California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 11, 2002
Student v. Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District
SEHO Case No. SN 1762-00 · Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown
Hart-Ransom Union Elementary must provide 168 hours of multisensory reading tutoring for denying FAPE over two school years.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
A parent filed for due process against Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District for a teenage boy who moved into the district from Gilroy Unified before the 1999-2000 school year. He had been eligible for special education under specific learning disability. He was later also found eligible under emotional disturbance. He missed school often, and the district argued that his truancy caused any failure to provide FAPE.
Hearing Officer Suzanne B. Brown found that the district denied FAPE for the 1999-2000 regular school year. The district did not give him an immediate interim placement as Education Code section 56325 requires. It waited until about November 1999 and did not hold an IEP meeting until January 2000. The IEP had no annual goals or present levels and had objectives only in spelling. It did nothing about attendance, even though staff knew he was missing school. A behavior plan was drafted but never agreed to or carried out. No one showed that the occupational therapy assessment promised in the IEP was ever done. He failed every class. The Hearing Officer found he did not need extended school year (ESY) services.
For 2000-2001, the district offered little evidence about its independent study and PACE alternative program placements, and the IEPs did not describe them. The district therefore did not meet its burden of proof. The parent asked for 468 hours of tutoring. The Hearing Officer ordered 168 hours of Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland tutoring.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a student's chronic truancy. Parents were mainly responsible for attendance, but the IEP still had to address it through goals or behavior measures. The decision also shows SEHO enforcing the immediate interim placement rule for transfer students and allowing a challenge to a placement agreed to in mediation.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 1 (regular school year). Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year?
The District denied FAPE for 1999-2000. It did not immediately give the transfer student an interim placement under Education Code section 56325. Its IEP had no annual goals or present levels, had objectives only in spelling, and did not address reading, writing or attendance. The occupational therapy assessment listed in the IEP was not shown to have been done.
- District prevailedIEP content
Issue 1 (ESY). Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000 extended school year (ESY)?
The student did not need ESY to receive a FAPE. His IEPs did not call for it, and he was not attending during the regular school year.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 2. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?
The District did not meet its burden of proving that its independent study and PACE placements were appropriate. Little evidence was presented, and the September and October 2000 IEPs did not describe the programs. A mediated interim agreement did not waive the right to challenge the placement.
- Student prevailed in partFAPE: services offered
Issue 3. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
The Hearing Officer awarded 168 hours of Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland tutoring (2 hours a week for 84 weeks), not the 468 hours requested.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Compensatory education. The District must provide 168 hours of tutoring in either the Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland program, delivered by a person trained and knowledgeable in that program. The decision says District staff are to consult with Stanislaus Learning Academy staff, Modesto City School District staff and the parents on when and how to provide the tutoring so it does not overload the student or increase his absences. Some hours may be delivered in summer.
Total: 168 hours of compensatory services
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School District; Board of Education of Oak Park and River Forest High School District v. Illinois State Board of Education (Kelly E.); Todd v. Andrews; Moubry v. Independent School District No. 696; Cal. Educ. Code § 56325; Cal. Educ. Code § 56345
People named in the decision
- Dr. Ream Lochry, District Superintendent, Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District
- Jennifer Hollibaugh, independent speech-language pathologist; witness for Student, Bay Area Speech & Language Services
- Susan (Sue) Mead, resource specialist program (RSP) teacher, Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District
- Janice Schafer, RSP instructional aide (also spelled Shafer in the decision), Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District
- Adella Perales, school secretary, Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District
- Patricia Dimond, SELPA director, Stanislaus County SELPA
- Linda Joseph, school psychologist (psychoeducational evaluation), Stanislaus County Office of Education
- Ted Schoenberger, behavioral analyst (functional analysis assessment and BIP)
- Vincent Nunno, independent clinical neuropsychologist
- Stanislaus Learning Academy, nonpublic school
- Excel, residential program
- PACE program, alternative education program, Stanislaus County Office of Education
- Stanislaus County Behavioral Health, county mental health agency (emotional disturbance and AB 3632 evaluation)
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter convened for hearing in Modesto, California, on December 18 and 19, 2001, and January 17, 2002, before Suzanne B. Brown, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Bob Varma. Present on Petitioner’s behalf was his mother, MOTHER. Respondent Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District (District or Respondent) was represented by attorney Douglas Purdy. Present on the District’s behalf was District Superintendent Dr. Ream Lochry.
Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Jennifer Hollibaugh, speech/language pathologist for Bay Area Speech & Language Services; Susan Mead, District resource specialist program (RSP) teacher; and MOTHER, Petitioner’s mother. Respondent called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Janice Schafer, District RSP instructional aide; Adella Perales, District school secretary; and Patricia Dimond, Stanislaus County SELPA director.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. Upon receipt of the written closing briefs, the record was closed on February 5, 2002, and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1999-2000 school year, including the 2000 extended school year (ESY)?
2. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?
3. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old boy who resides with his family in Modesto, California. STUDENT lives within the boundaries of the District, but he is no longer a District student because he has completed eighth grade, the highest grade served by the District. Upon completion of eighth grade, STUDENT became a student of the Modesto City School District. STUDENT currently attends a nonpublic school, Stanislaus Learning Academy and is eligible for special education because of emotional disturbance (ED) and a specific learning disability (SLD). He also has been diagnosed with oppositional defiance disorder (ODD) and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
Prior to entering the Hart-Ransom Union Elementary School District, STUDENT attended school in the Gilroy Unified School District (Gilroy). When STUDENT was in the third grade at Gilroy, he was assessed for special education eligibility. STUDENT’s IEP team determined that he was eligible for special education due to a specific learning disability (SLD), with a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement levels in written language. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 54-58.) Thereafter, STUDENT began receiving resource specialist program (RSP) services, and continued to receive them for the duration of his schooling in Gilroy. (Testimony of MOTHER; Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 41-58.)
For the 1998-99 school year, STUDENT attended the seventh grade at Gilroy’s South Valley Junior High School (South Valley). His South Valley records indicate that he was referred for discipline on several occasions, and received punishments including detentions and a behavioral contract. (Petitioner’s Exhs. 262-267.) In May 1999, STUDENT and his family moved to Modesto. In July 1999, MOTHER went to the District office to enroll STUDENT and his sister in school for the 1999-2000 school year. Although STUDENT had been in seventh grade for the 1998-99 school year, due to his poor grades in Gilroy he was again enrolled in seventh grade for the 1999-2000 school year at Hart-Ransom School. MOTHER wrote on STUDENT’s enrollment forms that STUDENT had been eligible for special education in Gilroy and had received RSP services there. (Testimony of MOTHER; District’s Exh. pg. 21.) MOTHER also told this to the District’s then-principal at the District office in late August 1999, when MOTHER accompanied STUDENT on the first day of school. However, STUDENT began the school year in regular education at Hart-Ransom School, without any special education services or an interim special education placement.
In early September 1999, District RSP teacher Sue Mead reviewed STUDENT’s enrollment forms and spoke with STUDENT’s mother about STUDENT’s possible enrollment in special education. MOTHER informed Ms. Mead that STUDENT had been receiving RSP services in Gilroy, and promised to provide a copy of STUDENT’s last individualized education program (IEP). In mid-September 1999, STUDENT’s homeroom teacher and a “DARE” police officer who works at the school met with STUDENT’s parents to discuss STUDENT’s poor attendance and academic problems.
Also in mid-September 1999, Ms. Mead received STUDENT’s Gilroy IEP, but found the document confusing. The January 18, 1999 IEP stated: “STUDENT will receive RSP assistance in his literacy core class. Drop from RSP support class.” In the section regarding least restrictive environment (LRE), the document stated: “Needs can not be met w/o RSP support in a modified core class.” After reviewing the IEP document, Ms. Mead contacted Gilroy to inquire about STUDENT’s previous special education status there, and was told by a Gilroy RSP teacher that STUDENT had been dropped from RSP. Ms. Mead informed MOTHER of this, and MOTHER indicated that she believed STUDENT needed special education services. Ms. Mead sent MOTHER an assessment plan, and subsequently sent another copy in late October 1999 after failing to receive back the first form.(Footnote 1) During this time period, Ms. Mead received separate communications from MOTHER and a Gilroy school psychologist, each indicating that STUDENT had not been dropped from special education while at Gilroy.
On the basis of information the District received about STUDENT’s special education status in Gilroy, in approximately early November the District placed STUDENT in an interim special education placement in which he received forty-five minutes of RSP services each school day.(Footnote 2) (See testimony of Ms. Mead; Respondent’s Exh. pg. 22.) However, STUDENT’s frequent absences continued.
On November 1, 1999, MOTHER signed the assessment plan. Pursuant to that plan, Stanislaus County Office of Education psychologist Linda Joseph conducted a psychoeducational evaluation of STUDENT in December 1999. For the academic achievement testing portion of that evaluation, Ms. Mead administered the Kaufman Test of Educational Achievement (KTEA). On January 10, 2000, the IEP team convened and found STUDENT eligible for special education based on an SLD, with a significant discrepancy in the area of spelling and weaknesses in “visual motor integration, sequential auditory and visual memory skills.” (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 31.) The team members agreed that STUDENT should receive RSP services for thirty to forty-five minutes per session, with three to six sessions per week. STUDENT’s mother and the other members of the IEP team signed their consent to this IEP.
