California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · September 6, 2001
Student v. Riverside Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1693-01 · Hearing Officer Paul R. Gant
Riverside Unified must readmit expelled student with ADHD after Hearing Officer finds a basis of knowledge and other health impairment eligibility.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of a 16-year-old Riverside Unified student with ADHD filed for due process after the District expelled him. In March 2000, after an assessment the parents had asked for, the District found him not eligible for special education. His grades then fell sharply and he piled up dozens of conduct violations. After a January 2001 incident, the District moved him to its COPE alternative program and suspended an expulsion. After a May 2001 incident, it reinstated the expulsion.
Hearing Officer Paul R. Gant found that the District gave the parents proper notice of their procedural safeguards in 2000. Forms the parents signed outweighed their testimony. However, the student's worsening grades and behavior after March 2000 gave the District a "basis of knowledge" that he might need special education before both incidents. District witnesses agreed the record justified more assessment. COPE staff never saw his ADHD history. As a result, he was entitled to the IDEA's discipline protections. The Hearing Officer also found him eligible as other health impaired. His ADHD limited his alertness and seriously harmed his schooling, and neither regular classes nor COPE could address it. The learning disability claim was not decided. The transfer and both expulsion decisions were vacated. The District had to return him to Martin Luther King High School immediately and hold an IEP meeting within 20 calendar days.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA "basis of knowledge" rule. An earlier ineligibility finding did not protect the District from that rule. Later declines in grades and behavior showed a possible need for special education, and staff did not share the student's ADHD history with the alternative program.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedDiscipline
Issue I. Did the District have a "basis of knowledge" that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services?
The District gave proper notice of procedural safeguards with its March 2000 ineligibility finding. But the student's worsening grades and many conduct violations after that date gave the District a basis of knowledge before both the January 31, 2001 and May 30, 2001 incidents, so he was entitled to IDEA discipline protections.
- Student prevailedEligibility
Issue II. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services?
The student is eligible as other health impaired. His chronic ADHD limited his alertness and badly hurt his educational performance in ways that neither regular education modifications nor the COPE program could address. The specific learning disability claim was not reached.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- The disciplinary transfer to COPE, the March 19, 2001 suspended expulsion, and the June 5, 2001 reinstated expulsion were vacated.
- Placement ordered. The District must immediately return the student to Martin Luther King High School, the placement he attended before January 31, 2001, pending further determination of his educational rights.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 20 calendar days of the order, the District must convene an IEP meeting to develop a program designed to provide FAPE in light of the student's unique needs, including reading if appropriate (footnote 5).
Key authorities
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School Dist. No. 23; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030(f); Cal. Educ. Code § 56026; Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.5
People named in the decision
- Steven Morford, Director of Special Education Services and SELPA Director, Riverside Unified School District
- Sharon Aros (also Sharon Rodriguez), educational psychologist / psychoeducational assessor, Riverside Unified School District
- Elizabeth Brittain, student advisor and special education chairperson; academic testing, Riverside Unified School District
- Bobby Hester, COPE program teacher, Riverside Unified School District
- W.E. Rucker-Hughes, assistant principal overseeing COPE student conduct, Riverside Unified School District
- William Hendrick, Director of Pupil Services, Riverside Unified School District
- Ray Easler, school psychologist, Riverside Unified School District
- Senia Pizzo, clinical psychologist, expert witness for Student, Private
- Sherry Faye (also spelled Fay), private psychotherapist, Private
- Timothy Mackey, private physician who diagnosed ADHD, Private
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Riverside, California, on August 14, 15, 16, and 17, 2001. Further testimony was received during a telephone conference call convened on August 20, 2001.
STUDENT (Petitioner) was represented by Ralph O. Lewis, attorney at law. MOTHER and FATHER, STUDENT’s parents, also appeared on STUDENT’s behalf. Riverside Unified School District (District) was represented by Maria E. Gless, attorney at law. Steven Morford, Director of Special Education Services and Director of Riverside Unified School District Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) also appeared.
Oral and documentary evidence was received, written closing arguments were presented by the parties, and the case was submitted for decision on August 22, 2001.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)
I. Did the District have a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services?
II. Is STUDENT eligible for special education and related services?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old boy who attended tenth grade in the District for the 2000-2001 school year. STUDENT has not been previously found eligible for special education services. At the time of due process hearing, STUDENT was attending a camping program in the Eastern United States. He is currently considered an expelled student by the District for the 2001-2002 school year.
FATHER, STUDENT’s father, testified at due process hearing that STUDENT began to display problems in his behavior in the first grade. Because of concerns expressed by the first grade teacher, STUDENT’s parents had him tested by a physician, who indicated that STUDENT was “on the fence” with regard to being diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder. Throughout STUDENT’s elementary school years, STUDENT’s teachers reported to his parents that STUDENT was getting up and down in class, talking to classmates at inappropriate times, touching his neighbors in a disruptive manner during the lessons, and banging on tables. As STUDENT’s difficulties progressively worsened, his teachers responded by moving his seat, separating him from other students, and placing him near the front of the classroom. However, neither STUDENT’s parents or teachers sought to determine whether he needed special education services.
