California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 20, 1999

Student v. McCloud Union Elementary School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 1596-98 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

McCloud Union ESD and Siskiyou COE denied a deaf student FAPE for two years; mileage reimbursement and speech therapy ordered.

Split decision: student prevailed on 5 of 9 issues (3 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of a profoundly deaf seven-year-old filed against McCloud Union Elementary School District and the Siskiyou County Office of Education. They challenged his program from 1994 through 1998 and sought transportation costs for a deaf and hard of hearing class at Mistletoe Elementary School in Redding, about 75 miles away. The Hearing Officer held that claims before November 11, 1995 were barred by a three-year statute of limitations. The 1995-1996 preschool program, with a signing aide and specialist services from teacher Barbara Pool, provided FAPE.

In December 1996, the IEP team placed the student at Mistletoe two days a week. He attended only nine to twelve times, and the respondents never reconvened the IEP team. The Hearing Officer found this a procedural violation that left him without deaf peers and the added speech services his IEP required. He made only minimal progress, so the 1996-1997 year was a denial of FAPE. His 1997-1998 general education kindergarten also denied FAPE, because classmates did not sign and his language skills fell behind. The parents get $.31 per mile for two round trips (300 miles) per attendance day at Mistletoe in late 1996, spring 1998, and 1998-1999. Their request for pay for driving time was denied. The Hearing Officer ordered 30 minutes per week of extra speech and language therapy for one school year, including ESY. He denied academic tutoring based on the current teacher's testimony.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO handled a placement that broke down because the parents stopped attending. The agencies still had to reconvene the IEP team. It also shows that a deaf child's need for a signing environment with deaf peers can be part of FAPE. For long trips, the Hearing Officer set mileage reimbursement for two round trips per day, but not pay for parent time.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue I. Are Petitioner's claims arising prior to November 11, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations?

    Under a three-year limitations period (Alexopulos; Ed. Code 56505(j)), claims arising before November 11, 1995 were barred because the parents had notice of their rights by September 1993 and attended all IEP meetings.

  2. Issue II.A. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 1994-1995 school and extended school year?

    Claims for the 1994-1995 school year and ESY were barred by the statute of limitations.

  3. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue II.B. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 1995-1996 school and extended school year?

    No procedural violation was shown; the preschool SDC with a signing aide and DHH services met the student's needs then, and he made more than trivial progress, so FAPE was provided.

  4. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue II.C. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-1997 school and extended school year?

    The triennial was adequate, and missing teachers and the late IEP were harmless. But failing to hold an IEP meeting after Mistletoe attendance stopped left the student without deaf peers and added speech services; he got only minimal benefit, which denied FAPE.

  5. Student prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue II.D. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a FAPE during the 1997-1998 school and extended school year?

    General education kindergarten with a signing aide and up to two hours weekly of DHH services did not meet the student's need for a signing environment with deaf peers; his progress was minimal, so FAPE was denied for the school year and ESY.

  6. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue III.A. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for costs of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1996-1997 school year?

    The $5-$7 per day offer was inadequate and the parents did not waive reimbursement; they get $.31 per mile for two round trips (300 miles) per attendance day, but nothing for parent time.

  7. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue III.B. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1997-1998 school year?

    The parents get $.31 per mile for two round trips per day the student attended Mistletoe from April to June 1998; the request for pay for parent time was denied.

  8. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue III.C. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1998-1999 school and extended school year?

    The district's offer to transport was appropriate and the parents' safety concerns were not persuasive. The parents received $.31 per mile for two round trips, which matched the district's March 1999 offer, so the district prevailed.

  9. Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered

    Issue IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

    For about a year of lost educational opportunity, the student gets 30 minutes per week of extra speech and language therapy for one school year including ESY; the requested daily academic and speech instruction was denied.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Respondents shall reimburse the parents $.31 per mile for two round trips (300 miles) per day the parents transported the student to Mistletoe Elementary School during November-December 1996, April-June 1998, and the 1998-1999 school year, based on official attendance records, within one month of the decision. Pay for parent time was denied.
  • Compensatory education. Speech and language therapy, 30 minutes per week for one school year including extended school year, beginning at the start of the 1999-2000 school year.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District; Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Todd v. Andrews; Moubry v. Independent School District No. 696

People named in the decision

  • Michael Shafer, acting director of special education, Siskiyou County Office of Education
  • Diane Brickell, superintendent, McCloud Union Elementary School District
  • Kathy Kaer, program manager, Siskiyou County Office of Education
  • Karen Pai, teacher for the deaf and hard of hearing (first grade), Mistletoe Elementary School
  • Therese Jarding, preschool special day class teacher, South County Preschool, Siskiyou County Office of Education
  • Barbara Pool, teacher for the deaf and hard of hearing (DHH specialist), Siskiyou County Office of Education
  • Jeralee Hanson, kindergarten teacher, McCloud Elementary School
  • Jan Kearns, administrator attending December 1996 IEP meeting
  • Melinda Abel, parent advocate at school board meeting
  • Dave Shaeffer, audiologist, University of California, Davis
  • Far Northern Regional Center, regional center that conducted psychological evaluation

