California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 31, 2003
Student v. Templeton Unified School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 1669-02 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown
Templeton Unified and San Luis Obispo County Office of Education owe $650 and 77 compensatory hours; 40-hour ABA program request denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
None noted.
Summary
The parents of a seven-year-old boy filed for due process against Templeton Unified School District and the San Luis Obispo County Office of Education (SLOCOE). The student was eligible under mental retardation until November 2002, when his category changed to autistic-like behaviors. The parents argued he was autistic, not intellectually disabled. They sought a 40-hour-per-week home applied behavior analysis (ABA) program and reimbursement for their home program and private assessments.
Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown found that years of evaluations showed mental retardation with autistic-like behaviors, not autism. She found the private psychologist's contrary opinion unpersuasive. The student made real progress in mainstream kindergarten with resource and speech services, so he did not need ABA or an autism aide. The November 2002 offer, with autism services supervised by Autism Partnership, was appropriate. The home ABA program was not reimbursed because it lacked adequate supervision and contact with typical peers.
The Hearing Officer found several limited violations:
- Two months passed without an IEP meeting after the student moved to kindergarten.
- A delayed assessment meant no occupational therapy (OT) from March to June 2001.
- OT consultation fell short of the IEP in early 2002.
- No adaptive physical education (APE) assessment was done.
The districts also agreed they denied FAPE in a special day class for students with severe disabilities in fall 2000. The order: $650 for private OT, 5 hours of compensatory OT, 72 other compensatory hours, and an APE assessment plan.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a dispute over eligibility labels. The question was whether the program met the student's needs, not which category the IEP listed. It also shows that a parent-run home program with little expert supervision and no contact with typical peers may not be reimbursed, while narrow violations can still lead to targeted compensatory hours.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailed in partAssessment
Issue 1. Did the District fail to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from September 2000 to the present?
The 2001 triennial and OT assessments were appropriate and physical therapy was not a suspected area. The failure to complete the APE assessment referred in May 2002 was the only gap, and it caused little prejudice because the student was out of school.
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 2. Did the District err in failing to correctly identify STUDENT as 'autistic-like' prior to November 7, 2002?
The prior evaluations consistently showed mental retardation with autistic-like behaviors (PDD-NOS), not autism, so the mental retardation designation was not in error. A mislabel alone would not deny FAPE.
- Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered
Issue 3. Did the District and SLOCOE provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 extended school year?
FAPE was denied by stipulation for the fall 2000 special day class placement. Going two months without an IEP meeting after the January 2001 kindergarten transfer was a procedural denial, and so was the delayed OT assessment, which left no OT from March to June 2001. The mainstream kindergarten program was otherwise appropriate, and the student did not need ESY.
- Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered
Issue 4. Did Respondents provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2001-2002 school year, including the 2002 extended school year?
The double-session kindergarten program, goals and ESY offer were appropriate, and the student did not need an ABA program or an autism technician. However, the OT consultation from January to early June 2002 was not delivered as often as the IEP required.
- Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered
Issue 5. Did Respondents offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, including the 2003 extended school year?
The March 2002 and November 2002 offers, including first grade with an aide and autism services supervised by Autism Partnership, were FAPE. Preparing a draft offer before the meeting was not a violation. The failure to conduct the APE assessment denied FAPE as to APE services.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 6. Is the appropriate program for STUDENT an intensive applied behavioral analysis (ABA) program for forty (40) hours per week, year-round, under the supervision of Verdugo Hills Autism Project, a certified nonpublic agency?
Because the districts offered a FAPE for 2002-2003, the Hearing Officer did not evaluate the parents' proposed ABA program. Respondents prevailed on this issue.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 7a. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for the psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Melanie Lenington?
The district's psychoeducational assessment was appropriate, so there was no reimbursement.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 7b. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for the occupational therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.?
The OT assessment was appropriate, so there was no reimbursement for this independent OT assessment.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 7c. Are STUDENT's parents entitled to reimbursement for the physical therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.?
Physical therapy was not an area of suspected disability, so there was no reimbursement.
- Student prevailed in partUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 8. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement and/or compensatory education as a result of denial of FAPE?
There was no reimbursement for the home ABA program or the shadow aide, which did not remedy the violations and lacked adequate supervision and peer contact. The parents received $650 for private OT, 5 hours of compensatory OT and 72 hours of compensatory education.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 25 calendar days, Respondents reimburse the parents $650 for private OT ($450 for therapy sessions plus $200 for the OT assessment) by Lisa Moreno/Marino of Pediatric Therapy Solutions (the order says 'Pediatric Therapy Services').
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 15 calendar days, the District must notice an IEP meeting to add the compensatory education to the IEP.
- Compensatory education. 5 hours of direct OT services. Respondents may use their own staff, and the IEP team decides when and where.
- Compensatory education. 72 hours of compensatory education for the stipulated denial (September 2000 to January 2001) and the procedural denial (January to March 2001), to be completed within one year of the decision. The IEP team should consider language, communication, socialization and play skills. Respondents may use their own staff or outside providers.
- Order to assess. Within 15 calendar days, SLOCOE and/or the District must mail or deliver to the mother a proposed APE assessment plan, then conduct the assessment and IEP meeting within statutory timelines.
Total: 77 hours of compensatory services; $650 ordered
Key authorities
Board of Education v. Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; Florence County School District Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education; Hudson v. Wilson; Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320, 56325, 56329, 56344, 56345, 56381; 5 C.C.R. §§ 3030, 3043
People named in the decision
- Mark Shoffner, school psychologist and director of special education, Templeton Unified School District
- Curt DuBost, superintendent, Templeton Unified School District
- Jackie Kirk-Martinez, area administrator, San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
- Mary Jo DeSio, assistant superintendent, San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
- Jacqueline (Jacki) Kinavey, occupational therapist, San Luis Obispo County Office of Education (described as District occupational therapist in the witness list)
- Deryl Goldenberg, director, ABA consultant to home program, Verdugo Hills Autism Project (nonpublic agency)
- Maria Spencer, speech-language pathologist, Templeton Unified School District
- Melanie Lenington, independent psychologist, expert witness for Student, Private
- Brooke Spang, home ABA therapist and school shadow aide, Hired by parents
- Debra Heller, home ABA therapist, Hired by parents
- Lisa Marino (also spelled Moreno), private occupational therapist, Pediatric Therapy Solutions
- Gina Scribner, resource specialist program teacher, Templeton Unified School District
- Beth Walker, kindergarten teacher, Templeton Elementary School
- Margaret Phillips, afternoon kindergarten teacher, Templeton Elementary School
- Vicki McEwan, first grade teacher, Templeton Elementary School
- Dawn-Marie Ickes, physical therapist, District witness
- Edward Ritvo, psychiatrist, expert witness for District, UCLA School of Medicine Neuropsychiatric Institute
- Jolene Martin, adaptive physical education teacher (also called occupational therapist in the witness list), San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
- Kathy Ferry, special education teacher, severely handicapped special day class, San Luis Obispo County Office of Education
- Lynne Gregory, prior evaluating physician, Children's Hospital of San Diego
- Ira Lott, pediatric neurologist, prior evaluator, UC Irvine Medical Center
- Michael DeYoung, prior psychoeducational assessor, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- John Kazalunas, school psychologist, initial assessment, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Bryna Siegel, prior evaluator, Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, UCSF
- Lee Neidengard, regional center evaluator, Tri-Counties Regional Center
- Autism Partnership, nonpublic agency proposed for doctoral-level supervision
- Center for Developing Kids, Inc., private provider of independent OT and PT assessments
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Templeton, California, on November 19-22, and December 3-6 and 10-12, 2002.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Geralyn Clancy, and also by attorney Bob Varma on most hearings days. Present on STUDENT=s behalf was his mother, MOTHER. STUDENT’s STEPFATHER, FATHER, also was present on some hearing days. Respondent Templeton Unified School District (District) was represented by attorneys Daniel Osher and Cynthia Floyd; attorney Cyndi Dalton represented the District on days when Ms. Floyd was not present. Present on the District=s behalf was Mark Shoffner, the District=s director of special education; District superintendent Curt DuBost also was present on the District’s behalf on some hearing days. Respondent San Luis Obispo County Office of Education (SLOCOE) was represented at the hearing by attorney Patricia Castle, and also by attorney Alan Harris on some hearing days. Present on behalf of SLOCOE was Jackie Kirk-Martinez, SLOCOE administrator. SLOCOE assistant superintendent Mary Jo DeSio was also present on SLOCOE’s behalf on some hearing days.
Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify: Mark Shoffner, school psychologist and District special education director; Jacqueline Kinavey, District occupational therapist; Deryl Goldenberg, director of Verdugo Hills Autism Project; Maria Spencer, speech-language pathologist; MOTHER, Petitioner’s mother; Melanie Lenington, psychologist; Brooke Spang, autism therapist; Debra Heller, autism therapist; and Lisa Marino, occupational therapist.
The District called the following witnesses to testify: Mr. Shoffner; Jackie Kirk-Martinez, SLOCOE area administrator; Gina Scribner, resource specialist program (RSP) teacher; Beth Walker, kindergarten teacher; Dawn-Marie Ickes, physical therapist; Vicki McEwan, first grade teacher; and Edward Ritvo, psychiatrist.
SLOCOE called SLOCOE occupational therapist Jolene Martin as a witness.
Oral and documentary evidence was received at the hearing. Upon receipt of written closing arguments, the record was closed on January 9, 2003, and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the District fail to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from September 2000 to the present?
2. Did the District err in failing to correctly identify STUDENT as “autistic-like” prior to November 7, 2002?
3. Did the District and SLOCOE (collectively “Respondents”) provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 extended school year?
4. Did Respondents provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2001-2002 school year, including the 2002 extended school year?
5. Did Respondents offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, including the 2003 extended school year?
6. Is the appropriate program for STUDENT an intensive applied behavioral analysis (ABA) program for forty (40) hours per week, year-round, under the supervision of Verdugo Hills Autism Project, a certified nonpublic agency?
7. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following assessments:
a. psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Melanie Lenington;
b. occupational therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.; and c. physical therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.
8. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement and/or compensatory education as a result of denial of FAPE?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In general, Petitioner contends that the District’s reassessment of him was not appropriate and that the District misidentified him as a student with mental retardation (MR), instead of correctly identifying him as a student with autism or pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS). Petitioner alleges that because the District failed to correctly identify his disability and his needs, the District failed to provide him with an appropriate program to address his needs. Petitioner argues that, for each school year he attended in the District and SLOCOE, including the current 2002-2003 year, he needed an applied behavioral analysis (ABA) program with an autism technician as his one-to-one aide throughout the school day. As a remedy for the District’s denial of FAPE for past school years, Petitioner seeks reimbursement for the ABA program his mother and stepfather have provided him in their home since March 2002. Petitioner argues that both the District and SLOCOE failed to offer him a FAPE for the current school year, and as a remedy Petitioner seeks prospective placement in an intensive ABA program for forty hours per week under the supervision of Verdugo Hills Autism Project, a certified nonpublic agency (NPA). Petitioner further contends that both Respondents failed to provide him with the designated instruction and services (DIS) that he required. Petitioner argues that he did not receive adequate occupational therapy (OT), and that he needed but did not receive DIS of adaptive physical education (APE) and physical therapy (PT). Petitioner also seeks reimbursement for independent educational evaluations he obtained, on the ground that Respondents’ assessments were not appropriate. Petitioner also seeks a remedy for his placement in a severely handicapped special day class (SH-SDC) from September to December 2000, for which period Respondents stipulated that Petitioner was denied a FAPE.
The District argues that its assessments were appropriate, that it properly identified Petitioner’s educational needs, and that for each school year it offered an appropriate program designed to address those needs. The District argues that, while the MR designation was correct, in any event the program offered addressed his unique needs and would not have differed had the student had a different eligibility designation. The District further contends that the ABA home program that PARENTS provided Petitioner beginning in March 2002 was not an appropriate program. SLOCOE endorses the District’s arguments on these points. Furthermore, both the District and SLOCOE argue that STUDENT was properly assessed in OT, did not require an assessment in PT, and did not require an assessment in APE until Respondents initiated an APE assessment in May 2002. Respondents argue that Petitioner received the DIS that he required. Respondents further argue that Petitioner is not entitled to reimbursement for assessments because the assessments conducted by Respondents were appropriate. For the period from September to December 2000, for which Respondents stipulated that Petitioner was denied a FAPE, Respondents argue that Petitioner was not injured or otherwise negatively affected by this denial of FAPE, and therefore no remedy need be awarded. Respondents further contend that, should a remedy be warranted, the appropriate remedy is seventy-two hours of compensatory education.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Petitioner STUDENT is a seven-year-old student who lives within the boundaries of the District with his family, including his mother, stepfather, and eight-year-old sister SISTER, who has been diagnosed with autism. At all relevant times, STUDENT has been and remains eligible for special education. At various times he has been diagnosed with mental retardation and/or autistic-like behaviors.
Prior to moving to Templeton, STUDENT received services from agencies including the Inland Counties Regional Center. At age fifteen months, STUDENT was diagnosed with global developmental delay by Dr. Lynne Gregory of Children’s Hospital of San Diego. Pediatric neurologist Dr. Ira Lott at the UC Irvine Medical Center subsequently assessed STUDENT at eighteen months and similarly diagnosed global developmental delay. When STUDENT was twenty-two months old, he underwent a psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Michael DeYoung of San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools. Dr. DeYoung found in part that STUDENT’s primary area of need was in language, and that he also exhibited some aggressive behaviors. Dr. DeYoung ruled out a diagnosis of autism because STUDENT displayed some interest in socialization.
