California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 19, 2000
Student v. Upland Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1653-99 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim
Upland Unified must reimburse 90 percent of private school tuition plus mileage; claim for private assessment costs denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of a 13-year-old boy with a specific learning disability in reading and writing filed for due process against Upland Unified School District. His June 1998 IEP offered only 160 minutes a week in the resource specialist program. The parents gave notice and placed him at Prentice Day School in Tustin, a private school that teaches with the Slingerland multisensory method.
The District argued it owed no FAPE to a student his parents had placed in a private school. The Hearing Officer disagreed because the parents made the placement over a dispute about FAPE. For 1998-1999, the resource program listed no supports or changes for the general education classes where he spent most of his day, even though he read well below grade level. The special day class the District also offered in August 1998 was not the least restrictive environment. The Hearing Officer held that parents should not have to sort good offers from bad ones.
For 1999-2000, the parents' request for public funding of Prentice triggered the District's duty to offer an IEP. The June 1999 IEP lacked goals, general education time and related services. Prentice met his reading and writing needs but gave no speech therapy. The Hearing Officer ordered the District to repay 90 percent of tuition plus mileage, according to proof. The claim for private assessment costs was denied because the parents never disagreed with the District's assessments.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a private placement made because of a FAPE dispute. Asking for public funding of a private school triggered the district's duty to offer an IEP. Offering several placements, some inappropriate, did not meet the district's duty to offer an appropriate placement. Tuition reimbursement was reduced because the private school gave no speech therapy.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 1a. Did the District offer Student a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year?
The District still owed a FAPE because the private placement came from a FAPE dispute; the June 1998 resource program listed no supports or modifications for general education, and the alternative special day class offer was not the least restrictive environment.
- Student prevailedIEP content
Issue 1b. Did the District offer Student a FAPE for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
The parents' request for public funding of the private school triggered the duty to offer an IEP; the June 1999 IEP lacked goals, general education time and related services, and the District offered no evidence that its placements were appropriate.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2a. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for nonpublic school costs, including transportation, for the 1998-1999 school year?
Prentice's multisensory program was appropriate but gave no speech therapy, so the parents get 90 percent of tuition plus full mileage, according to proof; the District's notice and equity arguments were rejected.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2b. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for nonpublic school costs, including transportation, for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
Prentice was still appropriate apart from the missing speech therapy; the Hearing Officer awarded 90 percent of tuition plus mileage and rejected the argument that reimbursement should be limited to the first year.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for private assessments by psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D. (September 1998 and July 2000) and audiologist Carolyn Atkins, M.A. (March 1999)?
The parents never disagreed with the District's assessments, which were appropriate; the July 2000 assessment was a litigation cost the Hearing Officer could not award.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days, reimburse the parents 90 percent of the tuition paid for Prentice Day School for 1998-1999 and the first half of 1999-2000, according to proof. The parents claimed $11,000 and $5,600 but offered no proof of these amounts.
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days, reimburse the parents' transportation costs to and from Prentice Day School for 1998-1999 and the first half of 1999-2000. Payment is mileage at the District rate, subject to the parents' proof of the specific days attended.
Key authorities
Rowley; Burlington; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Gregory K. v. Longview; Alamo Heights v. State Bd. of Educ.; Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.
People named in the decision
- Carolyn Tarris, Director of student services, Upland Unified School District
- Penny Valentine, Due process program manager; observed Student at Prentice, West End SELPA
- Robert Patterson, Psy.D., Private educational and clinical psychologist; expert witness for Student, Private practice
- David Metzler, Resource specialist teacher, Valencia Elementary School, Upland Unified
- Sharyn Bauer, School psychologist, Upland Unified School District
- Susan Thorndyke, Special day class teacher, Magnolia Elementary School, Upland Unified
- Mary Ellen Woodruff, SELPA office specialist, West End SELPA
- Juliann Reynolds, Language, speech and hearing specialist, Upland Unified School District
- Carolyn (Carol) Atkins, M.A., Private audiologist (central auditory processing assessment), Private
- Pamela King, Parents' advocate
- Prentice Day School, Private/nonpublic school (unilateral placement), Tustin
- Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes, Private learning provider
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Rancho Cucamonga, California, on August 31 and September 1, 2000.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Timothy J. Stafford from the firm of Stafford & Jackson. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf were his parents, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Upland Unified School District (District) was represented by attorney Jonathan Read from the firm of Lozano Smith. Also present on the District’s behalf were Carolyn Tarris, the District’s director of student services, and Penny Valentine, the due process program manager for the West End Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA).
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: FATHER and MOTHER and Robert Patterson, Psy.D., an educational and clinical psychologist in private practice. The District called the following witnesses to testify: David Metzler, STUDENT’s resource specialist teacher at Valencia Elementary School; Sharyn Bauer, a District school psychologist; Ms. Valentine; Susan Thorndyke, a special education teacher at Magnolia Elementary School; Mary Ellen Woodruff, a SELPA office specialist; and Ms. Tarris.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING(Footnote 1)
1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred to provide STUDENT with a nonpublic school placement, including expenses for transportation, during the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to private assessments they obtained from psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D., in September 1998 and July 2000 and from audiologist Carolyn Atkins, M.A., in March 1999?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a thirteen-year-old student who resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the District. STUDENT attended Valencia Elementary School (Valencia), a public school operated by the District and STUDENT’s designated home school, beginning in his kindergarten year (the 1992-1993 school year) and continuing through his fifth-grade year (the 1997-1998 school year). He was first identified as a child with a disability by the District during his fourth-grade year at Valencia.(Footnote 2)
The assessment and eligibility process began in November of STUDENT’s fourth-grade year, when he was assessed by Juliann Reynolds, a District language, speech, and hearing specialist (LSH). Over the course of three sessions with STUDENT, Ms. Reynolds administered the Receptive One-Word Picture Vocabulary Test (ROWPV), the Expressive One-Word Picture Vocabulary Test (EOWPV), and the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Revised (CELF-R). Ms. Reynolds concluded from her assessment that STUDENT had a generalized language disorder in the use of word and sentence structure (i.e., morphology and syntax), word meaning and association (i.e., semantics), and the recall and retrieval of information. She recommended that he be enrolled in the District’s speech and language program and that emphasis be placed on conceptual development. In December 1996, on the basis of Ms. Reynolds’ assessment, the District identified STUDENT as eligible for special education and related services. He began to receive speech and language services shortly thereafter.