In the sixth grade, STUDENT’s parents became aware of a worsening of STUDENT’s disruptive behaviors in school. The PARENTS then took STUDENT to Timothy Mackey, M.D., who diagnosed STUDENT with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and prescribed the medication ritalin.(Footnote 2) According to FATHER, STUDENT’s behavior problems improved with the medication. Nonetheless, in the seventh and eighth grade, FATHER noticed that STUDENT was having increased difficulty with homework assignments. As the work became more difficult, STUDENT began to skim his reading assignments, lost interest in school work, and became frustrated. STUDENT would fail to do his homework or would forget to bring to school assignments completed at home. In the eighth grade STUDENT began to arrive late to classes, and struggled academically, receiving two D grades out of six of his classes. (Dist. Exh. 6) Nonetheless, STUDENT was able to perform at an academic level that allowed him to be promoted to high school.
In the 1999-2000 school year (ninth grade), FATHER noticed that STUDENT had increasing problems keeping up with homework and continued to forget assignments at home. FATHER also noticed that STUDENT was not completing reading assignments at home because he couldn’t concentrate for lengthy periods of time. STUDENT started having temper tantrums at home. At school, STUDENT began to receive conduct-related discipline. Because of a variety of conduct-related problems, STUDENT was suspended several times during his ninth grade year. (Dist. Exh. 26) In February 2000, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District assess STUDENT to determine his need for special education services and supports. On February 17, 2000 Sharon Aros, Ph.D. performed a pscyho-educational assessment, which incorporated academic testing by Elizabeth Brittain, M.S. Dr. Aros concluded that STUDENT was suffering from ADHD to a moderate degree.(Footnote 3) On March 22, 2000, an IEP meeting was convened at which the District determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education.
On January 31, 2001, STUDENT was discovered in the school hallway under the influence of alcohol. According to teachers and administrators at the school, STUDENT was visibly impaired and smelled of alcohol. He was given a “Breathalyzer” test at the school site and was determined to have a .09 blood alcohol level. The District suspended STUDENT and, on February 9, 2001, transferred him to Creative Opportunities for Positive Education (COPE), a program designed by the District for students who are struggling behaviorally and academically at the regular high school. On March 19, 2001, the District held a disciplinary hearing at which it was determined that STUDENT was subject to expulsion for his conduct. However, the hearing panel decided to suspend the expulsion and maintain STUDENT at COPE. The suspension of the expulsion was subject to the proviso that the expulsion could be reinstated should STUDENT violate school rules at COPE in the future.
On May 30, 2001, STUDENT was accused by Bobby Hester, his teacher in the COPE program, of defiance and using profanity toward Mr. Hester in the classroom. Because STUDENT had a history of other conduct problems and rules infractions in the COPE program, a disciplinary panel for the District determined on June 5, 2001, that the May 30, 2001 incident justified reinstatement of the prior expulsion. STUDENT has not returned to a District classroom since May 30, 2001. By letter received at the Hearing Office on July 25, 2001, Petitioner requested a due process hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. I: Did the District have a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services?
Petitioner contends that the District had sufficient information, prior to both STUDENT’s alleged misconduct of January 31, 2001, leading to suspended expulsion on March 19, 2001, and his alleged misconduct of May 30, 2001, resulting in the reinstated expulsion on June 5, 2001, to constitute a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was a student in need of special education services and supports. The District contends that it had no such “basis for knowledge” at any relevant time.
Both federal and State law provide procedures and standards for suspension and expulsion of students eligible for special education services and supports. See 20 U.S.C. §1415(k); Cal. Educ. Code § 48915.5. These protections do not generally apply to students who have not been found eligible for special education previous to the behavior leading to the disciplinary action at issue. However, under federal law a student not yet found eligible for special education is entitled to the protections under Section 1415(k) if: (1) the student has engaged in behavior that violated any rule or code of conduct of the school district, and (2) the school district had knowledge, or is deemed to have had knowledge, that the student was a child with a disability “before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(a).
A school district is “deemed” to have had a ”basis of knowledge” that a student was a child with a disability when one of the following four conditions is established: (1) the student’s parent has expressed concern in writing to personnel of the appropriate educational agency that the student demonstrates the need for such services; (2) the behavior or performance of the student demonstrates the need for such services; (3) the student’s parent has requested an evaluation of the student to determine whether the student is eligible for special education and related services; or (4) the student’s teacher, or other personnel of the school district, has expressed concern about the behavior performance of the child to the director of special education of such agency or to other personnel of the agency in accordance with the agency’s established child-find or special education referral system. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(8)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b).