School psychologist John Kazalunas of San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools conducted STUDENT’s initial assessment in early March 1998, when STUDENT was almost three years old. That assessment report indicated that STUDENT’s primary areas of need were speech/language and general global development. The report also indicated that the test scores were not in the autistic range, although STUDENT exhibited many autistic-like behaviors. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 35-41.)
In April 1998, shortly after STUDENT’s third birthday, his individualized education program (IEP) team from the Desert Mountain SELPA and Hesperia Unified School District convened and agreed to place STUDENT in a pre-kindergarten special day class (SDC), with extended school year (ESY) services of 20 to 30 days. (Pet. Exh. 42-43.) When the IEP team reconvened in July 1998, it continued STUDENT’s placement in the SDC and specified that his eligibility for special education was due to mental retardation.
In October 1998, MOTHER received an evaluation report from Dr. Bryna Siegel, who had evaluated STUDENT in April 1998 at the Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute at University of California, San Francisco. Dr. Siegel’s report diagnosed STUDENT with pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) and moderate mental retardation, but specifically found that STUDENT did not meet all of the criteria to receive a diagnosis of autistic disorder. The report recommended that, given STUDENT’s significant delays in communication and social interaction, he should receive a one-on-one in-home behavioral program for a minimum of twenty hours per week.
STUDENT remained in a pre-kindergarten SDC through the end of the 1999-2000 school year, as specified in his IEP of September 1999. In June 2000, the Hesperia IEP team agreed that STUDENT would attend a county SDC kindergarten class for the 2000-2001 school year and would receive speech/language services twice a week for 40 minutes per week. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 89-94.) That IEP team also agreed to convene again in September 2000 to establish goals and objectives consistent with STUDENT’s kindergarten curriculum, and agreed to refer STUDENT for an OT assessment. On August 15, 2000, the IEP team reconvened to review STUDENT’s program and add goals and objectives in math. On September 1, 2000, the IEP team convened and added goals and objectives in speech and language. On an Inland County document entitled “Occupational Therapy Pediatric Narrative Report” and dated September 4, 2000, an OT assessor wrote: “Child evaluated by OT 7-20-00. Recommended OT 2x week for 30 minute sessions. No IEP held. Transfer to county.” However, because STUDENT moved out of Hesperia immediately thereafter, this document was never attached to STUDENT’s Hesperia IEPs. (See testimony of MOTHER.)
In September 2000, STUDENT and his family moved to Templeton. Twice in mid-September, STUDENT’s mother met with the District’s director of special education, Mark Shoffner, to discuss placement for STUDENT and for his older sister. During those meetings, Mr. Shoffner attempted to conduct a brief evaluation of STUDENT using the Differential Ability Scale (DAS), but Mr. Shoffner could not engage STUDENT and therefore was not able to complete the evaluation.
Pursuant to STUDENT’s August 2000 IEP from Hesperia, Mr. Shoffner sent a preliminary referral to SLOCOE to place STUDENT in a SLOCOE severely handicapped (SH) SDC. (Pet. Exh. pg. 127-128.) From September 2000 until January 2001, STUDENT attended a SLOCOE SH-SDC. In October 2000, STUDENT began receiving speech and language services on a pull-out basis. In approximately December 2000, MS. MOTHER expressed concerns that the SLOCOE SH-SDC was not appropriate for STUDENT, because he was under-stimulated there and had little interaction with non-disabled peers. Pursuant to a request from Mr. Shoffner, District teachers Gina Scribner and Beth Walker observed STUDENT in his SH-SDC classroom, and reported that they believed STUDENT could be successfully mainstreamed in a regular education kindergarten class.
In mid-January 2001, STUDENT transferred from the SLOCOE SH-SDC to a District regular education kindergarten class, held in the afternoon and taught by Beth Walker at Templeton Elementary School. STUDENT also began receiving speech and language services from District speech-language therapist Maria Spencer. In early February 2001, MOTHER signed her consent to an assessment plan prepared by resource specialist Gina Scribner. Shortly thereafter, the District sent SLOCOE a request for an OT consultation regarding STUDENT, and SLOCOE received that request on February 14, 2001. On March 15, 2001, SLOCOE occupational therapist Jacki Kinavey observed STUDENT and determined that an OT assessment was warranted due to his difficulties with fine motor skills.
During February and March 2001, pursuant to the assessment plan of February 7, Mr. Shoffner and Ms. Scribner conducted a psychoeducational evaluation of STUDENT and reported that STUDENT manifested delays across all areas of his development due to mild to moderate mental retardation. Also pursuant to the assessment plan, Ms. Spencer conducted a speech and language assessment and concluded that STUDENT continued to have significant delays in his verbal skills.
On March 26, 2001, MOTHER and the other members of the IEP team convened to discuss the results of the assessments and develop STUDENT’s program. The District members of the team offered to continue STUDENT’s placement in Ms. Walker’s kindergarten class for the remainder of the school year with pull-out speech/language services twice a week and RSP collaboration four times per week. The team also drafted new goals and objectives for STUDENT.
On March 31, 2001, MOTHER received a letter from SLOCOE occupational therapist Jacki Kinavey requesting parental consent for an OT assessment. MOTHER signed her consent to the OT assessment, and Ms. Kinavey conducted the assessment in April 2001. Also in April 2001, Dr. Lee Neidengard of the Tri-Counties Regional Center conducted a medical evaluation and determined that STUDENT remained eligible for Regional Center services. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 181-185.) Dr. Neidengard found that STUDENT had “intellectual skills scatter at about a 3-4 year level,” compared with his then-chronological age of six years. Dr. Neidengard also concluded that STUDENT had PDD-NOS, but not autism.
In a report dated May 5, 2001, Ms. Kinavey reported on the results of her OT assessment of STUDENT. On June 11, 2001, MOTHER signed her consent to the IEP of March 26, 2001. On June 14, 2001, the IEP team reconvened to review the OT assessment, review STUDENT’s program and determine his placement for the 2001-2002 school year. The team members agreed that STUDENT would repeat kindergarten, but would attend both morning and afternoon kindergarten classes so that he would attend school for a full day and receive a “double dose” of kindergarten. (Pet. Exh. p. 194.) The team further agreed to add DIS of OT consultation between the occupational therapist and STUDENT’s teachers twice a month. The IEP did not provide for any extended school year (ESY) services during the summer.
For summer 2001, MOTHER enrolled STUDENT in regular education summer school. However, she withdrew him after a few days because she felt that he was not receiving appropriate supervision. STUDENT remained out of school for the rest of the summer.
In September 2001, STUDENT returned to kindergarten at Templeton Elementary School. Each day he attended Ms. Walker’s morning kindergarten class, then ate lunch and spent the afternoon in a kindergarten class taught by Margaret Phillips. During this time period, STUDENT was often absent from or tardy to school, and also was showing some negative behaviors in school, such as increased aggressiveness. MOTHER requested that STUDENT be provided with a one-to-one aide during his school day; District staff did not agree that STUDENT needed a one-to-one aide, and stated instead that STUDENT’s behaviors were likely due to his attendance problems. (Testimony of Mr. Shoffner, MOTHER.) District staff requested that MOTHER ensure STUDENT’s regular attendance for a period of one month without any absences or tardies, so that they could evaluate whether STUDENT needed an aide when he was not affected by absences. (Testimony of Gina Scribner, Mr. Shoffner; Dist. Exh. 43.)
On December 10, 2001, STUDENT’s IEP team met and agreed to shorten STUDENT’s school day due to difficulties he was having with the full day of kindergarten. The team agreed that STUDENT would remain in Ms. Walker’s morning kindergarten class, but would no longer attend Ms. Phillips’ afternoon class. The IEP document indicated that the team would review STUDENT’s progress by February 15, 2002, and would add socialization goals and objectives at that time.
Thereafter, STUDENT continued to attend morning kindergarten. His IEP team reconvened on February 12, 2002, to review his progress and the length of his school day. PARENTS presented the team with new proposed goals and objectives to be discussed at the upcoming annual IEP meeting the following month.
On March 20, 2002, the IEP team reconvened for STUDENT’s annual IEP. Regarding STUDENT’s placement for the upcoming school year, the District team members proposed Vicki McEwan’s regular education first-grade class for fifty percent of the school day, with the remaining fifty percent of his school day spent in speech/language, RSP, or working one-on-one with an aide. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 248-250.) For the fifty percent of his day spent in the mainstream first-grade class, the District proposed that STUDENT have a one-on-one aide to assist with the increased academic demands of first grade. Respondents also continued to offer OT consultation services. MOTHER requested that STUDENT be provided an autism technician as his one-to-one aide, but District staff took the position that STUDENT did not need an autism technician and instead could have his needs met by a special education aide. District staff also proposed extending the length of STUDENT’s school day to 1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year, in order to prepare him for first grade. The offer also included providing STUDENT an aide from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. for the remainder of his kindergarten year. For the 2002 summer, the District offered summer school with a one-to-one aide, but without RSP, OT or speech-language services.
MOTHER did not sign her consent to the IEP immediately, and therefore STUDENT’s program continued to operate pursuant to his previously agreed-upon IEPs from June 2001, December 2001 and February 2002.
In March 2002, PARENTS set up an applied behavioral analysis (ABA) program for STUDENT at home, using Debra Heller and Brooke Spang to deliver the program to STUDENT. PARENTS also hired Ms. Spang to act as a shadow aide for STUDENT while he was at school. In mid-April 2002, MS. MOTHER obtained both an OT assessment and a physical therapy assessment of STUDENT by Center for Developing Kids, Inc. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 251-255, 510-513.) In May 2002, the District referred STUDENT to SLOCOE for an adaptive physical education (APE) assessment, because of concerns about STUDENT’s gross motor skills.
On May 29, 2002, MOTHER signed her consent to the IEP of March 20, 2002. However, because the regular school year was nearly over, at that point the District was no longer offering to change the length of STUDENT’s kindergarten day or provide him with an aide for the remainder of his kindergarten year; accordingly, those items were crossed out on the March 2002 IEP document. (Pet. Exh. pg. 250.) On June 18, 2002, MOTHER notified the District that she was withdrawing her consent to the March 2002 IEP and was removing STUDENT from his school placement. (Pet. Exh. pg. 260; testimony of MOTHER, Mr. Shoffner.) STUDENT continued to receive ABA instruction in his home program, but did not return to school at the District. MOTHER informed the District that she believed STUDENT’s eligibility designation should be changed to reflect his PDD-NOS diagnosis, and that he needed a “modified discrete trial program.” (Pet. Exh. pg. 262.) On July 17, 2002, Petitioner filed a request for due process hearing with the Hearing Office.
STUDENT did not return to school during the 2002-2003 school year. Pursuant to the May 2002 APE referral, SLOCOE APE teacher Jolene Martin attempted to contact MOTHER in fall 2002 to arrange for the APE assessment. Ms. Martin and MOTHER left telephone messages for each other, but never spoke and did not arrange for the assessment. (See testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Martin.)
In September 2002, PARENTS began providing STUDENT with occupational therapy from Pediatric Therapy Solutions for one hour per week. Also in September 2002, PARENTS took STUDENT for an independent assessment by psychologist Melanie Lenington. Dr. Lenington concluded that STUDENT had a DSM-IV diagnosis of autism, but had at least average intelligence and was not mentally retarded. Dr. Lenington recommended that STUDENT receive a one-to-one ABA home program with a school component, and DIS of occupational therapy, speech/language therapy and physical therapy. PARENTS also obtained an independent physical therapy assessment of STUDENT in October 2002.
On November 7, 2002, the IEP team convened again and agreed to change STUDENT’s eligibility category from mental retardation to autistic-like behavior. The District members of the IEP team offered a special education aide to accompany STUDENT for the entire school day and “autism services” that included at least two hours of one-to-one or small-group instruction each school day. The autism services would be provided by SLOCOE, with doctoral-level supervision by Autism Partnership, a certified nonpublic agency (NPA). The IEP offer specified that “Autism Partnership services will be reviewed after three months to determine the level of need for doctoral input.” (Dist. Exh. 50.) The offer also included increased amounts of speech and language services and OT services. MOTHER did not consent to the offer, and STUDENT remained in his home program.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Did the District fail to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from September 2000 to the present?
Before any action is taken with respect to the initial placement of an individual with exceptional needs, an assessment of the pupil’s educational needs shall be conducted. (Cal. Education Code § 56320.) Thereafter, special education students must be reassessed every three years or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the pupil’s parent or teacher requests a new assessment and that a new IEP be developed. (Cal. Education Code § 56381.)
Both initial assessments and reassessments must adhere to requirements specified in the federal Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law. Because STUDENT had already been evaluated and found eligible for special education prior to his entry into the District in September 2000, this analysis will address only the requirements applicable to reassessments. Reassessments must be conducted by individuals who are both “knowledgeable of the student’s disability” and “competent to perform the assessment, as determined by the school district, county office, or special education local plan area.” (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(g), 56322; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B)(ii).) A psychological assessment must be performed by a credentialed school psychologist. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56324.) Tests and assessment materials must be validated for the specific purpose for which they are used; must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally or sexually discriminatory; must be provided and administered in the student’s primary language or other mode of communication unless this is clearly not feasible; and must be administered by trained personnel in conformance with the instructions provided by the producer of such tests. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), (3); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(a), (b).) Additionally, the student must be assessed in all areas related to his or her suspected disability, and no single procedure may be used as the sole criterion for determining whether the student has a disability or an appropriate educational program for the student. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2), (3); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e), (f).)