On February 20, 1997, District school psychologist Sharyn Bauer completed a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT. According to Ms. Bauer’s assessment report, STUDENT was referred for psychoeducational testing because he was having difficulties with reading, spelling, attention, and putting together sentences. In completing her assessment, Ms. Bauer administered to STUDENT the following tests: the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - III (WISC-III), the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test (Bender), and the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills (TAPS). Ms. Bauer also reviewed records, observed STUDENT in the classroom, and interviewed him. Additionally, she took into consideration the results of Ms. Reynolds’ LSH assessment; academic achievement testing conducted by resource specialist (RS) teacher David Metzler on November 13, 1996; an informal teacher questionnaire; an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiance disorder (ODD) rating scale, which was filled out by STUDENT’s parents and teacher; and Achenbach Child Behavior Checklists filled out by his parents and teacher. Following the assessment, Ms. Bauer reported that STUDENT obtained a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) score of 99, which placed him in the average range of intelligence. She indicated that there was not a significant difference between STUDENT’s verbal and nonverbal abilities, and that short-term auditory memory and the ability to respond to oral stimuli (which measured how he handled numbers in a step-by-step sequential fashion) were relative weaknesses for him. She also reported that Mr. Metzler’s achievement testing showed that STUDENT’s reading skills were at the second-grade level, that his writing skills were at the first-grade level, and that his mathematics skills were at the third-grade level. She noted that the behavior checklists and her classroom observation indicated that STUDENT’s behavior was consistent with attention deficit disorder (ADD).(Footnote 3) Ms. Bauer concluded that STUDENT evidenced a severe discrepancy between his ability and achievement in reading and writing due to deficits in auditory processing and attention.
On April 16, 1997, the District convened an individualized education program (IEP) meeting to discuss the assessment results. At the meeting, the IEP team agreed that STUDENT qualified for special education and related services based on a specific learning disability (SLD) in reading and writing due to deficits in his auditory memory and attention. The team also agreed to placement in the resource specialist program (RSP) at Valencia in forty-minute sessions four days per week, with the rest of the school day spent in the general education program, where teacher-modified lessons would be provided on an as-needed basis. At the parents’ request, the IEP team met again on June 5, 1997, and reviewed STUDENT’s progress since April 1997. The team agreed to continue the forty-minute RSP sessions four days per week.
The next IEP meeting was convened for STUDENT on December 19, 1997, during his fifth-grade year. The IEP document from this meeting indicates that STUDENT was eligible for special education under the categories of SLD and language and speech impaired (LSI). The team agreed to continue STUDENT’s speech and language services and his four weekly forty-minute RSP sessions. The IEP team met again at the end of STUDENT’s fifth-grade year on June 10, 1998. The IEP document from the June 1998 meeting indicates that STUDENT was eligible under the category of SLD only. The document also indicates that, at the meeting, the team agreed that STUDENT should continue to receive four weekly forty-minute RSP sessions for reading and writing in the sixth grade.
Two months later, by letter dated August 5, 1998, FATHER informed Ms. Tarris that he and his wife disagreed with the placement decision made at the IEP meeting held on June 10, 1998. He stated: “We do not agree with the placement Upland Unified School District has offered our son. Also, we do not agree that it meets his educational needs.” FATHER stated that the letter was intended to serve as their ten-day notification that they intended to enroll STUDENT in a nonpublic school (NPS) and that they would be seeking District funding of the NPS placement. Upon her receipt of the letter, Ms. Tarris called the parents and requested that they meet with her to discuss their concerns. The parents agreed and, on August 14, 1998, the parents met with Ms. Tarris and special day class (SDC) teacher Susan Thorndyke. At the meeting, Ms. Tarris discussed placing STUDENT in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for learning disabled students at Magnolia Elementary School (Magnolia). The parents agreed at the meeting to observe Ms. Thorndyke’s class after school started the next month. That same day, on August 14, Ms. Tarris wrote the parents a letter memorializing the meeting which took place that morning. Additionally, Ms. Tarris stated the following in her letter:
I am indeed sorry that you feel you can’t trust the district to provide an appropriate educational program for STUDENT and would like to reiterate my offer to place STUDENT in the special day class at Magnolia Elementary School in September. ... I am very glad that you are willing to visit Ms. Thorndyke’s class to observe after school starts next month and hopefully, you will decide to place him there. However, I understand that, as his parents, you must do what you think is best for him and at this time, you believe he would be best served at the private school in Tustin. If you do enroll him in Tustin, I wish him every success and please know that should you decide to return him to the district, we will work with you in every way. At this point, your request for the district to pay for STUDENT’ placement in Tustin can be neither approved or disapproved until an IEP meeting has been convened to consider the request officially. I will be happy to schedule the meeting when staff return in September.
Shortly thereafter, on approximately August 18, 1998, STUDENT began attending Prentice Day School (Prentice) in Tustin. A month later, on September 23, 1998, the parents had STUDENT assessed by psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D. Dr. Patterson assessed STUDENT by administering the Woodcock-Johnson Psychoeduational Test Battery - Revised (WJ-R), the Test of Nonverbal Intelligence - II (TONI-2), the Peabody Individual Achievement Test - Revised (PIAT-R), the Bender, the Personality Inventory for Children, the Piers-Harris Self-Concept Scale, and the Presciptive Reading Performance Test. Dr. Patterson also interviewed MOTHER and had her fill out the Conners’ Parent Rating Scale - Revised, Long Form. Dr. Patterson concluded from his assessment that STUDENT had significant discrepancies between his ability and achievement in the areas of letter-word identification, basic reading skills, spelling, and production writing, if nonlanguage measures are used. Dr. Patterson noted in his assessment report that STUDENT functioned in the high average range when language was removed from a test, but that his performance at times fell into the very low average range when language was included. Dr. Patterson stated that the dyslexia screening suggested that STUDENT was an individual with an auditory and/or mixed type of dyslexia with some dysgraphic types of difficulty.(Footnote 4) Dr. Patterson concluded that STUDENT appeared to require, among other things, a multisensory method of reading and written language instruction that is simultaneously presented in all subject areas, and a central auditory processing disorder (CAPD) assessment by an audiologist or speech and language specialist.
In March 1999, the parents funded a CAPD assessment by audiologist Carol Atkins. Ms. Atkins conducted a diagnostic audiometric evaluation of STUDENT and found that the test results demonstrated that he did have a CAPD. Ms. Atkins stated in her report that STUDENT’s central auditory processing (CAP) deficits suggested involvement of the corpus callosum and the left temporal lobe, and that the deficits adversely affected his receptive and expressive language skills, as well as his reading ability. She then offered a number of recommendations for accommodating his CAP deficits in an educational setting.