Federal law provides an exception to the “basis of knowledge” provisions, when, as a result of receiving the information specified in 34 C.F.R. § 300.527(b), the agency conducted an educational evaluation of the student, determined that the child was not a child with a disability as defined by the regulations, and provided notice, including notice of procedural safeguards, to the child’s parents of its determination. 34 C.F.R § 300.527(c). In the comments to the federal regulations, the U.S. Department of Education has clarified that, where the agency has conducted an evaluation and determined that the student is not eligible for special education services, even though the student thereafter engages in behavior that violates any rule or code of conduct, and there was no intervening event or action that would independently put the agency on notice of the student’s need for special education services, the agency would not be deemed to have a “basis for knowledge.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12629.
In the instant matter, there is no dispute that prior to March 22, 2000, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District evaluate STUDENT for special education services and supports. There is also no dispute that the District provided such an evaluation, convened an IEP meeting, and on March 22, 2000, determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services and supports. Accordingly, in order to determine whether the District had a “basis of knowledge” in the instant matter, the following questions must be resolved: (1) Did the District provide proper notice to the child’s parents of its March 22, 2000 non-eligibility determination and the procedural safeguards under the IDEA, and, if so, (2) did STUDENT’s behavior or performance in school after March 22, 2000, but prior to January 31, 2001, or May 30, 2001, demonstrate STUDENT’s need for special education services?
Notice of Non-Eligibility and Procedural Safeguards
Petitioner contends that the District should be deemed to have had a “basis of knowledge” because, though it evaluated STUDENT and determined him ineligible for special education services at a March 22, 2000 IEP meeting, it violated federal law by failing to provide the parents with notice of their procedural safeguards at either the time the assessment plan was signed on February 9, 2000 or at the subsequent IEP meeting. Petitioner contends that the IEP was therefore “invalidated” and the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process was impaired. Petitioner further contends that because the parents did not receive notice of their procedural rights they did not have knowledge of their right to dispute the determination of the IEP team through due process. The District contends that it provided the notice as required by special education law.
Federal law requires a written notice of procedural safeguards be made available to the parents of a child with a disability a reasonable time before the public agency refuses to initiate the educational placement of the child. Such notice must advise parents of sources to contact to obtain assistance in understanding the provisions of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(c)-(d), 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.503-504.
FATHER testified that when he met with the District’s educational psychologist, Lisa Aros, to go over the District’s proposed assessment plan, he was not given a written copy of his procedural rights. Furthermore, FATHER testified that when he attended the IEP meeting of March 22, 2000, the only document he was given was a copy of the IEP. FATHER testified that his procedural rights, including his right to seek a due process hearing or an independent assessment, were not explained to him at the IEP meeting. MOTHER did not attend the assessment plan meeting, but was present at the March 22, 2000 IEP meeting. MOTHER testified that she was not made aware by the District representatives that she had a right to object to the District’s determination or pursue remedies regarding the eligibility finding.
Sharon Aros, educational psychologist for the District, testified that when she met with FATHER on February 9, 2000, to go over the assessment plan, she provided him a copy of the written notice of procedural rights. Ms. Aros testified that this is her standard practice and she is sure that she followed this practice in the instant matter because she noted on her copy of the assessment plan that she had provided the written notice. (Dist. Exh.41) While Ms. Aros admitted that, though she does not currently have an independent recollection of giving the written notice to the parents, she would not have written the notation on her copy of the plan had she not provided the notice.
Elizabeth Brittain, M.S., student advisor and special education chairperson for the District, conducted the IEP meeting of March 22, 2000. She testified that it is her standard procedure to take a copy of procedural rights to all IEP meetings, and offer them to the parents. If the parents are not sure that they want or need a written copy, Ms. Aros stated that she encourages them to take the document. If the parents have already received the document at a prior time, however, Ms. Brittain stated that she will not insist they take another. Although she did not specifically recall whether she provided the written notice of procedural rights to the PARENTS at the March 22, 2000, IEP meeting, Ms. Brittain noted that she marked on the IEP document that the rights had been offered.
Although the District witnesses did not claim to have a specific independent recollection of providing the required written notice of procedural rights to STUDENT’s parents at the assessment plan meeting or the IEP meeting, the weight of the evidence offered on this issue establishes that the PARENTS either received, or declined to receive, a copy of the procedural rights. The District witnesses’ testimony regarding their procedures was consistent with the information contained in the documentary record. The February 9, 2000 assessment plan bears FATHER’s signature acknowledging receipt of the written safeguards. (Dist. Exh. 41). Ms. Aros’s copy of the plan contains a written notation that she identifies as a contemporaneous confirmation that she provided the document. (Dist. Exh. 41). The IEP document likewise bears FATHER’s signature acknowledging that he was advised of his right to receive the procedural notice. (Dist. Exh. 1) FATHER provided no credible testimony to explain why on two separate occasions he would have signed his name acknowledging receipt of information he did not, in fact, receive. MOTHER testified that the parents did not agree with the District’s conclusions at the IEP, but did not know what remedy might be available and did not ask representatives of the District for such information. Under such circumstances, it is not credible that the parents would inaccurately confirm in writing that they received written notice of their rights when they did not.