During STUDENT’s time in RSP, Ms. Mead or her instructional aide worked with him using the Morphographic spelling program. Other than RSP, the January 2000 IEP did not provide for any special education services, although the IEP did specify that assessments of STUDENT would be conducted in the areas of behavior and occupational therapy.(Footnote 3) In February 2000, behavioral analyst Ted Schoenberger conducted a functional analysis assessment of STUDENT and drafted a behavioral intervention plan (BIP). (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 128-135.) After reviewing the plan, MOTHER wrote to the District to indicate that she disagreed with the BIP and would be seeking an independent assessment. (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 206.) In response, Mr. Schoenberger revised the BIP to incorporate some changes requested by MOTHER. (District’s Exh. pgs. 203-208.) The BIP was discussed at a subsequent IEP meeting on March 31, 2000. The parties were unable to reach agreement regarding the BIP on March 31, so they agreed to meet again; the follow-up IEP meeting was held on May 22, 2000. MOTHER continued to disagree with the BIP. The BIP was attached to the March/May 2000 IEP document, but was never signed or implemented. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 29-30; testimony of Patricia Dimond, Susan Mead.)
STUDENT’s absences continued throughout the 1999-2000 school year. The District had referred STUDENT to the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Office’s Student Attendance Review Board (SARB) on November 1, 1999. SARB scheduled a hearing for December 9, 1999. At that hearing, SARB issued directives that STUDENT maintain regular daily school attendance, and demonstrate appropriate conduct and academic performance while at school. On January 21, 2000, SARB notified MOTHER that STUDENT was in violation of the directives issued on December 9, 1999. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 242-245.) On April 5, 2000, District staff and MOTHER met to discuss ways to improve STUDENT’s poor attendance. (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 28.) SARB sent subsequent notices of additional violations in March, April, and August 2000. Thereafter the Sheriff’s Office initiated a misdemeanor criminal filing against MOTHER for STUDENT’s violations of the SARB directives. MOTHER pleaded “no contest” to the misdemeanor.(Footnote 4)
During the 1999-2000 year, STUDENT also received numerous detentions and other disciplinary measures. In December 1999, MOTHER filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR), alleging that the discipline measures imposed on STUDENT were motivated by racial discrimination. On June 30, 2000, OCR issued a report following its investigation into the matter. The OCR report indicated that the District had agreed to a voluntary resolution plan and that the terms of the plan resolved MOTHER’s allegations. In the plan, the District did not admit any violation of laws but did agree to changes in its disciplinary policies and procedures. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 296-305.) The District also agreed to expunge from STUDENT’s records a suspension which he had received in January 2000. (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 301.)
At the beginning of the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT was placed on independent study, with RSP services provided at Hart-Ransom School and a weekly meeting with his independent study teacher. In September 2000, MOTHER wrote SELPA director Patricia Dimond to request that STUDENT be assessed for emotional disturbance (ED). (Respondent’s Exh. pg. 201.) On September 27, 2000, the IEP team convened to discuss changing STUDENT’s eligibility category to ED. At the IEP meeting, MOTHER signed an assessment plan, and the District proposed changing STUDENT’s placement to the PACE program, an alternative education program operated by the Stanislaus County Office of Education (SCOE). On October 3, 2000, MOTHER filed a request for due process hearing with the Hearing Office. On October 9, 2000, the IEP team reconvened and the District again offered to place STUDENT in the PACE program. STUDENT’s father attended the meeting and signed the IEP, indicating his consent to the PACE placement. STUDENT’s mother did not attend the IEP meeting but, instead, waited in the school parking lot. MOTHER did sign the IEP document after STUDENT’s father brought it to her in the parking lot, although she later testified that she signed the document only because she believed that the District had given her no other choice.
STUDENT was in the SCOE’s PACE program for two months. There is little evidence regarding what his program or services at PACE included; however, in any event, STUDENT did not regularly attend PACE. (Testimony of Ms. Mead.) On December 8, 2000, a psychologist from Stanislaus County Behavioral Health evaluated STUDENT and found that he met the criteria for ED eligibility and AB 3632 mental health services. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 102-104.) On January 18, 2001, the parties participated in special education mediation and entered into an interim agreement. The agreement’s provisions included an interim placement for STUDENT in the District’s independent study program, with RSP for forty minutes each school day, instruction from the independent study teacher once a week, and District funding for independent assessments by mutually agreed-upon assessors. The mediation agreement noted that the parties agreed that the interim placement was not an appropriate permanent placement.