There was no request for reassessment upon STUDENT’s entry into the District, nor has Petitioner alleged that he should have been reassessed prior to his triennial reassessment due in March 2001. The triennial assessment plan dated February 7, 2001, indicated that STUDENT would be assessed in the following areas: academic/pre-academic achievement, sensory-motor development, communication development, intellectual development, health and development history, and “social/adaptive behavior if needed.” Pursuant to that plan, District staff conducted STUDENT’s triennial reassessment in February and March 2001. Additionally, pursuant to an assessment plan dated March 31, 2001, SLOCOE occupational therapist Jacki Kinavey conducted an OT assessment in areas including fine motor skills and visual motor integration. (Footnote 1) Pursuant to the triennial reassessment, District speech pathologist Maria Spencer tested STUDENT in communication areas including articulation, vocabulary, and expressive and receptive language. RSP teacher Gina Scribner assessed STUDENT’s academic skills by administering portions of the Brigance, reviewing STUDENT’s school work samples, informally testing his academic skills, observing him in kindergarten and speaking with his kindergarten teacher, Beth Walker.(Footnote 2) (Testimony of Ms. Scribner; see also Dist. Exh. 16.) Mr. Shoffner, a credentialed school psychologist, administered to STUDENT the Differential Ability Scales (DAS), which tests verbal and nonverbal cognitive levels. (Dist. Exh. 16, Pet. Exh. pgs. 106-123; testimony of Mr. Shoffner.) Mr. Shoffner also prepared STUDENT’s developmental history by reviewing his records, observed STUDENT in class and on the playground, and reported on STUDENT’s social/emotional development based on those observations and input from Ms. Scribner and Ms. Walker. (Id.) Furthermore, Mr. Shoffner reported on STUDENT’s performance on various visual motor skill tasks, although it appears that no formal assessment tool was used to obtain these results. (See Dist. Exh. 16, pg. 3; testimony of Mr. Shoffner.)
The undisputed testimony of Ms. Spencer, Ms. Scribner, Mr. Shoffner and Ms. Kinavey established that they were trained and qualified to administer the tests they gave, that they are knowledgeable about STUDENT’s areas of disability, that the tests were validated for the specific purpose for which they were given, that the tests were administered in STUDENT’s primary language, that the tests were administered in conformance with the instructions, and that neither the selection nor administration of the tests were racially, sexually or culturally discriminatory. However, Petitioner argues that the testing was not accurate and that the assessment did not cover all areas of suspected disability.
Regarding the allegations of inaccuracy, Petitioner argues in part that Mr. Shoffner “used the incorrect age level scale when scoring the protocol.” (Pet. Closing Brief, pg. 11; see testimony of Dr. Lenington.) Dr. Lenington, a psychologist who evaluated STUDENT at PARENTS’ request, explained that the DAS protocols that Mr. Shoffner used do not make clear whether the test scores recorded were from Mr. Shoffner’s initial attempt to administer the DAS in September 2000, or the second administration for the triennial reassessment in March 2001. Dr. Lenington testified that the T-scores matched a child of five years, four months, but STUDENT was age five years ten months when he took the examination in March 2001. Dr. Lenington explained that this resulted in STUDENT receiving an inflated score on the DAS, and thus the assessment report overestimated his abilities.
In contrast, Mr. Shoffner testified persuasively that he scored the test in conformity with the test instructions, and that the results were a valid reflection of STUDENT’s abilities. In any event, the Hearing Officer considers that Dr. Lenington and Petitioner are asserting generally that Petitioner’s intelligence was higher than the District’s assessment indicated, and that STUDENT no longer qualifies as mentally retarded. If Petitioner is correct on this point, then whether the District’s assessment overestimated STUDENT’s cognitive level would be largely immaterial. In light of all circumstances, the allegation regarding the scoring of this DAS does not support a finding that the District’s assessment was inappropriate.
Regarding the speech and language testing, Petitioner alleges that Ms. Spencer’s test results were inaccurate because she did not correctly compute the test scores. During Petitioner’s examination of Ms. Spencer, Ms. Spencer initially concurred with Petitioner’s proposition that STUDENT’s raw score on the Expressive Vocabulary Test (EVT) should have been 42, instead of the 37 raw score that Ms. Spencer had originally calculated. However, Ms. Spencer testified that, even if the raw score was 42 instead of 37, the higher raw score would not have shown a significant difference on STUDENT’s percentile score on the EVT, and thus would not have caused her to recommend different goals or objectives in speech/language. Mr. Shoffner later clarified in his testimony that Ms. Spencer had informed him that, after she reexamined the protocols following her testimony, she determined 37 was actually the correct raw score, because STUDENT’s answers to some items on the EVT were incorrect but appeared only lightly marked as such on the photocopied protocol exhibit. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 39-54.) In light of the testimony of Ms. Spencer and Mr. Shoffner, the District established that the results of Ms. Spencer’s speech and language tests were accurate.
Additionally, MOTHER alleged in her testimony that the triennial assessment report did not accurately report STUDENT’s abilities and skill levels. For example, MOTHER disagreed with the assessment report’s findings that STUDENT was able to engage in interactive play with peers. Instead, MOTHER explained that, at the time, STUDENT might have been able to initiate play with peers, but could not sustain it. The testimony on this point is conflicting, and both MOTHER and the District’s assessors provided credible testimony regarding their observations of STUDENT’s social and play skills. However, this type of variation in results, based on different observations done on different days, does not render a school district’s assessment inappropriate. In such circumstances, an assessment is not inappropriate solely due to disagreement with its conclusions.
There were no other notable claims regarding inaccuracy in the testing, and the Hearing Officer concludes that the tests given as part of this reassessment were not inappropriate due to any alleged inaccuracies. Petitioner also alleges that this reassessment was inappropriate because it failed to test STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, in particular in the areas of autistic-like behavior, occupational therapy, adaptive physical education and physical therapy.
Regarding autistic-like behavior, several prior evaluations, such as one by the San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools in March 1998 and one by Dr. Bryna Siegel in April 1998, concluded that STUDENT did not have autism but had autistic-like behaviors and/or pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS).(Footnote 3) The District’s March 2001 assessment report summarized the results of STUDENT’s previous evaluations, stating that “all evaluators also felt that STUDENT did not meet the diagnostic criteria for autism although there were some autistic like behaviors at two and a half to three years of age revolving around language and socialization deficits.” (Pet. Exh. pg. 150.) The triennial assessment report did not include any further references to autism or PDD, although it did include assessment information regarding STUDENT’s language and communication, academics, behavior and socialization, which are among the areas often affected in a child with an autistic spectrum disorder. (See, e.g., Pet. Exh. pgs. 58-65, 699-701.) The triennial assessment report and OT assessment report contained information from observation and testing of STUDENT in those areas, such as descriptions of his social skills, play skills, auditory comprehension, fine motor skills, visual motor integration, sensory motor integration, ability to follow directions, expressive and receptive language, and preference for routine. (Dist. Exhs. 16, 19.) Given that the triennial assessment addressed the areas related to STUDENT’s autistic-like behavior, the District’s assessment adequately assessed his disability in this area.
Regarding OT, Petitioner makes the general allegation that Ms. Kinavey’s OT assessment “failed to assess…areas that were impacting [STUDENT’s] education,” although Petitioner does not specify which areas of suspected disability Ms. Kinavey failed to assess. Dr. Lenington testified that gross motor skills, sensory-motor integration and play skills were areas of suspected disability, and that Ms. Kinavey’s OT assessment failed to assess in those areas.
In conducting the assessment, Ms. Kinavey initially observed STUDENT in his kindergarten classroom, and subsequently administered tests including the fine motor subtests of the Peabody Developmental Motor Scales-Second Edition and the Developmental Test of Visual Motor Integration. Ms. Kinavey explained that she is not certified to administer the Sensory Integration Praxis (SIP) test, but that she generally assessed STUDENT’s sensory-motor integration by observing him on the playground and in the classroom.(Footnote 4) Regarding STUDENT’s play skills, again Ms. Kinavey assessed in this area by observing STUDENT, and the District’s triennial report of March 2001 similarly reported observations and conclusions regarding STUDENT’s play skills.
Regarding gross motor skills, by the time of Dr. Lenington’s assessment in September 2002, Respondents had already initiated an APE assessment for STUDENT. There is little evidence in the record indicating concerns in this area raised prior to spring 2002, and MOTHER did not request such an assessment. Prior to that time, STUDENT was able to participate in kindergarten recess and play in the protected kindergarten playground environment. (See testimony of Jolene Martin, MOTHER, Ms. Walker, Ms. Scribner, Ms. Kinavey, Mr. Shoffner.)
In May 2002, Ms. Scribner reported concerns about STUDENT’s gross motor skills, prompting a referral to SLOCOE for an APE assessment. SLOCOE APE therapist Jolene Martin received the APE referral from the District. Ms. Martin was able to observe STUDENT informally on the playground in May 2002; she did not think that STUDENT’s motor skills raised any concerns about his safety on the playground, but did believe than an APE assessment was warranted. Ms. Martin testified that because the school year ended thereafter, she did not follow up on the APE assessment until school resumed in September 2002. Ms. Martin explained that she inquired about STUDENT and learned that he had not yet returned to school, so she waited a few weeks to see if he would return. Ms. Martin testified that, in October 2002, she left two telephone messages for MOTHER to arrange for preparing and signing an assessment plan, but that MOTHER never returned her calls. MOTHER testified that she returned Ms. Martin’s telephone message and left both her home and cellular telephone numbers, but never heard back from Ms. Martin. Ms. Martin testified that she again attempted to reach MOTHER by telephone on November 5, 2002, but there was no answer. Respondents never conducted an APE assessment for STUDENT.
Ms. Martin and MOTHER were both credible witnesses, and the Hearing Officer believes that both of their reports of attempted contact are true. It is of some concern that Ms. Martin waited until a month into the school year to contact MOTHER to obtain consent for the assessment. It is also of concern that Ms. Martin relied solely on telephone messages in her attempt to contact MOTHER. When Ms. Martin was unable to reach MOTHER by telephone, the obvious next step would be to send MOTHER a letter, perhaps with the proposed assessment plan enclosed. Under State law, LEAs are obligated to obtain a parent’s consent to assess a child in an area of suspected disability, and file for due process hearing to obtain authorization for the assessment if the LEA cannot obtain the parent’s consent.(Footnote 5)
However, it is notable that, while related to gross motor skills, APE is a service that can be provided only to a student participating in physical education at school. The failure to conduct the APE assessment may have caused Respondents to fail to offer APE services for the 2002-2003 school year, but otherwise had little impact because STUDENT remained out of school.(Footnote 6)
Finally, regarding physical therapy, MOTHER never requested a physical therapy assessment, and the evidence did not establish that Respondents should have suspected such an area of disability. Physical therapist Dawn-Marie Ickes observed Templeton Elementary’s campus, reviewed STUDENT’s records, and concluded that a student with STUDENT’s reported needs would not have any safety issues or significant difficulties navigating the playground, classrooms, or cafeteria. An independent physical therapy evaluation obtained by the parents in October 2002 found that STUDENT had some weaknesses in gross motor skills and would benefit from physical therapy. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 510-513.) However, no evidence was offered to establish how those weaknesses related to his educational needs, or to establish that Respondents should have suspected STUDENT needed a physical therapy assessment. The evidence does not support Petitioner’s contention that the District should have suspected that STUDENT had a disability warranting a physical therapy assessment.
Thus, the District assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, with the exception of APE. Because STUDENT was not attending a school with a physical education component, the failure to conduct the APE assessment did not significantly prejudice the student.
2. Did the District err in failing to identify STUDENT as “autistic-like” prior to his individualized education program (IEP) of November 7, 2002?
There is no dispute that Petitioner was and is eligible for special education. However, Petitioner argues that the District erred in identifying his eligibility as MR instead of autistic-like, and that therefore Respondents were not providing an appropriate program to address his needs as an autistic child.(Footnote 7) In contrast, the District contends that the MR designation was accurate and that, in any event, the eligibility category was just a label and did not determine the program provided to STUDENT. The District argues that it offered Petitioner an appropriate program, placement and services based on his needs and that a different eligibility category would not have affected what the District offered.
Neither federal nor State law envisions that misidentification of a student’s eligibility category stands alone to constitute a denial of FAPE. Rather, a denial of FAPE may have occurred if a misidentification resulted in an LEA failing to offer an appropriate program, placement or services designed to meet the student’s needs and result in educational benefit. Conversely, if an LEA failed to correctly identify the student’s eligibility category but nevertheless offered an appropriate program, placement and services, no denial of FAPE occurred.
When STUDENT initially entered the District in September 2000, his prior IEPs had identified him as eligible due to MR. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 47, 89, 96.) The MR designation was pursuant in part to STUDENT’s initial special education assessment at San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools, where the school psychologist found STUDENT eligible as MR but noted some autistic-like behaviors. Prior to that assessment, Dr. Ira Lott’s evaluation of STUDENT in 1996 had identified him as having global developmental delays and some autistic-like behaviors, but found that he did not score as autistic on the Children’s Autism Rating Scale (CARS).