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in Yreka, California, on April 6 and 7, and May 11 and 12, 1999. Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney F. Richard Ruderman. STUDENT's parents, FATHER and MOTHER, and his grandparents, GRANDFATHER and GRANDMOTHER, were also present on STUDENT's behalf throughout the hearing. Respondents McCloud Union Elementary School District (McClound Union ESD or District) and Siskiyou County Office of Education (Siskiyou COE) were represented at the hearing by attorney Laurie Reynolds. Present on the District's behalf was Diane Brickell, superintendent for McCloud Union ESD. Present on Respondent Siskiyou COE's behalf was Michael Shafer, acting director of special education for Siskiyou COE. Petitioner STUDENT called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Michael Shafer, acting director of special education for Siskiyou COE; Diane Brickell, superintendent of McCloud Union ESD; MOTHER, STUDENT's mother; Kathy Kaer, program manager for Siskiyou COE; and FATHER, STUDENT's father. Karen Pai, teacher for the deaf and hard of hearing at Mistletoe Elementary School, testified by telephone on April 7, 1999. Respondents District and Siskiyou COE called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Michael Shafer, acting director of special education for Siskiyou COE; Diane Brickell, superintendent of McCloud Union ESD; Therese Jarding, special day class teacher at South County Preschool; Barbara Pool, teacher for the deaf and hard of hearing for Siskiyou COE; and Jeralee Hanson, kindergarten teacher at McClound Elementary School. Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing briefs. Closing briefs were received on June 8, 1999. The record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision. ISSUES I. Are Petitioner's claims barred by the statute of limitations? II. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) A. During the 1994-1995 school and extended school year? B. During the 1995-1996 school and extended school year? C. During the 1996-1997 school and extended school year? D. During the 1997-1998 school and extended school year? III. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for: A. costs of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1996-1997 school year, and B. cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1997-1998 school year, and C. cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1998-1999 school and extended school year? IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education? POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES Petitioner STUDENT asserted three grounds for why he was substantively denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from the 1994-1995 school year through the 1997-1998 school and extended school year (ESY). First, Petitioner argued that STUDENT's unique and individual needs required that he be placed at the Mistletoe Elementary School class for the deaf and hard of hearing (DHH) beginning in 1994. Although his IEP dated December 2, 1996, had placed him at Mistletoe School during the 1996-1997 school year, Petitioner asserted that Respondent District's failure to provide transportation or adequate reimbursement for parent-provided transportation resulted in his inability to attend the Mistletoe program. Second, Petitioner contended that, because he was unable to attend the DHH class at Mistletoe, he was placed at schools within the Siskiyou County in which he was not provided adequate speech and language services. Third, Petitioner contended that he was denied a FAPE when the Respondents failed to provide him with extended school year instruction. Petitioner also asserted that Respondents committed a number of procedural violations which resulted in STUDENT's being denied a FAPE. Therefore, as a result of the denial of FAPE, Petitioner requested compensatory education, reimbursement for transportation costs, and payment to his mother for time that she spent driving STUDENT to school. Petitioner asserted that the current placement at Mistletoe is the appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year. In regard to the 1998-1999 school and extended school year, Petitioner only contested the Respondents' offer of transportation reimbursement. Respondents McCloud Union Elementary School District and Siskiyou County Office of Education asserted that STUDENT was provided with appropriate educational placements and services during the years in question and that they did not deny him a FAPE. They asserted that, as a result, STUDENT is not entitled to compensatory education. In regard to reimbursement to STUDENT's parents for transportation, Respondents agree that the District is responsible for providing STUDENT with transportation to school. However, Respondents argued that reimbursement was offered to and rejected by Petitioner's parents and, as a result, the parents are no longer entitled to such reimbursement. In the alternative, Respondents contended that STUDENT's parents are entitled to reimbursement for one round-trip for each day that STUDENT attended school, rather than two round-trips as requested by the parents. Respondents further contended that STUDENT's parents are not entitled to payment of hourly compensation for transporting STUDENT to school. BACKGROUND FACTS STUDENT is a seven-year-old who is profoundly deaf. He was born with clubbed feet that required surgical correction and has been diagnosed with a seizure disorder, which has been controlled. STUDENT lives with his parents in the city of McCloud in Siskiyou County. During the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was in the first grade. STUDENT is currently eligible for special education services due to his profound bilateral hearing loss and has been served by the Siskiyou County Office of Education (Siskiyou COE) since 1993, when he was eighteen months old. Pursuant to an infant individualized family service plan (IFSP) dated May of 1994, STUDENT transitioned from receiving services at home to preschool beginning in the fall of 1994. Until his third birthday in February 1995, STUDENT attended Siskiyou COE's special education preschool program for two days each week. STUDENT's preschool program was located in Mount Shasta in Siskiyou County, approximately twelve miles from STUDENT's home. He was driven to school by his parents and was assisted at preschool by Barbara Pool, deaf and hard of hearing (DHH) teacher. On his third birthday, STUDENT's IEP team met and increased his preschool placement to four days a week. STUDENT continued to receive assistance from Barbara Pool two days a week and was provided a full-time signing aide. Additionally, STUDENT was provided occupational therapy to work on his gross motor control, which was affected by his surgeries on his clubbed feet. STUDENT continued in preschool during the summer of 1995 and through the 1995-1996 school year. He was again provided with a one-to-one signing interpreter/instructional aide and deaf and hard of hearing services by Barbara Pool. He was also transported to school on the district school bus. Of the 144 days in the school year, STUDENT was absent for 42 days. STUDENT continued in the preschool program during the 1996-1997 school year. He was placed in the same class with the same teacher and signing aide as before. He also continued to receive DHH services from Barbara Pool for two days a week. However, his occupational therapy was discontinued because he had met his gross motor objective and could easily participate in preschool gross motor activities. (Resp. Exh. 24.) By October 1996, STUDENT's triennial evaluation became due. At this time, STUDENT was four years and eight months old. The District and STUDENT's parents disagree as to whether a formal triennial evaluation was completed. At hearing, the District witnesses testified that STUDENT's triennial evaluation consisted of a number of assessments administered by county service providers, as well as assessments administered by STUDENT's DHH instructor and classroom teacher. In December of 1996 an IEP meeting was scheduled at the site of the Mistletoe School in Redding in Shasta County. At the meeting, the IEP team agreed to split STUDENT's placement between two separate programs from two separate counties. Three days a week, STUDENT was to attend his preschool special day class in Mount Shasta in Siskiyou County and receive DHH services for two hours each week and assistance from a one-to-one signing aide. The other two days of the school week STUDENT was to attend a DHH class at Mistletoe School in Shasta County, over 75 miles away. While at Mistletoe, STUDENT was to be placed in a DHH class with other deaf students and to receive speech and language therapy for thirty minutes each week. In regard to transportation for STUDENT to attend Mistletoe, the IEP simply states that "Siskiyou County will provide in lieu of transportation reimbursement to the parents for transporting [STUDENT] to Redding 2 days per week." STUDENT's parents testified that they preferred to drive STUDENT to school because of a number of safety concerns involved with transporting a young, deaf child a long distance from home. STUDENT was taken to the Mistletoe program nine to twelve times before STUDENT's parents discontinued his attendance there. Although STUDENT no longer attended Mistletoe pursuant to his December IEP, no IEP meeting was held until May 1997. Rather, STUDENT attended his preschool in Mount Shasta five days per week and continued to receive services from a one-to-one signing aide and DHH instructor. STUDENT's parents testified that they stopped bringing STUDENT to Mistletoe because they could not afford to transport him to the school. However, Barbara Pool, STUDENT's DHH instructor, testified that the PARENTS indicated to her that STUDENT was not "getting enough out of" the program. Although the amount of reimbursement was never agreed to by the PARENTS and the District, no reimbursement was ever requested by the PARENTS until several years later. Additionally, STUDENT's attendance continued to be poor. He missed 38 out of 144 days of school during the 1996-1997 school year. On May 1, 1997, STUDENT's IEP team met to discuss his transition to kindergarten. During the fall of 1997, STUDENT began kindergarten at McCloud Elementary School in Shasta County. While at McCloud, STUDENT received a full-time signing aide and DHH services. Although STUDENT's transition to kindergarten was initially without difficulty, by December 1997 Barbara Pool became concerned about his progress in school. She testified at hearing that STUDENT became increasingly isolated and would create his "own world where he would sign to himself." Rather than watch the interpreter or his teacher, he would look away and sign to himself. Ms. Pool then spoke to STUDENT's teacher, Ms. Jeralee Hanson, who later spoke with STUDENT's father about possibly placing STUDENT at Mistletoe for the first grade. As a result of speaking with Ms. Hanson, the PARENTS visited the Mistletoe program and expressed their interest in placing STUDENT there for the first grade. By March or early April, STUDENT began attending the Mistletoe program in Shasta County for part of his school week. Although STUDENT's IEP indicated that extended school year services were recommended, STUDENT did not attend the 1998 ESY. On May 8, 1998, between four to six weeks after STUDENT began attending Mistletoe, an IEP meeting was held during which the team agreed to place