A month later, by letter dated April 20, 1999, MOTHER informed Ms. Tarris that she wanted to schedule an IEP meeting for STUDENT and that they were seeking reimbursement and funding for Prentice. An IEP meeting was thereafter scheduled for May 21, 1999, but, due to scheduling problems, was eventually rescheduled for June 11, 1999. According to the IEP document, when the IEP team met on June 11, the parents requested an NPS placement for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year because they believed he had been successful at the NPS and had not been successful in his District placements. The District stated at the meeting that, for fall 1999, it was offering STUDENT placement either in an SDC at Upland Junior High School (Upland JHS) or Pioneer Junior High School (Pioneer JHS), or in an RSP for 150 minutes per day at Upland JHS or Pioneer JHS. The District informed the parents that it believed STUDENT had been offered and provided an appropriate education by the District. However, the District also stated that it was not familiar with Prentice and requested that staff be allowed to observe STUDENT at Prentice and review his Prentice records. The parents agreed to allow a staff member to observe and review records at Prentice, and signed an authorization allowing an exchange of information between the SELPA and Prentice. The parent then requested that the District reimburse them for expenses related to the assessments conducted by Dr. Patterson and Ms. Atkins. The team agreed to reconvene the meeting on July 12 once a staff member had an opportunity to observe STUDENT at Prentice and review his records.
An IEP meeting was not convened on July 12, 1999. The SELPA was unable to schedule an appointment to observe STUDENT at Prentice before that date, because of this, shortly before July 12, the SELPA contacted Pamela King, the parents’ advocate, to request that the meeting be rescheduled. Ms. King denied the request to reschedule and indicated that the parents would proceed to due process. STUDENT again attended Prentice beginning August 1999 at his parents’ expense. The parents filed a request for a due process hearing on October 18, 1999.
Ms. Valentine was eventually able to observe STUDENT at Prentice on December 1, 1999, on behalf of the SELPA. STUDENT’ attendance at Prentice ended that same month on December 17, 1999. He thereafter attended Lindamood-Bell Learning Processes and was enrolled in an independent study program. There is no evidence in the record that the District convened any further IEP meetings for STUDENT after June 11, 1999.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).
In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. Id. The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit. Id. at 207. The school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
A. 1998-1999 School Year
Petitioner did not dispute that the District met its procedural obligations under the IDEA during the 1998-1999 school year. Petitioner instead alleged that the District failed in its substantive obligation to offer STUDENT a free and appropriate educational program for the 1998-1999 school year. In contrast, the District contended that it was not obligated to offer STUDENT a FAPE during the periods at issue because, beginning August 1998 when his parents unilaterally placed him at Prentice, he became a private school student within the meaning of 34 C.F.R. § 300.450. The District argued that STUDENT had no individual entitlement to special education and related services once his parents unilaterally placed him at Prentice, regardless of whether or not FAPE was at issue, and, consequently, the District was obligated only to make a FAPE available to STUDENT should his parents re-enroll him in the public school. Alternatively, the District asserted that it offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year.
Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that the District is correct that, pursuant to the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, children with disabilities who have been voluntarily placed by their parents in a private school or facility have no individual entitlement to receive services from a public educational agency.(Footnote 5) Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 153 F.3d 863, 865 (8th Cir. 1998); 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(a). However, where, as here, the question of whether the school district has offered the child a FAPE is at issue, the extent of the public educational agency’s obligations to the child may not be determined solely on the basis of the child’s private-school status.
In this case, the parents alleged that they were, for all intents and purposes, forced into seeking a private placement at their own expense because the District failed to offer STUDENT an appropriate placement. According to the PARENTS’ testimony, they were not satisfied with the progress STUDENT had made in the District’s programs in years past and believed that the District was not offering STUDENT what he needed to address his deficits in reading and written language. The PARENTS informed the District of their dissatisfaction prior to STUDENT’s removal from the public school system through a letter dated August 5, 1998. In the letter, the PARENTS stated that they were disagreeing with the decision made at the IEP meeting held on June 10, 1998, and that they did not believe that the placement the District was offering could meet STUDENT’s needs. They also informed the District that they intended to place STUDENT in a nonpublic school, for which they would seek District funding. Additionally, the PARENTS testified that they agreed to meet with Ms. Tarris on August 14, 1998, because they were interested in exploring whether the District would offer a program that they believed would be appropriate for STUDENT.
Their actions in meeting with Ms. Tarris and Ms. Thorndyke demonstrated their good faith and genuine interest in exploring what the District had available for STUDENT. The PARENTS also testified that their subsequent placement of STUDENT in Prentice was based on their belief that the District had not offered an appropriate program for STUDENT. Thus, the PARENTS clearly disagreed with the District’s offer of FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year and, because of this disagreement, placed STUDENT in a nonpublic school. Accordingly, STUDENT’s placement at Prentice was not voluntary. Because the parents’ unilateral decision to place STUDENT in a private school was not voluntary and came about because of the dispute about the District’s provision of FAPE, the District remained obligated to offer him a FAPE and could be liable for the costs of the private school placement if the District failed to offer him a FAPE in a timely manner prior to his enrollment in the private school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); Cal. Educ. Code § 562174; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 370-371, 105 S.Ct. 1996.
With regard to Petitioner’s assertion that the District failed to offer an appropriate program for STUDENT, the District contended that it offered STUDENT an appropriate educational program through its IEPs dated December 19, 1997, and June 10, 1998. These IEPs offered STUDENT placement in the resource specialist program (RSP) in four forty-minute sessions per week at Valencia Elementary School (Valencia), STUDENT’s home school. The District also presented evidence that, at a meeting convened by Ms. Tarris on August 14, 1998, it offered STUDENT placement in a special day class (SDC) at Magnolia Elementary School (Magnolia) taught by Ms. Thorndyke. Petitioner contended that neither the Valencia RSP nor the Magnolia SDC placement was substantively appropriate for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that the District failed to offer STUDENT a placement designed to meet his unique needs, including his need for multisensory instruction and for services to support his reading and written language deficits. Petitioner also contended that the District failed to offer STUDENT a placement reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit.(Footnote 6)
To determine whether the District offered STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program was designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs, was reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, and would have comported with his IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if the parents preferred another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would have resulted in greater educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. The District was also required to offer STUDENT a program which would have educated him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of his disabilities was such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services could not be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the programs the District proposed for the 1998-1999 school year must have met the following four requirements to have constituted an appropriate educational program for STUDENT: they must have been designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, been reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, comport with his IEP, and provide him an education in the least restrictive environment.
