California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 14, 2003
Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1531-01 · Hearing Officer Deborah M. Cooke
Los Angeles Unified must fund an independent assessment and repay $6,090 for an evaluation; learning disability claim denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
None stated. The decision notes that a CDE compliance complaint found the District missed the 50-day IEP timeline in 2000-2001 and ordered an IEP meeting.
Summary
The parents of a 13-year-old with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) filed against Los Angeles Unified School District. They claimed the district should have found him eligible with a specific learning disability (SLD) from 1998-1999 through September 2002. The district found him eligible for speech and language services in June 1999, exited him in May 2000, and then gave him a Section 504 plan. In October 2001 the parents placed him at Countryside Preparatory School. The Hearing Officer refused to add a late claim that he was eligible as other health impaired (OHI). She found that the district repeatedly failed its child-find duties. It held the 1999 and 2000-2001 assessments and IEP meetings late. It exited him without looking into his falling grades. It never sent an assessment plan after the December 2001 IEP meeting. Its 1999 and 2001 assessments did not test his attention. The parents also received an altered copy of the 1999 psychoeducational report, which denied them meaningful participation. However, IQ scores of 104 and 100 showed no severe discrepancy, so he never qualified as SLD, and the June 1999 IEP met his reading and math needs. Claims for tuition, transportation, Lindamood-Bell services, and the Yellen testing were denied. The district must fund an independent assessment by September 22, 2003, and repay $6,090 for Dr. Donald Hoagland's evaluation. It must also repay private school costs if the assessor finds he was OHI-eligible as of October 2001.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO kept child-find and assessment failures separate from eligibility. A district could miss timelines and skip testing in a suspected area, yet still be right that there was no severe discrepancy. The remedy was an independent assessment, and private school reimbursement depended on what that assessment found.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedChild find
Issue 1A. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to meet its child find obligations of timely assessing Petitioner and convening IEP meetings?
The District failed child find every year: it delayed the 1999 and 2000-2001 assessments and IEP meetings past the 50-day timeline (denying FAPE April 8 to June 9, 1999), exited him in May 2000 without looking into his declining progress, and never sent an assessment plan after the December 2001 IEP.
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 1B. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to identify Petitioner as a student with a specific learning disability?
Using full-scale IQ scores of 104 (UCLA, 1998) and 100 (Yellen, 2001), there was no corroborated severe discrepancy in any year, so the student never qualified as SLD; Dr. Hoagland's higher nonverbal and Stanford-Binet ability scores were not adopted.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1B (related). Whether the District interfered with parent participation by giving the parents an inaccurate copy of the 1999 District psychoeducational assessment
The parents received an altered copy of the May 1999 report, with prior scores omitted and the word 'not' handwritten into the severe-discrepancy finding; this denied them meaningful participation and denied FAPE.
- Student prevailed in partAssessment
Issue 1C. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability?
The 1999, May 2000, and 2001 District assessments did not assess attention or follow up on declining classroom performance despite known ADHD; no finding for 2001-2002 because the District conducted no assessments that year.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 1D. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to offer and/or provide Petitioner with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs?
An eligible student's IEP must address all unique needs, but the June 9, 1999 IEP met his needs in the disputed areas of reading comprehension and math; no ruling on attention because it was never assessed, and no IEP existed in later years.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Countryside Preparatory School in the amount of $11,000 for the 2001-2002 school year?
Tuition was denied because the student was not shown to be eligible, but reimbursement was ordered on the condition that the independent assessor finds he should have been eligible as OHI as of October 2001.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to Countryside Preparatory School from October 2001 to September 2002 in an amount according to proof?
Transportation reimbursement was denied, except under the conditional reimbursement tied to the independent assessment described in Issue 2.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Is Petitioner entitled to prospective tuition and placement at Countryside Preparatory School for the 2002-2003 school year?
This issue was treated as a 2002-2003 reimbursement claim plus a prospective placement claim for the next year; both were denied because the student was not shown to be eligible.
- Student prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 5. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Dr. Donald Hoagland in the amount of $6,090?
The parent disagreed with the 2001 District assessment, and the District offered no evidence that it was appropriate, so the $6,090 for Dr. Hoagland's 2001 evaluation must be reimbursed; his 2002 testing was not timely claimed.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Yellen and Associates in an amount according to proof?
Reimbursement was denied: there was no evidence Yellen tested visual deficits, the parents stopped the Yellen testing, and paying for two sets of cognitive testing would be double recovery.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- IEE at public expense. By August 25, 2003, the District must select an independent assessor from the Hearing Office list. At District expense, the assessor will conduct a comprehensive psychoeducational assessment in all areas of suspected disability, including attentional, organizational, task completion, and behavioral needs. The assessment plan is due to the parents by September 1, 2003, and the assessment must be completed by September 22, 2003. The assessor must review records from 1998-1999 through the present and must not find the student ineligible merely because current services are helping him.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Conditional: if the independent assessor finds the student should have qualified for special education as of October 2001 based on his attentional difficulties, the District must convene an IEP meeting by September 29, 2003, to determine eligibility and develop an IEP.
- Reimbursement. Conditional: if the independent assessor establishes the student should have been eligible as OHI as of October 2001, the District must reimburse the parents for the nonpublic school placement and related transportation from October 2001 through the end of 2001-2002 and for the 2002-2003 school year. No amount was stated.
- Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receiving proof of payment, the District must reimburse the parents $6,090 for Dr. Hoagland's 2001 neurocognitive and psychological evaluation.
Total: $6,090 ordered
Key authorities
Capistrano Unified School Dist. v. Wartenberg; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education; Alamo Heights Independent School Dist. v. State Board of Education; Cal. Educ. Code § 56337; 5 C.C.R. § 3030(j); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532; Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b)
People named in the decision
- Aviva Ebner, science/health teacher, witness for Student, Robert Frost Middle School, LAUSD
- Donald Hoagland, clinical psychologist, independent evaluator and expert witness for Student, Private practice
- David Helm, school psychologist, witness for Student, Temecula Valley School District
- Chris Faucher, principal, witness for Student, Countryside Preparatory School
- Paul Lane, clinical psychologist jointly retained by both parties for IQ testing, Private practice
- Nikki Jakins, clinical director, witness for Student, Lindamood-Bell Pasadena Center
- Alnita Dunn, coordinator of psychological services, District witness, Los Angeles Unified School District
- LaVerne Dumay, due process specialist, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Susan Glickman, due process specialist, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Z. James, fourth-grade teacher, El Oro Way Elementary School, LAUSD
- Elisa Bender, school nurse, health assessment, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Vivian Wolfe, school psychologist, 1999 psychoeducational assessment, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Claudia Bennett, resource specialist, 1999 achievement testing, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Elaine D. Wolfe, speech and language specialist, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Ms. Kearney, fifth-grade teacher, El Oro Way Elementary School, LAUSD
- Bill Gorback, middle school staff member who received the Section 504 plan, Robert Frost Middle School, LAUSD
- Ms. DePau, sixth-grade English/social studies teacher, Robert Frost Middle School, LAUSD
- Judith Wolf, resource specialist, 2000 educational evaluation, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Virginia Williams, school psychologist, 2001 psychoeducational evaluation, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Yellen and Associates, private evaluator (2001 WISC-III testing), Private
- Countryside Preparatory School, nonpublic school, unilateral placement, Northridge, California
- Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes, private reading services provider, Private
- Dr. Moss, physician who diagnosed ADHD, Kaiser Permanente
- Jodie NewDelman, research clinician, UCLA ADHD Genetic Study, UCLA Department of Psychiatry
- Melissa DelHomme, project coordinator, UCLA ADHD Genetic Study, UCLA Department of Psychiatry
- Maxine Benmour, Hearing Officer at the initial July 26, 2002 session, Special Education Hearing Office
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Los Angeles, California, on September 3 and 4, 2002, and May 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2003.
STUDENT (hereafter STUDENT or Petitioner) was initially represented on the first two days of the hearing by attorney Andrea Tytell. Petitioner replaced Ms. Tytell with attorney Marcy Tiffany, who represented him for the remaining days of the hearing. Also present on behalf of Petitioner were his parents, MOTHER and FATHER. Los Angeles Unified School District (hereafter District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Barrett Green from the law firm of Littler Mendelson. Also present on behalf of the District at different times were LaVerne Dumay and Susan Glickman, due process specialists for the District.
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: Aviva Ebner, former science teacher at Robert Frost Middle School in the District; Donald Hoagland, clinical psychologist; MOTHER and FATHER; STUDENT; David Helm, school psychologist for the Temecula Valley School District; Chris Faucher, principal at Countryside Preparatory School; Paul Lane, clinical psychologist; and Nikki Jakins, clinical director of the Lindamood-Bell Pasadena Center.
The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Alnita Dunn, coordinator of psychological services for the District.
Oral and documentary evidenced was received and the record was left open for the submission of written closing arguments and the submission of a motion by Petitioner to amend the issue statement. Closing briefs were timely submitted by both parties and the District’s response to Petitioner’s motion to amend the issue statement was received on June 16, 2003, at which time the record was closed and submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
This matter initially convened on July 26, 2002; however, no testimony was taken on that date, but the Hearing Officer present on that date generated a memorandum and Order clarifying the issues for hearing and the status of the hearing and continued the matter to September 3, 2002. When the matter reconvened in September 2002 with the current Hearing Officer, Petitioner’s former counsel, Andrea Tytell, did not dispute or question the clarification of the issues as stated in the written Hearing Office Order dated August 1, 2002. The only change to the issues in the August 1, 2002 Order that was made by this Hearing Officer was clarification that the issues related to eligibility and free appropriate public education (FAPE) would be limited to the time frame from the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002.
After two days of testimony on September 3 and 4, 2002, Petitioner’s parents obtained new counsel, the law firm of Wyner & Tiffany, to represent their son’s interests for the remainder of the hearing. Petitioner’s counsel notified the Hearing Office of the change in counsel by letter dated January 7, 2003. Because no attorneys from Wyner & Tiffany were present on the previous hearing dates, the firm requested copies of the hearing tapes from the previous hearing dates. The Hearing Office granted Petitioner’s counsel’s request and forwarded to both Petitioner’s and the District’s counsel copies of the hearing tapes from the September 3 and 4, 2002 hearing dates. The Hearing Office did not forward a copy of the tapes from the July 26, 2002 hearing date to either party. By agreement of the parties, the matter remained off calendar until March 28, 2003, when Petitioner requested that the matter be placed back on the calendar.
When this hearing reconvened with Petitioner’s new counsel on May 13, 2003, attorney Marcy Tiffany, from Wyner & Tiffany, presented a new statement of Petitioner’s case and indicated that Petitioner was now contending that in addition to specific learning disability (SLD), he also should have been deemed eligible under the category of other health impaired (OHI). The District argued that Petitioner should not now be allowed to raise an additional issue when originally, Petitioner had only raised the issue of eligibility under the category of SLD.
After listening to the tape of the hearing when it initiated on July 26, 2002, this Hearing Officer ruled at hearing that Petitioner would not now be allowed to raise the issue of his eligibility under the category of OHI. First, the August 2002 Order clearly identified the issues for hearing, which did not include eligibility under OHI, and nothing on the September 3 and 4, 2002 audio tapes could have led Petitioner’s current counsel to believe otherwise. Second, Petitioner clearly only raised SLD as an eligibility issue and when the hearing resumed in September 2002, Petitioner proceeded with the hearing and did not attempt to modify the issues as stated in the August 2002 Hearing Office Order. On September 3, 2002, this Hearing Officer discussed all of the issues as stated in the August 1, 2002 Hearing Office Order, asked the parties for clarification, and read back and reaffirmed the issues to the parties, ensuring that both parties understood the amendments with respect to the timeframes. Moreover, Petitioner’s new counsel was provided with copies of the tapes from both hearing days in September 2002 and a copy of the August 2002 Order. It was unfortunate that the Hearing Office did not initially forward to Petitioner’s counsel the audiotapes from July 26, 2002, but to have done so would have been irrelevant because the Order was clear on its face, it was received by both parties, and Petitioner’s counsel had almost three months between the time they began representing Petitioner and the time at which Petitioner placed the matter back on calendar to have requested leave to amend the issues.
Notwithstanding the ruling made by the Hearing Officer at hearing, Petitioner requested that he be allowed to first review the audiotapes from July 26, 2002, and then renew, in writing, his motion to add an issue. The Hearing Officer granted Petitioner’s request and on May 19, 2003, the Hearing Office forwarded both parties copies of the July 26, 2002 audiotapes. Upon receipt of Petitioner’s renewed motion, it was noticed by the Hearing Office and the District was given an opportunity to respond. The District’s response was received by the Hearing Officer on June 16, 2003. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
With respect to Petitioner’s renewed motion, the motion is denied on the same grounds as previously stated at hearing. Petitioner had ample opportunity to request an amendment to the issues once he received the August 2002 Hearing Office Order that clearly set forth the issues. To allow Petitioner to raise another issue nine months after that Order was issued would be unfair. Moreover, there were many timely opportunities for Petitioner to raise the additional issue before the hearing reconvened in May 2003. The issues were clarified and reaffirmed on September 3, 2002, and at no time did Petitioner’s former counsel request leave to amend the issues. Additionally, once Petitioner placed the matter back on calendar in March 2003, his new counsel could have requested that the issues be expanded to include eligibility under OHI; however, no mention of this request was made until May 2003. Petitioner’s changing of counsel during the course of the hearing does not entitle him to change the issues midstream, thus denying the District the opportunity to be fairly noticed of the hearing issues. In support of its opposition, the District argued that it did not prepare its case to address a claim for eligibility under OHI based on Petitioner’s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) because that issue was not included in Petitioner’s issue statement. Moreover, the District did not proffer any witnesses or evidence to address the issue of ADHD/OHI eligibility.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer is persuaded that adding an additional issue this late in the hearing process would unduly prejudice the District and denies the motion to add an issue.