STUDENT full time at the Mistletoe School program for the deaf and hard of hearing for the fall of 1998. The IEP did not reflect STUDENT's change in placement which had occurred weeks earlier. The IEP meeting was run by Shasta County personnel, as Mistletoe is within Shasta County. On the IEP, transportation was indicated as "not required." Subsequently, STUDENT's parents and the District had a number of conversations regarding transportation for STUDENT to attend Mistletoe. Because the parties were unable to reach an agreement, an IEP meeting was held in August 1998 to discuss transportation. At this IEP meeting, the District offered to provide transportation for STUDENT, or in the alternative, to provide reimbursement to his parents for $.31 per mile for one round-trip. The PARENTS rejected the reimbursement offer and requested that they be reimbursed $.31 per mile for two round-trips and time compensation at $8.25 per hour. Unable to reach an agreement, the issue of STUDENT's transportation reimbursement was placed on the agenda for the local school board meeting. At the school board meeting on September 8, 1998, the PARENTS, through their advocate Melinda Abel, asserted a number of grounds for why they believed STUDENT could not be transported by the District. Among their concerns were the unsafe driving conditions which were heavily affected by adverse weather conditions, STUDENT's young age, the driver's inability to communicate with STUDENT in sign language, and the lack of DMV or County standards for drivers and vehicles. The PARENTS also resubmitted their prior request for reimbursement and compensation for time. However, the dispute over transportation reimbursement remained unresolved. STUDENT's parents filed for a due process hearing on November 11, 1998. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Are Petitioner's claims prior to October 1995 barred by the statute of limitations? Pursuant to Education Code  56505(j), any request for a due process hearing "shall be filed within three years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request." Prior to the effective date of this provision on January 1, 1999, a three year statute of limitations for actions arising under the IDEA had been applied for California by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, a student requested an administrative hearing in 1985 to address issues relating to the school district's alleged failure to provide an appropriate education in 1979, some six years earlier. Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School District, 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal of the hearing officer's denial of the student's claims, the Alexopulos court found that all claims under the IDEA were time-barred. The court stated that: Congress' desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize filing of claims on behalf of or by the children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child's representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred. Id. at p. 556. The Court concluded that any cause of action which Ms. Alexopulos may have had would have accrued in 1979 when she "knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying it." In this case, the Hearing Office received Petitioner's request for a special education due process hearing on November 11, 1998. If a three-year statute of limitations were to apply, all claims arising prior to November 11, 1995, would be barred. At hearing, Petitioner presented issues relating to his 1994-1995 school year and extended school year, a period of time more than three years prior to the date Petitioner filed for hearing. The evidence established that Petitioner's parents received notice of their special education parental rights as early as September 1993. (Resp. Exh. 6.) The evidence also established that the PARENTS were present and participated at all of STUDENT's IEP meetings during this time. Because Petitioner's parents knew of or had reason to know of the facts underlying STUDENT's claim as early as September 1993, all claims arising prior to November 11, 1995, are time-barred. II. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE from 1994 to 1998? Under both state law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C.  1400; Education Code  56000. The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student's individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C.  1401(a)(18). "Special education" is defined as specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C.  1401(a)(16). The term "related services" includes transportation and other services that may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C.  1401(17). California Education Code  56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California's term for related services, shall be provided "when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program." The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide both whether procedural steps have been followed and whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate. Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-208. A. Procedural Appropriateness Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.  1400 et seq. The Supreme Court in Rowley recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the appropriate public education to which he or she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student's educational program. W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484. Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on the parents' participation in the IEP process. Id. Thus, the courts have created a two prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of education opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parents' participation in the IEP process. 1. 1994-1995 school year and extended school year As discussed above, Petitioner's claims arising during the 1994-1995 school year and extended school year are barred by the statute of limitations. 2. 1995-1996 school year and extended school year (Footnote 1) Petitioner asserted that in August 1995, the Respondents unilaterally discontinued his occupational therapy services and substantially reduced his DHH services by Ms. Pool. Petitioner further alleged that an IEP meeting was not held until September 1995, one month later, which affirmed the unilateral change in placement. Petitioner's allegations, however, are baseless. The September IEP that Petitioner refers to makes no mention of occupational therapy services. Additionally, no evidence was presented at hearing to establish that occupational therapy was unilaterally discontinued at this time. On the contrary, STUDENT received occupational therapy through March 1996, as is evidenced by an occupational therapy report dated March 1996. (Resp. Exh. 24.) With regard to STUDENT's DHH services, Barbara Poole testified that the September 1995 IEP addendum did not reflect a reduction in her services for STUDENT but, instead, was intended to clarify that a signing aide would work with STUDENT during the two days a week that she was not present. Thus, she continued to provide STUDENT with DHH services for two full days out of his four-day school week. In fact, her services were not reduced to two hours per week until the IEP dated March 28, 1996. The March 1995 IEP and the September 1995 addendum to the IEP also do not reflect any reduction in DHH services. The March 1995 IEP states that STUDENT will receive DHH services for two days per week. (Resp. Exh. 19.) The September 1995 addendum states that STUDENT will receive DHH services "2X a week." (Resp. Exh. 21.) Therefore, the evidence established that Respondents committed no procedural violations as alleged by Petitioner during the 1996-1997 school year. Petitioner made no allegations of procedural violations occurring during the 1996 extended school year. 3. 1996-1997 school year and extended school year Petitioner alleged that the Respondents committed four procedural violations during the 1996-1997 school year: (1) the Respondents failed to conduct a triennial evaluation of STUDENT, (2) the Respondents failed to convene an IEP meeting prior to placing STUDENT at the Mistletoe program in Shasta County, (3) the Respondents failed to include any of STUDENT's teachers in the December 1996 IEP meeting, and (4) the Respondents failed to convene an IEP meeting when STUDENT's attendance at Mistletoe was discontinued. With regard to Petitioner's first contention, that Respondents failed to conduct a triennial evaluation for STUDENT, California special education law provides that a reassessment of a student shall be conducted at least every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the pupil's parent or teacher requests a new assessment. California Education Code  56381. Additionally, California Education Code  56320(f) states that the student must be assessed in "all areas related to the suspected disability." It is undisputed that STUDENT's triennial evaluation was due October 1996, when STUDENT was four years old. Petitioner argues that assessments completed by Respondents provided only limited information and that Respondents failed to assess STUDENT for behavior and emotional problems. However, Petitioner's contentions are not supported by the evidence. Petitioner provided no significant evidence that the assessments completed by the District provided insufficient information. Additionally, although Petitioner alleged that STUDENTshould have been assessed in the area of emotional functioning, STUDENT's teachers testified that STUDENT was cooperative in class and got along well with his peers. Petitioner presented no significant evidence that established that STUDENT's mental condition or behavior problems were areas of suspected disability. Rather, the parties agree that STUDENT's problems lie in the area of language development as a result of his bilateral hearing loss. Respondent's witnesses testified that most formal tests are not standardized for children STUDENT's age. Thus, STUDENT's triennial included a composite of progress reports by his teacher and DHH teacher, an audiological exam conducted at the University of California at Davis, and a psychological evaluation conducted by Far Northern Regional Center. According to Respondents' witnesses, STUDENT's file was continually updated as a way to monitor his progress. Based on the above, and because Petitioner did not assert any other deficiency with the assessment, the evidence established that Respondents properly conducted STUDENT's triennial evaluation. With regard to Petitioner's second contention, that Respondents failed to convene an IEP meeting prior to placing STUDENT at the Mistletoe program in Shasta County, Education Code  56341(a) requires that a child's IEP team conduct meetings during which the child's IEP will be developed, reviewed, or revised. In a report dated October 31, 1996, Barbara Pool wrote that STUDENT had begun attending the Mistletoe program during that month. (Pet. Exh. at pg. 35.) However, an IEP meeting was not convened until December 2, 1996, to place STUDENT at the Mistletoe program. Placing STUDENT at another educational program seventy five miles from his home two days a week would clearly warrant a revision of his IEP. Thus, under this provision, an IEP team was required to have been convened prior to such change in STUDENT's placement. However, although Respondents committed a technical procedural violation, such violation did not prejudice STUDENT's education. Petitioner's position at hearing was that this placement at Mistletoe was appropriate for STUDENT. Because STUDENT's parents actively participated in placing STUDENT at Mistletoe and agreed with such decision to place STUDENT there, the lack of an IEP meeting resulted in no harm to STUDENT or his parents. For the foregoing reasons, Respondents' technical violation did not result in a denial of FAPE for STUDENT. With regard to Petitioner's third contention, that Respondents failed to include any of STUDENT's teachers in the December 1996 IEP meeting, Education Code  56341(b)(2) defines the IEP team as including the "the pupil's present teacher." Similarly, federal law mandates the inclusion of the following individuals in the IEP team: (1) the student's regular education teacher, if the child has one, and (2) at least one special education teacher, or if appropriate, (3) one of the child's special education providers. 