1. Resource Specialist Program at Valencia Elementary School
As noted previously, Petitioner contended that the District failed to offer STUDENT a placement designed to meet his unique needs, including his need for multisensory instruction and for services to support his reading and written language deficits. At the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT was a ten-year-old student with an identified specific learning disability. While the parties did not necessarily agree on whether or not STUDENT’s learning disability could be defined as dyslexia or dysgraphia, there was no dispute that his learning disability affected the acquisition of reading and written language skills. There was also no dispute that he required a simultaneous multisensory or multimodal method of instruction in reading and written language, such as Project Read. Both Ms. Bauer and Dr. Patterson came to this conclusion after assessing STUDENT in February 1997 and September 1998, respectively. According to Ms. Tarris, the District adopted the Project Read program approximately eight years ago and, since then, all the RS and SDC teachers in the District have been trained in Project Read. Ms. Tarris testified that Project Read is used throughout the District’s schools. Mr. Metzler, STUDENT’s RS teacher at Valencia during the 1997-1998 school year, confirmed Ms. Tarris’s testimony in this regard. Mr. Metzler testified that he was fully trained to administer the Project Read program and that he used multisensory methods of instruction, including Project Read, with STUDENT in the RSP during the 1997-1998 school year. Mr. Metzler also testified that he was prepared to implement the same multisensory program for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year in accordance with his IEP. Thus, the evidence established that the District’s program was designed to address STUDENT’s needs with regard to the necessity for multisensory instruction for reading and written language. The District was not required to state in the IEP that Project Read or another multisensory method of instruction would be used in the classroom. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. C, Q. 39 (1996). It is not necessary for a school district to identify the specific methods, activities, or materials which will be used to accomplish the goals and objectives set forth in a child’s IEP. Id.
With regard to Petitioner’s allegation regarding support services for the reading and written language deficits, there was no dispute that, because of his learning disability, STUDENT was performing well below his typically developing peers by the end of his 1997-1998 school year in reading and writing. According to academic achievement testing performed by Mr. Metzler on May 8, 1998, STUDENT was functioning at least 2.5 levels below his grade level by the end of the 1997-1998 school year.(Footnote 7) Specifically, although STUDENT was in the eighth month of his fifth-grade year at the time he was tested by Mr. Metzler, he obtained broad reading and broad written language scores on the WJ-R equivalent to a student in the fourth month of his third-grade year.(Footnote 8) The substantial disparity between the performance levels of STUDENT and his typically developing peers was known to the IEP team; in fact, it was the main reason he was qualified for special education services.
Despite this knowledge, and although STUDENT was supposed to receive only forty minutes of RSP four days per week and spend the vast majority of every school day in the general education program, the IEP proposed by the District did not list any modifications to the general education program to support his reading and writing deficits while he was in the general education program, except that he would receive “teacher modified lessons as needed.” If modifications to the general education program are necessary to ensure the student’s participation in that program, the modifications must be identified and described in the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). There was no question that, during his sixth-grade year, given the reading and writing demands placed on sixth-grade students in all subject areas, STUDENT would require more than just “teacher modified” lessons to participate in the general education program.(Footnote 9) Ms. Bauer’s and Dr. Pattersons’ assessments establish that STUDENT has at least average cognitive ability. There is no question that, with this cognitive potential, STUDENT could have benefitted from participation in the general education program during the 1998-1999 school year. However, the evidence also established that, given the extent of his reading and writing deficits at the time, he could not have functioned in the general education program without support services and modifications to the general education program. Ms. Bauer testified that, even during STUDENT’s fifth-grade year, STUDENT had the work in social studies and science read to him by his classmates. Specifically, she stated that STUDENT had a “classroom buddy” who would read assignments to him or he would work in cooperative groups. None of these support services was listed in the IEP proposed for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year, and there was no evidence that the District’s program offer included such support services or other modifications to ensure that the program was reasonably calculated to enable STUDENT to benefit from his education. This omission is significant in light of the amount of time STUDENT was to spend in the general education program and the necessity of reading and writing skills in almost all domains of academic instruction. The law required that the District provide STUDENT with support services and modifications to enable him to benefit from the general education program, but the evidence failed to demonstrate that the District met its obligation in this regard.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s IEP dated June 10, 1998, which described a program consisting of placement in the RSP for a total of 160 minutes per week at Valencia, did not offer STUDENT an appropriate program for the 1998-1999 school year. The District failed to indicate, in the IEPs developed for the 1998-1999 school year or elsewhere, how it intended to meet STUDENT’s needs for support in the general education classroom. The District thereby failed to establish that its proposed program was designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs and was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit.
2. Special Day Class at Magnolia Elementary School
Additionally, although the evidence demonstrated that the District also formally offered STUDENT placement in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC at Magnolia on August 14, 1998, the evidence disclosed that an SDC would not have been the least restrictive environment for STUDENT, as required by the IDEA.(Footnote 10) Mr. Metzler and Ms. Bauer, both of whom have assessed STUDENT and worked with him in implementing his educational program in years past, testified that an RSP placement was the appropriate and least restrictive placement for STUDENT. Their testimony in this regard was not contradicted by any other evidence. In fact, none of the witnesses’ testimony even suggested that the severity of STUDENT’s disability was such that placement in the general education program for the majority of the school day was inappropriate. Instead, the evidence established, and there was no dispute, that STUDENT could obtain benefit from participation in the general education program with adequate support for his reading and writing deficits while in the general education classroom. Consequently, Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC did not offer STUDENT placement in the least restrictive environment, as required by law.
There was a suggestion in the District’s closing brief that, at the meeting on August 14, 1998, Ms. Tarris discussed Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC and had Ms. Thorndyke speak with the parents simply to inform them that there were other placement options available in the District. While it may have been Ms. Thorndyke’s intent to provide information about other placement options, the evidence left no doubt that Ms. Tarris formally offered the parents placement for STUDENT in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year and that, had they chosen to, the parents could have placed STUDENT in the SDC. The testimony of the parents, Ms. Tarris, and Ms. Thorndyke, all of whom attended the meeting on August 14, 1998, indicated that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was described to the parents at the meeting and that the parents were encouraged to observe Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC after school resumed. The testimony also indicated that the parents were essentially informed at the meeting that they could place STUDENT in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year. Ms. Tarris’s follow-up letter dated the same day, August 14, 1998, confirms the conclusion that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was offered to STUDENT. In her letter, Ms. Tarris stated, “I ... would like to reiterate my offer to place STUDENT in the special day class at Magnolia Elementary School in September.”
While a school district is required to inform parents of all available alternative programs, both public and nonpublic, as part of the IEP process (Cal. Educ. Code § 56506(d)), it is generally not proper to recommend the continuum of program options for an individual student. Although a school district may offer more than one placement for a child with disabilities, the school district must ensure that all the placements being offered are designed to meet the child’s unique needs, are reasonably calculated to provide the child with educational benefit, comply with the IEP, and represent placement in the least restrictive environment. The burden cannot be placed on the parents to ferret out an appropriate placement for their child from a number of different placements being offered, some of which are appropriate and some which are not. A parent cannot be assumed to have the expertise necessary to weed out those that are inappropriate, and the law does not require that they do so. Even when a school district is trying to resolve a dispute with parents, it cannot avoid its responsibility to exercise its professional judgment in selecting and offering a specific educational placement which the district’s educational experts determine is appropriate to meet a student’s unique and individual needs and provide educational benefit.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year.
