California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · February 17, 1999

Student v. Long Beach Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 154-98 · Hearing Officer Kathleen Peterson

Long Beach Unified must reimburse private school tuition, occupational therapy and transportation, and must add direct therapy to the IEP.

Student prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A 13-year-old fifth grader filed for due process against Long Beach Unified School District. She has right-side paralysis and weakness from a prenatal stroke, plus attention and visual-motor processing deficits. Since first grade she had attended the Opportunity Program at Grace Christian School. The district found her not eligible for special education in October 1996. In May 1998 it found her eligible as other health impaired. For 1998-99 it offered a resource specialist program and one hour a week of consultative occupational therapy (OT).

The Hearing Officer first found that the parents had sought a public school placement in 1990 and again in 1996. That meant the student was not simply a parent-placed private school student with limited rights. The 1996 assessment left out OT and physical therapy. This was a failure even though the district had found her eligible for adapted physical education in 1990 based on the same condition. The student was eligible in both 1996-97 and 1997-98, and the district offered no services either year, so it denied her a FAPE. For 1998-99, she needed direct OT, not just consultation.

The district must reimburse the parents for three things for those two years. The first is private OT, without any reduction for amounts insurance paid. The second is full Grace Christian tuition; the Hearing Officer rejected a split for religious content. The third is transportation at the district rate. The district also had to hold an IEP meeting within 15 days to add direct OT and extended school year services.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO handled a student in private school whose parents had repeatedly sought a public placement. Because of those requests, she kept her full right to a FAPE and to reimbursement. The decision also shows a district held responsible for leaving obvious physical needs out of its assessment. It also addressed insurance-paid services and tuition at a religious school.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedEligibility

    Issue I.A. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1996-97 school year?

    The District's August 1996 assessment omitted OT and PT despite an obvious physical disability. The student was eligible as other health impaired, and the District offered no services, so it denied her a FAPE.

  2. Student prevailedEligibility

    Issue I.B. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1997-98 school year?

    The student should have been found eligible at the start of 1997-98. Eligibility came only in May 1998 and no services were offered that year, so the District denied her a FAPE.

  3. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue I.C. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1998-99 school year?

    The parties agreed the resource specialist program placement was appropriate. However, the offer of only consultative OT denied a FAPE because the student needed direct OT for 60 minutes once a week. The District's proportionate-share argument for private school students did not apply because the District had undertaken to offer a FAPE.

  4. Issue II.A. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for private occupational therapy (OT) services obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years?

    The private OT from a qualified therapist met the student's needs and gave her educational benefit. Reimbursement was ordered, not reduced by amounts paid by the family's health insurance, because the District did not prove the family would suffer no financial loss.

  5. Issue II.B. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for tuition and transportation for STUDENT's private placement at Grace Christian School for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years?

    The Opportunity Program at Grace Christian met the student's needs and gave her educational benefit. Full tuition was awarded without dividing out religious content, plus transportation at the District rate. California's notice requirement did not apply before January 1, 1999.

  6. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue III. Must the District prospectively provide direct OT services to STUDENT during the 1998-99 school year?

    The District must convene an IEP meeting and offer a FAPE for the rest of 1998-99, including direct OT at least once a week for 60 minutes with goals and objectives, plus extended school year services.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receipt of proof, reimburse the parents for private OT services obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, not reduced by any amount paid by the family's health insurance.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receipt of proof, reimburse the parents for the entire cost of Grace Christian School tuition for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years.
  • Reimbursement. Within 30 days of receipt of proof, reimburse the parents for the cost of transportation to Grace Christian School for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, at the District rate for transportation reimbursement.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 days of the decision, reconvene the IEP team and create a new IEP for the rest of the 1998-99 school year. It must include direct OT based on appropriate goals and objectives (the body of the decision says at least once per week for 60 minutes), extended school year services, and any other placement or services needed for a FAPE.
  • Order to provide or change services. Direct OT services at least once per week for 60 minutes per session, plus extended school year services, for the remainder of the 1998-99 school year.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; Florence County School District Four v. Carter; Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg; Raymond S. v. Ramirez; Alamo Heights ISD v. Texas Board of Education; Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.; Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259; Russman v. Board of Education; Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District; Christen G. v. Lower Merion School District; Lemon v. Kurtzman; David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee; Letter to Spann (OSEP 1993)

People named in the decision

  • Marlene Daniels, District program specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Laurie Cohen, Occupational therapist in private practice; footnote 8 calls her the District's own occupational therapist, Private practice
  • Julie Lieneke, Opportunity Program math specialist/teacher, Grace Christian School
  • Anita Burch, Opportunity Program language arts teacher, Grace Christian School
  • Mary Wardlow, Private occupational therapist (OTR), witness for Student, Private practice; High Hopes Head Injury Center
  • Shirley Sanders, District school psychologist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Carolyn Freese, Occupational therapist who assessed for District, Gallagher Pediatrics
  • Antoinette Guastella, District adaptive physical education specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Lorena Davila, District school psychologist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Jimene Miniaci, District assistive technology specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Daniel Pack, Assistant to Student's attorney
  • Grace Christian School, Private sectarian school (unilateral placement)
  • Los Altos Brethren, Private preschool/kindergarten
  • California Children's Services (CCS), Provider of early OT/PT

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Kathleen Peterson, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Long Beach, California, on November 5, 1998.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Carol Hickman Graham. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf were Daniel Pack, assistant to Ms. Graham, and Ms. PARENT, STUDENT’s mother.