20 U.S.C.  1414(d)(1)(B). Petitioner asserted that the absence of STUDENT's teachers from the IEP meeting resulted in a breakdown of communication between STUDENT's parents and the District members of the IEP team regarding the issue of reimbursement for the PARENTS' transporting of STUDENT to school. Petitioner's argument continues that, because the issue of reimbursement was not resolved, STUDENT was not able to attend his placement at Mistletoe Elementary School. According to the IEP dated December 2, 1996, the only District personnel that attended the IEP meeting were two administrators, Michael Shafer and Jan Kearns. Additionally, Ms. Pool, STUDENT's DHH teacher, and Therese Jarding, STUDENT's preschool teacher, both testified that they were not present at the meeting. Thus, the evidence established that Respondents failed to have a teacher present at the IEP meeting held on December 2, 1996. However, the evidence did not establish that the absence of STUDENT's teachers from the IEP meeting resulted in a "loss of educational opportunity" or "seriously infringe[d]" on the parent's opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process. Both Ms. Pool and Ms. Jarding testified at hearing that they knew very little about the District's transportation policy. Moreover, a number of IEP meetings followed at which STUDENT's teachers were present and the issue of reimbursement was discussed but remained unresolved. Thus, this procedural violation alone did not result in a denial of a FAPE for STUDENT. With regard to Petitioner's final contention (i.e., that the Respondents failed to convene an IEP when STUDENT's placement at Mistletoe was discontinued), as was discussed above, the district is required to convene an IEP meeting when a student's educational placement is developed, reviewed, or revised. Education Code  56341(b)(2). Respondents argued that STUDENT's parents discontinued STUDENT's attendance at Mistletoe and declined placement at Mistletoe because they felt that STUDENT was "not getting anything out of it." Respondents argued that, as a result of Petitioner's declining the Mistletoe placement, Petitioner's placement reverted back to his last placement prior to attending Mistletoe and that no IEP meeting was required. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that STUDENT could not attend Mistletoe because the Respondents' offer of reimbursement for transportation did not cover the cost of transporting STUDENT, and because the cost was prohibitive, they could not afford to transport STUDENT to school. Therefore, Petitioner argued that an IEP should have been convened to discuss STUDENT's placement after he stopped attending Mistletoe. The evidence clearly established that STUDENT's attendance at Mistletoe was discontinued in December 1996, but an IEP meeting was not convened until May 1997. According to the testimony of Respondents' witnesses, an IEP meeting was not convened during this time because STUDENT was receiving two parallel programs, each of which was an independently appropriate placement. Thus, according to Respondents, when STUDENT's parents refused the Shasta County placement, STUDENT's Siskiyou County program became effective by default. However, the December 1996 IEP states that, while STUDENT is receiving services through Siskiyou County, "the IEP team agrees that STUDENT needs increased services specifically addressing his hearing impairment." As a result, the IEP team placed STUDENT at the Mistletoe program for half of his school week and provided STUDENT with additional speech and language services and more intensive speech and language instruction from a DHH teacher. Consequently, the failure of Respondents to convene an IEP meeting after STUDENT's placement at Mistletoe was discontinued resulted in STUDENT receiving decreased services contrary to his IEP. It should be noted, however, that STUDENT's parents greatly contributed to the circumstances leading up to the need for an IEP meeting at this point in time. STUDENT's parents discontinued his attendance at Mistletoe by choice and not because of the Respondents' failure to provide adequate transportation reimbursement. As will be discussed in the section of transportation reimbursement below, STUDENT's parents were told that the reimbursement amount offered was negotiable and yet they failed to contact County personnel regarding the amount or to request their reimbursements. STUDENT's parents also testified that they understood that the District could provide transportation but preferred to transport STUDENT themselves. Moreover, STUDENT's parents expressed to District and County personnel that they wanted STUDENT to be educated close to home. Mike Shafer testified that STUDENT's parents expressed at the March 1995 IEP meeting that they wanted STUDENT to be educated in the area and that he understood from STUDENT's parents that they wanted STUDENT educated in Siskiyou County. Furthermore, both Mike Shafer and Barbara Pool testified that the Mistletoe program was brought up to the PARENTS regularly but that the PARENTS were adamant about keeping STUDENT in the local school and were sensitive whenever the program was brought up. Additionally, the PARENTS had known about the program since 1993. If the PARENTS had wanted STUDENT to continue at Mistletoe, they could have allowed the Respondents to transport him or they could have pursued negotiations with the County regarding the reimbursement amount. Thus, STUDENT's return to his full-time preschool placement in Siskiyou County was a result of his parents' desire for him to be educated locally. Notwithstanding the above, all of the parties understood that STUDENT was to remain in the public education system and, therefore, the local educational agency had a duty, independent of his parents' wishes, to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education. Education Code  56040 and 56041. Pursuant to California Education Code  56346(b), the District and/or County office has the affirmative duty to request a due process hearing if the parents do not consent to a proposed special educational program that is necessary to provide the student with a FAPE. STUDENT was placed part-time at Mistletoe in December 1996 because that was the most appropriate placement for him. Consequently, despite STUDENT's parents' wishes for him to stay in the local school full time, Respondents had the duty to ensure that he was provided a FAPE while they were still responsible for his education. When STUDENT's parents pulled him from Mistletoe after a month in the placement, STUDENT was provided fewer services than were provided for in his IEP. Rather than allow this to continue for the rest of the year, Respondents were required to hold an IEP meeting either to develop an appropriate substitute placement or to renew their prior offer of FAPE at Mistletoe. Regardless of the Respondents' good intentions in accommodating the PARENTS' interests, the law compels a finding that Respondents committed a procedural violation when they failed to convene an IEP meeting subsequent to STUDENT's return to the Siskiyou County preschool program full time. The effects of such procedural violation will be discussed below in the section on whether STUDENT was substantively provided a FAPE during this time. Petitioner made no allegations regarding procedural violations occurring during the 1997 extended school year. 4. 1997-1998 school year and extended school year Petitioner alleged that the Respondents failed to convene an IEP meeting when STUDENT demonstrated a "lack of progress" at the beginning of the 1997-1998 school year. Petitioner alleged that an IEP team meeting was not held until May 1998, months after Ms. Pool wrote her December 1997 report outlining her concerns regarding STUDENT's progress. Ms. Pool testified that the reason she did not call an IEP meeting was that she wanted to allow more time to observe STUDENT and to discuss with his teacher, Jeralee Hanson, any problems that he may have been having. Ms. Hanson testified that STUDENT was one of her "top students" and that he was able to progress in her class. She also testified that her concerns regarding STUDENT related to his ability to function the following year in first grade rather than his ability to function in her kindergarten class. Additionally, she testified that she convened a parent/teacher meeting in February with STUDENT's parents to discuss his progress. This meeting resulted in the parents visiting and agreeing to place STUDENT at the Mistletoe program in Redding soon thereafter. Nothing in the evidence established that an IEP meeting was required to be called at that time. Petitioner also alleged that Respondents never convened an IEP meeting to change STUDENT's kindergarten placement from McCloud Elementary School to Mistletoe Elementary School during the spring of 1998. It is clear from the evidence that STUDENT's parents visited the Mistletoe program during late winter or early spring and agreed to place STUDENT there during that time. Although an IEP meeting was held in May 1998, the IEP indicated that the services were to begin during the fall of 1998. Respondents did not allege that an IEP meeting was held to reflect the change in STUDENT's placement at the end of his kindergarten year. Furthermore, STUDENT's enrollment at Mistletoe was a result of an agreement between Respondents and the PARENTS and was not a unilateral placement on behalf of the parents. Although STUDENT's parents agreed to placing STUDENT at Mistletoe, significant changes in a special education student's placement must be done pursuant to an IEP meeting by an IEP team. However, Respondents' technical procedural violation did not prejudice STUDENT's education. Petitioner's position at hearing was that the Mistletoe placement was appropriate for STUDENT and is where STUDENT should have been placed "all along." MOTHER, STUDENT's mother, testified that she noticed positive changes in STUDENT's behavior immediately after he began attending Mistletoe. She also testified that STUDENT would interact with students at Mistletoe, was happier, and was eager to learn. Although no IEP meeting was held either before or after STUDENT was placed at Mistletoe, STUDENT's parents visited the program and understood what the placement entailed. Furthermore, STUDENT's parents agree that Mistletoe is the appropriate placement for STUDENT. Because STUDENT's parents fully participated in placing STUDENT at Mistletoe and because STUDENT did not lose educational opportunity as a result of being placed at Mistletoe, Respondents' technical procedural violation did not result in a denial of a FAPE for STUDENT. In conclusion, Respondents committed no procedural violations during the 1997-1998 school year which prejudiced STUDENT's education. Additionally, Petitioner made no allegations regarding procedural violations occurring during the 1998 extended school year. B. Substantive Appropriateness To determine whether the Respondents provided STUDENT a free appropriate public education, one must focus on the adequacy of Respondents' program. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F. 2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that the student's individualized educational program (IEP) must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize the student's abilities. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a "basic floor of opportunity" that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley, 458 at 207-208. Thus, if the District's program reflected STUDENT's needs, provided some benefit, and comported with his IEP, the District provided a FAPE, even if the parents preferred another program and even if the parents' preferred program would have resulted in greater educational benefit. To summarize, under the IDEA and Rowley, Respondent's proposed program must have met the following three requirements in order to have constituted an appropriate educational program: (1) been designed to meet STUDENT's unique needs, (2) been reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, and (3) comport with his IEP. 1. 1994-1995 school year and extended school year As was discussed above, claims arising prior to November 11, 1995, are barred by the statute of limitations. 2. 1995-1996 school year and extended school year a. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs The first step in this analysis is to determine what STUDENT's unique and individual needs were during the 1995-1996 school year and ESY. During this time, STUDENT was between three and four years old and attended preschool in Siskiyou County. It is undisputed and well-documented that STUDENT is cognitively normal and is profoundly deaf. The parties also agree that STUDENT's needs center on the area of speech and language development. In STUDENT's IEP dated March 15, 1995, the IEP team noted that STUDENT needed to improve his receptive and expressive language, increase vocalization and imitation of speech sounds, and improve readiness skills. (Dist. Exh. 19.) Although it was unclear to what extent STUDENT was able to hear, the team created a goal to develop the use of his residual hearing. The IEP team also indicated that STUDENT needed to increase his visual attention without prompting and that he needed signing assistance throughout the day for all activities. Barbara Pool, in a report dated March 14, 1995, indicated that such work with visual attention should be STUDENT's top priority. (Resp. Exh. 17.) Petitioner alleged that STUDENT also needed to be placed in an educational setting where signing was used by his teacher and peers throughout the school day. Respondents agree that STUDENT would benefit from such an educational setting. However, Respondents argue that STUDENT's unique and individual needs do not require that he be placed in a class with deaf peers. The only significant evidence from the 1995-1996 school year that supports Petitioner's contention is a report by Barbara Pool dated March 26, 1996. In her report, Ms. Poole wrote that she was "concerned about STUDENT's social skills because he is not with his signing peers" and that she witnessed STUDENT being "physical with his peers rather than signing with them" because they were not signing. (Pet. Exh. at pg. 52.) Although Ms. Pool's report indicated that STUDENT may have exhibited some problems interacting with his peers during this time, nothing in the evidence established that he was generally unable to interact satisfactorily with his peers or that he required deaf peers for his language development at this time. Based on the foregoing, STUDENT's unique and individual needs did not require that he be placed in a class with deaf peers during this time. STUDENT's placement during the 1995-1996 school year and extended school year was in Therese Jarding's preschool special day class. While in Ms. Jarding's class, STUDENT received the assistance of a signing aide and DHH services from Barbara Pool two days a week. Ms. Pool testified that, between her and the signing aide, STUDENT was never without assistance and instruction on his language skills. Ms. Jarding testified at hearing that she also used sign language throughout the school day. She also testified that her classroom instruction was primarily language based because the majority of the children in the class had language delays. With all of the assistance and instruction with signing by Ms. Pool, Ms. Jarding, and the signing aide, STUDENT's placement had a strong emphasis on his language development. Thus, STUDENT's placement during this time was designed to meet his unique and individual needs. b. Reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit To be appropriate under the IDEA, the District's proposed program must have been reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. While this requires a school district to provide a disabled child with meaningful access to education, it does not mean that the school district is required to guarantee totally successful results. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998). De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of "some" benefit. Id. at 130. Rather, a child's academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by his or her disability and must be gauged in relation to the child's potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997). It is undisputed that STUDENT made some progress during the 1995-1996 school year and extended school year. The question remains, then, whether STUDENT obtained more than de minimis benefit or trivial advancement while in Ms. Jarding's class. According to STUDENT's teacher, Therese Jarding, STUDENT showed good progress with most of his goals and objectives and he participated regularly in class. According to STUDENT's IEP dated March 15, 1999, STUDENT was able to sign his classmates' names, showed an increase in spontaneous signs of at least fifty new words, was able to imitate sounds and tongue movements, and was able to recognize colors, shapes, pictures and his written name. (Resp. Exh. 19.) Barbara Pool's report dated March 26, 1996 also indicated that STUDENT had shown progress in both receptive and expressive language. (Resp. Exh. 23.) Additionally, her report indicated that STUDENT understood more vocabulary, was signing more spontaneously, recognized colors and shapes, and was successful at imitating sounds. (Id.) Ms. Pool also worked with STUDENT on his residual hearing goals. STUDENT's March 1995 IEP set forth extensive goals to work on his residual hearing. Such goals included associating sounds with pictures, awareness of presence or absence of sound, and awareness of his name being called. However, Ms. Pool indicated in her report that STUDENT's residual hearing goals were not met because he showed no evidence of hearing. Accordingly, she recommended that STUDENT be retested by an audiologist to determine the extent of his hearing, if any. (Footnote 2) (Id.; see also Resp. Exh. 28.) Although STUDENT's goals regarding residual hearing were not met, it is found that STUDENT's placement was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit in that area. Although Petitioner asserted that he obtained only trivial advancement during the 1995-1996 school year and extended school year, he offered no evidence specific to this time period that his progress was lacking. Despite the fact that all of STUDENT's goals were not met, STUDENT made significant progress on most of his goals. His progress is particularly noteworthy considering that he was absent 42 days out of 144 days in the school year. Based on the above, it is found that STUDENT obtained some benefit from his 1995-1996 educational placement consistent with the standard set forth in Rowley. c. Comport with STUDENT's IEP STUDENT received the services outlined on his March 1995 IEP. Even though the March 1995 IEP did not state that STUDENT was to receive a one-to-one signing aide, one had been provided for him. The provision of such services was reflected in the IEP addendum dated September 28, 1995. Although, Petitioner alleged that his classroom teacher and signing aide were not proficient in sign language, he failed to establish how they were not proficient or allege to what level they needed to be proficient. Furthermore, the IEP did not state that STUDENT's classroom teacher was required to know sign language. Regardless, Barbara Pool, DHH specialist, testified that STUDENT's teacher and aide were both proficient in sign language. Therefore, STUDENT's placement comported with his IEP. Because STUDENT's 1995-1996 and ESY placement was designed to meet his unique and individual needs, was calculated to provide him with educational benefit, and comported with his IEP, STUDENT was provided a FAPE during this time. Moreover, as was found above, STUDENT was not denied a FAPE through any procedural violations by Respondents during this time. 2. 1996-1997 school year and extended school year a. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs STUDENT's needs during the 1996-1997 school year and ESY again centered on his language development and included all of the indicated requirements from his 1995-1996 school year, as discussed above. He continued to require assistance to develop the use of his residual hearing, improve his receptive and expressive language, increase vocalization and imitation of speech sounds, and improve readiness skills. (Dist. Exh. 26.) Additionally, one of STUDENT's annual goals was to develop his speech and reading skills. (Dist. Exh. 26.) STUDENT also continued to require the services of a one-to-one signing aide and services from DHH specialist Barbara Pool. (Id.) Unlike the previous year, however, during the 1996-1997 school year and ESY, STUDENT's needs increased as he matured, as did the understanding of his needs. The evidence regarding the 1996-1997 school year and ESY established that he also required an educational placement with his deaf peers. In a report dated October 31, 1996, Barbara Pool, STUDENT's DHH teacher, wrote that: STUDENT's language development has been the greatest area of concern. Because he is not in a group that is signing everything, the increase of his signs has been very slow. He is receiving most of his language in a more stilted teaching form. (Pet. Exh. at pg. 34-35.) Ms. Pool added that "when you take sign language away, STUDENT either looks away or 'tunes out'....He relies totally on manual communication." (Id.) Ms. Pool also wrote that she felt STUDENT "belongs in an educational setting where he is with other deaf children and signing constantly." (Id.) Similarly, in a report dated April 7, 1997, Ms. Pool wrote of STUDENT that "because none of his peers signed, and there was limited signing from the adults in his preschool placement, there was not a great deal of desire on his part to sign." (Pet. Exh. at pg. 31.) STUDENT's preschool teacher, Therese Jarding, also included similar statements in her report dated October 31, 1996. Ms. Jarding wrote that "STUDENT's preschool peers do not use sign language, thus, communication between he and his classmates is limited."