As it is determined that the District provided appropriate notice of procedural safeguards to STUDENT’s parents in connection with the determination that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services on March 22, 2000, it is also concluded that his parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process was not impaired. See W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the District cannot be deemed to have had a “basis of knowledge” prior to March 22, 2000, that STUDENT was in need of special education services and supports.
Subsequent “Basis of Knowledge”
Petitioner contends that STUDENT’s pattern of school performance and conduct from March 22, 2000, until January 31, 2001, or, at the latest, May 30, 2001, formed a “basis of knowledge,” independent of information considered by the IEP team on March 22, 2000, that STUDENT was in need of special education services. Petitioner argues that STUDENT should therefore be afforded the protections of the IDEA in connection with the District’s transfer of STUDENT to COPE on February 9, 2001, its decision on March 19, 2001, to place STUDENT on suspended expulsion, and its decision on June 5, 2001, to reinstate his expulsion. The District contends that the facts in this case do not support the existence of such an independent “basis of knowledge.” It is undisputed that STUDENT suffers from at least moderate ADHD.(Footnote 4) Sharon Aros, M.S., who assessed STUDENT in February 2000 on behalf of the District, identified the following behaviors as common manifestations of ADHD: lying, verbal abuse/profanity, defiance, inattentiveness, off task behavior, impulsiveness, speaking out, physical acting out, inattention, lack of motivation, distractability, avoidance, refusal to do assigned work, truancy, and tardiness. Ms. Aros testified that STUDENT’s grade reports with teacher comments that were issued after the March 22, 2000 IEP meeting, as well as documentation from the District regarding STUDENT’s history of school behavior between March 2000 and May 30, 2001, indicated that STUDENT was exhibiting a number of behaviors that could be symptomatic of ADHD. Ms. Aros also stated that STUDENT’s school performance and behavior were worsening during the period March 2000 to May 2001. Because much this information was unknown or unavailable to the March 2000 IEP team, Ms. Aros concurred at the IEP meeting that STUDENT was not eligible for special education. However, given the additional information that developed between March 2000 and May 2001, Ms. Aros concluded at hearing that an IEP should be convened to reconsider whether STUDENT qualified for special education services under the category “other health impaired” (OHI). Reviewing the same information, Senia Pizzo, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist testifying on behalf of Petitioner, stated that from March 2000 to May 2001, STUDENT was exhibiting poor judgement, disregard of long-term consequences, and high impulsivity that could be associated with ADHD. Dr. Pizzo concurred that this information was sufficient to justify further investigation regarding how STUDENT’s ADHD was affecting his performance and behavior in school and thus whether he was eligible for special education services.
William Hendrick, Ph.D., Director of Pupil Services for the District, indicated that, given STUDENT’s diagnosis of ADHD and previous assessment, his worsening grades, and numerous conduct violations, it would have been appropriate to conduct further investigation regarding special education eligibility. Dr. Hendrick testified that under the circumstances he would want to meet with the parents and student, review the educational record, convene a student study team, and perhaps perform additional testing to determine if there was a connection between the diminishing performance and the ADHD. Ray Easler, Ph.D., school psychologist for that District, similarly testified that STUDENT’s behavior in the COPE program and his grade records subsequent to March 2000, would justify further assessment to determine eligibility criteria.
“School personnel should be held responsible for referring children for evaluation when their behavior or performance indicates that they may have a disability covered under the Act.” 34 C.F.R. Part 300 Att. 1, p. 12628. The “basis of knowledge” provisions apply when “public agency personnel should have acted, but failed to do so.” Id. Before his January 31, 2001 alleged misconduct, STUDENT’s pattern of poor academic performance and conduct problems was well documented. His grades steadily deteriorated from the fall semester of the 1999-2000 school year, when he earned a grade point average of 1.428 and failed one out of seven classes, to the fall semester of the 2000-2001 school year, when he earned a GPA of .857 and failed three out of seven classes. (Dist. Exh. 6). By the January 31, 2001 incident, STUDENT had already amassed 40 documented conduct violations in categories that Ms. Aros admitted at hearing could have been symptomatic of ADHD. Thus, the information necessary to put the District on notice of the need to further investigate STUDENT’s need for special education was in place by January 31, 2001. Despite STUDENT’s ongoing and increasing behavior and performance problems in the school between the March 22, 2000 IEP and the January 31, 2001 incident leading to the suspended expulsion, no teacher or administrator at the District took any action to further investigate STUDENT’s potential need for special education.
Furthermore, even though STUDENT had continued behavioral and academic problems after his transfer to the COPE program in February 2001, the District took no action to further investigate STUDENT’s potential eligibility for special education prior to the May 30, 2001 incident leading to reinstated expulsion.