Respondent Long Beach Unified School District (hereafter “District”) was represented at the hearing by attorney Cynthia Yount. Also present on the District’s behalf was Marlene Daniels, District program specialist.

The Petitioner called the following witnesses to provide testimony: Ms. PARENT; Marlene Daniels, District program specialist; Laurie Cohen, occupational therapist in private practice; Julie Lieneke, math specialist at Grace Christian School; Anita Burch, teacher at Grace Christian School; and Mary Wardlow, occupational therapist in private practice.

The District called the following witnesses to provide testimony: Shirley Sanders, District school psychologist; Carolyn Freese, occupational therapist at Gallagher Pediatrics; Antoinette Guastella, District adaptive physical education (APE) specialist; Lorena Davila, District school psychologist; and Jimene Miniaci, District assistive technology specialist.

Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record remained open pending the receipt of written closing briefs. Subsequently, the Hearing Office received the closing briefs, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES (Footnote 1)

I. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?

II. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following: A. private occupational therapy (OT) services obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years; and B. tuition and transportation for STUDENT’s private placement at Grace Christian School for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years?

III. Must the District prospectively provide direct OT services to STUDENT during the 1998-99 school year?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a thirteen-year-old fifth-grader (footnote 2) who is currently eligible for special education as “other health impaired” due to physical disabilities resulting from a prenatal stroke, including right-side weakness and paralysis. She also has attention and visual motor integration deficits and a mild hearing loss in both ears caused by ear infections. STUDENT also wears glasses and a leg brace. STUDENT currently attends Grace Christian School, a sectarian school she has attended since first grade. STUDENT’s parents currently provide her with OT services and transportation to her school.

At eight months of age, STUDENT began receiving OT and PT services from CCS after behavioral evidence led to the discovery that she had suffered the stroke in utero. This stroke damaged the left side of STUDENT’s brain, affecting the entire right side of her body. When STUDENT was about two years old, her parents became dissatisfied with the services provided by CCS and obtained private therapy for her through their health insurance. At about this time, STUDENT’s parents enrolled her in a preschool program in Long Beach. After approximately three years at this preschool, STUDENT had not met developmental milestones, her attention span was limited, and she was unable to stay seated. STUDENT’s parents were told that she was not ready for kindergarten.

In response to being told that STUDENT was “behind” and unprepared to move on to kindergarten, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District evaluate STUDENT for special education eligibility. In February and March 1990, when STUDENT was four years old and still in preschool, the District conducted an initial evaluation, including a psychological evaluation, a speech and language assessment, and an adapted physical education (APE) assessment. At an individualized education program (IEP) meeting held on May 1, 1990, the District found STUDENT eligible for APE services (without noting an eligibility category) and offered her those services twice weekly for thirty-minute sessions. The IEP team also created goals and objectives for the 1990-91 school year. The IEP team stated that STUDENT’s “school of assignment” (an “area school”) was “pending parent approval.” (Dist. Exh. 23, at p. 1.) However, STUDENT’s parents ultimately decided that the District’s offer was not appropriate and, instead, placed her in Los Altos Brethren preschool for the summer and the 1990-91 school year. She then moved to the smaller of two kindergarten classes Brethren operated. At the end of this school year, Brethren staff indicated to STUDENT’s parents that STUDENT was not ready to move on to first grade; therefore, STUDENT repeated kindergarten at Brethren in its larger kindergarten class. STUDENT began taking Ritalin for an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder at this time.

After her second year of kindergarten, STUDENT’s parents learned of Grace Christian school and enrolled her there for first grade (the 1994-95 school year). Grace Christian operates an “Opportunity Program,” which provides additional help through modifications, extra assistance, and “Opportunity” classes for students who are unable to attend the regular education program. STUDENT began receiving the services of the Opportunity Program at Grace Christian in her first year there and has continued in that program to date.

In August 1996, when STUDENT was ten years old and in the third grade, her parents again requested an evaluation and IEP team meeting from the District. The PARENTs were concerned that, in addition to her physical condition, STUDENT might also be suffering from a specific learning disability. On October 9, 1996, the IEP team convened and concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services for the 1996-97 school year.

In March and April 1998, when STUDENT was twelve years old and in the fourth grade, her parents, for the third time, requested that the District assess her. On May 21, 1998, the IEP team agreed that STUDENT was eligible for special education services under the category “other health impaired” (OHI). Following that meeting, further assessments were conducted of STUDENT, including an assistive technology assessment and an occupational therapy assessment. On August 21, 1998, the IEP team reconvened. At this meeting, the District offered OT consultation services once a week for sixty minutes, to be provided at STUDENT’s school site during the 1998-99 school year.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years?