The findings of Dr. Lott and San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools were consistent with the subsequent report from Dr. Bryna Siegel, who evaluated STUDENT in April 1998 and concluded that he had an Axis I diagnosis of PDD-NOS and an Axis II diagnosis of moderate mental retardation. (Pet. Exh. pg. 65.) Similarly, in April 2001, Dr. Lee Neidengard evaluated STUDENT for the Tri-Counties Regional Center and concluded that STUDENT remained eligible for Regional Center services “based on overall mild developmental delays associated with developmental aphasia and [PDD-NOS].” The District continued to find STUDENT eligible as MR after his triennial assessment in February and March 2001.
The evidence consistently demonstrated that STUDENT had mental retardation and some autistic-like behaviors, with a diagnosis of PDD-NOS but not autism.(Footnote 8) As discussed above, the San Bernadino County Superintendent of Schools in 1998, Dr. Ira Lott in 1996, Dr. Bryna Siegel in 1998, and Dr. Lee Neidengard in April 2001 all diagnosed STUDENT with mental retardation and either PDD-NOS or autistic-like behaviors, but not autism. In her 1998 evaluation report, Dr. Siegel explained the bases for STUDENT’s PDD-NOS diagnosis were his significant difficulties with social interactions, significant delay in language skills and a delay in development of imaginative play. However, Dr. Siegel noted that STUDENT did not meet the DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder because he was interested in exploring his environment and did not have repetitive behaviors or a narrow range of interests. Dr. Siegel’s diagnosis of MR was due to STUDENT’s performance on tests such as the Merrill Palmer Scales, on which he scored a mental age of twenty months, compared to his then-chronological age of three years.
Similarly, three years after Dr. Siegel’s evaluation, Dr. Neidengard also agreed that STUDENT had PDD-NOS but not autism. Dr. Neidengard explained that STUDENT had some difficulties with language and communication, but did have some interpersonal skills and did not demonstrate the extremely limited repetitive play activities typical of autistic children. (Pet. Exh. pg. 184.) Furthermore, Dr. Neidengard concluded that STUDENT had MR, with a cognitive level of three to four years old, compared with a then-chronological age of six years. Dr. Neidengard’s conclusions regarding STUDENT’s mental retardation were consistent with the results of the District’s triennial assessment in February and March 2001. Mr. Shoffner testified that STUDENT’s scores on the DAS supported the conclusion that STUDENT had MR; STUDENT’s age-equivalent scores on the DAS were in the three to three-and-a-half year-old range, compared to his then-chronological age of five years, ten months.
In contrast to these fairly consistent depictions of STUDENT over the course of several evaluations, Petitioner contends that STUDENT was not MR but rather was autistic during this time period. The primary evidence supporting this contention was the report and testimony of Dr. Melanie Lenington, who assessed STUDENT in September 2002. Dr. Lenington’s evaluation included administering numerous standardized tests to STUDENT, reviewing his records, observing him in several settings, and interviewing his mother. From her evaluation, Dr. Lenington concluded that STUDENT had at least average intelligence and was not MR, but was autistic according to the DSM-IV criteria.
Dr. Lenington’s position was unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Dr. Lenington’s opinion contradicted all of the numerous prior evaluations of STUDENT, each of which had concluded that STUDENT had some form of MR and/or global developmental delay, and all but the earliest of which had expressly ruled out a diagnosis of autism.(Footnote 9) (See Pet. Exh. pgs. 16-20, 27-29, 35-41, 52-67, 181-185; see also Dist. Exh. 16.) Dr. Edward Ritvo, a noted autism expert and psychiatrist at the UCLA School of Medicine’s Neuropsychiatric Institute, testified that most cases of autism are diagnosable by the time the child is age three or four years old, and that even very mild cases are diagnosable by age five or six. Given that STUDENT had undergone several evaluations between the ages of eighteen months and six years, if he was autistic it is most likely that at least one other assessor would have diagnosed him accordingly. While the other evaluators identified autistic-like behavior, none diagnosed STUDENT as autistic, and several specifically ruled out a diagnosis of autism.(Footnote 10) Moreover, given this history, Dr. Lenington’s autism diagnosis is less persuasive because neither her report nor her testimony specified which elements of the DSM-IV autism criteria STUDENT met. (See Pet. Exh. pg. 452.)
Dr. Lenington also was the only assessor to determine that STUDENT had at least average intelligence and was not mentally retarded. Again, Dr. Lenington’s conclusion raises questions when compared to the findings of the other assessors that STUDENT had MR due to global developmental delays. Furthermore, even on the tests Dr. Lenington administered, the majority of the results were in the moderate deficit, borderline or below average range. For example, STUDENT’s scores on the Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Cognitive Test Battery-III (WJ-III) ranged from the ninth percentile to below the first percentile, with standard scores ranging from 31 to 80. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 472-473, Dist. Exh. 58.) Similarly, STUDENT’s scores on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales were generally in the moderate deficit range and below the first percentile. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 483-484, Dist. Exh. 58; see also testimony of Dr. Lenington, Mr. Shoffner.)
In her testimony, Dr. Lenington discounted the significance of many of STUDENT’s low test scores, explaining that STUDENT’s language impairment interfered with his ability to perform on language-based tests. Regarding STUDENT’s few scores in the average range, Mr. Shoffner’s testimony raised significant issues concerning Dr. Lenington’s interpretations of those test results. In particular, Mr. Shoffner asserted that Dr. Lenington’s administration of the DAS resulted in a score of questionable reliability. Of STUDENT’s two DAS subtest scores in the seven-year-old age equivalent range, Mr. Shoffner explained that the score on the Picture Similarities subtest was obtained from a shaded region on the norms table, which the DAS manual cautions may be relatively inaccurate.
Mr. Shoffner also identified valid concerns regarding Dr. Lenington’s administration of the Wechsler Preschool &Primary Scales of Intelligence (WPPSI-R). There is no dispute that STUDENT was one month older than the highest age normed for the WPPSI-R. During her testimony, Dr. Lenington acknowledged this situation and explained that the WPPSI-R was still an appropriate measure for STUDENT because it tested at his developmental level. Nevertheless, in light of STUDENT’s age on the date of testing, his WPPSI-R scores do not support any firm conclusions about his cognitive level. In any event, STUDENT’s Performance IQ on the WPPSI-R was only 73, which is in the borderline range. Even relying solely on that score and giving no weight to his Verbal IQ score of 47, STUDENT’s WPPSI-R scores did not suggest a student with average to above-average cognitive level as Dr. Lenington reported.
Additionally, some aspects of Dr. Lenington’s report and testimony indicated that she was less than impartial. For example, Dr. Lenington’s report recounts that Dr. Siegel had previously diagnosed STUDENT as PDD-NOS, but fails to mention that Dr. Siegel also diagnosed STUDENT as moderately MR. (Pet. Exh. pg. 451.) Instead, Dr. Lenington’s report states that “school personnel have raised the question of mental retardation,” thus implicitly affording the MR diagnosis less weight than if Dr. Siegel had made the diagnosis. While Dr. Lenington readily acknowledged this minor error in her report, such errors are nevertheless suggestive of an attempt to subtly shade the existing facts to support her position, which undermined her credibility.
In light of all of the above, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT had educational needs due to both MR and autistic-like behaviors. Thus, the IEP eligibility designation of MR was not in error. There is no question that Respondents were obligated to offer STUDENT an educational program that addressed his needs related to his autistic-like behaviors. However, the extent to which Respondents fulfilled that obligation is analyzed in the subsequent sections according to whether Respondents offered him a program that addressed his unique needs so that he could receive educational benefit, not by whether the IEPs specifically identified him as autistic-like. Thus, the District did not err in failing to identify STUDENT as autistic-like prior to November 7, 2002.
3. Did the District and SLOCOE (collectively “Respondents”) provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 extended school year?
Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and state law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) FAPE consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) “Related services” or designated instruction and services (DIS), means transportation and other developmental, corrective and supportive services as may be required to assist the child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).)
The analysis of whether a student has been provided a FAPE is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether the proposed placement is substantively appropriate, and whether procedural steps have been followed. (Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207 (1982).)
A. Procedural Appropriateness
Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Rowley at 205-206.) Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1484.) Procedural violations which do not result in educational loss for the student or an infringement upon parental participation in the IEP process are insufficient to support a finding that the student has been denied a FAPE. (Ibid.)
Respondents have already stipulated that STUDENT was denied a FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001, when he attended SLOCOE’s SH-SDC. After STUDENT’s initial placement in September 2000, Respondents prepared an IEP Student Information Form that identified STUDENT’s placement and services. However, Respondents did not convene an IEP team meeting within thirty days to review STUDENT’s interim placement and make a final recommendation, as required by Education Code section 56325(b). Rather, STUDENT remained in the interim placement in the SH-SDC until January 2001.
Regarding the period from January to June 2001, Petitioner raises two claims of procedural denial of FAPE: (1) STUDENT did not have a current IEP from January to March 2001 and (2) Respondents failed to conduct the OT assessment within the fifty-day timeline required by Education Code section 56344.
(1) STUDENT’s IEP from January to March 2001
A student’s IEP must reflect the specific special educational instruction and services to be provided to the student or on behalf of the student. (Cal. Educ. Code §56345(a)(3).) The District concedes that it “committed a procedural error by not developing an IEP until March 26, 2001,” but argues that this error did not cause STUDENT to lose educational opportunity and thus did not constitute a denial of FAPE. (Dist. Closing Brief, pg. 21.)
In January 2001, STUDENT transferred to a mainstream placement at Templeton Elementary. However, no IEP team convened until March 2001. The District did prepare an IEP Student Information Form for the mainstream placement. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 125-126.) The form indicated STUDENT’s placement at Templeton Elementary, with 15 percent of his time in special education and 85 percent in regular education. (Pet. Exh. pg. 126.) This form did not contain signatures of the parent or the staff involved in STUDENT’s education. Given the consensus that no IEP meeting took place, it appears that the IEP Student Information Form was not developed as part of an IEP meeting. Petitioner alleges that “STUDENT had no IEP in existence” from January to March 2001. This is not entirely correct because STUDENT’s Hesperia IEP contained his goals and objectives, which remained operative, albeit in a different classroom setting than the Hesperia IEP team envisioned. While the District was not required to draft new goals and objectives, it was required to convene an IEP meeting to discuss any changes to STUDENT’s special education instruction or services. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3).) Instead, except for the IEP Student Information Form discussed above, for this two-month period there was no IEP in existence that accurately identified STUDENT’s placement or DIS, including the frequency and duration of the DIS.(Footnote 11) Thus, this absence of an updated IEP constituted a procedural violation of Education Code section 56345(a)(3).
The remaining question is whether this procedural violation caused a serious infringement on the parent’s right to participate in the IEP meeting or a loss of educational opportunity for STUDENT that constituted a procedural denial of FAPE. While the requirement that an IEP reflect the student’s current program is an extremely important one, Petitioner did not argue, nor can the Hearing Officer determine, actual prejudice caused by the District’s failure to comply with this requirement for that period. There was no evidence of a loss of educational opportunity; STUDENT transitioned into the mainstream setting without difficulty and received his RSP and speech/language services. The more difficult question is whether the lack of an IEP meeting for those two months serious infringed on the parent’s right to participate in the IEP process. Given that the IEP meeting convened in March 2001, the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP meeting was postponed, but not denied. Nevertheless, this postponement prevented the parent from participating in planning STUDENT’s program from January until March 26, 2001. To this extent, the procedural violation constituted a denial of FAPE.
(2) OT assessment timeline
From the date an LEA receives a special education referral, it has fifteen days to provide parents with a proposed assessment plan. After receipt of the parent’s written consent to assess, the LEA has 50 days to complete its assessment and hold an IEP meeting to develop an IEP, unless the parent consents to an extension of time. (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321, 56344.)
In the present case, Petitioner argues that Respondents failed to comply with the 50-day timeline regarding the OT assessment. The District undertook to assess STUDENT for his triennial assessment and provided MOTHER with an assessment plan identifying several areas to be assessed, including sensory-motor development, measuring “how well an individual coordinates body movement in small and large muscle activities…[and] may also measure perceptual skills.” The plan did not specifically identify OT as an area to be assessed and did not identify an occupational therapist as an assessor. However, MOTHER asserts that she understood that OT would be one of the areas assessed as part of the triennial assessment.
After MOTHER signed her consent, the District conducted its own evaluation of STUDENT and also sent SLOCOE a referral to conduct an OT obs ervation of STUDENT. SLOCOE received this referral on February 16, 2001, and occupational therapist Jacki Kinavey conducted the observation on March 15, 2001. On March 31, 2001, MOTHER received a letter from SLOCOE occupational therapist Jacki Kinavey requesting parental consent for an OT assessment. MOTHER signed her consent to the OT assessment, and Ms. Kinavey conducted the assessment in April 2001. Ms. Kinavey issued her OT evaluation report on May 5, 2001. The IEP meeting was scheduled to convene and review that report on May 29, but because MOTHER was unable to attend on that date, the meeting was postponed to June 14, 2001. STUDENT began receiving OT consultation services when school resumed in September 2001.
The analysis here is two-fold. First, Petitioner essentially argues that the District’s triennial assessment plan of February 7, 2001, triggered the 50-day timeline for the OT assessment. However, the triennial assessment plan did not indicate that the assessment would include an OT evaluation, nor did it list the occupational therapist as one of the individuals conducting the assessment.(Footnote 12) Rather, the OT assessment was conducted by a different LEA pursuant to a separate assessment plan covering solely the OT assessment.
In light of these facts, the District’s triennial assessment plan of February 7, 2001, did not include the OT assessment. SLOCOE created a separate OT assessment plan, and pursuant to that plan the OT assessment and IEP meeting were completed consistent with the requirements Education Code section 56344. Thus, the OT assessment did not violate the 50-day timeline of section 56344.