W.E. Rucker-Hughes was the assistant principle in charge of overseeing the conduct of students in the COPE program during STUDENT’s attendance there. Ms. Rucker-Hughes stated that prior to the discipline hearing reinstating STUDENT’s expulsion, she had no information regarding STUDENT’s ADHD diagnosis. According to both District witnesses and FATHER, at the parents’ request, the District psycho-educational assessment from March 2000 was not maintained in STUDENT’s cumulative file at Martin Luther King (MLK), but was kept in a file at the District offices. Thus it was not transferred to the file at COPE and was not available for review by teachers and staff at COPE. However, according to several District witnesses, the March 22, 2000 IEP would have been maintained in the cumulative file and therefore should have been available for the COPE staff to review. The March 2000 IEP made reference to the fact that STUDENT was diagnosed with ADHD and also to the fact that he had been previously assessed for special education services. Ms. Rucker-Hughes admitted that she did not check his cumulative file and so did not see the March 22, 2000 IEP. Moreover, Bobby Hester, who taught STUDENT in the District’s COPE program for the period February 9, 2001, through May 30, 2001, testified that he first learned that STUDENT had a diagnosis of ADHD the day before the incident that led to the reinstatement of expulsion on May 30, 2001. Mr. Hester testified that, had he known that STUDENT had previously been diagnosed with ADHD, given STUDENT’s behavioral problems at COPE and failure to complete a large amount of his assigned school work, Mr. Hester would have contacted administrative personnel in the District to determine whether STUDENT needed further assessment regarding ADHD.
It was the duty of the District to make the necessary background information regarding STUDENT’s diagnosis and educational history available to the COPE staff so that they would be aware of the appropriate response, including referring STUDENT for further assessment of the need for special education. Instead, as STUDENT’s behavior and academic performance declined for well over a year, teachers and administrators in the District utterly failed to share the information necessary to understand that STUDENT required further consideration for special education services and supports.
Accordingly, it is determined that, prior to both the January 31, 2001 and May 30, 2001 incidents leading to disciplinary changes in STUDENT’s educational placement, the District had a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was in need of special education services.
ISSUE NO. II. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services?
Petitioner contends that he is eligible for special education under the category of “other health impaired” (OHI) and/or specific learning disabled (SLD).(Footnote 5) The District contends that STUDENT’s attention disorder and reading deficits, if any, do not require that he receive special education to benefit educationally.
A student can be considered eligible for special education services and supports if the results of an assessment demonstrate that he has a qualifying impairment that requires instruction, services, or both, which cannot be provided with modification of the regular education program. Title 5 Cal. Code of Regs. § 3030; Cal. Educ. Code Section 56026(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9). Title 5, Cal. Code of Regs. Section 3030(f) further provides that a student is eligible for special education under the category of “other health impaired” (OHI) if he has limited strength, vitality, or alertness, due to chronic or acute health problems, which are not temporary, and adversely affect the student’s educational performance.
As previously noted, there is no dispute that STUDENT suffers from ADHD, a chronic health impairment. There is also no substantial dispute that STUDENT’s “strength, vitality, or alertness” are limited by his ADHD. Dr. Aros, assessing STUDENT on behalf of the District in February 2000, reported that because of his ADHD, STUDENT had significant weaknesses in the areas of sustaining attention, concentrating, and exerting mental control. Dr. Aros also found on testing that STUDENT had weaknesses with regard to short-term memory, coordinating visual cues with fine motor movements quickly and accurately, solving problems quickly and accurately, using information presented in a sequential or serial manner to solve problems that require step-by-step or process reasoning, and working without distraction. Finally, Dr. Aros found that data provided by rating scales completed by STUDENT’s parents, and consistent with the diagnosis of ADHD, indicated that STUDENT had problems in maintaining attention and had a tendency to be easily distracted (Dist. Exh. 3).
Dr. Pizzo testified on behalf of Petitioner that STUDENT was a suffering from a pattern of impaired cognitive functioning consistent with ADHD. She noted that STUDENT scored relatively low in attention-related tests. Dr. Pizzo further found that STUDENT was exhibiting a number of symptoms that were consistent with his ADHD diagnosis, including fatigue, inattentiveness, impulsivity, daydreaming, and memory problems. Sherry Faye, STUDENT’s psychotherapist, confirmed that during the period December 2000 to May 2001, while she was treating STUDENT, he was having symptoms she considered related to his ADHD, including impulsivity and difficulty concentrating. STUDENT’s father, FATHER confirmed that in the home, STUDENT was exhibiting memory problems and difficulty concentrating.