(Resp. Exh. 28.) Although Ms. Pool and Ms. Jarding testified at hearing that placement with deaf peers is only necessary to maximize STUDENT's education, their reports make clear that the lack of deaf peers in STUDENT's educational environment negatively affected his basic ability to learn language and to communicate. Thus, the lack of signing in his educational environment interfered with his language development. At the IEP meeting on December 2, 1996, the IEP team wrote that "both Shasta County SELPA and Siskiyou County SELPA IEP teams agree that STUDENT needs increased services specifically addressing his hearing impairment." (Resp. Exh. 30.) As a result, STUDENT was placed in the Mistletoe program in Shasta County with speech and language services. It is clear from the IEP that such placement was to supplement the already existing services provided from Siskiyou County. As STUDENT already had a DHH teacher in Siskiyou County who provided speech and language services, as well as a signing aide, and a signing teacher whose class instruction was language based, it is reasonable to conclude that one of the major components of the placement at Mistletoe was an environment that included deaf peers. Therefore, such placement at Mistletoe to meet STUDENT's need for "increased services" is consistent with Ms. Jarding and Ms. Pool's reports indicating that STUDENT required deaf peer interaction. Based on the foregoing, the evidence established that STUDENT required an educational environment with deaf peers during his 1996-1997 school year. Moreover, neither parties dispute the appropriateness of the IEP team's decision to include additional speech and language services as part of STUDENT's placement. During the first months of the school year, STUDENT attended the Siskiyou County preschool program. Pursuant to an agreement between the District and STUDENT's parents, STUDENT began to attend the Mistletoe program in Shasta County during half of his school week. This change in placement was reflected in the December 2, 1996 IEP. As was discussed above, the supplemental placement at the Mistletoe program in the DHH class, which provided for speech and language services and an educational environment with deaf peers, was designed to meet STUDENT's needs for "increased services." However, STUDENT only attended the Mistletoe program between nine to twelve times. As was discussed above, STUDENT's parents declined the Mistletoe placement and returned STUDENT to the Siskiyou County preschool program full time. Without holding an IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT's placement change, Respondents and the PARENTS agreed to place STUDENT in the last placement prior to his part-time placement at Mistletoe. At the preschool program in Siskiyou County, he continued to have a full-time signing aide and services from the DHH instructor. However, he did not receive the additional speech and language services and his class did not contain deaf peers. Therefore, the STUDENT's full-time placement at the Siskiyou County program lacked key components and was not designed to meet his needs. Because STUDENT's ESY program was a continuation of these same services, STUDENT's ESY was also not designed to meet his needs. b. Reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit During the 1996-1997 school year, STUDENT attended two different placements (i.e., the full time Siskiyou County placement and the Siskiyou/Shasta County mixed placement.) Because STUDENT only attended the mixed placement for a brief period of time and because only scant evidence was provided regarding his progress in that placement, the analysis will focus on whether the District's full-time Siskiyou County program provided STUDENT with educational benefit. STUDENT's preschool teacher, Therese Jarding, testified at hearing that STUDENT met all of his readiness goals and made progress on most of his other goals. Barbara Pool also testified that STUDENT made appropriate progress. However, STUDENT only met six of thirteen IEP goals and made minimal progress with four of the seven unmet goals. (Resp. Exh. 26; Testimony of Therese Jarding.) On April 29, 1997, Ms. Jarding and Ms. Pool completed a "Transition to Kindergarten" report. This report evaluated STUDENT's readiness, language, numeracy, motor, social and self-help skills. According to the report, STUDENT's had the most difficulty in the area of language. He was unable to understand two-step simple directions, did not use language in self-play, did not converse with peers at play, did not deliver simple messages, did not volunteer in group activities, did not answer questions about stories, and did not know common opposites. In sum, STUDENT lacked seven of the twelve language skills evaluated. Furthermore, the report noted that STUDENT has difficulty communicating with his peers because they do not use sign language. Moreover, on STUDENT's May 1, 1997 IEP, social skills was indicated as an area that needed remediation. (Resp. Exh. 33.) The parties agree that STUDENT's main area of concern is his language development. Additionally, one purpose of the December 2, 1996 IEP was to provide additional services to address STUDENT's increased need in the area of language. Athough STUDENT was able to make some progress during the school year, STUDENT's progress in language was minimal. Furthermore, he continued to have the same problems communicating with his peers that he had entering the school year. Based on the foregoing, the evidence established that STUDENT only received de minimus benefit from his education during the 1996-1997 school year and such benefit falls below the standard set forth in Rowley. Although no significant evidence was presented regarding STUDENT's progress during the ESY program, because the ESY program was a continuation of the Siskiyou County preschool program, it is found that the ESY program was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. c. Comport with STUDENT's IEP When STUDENT began the 1996-1997 school year, he attended Ms. Jarding's preschool class in Siskiyou County pursuant to an IEP dated March 15, 1996. STUDENT's need for an educational environment with deaf peers was apparent by the IEP meeting on December 2, 1996. It is undisputed that STUDENT received the educational services set forth in this IEP while he was attending the Mistletoe program in Shasta County. However, when STUDENT's attendance at Mistletoe was discontinued in December, no IEP meeting was convened to reflect STUDENT's change in placement until May 1997. Accordingly, STUDENT received services based on his March 15, 1996 IEP, even though it was superceeded by the December 2, 1996 IEP. Additionally, the March 15, 1996 IEP did not contain the additional services added to the December 2, 1996 IEP. Thus, the services STUDENT received for the remainder of the school year did not comport with his December 1996 IEP. As the ESY program contained the same services as was indicated on the March 1996 IEP, STUDENT's ESY also did not comport with his December 1996 IEP. In summary, Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE through a procedural violation when they failed to convene an IEP meeting after STUDENT's attendance at Mistletoe was discontinued in December 1996. Additionally, the District's placement for STUDENT during the 1996-1997 school year and ESY was not designed to meet his unique and individual needs, did not provide him with educational benefit, and did not comport with his IEP. Therefore, during this school year and ESY, the Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE. 3. 1997-1998 school year and extended school year a. Designed to meet STUDENT's unique and individual needs During the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT was placed in kindergarten at McCloud Elementary School in Siskiyou County pursuant to an IEP dated May 1, 1997. STUDENT's needs remained essentially the same as during the prior school year. His problems continued to be in the area of language development. Additionally, he continued to require an educational environment containing deaf peers. For kindergarten, STUDENT was again provided a signing aide and up to two hours a week of DHH services. On his IEP, the IEP team acknowledged his need for more signing in his environment when they commented that "sign language should be taught to STUDENT's classmates and staff." (Resp. Exh. 33.) However, STUDENT was not provided an educational environment with deaf peers or services that would address his growing difficulties with language development. In fact, STUDENT's services (i.e., full-time signing aide and two hours a week of DHH services) remained relatively unchanged from those provided in his 1995-1996 school year, although his needs had changed. Based on the above, STUDENT's kindergarten placement was not designed to meet his unique and individual needs. Although STUDENT was finally placed at the Mistletoe program in Shasta County, where he received services designed to meet his unique and individual needs, such placement was not made until almost the end of his kindergarten school year. In regard to STUDENT's ESY program, his IEP dated May 1, 1997, indicates he is entitled to an extended school year with the same services provided during his school year. Because STUDENT had begun attending the Mistletoe program in April, the issue arose as to where he would attend his ESY (i.e., Shasta County or Siskiyou County.) Because no significant evidence was presented that defined STUDENT's 1998 ESY placement, the Hearing Officer finds that the District's offered ESY placement was the one indicated on the May 1997 IEP. For the same reasons his 1997-1998 school year was found not to be designed to meet his needs, his ESY program was also not designed to meet his needs. b. Reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit As discussed above, STUDENT's needs had increased since his early preschool years. While in preschool, STUDENT was taught by a teacher who had significant experience working with the deaf. Additionally, STUDENT attended the same preschool special day class with the same teacher for almost three years. Moreover, the preschool special day class was centered on language development as it was composed mostly of children with language-based disabilities. Yet, although STUDENT required more signing in his educational environment during his kindergarten year, he was placed in a class with a teacher who had never worked with deaf students and who had limited signing abilities when considering STUDENT's increasing need. In fact, he was placed in a regular education classroom with students who had not been taught to sign. Such placement, given STUDENT's need for more signing communication and language services, was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit and, in fact, did not. STUDENT's progress during his kindergarten year was also limited. Barbara Pool testified that she began to have concerns about STUDENT's progress by the end of October 1997 and spoke to STUDENT's parents about her concerns. Ms. Pool's concerns increased by December, by which time she noticed that STUDENT appeared to be withdrawing into his own world. In her report dated May 5, 1998, Ms. Pool wrote that STUDENT showed some academic progress. He was able to gain a sight vocabulary of nineteen words and use those words in isolation and in short sentences. STUDENT also knows the alphabet