; In re Judson W.; Education Code 48200; Government Code 244(d); Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1; Family Code 3003, 3010, 3086, 7501

People named in the decision

  • Jack Bannon, associate director of special education, Conejo Valley Unified School District
  • Ann Ross, school secretary, Ladera Elementary School, Conejo Valley USD
  • Craig Sherrod, general education teacher, Ladera Elementary School, Conejo Valley USD
  • Dr. Neil Snyder, principal, Ladera Elementary School, Conejo Valley USD
  • Catherine Horne, special day class teacher, Ladera Elementary School, Conejo Valley USD
  • Kelly Duhs, private investigator retained by District, Conejo Valley Unified School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Glenna Eubank deCamara, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Thousand Oaks, California, on November 12 and 13, 1998. Student (hereinafter Student or Petitioner) was represented by attorney Jodi Ossen of the Law Firm of Newman, Aaronson & Vanaman. Also present was Petitioner's father. Conejo Valley Unified School District (hereinafter Conejo or District) was represented by attorney Cynthia Yount of the law firm of Parker, Covert & Chidester. Also present on Conejo's behalf was Jack Bannon, associate director of special education for Canejo. Conejo called the following witnesses to testify: Jack Bannon, associate director of special education; Ann Ross, secretary, Ladera elementary school; Craig Sherrod, teacher, Ladera elementary school; Dr. Neil Snyder, principal, Ladera elementary school; Catherine Horne, special day class teacher, Ladera elementary school; and Kelly Duhs, investigator. Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify: father of Petitioner; Patricia Twigg and Judith Saunders, neighbors of Petitioner's father; and Fay Morton, a friend and neighbor of Petitioner's mother. Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments to be postmarked by November 20, 1998. The Hearing Officer received the closing arguments, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision. PROCEDURAL MATTERS On October 15, 1998, The California Special Education Hearing Office (hereinafter Hearing Office) received a request for a due process hearing from the law firm of Newman, Aaronson & Vanaman on behalf of Petitioner requesting a determination of Petitioner's school district of residence. On October 27, 1998, the Hearing Office received a request for a due process hearing from the District also raising the issue of residency and naming Student as the respondent. On November 10, 1998, the Hearing Office denied Petitioner's motion for continuance and granted the District's request to consolidate the two cases. At the outset of the hearing, the Hearing Officer ruled that as a Petitioner itself in one of the consolidated cases and as the party seeking to change the status quo, the District would bear the burden of going forward. The Hearing Officer therefore granted Petitioner's motion that the District present its evidence first. ISSUE 1. Is Student a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District? BACKGROUND FACTS Student is an eight-year-old boy who is eligible for special education as other health impaired resulting from attention deficit disorder with hyperactivity, Tourette's Syndrome and obsessive-compulsive and opposition-defiant disorders. Petitioner resided with both of his parents within the Simi Valley Unified School District (hereinafter Simi) when he began his education in 1994. Pursuant to an IEP meeting convened by Simi, Student was placed in Horizon Hills school within Conejo Valley Unified School District on an interdistrict transfer. Petitioner attended Horizon Hills school for two years. Thereafter a dispute arose concerning placement, and Petitioner filed for a due process hearing naming both Simi and Conejo as respondents. This matter was resolved by a final mediation agreement on January 15, 1997. The agreement provided that Student would continue his interdistrict transfer and attend Conejo's Ladera elementary school for the remainder of the 1996-97 school year as well as the 1997-98 school year. It was further agreed that in February 1998 Simi representatives and Petitioner's parents would begin to discuss and observe placement options within Simi for the 1998-99 school year. An IEP meeting to plan for Student's placement was to be held on or before April 5, 1998. If Petitioner's parents disagreed with the placement offered and filed for a due process hearing, "stay-put" placement was to be within Simi, not Conejo. This provision of the mediation agreement would not apply if the family actually moved into the Conejo district. Student's parents separated in April 1997 and his mother remained in the family's home located within the Simi Valley school district. Thereafter, Petitioner's father moved into the Conejo school district. On March 31, 1998, a stipulation and order to show cause were executed by Mr. and Mrs. Parent in their dissolution. It was filed with the Ventura County Superior Court on April 2, 1998. This stipulated agreement became an order of the Court. The custody provisions stated that both parents had joint physical and legal custody and that the mother was to have primary physical custody. Mr. Parent's custody was to occur each weekend, except the third weekend, from Friday evening until Sunday at 7:00p.m. Student continued to attend Conejo's Ladera school pursuant to the mediation agreement until the end