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is concluded that ADHD has resulted in STUDENT’s experiencing limited strength, vitality, and alertness. Furthermore, STUDENT has suffered from ADHD at least since the time he was diagnosed by Dr. Mackey during the sixth grade. No evidence was presented at hearing that the condition is likely to substantially improve in the foreseeable future. Thus, it is concluded that STUDENT’s condition is not temporary. Accordingly, in order to decide whether STUDENT is eligible for special education as OHI, it must determined whether STUDENT’s ADHD adversely affects his educational performance in a manner which cannot be addressed by modifications of the regular education program.(Footnote 6)
STUDENT experienced increasing problems in his in academic performance throughout the ninth grade. For the period September 2, 1999 through January 31, 2000, STUDENT received the following grades: D-, C, D, F, C+, C-, and C. Thus, STUDENT was failing one class and doing poorly to very poorly in two others. His grade point average (GPA) for this period was 1.428, and he received only 30 of 35 credits attempted. (Dist. Exh. 6). Teacher comments on STUDENT’s report cards include the following statements: “makes little or no effort,” “major projects incomplete,” “wastes class time,” “student work has deteriorated,” “is not doing all homework,” “to improve, study for tests,” and from a single class, “work is consistently good, outstanding academic potential.” For the second semester of the ninth grade, ending June 14, 2000, STUDENT’s grades were as follows: D-, D, D, C, D-, C-, and F. Thus, STUDENT was earning one failing grade and doing poor to very poor in four other classes. His GPA for this period was 1.142, and he again earned only 30 of 35 credits attempted. (Dist. Exh. 6). Although his PE teacher indicated on the grade report that STUDENT’s “achievement [was] average,” other teachers made the following comments, ”makes little or no effort, risk of retention,” and “major projects incomplete, wastes class time.”
Over the summer of 2000, STUDENT repeated one class and earned a C. However for the fall semester of the 2000-2001 school year, his last semester at MLK, he experienced a pronounced decline in academic performance. For September 14, 2000, through January 31, 2001, his grades were: F, D-, C-, F, C, F, and D-. STUDENT earned a GPA of .857 and completed only 20 of 35 credits attempted. (Dist. Exh. 6). STUDENT’s grade report for this period contains the following comments by his teachers: “is not doing all homework,” “to succeed, turn in all work,” “fails to dress out for PE, to succeed, turn in all work,” and “makes little or no effort.”
STUDENT’s final transcript, covering his one and one-half years at MLK, reveals that he ended with a cumulative GPA of 1.18. According to Dr. Hendrick, director of pupil personnel services for the District, by January 2001 STUDENT should have earned 100 credits toward the total required for graduation; instead, he earned only 85. (Dist. Exh. 6)
Examination of STUDENT’s grades for the period February 9, 2001, through May 30, 2001 would appear to indicate substantial improvement in STUDENT’s academic performance upon his transfer to the COPE program. (Dist. Exh. 6) STUDENT’s grades for that period were: B, B, B, B, B, B, and C. Bobby Hester, STUDENT’s teacher at COPE, however, clarified that the apparent success reflected in this progress report should not be interpreted to mean that STUDENT was performing at an acceptable level. Mr. Hester testified that he based the grades he gave STUDENT on completed work and did not factor in incomplete work or missed tests. Mr. Hester stated that when STUDENT actually turned in his work or took tests, the quality of his work was satisfactory or above. However, STUDENT did not complete most of his homework and did not take all the required tests. In fact, STUDENT missed twenty-five days of school during his attendance in the COPE program, as a result of absences, truancy, and suspensions. (Dist. Exh 34). Mr. Hester testified that because STUDENT had failed to complete much of his work, he was behind in virtually all his classes and was “far behind” in credits he required toward graduation. Mr. Hester concluded that STUDENT was not performing at a level required to pass from grade to grade or ultimately to graduate from high school.
The evidence offered at hearing also established that STUDENT was having substantial conduct problems during his attendance at MLK and at COPE. Discipline records from the District document forty-one instances of misconduct in the period November 8, 1999, through January 31, 2001. The conduct included truancy, tardiness, defiance of authority, forgery, gum chewing, assault of another student, disturbance, possession of tobacco, marijuana use, alcohol use, and several incidents characterized only as “counseling” and “miscellaneous.” (Dist. Exh. 26). STUDENT’s conduct violations continued into his attendance in the COPE program. From February 14, 2001, through May 30, 2001, STUDENT had sixteen documented incidents of misconduct. These included truancy, leaving campus without permission, profanity, defiance of authority, talking without permission, and sleeping in class. In the progress report for the period ending May 30, 2001, Mr. Hester classified STUDENT’s progress toward behavioral goals as “unacceptable.” Mr. Hester testified that the documented behavior was only a fraction of the problem with STUDENT at COPE. For every written-up violation or notation, there were at least one to two warnings off the record for the same or a similar type of behavior. According to Mr. Hester, undocumented incidents included lack of doing homework, disruptive behavior, dress code violations, sleeping in class, profanity, attendance problems, and disrespect for persons in authority. Once or twice a week, Mr. Hester also observed STUDENT to be “dazing,” “fading,” sleeping, and putting his head on his desk. Mr. Hester stated that by the end of the school year, STUDENT’s behavior had worsened and “it seemed as if [STUDENT] didn’t care.”