ISSUES (Footnote 1)
1. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to:
A. meet its “child find” obligations of timely assessing Petitioner and convening IEP meetings; B. identify Petitioner as a student with a specific learning disability; C. assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability; and D. offer and/or provide Petitioner with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs?
2. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Countryside Preparatory School in the amount of $11,000 for the 2001-2002 school year?
3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to Countryside Preparatory School from October 2001 to September 2002 in an amount according to proof?
4. Is Petitioner entitled to prospective tuition and placement at Countryside Preparatory School for the 2002-2003 school year?
5. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Dr. Donald Hoagland in the amount of $6,090?
6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Yellen and Associates in an amount according to proof?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner contends that the District violated its mandate under the “child find” statute by failing to timely assess him and convene IEP meetings. When the District did convene the IEP meetings, Petitioner alleges that the District failed to find him eligible for special education and related services under the category of specific learning disability and failed to offer and/or provide him with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs.
Petitioner also argues that the testing performed by the District was global and insufficient and therefore, the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability. Moreover, according to Petitioner, the District withheld assessment information from his parents and gave his parents an inaccurate copy of the 1999 LAUSD psychoeducational assessment, thereby interfering with the parents’ participation in the IEP formulation process.
According to Petitioner, the District minimized the curriculum to make it appear as though the District was doing its job and consequently, he never advanced while in the District. Petitioner’s parents therefore unilaterally placed him at Countryside Preparatory School so as to expose him to an environment where he could grow and be recognized for his strengths.
The District did not respond to any of Petitioner’s contentions regarding its child-find obligations. With respect to eligibility, the District contends that Petitioner was not eligible for special education services as a student with a specific learning disability because at no time did there exist a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement. The District also argues that Petitioner did not establish that accommodations that he might have needed to help address any relative weaknesses could not have been provided for in the regular education program. According to the District, once Petitioner was found eligible under the category of language and speech, it was not required to provide services in other areas of need.
Additionally, the District argues that it accurately concluded that Petitioner did not meet the requirements for eligibility as a student with a specific learning disability and that the District was aware of Petitioner’s ADHD and considered the issue in its assessments and eligibility determinations, both in the 1999 individualized education program (IEP) and the 2001 IEPs. According to the District, Petitioner proffered no evidence that the District failed to assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability or that the District’s assessment was inappropriate.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a thirteen-year-old young man currently classified as ineligible for special education services. STUDENT has been diagnosed as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (Footnote 2) He currently attends Countryside Preparatory School, a nonpublic school, in Northridge, California, and is in the eighth grade.
During the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was in the fourth grade and attended El Oro Way Elementary School in the District. According to MOTHER, STUDENT was an “A” student up through the third grade. It was not until his fourth-grade year that STUDENT’s teacher, Ms. James, told MOTHER that STUDENT had a lack of attention, poor handwriting, could not focus, and often fidgeted. Based on her years of teaching, Ms. James suspected that STUDENT had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and suggested to MOTHER that she have STUDENT tested. In November 1998, STUDENT participated in an ADHD Genetic Study conducted by the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Department of Psychiatry. Their study included a structured psychiatric interview regarding STUDENT’s social, emotional, and behavioral health, completion of questionnaires by both MOTHER and STUDENT, and cognitive and education assessments. The study concluded that STUDENT met the criteria for ADHD and exhibited symptoms of depression. As part of the cognitive and educational assessments, the clinicians administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III) and Peabody Individual Achievement Test-Revised (PIAT-R). The clinicians found that STUDENT’s overall score on the WISC-III, a measure of intellectual functioning, was generally consistent with his overall score on the PIAT-R, a measure of academic functioning, both of which placed him in the average range. The test administrators noted, however, that during test taking, STUDENT seemed to rush through the subtests and responded impulsively before instructions were fully explained. There was no indication that STUDENT was on medications for his ADHD at the time of the UCLA testing. The clinicians recommended educational interventions, such as training the child in specific learning strategies, assignment adjustment, and classroom and environmental adaptations, so that STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties did not impede his academic and social functioning.
During STUDENT’s fourth grade year, Kaiser Permanente’s West Valley Children’s Center for Attentional Problems also conducted an evaluation of STUDENT for a learning and/or attentional problem. As part of that evaluation, STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher, Ms. Z. James, completed a school report dated December 1, 1998, indicating that STUDENT exhibited attentional, work completion, and writing problems in the classroom. Ms. James noted that STUDENT could be an outstanding student, but that his short attention span caused problems with his ability to learn and complete work. On February 17, 1999, MOTHER requested that the District assess STUDENT to determine if he was eligible for special education and/or related services. At that time, MOTHER had concerns regarding STUDENT’s vocabulary, reading comprehension, spelling, his difficulty doing homework independently, and his uncertainty with what his assignments were.
On March 15, 1999, MOTHER forwarded via facsimile a copy of the November 1998 UCLA assessment report to El Oro Way Elementary School for its use and records.
As a result of the parent’s request, District nurse Elisa Bender performed a health assessment of STUDENT on April 29, 1999. Ms. Bender’s report indicated that STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD by UCLA and by Dr. Moss at Kaiser and that Dr. Moss had suggested the medication Adderall, but his parents did not want to use medications at that time. Ms. Bender also noted that STUDENT was sloppy and unorganized and that his academics had declined since second grade due to his difficulty with reading and language arts.
On May 8, 1999, school psychologist Vivian Wolfe conducted a psychoeducational case study of STUDENT to examine MOTHER’s academic and behavioral concerns. STUDENT was still in the fourth grade at that time. Ms. Wolfe administered the Matrix Test-Expanded Form (MAT-EF),Verbal Opposites Test, Comprehensive Receptive and Express Vocabulary Test (CREVT), Learning Efficiency Test (LET-II), Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills-Revised (TAPS-R), Oral and Written Language Scales (OWLS), Test of Visual-Perceptual Skills (n-m)-Revised (TVPS-R), Jordan Left-Right Reversal Test, The Beery-Buktenica Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI), Draw-A-Person Test, Bender Visual Motor Gestalt, Burks’ Behavior Rating Scale, Sentence Completion, and the Draw-A-Person Story. Since no intelligence quotient (IQ) tests were administered in accordance with the District’s policy, Ms. Wolfe estimated that based on observation, professional judgment, teacher reports, work and language samples, and analysis of test scores, STUDENT’s ability to learn, apply knowledge, generalize, utilize abstract concepts and evaluate was within the average to high average range of cognitive ability. Ms. Wolfe also found that STUDENT’s nonverbal reasoning was low average and that STUDENT had difficulty attending, poor impulse control, excessive dependency, poor reality contact, poor sense of identity, and poor ego strength. Areas of sensory processing weakness were found in both short and long term auditory and visual memory, auditory discrimination, visual closure, and left-right orientation. Based on the results of her evaluation, Ms. Wolfe made the following summary and recommendations:
…[T]here was a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and academic achievement in the areas of reading comprehension and math. This discrepancy is due to a psychological process disorder in attention, auditory, visual and sensory processing. These deficits are not primarily due to linguistic, cultural, or environmental factors. Based on these results, STUDENT may be learning disabled and in need of special education services.
On June 9, 1999, resource specialist Claudia Bennett tested STUDENT’s academic achievement using the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA). According to Ms. Bennett’s report, his results were a standard score of 91 on math applications, 111 on reading decoding, 113 on spelling, 107 on reading comprehension, 110 on math computations, 110 on reading composite, 100 on math composite, and 107 on the battery composite. The report also notes that STUDENT’s teachers stated that his greatest academic challenge appeared to be related to attentional challenges.
The District convened an IEP meeting on June 9, 1999, to determine STUDENT’s eligibility for special education. Both parents attended, but the school psychologist who performed the psychoeducational testing in May 1999 did not attend, although one page of her report was attached to the IEP document. According to the IEP document, the IEP team discussed STUDENT’s eligibility for special education and determined, with the parents’ consent, that because STUDENT did not appear to have a severe discrepancy between cognition and achievement, he would not qualify under the category of SLD. Additionally, although STUDENT had ADHD, the team concluded, also with the parents’ consent, that he did not qualify as other health impaired (OHI) because he did “not have a significant discrepancy.” (Footnote 3) However, according to the IEP notes, the team consensus was that STUDENT was eligible for speech and language services “due to a significant discrepancy between expressive and receptive language.” (Footnote 4) Speech and language services were therefore offered as a support system for one year.
Notwithstanding school psychologist Wolfe’s determination that STUDENT’s cognitive ability was within the average to high average range and that there was a severe discrepancy between his cognitive ability and academic achievement in the areas of reading comprehension and math, the IEP team noted on the June 19, 1999 IEP document that STUDENT’s cognitive functioning was in the average range and that there did not appear to be a discrepancy between his cognitive ability and academic achievement at that time. The IEP team noted that attentional challenges were more of a concern on a daily basis in areas such as completing assignments and organizing his physical belongings. Major concerns were also noted by the teacher that STUDENT frequently daydreamed and frequently did not finish his class work. The IEP document also indicates that the team discussed accommodations necessary to support STUDENT in the general classroom and reasons to pursue a Section 504 plan.
During STUDENT’s 1999-2000 fifth-grade school year, he received speech and language services pursuant to the June 9, 1999 IEP. On May 17 and 18, 2000, District speech and language specialist Elaine D. Wolfe conducted an annual review of STUDENT’s speech and language. Ms. Wolfe administered the Comprehensive Receptive and Expressive Vocabulary Test (CREVT), which was normed on students four years through seventeen years eleven months old. According to Ms. Wolfe’s report, “STUDENT’s vocabulary was within the low average range with no discrepancy between expressive and receptive language.” Ms. Wolfe also reported that STUDENT showed grammatically correct, complex sentences and was able to use specific vocabulary appropriately. STUDENT was able to answer topic-based questions appropriately and no longer exhibited any speech and language disorder. Ms. Wolfe concluded that STUDENT showed within normal limits in articulation, language, voice, and fluency skills, and therefore, he was no longer eligible for speech and language services and recommended he be exited as corrected.
On May 30, 2000, another IEP team meeting was convened, which MOTHER attended, to exit STUDENT from speech and language services. Ms. Wolfe’s speech and language assessment results were noted on the IEP document and the IEP team determined that STUDENT had “corrected his LAS goals” and, with the parent’s consent, exited him from speech and language class.
On June 19, 2000, while STUDENT was still a fifth-grade student at El Oro Way Elementary School, a Section 504 Plan meeting was held, at which time it was determined that STUDENT’s ADHD impaired his ability to learn in the general education setting and that he required greater time and intensity compared to the average student of the same age/grade level. A Section 504 Plan was drafted to enable STUDENT to access a free and appropriate public education.
STUDENT advanced to the sixth grade and during the 2000-2001 school year attended Robert Frost Middle School in the District. By letter dated September 8, 2000, MOTHER forwarded a copy of STUDENT’s Section 504 Plan to Mr. Bill Gorback at the middle school and reminded him that during their previous conversation, he had indicated that he would make copies of the Section 504 Plan and distribute it to all of STUDENT’s teachers. On October 2, 2000, MOTHER submitted to the District a request to assess STUDENT for special education because she was concerned that he was not doing well in all of his classes, he needed help with reading comprehension, and he did not know exactly what classes he needed to prepare for. An assessment plan was prepared on the same date and MOTHER consented to the District assessing STUDENT’s social/emotional development, cognitive development, academic achievement, perceptual development, motor development, communications/language and health. The District received the signed assessment consent form on October 3, 2000.
On November 27, 2000, District resource specialist Judith Wolf conducted an educational evaluation of STUDENT. Ms. Wolf administered the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery-Revised (WJ-R) Tests of Achievement to STUDENT. STUDENT’s results were a standard score of 121 on basic reading skills, 102 on reading comprehension, 102 on broad mathematics, 90 on broad written language, and 87 on basic writing skills. He demonstrated limited to average mastery of punctuation and capitalization skills, average mastery of spelling skills, and limited mastery of usage (skill in producing and detecting grammatically correct language in written expression). Ms. Wolf’s summary of her report included the following statements:
When compared to others at his grade level, STUDENT’s performance is superior in Basic Reading Skills; his performance is average in Reading Comprehension, Broad Mathematics, and Broad Written Language; his performance is low average in Basic Writing Skills.
STUDENT will find the performance demands of grade-level tasks involving Basic Reading Skills very easy; grade-level tasks involving Reading Comprehension and Broad Mathematics will be manageable; grade-level tasks involving Broad Written Language will be difficult; grade-level tasks involving Basic Writing Skills will be very difficult for him.
It was not until March 29, 2001, that the District conducted its psychoeducational evaluation of STUDENT pursuant to the October 2000 signed assessment plan. School psychologist Virginia Williams administered the Matrix Analogies Test, Drawing of a Person, Wide Range Achievement Test-3, Woodcock Johnson Language Proficiency Battery-Revised, Bender Gestalt Test (Bender), Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills-R (TAPS-R), Test of Visual-Perpetual Skills-R (TVPS-R), and reviewed STUDENT’s school records and the achievement testing administered by the resource specialist. Ms. Williams concluded that based on alternative means of assessment, STUDENT’s cognitive ability appeared to be in the average range. Motor skills were in the average range, and auditory and visual perceptual ability were in the average range. Academically, STUDENT’s achievement appeared to be in the high average to superior range, while math was in the average to above-average range. Based on the results of her assessment, Ms. Williams concluded that STUDENT appeared to be achieving to the level of his ability and therefore, did not meet the criteria for special education services.
By letter dated April 20, 2001, attorney Andrea Tytell informed the District that she had been retained by the PARENTS to represent STUDENT with respect to his special education needs and requested an immediate IEP meeting. On May 3, 2001, the District convened an IEP team meeting to conduct a “comprehensive review.” According to MOTHER, the IEP team discussed STUDENT’s Section 504 Plan and how certain aspects of the plan, such as notifying the parents when assignments were missing, were not working. During the meeting, Ms. Ebner expressed her concerns about STUDENT’s written expression difficulties. The IEP team concluded, however, that there did not appear to be a specific disability based upon the tests administered by the school psychologist.