of the 1997-98 school year. On June 8, 1998, Conejo convened an IEP meeting to discuss Student's placement for the 1998-99 school year. The Petitioner's parents informed the IEP team members that they had separated and that Mr. Parent lived within the Conejo school district. Mr. Parent was asked for and provided evidence of his residency within the Conejo Valley Unified School District. The District accepted the parents' representation and verification of STUDENT's residency. As a result, neither party invited Simi to attend the IEP meeting. An IEP was agreed upon, and petitioner continued his placement at Ladera elementary school as a Conejo resident. Early in the 1998-99 school year, the District became concerned that Petitioner actually resided in the family's Simi home with his mother rather than in the Conejo school district with his father. This suspicion was initially aroused when Student's mother submitted an emergency information card listing her own residence as that of the Petitioner. Thereafter, Mr. Bannon, Conejo's assistant director of special education, requested that the principal of Ladera Elementary School conduct an informal observation of which parent dropped off and picked up Student from school. The District hired a private investigator to observe the residences of both parents and question neighbors in an effort to determine where the Petitioner lived. Mr. Bannon also had conversations with Student's general education teacher and SDC teacher. After gathering this information, Mr. Bannon sent Mrs. Parent a letter stating that Student was not a resident of Conejo and that she must arrange for Student to attend school in the Simi Valley Unified School District by mid-October. This ultimately resulted in the Petitioner's filing for the instant due process hearing and obtaining a stay put order. Twelve days later, the District also filed against Petitioner over the same issue of residency. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES The District contends that the Petitioner has resided, and continues to reside, primarily with his mother within the Simi Valley Unified School District. It therefore asserts that its duty to educate the Petitioner terminated at the end of the 1997-98 school year and that the Petitioner must return to his district of residence pursuant to the mediation agreement of January 15, 1997, which stated: If Student's parents proceed to due process pursuant to paragraph nine above, they agree that as part of such proceedings they will not seek a placement for Student at Ladera Elementary School for the 1998-99 school year and that for the purpose of the 'last agreed to placement' language of the federal law, Student's placement will be considered to be a placement within the Simi Valley Unified School District. Petitioner agrees that the above statement applies even if there is a significant change of circumstances (which is not to include a move by the family into the Conejo Valley Unified School District). (Emphasis added) Petitioner contends that his father resides in Conejo and that his residence has been primarily with his father since right before the 1998-99 school year began. Petitioner further contends that this change resulted because of his mother's declining health, her resulting difficulties in handling his behaviors and his parents' belief that he required more individual attention. Petitioner states that he stays with his mother on Monday and Friday nights and that she also provides his after- school care until his father picks him up after work. DISCUSSION Residency under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the California Education Code is determined pursuant to the applicable laws of general residency. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F3d 1519 9th Cir (1994), held "[w]e find no basis for holding that the determination of residency under IDEA or the California Education Code should be different from the ordinary determination of residency." Education Code 48200 provides that a child will attend school in the district "in which the residency of either the parent or legal guardian is located." Government Code 244 provides guidance on the general definition of residency for both adults and children. This code section addresses the residency of minors in subsection (d) and states in relevant part: "The residence of the parent with whom an unmarried child maintains his or her place of abode is the residence of such an unmarried child." The residence of a child of separated or divorced parents is more specifically addressed in Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1 and will be discussed below. In the instant case, there is little disagreement between the parties that Petitioner lived primarily with his mother in Simi from the time of his parents' separation until the end of the 1997-98 school year. Residency is disputed from the inception of the 1998-99 school year through the due process hearing. The District maintains that residency should be determined as of the date of filing for the due process hearing. Petitioner urges the Hearing Officer to determine residency as of the date of the hearing. The Hearing Officer agrees that the relevant issue is where Student lives now and which school district has the resulting obligation to provide his education. Conejo initially had a reasonable concern regarding Student's school district of residence. Mrs. Parent stated on the emergency information card she submitted to the