The above discussion establishes that STUDENT was having substantial academic and behavioral problems after entering high school, and that these problems were worsening through the end of the 2000-2001 school year. However, to be eligible for special education, the Petitioner must establish that STUDENT’s academic and conduct problems were connected with his ADHD. The District contends that there is insufficient information to conclude that STUDENT’s problems in school were caused by his ADHD, rather than alcohol and drug use, a conduct disorder, or simple volitional misconduct.
Sherry Fay, M.S., STUDENT’s therapist, testified that she considered STUDENT’s academic and behavioral problems to be associated with his ADHD. Although Ms. Fay admitted that ADHD was not her area of expertise, she stated that she was familiar with the symptoms of the condition from her background and training in counseling psychology. Ms. Fay noted that STUDENT was having problems that were consistent across different settings, which is one diagnostic criterion for ADHD. Ms. Fay believed that ADHD was playing a strong role in STUDENT’s poor judgement, conduct problems, and impulsivity which were being reflected in problems both in school and in the home, including “acting out,” truancy, suspensions, academic problems at school, troubles with the law, and alcohol and drug use.
Because Ms. Fay concluded that she could not provide the type of services STUDENT needed, she referred him to Dr. Pizzo for evaluation to determine what steps might need to be taken to address STUDENT’s deteriorating condition. Dr. Pizzo’s curriculum vitae (C.V.) and testimony at hearing revealed that she has substantial background in the evaluation and treatment of children with ADHD. In connection with her June 1, 2001 evaluation, Dr. Pizzo met with STUDENT’s parents, gave the parents a rating scale to complete, took a thorough developmental history, reviewed any testing that was available, including the February 2000 assessment by Dr. Aros, reviewed treatment notes and records from Ms. Fay, and reviewed STUDENT’s educational record, including grades, conduct records, and the March 22, 2000 IEP. Dr. Pizzo testified that she considered STUDENT’s academic and conduct problems at home and at school to be manifestations of his moderate to severe ADHD. Dr. Pizzo testified that STUDENT was displaying numerous symptoms that were consistent with ADHD, including fatigue, inability to concentrate on homework, frustration at his inability to complete work, inattentiveness, impulsivity, daydreaming, not remembering his work and books, being late to class, and negative feelings. Commenting specifically on STUDENT’s difficulty in completing homework, Dr. Pizzo associated this with ADHD symptoms of inattentiveness, distractability, and fatigue. With regard to conduct issues involving truancy and tardiness, Dr. Pizzo considered those behaviors to be manifestations of avoidance behavior consistent with ADHD. Dr. Pizzo further stated that STUDENT’s use of alcohol and drugs, his defiance of authority, and his use of profanity, were consistent with ADHD symptoms of impulsivity, poor judgement, and frustration.
Several witnesses for the District, including Dr. Aros, Dr. Easler, and Dr. Hendrick, testified that from the information they currently had available, they doubted that STUDENT’s academic and conduct problems were caused by his ADHD. However, as noted previously in the section pertaining to “basis of knowledge,” each of the District witnesses admitted that STUDENT’s conduct and academic history that arose after the March 22, 2000 IEP meeting, provided sufficient information to justify further investigation to determine whether STUDENT required special education services because of his ADHD. Dr. Aros, Dr. Easler, and Dr. Hendrick each testified that not all students with ADHD exhibit the kind of problems that STUDENT had, particularly the conduct problems, and that many students without ADHD do engage in such behavior as a result of a conduct disorder, alcohol or drug use, or simple volitional misconduct. However, although there was evidence that STUDENT had engaged in some alcohol and drug use, the District presented no evidence that STUDENT had been diagnosed with a conduct disorder or a chronic alcohol and drug problem. Conversely, as previously discussed, there was ample evidence that STUDENT suffers from at least moderate ADHD and that the vast majority of the conduct and academic problems he has exhibited were consistent with that diagnosis.
Accordingly, the evidence demonstrates that STUDENT suffered from ADHD which affected both his behavior in school and his academic performance. The sole remaining question pertaining to OHI eligibility, therefore, is whether STUDENT’s ADHD adversely affected his educational performance to a degree that his problems cannot be resolved by modifications in the regular classroom.
There is no substantial dispute that STUDENT’s ADHD, through his behavioral and academic problems, has had a severe, adverse impact on his ability to benefit educationally. Dr. Pizzo, Dr. Aros, Dr. Easler, Mr. Hendrick, and Mr. Hester agreed that STUDENT’s conduct and performance were negatively affecting his grades and the amount of credit he was earning for graduation. Dr. Hendrick stated that STUDENT’s use of profanity, absences, tardiness, and disruptiveness in class likely had a substantial effect on his ability to benefit in school. Dr. Pizzo testified that, given the amount of educational interruption STUDENT was experiencing due to tardiness, truancy, and suspension, there was “no way” he could obtain appropriate educational benefit. Dr. Pizzo pointed out that, even before the final misconduct incident of May 30, 2001, STUDENT was failing in the COPE program and was in danger of losing his place there because of ongoing behavioral problems. Mr. Hester concurred that because of lack of work, incomplete work, absences, and suspensions, STUDENT would not benefit enough to ultimately pass from grade to grade or graduate from high school.