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA(footnote 3)) and state law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); California Education Code § 56000.) Federal and state law mandates that all children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that includes special education and related services to meet their unique needs. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; California Education Code § 56000.) "FAPE" is defined as special education and related services that meet state standards, that include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education, and that are provided at public expense and in conformity with an IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) The term “related services” is defined as transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) (Footnote 4)

STUDENT, a student who has attended Grace Christian school since first grade, has never been enrolled in a District elementary school program. The Hearing Officer notes that there are two types of private school students. First, there are students whose parents place them in private schools in response to a dispute with their local educational agency regarding special education eligibility or the offer of a FAPE. The parents of these students either had their children enrolled in the public school system or sought to do so, but, because of the dispute have, instead, enrolled the students (or kept the students enrolled) in private placements in their effort to ensure that their children receive a FAPE. Second, there are students whose parents are not seeking an appropriate placement from a local educational agency. The parents of these students choose to place them in private schools even when the school district has made a FAPE available, and they desire only to have the educational agency provide related services while their child attends the private school. The former group is covered under the IDEA provisions above. The latter group may receive services under the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR) and, more recently, the 1997 amendments to the IDEA. (Footnote 5) In general, the circuit courts have recently concluded that students in the latter group are not individually entitled to special education services. (Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 117 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1997); K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corporation, 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1360 (1998); Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Russman v. Board of Education, 150 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1998); Foley v. Special School District of St. Louis County, 153 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1998).)

Here, the PARENTs initially approached the District in 1990 after being told that their daughter was not ready for kindergarten. The IEP resulting from this first request indicates that the District had assigned an area school for STUDENT but was awaiting the parents’ approval for the school placement. (Dist. Exh. 23, at pp. 1 and 3.) Although the PARENTs ultimately decided not to consent to the offered services, the evidence shows that the parents’ intent was to obtain an appropriate public school placement and appropriate services. Ms. PARENT credibly testified that she and her husband initially enrolled STUDENT in Brethren preschool because of the dispute with the District regarding the IEP in May 1990. The PARENTs again approached the District in 1996 for special education and services. The IEP resulting from this request indicates that, despite the fact that STUDENT was then in a private school, the parties considered not only the District’s recommendation of regular education at her area school in their discussions, but also a resource specialist program (RSP) placement and a special day class placement within the District. (Dist. Exh. 12, at p. 1.) Such evidence shows that, in 1996, the PARENTs renewed their intent to obtain an appropriate public school placement and appropriate services for STUDENT. The Hearing Officer finds that the evidence here shows that STUDENT’s parents were seeking an appropriate public school placement and appropriate services from the District in their requests for an IEP in both 1990 and 1996, and that their decision to enroll STUDENT in her private school was their effort to provide her with an appropriate education when they felt that the District had failed to do so. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the Petitioner has presented sufficient evidence of her parents’ intent to enroll STUDENT within the public school system to proceed on the issues of eligibility, FAPE, and reimbursement below.

A. The 1996-97 school year

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1996-97 school year because the District failed to properly assess STUDENT, find her eligible for special education, and offer her any services. The Petitioner alleges that STUDENT was eligible for special education services during the 1996-97 school year as a student with an other health impairment and specific learning disabilities. The Petitioner asserts that the District’s assessment of STUDENT in August 1996 failed to assess her in all suspected areas of disability and did not consider information from her private school teachers. The District argues that it assessed STUDENT in her only area of suspected disability -- a specific learning disability -- and that the entire IEP team, including STUDENT’s parents, agreed that she was not eligible on that basis.

At an IEP team meeting on October 9, 1996, the District found STUDENT ineligible for special education for the 1996-97 school year. In order to be entitled to a free appropriate public education, a student must be eligible for special education as a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).) Therefore, the threshold issue is whether STUDENT was eligible for special education during the 1996-97 school year.

The Hearing Officer notes first that the evidence regarding STUDENT’s physical condition shows that it affected her entire right side from birth. She is paralyzed on her right side and is unable to use her right arm and hand. (Dist. Exh. 6 and 7; testimony of Ms. PARENT.) Credible testimony from Mary Wardlow, the occupational therapist who has worked with STUDENT for several years, showed that at times, STUDENT forgets she even has a right arm and that she holds it next to her body most of the time, unable to use it functionally. She is unable to write with her right hand and struggles to use it even to hold paper while she writes with her left hand. No evidence showed that this condition differed appreciably at the time the District conducted its assessment in August 1996. Furthermore, the District had found STUDENT eligible for APE services six years before, in 1990, on the basis of this same physical condition. (Dist. Exh. 23. (Footnote 6)) The District was aware that STUDENT was receiving private OT and PT services for this condition. (Pet. Exh. H. (Footnote 7)) The obviousness of STUDENT’s physical condition, the previous finding of eligibility, and the knowledge that she was receiving private OT and PT for her condition should have alerted the District to the possibility that her physical condition was a suspected area of disability. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s assessment in August 1996 should have included formal OT and PT assessments to determine whether STUDENT needed OT or PT. Although the District conducted a new APE assessment, there is no evidence that the District conducted either an occupational therapy or a physical therapy assessment. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District failed to assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability during the 1996-97 school year.