District on September 3, 1998, that Student lived with her. Following her first visit to the homes of the Petitioner's parents, the private investigator retained by the District advised them that Student lived with his mother. The principal of Student's school, Mr. Snyder, kept a log of the days in September 1998 on which he observed Mrs. Parent drop off or pick up Student from school. These dates did not coincide with Student being with his mother only on Monday and Friday nights. The Petitioner's witnesses provided somewhat inconsistent testimony regarding the amount of time he spent with his father in September 1998. For these reasons, the evidence suggests that Student lived primarily with his mother when school started. The District offered evidence that on July 2, 1998, Mrs. Parent signed a declaration under penalty of perjury stating that the Petitioner resided with her and seeking additional funds from the father. No evidence was presented that Mrs. Parent's motion to increase the child support was granted. Stuednt's mother did not attend either day of the hearing. Consequently, the Hearing Officer has no direct evidence to conclude that Mrs. Parent's declaration under oath in July 1998 remained her position on Petitioner's primary custody during the relevant months. Instead, Ms. Morton, a friend and neighbor of Mrs. Parent's, provided hearsay testimony of the mother's confirmation that Student's primary home is with his father. The Hearing Officer thus cannot find that Mrs. Parent's statement under oath in early July determines Student's residency three to five months later. However, as previously stated, the relevant issue is not where Student lived when school began, but where he presently resides. A school district has a responsibility to provide an education for those children who currently reside within its boundaries. This obligation is not owed only to children who resided in the district when a school year began. Residency is also not determined on the date a request for due process is filed, as the District suggests. Education Code 48200 states that a child's education will be provided by the school district in which the parent's residence "is" located. This statute is written in the present, not the past tense. If any date other than the present were used to determine residency, a child could find himself in a situation where the district in which he currently resides need not provide his education because he did not live there on some past date and his prior school district has no educational obligation because the child has left its district. This type of loophole was not intended by the law that requires mandatory education for children. There is credible evidence that by October 1998 Student lived with his father the majority of time. Using his calendar to refresh his recollection, Mr. Parent testified to the exact dates he claimed Student was with him throughout October 1998. He testified that he was maintaining this calendar pursuant to the instructions of his dissolution attorney. According to Mr. Parent's testimony, Petitioner resided with him approximately twenty-two out of thirty-one days in October 1998. Ms. Morton, a friend of Mrs. Parent's, and Ms. Saunders, the mother of Student's playmate, testified that Student lived with his father approximately five out of the seven days of the week. Ms. Morton testified that she spent significant time at the home of Mrs. Parent. She ate dinner there two times a week and stayed throughout the evening. As a neighbor who lived only a mile and a half away, she was also in Mrs. Parent's home frequently during the week. She was therefore aware of who resided in the home. Ms. Morton had been present on occasions when Mr. Parent picked Student up on his way home from work. Ms. Morton testified that she personally knew of Mrs. Parent's health problems and the effect they had on her ability to care for Student. She had gone with Mrs. Parent to her doctor visits and had observed the consequences of the illness on her stamina. Ms. Saunders testified that she has lived in an apartment two doors away from Mr. Parent's for one year. Her son plays with Student at least two school evenings a week. She stated that Student is at his father's apartment every day except Friday nights as well as one other night per week, either Monday night or Tuesday night. Ms. Twigg, the girlfriend and neighbor of Mr. Parent, testified that Student's time with his father increased from four nights to five nights per week during the later portion of October. She has lived in the apartment across from Mr. Parent's for eighteen months. Her apartment looks directly into the family's apartment window. She can therefore either see Student inside the apartment or hear him in the background during her nightly telephone calls with Mr. Parent. Ms. Twigg testified that Student lives with his father on Sundays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. All of the above witnesses have frequent contact with Student and Mr. and Mrs. Parent. The Hearing Officer finds their testimony credible evidence of Student's primary home. Conejo provided no evidence to contradict the Petitioner's evidence that he resided primarily with his father by October 1998. The sole District witness to provide direct information pertaining to Student's custodial status in October was its private investigator, Kelly Duhs, and she was unable to form an opinion regarding Petitioner's primary residence. Ms. Duhs conducted