In February and March 2001, STUDENT was assessed by clinical neuropsychologist Vincent Nunno and speech-language pathologist Jennifer Hollibaugh. Dr. Nunno’s assessment report included diagnoses of severe chronic depression, anxiety disorder, ADHD, reading disorder, disorder of written expression, visual motor processing disorder, and marijuana abuse, and also indicated that STUDENT was at risk for suicide. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 69-79.) On April 12, 2001, the Stanislaus SELPA formally determined that STUDENT qualified as an emotionally disturbed (ED) student, with diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic depression and anxiety disorder. On May 7, 2001, the IEP team convened to discuss the results of the assessments by the independent assessors,. The team agreed that STUDENT qualified as an emotionally disturbed student. The team also agreed to place STUDENT at a nonpublic school, Stanislaus Learning Academy, and agreed to explore residential placement options. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 15-17.) On June 13, 2001, the team agreed to a six-month placement at Excel, a residential program.(Footnote 5) (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 11-13.) Thereafter STUDENT completed eighth grade and thus ended his attendance at the District. STUDENT currently is a student of the Modesto City School District and attends Stanislaus Learning Academy.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1999-2000 school year, including the 2000 extended school year (ESY)?
Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) FAPE consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).) “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. ) “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective and supportive services as may be required to assist the child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).)
The analysis of whether a student has been provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) is twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to decide whether the proposed placement was substantively appropriate and whether appropriate procedural steps were followed. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-207.)
A. Substantive Appropriateness
The standard for determining whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE involves the following three factors: whether the program was designed to address STUDENT's unique needs; whether the program was reasonably calculated to provide him with educational benefit; and whether the program conformed to his IEP. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).)
In Rowley, the Supreme Court decided the appropriate level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that “the ‘basic floor of opportunity’ provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200.) Moreover, as long as a school district provides an appropriate education, methodology is left up to the school's discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.)
Additionally, special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occur only when the nature or severity of the student’s disability is such that education in regular education classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); Education Code § 56031.) In the present case, LRE is not in dispute, and therefore this Decision will not examine whether or not STUDENT’s placement was in the LRE.
In analyzing whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE in 1999-2000, the first step is to determine what STUDENT’s needs were that year. There is no dispute that STUDENT had an attention processing disorder and a severe discrepancy between his ability and achievement in written expression, largely due to his poor spelling. In addition to spelling, STUDENT had weaknesses in other areas of written language, such as grammar, punctuation and handwriting.(Footnote 6) (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 42-45; testimony of Ms. Mead, Ms. Hollibaugh.)
Additionally, although STUDENT did not qualify as having a severe discrepancy in reading, he needed additional assistance in reading and had particular difficulty with reading decoding.(Footnote 7) (See Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 76; testimony of Ms. Hollibaugh, Ms. Mead.) In seventh grade, STUDENT was reading at approximately a fourth- to fifth-grade level. While the District’s KTEA assessment results did not indicate a significant weakness in reading decoding, testing conducted previously in Gilroy and subsequently by independent assessors demonstrated this weakness. (Petitioner’s Exh. pgs. 42, 76, 92-93; testimony of Ms. Hollibaugh.) In light of all evidence, the Hearing Officer concludes that reading was one of STUDENT’s areas of need for the 1999-2000 school year.
In addition to STUDENT’s academic problems, it was evident early in the 1999-2000 school year that STUDENT had some behavioral problems, particularly severe attendance problems. After only a month into the school year, STUDENT had already missed several days of school, causing his homeroom teacher to schedule a meeting with MOTHER to address STUDENT’s attendance and academic problems. STUDENT’s failure to attend school continued throughout the year, resulting in a SARB hearing and subsequent SARB notices of violations.
Petitioner also argued at hearing that STUDENT’s unique needs included attendance at extended school year (ESY), although STUDENT’s parents had never requested ESY previously. ESY is educational services that extend instruction beyond the normal school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months. (5 C.C.R. § 3043; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992).) STUDENT’s IEPs reflect that he did not require ESY, and the evidence concerning this is consistent with that conclusion. Given that STUDENT was not attending the regular school year, requiring him to attend the ESY would have had little effect, and likely would not have had a positive impact on his attendance. Thus, STUDENT did not need ESY in order to receive a FAPE.
Having determined STUDENT’s unique needs for the 1999-2000 school year, the next step is to determine whether the District’s offer was designed to meet those unique needs. Pursuant to the January 2000 IEP, the District offered mainstreaming in regular education with RSP services for thirty to forty-five minutes per session, three to six sessions per week. For STUDENT’s RSP sessions, Ms. Mead or the resource aide worked with STUDENT using the Morphographic spelling program, pursuant to the IEP objectives in spelling.