B. First Half of the 1999-2000 School Year
Petitioner contended that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year. Petitioner asserted that the District failed to offer STUDENT a placement for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year that was designed to address his unique needs and that was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit and that, in fact, the District did not have an appropriate program for STUDENT.
In contrast, the District contended that it did not have an obligation to develop and offer a program for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year because he was a parentally placed private school student. The District pointed out that, although the parents expressed an interest in having the District fund a nonpublic school placement for the 1999-2000 school year, they never expressed an interest in placing STUDENT in a public school placement. The District argued that it is “insufficient and counterintuitive to express interest in public school placement so long as that placement consists exclusively of funding for a private school.” The District contended in its closing brief:
In such a case, the expression of interest is merely a pretext for the Parents’ attempt to obtain private school funding. [¶] A ruling that an expression of interest in a public school placement is sufficient even if it only consists of private school funding would effectively render all private school children with disabilities eligible for an IEP; all parents of private school children with disabilities, regardless of whether or not FAPE is at issue, would prefer public school funding of their private school placements and would, consequently, express an interest in public school placement. This result would run directly contrary to [the] intent of the Regulations, [as] reflected in the Comments. Thus, in this case, SEHO must find that the Parents did not adequately express an interest such that the June 1999 IEP should be held under scrutiny. Rather, the analysis must center on whether the District was prepared to offer FAPE in the event that the Parents re-enrolled Petitioner in public school.
The Hearing Officer is not persuaded by the District’s argument. Through a letter dated April 20, 1999, and during an IEP meeting convened on June 11, 1999, the parents communicated to the District their desire for it to fund STUDENT’s placement at Prentice for the 1999-2000 school year. Thus, STUDENT’s parents clearly expressed to the District an interest in having it provide STUDENT a placement at public expense which they believed was appropriate to meet his educational needs. As the District conceded, the IDEA’s promise of a free and appropriate program is not limited to public school placements. Rather, the IDEA and State special education law recognize that school districts may decide to provide FAPE to some children with disabilities at private schools because a private school placement is necessary to provide the children with a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56365(a), 56366. It would be counterintuitive to find that a parent’s request to have a private placement provided at public expense is not sufficient to invoke a school district’s obligation to offer the child a FAPE, when the IDEA expressly provides that school districts may use private school placements to fulfill their FAPE obligations. Additionally, State law provides that children with disabilities who are enrolled in private schools by school districts are deemed to be enrolled in public schools, at least for funding purposes. Cal. Educ. Code § 56365(b). Thus, the parents’ request for public funding of a private school placement constituted a sufficient expression of interest in re-enrolling the child in the public school system to trigger the District’s obligations to develop and offer an appropriate IEP.
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the District’s predictions about school districts having to develop IEPs for all privately placed children with disabilities. The finding above does not, as the District claims, render all parentally placed private school children “eligible for an IEP.” Under the facts of this case, the District was obligated to develop and offer STUDENT an appropriate IEP because his parents requested a placement at public expense. The parents expressly stated to the District at the IEP meeting held on June 11, 1999, that they were requesting public funding of the Prentice placement because they believed that Prentice was able to meet STUDENT’s needs and that the prior public school placements provided by the District had not been able to do the same. These facts do not exist in all cases involving parentally placed private school children, and this holding is limited to the facts of this case. The Hearing Officer declines to offer any speculations about the extent of school districts’ obligations to other parentally placed private school children, especially in those cases in which the parents have not expressed any interest in a public school placement or a placement at public expense. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was obligated to develop and offer an appropriate IEP for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year.
The evidence established that, after receiving the parents’ letter dated April 20, 1999, in which the parents asked for funding of Prentice, the District convened an IEP meeting on June 11, 1999. The IEP document created that date states, “District feels [STUDENT] has been offered/provided an appropriate education within the district. District is offering SDC class at Upland Junior High School or SDC class at Pioneer Junior High School for Fall 1999. District also is offering an RSP program for 150 minutes/day at Pioneer Junior High or Upland Junior High School.” The District contended, however, that the discussion at the IEP meeting was intended only to make the parents aware that a range of placements was available in the public school system for STUDENT. The District stated in its closing brief, “[T]he District did not purport to complete an IEP. ... [T]he June 10, 1999 IEP should not be held under scrutiny as a complete IEP because it was never intended to be a complete IEP.” In keeping with this position, the District offered no evidence at hearing to establish the appropriateness of either the RSP or SDC placements at Upland or Pioneer Junior High School. Instead, Ms. Tarris testified that the District did not complete the IEP at the June 10 meeting once the parents made it clear that they wished for STUDENT to remain at Prentice. The Hearing Officer agrees with Ms. Tarris that required components are missing from the IEP created on June 10, such as goals and objectives, a statement regarding the proposed amount of time to be spent in the general education program, and necessary related services.
Moreover, the District did not take advantage of the further opportunities the parents gave the District for it to develop an appropriate IEP for STUDENT. Specifically, at the June 10 meeting, the parents gave consent for the SELPA (on behalf of the District) to gather information from Prentice regarding STUDENT’s placement there during the 1998-1999 school year and gave their permission for a representative to observe STUDENT in the Prentice placement. The parents also agreed to meet again with the IEP team once the SELPA had procured the information from Prentice and observed STUDENT at Prentice. However, despite having received the parents’ consent to gather information about STUDENT’s present functioning and program at Prentice, the District never thereafter used any of the information, or requested any further information, in order to develop an appropriate program for STUDENT for the 1999-2000 school year.(Footnote 11)
Given that the District was obligated to develop and offer STUDENT an appropriate program for the 1999-2000 school year, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE because required elements were missing from the IEP developed on June 10, 1999. Additionally, there was no evidence presented to establish that any of the placements “offered” at the June 10, 1999 meeting were appropriate for STUDENT.
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In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was required to offer a FAPE to STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year, but failed to do so.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred to provide STUDENT with a nonpublic school placement, including expenses for transportation, during the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo Heights court stated the following about the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Burlington:
The rationale behind Burlington’s holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an “empty victory.” [Footnote omitted.] As stated by the Court, if “appropriate relief” in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed, “the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parent’s right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete.” [Footnote omitted.] Id.
In light of the conclusion reached in Issue No. 1, that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year, the Hearing Officer must now determine whether the program provided by STUDENT’s parents during the same period was proper under the IDEA. In Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the child’s IEP or provide an educational placement that is certified by the state. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court has recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet a standard as high as that of the school district’s, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that is designed to address the child’s unique needs and is reasonably calculated to provide the child educational benefit. Id.