A student is eligible for special education as other health impaired (OHI) if he or she has limited strength, vitality, or alertness due to chronic or acute health problems which are not temporary in nature. (Title 5 California Code of Regulations § 3030(f).)

As noted above, the evidence of STUDENT’s physical condition shows no appreciable difference between May 1990 (when the District found her eligible), August 1996 (when the District found her ineligible), and May 1998 (when the District again found her eligible). STUDENT has had the same diagnosis throughout this time -- right hemiparesis/hemiplegia due to prenatal stroke. (Testimony of Ms. PARENT and Ms. Wardlow; Dist. Exh. 9, 13, and 24.) STUDENT has had the same problems for which OT and PT have been provided privately during this time. (Testimony of Ms. Wardlow; Pet. Exh. H, L, M, and N.) Thus, in the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT suffered from a chronic health problem which was not temporary in nature.

The evidence -- including the notes of the IEP team -- shows that STUDENT had limited strength in 1996 as a result of her condition. (Testimony of Ms. PARENT and Ms. Wardlow; Pet. Exh. L and M; Dist. Exh. 12, at p. 2.) The Hearing Officer finds that during the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT had limited strength due to a chronic health problem that was not temporary in nature. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was eligible for special education as OHI during the 1996-97 school year.

Because the Hearing Officer has found that STUDENT was eligible for special education as OHI during the 1996-97 school year, it is unnecessary to address whether she also met the eligibility criteria of a specific learning disability. However, the Hearing Officer will address the information used in the determination of eligibility on the basis of a specific learning disability in the analysis of STUDENT’s unique needs, below.

Because STUDENT was eligible for special education during the 1996-97 school year, the question is now whether the District offered a FAPE to her that year. In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), the Supreme Court decided the level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that "the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child." (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200.)

The standard for determining whether the District’s provision of services substantively provided a FAPE involves three factors: whether the services were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs; whether the services provided educational benefit to her; and whether the services conformed with her written individualized educational program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.)

1. STUDENT’s unique needs

As noted above, the District did not conduct an OT assessment of STUDENT during the 1996-97 school year. Therefore, the Hearing Officer cannot look to information from the District regarding whether STUDENT needed OT during that year. However, the Petitioner presented credible evidence regarding STUDENT’s need for direct OT services.

As found above, during the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT suffered from weakness and paralysis in her right arm and right leg. STUDENT had undergone surgery in April 1996 on her right leg to “lengthen” it, and her doctor prescribed OT twice per week and PT three times per week to improve her functional level following that surgery. (Pet. Exh. N, at p. 2.) It is undisputed that STUDENT was also unable to use her right hand to write. There is no indication in the evidence regarding whether STUDENT is naturally left-handed or she has been forced to use her left hand because of the paralysis. During the 1996-97 school year, STUDENT received direct OT services from occupational therapist Mary Wardlow. The evidence shows that STUDENT’s stroke-injured brain has often failed to communicate to the rest of her brain the fact that she has a right arm. (Testimony of Ms. Wardlow and Ms. PARENT.) Ms. Wardlow indicated that STUDENT’s attention deficit, on top of the lack of sensation, caused her to forget she has a right side and she had to be continuously reminded to try to use it. STUDENT had difficulties with “school activities” requiring two hands, like writing on paper and handling books. STUDENT also had problems with daily living skills, like tying her shoes, using zippers or snaps, putting on her leg brace independently, and getting dressed after using the bathroom (even though she has specially adapted clothing). Ms. Wardlow indicated that although there was potential in STUDENT’s right side, she needed to be taught one-handed skills for use at school. In 1996, Ms. Wardlow taught STUDENT to type with her left hand because of her inability to use her right hand in school. Ms. Wardlow also indicated that when STUDENT’s family’s insurance company refused to pay for her services, eventually resulting in a loss of services for some months, STUDENT regressed, losing some of the strength, agility, and range of motion she had previously achieved.

Ms. Wardlow testified that one of the reasons STUDENT needs direct OT services and not just consultative OT services is that STUDENT’s attention deficit prevents her from remembering how to utilize tools, such as one-handed typing software. She said that another reason is that STUDENT is unable to organize herself and has difficulty with abstract thinking.

The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s physical condition, as affected by her attention deficit, caused her to require services during the 1996-97 school year to address her physical deficits that have affected her classroom functioning, including writing, and her daily living functioning at school, including the ability to get dressed after using the bathroom. The evidence shows that STUDENT needed to have her range of motion, strength, and agility addressed by an occupational therapist and to have one-handed skills taught to her while refocusing her to use her right side whenever possible. The Hearing Officer finds based on the evidence presented, STUDENT required direct OT services during the 1996-97 school year.