Goals, objectives, present levels of performance and measurable benchmarks are essential components in the design of a student’s program, giving teachers a roadmap for how to address the student’s needs and how to measure progress. Yet STUDENT’s IEP did not contain annual goals or present levels of performance, and had objectives only in the area of spelling. Despite STUDENT’s needs in reading and written language, the IEP did not contain any objectives in those areas. Ms. Mead testified that STUDENT needed to work on other areas of written language, but explained that it was most effective to begin in a limited area, then “work up” to other areas. Ms. Mead noted that, although not specified in the IEP objectives, she also worked with STUDENT on editing and word processing to address his written language needs. Nevertheless, the absence of goals and objectives in written language, including means to measure STUDENT’s progress in that area, indicates that the program was not designed to meet STUDENT’s needs in written language. In light of the absences of any goals or objectives to address reading, the IEP likewise was not designed to meet STUDENT’s needs in reading.
Additionally, the District’s offer did not sufficiently address STUDENT’s attendance problems. Notably, the District’s primary contention in this case is that STUDENT’s excessive absences caused any failure to provide a FAPE, and thus implicitly that STUDENT’s truancy was the fault solely of STUDENT and his parents. The Hearing Officer concurs that STUDENT and his parents bore the primary responsibility for ensuring STUDENT’s school attendance. While STUDENT’s mother testified regarding some efforts she made to get STUDENT to school, these efforts were clearly inadequate in light of STUDENT’s ongoing truancy. However, STUDENT’s and his parents’ failure to ensure his attendance did not remove the District’s obligation to address STUDENT’s behavioral needs in his special education program. Although school authorities are not necessarily able to compel teenage students to attend school, a program for a truant special education student generally should include at least some aspect designed to address attendance. (See, e.g., Board of Education of Oak Park and River Forest High School District v. Illinois State Board of Education and Kelly E., 21 F.Supp.2d 862, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1998).) In the present case, the IEP team members knew by January 2000 that STUDENT was failing to attend school, yet the IEP did not include any goals or objectives, or any aspect of the program or services, to address STUDENT’s attendance problem. While the Hearing Officer concurs with the District that the student and his parents are primarily responsible for ensuring the student’s attendance, an appropriate program for a student with STUDENT’s attendance problems should include goals, objectives or other measures to address those problems.
It is true that District staff made efforts to improve STUDENT’s attendance in the 1999-2000 school year, although those efforts were generally outside of the IEP process. Those efforts included several meetings scheduled to address the issue with STUDENT and his parents, telephone calls by District staff to STUDENT’s home on days when he was absent, and a SARB referral. Notably, those efforts had not been successful as of January 2000, when the initial IEP team meeting occurred. The District also took appropriate efforts towards improving STUDENT’s attendance by arranging for a behavioral assessment. That assessment addressed STUDENT’s failure to attend school and suggested strategies to improve STUDENT’s attendance. Those strategies included providing positive reinforcement for engaging in on-task behaviors such as attending school, and arranging with the parents to create a daily reward system for attending school and a “cost” for not attending school. However, because the behavioral assessment was never signed or implemented, these strategies were never implemented. Given that STUDENT was not in regular attendance at the time the parties could not reach agreement on the behavioral assessment, either the District or the parent should have filed for due process hearing to resolve the dispute regarding what behavioral strategies to implement. Although at a meeting in April 2000, MOTHER and District staff did subsequently draft behavioral intervention strategies consistent with the recommendations in the BIP, there is no evidence regarding whether these were ever implemented.(Footnote 8)
Thus, while the District made some efforts to ensure STUDENT’s attendance, the District had knowledge as of January 2000 that those efforts were insufficient to improve his attendance. While there is no guarantee that additional measures, such as behavioral interventions, would have improved STUDENT’s attendance, inclusion of such measures was necessary in designing a program to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.
Likewise, STUDENT’s failure to attend school obviously interfered with his receipt of educational benefit. The District argues that STUDENT was making progress when he attended school. The Hearing Officer finds persuasive the testimony of Ms. Mead and the RSP aide, Janice Shafer, in establishing that STUDENT was doing well with instruction using the Morphographic spelling program, on those instances when he attended school. (See also District’s Exh. pgs. 70-165.) However, there was no specific data ever presented to establish grade-to-grade progress, and STUDENT’s Stanford-9 achievement test scores indicate that he did not answer enough test questions to even receive scores in most of the test categories. (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 269-270.) Moreover, STUDENT’s report card for the 1999-2000 school year indicated that he received Fs in every academic class, resulting in a grade-point average of 0.17 for the year. (Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 268.) These failing grades are even more indicative when it is considered that STUDENT’s report card reflects that he received “grading accommodations as per IEP” for the second and third trimesters. (Id.) For each class, the teacher comments included that “excessive absences affected performance” and “excessive talking/off-task behavior.”