a return surveillance of Mrs. Parent's home in October and she did not observe any activity. When asked directly by the District if she had formed an opinion about Petitioner's primary residence, the private investigator responded "no." She further stated that the absence of any activity at a time when she would have expected to see the family caused her to think, "I don't know where Student lives." Dr. Snyder did not record Student's arrival at school during October and he had no personal knowledge of which parent brought him. He did note that Student's mother picked him up on three occasions. The Petitioner's regular education teacher, Craig Sherrod, his special day class teacher, Catherine Horne, and Ann Ross, secretary for Ladera elementary school, all testified that they had observed only Mrs. Parent collect Student after school. None of these three witnesses had knowledge of Student's arrival at school, nor were they aware of where he spent his nights. That Petitioner went home with his mother each day after school does not determine his custodial status. Both Mr. Parent and Ms. Morton testified that Student went to his mother's home after school and that either his mother or the housekeeper provided childcare for him until his father finished work. Mr. Parent picked Student up from his mother's house on his way home. These childcare arrangements for Student were uncontroverted by the District. Ann Ross, secretary at Ladera school, did testify that Mrs. Parent provided the school with her cell phone and pager numbers during the first week of November for use in the event of an emergency. The Hearing Officer does not find it persuasive evidence of residency that a mother gave her child's school methods by which to contact her in an emergency. Student's parents share joint legal and physical custody. It is reasonable that Student's mother would want, and be entitled to receive, notice of an emergency even if Student lived primarily with his father. Finally, Mr. Parent testified that while the hearing was taking place, a modified custody order was issued by the Court naming him as the primary custodial parent. The Hearing Officer finds this further evidence that, at the present time, Student is a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District. The District argued that a custody document filed by Petitioner's parents with the Family Law Court on April 2, 1998 provided strong evidence of Student's present residency. On April 2, 1998, Mr. and Mrs. Parent filed a stipulated custody agreement in the California Superior Court giving both parents joint physical and legal custody, with Petitioner's primary physical custody to his mother. This agreement became an order of the court. The California Family Law Code defines joint legal and physical custody: " 'Joint legal custody' means that both parents share the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education and welfare of a child." ( Family Code 3003 ) "'Joint physical custody' means that each of the parents shall have significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents." ( Family Code 3304 ) Section 3010(a) states, 'The mother of an unemancipated minor child and the father . . . are equally entitled to the custody of the child." Family Code 7501 provides that "a parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child. . . . " Both Mr. and Mrs. Parent are entitled to custody of Student pursuant to their joint custody order. As a result of the above, Mr. and Mrs. Parent's custody order does not preclude them from modifying or changing Student's primary caretaker to the other parent if they so agree. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that a statement granting one parent primary custody in a joint custody order precludes a child from residing the majority of the time with the other parent. By statutory definition, an award of joint physical custody mandates that the parents "shall have significant periods of physical custody" with their child. (Family Code 3304; emphasis added) The language requiring frequent parental contact in the joint custody statute is unambiguous. In contrast, language pertaining to the identification of a primary caretaker in a joint custody order may be inserted for the purpose of establishing eligibility for public aide. "In making an order of joint physical or joint legal custody, the court may specify one parent as the primary caretaker of the child . . . for purposes of determining eligibility for public assistance." ( Family Code 3086) Petitioner's parents have joint physical custody entitling each of them to substantial time with him. ( Family Code 3304 ) They also have the authority to change his residence. ( Family Code 7501) The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the reference to Mrs. Parent having primary physical custody in the stipulated custody order does not prohibit Student from living primarily with his father or provide prima facie evidence of the Petitioner's residency. As specified in Government Code 244(d), (supra), Student's primary home is with his father whose residence is within the Conejo school district. Thus, Student's residence is also within the Conejo Valley Unified School District. Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1 provides more specific information about the residence of a child who lives in the home of the parent who may not possess legal custody. Two methods are expressed for determining the residence of such a child. One is the residency of the parent with whom the child lives and the other is the residency of the parent (or legal guardian) who has been awarded custody by the Court. Unless otherwise provided under the provisions of this code, to the extent not in conflict with federal law, the residence of a minor child shall be determined by the following rules: (a) The residence of the parent with whom a child maintains his or her place of abode or the residence of any individual who has been appointed legal guardian or the individual who has been given the care or custody by a court of competent jurisdiction, determines the residency . . . . The case of In Re Gi, 134 Cal App2nd 479, (1955) provides history regarding the construction of Government Code 244(d) and Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1 as they each pertain to the residency of a minor. While Government Code, Section 244(d) sets forth the general rule that the residence of the [parent] determines the residence of the unmarried (Footnote 1) minor, the method of determining the residence of the child of separated parents is set forth in detail in Section 17.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Therefore, any proceedings arising under that code are governed by those specific provisions, for Section 17.1 states that 'unless otherwise provided under the provisions of this code, the residence of a minor person shall be determined by the following rules. . . . (citing Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1). Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1 has been amended and more recently interpreted to mean that a child's residency may be established in two separate ways. The court in In Re Judson W., 185 Cal. App.3d 838 (1994), addressed the two methods by which a minor's residency is determined under Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1. "The rules set forth in section 17.1, subdivision (a) are in the disjunctive. The minor's residency can be determined by looking to the residence of the individual who has been given custody of the minor by a court, but the statute also permits determination of the minor's residence based upon the residence of the parent with whom the child maintains his or her abode. . . ." The above statute gives a child derivative residency through the parent with whom he maintains his home or the parent who possesses court-ordered physical custody. Either the parent with whom the child actually lives or the parent with physical custody would satisfy the requirement of one of the alternative methods for determining their child's residency. Mr. Parent has actual physical custody of Student a majority of the time. Student's residency is thus that of his father's pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1(a). Welfare and Institution Code 17.1(b) addresses residency and joint custody. "Wherever in this section it is provided that the residence of a child is determined by the residence of the person who has custody, 'custody' means the legal right to custody of the child unless that right is held jointly by two or more persons, in which case 'custody' means the physical custody of the child by one of the persons sharing the right to custody. . . ." Thus, the residency of a child is determined by the residence of the parent who has the legal right to custody unless both parents have legal custodial rights. In the event of joint physical custody, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the residency of the child is determined by the residency of the parent with whom the child lives most of the time. In this case, Mr. Parent is that parent. The evidence establishes that Student now lives primarily with his father within the Conejo Valley Unified School District. Student is therefore also a resident of Conejo and entitled to attend school in the Conejo school district. CONCLUSION Based upon the evidence, arguments presented, and a review of the applicable law, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner's primary home is with his father who lives within the Conejo school district. For this reason, the Hearing Officer concludes that Student is a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District. ORDER 1. The Petitioner is a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District and District shall assume the responsibility of providing the Petitioner's education. PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE Pursuant to California Education Code 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement: 1. Is Petitioner a resident of Conejo Valley Unified School District? Petitioner prevailed on this issue RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code 56505(I).

DATE: December 28, 1998 GLENNA EUBANK deCAMARA, Hearing Officer, California Special Education Hearing Office

1. This case was decided when Government Code 244 still stated that a minor's residency was determined by "the general rule that residence of the father during his life" defined his child's residency. Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1 originally reiterated this general rule and added "unless the father has abandoned the child, has been legally deprived of his custody, or is in fact living separate and apart from the mother of the child; in the later case the residence of the child is determined by the residence of the parent who had his custody." In Re Gi, (supra) (quoting Government Code 244(d) and Welfare and Institutions Code 17.1)