On May 31, 2001, the PARENTS had STUDENT assessed by a private evaluator, Yellen and Associates, who administered the WISC-III to STUDENT. His results were a standard score of 101 on the verbal, 99 on the performance, and a full-scale score of 100. According to MOTHER, at the time of that testing, STUDENT was taking medication for his depression, which also addresses his ADHD. However, on the actual testing date, May 31, 2001, STUDENT had not taken his medicine during his usual morning routine.
STUDENT enrolled in a creative writing class during the summer session in 2001 and as of July 30, 2001, he was failing the class. According to MOTHER, she became more concerned about STUDENT only being able to write two-word sentences and it seemed as though the summer class did not work to remediate his problems.
In July 2001, the PARENTS filed a request for a due process hearing. During STUDENT’s 2001-2002 seventh-grade school year, MOTHER was prompted to obtain an independent assessment at the beginning of the year because STUDENT was deteriorating and having panic and anxiety attacks, crying, and feeling angry. Between July 24, 2001, and September 18, 2001, licensed psychologist, Dr. Donald Hoagland, Ph.D., conducted a neurocognitive and psychological evaluation of STUDENT. Dr. Hoagland completed a records review, had MOTHER complete a child’s history questionnaire, and had both MOTHER and STUDENT’s sixth-grade teachers complete neurocognitive and psychological rating scales. Dr. Hoagland also consulted with MOTHER and conducted an interview and observations of STUDENT. He conducted neurocognitive testing by administering the following testing instruments: the WISC-III, Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (CTONI), Woodcock-Johnson Cognitive Abilities Battery-Second Edition Tests of Achievement (Form B) and Tests of Cognitive Ability, Woodcock Johnson Cognitive Abilities Battery-Second Edition (selected subtests), Informal Reading Inventory, Test of Written Language-Third Edition, Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-Third Edition, Test of Language Competence, Test of Variables of Attention, ADHD Checklist, Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning, Lindamood Auditory Conceptualization Test, Rey Tangled Lines Test, Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Third Edition, Beery Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration, and Reversals Frequency Test. Psychological testing included administration of the Reynold’s Adolescent Depression Scale, Rorschach Inkblot Test, Thematic Apperception Test, and the Children’s Sentence Completion Test.
Dr. Hoagland made the following conclusions regarding the results of his testing:
A comprehensive battery of neurocognitive tests determined that a standard intelligence scale underestimate STUDENT’s ability. An alternative skill, which was less impacted by his processing deficits, identified his ability as at the upper end of the above-average range. Deficient processes include attention and concentration, long-term memory, and elements of visual processing. Among the latter are basic perception and tracking and, under some conditions, closure and integration and processing speed. Auditory processing is deficient at the phonemic (sound unit) level. Although formal testing suggested that auditory processing is intact at the semantic (word) level, weakness in word discrimination occurs in a less structured setting, such as the communication during the evaluation. When STUDENT’s true ability is recognized, learning disabilities are identified in multiple facets of reading, math, written language, oral expression, and listening comprehension. Consequently, STUDENT would have special education eligibility as a pervasively learning disabled student. His ADHD would provide secondary eligibility under Other Health Impaired.
A psychological evaluation, including tests, rating scales, interviews, and observations found STUDENT to experience a high degree of psychological distress that is primarily characterized by a serious degree of depression. …Testing also suggested that without significant interventions, he is vulnerable to becoming increasingly dysfunctional. Because STUDENT’s depression appears to be the product of his learning difficulties, effective educational intervention should be attempted before identifying him as emotionally disturbed.
Dr. Hoagland recommended that STUDENT receive special education placement that effectively addressed his learning disabilities and his ADHD, an assistive technology assessment, a vision therapy assessment, and individual psychotherapy. Dr. Hoagland also recommended that further pharmacological interventions be explored for STUDENT’s ADHD and depression. STUDENT was on his medication for ADHD when Dr. Hoagland performed his testing in 2001.
By October 2001, STUDENT was failing his health and English classes, and receiving a “D” grade in math. On his progress reports, the math, English, and homeroom teachers indicated that STUDENT “does not complete assignments/tasks.” The math teacher also noted that STUDENT “talks too much.” MOTHER testified that she attempted to implement an assignment book for STUDENT in accordance with his Section 504 Plan, but she received nosupport from the school principal or STUDENT’s teachers in implementing the Plan. (See also Pet.’s Exhs. 15, 16, and 17.)
On October 23, 2001, the parties participated in a mediation to consider Dr. Hoagland’s assessment report. By letter dated October 23, 2001, the PARENTS informed the District that they intended to unilaterally place STUDENT at Countryside Preparatory School (CPS), effective October 24, 2001, due to the District’s alleged “failure to timely and properly identify [their] son’s learning differences and ensuing emotional problems…”
Based on a partial agreement reached in the October 23, 2001 mediation, an IEP team meeting was convened on December 14, 2001, which the parents did not attend because their counsel advised them not to attend since they were going to hearing and it would be addressed there. According to the IEP document, the IEP team discussed STUDENT’s academic success, STUDENT’s Section 504 Plan, and how the parents felt that his ADHD impacted his learning and academic grades. The IEP team also reviewed Dr. Hoagland’s report and found that because there was no severe discrepancy between ability and achievement and because his attentional issues did not adversely affect his educational programming, STUDENT was not eligible for special education under the categories of specific learning disabilities and other health impaired. The IEP team decided, however, to obtain additional assessments for assistive technology and vision therapy and also referred STUDENT for an AB 3632 assessment.
By letter dated December 17, 2001, the District forwarded a copy of the IEP dated December 14, 2001, to the PARENTS. However, according to MOTHER, she never received the signature page for the assessment plan developed at the December 14, 2001 IEP meeting and thus, no additional assessments were ever conducted pursuant to that assessment plan.
This hearing initially convened before Hearing Officer Maxine Benmour on July 26, 2002, at which time the issues were clarified and a resulting memorandum dated August 1, 2002, was generated that clearly identified the issues for hearing. No testimony was taken on that date and the matter was continued until September 3, 2002, when this Hearing Officer began residing over the remainder of the hearing. On September 3, 2002, the parties engaged in further discussions with this Hearing Officer and the Hearing Officer indicated that the time frame for allegations made by Petitioner would have a cut-off date of September 2002. After two days of hearing, the parties agreed to take the matter off calendar in order to have STUDENT’s cognitive abilities re-tested by a mutually agreed-upon independent evaluator and while he was properly medicated for his ADHD.
Before the mutually agreed-upon evaluator conducted his cognitive assessment, however, Petitioner had Dr. Hoagland administer a third scale to further clarify his intelligence. On September 13, 2002, Dr. Hoagland administered the Stanford-Binet-Fourth Edition to STUDENT because, according to Dr. Hoagland, it is a comprehensive measure that approximates the WISC-III and its composite score correlates strongly with the WISC-III IQ scores. According to Dr. Hoagland’s report, STUDENT was on medication for his ADHD during the test’s administration, unlike he was for the 1998 and 2001 WISC-III testing. When all the subtests of STUDENT’s Stanford Binet testing were combined, he had a composite score of 116. Dr. Hoagland believed STUDENT’s Stanford Binet scores were much more consistent with the CTONI pictorial, geometric, and non-verbal IQ scores of 119, 115, and 118, respectively, than with the 1998 WISC-III verbal, performance, and full scale IQ scores of 100, 107, and 104, and the 2001 WISC-III scores of 101, 99, and 100.
Dr. Paul J. Lane, Ph.D., clinical psychologist, was retained by both parties to administer an intellectual evaluation of STUDENT. Over a period of three days in January 2003, Dr. Lane administered the WISC-III. STUDENT had taken his medication on all three days during which the intellectual testing was administered. STUDENT obtained a verbal IQ score of 93, a performance IQ score of 115, and a full-scale IQ score of 104, which, according to Dr. Lane, indicated that he was functioning within the average range of intelligence.
The due process hearing resumed on May 13, 2003, after Petitioner requested that the matter be placed back on calendar. As discussed above in the procedural history section, on the last day of hearing, Petitioner’s counsel requested that the record be left open for submission of a written request to amend the issues to include eligibility under OHI. The Hearing Officer received Petitioner’s written motion, noticed it for a response, and received the District’s response on June 16, 2003, at which time the record was closed and submitted for decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to:
A. meet its “child find” obligations of timely assessing Petitioner and convening IEP meetings; B. identify Petitioner as a student with a specific learning disability; C. assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability; and D. offer and/or provide Petitioner with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs?
1998-1999 School Year
Petitioner alleges that the District failed to properly and timely meet its “child find” obligations by failing to identify him as a student with a specific learning disability for the 1998-1999 school year. (Footnote 5) Petitioner also contends that the District failed to provide him with an accurate copy of the District’s 1999 assessment report. Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability. And finally, Petitioner argues that although the IEP team found him eligible under language and speech (LAS) in 1999, he was not provided an educational program designed to address all of his unique needs, including the areas of attention, reading comprehension, and math.
The District did not respond to Petitioner’s allegation regarding its child-find obligations and the timeliness of assessments and IEP meetings. However, the District contends that there existed no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement during the 1998-1999 school year and therefore, it accurately concluded that STUDENT did not meet the requirements for eligibility as a student with a specific learning disability. Additionally, the District contends that it was aware of STUDENT’s ADHD and considered the issue in its assessments and eligibility determinations in the 1999 IEP. The District also argues that once it found Petitioner eligible under LAS, it was not required to provide services to him in other areas of need.
A. Child Find Obligations
The federal Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), as amended in 1997, and State law impose upon each school district the duty to actively and systematically identify and assess all children with disabilities who require special education and related services. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56300, 56301.) Identification procedures must include referrals of students by teachers, parents, agencies, professional persons, and members of the public. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56302.) Once a student is identified and assessed, a district is then required to develop a student’s individualized education program (IEP) in accordance with statutory timelines. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56344.) The obligation set forth in this statutory scheme is often referred to as the “child-find” obligation. (Footnote 6)
As early as November 1998, STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher, Ms. Z. James, indicated that STUDENT’s lack of attention in class concerned her most. According to a teacher’s report dated November 16, 1998, completed by Ms. James, STUDENT would drift off in class and she would have to call him back to his work. Any outside activities could cause him to stray from his tasks. Ms. James noted that STUDENT was at grade level in reading, math, science, and social science, and that his reading was “very good.” (Pet.’s Exh. 49.) Ms. James reported similar concerns on a December 1, 1998 school report that she completed for an outside assessment performed by Kaiser Permanente because of a perceived learning and/or attentional problem. (Pet.’s Exh. 48.)
MOTHER testified that STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher suggested that she request an IEP meeting due to the spelling, vocabulary, and handwriting problems that STUDENT was having in the classroom. According to MOTHER, Ms. James had suspected that STUDENT had ADHD and suggested that she have STUDENT tested. Consequently, on February 17, 1999, MOTHER requested an IEP meeting and completed the District’s necessary paperwork. (Pet.’s Exh. 47.) According to the District’s records, MOTHER signed an assessment plan on February 17, 1999, and the District received it on February 18, 1999. (Dist.’s Exh. 4.) (Footnote 7)
At the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting, the District did identify STUDENT as a child eligible for special education and related services under the category of language and speech disorder. In the context of the issues presented for determination with respect to the 1998-1999 school year, the Hearing Officer is primarily concerned with whether or not the District timely assessed and convened the IEP meeting, whether STUDENT was eligible for services under the category of SLD, and whether STUDENT had needs in the areas of attention, reading comprehension, and math that should have been addressed in the IEP that was developed on June 9, 1999.
Within fifty calendar days, excluding July and August, of a district’s receipt of a signed assessment plan from the parents, it is obligated to conduct an initial evaluation and assessment and convene an IEP meeting. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56344.) As stated above in the background facts, the District conducted a health assessment of STUDENT on April 29, 1999, over two months after its receipt of the signed assessment plan, and the psychoeducational evaluation was conducted some three months after that on May 8, 1999. The District did not conduct achievement testing until June 9, 1999, and did not convene an IEP meeting until June 9, 1999, more than one hundred days after its receipt of the signed assessment plan from the parent. When the IEP team met on June 9, 1999, it concluded that STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability (SLD), did not qualify as other health impaired (OHI), but that he was eligible for speech and language services. (Footnote 8)
Although the IEP team ultimately determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services in the area of speech and language, by June 9, 1999, the majority of his fourth-grade year was over before his IEP was developed. The law does not tolerate such delay. (Footnote 9)
It should not have taken until February 1999, approximately three months after Ms. James had identified attentional, work completion, and writing problems in the two different teacher report and school report forms, for STUDENT to be formally referred for assessment. There was no explanation offered for the delay. The Hearing Officer finds that the District had adequate information regarding STUDENT’s difficulties initially by November 16, 1998, and certainly no later than December 1, 1998, when Ms. James completed the Kaiser school report form listing her concerns and observations. The District should have immediately referred STUDENT for a special education assessment at the time STUDENT’s teacher identified his difficulties and not waited until February 1999, when the parents made their formal request.
Additionally, even when the District received the signed assessment plan on February 18, 1999, there was another delay of almost three months before all District testing was completed in May 1999. Once the plan was signed, the IEP should have been developed on or before April 8, 1999. Instead, the IEP was not developed until June 9, 1999, sixty-two days later. STUDENT had essentially completed his fourth-grade year before services were provided. The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the District failed to conduct appropriate child-find for STUDENT.
B. Identification as Student with SLD
The Hearing Officer next addresses whether the District failed to identify STUDENT as a student with specific learning disability when it convened the IEP meeting on June 9, 1999. Petitioner argues that various achievement test scores obtained during his fourth-grade-year demonstrated that there was a severe discrepancy between his ability and achievement in the areas of reading comprehension, written expression and mathematics calculation and reasoning. The District contends that the undisputed evidence is that there existed no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement during the 1998-1999 school year and that Petitioner’s own psychologist, Dr. Donald Hoagland, concurred with this conclusion.