Second, the issue arises regarding the delay in assessing STUDENT for OT issues, as part of the reassessment in all areas of suspected disability. The evidence supports the finding that fine motor skills were an area of suspected disability. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 94, 105, 189-193; testimony of Ms. Kinavey, MOTHER.) As such, those areas should have been assessed pursuant to STUDENT’s triennial assessment. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 56320.) While the OT assessment complied with the 50-day timeline of section 56344, the delay inherent in Respondents’ consultation referral process resulted in OT areas not being assessed as part of the triennial assessment. This delay constituted a procedural violation of Education Code section 56320, and resulted in STUDENT not receiving OT services in April, May or June 2001. Because this was a loss of educational opportunity for that three-month period, to that limited extent it constituted a procedural denial of FAPE.
B. Substantive Appropriateness
The standard for determining whether the District substantively offered a FAPE involves the following three factors: whether the program was designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs; whether the program was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit; and whether the program conformed to his IEP. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 176; Gregory K. v. Longview School District (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1307, 1314; 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.)
In Rowley, the Supreme Court decided the appropriate level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that “the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.) Moreover, as long as an LEA provides an appropriate education, methodology is left up to the LEA's discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.)
Special education law also requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occur only when the nature or severity of the student’s disability is such that education in regular education classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); Education Code § 56031.) Furthermore, the amended IDEA specifies additional requirements for the provision of a FAPE which are not in dispute in the present case, such as the obligation to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum. (See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a).)
The LRE requirement is codified in federal law as follows:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities...are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
(20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.550; California Education Code § 56364.2.)
The requirement that disabled children be educated to the maximum extent appropriate with nondisabled children is often referred to as “mainstreaming” or education in the LRE. The law demonstrates “a strong preference for ‘mainstreaming’ which rises to the level of a rebuttable presumption.” (Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education (5th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 1036, 1044-45.)
To summarize, the IDEA and Supreme Court’s decision in Rowley require that an appropriate placement: (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide the student with educational benefit; (3) conform to the student’s IEP; and (4) be in the LRE. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, supra, 458 U.S. at 188.)
STUDENT’s Unique Needs in 2000-2001
In analyzing whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE for 2000-2001, the first step is to identify his unique needs at that time. As determined above, Petitioner had both MR and autistic-like behaviors, and had needs stemming from those disabilities.
Overall, STUDENT’s areas of deficit included communication, language, socialization and play skills, attention, fine motor skills, and academic areas. (Testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Walker, Mr. Shoffner.) While his needs changed over the course of that school year, at the beginning of the year he had emerging play skills and social skills. He could “parallel play” near other children and was beginning to seek out interactions with other children, although he usually could not maintain interactive play without adult facilitation. (Testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Scribner.) His language and communication skills were also emerging; he used oral language to express himself but spoke using single words or two-word phrases instead of full sentences. (Id.; testimony of Ms. Walker, Pet. Exh. pg. 155.) He had difficulties with fine motor skills such as cutting or holding a crayon or pencil. Regarding gross motor skills, he had an awkward gait and sometimes seemed unsure of his balance, but once in mainstream kindergarten was able to participate in regular physical education. Regarding attention, he had a short attention span and high distractibility. (Pet. Exh. pg. 185; testimony of Ms. Walker, Ms. Scribner.) He could pay attention longer when engaging in an activity he chose himself, but had a shorter attention span for activities he did not choose. Regarding preacademic skills, he knew some basic skills such as counting to 5 or 10, coloring, and holding a book correctly to look at its pictures. (Testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Walker, Ms. Scribner.) STUDENT did not have significant behavior problems at school and generally followed school rules and routines. (Testimony of Ms. Walker; Pet. Exh. pg. 156.)
Program offered from September 2000 - January 2001
From September 2000 until January 2001, STUDENT attended an SH-SDC operated by SLOCOE and taught by special education teacher Kathy Ferry. Initially the class was a combination kindergarten/first-grade at an elementary school. In October 2000, the class was split and STUDENT’s group was moved to a middle school campus. Because the middle school campus did not offer age-appropriate mainstreaming opportunities for the SH-SDC students, STUDENT and the other students went to a different elementary school campus once a week for music class with age-level nondisabled peers. (Testimony of MOTHER.) During his time placed in the SH-SDC, STUDENT received speech therapy in a group, but not on an individual basis. (Testimony of MOTHER.) He did not receive OT or any other DIS services.
Respondents stipulated that STUDENT did not receive a FAPE from September 2000 until his transfer to mainstream kindergarten in January 2001. This time period constituted a denial of FAPE in part because the SH-SDC was not STUDENT’s LRE and did not offer the mainstream socialization opportunities STUDENT needed to develop his language and play skills. Additionally, as is discussed above in the section regarding procedural violations, STUDENT’s IEP team never convened to review his interim placement pursuant to Education Code section 56325(b).(Footnote 13)
Program offered from January - March 2001
Petitioner argued that he needed an autism technician as a one-to-one aide during school, and placement in an ABA program. Petitioner also argued that he required OT, physical therapy and APE services. Respondents contended that he needed to attend regular education kindergarten in his LRE.
To recap, in mid-January 2001, STUDENT transferred into Ms. Walker’s regular education kindergarten class at Templeton Elementary. During this period, he received DIS of RSP and speech-language therapy. His IEP from his prior school district in Hesperia continued to be the source of his goals and objectives. STUDENT remained in Ms. Walker’s afternoon kindergarten class through the end of the school year, although his March 2001 IEP added some elements to his program, such as new goals and objectives.
Overall, the evidence supported Respondents’ contention that the mainstream kindergarten placement was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs. MOTHER testified, and Respondents did not dispute, that in light of STUDENT’s needs in 2000-2001 he needed a placement in a class with age-level, higher-functioning peers with whom he could interact socially. Consistent with those requirements, Ms. Walker’s afternoon kindergarten class provided STUDENT with both the instruction and peer models he needed to develop language, play skills and socialization, and offered many opportunities for social interaction throughout the day. Ms. Walker explained that she had attended workshops regarding inclusion of disabled children in a regular education setting, and over the years had had ten to fifteen special needs students in her classes, with disabilities ranging from attention deficit disorder to speech impairment to autism. Ms. Walker described how her classroom was a language-rich, stimulating environment that was designated as a demonstration classroom for California’s Early Intervention for Student Success (EISS) program.
The kindergarten class had a low teacher-student ratio, with twenty students, two teachers, one aide, and some parent volunteers. (Testimony of Ms. Scribner, Ms. Walker, MOTHER.) STUDENT also received one-on-one academic assistance from the RSP teacher, Gina Scribner, and speech-language therapy from District speech-language therapist Maria Spencer. The combination of these factors allowed STUDENT to address most of his areas of need, without the assistance of a one-to-one aide.
Evidence of STUDENT’s educational progress in other areas during this time period is substantial. STUDENT’s use of language expanded noticeably; he used new words and phrases, and used complete sentences to express himself. (Testimony of Ms. Walker, Ms. Spencer, Ms. Scribner.) Academically, he learned the alphabet song. (Testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Scribner; Pet. Exh. pg. 157.) Socially, STUDENT enjoyed his new classmates; using a book of their names that Ms. Scribner had made, he learned to say all of his classmates’ names. (Testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Scribner, Ms.Walker.) MOTHER acknowledged that, from January to June 2001, STUDENT made progress socially; he became excited about school, grew more socially engaged, and got better at initiating contact with peers.
Petitioner argues that STUDENT needed to have an autism technician and an ABA program to address his needs as an autistic child. Petitioner offered the evaluation report and testimony of Dr. Lenington, who explained that she recommends ABA programs for all autistic children. In support, Dr. Lenington cited Dr. Siegel’s recommendation in 1998 that STUDENT receive at least twenty hours of discrete trial training (DTT) per week. However, the Hearing Officer concurs with Dr. Ritvo that Dr. Siegel’s 1998 recommendation was likely no longer applicable in 2001, because STUDENT’s skill levels and needs had changed. In 1998, STUDENT was a three-year-old who used no language other than the word “Mom.” In 2001, six-year-old STUDENT had significant increases in language and improved social skills, and was able to participate in regular education.
This Decision has already determined that STUDENT had some autistic-like behaviors, but did not have autism. The program offered to him addressed his deficits in the areas related to his autistic-like behaviors, including language, communication, social-emotional development, and attention. Petitioner did not establish that he required an ABA program in order to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit.(Footnote 14) Similarly, the evidence established that STUDENT did not need the assistance of an autism technician, in light of his language, communication and social skills that allowed him to work on his goals and objectives using the available supports and services. Such supports and services included his RSP instruction four times per week, as well as the one-to-one attention and small group instruction he received due to the small teacher-student ratio in Ms. Walker’s classroom. In light of these circumstances, STUDENT did not require an autism technician in order to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit.
Regarding services, STUDENT’s prior school district in Hesperia had referred him for an OT assessment, which resulted in a recommendation of OT services twice a week, for thirty minutes per session. (Pet. Exh. pg. 105.) However, because PARENTS moved out of that district immediately after this recommendation was issued, STUDENT never received OT services in Hesperia. Moreover, the OT recommendation was never attached to an IEP, and the District apparently had no knowledge of the recommendation prior to initiating its triennial assessment. There was no evidence that MOTHER requested an OT assessment or OT services, nor that she notified Respondents that OT had been added to STUDENT’s program in Hesperia. Thus, Respondents had no knowledge that STUDENT’s program should have included OT services, nor did they have an obligation to conduct an OT assessment prior to his triennial assessment. Thus, the failure to provide OT services from January to March 2001 did not constitute a denial of FAPE.
The same considerations apply regarding physical therapy and APE for this time period, although STUDENT did not receive a recommendation for these services while he was in Hesperia. MOTHER never requested an assessment in these areas, and they were not part of STUDENT’s Hesperia IEP or initial assessment. As discussed under Issue #1, Respondents did not have reason to suspect that STUDENT had disabilities in these areas. Thus, there was no obligation to provide STUDENT with these services from January to March 2001.
In summary, STUDENT’s program addressed his needs and resulted in substantial progress in most areas from January to March 2001. No substantive denial of FAPE occurred for this period.
Program offered from March - June 2001
During this period, STUDENT remained in the same placement in Ms. Walker’s afternoon kindergarten class, and received the same DIS. His program changed to the extent that his IEP team convened, drafted new goals and objectives, and determined the specific amount of time each week that STUDENT would receive his speech/language therapy and RSP services.
Petitioner argues that the goals and objectives contained in the March 2001 IEP document were not designed to meet his unique needs because they failed to address several areas of deficit. Dr. Lenington testified that the IEP failed to include goals and objectives regarding attention, coping skills or social-emotional development. Regarding attention, the IEP document section notes STUDENT’s distractibility, and identifies a goal for STUDENT to “attend to [an] adult-selected activity for at least 10 minutes on ¾ [of] trials.” Regarding coping skills, Ms. Scribner testified that the staff addressed this within STUDENT’s program, through modeling appropriate behaviors, peer interaction and encouraging STUDENT to use language to express himself when frustrated. Regarding social-emotional development, Ms. Scribner explained that this was an area addressed continuously during STUDENT’s mainstream classroom program. Ms. Walker described her successful efforts to facilitate STUDENT’s social interactions with his classmates, such as positively preparing the other students for STUDENT’s entry into the class. Notably, Ms. Walker also described her training and experience in inclusion of disabled students in regular education. Thus, the goals and objectives addressed STUDENT’s areas of need in attention. Regarding coping skills and social-emotional development, while these areas were not specifically identified in the goals and objectives, overall the program addressed STUDENT’s needs in these areas.
The goals and objectives also covered areas of speech, language, and academic areas such as reading, counting, written communication, sorting items into categories, answering questions, identifying objects by their function, and using prepositions that indicate location. The Hearing Officer concludes that the goals and objectives, as part of STUDENT’s overall program, were designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs and to allow him to receive educational benefit.
Regarding placement, the afternoon kindergarten class continued to be appropriate for STUDENT, as discussed in the prior section regarding his placement from January to March 2002. STUDENT continued to receive RSP services and the speech/language therapy he needed. As discussed in the prior section, MOTHER and the District’s witnesses agreed that STUDENT made noticeable progress from January to June 2001, particularly in language, communication, socialization and play skills.
Petitioner argues that STUDENT continued to need an autism technician and an ABA program to address his needs. As discussed in the prior section, STUDENT was able to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit utilizing the mainstream placement, supports and services offered by Respondents. That program addressed his needs in the areas related to his autistic-like behaviors, including language, communication, social-emotional development, and attention. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that STUDENT required an ABA program and an autism technician to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit.
Regarding services, Petitioner contended that STUDENT needed OT, physical therapy and APE. As discussed above in the section on procedural appropriateness, STUDENT did not receive OT because of the delay in initiating his OT assessment. Ms. Kinavey’s OT assessment subsequently determined that STUDENT required OT due to his fine motor weaknesses, which was consistent with a similar finding by Inland County before STUDENT transferred into the District. (Pet. Exh. pg. 105.) Notably, Ms. Walker testified that the kindergarten students worked on fine motor skills in varying classroom activities, including coloring, cutting, stringing beads, playing with “Play Doh” and writing in salt boxes. Ms. Walker testified that STUDENT made some gains in fine motor skills during this period, such as improvement in writing his name.