Once STUDENT is eligible for special education, all of her unique educational needs must be addressed, if doing so is necessary for her to benefit from her education. (Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995.).) Even though STUDENT was eligible for special education during the 1996-97 school year on the basis of an other health impairment due to her physical condition, other needs not related to that physical condition that affect her ability to benefit from her education (e.g., a processing deficit) must be addressed in order to offer her a FAPE. The District’s own evidence showed that STUDENT suffered from a visual motor integration processing deficit during the 1996-97 school year. (Dist. Exh. 13, at p. 4.) School psychologist Shirley Sanders concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education on the basis of a specific learning disability because Ms. Sanders found that this processing deficit was not accompanied by a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. Under Wartenberg, STUDENT’s processing deficit -- whether or not it separately supported a finding of special education eligibility -- became a part of her unique needs as a student who was otherwise eligible for special education.

Ms. Sanders made several recommendations of modifications for STUDENT to address her visual motor integration deficit, including using tapes, music, rhymes, puppet action, conversation, poetry, reading aloud, and talking about the skills to be learned. She also suggested that STUDENT use graph paper in mathematics in order to help her align problems and that all visual materials should be reinforced with oral directions. (Dist. Exh. J, at p. 5.) Anita Burch, STUDENT’s language arts teacher in the Opportunity program at Grace Christian school during the 1996-97 school year, testified that STUDENT needed to have things be explained to her orally on a one-to-one basis, and that STUDENT required a multisensory teaching approach.

The Hearing Officer finds that based on the evidence presented, STUDENT’s unique needs for the 1996-97 school year included a need for modifications to her education to address her visual motor integration deficit, including, e.g., modifying how information is presented to her, using multisensory methods to teach her, and using oral methods to reinforce visual material.

STUDENT also suffered from an attention deficit in 1996. She has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (Dist. Exh. 3.) In 1996, STUDENT was taking Ritalin for her ADHD. (Dist. Exh. 12, at p. 2.) Ms. Burch, STUDENT’s language arts teacher during the 1996-97 school year, stated that STUDENT exhibited an attention deficit in her class. The District’s school psychologist, Ms. Sanders recommended several modifications to assist in addressing her attention deficit, including being in a class with short-term goals and assignments, slowing down STUDENT’s work pace, and placing her at the front of her classroom. Ms. Burch confirmed that STUDENT needed accommodations to address her attention deficit during the 1996-97 school year. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s unique needs for the 1996-97 school year included a need for modifications to address her attention deficit, such as placing her in a class with short-term goals and assignments, slowing down the pace at which STUDENT works, and allowing her to sit near the front of her classroom.

STUDENT also had a mild hearing loss in both ears as a result of frequent ear infections. However, there is no indication from the evidence that STUDENT required anything other than preferential seating to address this deficit. (Pet. Exh. J.)

2. The District’s offer of services

Because the District did not find STUDENT eligible for special education for the 1996-97 school year, it did not offer her any services for that year. The Hearing Officer has found that STUDENT was eligible and required the placement and services noted above. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer services designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs. It is unnecessary to address the third factor because the Hearing Officer concludes that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-97 school year based on the failure to offer any services.

B. The 1997-98 school year

The Petitioner contends that STUDENT was also eligible for special education during the 1997-98 school year. The Petitioner argues that the District did not offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1997-98 school year because the District did not find her eligible until May 1998, near the end of the 1997-98 school year, and that it offered no services during that school year. The District asserts that it properly found STUDENT eligible when approached by STUDENT’s parents during the 1997-98 school year and that the team agreed to conduct further assessments before recommending services.

There is no evidence indicating that STUDENT’s physical condition changed appreciably from the 1996-97 school year to the 1997-98 school year. STUDENT has suffered from her right-side paralysis during the 1997-98 school year, as she has all her life. It was at the end of this school year that the IEP team agreed that STUDENT was eligible for special education as other health impaired. (Dist. Exh. 6.) Therefore, for the same reasons the District should have found STUDENT eligible for services in the 1996-97 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should have found her eligible for services at the beginning of the 1997-98 school year. There is also no evidence showing that STUDENT’s unique needs had changed from those she had during the 1996-97 school year. However, no services were offered for the 1997-98 school year, as the team recommended further assessments before addressing what services STUDENT would need. (Dist. Exh. 6.) Because STUDENT was eligible for special education, yet the District offered no services to her, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-98 school year.

C. The 1998-99 school year

The Petitioner alleges that although STUDENT had been properly found eligible for special education, the services offered by the District during the 1998-99 school year were inadequate to meet STUDENT’s needs. The Petitioner contends that STUDENT required direct OT services, yet the District offered only consultation services. The District asserted at the hearing that under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA regarding private school students, STUDENT is not individually entitled to any services. The District argued at the hearing that its chosen “model” for providing services to such students who elect to attend private school even when they have been offered an appropriate placement is the “consultative” model. Thus, the District asserts that it has fulfilled its obligation under section 1412(a)(10)(A)(i) of the IDEA by offering consultative OT.