In light of all evidence, including low grades and excessive absences, there is little question that STUDENT did not make any measurable educational gain for the 1999-2000 school year. As discussed above, the District made some efforts outside the IEP process to improve STUDENT’s attendance, but given that STUDENT remained truant and that his behavioral problems were within his unique educational needs, behavioral interventions or similar measures should have been included in STUDENT’s program. Thus, due to STUDENT’s frequent absences and the lack of measures to address them, the District’s program was not reasonably calculated to allow STUDENT to receive educational benefit.
Regarding nonconformity with the IEP, Petitioner argues that the District did not provide the occupational therapy (OT) assessment specified in the January 2000 IEP. Ms. Mead testified that she believed the assessment had been conducted, but neither she nor any other witness established that they had actually seen the report. Indeed, no copy of the assessment report was provided by either party at the hearing. Petitioner argues that an occupational therapy assessment would have been useful to address STUDENT’s fine motor needs as they relate to his handwriting. The Hearing Officer finds that the failure to conduct the OT assessment fails to comport with the IEP and constitutes a denial of FAPE.
Thus, the District substantively denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999-2000 regular school year because the offer was not designed to meet STUDENT’s needs in reading, writing, or behavioral/attendance issues, was not reasonably calculated to result in educational benefit due to lack of behavioral interventions regarding attendance, and did not include an OT assessment in conformity with the IEP.
B. Procedural AppropriatenessParents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Rowley that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-206.)
Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents' opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parents’ participation in the IEP process. (Id.) Thus, the courts have created a two-prong test for determining if a procedural violation resulted in a denial of FAPE for a student: (1) whether a procedural protection has been violated, and (2) whether the procedural violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringed on the parents’ participation in the IEP process.
The primary allegation involves the delay in offering appropriate special education services to STUDENT at the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year. As previously recounted, MOTHER informed the District during the summer prior to STUDENT’s enrollment that STUDENT had been eligible for special education in Gilroy and had received RSP services there. However, STUDENT began the school year in regular education without any special education services or an interim special education placement.
In early September 1999, Ms. Mead reviewed STUDENT’s enrollment forms and spoke with STUDENT’s mother about STUDENT’s possible enrollment in special education. Ms. Mead finally obtained a copy of STUDENT’s last Gilroy IEP in mid-September 1999. However, Ms. Mead found the document internally contradictory and sought confirmation from Gilroy staff, who apparently gave Ms. Mead the erroneous impression that STUDENT had been dropped from RSP entirely. When Ms. Mead conveyed this information to MOTHER, MOTHER disagreed and stated that STUDENT still needed special education services. Ms. Mead agreed to send MOTHER an assessment plan. Thereafter MOTHER did not immediately return the signed plan, reportedly because she believed that STUDENT was already eligible and did not need to be reassessed. It was not until approximately November 1, 1999, that the District offered to place STUDENT in an interim special education placement, and it was not until January 10, 2000, that STUDENT’s initial IEP team meeting took place in his new school district.
Regarding students who transfer to a new school district, California Education Code section 56325 (a) and (b) provides the following:
(a) Whenever a pupil transfers into a school district from a school district not operating programs under the same local plan in which he or she was last enrolled in a special education program, the administrator of a local program under this part shall ensure that the pupil is immediately provided an interim placement for a period not to exceed 30 days. The interim placement must be in conformity with an individualized education program, unless the parent or guardian agrees otherwise. The individualized education program implemented during the interim placement may be either the pupil’s existing individualized education program, implemented to the extent possible within existing resources, which may be implemented without complying with subdivision (a) of Section 56321, or a new individualized education program, developed pursuant to Section 56321.
(b) Before the expiration of the 30-day period, the interim placement shall be reviewed by the individualized education program team and a final recommendation shall be made by the team in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. The team may utilize information, records, and reports from the school district or county program from which the pupil transferred.