While working on fine motor skills in the regular education classroom may have minimized the negative impact of STUDENT’s failure to receive OT during this period, nevertheless due to his fine motor weaknesses he required OT to address his needs. When considered in context with Respondents’ subsequent failure to provide occupational therapy to STUDENT, as discussed below, the lack of occupational therapy failed to address STUDENT’s unique needs in fine motor skills and constituted a denial of FAPE in that area.
Regarding physical therapy and APE, as discussed already in this Decision, MOTHER never requested a physical therapy assessment, and the evidence did not establish that Respondents should have suspected such areas of disability. Moreover, because no APE assessment was conducted, and no testimony was received from a physical therapist or APE therapist who had evaluated STUDENT, the evidence regarding his needs in this area was very limited. Thus, the evidence did not establish that STUDENT required APE or physical therapy in order to address his unique needs or receive educational benefit.
There were no allegations regarding nonconformity with the March 2001 IEP during this period. Additionally, there was no dispute that the regular education kindergarten placement was in the LRE. Thus, with the exception of the failure to provide OT services from March to June 2001, Respondents’ offer during this time period was substantively appropriate, in that it addressed his unique needs and allowed him to receive educational benefit in conformity with his IEP and in the LRE.
Summer 2001
Extended school year (ESY) services are provided when individuals with special needs require special education services in excess of the regular academic year when interruption of the pupil’s regular education program may cause regression. (5 C.C.R. § 3043(a).) In the present case, the District did not offer STUDENT ESY for summer 2001. The District members of the IEP team informed MOTHER that STUDENT could attend the regular education summer school that was available for all students. The District did not offer speech therapy, RSP services, or any other DIS for that summer. The IEP team did conclude that STUDENT was not yet ready to enter first grade, and therefore decided that he should repeat kindergarten.
Mr. Shoffner testified that the IEP team concluded that STUDENT did not need ESY because his smooth transition into his new classroom and his substantial progress from January to June 2001 indicated that he was not likely to significantly regress over the summer. Consistent with this position, the staff who worked with STUDENT did not report any significant regression at the beginning of the 2001-2002 school year. Petitioner did not offer any persuasive evidence to the contrary, other than to argue that STUDENT’s lack of readiness for kindergarten was evidence enough that he would regress over the summer. However, there was no evidence that STUDENT’s slow development of skills was related to any tendency to regress over lengthy break periods. Thus, STUDENT did not need ESY services that summer, and the District was not obligated to offer ESY or other special education services during summer 2001.
4. Did Respondents provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2001-2002 school year, including the 2002 extended school year?
No notable procedural claims were raised regarding the 2001-2002 school year, and therefore the analysis for this year will focus on substantive appropriateness. Regarding substantive claims, as discussed regarding January to June 2001, Petitioner again argued that the District’s offer failed to address his autistic-like behaviors, and that he needed an ABA program and an autism technician. Petitioner again argued that he needed physical therapy and APE services. Petitioner also argued that he needed more intensive OT services than Respondents offered, and that the OT services provided did not comport with the IEP. Respondents again argued that they had offered an appropriate program to address STUDENT’s unique needs, including his needs related to his autistic-like behaviors, regardless of what label was attached to STUDENT’s disability. Regarding services, Respondents argued he did not require APE or physical therapy services. Regarding OT, Respondents argued that the OT services offered were sufficient to allow Petitioner to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit, and that the services comported with the IEP.
STUDENT’s unique needs for 2001-2002
As discussed in the prior section, STUDENT had MR and some autistic-like behaviors, although he did not have autism. As also discussed in the prior section, during the 2000-2001 school year STUDENT achieved progress in several areas, particularly language and social interactions. However, in light of his MR and PDD-NOS, he continued to have unique needs in the same general areas, including language, communication, socialization, attention, fine motor skills, and academics.
Program offered for 2001 – 2002 From September 2001 to March 2002, the program offered continued the services, goals and objectives from the March 2001 IEP. (Pet. Exh. pgs. 156-167.) In June 2001 the IEP team agreed that STUDENT would repeat kindergarten, but would enroll in both morning and afternoon kindergarten classes so that he would attend school for a full day. (Pet. Exh. p. 194.) The offer continued his attendance in Ms. Walker’s kindergarten class, which would occur in the morning session, and added placement in Margaret Phillips’ afternoon kindergarten class. The team also agreed to add OT consultation services and OT goals and objectives.
In December 2001, the IEP team reconvened and agreed that because STUDENT was having difficulties in his afternoon kindergarten class, he should attend only morning kindergarten. In March 2002, partly to prepare STUDENT for first grade, the District proposed to add RSP services after the end of the morning kindergarten day; under this proposal, STUDENT would attend school until 1:00 p.m. and receive transportation from school to home as a DIS. The District also offered to provide STUDENT with a one-to-one special education aide from 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the regular school year, and all day during the four-week ESY. (Pet. Exh. pg. 250.) The March 2002 IEP also updated STUDENT’s goals and objectives, and added goals and objectives in areas such as gross motor skills, cooperative play and expressing feelings appropriately.
Regarding goals and objectives, Petitioner argues that both those from the March 2001 and March 2002 IEPs were not appropriate for STUDENT’s needs. In light of this Decision’s conclusion that the goals and objectives from the March 2001 IEP were appropriate for STUDENT from March to June 2001, and considering STUDENT’s ongoing needs in the same areas the following school year, those goals and objectives remained appropriate for STUDENT from September 2001 to March 2002.
Regarding the goals and objectives drafted for the March 2002 IEP, Petitioner argues that they were inappropriate because the District members of the IEP team agreed to incorporate only some, and not all, of the goals and objectives proposed by PARENTS. (See Pet. Exh. pgs. 140-144.) Ms. Scribner testified that some of the proposed goals were not needed, and some were too high for STUDENT’s level. The District’s March 2002 IEP goals and objectives are extensive, addressing areas including attention and on-task behavior, speech, language, communication, following routines, socialization, emotional development, and various academic areas covering reading, writing and math. (Dist. Exhs. 31, 32, 57; testimony of Ms. Scribner.) In light of the evidence regarding STUDENT’s unique needs, the Hearing Officer finds that the March 2002 IEP goals and objectives were designed to address those needs and allow STUDENT to receive educational benefit.
Regarding STUDENT’s placement, District staff members credibly testified that while STUDENT had achieved good progress during his six months in regular kindergarten, he still did not have the skill levels necessary to be successful in first grade. (Testimony of Mr. Shoffner, Ms. Walker, Ms. Scribner.) The “double dose” of kindergarten was designed to maximize STUDENT’s learning and social growth by exposing him to kindergarten curriculum presented in two different ways by two different teachers, with peer modeling and socialization opportunities throughout the day. (Id.) The kindergarten classrooms had two teachers, one aide, and various volunteer parents to work with the twenty or fewer kindergarten students. (See testimony of Ms. Walker.)
After the first three months of STUDENT’s full day of kindergarten, STUDENT was having difficulties attending for the full day, with noncompliance behaviors primarily in the afternoon session. (Testimony of Ms. Scribner, Ms. Walker.) Mr. Shoffner and Ms. Scribner explained that because STUDENT was doing well in the morning kindergarten, the IEP team agreed that he should attend only in the mornings, when he could perform well. District staff also believed that STUDENT’s difficulties were due in large part to his frequent absences from school. (Testimony of Ms. Scribner; Pet. Exh. pgs. 207, 445, 447, Dist. Exh. 43.) Ms. Scribner explained that STUDENT demonstrated the greatest difficulties with behaviors and readjusting to classroom routines on days when he was tardy to school or returning to school after an absence.
The Hearing Officer finds that the kindergarten placement continued to be designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs for the 2001-2002 school year. Because STUDENT was working on kindergarten-level skills and was able to receive benefit in the kindergarten classroom, the placement remained appropriate for him. While there was no dispute that it turned out that STUDENT could not handle a full day of kindergarten, District staff monitored his progress and proposed a modification after alternative interventions had been attempted.
The evidence further demonstrated that STUDENT received educational benefit that year. While he had more noncompliant and aggressive behaviors than the prior year, he nevertheless made progress on all of his goals and objectives, and met approximately half of them. (Dist. Exhs. 31, 32; testimony of Ms. Scribner, Ms. Walker.) Ms. Scribner described how STUDENT’s use of language had increased and he made gains in areas such as math, reading, play skills and gross motor skills. (See, e.g., Pet. Exh. pg. 427.) Ms. Walker explained how STUDENT’s report card detailed his specific academic growth, such as the new shapes, letters and letter sounds he could identify at the end of each school trimester. (Dist. Exhs. 43, 48; testimony of Ms. Walker.) Ms. Walker also testified about how STUDENT’s social and play skills had improved by spring 2002, noting that STUDENT had developed friendships and would often interact with other children during play. In light of the evidence, the Hearing Officer concurs that STUDENT received educational benefit during the 2001-2002 school year.
Petitioner again argues that he needed an autism technician during a shortened school day and an ABA program for the remainder of his day. As discussed above, STUDENT’s deficits related to his MR and PDD-NOS did not require either an autism technician or an ABA program. Given the small teacher-student ratio in the kindergarten classes, and the additional classroom support he received from the RSP teacher, STUDENT was able to make meaningful progress without an autism technician or other type of one-to-one aide in kindergarten.(Footnote 15)
Thus, the placement, goals and objectives were appropriate for STUDENT. Regarding services, STUDENT continued to require RSP, speech-language therapy and OT. Regarding physical therapy and APE, as discussed regarding the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT was able to participate in physical education and playground activities. MOTHER did not request an assessment or services in these areas, and Respondents did not have reason to suspect that STUDENT had disabilities in these areas. Moreover, in light of the limited evidence presented at hearing, the evidence did not establish that STUDENT required APE or physical therapy in order to address his unique needs or receive educational benefit.
Petitioner argues that the OT services for the 2001-2002 school year were not sufficiently intensive. Petitioner argues that STUDENT needed direct OT services, not just the consultation services that were offered. Jacki Kinavey, the SLOCOE occupational therapist who provided STUDENT’s OT, explained that OT consultation involved her observing STUDENT and consulting with his classroom teacher and RSP teacher about how to address his OT needs. Ms. Kinavey explained that consultation services addressed STUDENT’s needs because consultation allowed his teachers to implement the OT accommodations and activities throughout his school day. Ms. Kinavey explained that direct OT services necessarily were for a only a short time each week, and would not have as effective an impact as accommodations and activities STUDENT could do every day in class. Ms. Kinavey testified that she frequently consulted with STUDENT’s RSP teacher, Gina Scribner, and Ms. Kinavey felt that Ms. Scribner was particularly experienced and skilled and would implement the OT recommendations to the exact specifications.
In contrast, Petitioner offered the testimony of private occupational therapist Lisa Marino, who evaluated STUDENT in September 2002 and thereafter provided him with several clinical OT sessions. Ms. Marino described her findings regarding STUDENT’s OT needs, and recommended that STUDENT receive one to two hours per week of clinic-based OT, plus additional OT and consultation services at school.
Ms. Kinavey adequately established that OT consultation services at school were sufficient to address STUDENT’s OT needs. Ms. Marino’s recommendations appeared to go beyond the limited obligation of LEAs to provide an appropriate program to address the child’s educational needs. While the intensive OT services Ms. Marino recommended would have been of benefit to STUDENT, he did not require such intensive and far-ranging OT services to meet his unique needs and receive educational benefit. The Hearing Officer finds that OT consultation services were adequate to address STUDENT’s unique needs in fine motor skills.
Additionally regarding the OT DIS, Petitioner argues that the OT services were not in conformity with the IEP because Ms. Kinavey did not actually deliver the consultation services. The June 2001 IEP stated that STUDENT would receive OT consultation services twice a month. Ms. Kinavey testified that, to provide the consultation services, she would observe STUDENT working with a teacher or aide in class, and then later meet with that teacher or aide to offer suggestions regarding OT accommodations and activities. Ms. Kinavey explained that she did not always observe STUDENT prior to consulting with his teachers.
Petitioner argues that Ms. Kinavey’s log sheet proves that STUDENT did not actually receive the OT services on his IEP. Ms. Kinavey’s log indicates that, not including her attendance at STUDENT’s IEP meeting in March 2002, she provided consultation services to STUDENT on eight occasions from January to May 2002. (SLOCOE Exh. 5.) Of those eight occasions, seven had log entries reflecting that the services were provided in the afternoons, ranging from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Given that STUDENT was no longer attending the afternoon kindergarten session in 2002, the log reflects that Ms. Kinavey observed STUDENT only once from January 2002 until STUDENT left school in early June 2002, although Ms. Kinavey testified that she recalls observing him twice during that period. In any event, Ms. Kinavey’s other recorded OT consultations did not entail observation of STUDENT or how his teacher ran the classroom, since Ms. Walker assisted during the afternoons but did not teach the afternoon class. Instead, for those afternoon observation and consultation sessions, Ms. Kinavey spoke with the RSP teacher or classroom aide, but usually observed the kindergarten classroom when occupied by other students and taught by a different teacher. In light of Ms. Kinavey’s description of what OT consultation services entailed, the occupational therapist’s infrequent observation of the student over a period of five months did not comport with the IEP.(Footnote 16) Thus, while STUDENT received some OT consultation services, the frequency of those services were not in conformity with his IEP from January to early June 2002, and to that extent Respondents denied him a FAPE.
To summarize, Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE to the extent that the provision of OT consultation services from January to early June 2002 failed to comport with his IEP. Other than that denial, Respondents offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year.