The District is correct in noting that school districts need not expend more than a proportionate amount of federal funds on private school students who have been offered a FAPE and who then choose to attend private school. (20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).) If the Petitioner were seeking only to have the offered OT consultation services provided to her while she attends her private school, the District’s argument would be relevant and persuasive. When a student has been offered a FAPE, the student has no individual entitlement to any services, much less any entitlement to have those services provided at his or her private school. (Cefalu, 117 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 1997); K.R., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1360 (1998); Fowler, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Russman, 150 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1998); Foley, 153 F.3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1998).)

However, the dispute here focuses on whether the District, in fact, offered a FAPE to STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year. STUDENT was eligible for special education as OHI during the 1998-99 school year. The District undertook to offer a FAPE to STUDENT, a disabled student who was approaching the District for a public school education. Although the Petitioner stipulates that the District offered an appropriate RSP placement for the 1998-99 school year to address her processing deficit and ADHD (and for this reason does not request tuition reimbursement for this year), the District was obligated to also offer appropriate related services as a part of its offer of a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. 1401(8).) The parties dispute whether the related services that the District offered -- consultative OT once a week for sixty minutes -- are appropriate for STUDENT.

The evidence shows that during the 1998-99 school year, STUDENT has continued to suffer from the physical condition she has had all her life, i.e., paralysis and weakness on her right side. Ms. Wardlow testified that STUDENT continues to require direct OT services this year. The therapist at Gallagher Pediatrics who assessed STUDENT for the District indicated that she did not require pull-out OT services and, instead, recommended consultative OT services. (Dist. Exh. 3, at p.4.) The Hearing Officer notes that an inherent problem with such an assessment is the fact that STUDENT was already receiving direct OT services through her parents’ insurance at the time. Though she might not need additional direct OT services on top of what she is already receiving, the Hearing Officer finds that the evidence supports the finding that she needs a baseline amount of direct OT services. (Footnote 8) The Hearing Officer finds that in order to receive appropriate related services, for the 1998-99 school year, STUDENT requires direct OT services once per week for sixty minutes per session. The Hearing Officer concludes that the District did not offer a FAPE to STUDENT for the 1998-99 school year to the extent that it failed to offer direct OT services.

II. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following: A. private occupational therapy (OT) services obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years; and B. tuition and transportation for STUDENT’s private placement at Grace Christian School obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years?

Under Burlington School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al., v. Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985), the Supreme Court held that if a school district has failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE), the child’s parents or guardians may seek reimbursement for an appropriate private placement or services. (Footnote 9) To be appropriate, the services and equipment provided by a parent must be designed to meet the student’s unique needs and to provide the student with educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200.) For purposes of reimbursement, such services need not meet every requirement in order to be appropriate (e.g., a placement need not be state-certified). (Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 14, 114 S.Ct. 361, 365-366 (1993).) Parents are not required to provide the “perfect” placement for their children when a school district has failed to provide a FAPE. (Alamo Heights Independent School District v. Texas Board of Education, 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).)

A. Private OT services during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years

The Hearing Officer found above that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years. Therefore, if STUDENT’s parents provided appropriate services for their daughter, they will be entitled to reimbursement for those services.

As found above, STUDENT needed direct OT services during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, due to her long-standing problems resulting from her prenatal stroke. The evidence shows that STUDENT’s parents met her unique needs by providing such services. Mary Wardlow, STUDENT’s private occupational therapist, worked for several years with CCS, and is an OTR (registered occupational therapist). (Testimony of Ms. Wardlow; Pet. Exh. L.) She currently works at High Hopes Head Injury Center, although she sees STUDENT privately. (Testimony of Ms. Wardlow.) The Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Wardlow is a qualified provider of OT services. The evidence also shows that Ms. Wardlow’s services provided educational benefit to STUDENT. Ms. Wardlow has been providing direct OT services during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years. Ms. Wardlow testified that she taught STUDENT to type with one hand because of her inability to use her right hand. Such a skill benefitted STUDENT educationally by giving her the ability to write in a more facile manner. Ms. Wardlow also indicated that during the times when she was unable to provide OT to STUDENT due to billing problems with the family’s insurance, STUDENT’s abilities regressed. The Hearing Officer finds that the PARENTs obtained direct OT and PT services through their health insurance that were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and provide her benefit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the OT services the PARENTs provided for STUDENT were appropriate, and that they are entitled to reimbursement for those services provided during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years.