A. 1998-1999 School Year
The evidence presented at hearing established that the Prentice placement was, to an extent, an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1998-1999 school year. Dr. Patterson’s testimony established that he was very familiar with the Prentice program. Dr. Patterson testified that he has worked with a number of clients placed at Prentice for the last fifteen to sixteen years and that he himself placed students at Prentice in his role as a SELPA director. He also testified that he visits the Prentice campus at least every two months and that he observed classes at Prentice at least five to six times during the 1998-1999 school year and at least once during the 1999-2000 school year. He stated that he observed STUDENT at Prentice one time for about thirty minutes during the 1998-1999 school year.
Based on his substantial experience with Prentice, Dr. Patterson testified that Prentice is a very small school and that the founders and administrators of the school are all trained in Slingerland, a simultaneous multisensory method of teaching reading and written language. Dr. Patterson also testified that the school offers a comprehensive program which includes, among other things, approximately 1 to 1 ½ hours of one-to-one instruction each day in decoding and other reading and writing skills, a computer lab to work on reading and writing which students use three to five times per week, a teacher and adult aide in every classroom, and a maximum of twelve students in each class. Additionally, according to Dr. Patterson, all the teachers at Prentice have been trained in Slingerland and use the Slingerland method of instruction in their classrooms. This testimony was supported by MOTHER, who testified that she observed STUDENT at Prentice in September 1998. MOTHER testified to the simultaneous multisensory approach she saw used in STUDENT’s classroom. Specifically, MOTHER testified that, during her observation, she saw the teacher instruct the students to use their hands to demonstrate the sound being taught while also saying the sound, then writing the sound-symbol in cursive in the air while saying the sound, and finally writing the sound-symbol on a piece of paper which they then traced with their fingers. Finally, Dr. Patterson testified that the Prentice placement was also designed to address STUDENT’s auditory processing deficit and was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit with regard to his auditory processing deficit.(Footnote 12) No evidence was presented to refute Dr. Patterson’s and MOTHER’s testimony in this regard with respect to the 1998-1999 school year. Therefore, the evidence clearly established that the Prentice placement was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and was reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit in that it provided him with a simultaneous multisensory instruction to address his reading and written language deficits.
However, the evidence showed that the Prentice program, standing alone, was not able to meet all of STUDENT’s unique needs. There was no dispute that STUDENT required speech and language services during the 1998-1999 school year to address his language needs. STUDENT was not provided with speech and language therapy during the 1998-1999 school year, although such services were available on the Prentice campus. No evidence was provided to explain why the parents chose not to have speech and language services provided to STUDENT.
Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the Prentice placement during the 1998-1999 school year. However, because the Prentice placement was not designed to meet STUDENT’s speech therapy needs, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner failed to establish entitlement to full reimbursement of the Prentice tuition. Although it did not include speech and language therapy, the Prentice placement was designed to meet STUDENT’s primary needs in reading and written language. Neither party disputed the appropriateness of the frequency of speech and language services offered by the District for the 1998-1999 school year (i.e., twenty-five minutes per week). Taking into consideration the fact that twenty-five minutes of speech and language therapy constituted less than two percent of a typical school week but was intended to address some of the needs arising out of STUDENT’s disability, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for ninety percent of the Prentice tuition for the 1998-1999 school year, according to proof.(Footnote 13) Transportation expenses are also reimbursable so long as the services were necessary for the student to benefit from his special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). There is no doubt that transportation to and from Prentice was necessary for STUDENT to be able to attend and benefit from the instruction at Prentice. The evidence showed that MOTHER transported STUDENT to and from Prentice during the 1998-1999 school year. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to full reimbursement for the expenses incurred in transporting STUDENT to and from school during the 1998-1999 school year in the form of mileage reimbursement at the District rate. The total amount that the District must reimburse Petitioner for transportation shall be subject to proof (to be presented by the parents to the District) of the specific days that STUDENT attended Prentice during the 1998-99 school year.
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the two arguments forwarded by the District as to why equitable considerations justify a denial or reduction in reimbursement for expenses incurred during the 1998-1999 school year. First, the District argued reimbursement should be reduced or denied because it convened IEP meetings and “made FAPE available” to STUDENT and the parents agreed at the IEP meetings that FAPE had been offered. This is not an equitable consideration argument, but addresses issues that are part of the initial analysis of whether the District complied with the IDEA and these issues have already been adjudicated in Petitioner’s favor. Second, the District contended that reimbursement should be reduced or denied because the parents failed to adequately inform the District of their decision to unilaterally enroll STUDENT in Prentice prior to his enrollment. The District argued that, because the parents entered the meeting with Ms. Tarris on August 14, 1998, with the intent of considering District placement options and Ms. Tarris understood that this was the parents’ intent, the parents essentially revoked their ten-day unilateral placement notification under 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). There is no dispute that the parents gave the District notice of their intent to unilaterally place STUDENT in Prentice, as required by section 1412. The Hearing Officer does not agree that the parents can be deemed to have revoked their notification by attending a meeting with the District in good faith to explore what the District might be able to offer instead. Additionally, Ms. Tarris testified that, at the conclusion of the meeting with the parents, the parents gave her the impression that Prentice was their “definite decision” but that they were willing to visit Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC. The letter Ms. Tarris wrote immediately following the meeting echoes this impression. In the letter, Ms. Tarris stated that it was her understanding that, at that time, the parents believed STUDENT would be best served by the Prentice placement and essentially assumed he would be placed there.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for ninety percent of the tuition costs incurred to place STUDENT at Prentice during the 1998-1999 school year, and full reimbursement for the transportation expenses incurred during the same period.
B. First Half of the 1999-2000 School Year
As with the 1998-1999 school year, the evidence presented at hearing established that the Prentice placement was, to an extent, an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year. There was no evidence that STUDENT’s needs changed significantly between the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. Additionally, the testimony of Dr. Patterson showed that the Prentice program remained virtually the same between the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years. While Penny Valentine, the SELPA due process program manager, testified that she observed STUDENT in Prentice on December 1, 1999, her testimony regarding the inappropriateness of his placement does not refute the other credible evidence that Prentice was an appropriate placement for STUDENT. First, Ms. Valentine testified that she observed STUDENT in his geography class and did not see any Slingerland methods being used. However, she also stated that the geography class at Prentice appeared to be like any other RSP geography class, indicating that the same specialized instruction and methods were being used to teach the students. She did not testify that it appeared to be like any general education geography class, where no modifications or accommodations are built in for children with learning disabilities. Second, Ms. Valentine testified that Prentice staff did not permit her to observe STUDENT in his reading class and that she was told that STUDENT’s teacher in that class was not yet fully certified in Slingerland. Standing alone, however, Ms. Valentine’s testimony is insufficient to refute Dr. Patterson’s testimony in this regard. Dr. Patterson testified based on his personal knowledge, gained through years of working with Prentice staff and observing classes at Prentice, that Prentice is founded on the Slingerland method and uses the Slingerland method to instruct students in reading and written language. Ms. Valentine’s testimony in this regard can be regarded as nothing more than hearsay since she did not observe STUDENT’s class herself. See Cal. Code Regs. tit 5, § 3082(b).
Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the evidence established that the Prentice placement was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and was reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit in that it provided him with a simultaneous multisensory instruction to address his reading and written language deficits. However, as with the 1998-1999 school year, the evidence showed that the Prentice program, standing alone, was not able to meet all of STUDENT’s unique needs. There was no dispute that STUDENT required speech and language services during the 1999-2000 school year to address his language needs. Neither party disputed that, during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT continued to require the same frequency of speech and language services as during the 1998-1999 school year (i.e., twenty-five minutes per week). Taking into consideration the fact that twenty-five minutes of speech and language therapy constituted less than two percent of a typical school week but was intended to address some of the needs arising out of STUDENT’s disability, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for ninety percent of the Prentice tuition for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year, according to proof.(Footnote 14) Transportation expenses are also reimbursable so long as the services were necessary for the student to benefit from his special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). There is no doubt that transportation to and from Prentice was necessary for STUDENT to be able to attend and benefit from the instruction at Prentice. The evidence showed that MOTHER transported STUDENT to and from Prentice during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to full reimbursement for the expenses incurred in transporting STUDENT to and from school during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year in the form of mileage reimbursement at the District rate. The total amount that the District must reimburse Petitioner for transportation shall be subject to proof (to be presented by the parents to the District) of the specific days that STUDENT attended Prentice during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year.
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the argument made by the District as to why equitable considerations justify a denial or reduction in reimbursement for expenses incurred during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year. The District contended that public policy requires that reimbursement for a unilateral parent placement be limited to the year in which the unilateral removal occurred. In support of its contention, the District advanced the same arguments it had used in analyzing the extent of the District’s obligation (i.e., that the District only had a duty to make a FAPE “available” prior to the unilateral removal and that a parent’s expression of interest in having a private school funded at public expense does not constitute interest in a public school placement). These arguments, while relevant to the discussion of the District’s obligation to provide FAPE, are not related to equitable considerations which would justify reduction or denial of reimbursement.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for ninety percent of the tuition and transportation costs incurred to place STUDENT at Prentice during the first half of the 1999-2000 school year.
ISSUE NO. 3: Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to private assessments they obtained from psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D., in September 1998 and July 2000 and from audiologist Carolyn Atkins, M.A., in March 1999?
A parent may obtain an independent educational evaluation (IEE) performed by a qualified specialist at public expense if (1) the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the educational agency and (2) the educational agency is unable to show at a due process hearing that its evaluation was appropriate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b). In this case, there does not appear to be any grounds upon which to award reimbursement for the three assessments obtained by the parents.
The evidence disclosed that the parents did not seek outside assessments because they disagreed with any of the District’s assessments. FATHER testified that he leaves educational matters for his wife to take care of and never even reviewed any of the District’s assessments. During the hearing, MOTHER described the District’s assessment during the fourth grade as “big thorough testing” and testified that she did not disagree with the District’s assessments, but that her real disagreement was with the District’s conclusions at IEP meetings about what STUDENT needed and with what educational services it was offering him. Furthermore, when asked by the Hearing Officer what Petitioner’s basis was for seeking reimbursement for Dr. Patterson’s assessment in July 2000, Petitioner’s attorney responded that parents obtained the assessment in preparation for hearing, to provide a clear picture of what was going on with STUDENT at the time, and to assist in potential settlement negotiations. Noticeably absent from the response was any indication that the parents sought the assessment because they disagreed with an assessment the District had performed or with a refusal by the District to assess. Instead, it appears that the parents had Dr. Patterson assess STUDENT in July 2000 for litigation purposes and, therefore, the cost of Dr. Patterson’s assessment is a cost of litigation. Neither State nor federal law gives the Hearing Officer authority to award litigation costs absent the consent of both parties. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); Education Code § 56507(b). The District did not consent to the award of litigation costs in this matter.
Moreover, even if the parents had agreed with any of the District’s assessments, the testimony of Ms. Bauer, Mr. Metzler, and Ms. Tarris established that the District’s assessments met the requirements of the law, including California Education Code section 56320, and were appropriate. Petitioner did not present any evidence to refute the credible testimony of Ms. Bauer, Mr. Metzler, and Ms. Tarris with respect to this issue.
In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner did not disagree with any of the District’s assessments and that the District conducted appropriate assessments of STUDENT during the 1996-1997 school year and thereafter. Consequently, the parents are not entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to the assessments they obtained from Dr. Patterson in September 1998 and July 2000 and from Ms. Atkins in March 1999.
Finally, Petitioner included in his proposed resolution to Issue No. 3 a request that the parents be reimbursed for their attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,500.00 and for “costs incurred.” The Hearing Officer noted during the discussion of issues on the first day of hearing that she does not have the authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party in a due process proceeding. Petitioner stated that he understood this and did not dispute the limited nature of the Hearing Officer’s authority in this regard. Neither State nor federal law gives the Hearing Officer authority to award attorneys’ fees or other legal costs absent the consent of both parties. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); Education Code § 56507(b). Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs is denied.
ORDER
1. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this decision, Respondent Upland Unified School District shall reimburse the parents of STUDENT the following amounts, according to proof:
a. Ninety percent of the tuition the parents paid to place STUDENT at Prentice Day School for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year, and b. The expenses the parents incurred, in the form of mileage reimbursement at the District rate, to transport STUDENT to and from the Prentice Day School during the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year. The total amount that the District must reimburse the parents for transportation shall be subject to proof (to be presented by the parents to the District) of the specific days that STUDENT attended Prentice during the 1998-99 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year? **Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the costs they incurred to provide STUDENT with a nonpublic school placement, including expenses for transportation, during the 1998-1999 school year and the first half of the 1999-2000 school year? **Petitioner substantially prevailed on this issue.
3. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to private assessments they obtained from psychologist Robert Patterson, Psy.D., in September 1998 and July 2000 and from audiologist Carolyn Atkins, M.A., in March 1999? **Respondent prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Date: December 19, 2000 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1: The issues listed here differ slightly in wording from those noticed by Petitioner. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and to facilitate proper analysis, as well as to reflect the discussion held with the parties on the first day of hearing. Additionally, during the discussion of the issues on the first day of hearing, Petitioner withdrew the fourth issue he had noticed regarding transportation.