Summer 2002
Extended school year (ESY) services are provided when individuals with special needs require special education services in excess of the regular academic year when interruption of the pupil’s regular education program may cause regression. (5 C.C.R. § 3043(a).) In the present case, the District offered ESY with a one-to-one aide for the entire school day, but did not offer RSP, OT, speech-language or any other DIS. Given the purposes of ESY, there was no evidence that STUDENT required OT or speech-language during the four-week summer session in order to work on his academic goals and objectives. While RSP may have otherwise been necessary, the offer of a one-to-one aide was sufficient to allow STUDENT to benefit from the summer session. Thus, the failure to offer other DIS during the summer did not constitute a denial of FAPE.
5. Did Respondents offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, including the 2003 extended school year?
As with the two prior school years, for the current school year Petitioner’s primary contention is that Respondents’ offer fails to address his autistic-like behaviors, and that he needs an ABA program and an autism technician. Respondents again argue that they have offered an appropriate program to address STUDENT’s unique needs, including his needs related to his autistic-like behaviors.
A. Substantive Appropriateness
STUDENT’s Unique Needs
In fall 2002, because STUDENT did not return to Templeton Elementary and remained in a home-based ABA program PARENTS provided, District witnesses received little information regarding how STUDENT’s needs had changed since June 2002. Dr. Deryl Goldenberg and STUDENT’s ABA therapists, Debra Heller and Brooke Spang, described how STUDENT made improvements in nearly all areas, including academics, language, play skills, fine motor skills, attention, reduction of aggressive behaviors and expressing his feelings verbally. (See Pet. Exh. pgs. 699-701.) While Respondents disputed the validity of these reports and the extent of his gains, in any event there is no question that STUDENT continues to have needs in the same general areas: language, communication, attention, social and play skills, fine motor skills and academics. As discussed under Issue #4, STUDENT occasionally manifested some aggressive and/or noncompliant behaviors during the 2001-2002 school year, and to that extent behavior was also an area of need.
Program Offered for September – November 2002
For his first grade year, initially Respondents offered STUDENT a mainstream first grade placement for fifty percent of the day, with an aide accompanying him during that time. The remaining fifty percent of his school day would be spent in speech/language, RSP, or working one-on-one with an aide outside of class.
The mainstream first grade placement offered was a regular education class taught by Vicki McEwan. Ms. McEwan described her class’s daily routines and activities, and discussed strategies she would use to address STUDENT’s needs in her classroom. For example, Ms. McEwan discussed ways to address STUDENT’s inattentiveness, such as giving him incentives to pay attention and remain on task. Ms. McEwan testified that STUDENT would be able to work on his goals and objectives in her class, noting that many of the goals in STUDENT’s IEP are already part of the first grade curriculum.
Ms. McEwan teaches the first grade class without assistance from a co-teacher or aide, although she usually has help from two or three volunteer parents each day. Because fewer adults would be present to assist STUDENT in first grade, and because of the increased school day and increased academic demands of first grade, a one-to-one aide would be appropriate to redirect STUDENT to academic tasks and help him work on other IEP goals and objectives. In light of all evidence, the first grade placement offer was designed to meet STUDENT’s needs and allow him to receive educational benefit.
Regarding DIS, Petitioner appears to argue that the offer of speech/language services for a total of sixty minutes per week was not intensive and did not address all areas of need, although Petitioner has not clarified which areas of need were lacking. As discussed under Issue #4, the March 2002 IEP goals and objectives were appropriate for STUDENT. Specifically regarding the speech/language goals, speech/language therapist Maria Spencer discussed how these goals and objectives were appropriate for STUDENT’s current levels. (See Pet. Exh. pgs. 245-246.) Because STUDENT had difficulty with attending to task, the IEP included a goal regarding attention, which would be implemented by Ms. Spencer during speech/language therapy, as well as by STUDENT’s other teachers. This Decision has already determined that STUDENT made significant gains in speech and language from January 2000 to June 2002, during which period he received speech/language therapy twice a week, for a total of forty to sixty minutes per week. In light of all evidence, the present offer of speech-language therapy twice a week for thirty minutes per session, using the March 2002 IEP goals and objectives, was designed to address STUDENT’s speech and language needs and reasonably calculated for him to benefit in this area.
Petitioner also argues that Respondents’ failure to offer him APE constituted a denial of FAPE. As discussed regarding Issue #1 of this Decision, in May 2002 the District initiated a referral to SLOCOE to conduct an APE assessment due to concerns about STUDENT’s gross motor skills in physical education and on the playground. However, because no APE assessment was ever conducted, and little evidence was presented regarding STUDENT’s gross motor deficits, the Hearing Officer cannot determine whether STUDENT required APE services to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit. As discussed previously, Respondents failed to obtain MOTHER’s consent for the APE assessment. Considering also that Respondents have the burden of proving that they complied with the IDEA, the Hearing Officer concludes that the failure to conduct the APE assessment constituted a denial of FAPE to the extent that it prevented the IEP team from determining whether STUDENT needed APE services for the 2002-2003 school year.
Petitioner again contends that he required physical therapy as a DIS. As discussed previously, Respondents did not have reason to suspect that STUDENT had a disability in this area, and MOTHER never requested physical therapy services or assessment. Thus, Respondents were not obligated to offer STUDENT physical therapy as part of an offer of FAPE.
Because STUDENT never returned to Templeton Elementary, the program was never provided to him, and thus there are no issues regarding conformity with the IEP. Regarding LRE, while Respondents’ offer proposed to place STUDENT in a more restrictive environment for half the school day, Petitioner did not allege that STUDENT needed a less restrictive environment; there is no question that the placement Petitioner sought was a more restrictive environment than Respondents proposed. Because there were no issues raised regarding LRE, this Decision will not examine whether this offer was in the LRE.
Thus, except for the denial of FAPE regarding APE services, the program proposed for September to November 2002 was an offer of FAPE.
Program Offered in November 2002
In fall 2002, STUDENT remained out of school and the parties remained in disagreement regarding his program. At the IEP meeting on November 7, 2002, Respondents proposed to modify the program offered in the IEP of March 2002. The new offer continued STUDENT’s placement for part of the day in regular education first grade, but added a minimum of two hours per day of autism services. The IEP specified that the autism services would be developed and supervised by District and [SLOCOE] SELPA Autism Services staff, with doctoral-level supervision provided by the non-public agency Autism Partnership. The IEP offer further stated that “Autism Partnership services will be reviewed after three months to determine the level of need for doctoral output.” (Dist. Exh. 50.) The new offer also specified that STUDENT would have a one-to-one aide for the entire school day, increased the amounts of OT and speech/language services STUDENT would receive, and added direct OT services.
Regarding the autism services, SLOCOE administrator Jackie Kirk-Martinez described SLOCOE’s autism program and explained her opinion that the program could address STUDENT’s needs related to his autistic-like behaviors. (See also SLOCOE Exh. 14.) While Petitioner is seeking an autism program, he argues that Respondents’ offer was inappropriate because receiving only three months of autism services would not benefit STUDENT. However, Mr. Shoffner testified that the IEP offer only specified a review of the autism services after three months, not termination after three months, and that the Autism Partnership services could remain in place if the doctoral-level supervisor and IEP team believed that it was appropriate. Dr. Ritvo explained that a three-month transition period was appropriate in this instance, particularly given STUDENT’s long absence from school, so that the autism staff could evaluate STUDENT’s functioning levels and determine what level of autism services he required.
The Hearing Officer concurs that the IEP document clearly states that the Autism Partnership services would be reviewed after three months to determine the need for doctoral-level supervision. There is no indication in the IEP document, or from any other evidence, that the offer was for only three months of autism services and thereafter reverted back to the prior IEP, as Petitioner suggests. Given that the staff of SLOCOE’s autism program and of Autism Partnership would not be familiar with STUDENT, the three-month transition period for evaluation and review was consistent with designing an appropriate program for STUDENT and facilitating his transition out of his current home program. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the offer of autism services was appropriate for STUDENT.
Regarding the DIS, Mr. Shoffner and Ms. Spencer both explained that Respondents offered increased DIS services because they believed that STUDENT would need increased services to facilitate his return to school and compensate for the lack of services for the months he was out of school. This Decision already found the lower levels offered for September to December 2002 to be sufficient. However, there is no dispute that STUDENT would benefit more from increased amounts of OT and speech/language therapy. Accordingly, the offer of OT and speech/language services was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and reasonably calculated to allow him to receive educational benefit.
The Hearing Officer’s prior findings regarding APE services and physical therapy for September to November 2002 remain applicable for the subsequent portion of the 2002-2003 school year. Respondents’ failure to obtain MOTHER’s consent for the APE assessment constituted a denial of FAPE to the extent that it prevented the IEP team from determining whether STUDENT needed APE services for the 2002-2003 school year. However, Respondents had no obligation to include physical therapy services as part of their offer for the 2002-2003 school year.
Again, there were no issues regarding conformity with the IEP or placement in the LRE. Therefore, the November 2002 offer was substantively appropriate.
B. Procedural Appropriateness
For the 2002-2003 school year, the only notable procedural claim raised concerned MOTHER’s participation in the November 2002 IEP meeting. Petitioner argues that because the program offer, contained on the second page of that IEP document, was already prepared prior to the IEP meeting, MOTHER had no input into the program or services.
Both the Hearing Office and court decisions have previously established that an LEA’s pre-drafting of an IEP does not necessarily constitute a denial of FAPE. Given the complexity of many special education programs, preparing the specifications of a program in advance may be necessary to present a clear written offer and facilitate meaningful discussion at the IEP meeting. Given that MOTHER was able to participate in the discussion at the IEP meeting, and was free to suggest changes that could have been handwritten onto the IEP document, Respondents’ action of typing their offer prior to the IEP meeting does not constitute a denial of FAPE. (See, e.g., Hudson v. Wilson (W.D. Va. 1986) 1986-87 EHLR Dec. 558:186, 189.)
Accordingly, there were no procedural denials of FAPE regarding the offer for the 2002-2003 school year.
6. Is the appropriate program for STUDENT an intensive Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) program for forty (40) hours per week, year round, under the supervision of Verdugo Hills Autism Project, a certified non-public agency?
Because the Hearing Officer found that overall the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, this Decision will not evaluate the appropriateness of Petitioner’s proposed program. While the Hearing Officer did find that Respondents denied Petitioner a FAPE to the limited extent that they failed to conduct an APE assessment, Petitioner’s proposed program did not include APE services. Indeed, the limited denial of FAPE in APE is entirely unrelated to Petitioner’s proposed ABA program.
7. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following assessments:
a. psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Melanie Lenington;
Special education students must be reassessed every three years, “or more frequently, if conditions warrant, or if the pupil’s parent or teacher requests a new assessment and a new [IEP] to be developed.” (Education Code § 56381.) When a parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the public educational agency, the parent has the right to an independent educational evaluation (IEE) from qualified specialists at public expense unless the educational agency is able to demonstrate at a due process hearing that its assessment was appropriate. (Education Code § 56329(b).)
In the present case, the Hearing Officer found that the District conducted an appropriate psychoeducational assessment. Therefore, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for Dr. Lenington’s assessment.
b. occupational therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.; and
The Hearing Officer found that the District conducted an appropriate OT assessment, and therefore STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for the OT assessment on this basis.
c. physical therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.
Because the Hearing Officer found that STUDENT did not have suspected disability in this area, other than those disabilities already addressed in his OT assessment, STUDENT’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for this assessment.
8. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement and/or compensatory education as a result of denial of FAPE?
Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496.) Parents need not provide the exact proper placement or services required under IDEA, but rather must only provide a placement or services that address the student’s needs and provides the student with educational benefit. (Florence County School District Four v. Carter (1993) 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361; Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education (5th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153, 1161.) In addition, equitable considerations may be considered in granting relief, and courts have broad discretion in granting relief. (Burlington, supra; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496.)
Petitioner seeks reimbursement for the ABA home program his parents provided from March 2002 to November 2002, as well as reimbursement for shadow aide services provided by Brooke Spang from March to May 2002. However, as discussed further below, none of the limited denials of FAPE warrant reimbursement for the ABA program or shadow aide services. Respondents offered STUDENT an appropriate placement in the LRE for the period from March to November 2002, as well as for prior school years. The only denials of FAPE determined by the Hearing Officer concerned very limited areas, such as DIS unrelated to the ABA program and shadow aide services. While Respondents stipulated to a denial of FAPE for September 2000 to January 2001, the ABA program and shadow aide services did not remedy that denial of FAPE. There was no evidence that the home program or shadow aide services addressed any deficits that may have grown out of the September 2000 to January 2001 period. Indeed, the primary denials relating to that period are the failure to place STUDENT in the LRE, and the procedural violation of failing to conduct an IEP meeting after STUDENT had been in the interim placement for thirty days. The subsequent provision of the ABA program and shadow aide services, over one year later, did nothing to address the results of either denial. Indeed, placing STUDENT in the highly restrictive environment of an ABA/DTT home program is somewhat contrary to remedying an LRE violation.