from "A" to "E" and can recognize numbers from one to twenty. However, STUDENT's scores on the Assessment of Children's Language Comprehension (ACLC) decreased from the previous year. STUDENT also scored very low on the Boehm Test of Basic Concepts Form D, Book One, showing that he did not know concepts such as "top, next to, through, first, away from, most, in every, [and] side." Ms. Pool wrote that STUDENT's decline in score on the ACLC indicated "how he has been functioning most of the year." She also added that STUDENT seems to have "shut down" and almost "presents a feeling of hopelessness." Finally, Karen Pai, STUDENT's first grade DHH teacher, testified that STUDENT's academic skills are low compared to other deaf children. She added that STUDENT likely has a vocabulary of about two hundred words compared to other deaf kids his age who know about 750-1000 words. Based on the above, STUDENT's progress during his kindergarten year was de minimus and his placement did not provide him with some educational benefit as required under Rowley. Because STUDENT did not attend his ESY, it would not be possible to determine whether he made progress during this time. However, because he was to receive ESY under the May 2, 1997 IEP and because he only received de minimus progress during the school year when he received such services, it is found that the ESY placement was not reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. c. Comport with STUDENT's IEP STUDENT attended kindergarten pursuant to an IEP dated May 1, 1997. It is undisputed that STUDENT received the services outlined in the IEP until about April 1998. However, as discussed above, STUDENT's placement was not designed to meet his needs. By about April 1998, STUDENT began to attend class part of the week at the DHH class at Mistletoe Elementary School in Shasta County. Other than information that STUDENT's class was composed of other deaf children, the parties presented no evidence on what services STUDENT was receiving while at Mistletoe during this time. Furthermore, no IEP meeting was held either before or after STUDENT's placement at Mistletoe to define his placement during the remainder of the 1997-1998 school year. Thus, STUDENT's placement for part of the 1997-1998 school year did not comport with his IEP. STUDENT did not attend the 1998 ESY. At hearing, STUDENT's mother, MOTHER, testified that she did not remember why he did not attend the summer program. Respondents' witnesses, on the other hand, testified that STUDENT's parents declined the summer program. Because Respondents' contention is uncontested, it is found that ESY services were offered but refused by STUDENT's parents. However, as was found above, such ESY placement was not designed to meet his unique and individual needs, nor was it reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit. In conclusion, STUDENT's 1997-1998 school year and ESY placement was inappropriate in that it was not designed to meet his unique and individual needs, was not calculated to provide him with educational benefit, and did not comport with his IEP. Thus, the Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 1997-1998 school year and extended school year. III. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School from 1996 to the present? Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 (1985). Transportation is a related service that must be provided if necessary for a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C.  1401(22). The Code of Federal Regulations defines "transportation" as including travel to and from school and, if required to provide special transportation for a child with a disability, specialized equipment (such as special or adapted buses, lifts, and ramps). 34 C.F.R.  300.24(b)(15). In granting relief, equitable considerations may be considered and courts have broad discretion in granting such relief. Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir 1994). Petitioner claimed that his parents should be reimbursed for transporting him to and from Mistletoe Elementary School from 1996 to the present. STUDENT attended Mistletoe nine to twelve times during November and December of 1996, from April to June 1998, and during the 1998-1999 school year. Petitioner requests that his parents be reimbursed at $.31 per mile for 300 miles per day (i.e., two round trips per day at a distance of 75 miles one way) and be paid an hourly wage of $8.25 for six hours per day to compensate for parental time in transporting STUDENT to school. A. 1996-1997 school year It is undisputed that Respondents agreed to pay STUDENT's parents for reimbursement in lieu of District-provided transportation to Mistletoe during this time. On the IEP dated December 2, 1996, the IEP team wrote that "Siskiyou County will provide in lieu of transportation reimbursement to the parents for transporting to Redding 2 days per week." (Resp. Exh. 30.) However, Petitioner argues that the amount of reimbursement offered to his parents was inadequate given the distance they had to travel to transport him to school. According to witness testimony, the Respondents' original offer of reimbursement to the PARENTS was between $5.00 and $7.00 per day for transporting STUDENT to and from school 75 miles each way. Respondents argued that, because reimbursement was offered to and never requested by STUDENT's parents, they are no longer entitled to reimbursement for such transportation. However, Respondents cited no authority and the Hearing Officer knows of none that states that the parents' failure to immediately request the offered reimbursement results in a waiver of such reimbursement. Thus, STUDENT's parents are clearly entitled to reimbursement for the cost of transporting STUDENT to school during this time. The issue that remains is to what amount of reimbursement the PARENTS are entitled. Mike Shafer, acting director of special education for Siskiyou COE, testified at hearing that the County Office's policy was not designed to cover situations in which the student is required to be transported to another county for his education. According to Mr. Shafer, the County's transportation policy was not based on cents per mile, but rather on a set amount of money according to a range of miles traveled. However, the policy did not take into account traveling distances as far as the PARENTS had to travel. The offer of $5.00 to $7.00 per day was the highest reimbursement provided for in the County's policy. Accordingly, Mr. Shafer told the parents that the County might be willing to negotiate with them on the reimbursement amount. Mr. Shafer also testified that the County policy was to reimburse parents for transportation when the child is in the car (amounting to one round-trip per day.) Moreover, according to Mr. Shafer, the PARENTS neither attempted to negotiate with the County for a higher reimbursement rate nor requested that they be provided the reimbursement during that time. The evidence clearly established that the Respondents' offer of $5.00 to $7.00 per day was inadequate to cover the extensive distance traveled by Petitioner to and from Mistletoe School and home. Regardless of whether the PARENTS ever attempted to negotiate with the County, Respondents are legally required to offer a FAPE. With regard to reimbursement for mileage, Respondents pay their employees $.31 per mile for work-related transportation. (Test. of Diane Brickell.) Had such an offer been made to Petitioner's parents, it would have taken into account the distance they had to travel and would have reasonably compensated them for expenses involved in transporting STUDENT to the Mistletoe program. In regard to whether Petitioner should be reimbursed for one or two round-trips, 34 C.F.R.  300.24(b)(15) defines "transportation" as including "travel to and from school." This provision does not specifically limit the definition of transportation to time when the student is in the car. Respondents acknowledged that their reimbursement policy was inadequate to cover far distances required to travel to school. The Hearing Officer finds it also unreasonable for the District to offer in lieu of reimbursement while requiring that the PARENTS pay for part of the cost involved in transporting STUDENT 75 miles each way to and from school (i.e., the additional round-trip that STUDENT is not in the car.) Finally, with regard to reimbursement of $8.25 per hour to STUDENT's mother for transporting him, Petitioner has not provided any authority, and the Hearing Officer does not know of any, for reimbursement of parental time. Based on the above, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT's parents are entitled to $.31 per mile for two round-trips per day (i.e., 300 miles per day) for each day that they took STUDENT to attend Mistletoe School during this time. The amount of days to be reimbursed shall be based on his school attendance records. No other proof is required for such reimbursement. B. 1997-1998 school year STUDENT attended the Mistletoe program for two days a week beginning around April 1998. According to Diane Brickell, superintendent for McCloud Unified School District, STUDENT's parents were offered in May or June reimbursement at $10.00 per day, then reimbursement at $.24 per mile based on Shasta County's reimbursement policy, then later reimbursement at $.31 cents per mile for one round-trip. (See also Resp. Exh. 41.) The PARENTS declined each of the amounts offered because they felt the offers were too low. There was no evidence presented that the PARENTS waived the right to reimbursement. Rather, they wanted reimbursement for $.31 per mile for two round-trips per day and reimbursement of $8.25 per hour compensation for parental time spent on transportation. Again, the evidence shows that the PARENTS are entitled to reimbursement for transporting STUDENT to Mistletoe during this time. Also again, the dispute between the parties involves the amount of the reimbursement. For the same reasons stated above, it is found that Respondents' last offer of reimbursement of $.31 per mile for two round-trips was reasonable to compensate STUDENT's parents for transporting him to and from Mistletoe School. Thus, STUDENT's parents are entitled to reimbursement for $.31 per mile for two round-trips (i.e., 300 miles) per day that STUDENT was transported to Mistletoe during this academic school year (STUDENT did not attend ESY) as was offered by Respondents. STUDENT's attendance shall be based on school attendance records. The parents' request for compensation for time is denied. C. 1998-1999 school and extended school year Petitioner argued that his parents are entitled to reimbursement for transporting him to Mistletoe School because Respondents' offer of transportation was inappropriate. STUDENT's parents asserted that he can not safely be transported by bus due to his young age, deafness, and the far distance and dangerous seasonal road conditions. Among their concerns, the PARENTS contended that STUDENT requires a driver and bus aide that is experienced in sign language, a driver who is experienced with adverse weather conditions, and a four-wheel drive vehicle. (Resp. Exh. 41.) The PARENTS also expressed their concern that Siskiyou County and the state Department of Motor Vehicles have few requirements placed on school drivers and vehicles. (Id.) Respondents opposed the request for reimbursement and asserted that appropriate transportation was offered to the parents but that they declined the offer. The