Footnote 2: This was not, however, the first time STUDENT had been assessed to determine whether he qualified for special education and related services. The District assessed STUDENT during his second-grade year because of difficulties he was experiencing with reading at the time. After the assessment, District personnel informed the parents that STUDENT did not qualify for special education and related services.
Footnote 3: According to MOTHER’s testimony, at about this time, she took STUDENT to see a pediatrician for the attention issues. The pediatrician prescribed Ritalin. Shortly thereafter, the doctor changed the prescription to Adoral because of some adverse side-effects produced by the Ritalin. When the Adoral also proved to produce adverse side-effects, the parents took STUDENT off all medication during the summer of 1997.
Footnote 4: Dr. Patterson testified that the term “dyslexia” refers to specific language processing difficulties which are often genetic and which are predominantly seen in males. He stated that there are basically three different processing units in the brain and, in the brains of dyslexics, there appear to be a large number of areas where the neurons did not connect properly, or misconnect. According to Dr. Patterson, the location of the misconnections determines the type of dyslexia exhibited and can be either primarily visual or auditory, or a mix of the two. He described “dysgraphia” as the written form of dyslexia. Dr. Patterson testified that dyslexia and dysgraphia were adversely impacting STUDENT’s ability to read and write. Ms. Bauer stated that dyslexia is basically a reading problem.
Footnote 5: The IDEA, which was originally enacted in 1970, Pub.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 178 (1970), was amended in 1997. Pub.L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). Most of the provisions of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA (IDEA ‘97), and specifically those at issue in this case, became effective on June 4, 1997. On March 12, 1999, the Department of Education issued new regulations to reflect the mandates of IDEA ‘97. 64 Fed. Reg. 12406 (1999).
Footnote 6: Neither party disputed that the District’s program offer for the 1998-1999 school year included the related service of speech and language therapy. There was no dispute that the proposed frequency and duration of the therapy, as well as the accompanying goals and objectives, were substantively appropriate for STUDENT. Because the appropriateness of the proposed speech and language therapy was not put at issue, the issue of related services will not be adjudicated in this decision.
Footnote 7: Although an assessment by Dr. Patterson on September 23, 1998, suggested that STUDENT was performing even lower than 2.5 levels below his grade level at the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year, the evidence established that Mr. Metzler’s achievement scores were valid indicators of STUDENT’s functioning on May 8, 1998. Mr. Metzler’s testimony established that he was qualified and experienced in administering the WJ-R. Mr. Metzler’s testimony also established that he administered the WJ-R in accordance with the test instructions, and that STUDENT’s behavior during testing suggested that the results were reliable and valid indicators of his functioning at the time. Moreover, as Ms. Tarris testified, a child cannot obtain falsely inflated scores on an assessment measure because he cannot perform a skill unless he actually has it. However, the reverse can certainly happen and result in relatively low scores which do not reflect the child’s true level of performance. For these reasons, although Dr. Patterson’s assessment obtained lower achievement scores than those obtained by Mr. Metzler four months earlier, the difference in scores did not establish that Mr. Metzler’s May 1998 results were anything but a valid and reliable indication of how STUDENT was performing on May 8, 1998. The difference does, however, call into question to a degree the validity of Dr. Patterson’s test scores.
Footnote 8: According to Mr. Metzler, the grade equivalent is an approximation of where the average student falls in the norming population.
Footnote 9: While Prentice decided to retain STUDENT in the fifth grade during the 1998-1999 school year, there is no evidence that the District intended to retain him in the fifth grade for the 1998-1999 school year. In fact, the District’s IEP dated June 10, 1998, states that the District members of the IEP team were recommending that STUDENT “continue RSP service in 6th grade.”
Footnote 10: Although the District alleged in its opening statement that, in addition to the RSP at Valencia, it also offered STUDENT placement in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year, it seemed to abandon this argument in its closing brief. However, the evidence introduced at hearing established that the District did indeed offer STUDENT placement in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC at a meeting attended by the parents on August 14, 1998. The testimony of the parents, Ms. Tarris, and Ms. Thorndyke, all of whom attended the meeting on August 14, 1998, indicated that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was described to the parents at the meeting and that the parents were encouraged to observe Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC after school resumed. Essentially, the parents were informed at the meeting that they could place STUDENT in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year. Ms. Tarris’s follow-up letter dated the same day, August 14, 1998, confirms the conclusion that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was offered to STUDENT. In her letter, Ms. Tarris stated, “I ... would like to reiterate my offer to place STUDENT in the special day class at Magnolia Elementary School in September.”
Footnote 11: Although the District alleged in its opening statement that, in addition to the RSP at Valencia, it also offered STUDENT placement in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year, it seemed to abandon this argument in its closing brief. However, the evidence introduced at hearing established that the District did indeed offer STUDENT placement in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC at a meeting attended by the parents on August 14, 1998. The testimony of the parents, Ms. Tarris, and Ms. Thorndyke, all of whom attended the meeting on August 14, 1998, indicated that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was described to the parents at the meeting and that the parents were encouraged to observe Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC after school resumed. Essentially, the parents were informed at the meeting that they could place STUDENT in Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC for the 1998-1999 school year. Ms. Tarris’s follow-up letter dated the same day, August 14, 1998, confirms the conclusion that Ms. Thorndyke’s SDC was offered to STUDENT. In her letter, Ms. Tarris stated, “I ... would like to reiterate my offer to place STUDENT in the special day class at Magnolia Elementary School in September.”
Footnote 12: While Dr. Patterson also testified that the Prentice placement was not designed to provide STUDENT with complete remediation of his auditory processing deficits, it was not required to in order for it to be an appropriate unilateral parent placement under the IDEA. Even a school district is only obligated to provide a child with a disability a “basic floor of opportunity,” and not the best placement or even a placement that maximizes the child’s potential. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200. Nothing more, then, can be required of parents in their unilateral placements. Alamo Heights, 790 F.2d at 1161.
Footnote 13: Although Petitioner claimed that tuition for Prentice totaled $11,000 for the 1998-1999 school year, Petitioner did not present any testimony or documentary evidence to support his claim. Similarly, Petitioner did not provide any evidence to substantiate the amount claimed for mileage reimbursement for transporting STUDENT to and from Prentice.
Footnote 14: Similar to the 1998-1999 school year, Petitioner claimed that tuition for Prentice totaled $5,600 for the first half of the 1999-2000 school year but neglected to present any testimony or documentary evidence to support his claim. Additionally, Petitioner did not provide any evidence to substantiate the amount claimed for mileage reimbursement to his parents for transporting him to and from Prentice.