Finally, the evidence indicates that STUDENT’s behavior and academic problems associated with his ADHD could not be addressed by modification of the regular classroom. Dr. Pizzo testified on behalf of Petitioner that his ADHD-related problems could not be adequately addressed in his regular education classroom and that he needed to attend a “different setting” with “appropriate classroom and educational accommodation and resources” to allow him to “catch up,” and ultimately be able in the future to have success in the “traditional school setting.” Although Dr. Pizzo’s opinion is somewhat weakened by her failure to personally interview any of STUDENT’s teachers in the District, it is consistent with the educational record and testimony of District witnesses. While attending MLK, STUDENT was subject to the District’s regular progress reporting and discipline procedures. Nonetheless, his behavior and performance worsened. The District then removed STUDENT to the COPE program, which District witnesses indicated was specifically to address the types of behavioral and academic deficiencies that STUDENT was exhibiting. Ultimately, STUDENT’s performance and conduct continued to deteriorate, culminating in his expulsion. Thus, notwithstanding the efforts of the District’s administrators and teachers, STUDENT’s parents and therapist, his overall academic and behavioral performance deteriorated from at least the time he entered high school until his was expelled on May 30, 2001. Thus, it is concluded that STUDENT’s ADHD-related disability could not be adequately addressed in the District’s regular education program.
For the reasons discussed, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT is eligible for special education services and supports under the category “other health impaired ” (OHI).
REMEDY
Because the District had a “basis for knowledge” that STUDENT was eligible for special education prior to January 31, 2001, the disciplinary transfer to COPE and suspended expulsion of March 19, 2001, must be vacated. Similarly, because the District had such a basis of knowledge” prior to May 30, 2001, the reinstated expulsion of June 5, 2001, must also be vacated. Accordingly, pending further determination of his educational rights, STUDENT is entitled to return to the educational placement that he attended prior to January 31, 2001.
ORDER
1. The District shall immediately return STUDENT to Martin Luther King High School.
2. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Order, the District shall convene an IEP meeting to develop a program that is designed to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in light of his unique needs.
PREVAILING PARTY OF EACH ISSUE
1. Did the District have a “basis of knowledge” that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. Is STUDENT eligible for special education services?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code §56505(j).
Dated: September 6, 2001 ________________________________ Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1.The issues have been framed to reflect discussions held between the parties and the Hearing Officer at the time of hearing, and for the purpose of organized discussion. Petitioner also raised the issue of entitlement to attorney fees in the event that he prevailed on one or more issues. The attorney fee issue is not addressed as it is not within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Office. 2. Throughout the hearing both the Petitioner’s and the District’s witnesses used the terms attention deficit disorder (ADD) and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) interchangeably. The Diagnostic and Statistics Manual, Fourth Edition (1994 American Psychiatric Association) (DSM-IV), was referenced by several witnesses as an authoritative source pertaining to diagnosis of attention deficit disorders. The DSM-IV does not distinguish between ADD and ADHD. Rather, it lists three categories of ADHD in the section pertaining to attention deficit disorders: (1) predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type, (2) predominantly inattentive type, and (3) combined type. According to the DSM-IV, “although most individuals [with the condition] have symptoms of both inattention and hyperactivity-impulsivity, there are some individuals in whom one or the other pattern is predominant.” This characterization of the diagnosis is consistent with the uncontradicted testimony of several witnesses at hearing. For purposes of consistency, STUDENT’s attention deficit disorder will be referred to throughout this decision as “ADHD.” 3.Dr. Aros changed her name because of marriage subsequent to the time of the evaluation. Her name appears on the report as Sharon Rodriguez. She will be referred to by the surname Aros in this decision. 4.Sharon Aros, M.S., the District’s evaluator characterized STUDENT’s ADHD as “moderate,” while Senia Pizzo, Ph.D., the Petitioner’s evaluator characterized his condition as “moderate to severe.” 5.Because it is determined herein that STUDENT is eligible for special education services as OHI, it need not be determined whether he also qualifies under SLD. It is noted that evidence was presented at hearing that STUDENT performed poorly on some reading subtests. At the IEP meeting to be held to develop STUDENT’s placement and program, the IEP team shall develop a program to address all educational needs related to his qualifying disability, including reading, if appropriate. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). 6. The relevant time period for purposes of this discussion includes the period before the March 22, 2000 IEP meeting. Unlike the “basis of knowledge” analysis, a determination of eligibility must consider STUDENT’s history prior to the District’s March 2000 determination of noneligibility.