Contrary to the requirements of section 56325, STUDENT was not immediately provided an interim placement. Given the widespread use of facsimile machines and the participation of STUDENT’s mother, it is unclear why neither Gilroy nor MOTHER provided the District with STUDENT’s last Gilroy IEP sooner than mid-September 1999, particularly given that STUDENT’s mother notified the District of the special education eligibility in July 1999.(Footnote 9) Certainly upon receipt of the Gilroy IEP in September 1999, the District had an obligation to implement the interim placement in conformity with that IEP document. Even though Ms. Mead was confused regarding what program the Gilroy IEP provided, that IEP clearly did not exit STUDENT from special education. Indeed, the IEP document stated that STUDENT’s needs could not be met without RSP support in a modified core class. Moreover, while it is unfortunate that a Gilroy RSP teacher gave Ms. Mead the erroneous impression that STUDENT had been exited from RSP entirely, it is still unclear why Ms. Mead interpreted that information to mean that STUDENT had been exited from special education entirely, particularly given the lack of an exit IEP.
Thus, despite knowledge that STUDENT was eligible as SLD, the District did not offer an interim placement until approximately November 1, 1999, and did not convene an IEP meeting until January 10, 2000. In light of these facts, the District’s failure to comply with section 56325 constitutes a procedural violation. Because the violation denied the student appropriate special education services for the first part of the 1999-2000 school year, the violation resulted in a loss of educational opportunity which denied STUDENT a FAPE for the first portion of the 1999-2000 school year.
Petitioner also raises procedural claims concerning the goals, objectives and present levels of performance in the January 2000 IEP. As discussed in the previous section of this Decision, the IEP failed to include annual goals, failed to include objectives in all of STUDENT’s areas of need, and failed to set out the present levels of performance, although the performance levels were indicated in the assessment. These failures are in contrast to the requirements of 20 U.S.C. section 1414(d)(1)(A) and Education Code section 56345. As previously recounted in this decision, the failure to include these elements in the IEP was part of the failure to design a program to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, and thus constituted a loss of educational opportunity. Thus, the failures to include annual goals, present levels of performance and objectives in all areas of need constituted procedural denials of FAPE, as did the District’s failure to implement STUDENT’s special education placement upon his entry into the District in fall 1999.
2. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?
A. Substantive Appropriateness
Petitioner argues that the District’s offers for the 2000-2001 school year were inappropriate, until the offer of residential placement in mid-June 2001. The District again argues that it offered appropriate placements for this school year and, moreover, that any failure to offer or provide FAPE was due to STUDENT’s continued absences.
Regarding STUDENT’s unique needs for the 2000-2001 school year, the evidence indicates that they were similar to his needs for the prior school year. His academic needs continued, as did his truancy and other behavioral problems. His emotional problems apparently became more prominent, and in September 2000 his mother requested that he be evaluated for ED. In that assessment report, dated December 2, 2000, the Stanislaus County Behavioral Health therapist wrote that STUDENT had “classic symptoms of childhood depression which appear to have become entwined with oppositional-defiant behavior.” (Petitioner’s Exh. 104.) In April 2001, the SELPA certified STUDENT as ED.
Considering STUDENT’s unique needs for the 2000-2001 school year, the Hearing Officer must next determine whether the District’s offer was designed to meet those needs. From late August to October 9, 2000, STUDENT was on independent study with one RSP session per day. For his independent study, STUDENT received a packet of assignments, which he was to turn in at his weekly meeting with his home instruction teacher. Initially this placement was not identified in any IEP, and apparently was created via informal agreement with the parent. On the IEP dated September 27, 2000, the program is identified as general education with RSP, with no mention of the independent study program.
At the September 27, 2000 IEP, the District offered placement in Stanislaus County Office of Education’s (SCOE) PACE program, an alternative education program. STUDENT continued on independent study until October 9, 2000, when the parents signed the IEP placing STUDENT in the SCOE’s PACE program. PACE remained STUDENT’s placement until the parties met in mediation on January 18, 2001, and agreed to return STUDENT temporarily to independent study with RSP. The parties signed a mediation agreement and accompanying IEP document that specified an interim placement for STUDENT in the District’s independent study program, with RSP for forty minutes each school day, instruction from the independent study teacher once a week, and District funding for independent assessments by mutually agreed-upon assessors.(Footnote 10) The mediation agreement indicated that the parties agreed that the interim placement was not an appropriate permanent placement. STUDENT remained on independent study with RSP from mid-January until his residential placement in mid-June 2001.
The District contends that Petitioner should not be permitted to challenge the independent study placement agreed to on January 18, 2001, because the placement was temporary and was the result of mediation. The District argues that permitting this challenge to the mediated agreement would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging parties to resolve disputes via mediation. However, neither the interim agreement nor the IEP of January 18, 2001, contained any sort of waiver of Petitioner’s right to dispute the appropriateness of the placement via due process procedures. Indeed, the parties agreed that the placement was not an appropriate permanent placement, although STUDENT remained on that independent study placement for five months.