The Hearing Officer notes that in one case, a district court did not require a parent to use private insurance to pay for educationally necessary private evaluations, when doing so would cause the parent to incur a financial loss. (Raymond S. ex rel. Joseph S. v. Ramirez, 918 F.Supp. 1280 (N.D. Iowa 1996).) The Hearing Officer finds the reasoning used by Raymond S. logical and persuasive. Additionally, the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) indicates that school districts must obtain parental consent and inform the parent of the risk of the potential loss of lifetime insurance benefits before using parental insurance. (OSEP 1993, Letter to Spann, 20 IDELR 627.) Because it is a school district’s burden to advise parents of their rights regarding potential loss if the district attempts to use a parent’s insurance to pay for FAPE-related services, the Hearing Officer finds that, based on the reasoning of Raymond S., it is the District’s burden to prove that no financial loss to the PARENTs would occur from the use of their insurance to pay for STUDENT’s OT services. Here, the District provided no evidence in this hearing that the PARENTs would not suffer financial loss as a result. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that reimbursement for the OT services ordered herein shall not be reduced by any amount already paid by the family’s insurance. (Footnote 10)

B. Tuition and transportation related to STUDENT’s placement at Grace Christian School for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years

Because the Hearing Officer found above that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, STUDENT’s parents will be entitled to reimbursement for the private placement they obtained for STUDENT if that placement was appropriate.

The Petitioner presented credible evidence that certain modifications had been made for STUDENT while at Grace Christian to accommodate her physical condition, her visual motor integration deficit, and her attention deficit, in order to meet her unique needs in those areas. STUDENT was involved in Grace Christian school’s “Opportunity Program” during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years. (Testimony of Ms. Burch and Ms. Lieneke; Pet Exh. S.) STUDENT’s current Opportunity mathematics teacher, Julie Lieneke, stated that this program is a modification of the regular education program at Grace Christian. STUDENT’s current Opportunity language arts teacher, Anita Burch, taught STUDENT during the 1996-97 school year. Ms. Burch indicated that STUDENT received assistance through various methods, including having tests read to her, instead of having her read them herself, and receiving modifications to her homework assignments. (Testimony of Ms. Burch; Pet. Exh. S, at p. 6.) Ms. Lieneke testified that small group instruction, multisensory teaching methods, hands-on activities, and verbal interaction are utilized as a part of the Opportunity Program. Based on the findings regarding STUDENT’s unique needs during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s private placement at Grace Christian school was designed to meet those unique needs.

STUDENT’s grades during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years were mostly A’s and B’s. (Pet. Exh. S, at pp. 7-8.) As the District pointed out, STUDENT’s academic achievement levels in 1996 were on par, or in some cases, above her estimated level of cognitive ability. (Testimony of Ms. Sanders; Dist. Exh. 13, at pp. 2-3.) Despite STUDENT’s physical condition and her visual motor integration processing deficit, she did well in her private placement at Grace Christian elementary school during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, according to the comments of her teachers. (Testimony of Ms. Burch and Ms. Lieneke.) Based on the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s private placement provided educational benefit to her. Because STUDENT’s private placement was designed to meet her unique needs and provided her with educational benefit, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT’s private placement at Grace Christian school during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years was appropriate.

Because the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years and the PARENTs provided an appropriate placement for her during that time, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s tuition at Grace Christian school for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years. (Footnote 11) Although the Petitioner had asked that the District pay for ninety percent of the tuition because “approximately” ten percent of her education was religious, the Hearing Officer notes that the law does not recognize this type of division of tuition reimbursement. (Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (1971); Christen G. v. Lower Merion School District, 919 F.Supp. 793 (E.D. Pa. 1996).) The Hearing Officer declines to apportion STUDENT’s tuition in this way and, instead, awards the entire tuition as reimbursement.

The Hearing Officer also notes that, although the 1997 amendments to the IDEA now allow a reduction or elimination of reimbursement for a private school placement if a parent fails to notify the school district before such a unilateral placement, California did not have a similar requirement in effect until January 1, 1999. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii); California Education Code § 56176.) Therefore, as California law did not contain the additional notice requirement until January 1, 1999, it is not applicable to STUDENT until that date. (See supra footnote 9.) Because the PARENTs’ reimbursement request for tuition concerns the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, the notice requirement that went into effect in California in January 1999 does not apply to their request and reduction or elimination of reimbursement is not appropriate.

Transportation is also a related service which must be provided to special education students when it is required to assist a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) Here, the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, and STUDENT’s parents provided her transportation to Grace Christian school. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents are also entitled to reimbursement for the cost of the transportation they provided for STUDENT to Grace Christian during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, at the District rate for transportation reimbursement.

III. Must the District prospectively provide direct OT services to STUDENT during the 1998-99 school year?

The Petitioner argues that the District must prospectively provide direct OT services during the remainder of the 1998-99 school year because the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by failing to offer her direct OT services in the IEP dated August 21, 1998. The Hearing Officer found above that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE to the extent that it failed to offer direct OT, a related service necessary to meet her unique needs. The Hearing Officer notes that although the Petitioner, arguably, may have been entitled to reimbursement for OT services provided by STUDENT’s parents, the Petitioner’s request that the District be ordered to provide direct OT services for the remainder of the 1998-99 school year does not fall within the Burlington reimbursement standard because the Petitioner does not request reimbursement for OT services during the present year.