The IDEA defines “specific learning disability” as a “disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” (20 U.S.C. § 1401(26).) California Education Code section 56337 states that the following three requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability:
(a) A severe discrepancy exists between the intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the following academic areas:
(1) Oral expression;
(2) Listening comprehension;
(3) Written expression;
(4) Basic reading skills;
(5) Reading comprehension;
(6) Mathematics calculation;
(7) Mathematics reasoning.
(b) The discrepancy is due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and is not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages.
(c) The discrepancy cannot be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program.
With regard to the first criterion, a severe discrepancy can be established by the following: [F]irst, converting into common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15, the achievement test score and the ability test score to be compared; second, computing the difference between these common standard scores; and third, comparing this computed difference to the standard criterion which is the product of 1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of the distribution of computed differences of students taking these achievement and ability tests.
(5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(A).)
From the calculation of this formula, a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement is found when the difference in standard scores is at least 22.5 points (1.5 multiplied by the standard deviation of 15), adjusted by 4 points, which is one standard error of measurement (Footnote 10) This computed difference constitutes a severe discrepancy when “such discrepancy is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments and work samples, as appropriate.” (Id.)
Petitioner contends that a severe discrepancy can be found by comparing his ability score of 116 from the Stanford-Binet test that was administered by clinical psychologist Dr. Donald Hoagland in September 2002 with his achievement scores. However, at the time of the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting, the IEP team did not have Dr. Hoagland’s 2002 test scores, or his 2001 testing for that matter. Rather, at the time of the June 1999 IEP meeting, the UCLA had assessed STUDENT’s cognitive ability using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Third Edition (WISC-III). On UCLA’s 1998 testing, STUDENT has a verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of 100, a performance IQ of 107, and a combined full scale IQ of 104. STUDENT’s full scale IQ falls within the “average” range, and his performance and verbal IQ scores also fall within the “average” range. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.) According to District policy, it does not administer IQ testing. (Dist.’s Exh. 9, pg. 77; Pet.’s Exh. 49, pg. 220.) Thus, the District’s May 8, 1999 psychoeducational assessment performed by psychologist Vivian Wolfe does not provide a standardized IQ score for STUDENT. However, the school psychologist found that based on her observation, professional judgment, teacher reports, work and language samples, and analysis of other test scores, STUDENT’s ability to learn, apply knowledge, generalize, utilize abstract concepts and evaluate was estimated to be within the “average to high average range of cognitive ability.” (Dist.’s Exh. 7, pg. 77.)
The Hearing Officer finds that the District psychologist, Vivian Wolfe’s, suggestion that STUDENT’s ability may be in the “high average” range is just an estimation and is not supported by other assessment data. In fact, Dr. Hoagland, in his review of the District’s testing, noted in his evaluation report the illogical conclusion that Ms. Wolfe reached regarding STUDENT’s ability level given the fact that STUDENT had scored within the below-average range on two of the three measures used by the school psychologist to estimate his ability. (Pet.’s Exh. 6, pg. 65.) Moreover, both of Petitioner’s witnesses, psychologists David Helm and Paul Lane, testified that during the 1998-1999 school year, they would use the WISC-III full-scale IQ score of 104 to determine whether there existed a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement.
The Hearing Officer finds STUDENT’s cognitive ability during the 1998-1999 school year to be 104, as measured by UCLA and corroborated by the District’s own 1999 cognitive testing, which showed scores closer to the average range than the high average range. Based on the ability level of 104, no severe discrepancy existed with respect to the standardized achievement scores that were available at the time of the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting, and thus, STUDENT was not eligible for special education because of an SLD.
In reviewing the scores obtained from achievement tests administered by UCLA in November 1998 and the District in April 1999, and from Standford-9 testing done in May 1999, except for one score in reading comprehension, no discrepancy was reflected between STUDENT’s ability and achievement in any of the academic categories set forth in Education Code Section 56337. (See Pet.’s Exh. 31; Resp.’s Exhs. 6 & 11, pg. 88.) STUDENT’s relevant standard scores obtained from achievement testing conducted by UCLA and the District ranged from 91 to 110.
The one low Stanford-9 reading comprehension standard score of 80 was contradicted by other available data. For instance, STUDENT’s teacher indicated on two different teacher report forms that his reading was very good and that it was one of his strengths. She also noted that he was performing at grade level in reading. (Pet.’s Exhs. 5 & 49.) In addition, by the third reporting period during the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was receiving a “B” in language arts. (Pet.’s Exh. 50.) STUDENT’s reading comprehension score on the PIAT-R administered by UCLA was 97, and his reading comprehension score on the KTEA administered by the District was 107. (Pet.’s Exh.11; Resp.’s Exh. 11, pg. 88.) Therefore, there was no persuasive evidence at the time of the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting that STUDENT had a discrepancy between ability and achievement in the area of reading comprehension because the discrepancy between his IQ score of 104 and this single May 1999 Stanford-9 reading comprehension achievement score was not “corroborated by other assessment data, which includes other tests, scales, instruments, and work samples, as appropriate.” (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4 )(A ).) Moreover, no single score or product of scores can be used as the sole criterion for the determination of special education eligibility. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4 ).)
Having found that STUDENT does not exhibit a severe discrepancy based on valid standardized assessments, the Hearing Officer next determines whether STUDENT has a severe discrepancy based upon alternative means. There was no convincing evidence that the standardized tests administered by UCLA and the District were invalid; therefore, STUDENT does not meet this criteria. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(B).)
The Hearing Officer therefore concludes that during the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning ability.
Notwithstanding the Hearing Officer’s conclusion above that STUDENT did not qualify under the category of SLD, the Hearing Officer addresses the manner in which the District conducted the June 1999 IEP meeting and its alleged interference with the parents’ participation in the IEP formulation process. According to MOTHER, they were never given an accurate copy of the 1999 District psychoeducational assessment. MOTHER testified that during the June 1999 IEP meeting, the District provided them with the version of the May 8, 1999 psychoeducational study located at Petitioner’s Exhibit 10, which was different in two respects from the version contained in STUDENT’s school records. (See District’s Exh. 9.) First, page 2 of the report that was provided to the parents did not include general information regarding STUDENT’s education and test scores from previous assessment. Additionally, on the last page of the copy provided to the parents where Ms. Wolfe makes her summary and recommendations, someone, unbeknownst to either party, hand wrote the word “not” into the first sentence so as to indicate that the test results did not indicate there was a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s cognitive ability and achievement. However, when the rest of the sentence and the paragraph on the last page of the report are read through, it is apparent that the assessor did not intend to insert the word “not” into the sentence because doing so would make the sentence illogical. There was no indication at what point in time the word “not” was inserted into the report in front of the phrase “a severe discrepancy.” The District proffered no evidence to refute Petitioner’s allegation that the District provided the parents with an altered copy of the 1999 District psychoeducational evaluation.
MOTHER testified that she believed she was “at the District’s mercy,” so she agreed to whatever the District was willing to provide for STUDENT. She also testified that since she was a “novice” at the time of the first IEP team meeting she did not know that the version of the District’s 1999 psychoeducational case study with which the District had provided her had been altered to indicate STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between achievement and ability and had omitted his scores from a previous assessment.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to provide the parents with an accurate copy of the 1999 District assessment denied the parents the opportunity to effectively participate in the development of the IEP.
C. Proper Assessment
Petitioner alleges that the District did not properly assess his attentional skills, which was an identified area of need. The District denies this allegation and asserts that it assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability.
The law requires that a student be assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability. If appropriate, assessment must include language function, motor abilities, and social, emotional, and communicative status. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f).) The purpose of the assessment is to gather all relevant information that will assist the IEP team in identifying the student as a child with a disability and providing the team with the information it will need to develop an appropriate IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2)(A).) Another of the factors that must be considered by the IEP team when developing the plan for the student is whether the student engages in behaviors that impede his or her learning or the learning of others.
Prior to the District conducting its assessment, STUDENT’s parent had alerted the District of her concerns regarding STUDENT’s attention and off-task behavior. On the initial request for special education assessment, MOTHER had indicated that STUDENT had difficulty doing homework independently and was not always sure of his assignments. (Pet.’s Exh. 47.) In addition, by fax dated March 15, 1999, MOTHER provided the District with a copy of the UCLA ADHD Genetic Study completed on STUDENT. (Resp.’s Exh. 6.) And finally, by letter dated May 10, 1999, MOTHER, again, informed the District of her concerns regarding STUDENT’s attentional issues and how they were being addressed in the classroom. (Pet.’s Exh. 46.)
There is no convincing evidence that District psychologist Vivian Wolfe assessed STUDENT’s attentional difficulties and the impact those difficulties may have on his ability to benefit from his education. Rather, it appears that Ms. Wolfe accepted the earlier diagnoses of ADHD made by UCLA and Kaiser without conducting additional testing outside her administration of the Burkes Behavior Rating Scale to STUDENT’s teacher. There is also no indication that the school psychologist conducted a classroom observation of STUDENT’s attentional skills, which is a significant omission, given STUDENT’s attentional deficiency was observed during Ms. Wolfe’s own testing, it was indicated as a significant challenge by his teacher, and identified during test administration by UCLA. Ms. Wolfe’s report made no conclusions regarding the impact ADHD may be having on STUDENT’s education.
In addition, there was no evidence that STUDENT’s attentional issues were successfully being addressed in the regular education program. In fact, STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher indicated on various teacher report forms dated December 1, 1998, and March 9, 1999, that STUDENT’s greatest academic challenge was related to attentional challenges and that his short attention span caused problems with his ability to complete his work. She noted that STUDENT also had trouble staying on task. So STUDENT’s attentional problems persisted, despite the numerous interventions that were being implemented in the classroom to try and assist him with re-directing his focus. (Pet.’s Exhs. 49, 9, & 5.) Additionally, UCLA’s Department of Psychology had diagnosed STUDENT as having ADHD and indicated in its report his impulsiveness during test taking (noting STUDENT’s approach as over-eager with certain tasks and lacking persistence with others). The UCLA assessors also recommended various educational interventions for treating STUDENT’s ADHD so that his behavioral difficulties would not impede his academic and social functioning. MOTHER forwarded the UCLA report to the District by fax on March 15, 1999. (Dist.’s Exh. 6.)
Dr. Hoagland testified and opined in his 2001 report that the District’s assessment of STUDENT’s social and emotional functioning was rather limited. Dr. Hoagland pointed out that the Burkes Behavior Scale was administered only to STUDENT’s teacher and not his mother and that it appeared that no consideration was given to whether STUDENT’s ADHD provided special education eligibility as a category of OHI.
District psychologist Alnita Dunn testified that she would have followed up with STUDENT’s fourth-grade teacher’s statement regarding his having a short attention span to find out how he responded to certain instruction and strategies provided in class. (Pet.’s Exh. 48.). However, the District assessor apparently did none of these things. The District offered no evidence otherwise.
In light of the concerns expressed by STUDENT’s mother and the fact that STUDENT’s teacher had identified attention as his most serious challenge despite numerous accommodations that had been provided, there was enough information to warrant assessment of STUDENT’s attentional needs in order to determine his eligibility under OHI. The Hearing Officer finds that even if STUDENT had already been diagnosed with ADHD by another assessor, the District still had a duty to assess in all areas of suspected disability, including attention, and was obligated to conduct an assessment that is “sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the child’s special education and related services needs, whether or not commonly linked to the disability category in which the child has been classified.” (34 C.F.R. § 300.532(g) and (h).)
The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the District’s 1999 assessment was inadequate in that it did not assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. The record shows a failure to follow up with suitable testing and observation after repeated indications of attentional difficulties to determine whether such difficulties adversely affected STUDENT’s educational performance. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(f).)
D. Meeting Unique Needs
In addition to alleging that the District failed to find him eligible for special education and related services, Petitioner argues that the District failed to provide him an appropriate educational program. Specifically, Petitioner contends that when the District developed his IEP, it failed to address his attentional, reading comprehension, and math needs. The District contends that the June 9, 1999 IEP was only required to provide STUDENT services in the area of language and speech, the category under which he was qualified. According to the District, since STUDENT was not found learning disabled, the District was not required to provide services based on a learning disability. And even if it were required to do so, the District argued that STUDENT was performing on par with his cognitive ability, and therefore, did not require any goals and objectives in other academic areas.
The Hearing Officer does not find the District’s argument persuasive with respect to the District’s duty to provide educational services. Once a student is deemed eligible to receive special education and related services, he is entitled to an educational program that addresses all of his unique needs and affords him an opportunity to benefit educationally. (Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995).) A student’s educational program need not be limited to addressing only those needs that are related to the student’s qualifying disability. If the student’s identified educational needs are not being met in the general education program, then the District must address those needs in the student’s IEP, whether or not they are related to the qualifying disability. (Id.)
With respect to STUDENT’s attentional difficulties, because the Hearing Officer found above that the District has not properly assessed STUDENT in the area of attention, the Hearing Officer cannot make a determination as to whether the District appropriately addressed STUDENT’s attentional needs during the 1998-1999 school year. Although the evidence suggests that STUDENT has needs in the area of attention, the District first must properly assess STUDENT’s needs in that area in order to determine how, if at all, those needs should be addressed in his educational program.
In the areas of reading comprehension and math, the Hearing Officer finds that notwithstanding the identification by the District’s school psychologist of a severe discrepancy inthose areas, there was no evidence corroborating the discrepancy or demonstrating that these were areas of need not being adequately addressed in the regular education program. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(A).) STUDENT’s teacher indicated on two different teacher report forms that his reading was good and that it was one of his strengths. She also noted that he was at grade level in both reading and math. (Pet.’s Exhs. 5 & 49.) In addition, by the third reporting period during the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was receiving a “B” in both language arts and mathematics. (Pet.’s Exh. 50.) Therefore, there was no persuasive evidence at the time of the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting that STUDENT had unique needs in the areas of reading comprehension and math that should have been addressed in his June 9, 1999 IEP.
Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP dated June 9, 1999 offered STUDENT special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to meet its child-find obligations because it did not timely find STUDENT eligible for special education and related services. Therefore, from April 8, 1999, to June 9, 1999, STUDENT was denied a FAPE because he was not provided speech and language services for most of the school year, until June 9, 1999. The Hearing Officer also concludes that although STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD, the District denied STUDENT a FAPE when it failed to provide the parents with an accurate copy of the District’s assessment so that they could have the opportunity to effectively participate in the development of the IEP. In addition, the District failed to properly assess STUDENT’s attentional difficulties in order to determine his eligibility under the category of OHI. And finally, although the Hearing Officer could not make a determination as to whether the IEP adequately addressed STUDENT’s attentional needs since the District had not properly assessed him in this area, it was determined that the District was not required to address reading comprehension and math in the IEP dated June 9, 1999.
1999-2000 School Year
Petitioner contends that during the 1999-2000 school year, he should have been found eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD. (Footnote 11) According to Petitioner, the District failed to consider making him eligible on the basis of SLD and ADHD/OHI at the May 30, 2000 IEP meeting and he should not have been exited from special education at that time. Petitioner again contended that during every year at issue in this matter, the District failed to address his unique needs
The District argues that the evidence continued to demonstrate that there existed no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement levels.
A. Child Find AND C. Proper Assessment
The crux of Petitioner’s contention for the 1999-2000 school year is that the District exited him from special education services without considering whether or not he could be eligible under a category other than speech and language. Therefore, in the context of the issues presented for determination for the 1999-2000 school year, the Hearing Officer considers the child-find and assessment issues together, to determine whether the District was aware of facts at the time of the May 30, 2000 IEP meeting warranting consideration of STUDENT’s eligibility under other categories and warranting assessment of more than just his speech and language skills. The Hearing Officer will also determine whether, in light of those facts, the District was correct in exiting STUDENT from special education.
The IEP team found that STUDENT qualified for special education and related services during the June 9, 1999 IEP meeting; therefore, during the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT’s educational program was guided by the IEP dated June 9, 1999, which included the provision of speech and language services. (Pet.’s Exh. 5.) When the IEP team convened again on May 30, 2000, it determined that STUDENT was no longer eligible for speech and language services and that he had “corrected LAS goals.” The IEP team recommended that STUDENT be exited from speech and language services. The IEP team’s decision was apparently based on the District’s speech and language assessor’s assessment conducted on May 17 and 18, 2000. (Footnote 12) (Pet.’s Exh. 4.)
Had the May 30, 2000 IEP team conducted even a brief investigation, such as reviewing STUDENT’s 1999-2000 fifth-grade progress report, it would have seen the steady decline in STUDENT’s progress in class. STUDENT’s teacher, Ms. Kearney, indicated on the progress report for the time period December 3, 1999, through March 17, 2000, that STUDENT needed to focus on completing and turning in all of his assignments and projects and that his difficulty in this area had impeded his progress in social studies. The teacher also noted that STUDENT would benefit from reviewing his writing in all areas before turning in assignments. For the reporting period of May 20, 2000, to June 23, 2000, the teacher indicated that STUDENT’s progress in class had slowed, he had lost focus, and that he had lost the concern that he once had for producing quality work. According to the report, Ms. Kearney believed STUDENT needed to practice his reading and math during the summer. (Pet.’s Exh. 45.) Moreover, by the third reporting period of the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT had received achievement marks of “partially proficient” in the areas of reading, writing, and history/social science, notwithstanding effort marks that indicated he was putting forth consistent effort. The progress report alone was sufficient to warrant further evaluation to assist the IEP team in determining whether STUDENT qualified for special education and related services under other categories of disability.
The evidence demonstrated that the District’s assessment was limited to only an evaluation of STUDENT’s speech and language skills, and not an examination of his attentional difficulties or his declining class progress.
On May 17 and 18, 2000, the District performed a speech and language assessment of STUDENT for the purpose of conducting an annual review and exiting him from speech and language services. (Pet.’s Exh. 4, pg. 40.) However, when the District conducted its assessment in preparation for the May 30, 2000 IEP meeting where it intended to exit STUDENT from special education, it did not consider whether STUDENT continued to need supports and services to address his attentional needs, it did not identify his present levels of performance in all appropriate areas, including attention, and it did not consider whether STUDENT could have been eligible under categories other than language and speech. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(c).)
Before the District exited STUDENT from special education in May 2000, the District was required to first review evaluation data, including information provided by the parents, classroom-based assessments and observations, and teacher and related service providers’ observations. On the basis of that review and input from the child’s parent, the District was to identify what additional data, if any, were needed to determine whether STUDENT continued to need special education and related services and whether any additions or modifications to the special education and related services were needed to enable him to participate, as appropriate, in the general education curriculum. (Id.) Instead, the District conducted only a speech and language evaluation and did not assess STUDENT’s present levels of performance in any other areas of need than speech and language. Information from STUDENT’s teacher indicating that he was having difficulty completing and turning in assignments and projects and that he had lost concern for producing quality work and his ability to focus should have been further investigated. (Pet.’s Exh. 45.)
MOTHER testified that District personnel told her that STUDENT had improved and no longer needed LAS services and that they, therefore, needed to “kick him out” of special education. According to MOTHER, at the time of the May 2000 IEP meeting, she was unfamiliar with all of the assessment scores and since she did not know enough to debate the matter with the IEP team, they exited him from LAS services. MOTHER stated that during the May 2000 IEP meeting, there was no discussion regarding further assessment of STUDENT in his areas of need.
Based on all of the above, the Hearing Officer finds that the District had adequate information regarding STUDENT’s difficulties at the time of the May 2000 IEP meeting, warranting another look at the eligibility issue. Therefore, before exiting STUDENT from special education, the District should have referred him for a special education assessment to reconsider his needs with respect to potential eligibility under categories other than LAS. The District failed to further investigate STUDENT’s declining progress in class and failed to assess his attentional needs and their impact, if any, on his classroom performance. Additionally, the District failed to consider, during its assessment, whether he may be eligible for special education under categories other than language and speech.
B. Identification as Student with SLD
No new cognitive testing was performed during the 1999-2000 school year, and the only evidence of achievement testing was STUDENT’s Stanford-9 testing taken in May 2000. (Pet.’s Exh. 31, pg. 89.) STUDENT’s standardized scores from the May 2000 Stanford-9 testing in the academic categories set forth in Education Code Section 56337 ranged from 90 to 101. (Id.; see also Pet.’s Exh. 25, pg. 34 for percentile rank to standard score conversion chart.) Therefore, based on the ability level of 104, no severe discrepancy existed with respect to the standardized achievement scores from STUDENT’s May 2000 Stanford-9 testing.
Although STUDENT’s progress report indicated that by the third reporting period he was only “partially proficient” in the areas of reading, writing, and history/social science, STUDENT’s standardized test scores did not demonstrate a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement, which is the legal standard required by law. Moreover, since there was no indication that the standardized tests administered by UCLA and the Stanford Achievement Test series were invalid, STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy based upon alternative means.
The Hearing Officer therefore finds that during the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT did not have a specific learning disability.
D. Meeting Unique Needs
As stated earlier, the Hearing Officer analyzed the June 9, 1999 IEP for its appropriateness at the time it was written and found it was appropriate with respect to Petitioner’s contentions regarding reading comprehension and math. The Hearing Officer was unable to make a determination with respect to STUDENT’s attentional needs because the District failed to assess him in that area. Therefore, since the June 9, 1999 IEP covered STUDENT’s program from June 1999 through June 2000, and it was concluded that the program was appropriate, the Hearing Officer need not address the matter again here. The real issue for the 1999-2000 school year has to do with child-find and assessment, as discussed above.
In conclusion, for the 1999-2000 school year, the District failed to meet its child-find obligations when it exited STUDENT from special education without referring him for further assessment. The District should have assessed STUDENT’s declining progress and attentional issues before exiting him from special education. Additionally, Petitioner was not eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD.
2000-2001 School Year
Petitioner argues that during the 2000-2001 school year, the District failed to timely assess him, failed to timely conduct an IEP meeting, failed to make him eligible for special education, and failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability.
The District contends that the uncontradicted evidence is that during the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT did not manifest a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. The District also contends that it assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. The District proffered no response with respect to allegations regarding the delay in conducting assessments and the IEP meeting.
A. Child-Find Obligations
At the IEP meeting on May 30, 2000, the IEP team exited STUDENT from special education and related services. Less than one month later on June 19, 2000, a Section 504 Plan that addressed STUDENT’s organizational skills, attention span, written performance, test taking, and homework was developed and, according to MOTHER, she signed the plan, believing that the related accommodations would help support STUDENT in the classroom. MOTHER testified that she was concerned with STUDENT moving on into the middle school with his challenges and not being provided any services, so she prompted the elementary school to draft the Section 504 Plan.
The 2000-2001 school year marked the beginning of STUDENT’s sixth-grade year and his transfer to Robert Frost Middle School. Since the District had exited STUDENT from special education at the end of the previous school year, MOTHER provided a copy of STUDENT’s Section 504 Plan to STUDENT’s counselor at his new school, Frost Middle School, in September 2000, and asked him to put a copy of the Plan in STUDENT’s teachers’ mailboxes. (Footnote 13) MOTHER also created a log, dating from June 29, 2000, through August 15, 2001, documenting all of the attempts she made to communicate with Frost Middle School to request services and summarizing everything that occurred during the 2000-2001 school year. (Pet.’s Exh. 12.) According to MOTHER, she had meetings with STUDENT’s sixth-grade English/social studies teacher, Ms. DePau, and she asked Ms. DePau to keep her informed on what was going on with STUDENT in school. MOTHER testified that she also contacted STUDENT’s other teachers, visited the school, and sat with STUDENT every night to try and help him get on track with his class work, to no avail. According to MOTHER and Ms. Ebner, STUDENT’s teachers were not implementing his Section 504 Plan.
STUDENT was depressed, angry, and cried a lot during this time and according to MOTHER, his teachers did not understand him. STUDENT could only write two-word sentences and his health/science teacher, Aviva Ebner, confirmed the same. Ms. Ebner testified that although STUDENT grasped concepts, it was difficult for him to put down his thoughts in writing. STUDENT responded quickly and his written responses were very brief. Ms Ebner also indicated that STUDENT did not participate, had little interaction with peers, had noticed, to a very large degree, that STUDENT was easily distracted, confused in following directions and apprehensive about rightness of response, had difficulty reasoning things out logically with others, and to a large degree, seemed generally unhappy. Ms. Ebner noted that STUDENT withdrew and avoided attention, was reluctant to participate, did not do homework, had a short attention span, seldom asked for help, lacked effort, and seldom completed his work. Although Ms. Ebner had used various interventions and modifications in class, she indicated that she believed STUDENT had potential but that he really needed one-on-one attention to succeed. (Resp.’s Exh. 19.)
At least one of STUDENT’s teachers had confirmed the parents’ concerns with STUDENT’s attentional difficulties and his performance in class. Therefore, on September 29, 2000, MOTHER requested that the District reassess STUDENT for eligibility for special education. On October 3, 2000, the District received an assessment plan signed by MOTHER, consenting to the District’s assessment of STUDENT’s social/emotional development, cognitive development, academic achievement, perceptual development, motor development, communications/language, and health. (Pet.’s Exh. 2, pg. 35.) In October 2000, STUDENT’s English/history, science/health, and physical education teachers completed written evaluations of STUDENT’s school performance and submitted them to Ms. Wolf in the resource specialist program. Ms. DePau’s report indicated that at the beginning of the school year STUDENT was missing many assignments but after talking with his mother and setting up a plan, STUDENT had shown extreme progress and seriousness in his work.
Pursuant to the assessment plan received by the District on October 3, 2000, the District conducted achievement testing of STUDENT in November 2000 and psychoeducational testing in March 2001. However, it was not until May 3, 2001, that the District convened an IEP team meeting to conduct a comprehensive review of the testing and make a determination as to whether STUDENT qualified for special education and related services. (Footnote 14) The IEP team concluded at the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting that STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services.
By the time the District held the IEP team meeting on May 3, 2001, the majority of STUDENT’s sixth-grade year was over. Moreover, after the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting, STUDENT’s counselor was supposed to preside over a future meeting with STUDENT’s teachers to coordinate plans on how to instruct STUDENT most successfully. During that meeting, STUDENT’s teacher, Ms. Ebner, had planned to share with all of STUDENT’s other teachers strategies that she had used with STUDENT that were successful. However, none of the teachers, other than Ms. Ebner, came to the scheduled meeting and STUDENT’s counselor never rescheduled another one. (Testimonies of A. Ebner and MOTHER.)
Again, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to meet its child-find obligations to timely conduct its assessments and convene an IEP team meeting.
B. Identification as Student with SLD
The Hearing Officer now turns to the issue of whether STUDENT should have been found eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD at the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting. Petitioner continues to assert that he was eligible for special education because of his specific learning disability and his other health impairment resulting from his attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD). (Footnote 15)
Petitioner contends that a severe discrepancy can be found by comparing his ability and achievement scores from the independent assessments conducted by Dr. Donald Hoagland in 2001 and 2002. However, at the time of the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting, the IEP team did not have Dr. Hoagland’s testing results available to it. At the time of the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting, the District had, as discussed earlier, the results of the UCLA cognitive testing, which indicated STUDENT had a full-scale IQ of 104 – within the average range. Although the District’s March 29, 2001 psychoeducational evaluation does not provide a standardized score for STUDENT’s cognitive abilities, the school psychologist also found that the cognitive testing that she administered indicated STUDENT’s overall cognitive ability to be in the average range. (Dist.’s Exh. 7.)
The Hearing Officer finds STUDENT’s cognitive ability during the 2000-2001 school year to be 104, as measured by UCLA and corroborated by the District’s 2001 testing. Based on the ability level of 104, no severe discrepancy existed with respect to the standardized achievement scores that were available at the time of the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting, and thus, STUDENT was not eligible for special education because of an SLD.