Moreover, even if the ABA program was an appropriate remedy for the denial of FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001, the weight of evidence supports Respondents’ contention that the ABA program and shadow aide services did not meet the limited standard required for a parentally-provided program. The ABA program was not designed to address STUDENT’s unique needs, in part because it was designed and operated with inadequate doctoral-level or mid-level supervision. Dr. Goldenberg consulted with the ABA therapists on only a few occasions. Designing and implementing an ABA program is a complex endeavor typically supervised by an individual with a master’s degree or Ph.D. in psychology or a related field. (See, e.g., testimony of Dr. Goldenberg.) Ms. Heller and Ms. Spang do not have the experience or education required to design, implement and oversee an ABA program. (See testimony of Ms. Spang, Ms. Heller, Pet. Exh. pgs. 697, 702.) While Petitioner’s witnesses established that PARENTS were attempting to provide the best home program in light of financial constraints, case law does not allow for reimbursement for inappropriate private placements. Apart from any financial limitations, the ABA program failed to address STUDENT’s needs regarding socialization and interaction with regular education peers. Given STUDENT’s deficits in areas including language, communication, socialization and play skills, and the evidence that he has imitation skills and benefits from interaction with typically developing peers, STUDENT needs at least some mainstreaming to address his unique needs and receive educational benefit.(Footnote 17)
Petitioner proposed no other remedy for the stipulated denial of FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001. The only other evidence regarding a remedy was the testimony of Mr. Shoffner, who stated his opinion that an appropriate remedy would be one hour of compensatory education for each of the seventy-two days STUDENT attended the SH-SDC.(Footnote 18) The Hearing Officer considers that seventy-two hours, in addition to STUDENT’s school day or home program, would equal twelve hours per week, if delivered over the remaining five months of the 2002-2003 school year, including the extended school year. Twelve hours per week, if added to the home program or school program STUDENT will already be attending, would likely tax STUDENT’s attention and strength. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that seventy-two hours of compensatory education is appropriate for STUDENT, but may be delivered over a longer period of time than the end of the 2002-2003 school year if appropriate. In any event, the seventy-two hours shall be completely delivered to STUDENT no later than one year from the date of this Decision. The IEP team shall convene to determine what compensatory education STUDENT requires, but should particularly consider areas which were likely impacted by the SH-SDC placement, such as language, communication, socialization, and play skills. Respondents may provide compensatory education by their own staff or may contract with outside providers, but are not required to utilize outside providers.
In addition to Respondents’ stipulation of denial of FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001, the Hearing Officer determined three areas constituting denials of FAPE, although those denials were relatively limited in time and scope. Substantively, the Hearing Officer found that Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE by delaying the OT assessment and thus failing to offer OT services from March to June 2001, and by not providing OT services in conformity with the IEP from January 2002 until STUDENT left school in early June 2002. Respondents also denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year to the extent that they failed to conduct an APE assessment. Procedurally, the Hearing Officer concluded that Respondents denied STUDENT a FAPE from January to March 26, 2001, during which time STUDENT’s mother was not able to participate in the IEP process. Additionally, Respondents stipulated that STUDENT was denied a FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001, for reasons including failure to place him in the LRE and failure to convene an IEP meeting after thirty days of interim placement.
Regarding the OT services, Respondents failed to provide any services for a three-month period, and failed to provide some OT services in conformity with the IEP for a five-month period. To compensate for these denials, both reimbursement and limited compensatory education are warranted. Petitioner’s parents obtained an OT assessment and five private clinical OT sessions for STUDENT in September, October and November 2002. The assessment and therapy sessions were provided by Lisa Moreno, owner of Pediatric Therapy Solutions. Ms. Moreno is a registered occupational therapist with several years’ experience. Ms. Moreno testified regarding the areas in which she assessed and worked on with STUDENT, including sensory motor processing, eye reflexes, handwriting, coordination, and other fine and gross motor skills. Ms. Moreno identified some gains STUDENT had shown after these sessions.
Respondents did not offer any arguments regarding the appropriateness of the OT services Ms. Moreno provided. The Hearing Officer finds that, based upon Ms. Moreno’s testimony, the OT services she provided to STUDENT in fall 2002 addressed STUDENT’s unique needs and provided him with educational benefit. Therefore, PARENTS are entitled to reimbursement for those services in the amount of $450. (See Pet. Exh. pgs. 520-521.) Additionally, because Ms. Moreno had to determine STUDENT’s deficits in order to provide him with OT services, Ms. Moreno’s initial assessment was a necessary component of the OT services. Therefore, Respondents shall also reimburse PARENTS for Ms. Moreno’s OT assessment, in the amount of $200. (Id.)
Furthermore, to ensure that STUDENT is entirely compensated for the denials of OT services, STUDENT may be entitled to compensatory OT services in addition to the reimbursement awarded above. Given the extent to which STUDENT did not receive OT services, and also considering the evidence regarding STUDENT’s current OT needs, Respondents shall provide STUDENT with an additional five hours of direct OT services. Respondents may utilize their own staff to provide these services and are not required to contract with an outside agency. The IEP team shall convene to determine when and where the five hours of compensatory OT services shall be delivered.
Regarding the failure to conduct the APE assessment in May 2002, this Decision previously found that this failure caused little actual prejudice to STUDENT because APE services can only be provided to a student attending a school with a physical education component. Here, there was no evidence that STUDENT’s home program has a physical education component. Moreover, because PARENTS were in disagreement regarding the program offered for 2002-2003, and did not accept any offer of DIS, it is unlikely that PARENTS would have accepted APE services had they been offered. Thus, STUDENT does not require compensatory education to address this denial.Footnote 19) The Hearing Officer finds that an appropriate remedy requires Respondents to obtain MOTHER’s consent for an APE assessment, and conduct the assessment and subsequent IEP meeting within the statutory timeline.
Regarding the procedural denial of FAPE resulting in the parent’s inability to participate in the IEP process for two months, it is unclear what, if anything, is an appropriate remedy. The parties provided no evidence on this point. Given the significant amount of compensatory education already awarded in this Decision, that award already encompasses any remedy of compensatory education. Thus, no further remedy shall be awarded for the procedural violation from January to March 2001.
ORDER
1. Within twenty-five calendar days of the date of this Decision, Respondents shall reimburse PARENTS in the total amount of $650.00 for the occupational therapy services provided by Lisa Moreno of Pediatric Therapy Services.
2. Within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall notice an IEP meeting for the purpose of adding to STUDENT’s current IEP the compensatory education awarded herein. Respondents shall provide STUDENT with five hours of direct occupational therapy services, as compensatory education for a denial of FAPE in this area. Respondents shall further provide STUDENT with an additional seventy-two hours of compensatory education, to remedy the stipulated denial of FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001, and the procedural denial from January to March 2001. The IEP team shall plan that STUDENT’s receipt of those seventy-two hours be completed no later than one year from the date of this Decision. Respondents may provide this compensatory education by their own staff or may contract with outside providers, but are not required to utilize outside providers.
3. Within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Decision, SLOCOE and/or the District shall mail or deliver to MOTHER a proposed assessment plan to assess STUDENT for APE services.
4. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District fail to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability from September 2000 to the present?
Petitioner prevailed to the limited extent that the District failed to assess STUDENT’s need for APE. The District prevailed on the remainder of this issue.
2. Did the District err in failing to correctly identify STUDENT as “autistic-like” prior to November 7, 2002?
The District prevailed on this issue.
3. Did the District and SLOCOE (collectively “Respondents”) provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2000-2001 school year, including the 2001 extended school year?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue only to the limited extent that Respondents failed to provide STUDENT with OT services from late March to June 2001, and that Respondents committed a procedural denial of FAPE by seriously infringing on the parent’s right to participate in the IEP process. Additionally, Respondents stipulated that they denied Petitioner a FAPE from September 2000 to January 2001. Respondents prevailed on the remainder of this issue.
4. Did Respondents provide STUDENT with a FAPE during the 2001-2002 school year, including the 2002 extended school year?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue only to the limited extent that, from January to early June 2002, Respondents failed to provide STUDENT with OT consultation services in conformity with his IEP. Respondents prevailed on the remainder of this issue.
5. Did Respondents offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, including the 2003 extended school year?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue only to the limited extent that Respondents’ failure to conduct an APE assessment constituted a denial of FAPE regarding APE services for the 2002-2003 school year. Respondents prevailed on the remainder of this issue.
6. Is the appropriate program for STUDENT an intensive Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) program for forty (40) hours per week, year round, under the supervision of Verdugo Hills Autism Project, a certified non-public agency?
Respondents prevailed on this issue.
7. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the following assessments:
a. psychoeducational assessment by Dr. Melanie Lenington;
b. occupational therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.; and c. physical therapy assessment conducted by Center for Developing Kids, Inc.
Respondents prevailed on this issue.
8. Is STUDENT entitled to reimbursement and/or compensatory education as a result of denial of FAPE?
Petitioner prevailed on this issue only to the limited extent that he is entitled to reimbursement of $650 for occupational therapy services, plus compensatory education totaling seventy-seven hours. Respondents prevailed on the remainder of this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (Cal. Educ. Code ' 56505(i).)
Date: January 31, 2003 ____________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. Petitioner’s allegations regarding the “OT assessment referral process” are discussed in a subsequent section of this Decision. 2. Ms. Scribner testified that her test results are not directly reported in the assessment report, but are included in the report’s “Interpretation of Results” section. 3. As Dr. Lenington explained, PDD-NOS is essentially a lesser form of autism. A child who has some autistic behaviors but does not meet all of the DSM-IV criteria for autism may be diagnosed with PDD-NOS. 4. Additionally, the triennial reassessment report described the results of Mr. Shoffner’s visual perceptual evaluation. 5. There is no indication that MOTHER would have refused consent to the APE assessment. 6. Moreover, Petitioner’s claim regarding the failure to conduct the APE assessment is disingenuous. Petitioner’s mother was on notice that Respondents sought to conduct the APE assessment, and could have initiated the assessment simply by sending a letter or otherwise contacting Ms. Martin. 7. California special education law qualifies a student as an individual with special needs eligible for special education due to mental retardation when “a pupil has significantly below average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period, which adversely affects a pupil’s educational performance.” (5 C.C.R. § 3030(h).). State law does not specifically define autism, but section 3030(g) identifies autistic-like behaviors that may qualify as student as eligible for special education as follows: (g) A pupil exhibits any combination of the following autistic-like behaviors, to include but not limited to: (1) An inability to use oral language for appropriate communication. (2) A history of extreme withdrawal or relating to people inappropriately and continued impairment in social interaction from infancy through early childhood. (3) An obsession to maintain sameness.
(4) Extreme preoccupation with objects or inappropriate use of objects or both. (5) Extreme resistance to controls.
(6) Displays peculiar motoric mannerisms and motility patterns. 1. (7) Self-stimulating, ritualistic behavior.
8. Petitioner contends that Title 5, section 3030(g) of the California Code of Regulations, specifies only autistic-like behavior and not autism as a basis for eligibility, and thus the distinction between the two is not significant. The Hearing Officer concurs with this argument to the extent eligibility is at issue, but in the present case the distinction between autism and autistic-like behavior is relevant only as to what STUDENT’s needs were in relation to his autistic-like behaviors. 9. When STUDENT was assessed at age eighteen months by Dr. Ira Lott, Dr. Lott indicated that STUDENT had behaviors suggestive of autistic spectrum disorder, but stated that STUDENT was too young for a formal autism diagnosis. (Pet. Exh. pg. 18.) 10. Additionally, the autism diagnosis was inconsistent with the observations of STUDENT’s kindergarten teacher. Ms. Walker testified that she did not see STUDENT engaging in the repetitive and/or self-stimulatory behaviors that she had observed in the other autistic students she had taught over the years. Ms. Walker also reported that STUDENT demonstrated more verbal language than her other autistic students had. 11. The frequency and duration of the RSP services were indicated on STUDENT’s IEP Student Information Form. The Form also indicated that STUDENT was to receive speech/language services from Ms. Spencer, but did not indicate the frequency or duration of those services. 12. The plan listed one area, sensory-motor development, which occupational therapists typically test. However, the triennial assessment plan indicated that sensory-motor development would be assessed by the school psychologist. 13. While Respondents stipulated that STUDENT was denied a FAPE from his entry into the District in September 2000 until his transfer to a mainstream placement in January 2001, there is no dispute that Respondents fulfilled their obligation to provide STUDENT with an interim placement in conformity with his prior IEP for the first thirty days of his enrollment in the District. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 56325(a).) Thus, in fact any denial of FAPE actually began thirty days after that enrollment, in October 2000. 14. Moreover, Petitioner’s proposed program of a full-time ABA program would constitute a more restrictive environment for STUDENT, contrary to the LRE requirement 15. While the District’s offer of a one-to-one aide from March 2002 to the end of the summer session was not necessary, it was still consistent with STUDENT’s needs. Although it appeared to be in part an attempt to compromise with MOTHER’s request for an autism technician, it also appeared designed to prepare STUDENT for having an aide in first grade. 16. SLOCOE did not appear to offer an explanation for this discrepancy. The District’s explanation was the times of day recorded on Ms. Kinavey’s log sheet “could simply be an error in writing.” (Emphasis added.) 17. There was no evidence that PARENTS had even requested that Respondents allow STUDENT limited attendance in a regular education first grade class in addition to his ABA home program. 18. Arguably the period of denial is reduced pursuant to California Education Code section 56325(a), which specifies that a student transferring into a new school district from a different SELPA shall be placed in an interim placement in conformity with the existing IEP. There is no dispute that the interim placement for STUDENT’s first thirty days was in conformity with his Hesperia IEP. There are no provisions for denial of FAPE for an interim placement meeting the requirements of section 56325. However, because Respondents did not raise this claim, the parties did not offer any arguments or evidence on this point, and the denial of FAPE was pursuant to a stipulation, the Hearing Officer will not reduce the stipulated denial or the compensatory education awarded. 19. There was no allegation that PARENTS had provided STUDENT with APE services privately