Respondents also argued that they have no legal obligation to reimburse parents for transportation when they have already made an offer to transport the student. None of the grounds asserted by STUDENT's parents is persuasive. First, STUDENT's parents asserted that they need to transport STUDENT because only they can understand him and even a certified signer would have trouble communicating with STUDENT because of his use of slang. Yet, the district was prepared to train a driver in sign so that he or she could communicate with STUDENT. Additionally, there is no evidence that a driver who is trained in sign language would be unable to communicate with STUDENT. On the contrary, much of the evidence established that STUDENT is able to communicate with his teachers and aide while at school. STUDENT's parents also contended that the driver must be experienced in adverse weather conditions and drive a four- wheel drive vehicle. Diane Brickell testified that the District was willing to hire a driver and obtain a car to transport STUDENT. Petitioner presented no evidence to prove that such conditions could not be met by the Respondents. Finally, the PARENTS' concerns regarding legal requirements for school drivers and vehicles are not specific to STUDENT's unique needs and circumstances. Based on the above, Petitioner has failed to establish that STUDENT was unable to be transported to school by bus or other transportation provided by the Respondents. It is undisputed that Respondents have offered to provide transportation for STUDENT for the school and extended school year. On August 13, 1998, an IEP meeting was held to discuss the issue of transportation. (Resp. Exhs. 37 and 38.) At that meeting, the District offered to provide transportation or to provide reimbursement in lieu of transportation in the amount of $.31 per mile for one round-trip. (Id.) The PARENTS refused the offer of transportation but presented a counteroffer regarding the amount they should be reimbursed. However, the parties were unable to resolve the transportation issue. In a letter dated August 24, 1998, the PARENTSwrote that "the ultimate issue is over transportation reimbursement cost." (Resp. Exh. 39.) In a letter dated September 1, 1998, Diane Brickell wrote that Respondents' offers to provide transportation or to pay in lieu mileage "remain open." (Resp. Exh. 40.) Respondents again restated their offer to provide transportation or in lieu mileage at STUDENT's IEP meeting dated March 15, 1999. (Resp. Exh. 51.) At this IEP meeting, Respondents increased their offer of reimbursement to $.31 per mile for two round-trips. Thus, the evidence established that Respondents offered both transportation and reimbursement in lieu of transportation to the Petitioner. Although the Respondents are not obligated to provide reimbursement if a valid offer of transportation was made, in this situation, the Respondents additionally offered reimbursement. Thus, similar to the two above sections, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement and the issue that remains is what amount of reimbursement the PARENTS are due. For the same reasons stated in the above sections, STUDENT's parents are entitled to $.31 per mile for two round-trips (totaling 300 miles) per day for each day that STUDENT attended school at Mistletoe during the school and extended school year. Days of attendance shall be based on school attendance records. No other proof is needed for such reimbursement. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, the parents' request for compensation for time is denied. IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education? Courts have consistently held that the authority to award compensatory education is derived from 20 U.S.C.  1415(i)92)(B)(iii), which authorizes a court to grant such "relief as it determines is appropriate." "The purpose of compensatory education is to replace lost educational services." Moubry v. Independent School District Number 696, 951 F.Supp. 867 (8th Cir. 1996). Compensatory education may be an appropriate equitable remedy when the responsible educational authority has failed to provide a disabled child with an appropriate education as required by the IDEA. Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991). There is, however, no obligation to compensate the child by providing a day of education for each educational day lost. "Compensatory education is not a contractual remedy, but an equitable remedy, part of the Court's resources in crafting appropriate relief...Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA." Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, when considering a request for compensatory education, it is first necessary to determine whether a school district failed to provide a FAPE. If that issue is answered in the affirmative, the subsequent question is not what precise services were missed but, rather, what compensatory services are necessary to provide an appropriate education under the law. To remedy Respondent's failure to provide STUDENT with an appropriate placement, Petitioner requested that he be provided with one-to-one academic instruction at a frequency of 30 minute each day. To remedy Respondents' failure to provide STUDENT with speech and language therapy, Petitioner requested that he be provided with one-to-one speech and language therapy at a frequency of 30 minutes each day. Then, to remedy Respondents' failure to provide STUDENT with extended school year instruction, Petitioner requested that he be provided with one-to-one academic instruction at a frequency of 1 hour each day that he is on a school break. As discussed above, Respondents failed to provide STUDENT a FAPE during the 1996-1997 school and extended school year and the 1997-1998 school year. STUDENT was not placed in a class with other deaf peers and was not provided with 30 minutes a week of speech and language services pursuant to his IEP dated December 2, 1996, during the last half of the 1996-1997 school year and extended school year. Additionally, his IEP dated May 1, 1997, did not reflect his need for such class placement and speech and language services, and thus he was denied such services during the first 2/3 of his kindergarten year. Consequently, STUDENT lost approximately one calendar year of educational opportunity which resulted in his having delays in the area of language and which makes him eligible for compensatory education. Some of STUDENT's language delays, however, may also be attributable to his significant absences each of these years. With regard to STUDENT's academic ability, STUDENT's current teacher, Karen Pai, testified that STUDENT is adding and subtracting, can participate in regular classroom activities, and is working on pre-reading skills. Accordingly, she testified that STUDENT is "in the ballpark" academically with other deaf children. She emphasized that STUDENT's only real need is to bring up his language skills. She also testified that STUDENT needs his breaks and that academic tutoring during school and the summers are "too much" because he would be overwhelmed with academic demands. Ms. Pai explained that STUDENT is already provided with a curriculum that maximizes his productivity. Because STUDENT is young, and because he spends three hours a day traveling to and from school, he is already spending most of his day on his educational needs. The Hearing Officer finds Ms. Pai's testimony persuasive because she is the person who is currently in the best position to know STUDENT's curriculum as well as STUDENT's academic and language needs. Furthermore, no evidence was presented contrary to her testimony. It is thus concluded that STUDENT does not require additional academic school instruction, but only assistance in the area of speech and language. Based on the above, it is ordered that STUDENT be provided with additional speech and language therapy at a frequency of 30 minutes per week for a period of one school year, including extended school year, to remediate his speech and language deficiencies due to Respondents' failure to provide him with a FAPE. Such order of compensatory education takes into account the amount of services STUDENT was denied as well as STUDENT's tolerance of additional services added to his academic program. All Petitioner's other claims are denied. ORDER 1. Respondents shall reimburse STUDENT's parents $.31 per mile for two round trips (i.e., 300 miles) per day that his parents transported him to Mistletoe Elementary School during November to December 1996, April to June 1998, and the 1998-1999 school year. The number of days for which he is to be reimbursed shall be based on official school attendance records. Reimbursement shall be made within one month of the date of this decision. 2. Respondents shall provide STUDENT compensatory education in the form of speech and language therapy for 30 minutes per week for a period of one school year, including extended school year. Such compensatory education shall commence at the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. 3. All of Petitioner's other claims are denied. PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE Pursuant to Education Code  56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: I. Are Petitioner's claims arising prior to November 11, 1995, barred by the statute of limitations? -Respondent prevailed on this issue. II. Did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) A. During the 1994-1995 school and extended school year? -Respondents prevailed on this issue in that it is barred by the statute of limitations. B. During the 1995-1996 school and extended school year? -Respondents prevailed on this issue. C. During the 1996-1997 school and extended school year? -Petitioner prevailed on this issue. D. During the 1997-1998 school and extended school year? -Petitioner prevailed on this issue. III. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for: A. costs of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1996-1997 school year, -Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that reimbursement for mileage was ordered. B. cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1997-1998 school year, and -Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that reimbursement for mileage was ordered. C. cost of transporting STUDENT to and from Mistletoe Elementary School during the 1998-1999 school and extended school year? -Respondent prevailed because Petitioner was awarded no more than was offered by Respondents. IV. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education? -Petitioner prevailed on this issue to the extent that speech and language therapy was ordered. RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code  56505(i). DATED: July 20, 1999 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnotes: 1. As discussed above, Petitioner's claims arising prior to November 11, 1995 are barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the analysis regarding STUDENT's 1995-1996 school and extended school year will include the time period from November 11, 1995, through the end of the extended school year. 2. STUDENT was assessed by audiologist Dave Shaeffer at UC Davis in April 1996 . He found that STUDENT had speech detection thresholds between 59-75 dB. Mr. Shaeffer also found that STUDENT's hearing aides could only be turned up to « volume without feedback. He recommended that STUDENT be fitted with new ear molds for his hearing aides, which was done in June 1996.