In reviewing the scores obtained from achievement tests administered by the District in November 2000 and March 2001, and from Standford-9 testing done in May 2000 and May 2001, no discrepancy was reflected between STUDENT’s ability and achievement in any of the academic categories set forth in Education Code Section 56337. (See Resp.’s Exhs. 18 and 20; Pet.’s Exh. 31, pg. 89.) (Footnote 16) In addition, with respect to his class grades in academic subjects, as of May 2001, STUDENT had a grade of “B” in science/health, English/reading, and world history/ancient civilization, but was failing math. His teacher’s comments for his math class, however, consistently indicated throughout the year that STUDENT did not complete his assignments and talked too much. In addition, most of STUDENT’s achievement testing in the area of math, except for his May 2001 Stanford-9 testing, reflected standard scores in the average range. (See Pet.’s Exhs. 22 and 31; Resp.’s Exh. 18 and 20.) (Footnote 17) By the end of the school year, however, STUDENT had a grade of “B” in science/health and English/reading, a “C” in world history/ancient civilization, and had brought his math grade up to a “C.”
MOTHER also testified that over a period of seven months, STUDENT had gone through four or five different math teachers and suffered alleged emotional abuse from one of those teachers, which might have accounted for his initial poor grades in math. District coordinator of psychological services, Alnita Dunn, opined that STUDENT’s absences and changes in math teachers could have impacted his ability to perform in math class. Moreover, as noted earlier, according to MOTHER, STUDENT’s teachers were not following the Section 504 Plan and MOTHER was having difficulty corresponding with the teachers to ensure they were implementing the Plan. It appears that the real difficulty, therefore, may have been with the apparent lack of diligence by most of STUDENT’s teachers to implement the Section 504 Plan, which was designed to assist STUDENT with his assignment completion, homework, organizational skills, and staying on task. (Footnote 18) (Testimonies of MOTHER and A. Ebner.) The parents retained an independent evaluator, Yellen and Associates, to perform cognitive testing of STUDENT on May 31, 2001, after the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting. (Pet.’s Exh. 55.) Although it does not appear that this information was available to the IEP team on May 3, 2001, the Yellen testing, nevertheless, further supports the Hearing Officer’s determination that STUDENT’s cognitive ability is in the average range. According to the results of the Yellen May 2001 administration of the WISC-III, STUDENT has a verbal IQ of 101, a performance IQ of 99, and a combined full scale IQ of 100. The Yellen testing is therefore consistent with the 1998 UCLA testing as well as the cognitive testing performed by the District in March 2001. STUDENT’s average cognitive ability was further corroborated by administration of the WISC-III to STUDENT by Dr. Paul Lane later in January 2003, during which it was undisputed that STUDENT was medicated for his ADHD. Dr. Lane’s testing revealed a verbal IQ of 93, performance IQ of 115, and a full-scale IQ score of 104, which is exactly the full-scale score obtained by UCLA in 1998. The Hearing Officer notes, however, that Dr. Lane’s test results also were not available to the IEP team when it convened in May 2001 or again in December 2001. Both psychologists Dr. Paul Lane and Dr. David Helm testified that until the Yellen testing information was available, they would use the 104 IQ score obtained by UCLA in identifying STUDENT’s cognitive ability.
Dr. Hoagland testified that using the full scale WISC-III IQ score from the 1998 UCLA testing and the achievement testing conducted by the District in November 2000, there would be a severe discrepancy in the area of “Usage;” however, Usage is not an academic area identified by law in which a discrepancy must exist for special education eligibility under SLD. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56337.) Dr. Hoagland also acknowledged that using the full-scale WISC-III score from the May 2001 cognitive testing and the District’s 2000 achievement testing, there was no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement.
Notwithstanding Dr. Hoagland’s acknowledgements as noted above, he also testified that since STUDENT was not taking his medications for his ADHD during any of the WISC-III testing conducted in 1998 or 2001, STUDENT’s scores could have been depressed and the ability to capture his potential on those tests is therefore questionable. Dr. Hoagland testified that an attentional deficit influences thoughts and could influence one’s thinking. According to Hoagland, because the WISC-III test, unlike the CTONI, is timed, it put STUDENT, an attention deficit child, at a significant disadvantage since he was not on his ADHD medications at the time of the test administrations. (Footnote 19) However, Dr. Hoagland is not a medical doctor and could not cite any authority for his conclusion regarding the medication’s possible affect, if any, on STUDENT’s performance on cognitive and achievement testing.
In addition, Dr. Paul Lane testified that ADHD may affect a child both on timed and un-timed tests and therefore, one could not categorically say that STUDENT would have done better on an un-timed test. In fact, Dr. Hoagland states in his report that during the testing that he conducted, STUDENT was generally very hyperactive, noting that at times he was in constant motion, rocking and bouncing in his chair and tipping it back from the table, sitting up on his knees in the chair or slouching down low, jostling his legs, and tugging and pulling on his shirt. (Footnote 20) (Pet.’s Exh. 6, pg. 88.) Therefore, the Hearing Officer does not find persuasive Petitioner’s argument that the WISC-III might not be the best tool to accurately assess STUDENT’s cognitive ability given his ADHD, because STUDENT seems to demonstrate attentional and hyperactive qualities during all of his testing, regardless of whether or not he is properly medicated, and none of the assessors, including Dr. Hoagland, indicated that STUDENT’s hyperactivity and hastiness compromised the test results.
Having found that STUDENT does not exhibit a severe discrepancy based on valid standardized assessments, the next question is whether STUDENT has a severe discrepancy based upon alternative means. Because there was no convincing evidence that the standardized tests administered by UCLA, Yellen & Associates, and the District were invalid, STUDENT does not meet this criteria. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(B).)
In sum, the Hearing Officer concludes that during the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability.
C. Proper Assessment
Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas of suspected disability. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the District’s assessment consisted of only standardized tests, there was no consideration of whether Petitioner qualified as ADHD/OHI or SLD using alternative criteria, there was no consideration of Petitioner’s performance in class, and no reference to his downward spiral on the Stanford-9 testing.
The District contends that it accurately concluded that STUDENT did not meet the requirements for eligibility as a student with a specific learning disability and that it was aware of STUDENT’s ADHD and considered the issue in its assessments.
As discussed earlier, the law requires that a student be assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability. If appropriate, assessment must include language function, motor abilities, and social, emotional, and communicative status. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f).) At the time of the District’s March 2001 psychoeducational assessment, STUDENT was on a Section 504 Plan that was designed to address attentional deficiencies that impacted his performance in class. Notwithstanding her acknowledgement of the existence of the Section 504 Plan and mentioning in her report that STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD, there is no indication that District school psychologist Virginia Williams included any measures of attention and concentration in her psychoeducational evaluation. (Dist.’s Exhs. 20 and 21.) There is also no indication in her report that she conducted a classroom observation of STUDENT’s attentional skills, which, according to Dr. Hoagland, was a significant omission, since STUDENT’s attentional deficiency was the basis of his Section 504 Plan. Moreover, STUDENT’s health/science teacher, Ms. Ebner, had indicated at hearing and on a school performance evaluation that STUDENT did not participate or express his needs in class, did not do his homework, had a short attention span, seldom completed his work, and “to a very large degree,” was easily distracted, confused in following directions and apprehensive about rightness, and had difficulty reasoning things out logically with others. (Pet.’s Exh. 16.) Yet, it appears that the District’s assessor did not follow up on Ms. Ebner’s comments and comments made by other teachers earlier in the year about STUDENT’s low scores, talking too much, and his difficulty in meeting the standards and completing assignments. (Pet.’s Exh. 22.) Dr. Hoagland also believed that the District’s assessment of STUDENT’s social and emotional functioning was very limited because it was based only on his teacher’s observations. Moreover, it appeared that the school psychologist’s testing gave no consideration to STUDENT’s eligibility under OHI.
The District offered no evidence as to the appropriateness of its assessment. The Hearing Officer therefore finds that since the District was on notice that STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD by other assessors and that his ADHD was the basis for his Section 504 Plan, the District had a duty to assess STUDENT’s attentional skills, and was obligated to conduct an assessment that was sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of the child’s suspected special education and related services needs. (34 C.F.R. § 300.532(g) and (h).)
The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the District’s 2001 psychoeducational assessment was inadequate in that it did not assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. The record shows a failure to follow up with suitable testing and observation after various indications of attentional and organizational difficulties to determine whether such difficulties adversely affected STUDENT’s educational performance. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(f).)
D. Meeting Unique Needs
Since the Hearing Officer found above that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD, and there was no existing IEP during this time frame, the Hearing Officer does not discuss whether the District offered and/or provided STUDENT with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that during the 2000-2001 school year, the District, again, failed to meet its child-find obligations, but correctly determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education as a student with an SLD. Lastly, the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability.
2001-2002 School Year A. Child-Find Obligations
As a result of the parties’ October 2001 mediation discussion, the parties agreed to reconvene an IEP team in December to discuss Dr. Hoagland’s 2001 assessment. Notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to meet in December 2001, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally withdrew him from the District and placed him in a private school as of October 24, 2001. By letter dated October 23, 2001, Petitioner’s parents notified the District that STUDENT would be placed in a nonpublic school due to the District’s alleged failure to timely and properly identify his learning differences and emotional problems. (Resp.’s Exh. 31.) According to the evidence, the parties agreed to convene an IEP meeting on December 14, 2001, to discuss Dr. Hoagland’s assessment. However, the parents’ attorney gave them improper advice that they should not participate in the IEP process, which the Hearing Officer finds is contrary to the spirit of the IDEA’s requirement that the parents be active participants in the IEP process. (Testimony of MOTHER.)
When the IEP team convened on December 14, 2001, it determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services under the categories of SLD or OHI because there was no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement and because his attentional issues did not adversely affect his educational performance. (Resp.’s Exh. 34.) However, the IEP team did decide to assess STUDENT “as soon as possible” in the areas that Dr. Hoagland had recommended: assistive technology, vision therapy, and AB 3632 services. (Pet.’s Exh. 34.) By letter dated December 17, 2001, the District forwarded to the PARENTS a copy of the December 14, 2001 IEP document, which states the District’s intention to assess STUDENT in the areas recommended by Dr. Hoagland. (Dist.’s Exh. 36.) (Footnote 21) MOTHER testified, however, that they never received a signature page or an assessment plan for them to sign and return to the District. The District provided no evidence to dispute this fact.
The Hearing Officer finds that under the circumstances described above, based on the December 14, 2001 IEP team’s findings and recommended follow-up actions, the District was still required to forward an assessment plan to STUDENT’s parents and after the District’s receipt of the signed assessment plan, conduct an appropriate assessment. There was no evidence that the parents refused to consent to any assessment – presumably because the District never sent a plan to them for their response.
The overall statutory scheme of IDEA ‘97, particularly the notice requirement for unilateral parent placements, embodies the concept that a school district is to be given a legitimate opportunity to offer a student a FAPE for the year initially at issue and every year thereafter before incurring the responsibility for reimbursing a parent for a unilateral private placement. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10).) Thus, a school district is not required to develop an IEP or make a specific formal offer of FAPE every year for every student who has been unilaterally withdrawn from the district by his or her parents without some indication that the parents are seeking services from the district, even where FAPE had been put in issue in the past. (34 C.F.R., Attachment 1, p. 12601 (1999).)
Here, the evidence established that STUDENT’s unilateral placement at Countryside during the 2001-2002 school year was not a matter of his parents simply preferring one educational facility to another. Rather, STUDENT’s parents were attempting to find an alternative to the District’s program, which they found inadequate. Additionally, STUDENT’s mother had indicated on the IEP dated May 3, 2001, that she did not agree with the District’s determination regarding assessment, eligibility, the instructional setting, and specific instruction and services. Through the direct testimony of his mother, Petitioner also gave the District sufficient indication that he was interested in a public school placement for the 2001-2002 school year. Therefore, the District erred and failed to meet its child-find mandate when it failed to provide the parents with an assessment plan to conduct further assessments as identified in the IEP dated December 14, 2001, as it was not excused from doing so because his parents had not attended the IEP meeting and had unilaterally placed him in a private school.
B. Identification as Student with SLD
Petitioner maintains that he remained eligible under the category of SLD during the 2001-2002 school year. The District argues that the weight of the evidence establishes that there continued to exist no severe discrepancy between ability and achievement during the 2001-2002 school year.
Petitioner obtained an independent neurocognitive and psychological evaluation from licensed clinical psychologist Dr. Donald Hoagland. (Footnote 22) Dr. Hoagland’s initial testing was performed from July 24, 2001, through September 18, 2001, and his report included results from both cognitive and achievement testing. (Pet.’s Exh. 6.) According to Dr. Hoagland’s administration of the Comprehensive Test of Non-Verbal Intelligence (CTONI), STUDENT’s non-verbal IQ is 118, which Dr. Hoagland testified confirmed his hypothesis that STUDENT’s performance on the WISC-III had been compromised by various factors, including processing deficits, and that STUDENT’s ability level is actually above average. Dr. Hoagland concluded that when STUDENT’s true ability was recognized, “learning disabilities were identified in multiple facets of reading, math, written language, oral expression, and listening comprehension.” (Pet.’s Exh. 6.)
However, in contrast, Dr. Paul Lane testified that with a ninety-five percent probability, STUDENT’s true full-scale IQ score is most likely somewhere between 98 and 109, taking into account the standard error of measurement. Dr. Lane also testified that he puts less weight on the results of the CTONI because that test focuses more on nonverbal abilities and in order to understand a student’s global abilities, you need to look at both the verbal and nonverbal abilities.