However, as mentioned above, having undertaken to offer STUDENT a FAPE, the District was obligated to offer her appropriate related services. Therefore, the District is ordered to immediately convene an IEP team meeting at which it shall create goals and objectives for an occupational therapist to implement and offer direct OT services at least once per week for sixty minutes each session, in addition to any other placement or services necessary to offer STUDENT a FAPE (e.g., an RSP placement) for the remainder of the 1998-99 school year. The IEP team agreed that STUDENT needed extended year services. (Dist. Exh. 1, at p.1.) Therefore, the District’s offer shall include extended school year services.

ORDER

1. Within thirty days of receipt of proof, the District must reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the following: a. the private occupational therapy services obtained for STUDENT during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, not reduced by any amount paid for by her family’s health insurance; b. the entire cost of STUDENT’s tuition for Grace Christian school for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years; and c. the cost of STUDENT’s transportation to Grace Christian school for the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years, at the District rate for transportation reimbursement.

2. Within fifteen days of the date of this Decision, the District shall reconvene the IEP team to create a new IEP for STUDENT, which shall include the provision of direct occupational therapy services based on appropriate goals and objectives, extended school year services, and any other placement or services the IEP team agrees is necessary in order to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the remainder of the 1998-99 school year.

3. The Petitioner’s remaining requests are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:

I. Did the District offer STUDENT a free, appropriate public education during the 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1998-99 school years? The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

II. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following: A. private occupational therapy (OT) services obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years; and The Petitioner prevailed on this sub-issue.

B. tuition and transportation for STUDENT’s private placement at Grace Christian School obtained during the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years? The Petitioner prevailed on this sub-issue.

III. Must the District prospectively provide direct OT services to STUDENT during the 1998-99 school year? The Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that the District is ordered to convene an IEP team meeting an offer STUDENT a FAPE for the remainder of the 1998-99 school year which must include the provision of direct OT services.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: February 17, 1999 ___________________________________ Kathleen Peterson Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

FOOTNOTES

1. The issues presented here are worded slightly differently from those listed in the Petitioner’s notice, pursuant to discussions at the start of the hearing, and to allow for appropriate legal analysis of threshold issues.

2. STUDENT was held back a year before starting kindergarten. She also repeated kindergarten, making her two years older than her “grade-level” peers.

3. Amendments to the IDEA were signed into law on June 4, 1997.

4. In California, related services are known as “designated instruction and services” (DIS). (California Education Code § 56363.)

5. For example, under EDGAR, school districts were only required to provide a “genuine opportunity for equitable participation” in special education programs to students whose parents chose a private school over an appropriate public school education. Districts were to ensure that the “program benefits” received by such students be “comparable in quality, scope and opportunity for participation to the program benefits” received by disabled public school students. (34 C.F.R. §§ 76.651 and 76.654.) Under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, school districts are only required to expend a “proportionate amount” of federal special education money on such students. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).)

6. "Dist. Exh.” refers to the District’s exhibits, numbered 1 through 25, admitted into evidence.

7. "Pet. Exh.” refers to the Petitioner’s exhibits, lettered A through S, admitted into evidence.

8. The Hearing Officer also notes that the District’s own occupational therapist, Laurie Cohen, stated that STUDENT “still meets the requirements for CCS services.” (Dist. Exh. 7, at p. 1.) There is no indication in the evidence that the District referred STUDENT to CCS.

9. The Hearing Officer notes that there is language in the 1997 amendments to the IDEA that could, arguably, be construed as changing the criteria for retroactive reimbursement requests from the widely-accepted Burlington standard. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).) However, the regulations construing this language have not yet been published. In any case, California law did not contain similar language on this point until January 1, 1999. (California Education Code § 56175.) Therefore, as states may adopt substantive and procedural standards that are higher than those provided for in federal law, California law, which utilized the Burlington reimbursement standard during the relevant time period, will govern the reimbursement requests in this matter, which concern the 1996-97 and 1997-98 school years. (David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1985).)

10. The District court in Raymond S., within its broad discretion to grant appropriate relief as a court of civil law, also ordered the student’s parents to reimburse their insurance company for the costs paid by that provider. The court ruled that such an order was designed to avoid a windfall to the parent and to place the parties back in the position they would have occupied, had the school district originally paid for the services. (Raymond S., 918 F.Supp. 1280, 1297 (N.D. Iowa 1996).)

11. The fact that Grace Christian School is a sectarian school is not a bar to an order granting reimbursement to STUDENT’s parents. Such an order benefits the parents, not the sectarian school and, therefore, does not violate the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. (Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S.Ct. 2462 (1993); Christen G. v. Lower Merion School District, 919 F.Supp. 793 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Matthew J. v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 989 F.Supp. 380 (D.Mass. 1998).)