As discussed above, the cognitive testing that was performed by Yellen & Associates in May 2001 (after the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting) revealed a full scale IQ for STUDENT at 100. Both Dr. Lane and Dr. Helm testified that in 2001, the most appropriate cognitive score to use for identification of STUDENT’s cognitive ability would be the score of 100 obtained by Yellen & Associates. (Footnote 23) The Hearing Officer is persuaded by the consistency of the cognitive scores in the average range that were obtained by UCLA, the District, and Yellen and Associates. (Footnote 24) Moreover, cognitive testing performed on STUDENT by Dr. Lane in January 2003 further confirmed that STUDENT’s cognitive ability is in the average range. Therefore, in determining whether STUDENT had a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement during the 2001-2002 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the IQ score of 100, or in the average range, obtained by Yellen and Associates on May 31, 2001, is the appropriate and correct measure as compared to Dr. Hoagland’s unsupported measure of 118, the above average range.
In comparing the IQ score of 100 with achievement testing performed by Dr. Hoagland in August 2001 and previously by the District in November 2000 and March 2001, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement. STUDENT’s achievement test standard scores in the academic categories set forth in Education Code Section 56337 on Dr. Hoagland’s and the District’s testing ranged from 85 to 122. (Pet.’s Exh. 79; Resp.’s Exhs. 18 and 20.) However, in comparing STUDENT’s IQ score with his May 2001 Standford-9 math procedures score of 80, there was a discrepancy of twenty points, and a discrepancy of eighteen points in total math. (Footnote 25) (Pet.’s Exh. 31, pg. 88.) When adding the four points to those two differences, there is a discrepancy of twenty-four and twenty-two points respectively. However, these scores are somewhat isolated, even when supported by his math grade of “D” for the first fifteen days of the 2001-2002 fall semester.
For instance, the teacher comments for STUDENT’s fall 2001 math class indicate again, that STUDENT was not completing his assignments/tasks and was talking too much in class. (Pet.’s Exh. 22.) During this time frame, STUDENT had missed three days of school and his brother was already attending Countryside Preparatory School (Countryside), the nonpublic school. In addition, although MOTHER testified that she waited until after the October 2001 mediation to tell STUDENT that he would be attending Countryside so as not to encourage him to perform badly at the District, according to MOTHER, STUDENT had already wanted to attend school there because his brother attended that school. The evidence also shows that when STUDENT started attending Countryside, he received a grade of “B” in math and “excellent” work habit and cooperation scores. By December 14, 2001, however, STUDENT’s math teacher at Countryside noted that his test scores had been low, but that when he focused and put in the effort, he could do very well. The teacher also noted that STUDENT was missing some homework, a problem that he had also faced while attending school in the District. (Pet.’s Exh. 40.) Lastly, his achievement scores in mathematics from Dr. Hoagland’s more recent September 2001 testing were all in the average range, between 95 and 108. In particular, STUDENT’s calculation score was 95 in September 2001, as compared to the score of 80 that he received on the Stanford-9 procedures/calculation subtest in May 2001.
The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the evidence does not support a finding of a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in the area of mathematics calculations and reasoning for the 2001-2002 school year. There also is no indication that the various standardized tests were invalid. (5 C.C.R. § 3030(j)(4)(B).) Rather, as was the case during the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT’s difficulties during the 2001-2002 school year appear to stem from his difficulty in completing his work and staying on task, something that his Section 504 Plan was designed to address. Therefore, for the 2001-2002 school year, STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD.
C. Proper Assessment
There were no assessments conducted by the District during the 2001-2002 school year. Therefore, the Hearing Officer does not make any determination as to the appropriateness of any assessment.
D. Meeting Unique Needs
Since the Hearing Officer found above that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services under the category of SLD, and there was no existing IEP during this time frame, the Hearing Officer does not discuss whether the District offered and/or provided STUDENT with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that for the 2001-2002 school year, the District failed to meet its child-find mandate when it failed to forward an assessment plan to the parents after the December 14, 2001 IEP meeting. However, based on the information available to the IEP team during the 2001-2002 school year, STUDENT was not eligible to receive special education and related services under the category of SLD.
Beginning of 2002-2003 School Year Through September 2002
The Hearing Officer placed a cut-off date of September 2002 on Petitioner’s issues with respect to the time frame through which the Hearing Officer would consider. Therefore, the Hearing Officer looks solely at the time frame from the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year through September 2002.
Petitioner makes no specific argument regarding this time frame, other than to contend that he was eligible for special education and related services as a student with a specific learning disability. The District continues to contend that using STUDENT’s IQ score of 104, there is no severe discrepancy in any of the categories listed in Education Code section 56337(a). The District also argues that even if some other higher cognitive ability level were used to suggest a severe discrepancy, no single score may establish a severe discrepancy, and there was no corroborating evidence whatsoever to establish a current severe discrepancy.
Dr. Hoagland administered the Stanford-Binet, Fourth Edition intelligence test to STUDENT in September 2002 and obtained a test composite score of 116. According to Dr. Hoagland, the Stanford-Binet 116 score was more consistent with the CTONI IQ score of 118 – above average. However, according to a stipulation entered into between the parties at hearing on May 16, 2003, Petitioner did not provide the District with a copy of Dr. Hoagland’s September 2002 testing results until on or about April 17, 2003. (Footnote 26)
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, when the third-party psychologist, Dr. Paul Lane, administered the WISC-III to STUDENT in January 2003, those results further corroborated determinations that STUDENT’s IQ was in the average range. (Pet.’s Exh. 53.) Dr. Lane’s WISC-III testing revealed a performance score of 115, verbal score of 93, and full-scale score of 104. The evidence also indicated that STUDENT was on his ADHD medication when Dr. Lane conducted his testing. STUDENT’s attainment of a full scale of 104 on the WISC-III while on medication tends to refute Dr. Hoagland’s contention that the WISC-III underestimated STUDENT’s ability and that the CTONI offered a more valid measure. Dr. Hoagland believed that STUDENT’s stronger performance on the Stanford-Binet than on previous administrations of the WISC-III was attributable to the fact that he was on medication for his ADHD during its administration. However, STUDENT was on his ADHD medication for the January 2003 administration of the WISC-III and still received a full-scale score in the average range. And although STUDENT’s 2003 WISC-III performance score was in the above-average range, the Hearing Officer found persuasive the fact that STUDENT’s full-scale IQ score had remained consistent over time, thus further confirming its accuracy as an estimate of STUDENT’s cognitive functioning. (Testimony of A. Dunn.)
Moreover, the Hearing Officer found convincing Dr. Lane’s testimony that he agreed with author and educational psychologist Jerome Satler in using the full-scale IQ score to determine a student’s cognitive ability. According to Dr. Lane, you waste valuable information when you exclude either the performance or verbal scores. Ms. Dunn also testified that she prefers to use a student’s full-scale IQ score in assessing cognitive ability because the full-scale score tends to be more stable over time. Additionally, the Hearing Officer found persuasive the testimonies of Dr. Lane, Ms. Dunn, and Dr. Helm that the WISC-III was the most generally accepted instrument used to measure a student’s cognitive ability level.
Neither Dr. Hoagland’s September 2002 nor Dr. Lane’s 2003 cognitive testing results were available to the District at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year. The most recent standardized achievement testing available to the IEP team at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year was Dr. Hoagland’s August 2001 WJ-III testing. (Pet.’s Exh. 79.) Thus, as decided above, using STUDENT’s May 2001 full-scale score IQ of 100 obtained by Yellen & Associates and Hoagland’s August 2001 achievement testing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year through September 2002. (Footnote 27)
Final Conclusion
In sum, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to meet its child-find obligations from the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002. However, when the District finally did assess STUDENT and hold IEP meetings, it was correct, on each occasion, in its determination that STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability. The Hearing Officer also concludes that each assessment conducted by the District failed to either adequately consider STUDENT’s attentional difficulties and their potential impact, if any, on STUDENT’s educational performance, or failed to further investigate STUDENT’s declining progress in class during certain time periods. Therefore, during the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability.
When the District developed an IEP for STUDENT on June 9, 1999, the Hearing Officer concludes that based on the information available to the IEP team at that time, the District offered and provided STUDENT with an educational program that met his needs in the contested areas of reading comprehension and math. With respect to attentional difficulties, the Hearing Officer made no determination whether the IEP addressed those needs because the District failed to assess STUDENT in that area.
2. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Countryside Preparatory School in the amount of $11,000 for the 2001-2002 school year?
3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to Countryside Preparatory School from October 2001 to September 2002 in an amount according to proof?
4. Is Petitioner entitled to prospective tuition and placement at Countryside Preparatory School for the 2002-2003 school year? (Footnote 28)
In this case, Petitioner seeks reimbursement for his attendance at Countryside Preparatory School (Countryside) for the 2001-2002 school year, transportation costs through September 2002, and prospective tuition and placement at Countryside for the 2002-2003 school year. Given the Hearing Officer’s determination above that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability during any of the relevant time frames, STUDENT’s placement at Countryside does not constitute replacement services for services that the District failed to provide. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for replacement of educational services or transportation for the period from the 2001-2002 school year to September 2002, or prospective placement at Countryside for the forthcoming school year. (See School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985).) However, Petitioner did prevail in part in that the District failed to meet its child-find obligations, failed to provide his parents with an accurate copy of the District’s June 1999 psychoeducational report, failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, and failed to forward an assessment plan to his parents once his parents unilaterally removed him from the District. Where parents prevail in whole or in part, they “should receive more than an ‘empty victory,’” and “if ‘appropriate relief’ in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed ... the child’s right to a free appropriate public education ... would be less than complete.” (Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Equalization, 79 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).) With this in mind, the Hearing Officer considers awarding relief in the form of additional assessment.
Since the evidence establishes that the District may not have gleaned an accurate picture of all of STUDENT’s educational needs by failing to assess him in all suspected areas, the District is ordered to conduct a comprehensive assessment that includes consideration of STUDENT’s attentional, organizational, task completion, and behavioral needs and a determination of whether or not these difficulties are temporary and whether they adversely affect his educational performance. Selecting from the Hearing Office list of psychologists who conduct comprehensive psychoeducational evaluations, an independent assessor shall be provided, at District expense, to examine STUDENT’s school records and related documentation from the 1998-1999 school year, as well as his current needs. When considering STUDENT’s current needs, the assessor shall evaluate his needs, eliminating, to the extent possible, the effects of the educational services currently being provided, i.e., STUDENT shall not be found ineligible merely because current services are assisting him with dealing with a disability. If the independent assessor finds that STUDENT should have qualified for special education and related services from the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002 based on his attentional difficulties that previously were not assessed, the District shall convene an IEP meeting for purposes of determining eligibility in accordance with the independent assessment and developing an IEP. The parents shall also be reimbursed for the nonpublic school placement if the independent assessor is able to establish that STUDENT should have been eligible under OHI as of October 2001, when the parents first placed STUDENT in the nonpublic school.
Parents also provided testimony from a staff member from Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes (LMB) and request reimbursement for reading services and assessments provided by that company. However, Petitioner has not established that reading was an area of need for him that should have been addressed by the District and therefore, the Hearing Officer denies Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for LMB costs.
5. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Dr. Donald Hoagland in the amount of $6,090?
Petitioner contends, in his closing brief, that he is entitled to reimbursement for the costs of all assessments conducted by Dr. Hoagland. However, the issue statement indicates that parents were requesting only reimbursement “for an assessment by Dr. Hoagland in the amount of $6,090.” Moreover, an October 20, 2001 billing statement from Dr. Hoagland that was included in Petitioner’s exhibit packet indicates that his neurocogntive and psychological evaluation of STUDENT in 2001 totalled $6,090. (Pet.’s Exh. 60.) Because Petitioner did not timely raise reimbursement of Dr. Hoagland’s 2002 cognitive testing as a remedy, the Hearing Officer will only make a determination with respect to reimbursement for Dr. Hoagland’s 2001 assessment. (Footnote 29)
A parent may obtain an independent educational assessment performed by a qualified specialist at public expense if (1) the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the educational agency and (2) the educational agency is unable to show that its assessment was appropriate at a due process hearing. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b).) Federal and State special education law provide that before any action can be taken with regard to the placement of a child in special education, an assessment of the student’s educational needs shall be conducted. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320.) When a parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the public educational agency, the parent has the right to an independent assessment from qualified specialists at public expense, unless it is established in a due process hearing that the public educational agency’s assessment was appropriate. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b).)
As discussed earlier, when STUDENT’s parents consented to an assessment of STUDENT’s needs in October 2000, the District conducted achievement testing in November 2000, but did not perform a psychoeducational evaluation until March 2001. A subsequent IEP meeting was not held until May 2001. The evidence establishes that the parents disagreed with the District’s 2001 assessment of STUDENT and its findings regarding his reading comprehension and written expression. (Pet.’s Exh. 2, pg. 31.) The school psychologist concluded in her March 2001 psychoeducational evaluation that STUDENT’s achievement in reading was in the high average to superior range, math was average to above average, and written language was in the average range. She also concluded that STUDENT was achieving to the level of his ability. In the IEP document dated May 3, 2001, MOTHER checked the box indicating she disagreed with the District’s assessment and wrote out her concerns regarding the results obtained by the District with respect to these two academic areas. MOTHER wrote that she believed there was in fact a discrepancy between STUDENT’s cognitive ability and his performance. The parents subsequently obtained an independent neurocognitive and psychological evaluation from Dr. Donald Hoagland in July 2001.
With respect to the appropriateness of the District’s assessment, the Hearing Officer found above that the District failed to assess STUDENT’s attentional skills and therefore, failed to meet its obligation to conduct an assessment that was sufficiently comprehensive to identify all of STUDENT’s special education and related services needs. The District proffered no evidence regarding the appropriateness of its March 2001 assessment. Therefore, given the District’s failure to show that its assessment was appropriate and the Hearing Officer’s determination above that the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Hoagland’s 2001 assessment in the amount of $6,090.
6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Yellen and Associates in an amount according to proof?
Petitioner requests reimbursement for services provided by Yellen and Associates (Yellen). Specifically, in his closing brief, Petitioner states that his request in this respect is for an assessment of STUDENT’s “visual deficits.” However, no evidence was provided that Yellen performed any visual deficit testing. Rather, witnesses at hearing testified about cognitive testing performed by Yellen, and the only additional information provided was a score sheet used by Yellen in administering the WISC-III to STUDENT to obtain his cognitive ability level. (Pet.’s Exh. 55.) Moreover, Petitioner argued at hearing that Yellen’s WISC-III testing, along with all other administrations of the WISC-III by other evaluators, underestimated his cognitive ability and was not the appropriate instrument to use to measure his intelligence. And finally, Petitioner has not established that he required visual deficit testing in 2001 or that he requested such testing and the District refused to conduct it. Additionally, reimbursing the parents for two sets of cognitive testing for the same time period would allow Petitioner to essentially “double dip” in his recovery in this respect. Also, the parents chose to halt the Yellen testing, for reasons not made known, and subsequently retain Dr. Hoagland to complete the evaluation.
Based on the above, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner has not established that he is entitled to reimbursement for this assessment and his request is therefore denied.
ORDER
1. From the Hearing Office list of psychologists who conduct comprehensive psychoeducational evaluations, the District shall select, by or before August 25, 2003, an independent assessor who will, at District expense, conduct a comprehensive psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, including his attentional, organizational, task completion, and behavioral needs. The independent assessor shall, in cooperation with the District and the parents, develop an assessment plan, which must be delivered to the parents by or before September 1, 2003. As part of the evaluation, the independent assessor shall examine STUDENT’s school records and related documentation from the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, and the 2002-2003 school year, as well as his current school records. When considering STUDENT’s current needs, the assessor shall evaluate his needs, eliminating, to the extent possible, the effects of the educational services currently being provided, i.e., STUDENT shall not be found ineligible merely because current services are assisting him with dealing with a disability. The independent assessment must be completed by or before September 22, 2003.
If the independent assessor finds that STUDENT should have qualified for special education and related services as of October 2001 based on his attentional difficulties that previously were not assessed, the District shall convene an IEP meeting by or before September 29, 2003, for purposes of determining eligibility in accordance with the independent assessment and developing an IEP. The parents shall also be reimbursed for the nonpublic school placement and related transportation (from October 2001 through the end of the 2001-2002 school year and for the 2002-2003 school year) if the independent assessor is able to establish that STUDENT should have been eligible under the category of OHI as of October 2001, when the parents first placed STUDENT in the nonpublic school. The Hearing Officer has allotted approximately six weeks from the date of this Decision for this entire independent assessment process to be completed, because it is imperative that STUDENT’s needs be immediately identified since a significant amount of time has already passed where this child has not been properly assessed by the District.
2. Within 30 days of receipt of proof of payment from STUDENT’s parents, the District shall reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of Dr. Hoagland’s 2001 neurocognitive and psychological evaluation in the amount of $6,090.
3. All of Petitioner’s remaining claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement.
1. From the 1998-1999 school year through September 2002, did the District fail to:
A. meet its “child find” obligations of timely assessing Petitioner and convening IEP meetings; B. identify Petitioner as a student with a specific learning disability; C. assess Petitioner in all areas of suspected disability; and D. offer and/or provide Petitioner with special education and related services necessary to meet his unique needs?
Petitioner partially prevailed on this issue with respect to the District’s failure to meet its child-find obligations and its failure to properly assess him in all areas of suspected disability – except for the 2001-2002 school year, because there were no assessments conducted by the District during that school year.
The District prevailed on this issue in that during all relevant time frames, STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability. In addition, when the District found STUDENT eligible for special education pursuant to the IEP dated June 9, 1999, the Hearing Officer found that it offered and provided STUDENT with an educational program that met his needs in the contested areas of reading comprehension and math. No decision was made with respect to the area of attention.
2. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Countryside Preparatory School in the amount of $11,000 for the 2001-2002 school year? The District substantially prevailed on this issue as Petitioner’s claim for relief was denied. However, Petitioner partially prevailed in that the Hearing Officer ordered the District to conduct an independent comprehensive assessment of all of STUDENT’s needs. The District was ordered to reimburse the parents for the nonpublic school placement and related transportation (from October 2001 through the end of the 2001-2002 school year and for the 2002-2003 school year) if the independent assessor is able to establish that STUDENT should have been eligible under OHI as of October 2001, when the parents first placed STUDENT in the nonpublic school.
3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for transportation costs to Countryside Preparatory School from October 2001 to September 2002 in an amount according to proof?
The District prevailed on this issue, except as noted above in Issue 2.
4. Is Petitioner entitled to prospective tuition and placement at Countryside Preparatory School for the 2002-2003 school year?
The District prevailed on this issue.
5. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Dr. Donald Hoagland in the amount of $6,090?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
6. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for an assessment by Yellen and Associates in an amount according to proof?
The District prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (California Education Code § 56505(i).)
Dated: August 14, 2003 __________________________________ Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. The issues listed here differ in numbering and wording from those noticed by Petitioner before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification or for appropriate analysis.
2. Report of Jodie NewDelman, Psy.D., research clinician, and Melissa DelHomme, Ph.D., project coordinator, ADHD Genetic Study, UCLA Department of Psychiatry, dated February 2, 1998 (The Hearing Officer notes that both parties indicated that the cover letter that accompanied this report likely had the wrong date, and should have indicated the date of February 2, 1999, since testing was performed in November 1998.)
3. The Hearing Officer notes that the eligibility criteria for special education and related services under the category of OHI are not based on “a severe discrepancy.” Rather, to be eligible under the category of OHI, a student must have limited strength, vitality, or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems, which adversely affect a student’s educational performance. (5 C.C.R. §3030(f).)
4. The Hearing Officer notes that the eligibility criteria for special education and related services on the basis of a language disorder is not based on such a discrepancy but on the standard of meeting one of two criteria involving standardized test scores that are below the seventh percentile and a display of inappropriate or inadequate usage of expressive or receptive language. (5 C.C.R. §3030(c)(4).)
5. Although the Hearing Officer decided above that she will not consider the issue of whether STUDENT was eligible for special education services under the category of OHI, issues related to STUDENT’s ADHD will be addressed in the context of whether the District properly assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability – an issue which Petitioner properly and timely identified.
6. It is also referred to as the “search and serve” obligation.
7. The District’s own assessment plan intake form even indicates that an IEP meeting was required to be held by April 8, 1999, given that it received the signed assessment plan from the parent on February 18, 1999.
8. The IEP team made the determination that STUDENT was not eligible, notwithstanding the District’s own school psychologist Vivian Wolfe’s conclusion in her report that there was a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s cognitive ability and academic achievement in the areas of reading comprehension and math and that STUDENT may be learning disabled and in need of special education services.
9. The District did not proffer any evidence that suggests that the parents had any responsibility for the delay in conducting the assessment or the IEP meeting.
10. Dr. David Helm testified regarding an article he co-authored that was published in the “California School Psychologist.” (Pet.’s Exh. 27.) His article calls into question this practice. (Helm and Johnson, “Updated Tables Needed to Determine a Severe Discrepancy Under California's Title 5 Regulations,” 8 Cal. Sch. Psychologist 19 (1998).) According to this article, the formula must take into account the correlation between the specific ability and achievement tests used (by computing the correlation coefficient, r) rather than merely calculating simple differences between scores. The authors set forth tables showing standard criterion values for specific cognitive and achievement tests, based upon the correlation between the tests, and give the standard error of measurement to be applied. Dr. Helm also subsequently coauthored a second article entitled “Additional Severe Discrepancy Values: WISC-III used with WJ-III Achievement Tests and WIAT-II used with WPPSI-R, WISC-III, and WAIS-III;” however, that article has not been published or peer-reviewed. (Testimony of D. Helm; Pet.’s Exh. 28.) The Hearing Officer also notes that there is no known corroboration of the data, and the utility of the data provided is seriously limited. For example, no information is provided in either article for the WJ-R Broad Written Language score in comparison with the WISQ-III IQ, and according to Dr. Helm, the information in his second article regarding the WJ-III Test of Achievement reading comprehension cluster mistakenly did not include both the passage comprehension and reading vocabulary subtests. Lastly, no data are presented for the Stanford-Binet or C-TONI tests. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer will not utilize Dr. Helm’s model in analyzing STUDENT’s test scores to determine whether a severe discrepancy exists.
11. In his closing brief, Petitioner also argues that he should have remained eligible under the category of LAS; however, STUDENT’s continued eligibility under LAS was not raised as an issue for hearing and therefore, the Hearing Officer will not consider it in this Decision.
12. In his closing brief, Petitioner also argues that he should have remained eligible under the category of LAS; however, STUDENT’s continued eligibility under LAS was not raised as an issue for hearing and therefore, the Hearing Officer will not consider it in this Decision.
13. MOTHER testified that staff at El Oro Way Elementary School told her that it was her responsibility to make sure that STUDENT’s Section 504 Plan was provided to the staff at Robert Frost Middle School.
14. Petitioner filed a complaint with the California Department of Education (CDE) alleging that the District had not held a timely IEP meeting for STUDENT to discuss the results of the assessment plan signed on October 2, 2000. The CDE made a finding that the District did not adhere to the fifty-day timeline for development of the IEP, concluded the District was out of compliance, and ordered that the District convene an IEP meeting within thirty days. (Pet.’s Exh. 12.)
15. As discussed in the procedural section above, because it was not timely raised as an issue for hearing by Petitioner, the Hearing Officer will not make a determination as to whether STUDENT should have been found eligible for special education and related services under the category of OHI.
16. STUDENT’s achievement scores in the relevant academic categories ranged from 90 to 122.
17. STUDENT’s total mathematics, problem solving, and procedures percentile scores on the Stanford-9 Achievement Test taken in May 2001 were 12, 19, and 9, respectively, which convert to standard scores of 82, 87, and 80, respectively. Testimonies from Dr. Alnita Dunn, Dr. Donald Hoagland, and Dr. Paul Lane all indicated that the conversion table at Petitioner’s Exh. 25, page 34 could be used to properly convert percentile scores to standard scores. These math scores, however, are not corroborated by any evidence other than the poor math grade that STUDENT received on his May 2001 progress report. Moreover, Dr. Dunn testified that the May 2001 Stanford-9 scores were likely not yet available at the time of the May 3, 2001 IEP meeting. The Hearing Officer also notes that the Stanford-9 testing is not necessarily reflective of a student’s class performance because in STUDENT’s case, he was able to bring his math class grade up to a “C” by the end of the school year.
18. The Hearing Officer notes that the District indicated in its closing brief that should STUDENT’s parents return him to the District, it will make every effort in good faith to ensure any Section 504 Plan developed for STUDENT is implemented. The District is encouraged to follow through with that offer.
19. MOTHER testified that during the 2001 administration of the WISC-III by Yellen and Associates, STUDENT had forgotten to take his ADHD medication on that day of testing only, although he had been taking it up to the date of testing. There was no testimony regarding the possible effect of this brief lapse in medication could have had, if any, on STUDENT’s performance on the 2001 WISC-III testing. Dr. Hoagland testified that STUDENT was medicated when he administered the CTONI to him in 2001 and when he administered the Stanford Binet in 2002.
20. Although the Hearing Officer does not rely on Dr. Hoagland’s cognitive testing in determining whether there existed a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement, it is important to note that Dr. Hoagland’s comprehensive neurocognitive and psychological evaluation does contribute to the total picture of STUDENT and provides some valuable insight into understanding STUDENT’s learning and emotional difficulties. Thus, the IEP team is encouraged to consider the findings in Dr. Hoagland’s report when analyzing STUDENT’s educational needs.
21. The evidence also indicates that the parties had originally attempted to convene an IEP meeting on November 20, 2001, but the parents agreed to cancel that meeting date so that their advocate/counsel could attend.
22. Dr. Hoagland testified that he has doctoral and masters degrees in clinical psychology and maintains a private practice with his primary focus on the evaluation of students with learning needs.
23. Clinical psychologist Paul Lane performed only IQ testing of STUDENT per an agreement between both parties in January 2003. Dr. Lane’s testing took place over a three-day period in January 2003, and consisted of a mental status examination and administration of the WISC-III. (Pet.’s Exh. 53.) Dr. Lane testified that he has a bachelor’s degree in psychology from the University of Massachusetts, and masters and doctoral degrees in clinical psychology from Florida State University, an American Psychologist Association approved program. He also has a minor in law and criminology. Dr. Lane has been in private practice for twenty-three years, practicing general clinical psychology, with a specialty in assessments – both forensic and nonforensic (assessment of children with learning disabilities and/or ADHD). Dr. Helm testified that he has a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and a master’s degree in psychology. He has a school psychology credential and has been employed by the Temecula Valley School District for thirteen years as a school psychologist where he mostly conducts assessments to determine students’ possible eligibility for special education services. (Pet.’s Exh. 69.)
24. On standardized tests, the “average” range consists of scores between 90 to 110. (Testimonies of psychologists A. Dunn & D. Hoagland.)
25. Psychologist Alnita Dunn testified that “math procedures” on the Stanford-9 was the same as “math calculations.”
26. Psychologist Alnita Dunn testified that “math procedures” on the Stanford-9 was the same as “math calculations.”
27. The evidence also indicates that using either the IQ score of 100 or 104 and comparing it to achievement testing done by Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes in December 2002, STUDENT still did not demonstrate a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in any category listed in Education Code section 56337 during the entire 2002-2003 school year.
28. The Hearing Officer recognizes that this hearing concluded toward the end of the 2002-2003 school year. Therefore, since the 2002-2003 school year is over as of the time of rendering this Decision, Petitioner’s request for prospective placement at Countryside for the 2002-2003 school year will be treated as a request for reimbursement for tuition and transportation costs incurred during the 2002-2003 school year. However, the Hearing Officer will still address Petitioner’s request for prospective placement at Countryside, but will do so with respect to the forthcoming school year.
29. In addition, in 2002, there was no District assessment with which the parents could have disagreed and there was no request made by the parents to assess STUDENT to which the District refused.