Little evidence was received regarding the independent study placements. There was no information about the programs in any IEP document. MOTHER testified that STUDENT received a packet of work that he was supposed to complete each week but the work was too difficult for him to do, although neither she nor STUDENT ever told that to anyone at the District. Ms. Dimond testified that, given STUDENT’s truancy and emotional issues, the purpose of independent study was to create a program that STUDENT could handle and to ensure that he received at least some instruction.(Footnote 11)
Similarly, there was little evidence submitted regarding the PACE program. Neither the September nor October 2000 IEP contains any information about what program or services STUDENT would receive at PACE. Ms. Mead and Ms. Dimond both generally testified that PACE was appropriate for STUDENT because it was designed to address STUDENT’s attendance problems and provide resource support.
The Hearing Office follows a long line of case law holding that the school district bears the burden of persuasion to prove that it complied with the IDEA. (Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).) In the present case, considering the dearth of evidence regarding this school year, the District has not met its burden of establishing the appropriateness of its offers. Thus, the Hearing Officer must conclude that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year.(Footnote 12)
B. Procedural Appropriateness
For the 2000-2001 school year, the only notable procedural issues concern the IEPs of September and October 2000. As noted above, the September 2000 IEP does not contain any information about STUDENT’s then-current placement on independent study, other than that his RSP placement is continuing. Regarding both the September and October 2000 IEPs, neither document contains any information about the proposed placement at PACE, such as what the program entailed, what STUDENT’s goals and objectives would be, or even when future goals and objectives for the PACE program might be drafted.
The inadequacy of these IEPs constitute procedural violations. However, this Decision has already determined that the student was denied FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year. In light of the previous findings regarding the denial of FAPE for this period, determination of whether these violations resulted in a loss of educational opportunity constituting a denial of FAPE is unnecessary.
3. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
Compensatory education is an equitable remedy which may be available when the school district has denied the student a FAPE. (Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1994).) In fashioning appropriate equitable relief the conduct of both parties should be reviewed, along with the nature of relief requested, to determine whether an award of compensatory education is appropriate. (Id.) Courts have explained that the purpose of compensatory relief is to replace lost educational services and ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA. (Student W. at 1497; Todd v. Andrews, 933 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1991); Moubry v. Independent School District No. 696, 951 F.Supp. 867 (8th Cir. 1996).) There is, however, no obligation to compensate the child by providing a day of education for each educational day lost. (Student W. at 1497.) In the present case, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was denied a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year and the 2000-2001 school year. Petitioner seeks compensatory education in the form of 468 hours of tutoring in either the Orton-Gillingham program or the Slingerland program, with the instruction provided by a person knowledgeable in the particular program being utilized. Both Ms. Hollibaugh and Ms. Dimond explained that the Orton-Gillingham and Slingerland programs are multi-sensory programs that require the student to “see it, say it, hear it, do it.” The witnesses explained that the multisensory approach uses the visual, oral, auditory, and tactile channels as part of the instruction, so that a student with a weakness in one channel can learn and reinforce the instruction using the other channels. Both Ms. Hollibaugh and Ms. Dimond testified that such an approach would be appropriate for STUDENT, and that either Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland would be an appropriate program for him.
On the basis of witness testimony, the Hearing Officer concludes that instruction using the Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland methods would be appropriate to address STUDENT’s academic needs. Regarding the amount of instruction, Petitioner has requested 468 hours of tutoring. The basis for this request is a recommendation from Ms. Hollibaugh that STUDENT receive three hours of instruction per week for three years, fifty-two weeks per year. (Testimony of Ms. Hollibaugh; Petitioner’s Exh. pg. 66.) Ms. Hollibaugh’s recommendation is based on her opinion that STUDENT functions at six to seven grade levels below his age; this opinion differs from the independent assessment results of Dr. Nunno, who concluded in spring 2001 that, at that time, STUDENT was five to six years below grade level in writing, two to three years below grade level in reading, and about one year below grade level in math. (Petitioner’s Exh. 76.) Moreover, considering that STUDENT is already in a full-time high school academic program, adding an additional three hours of instruction for the next three years appears somewhat excessive, particularly given STUDENT’s tendency to withdraw from school when stressed by the demands placed on him.
In light of all factors, the Hearing Officer finds that two hours of tutoring per week for two school years would be an appropriate remedy for the denial of FAPE for the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years. Given that each school year lasts approximately forty-two weeks, two school years totals eighty-four (84) weeks. Thus, STUDENT is entitled to a total of one hundred and sixty-eight (168) hours of tutoring in either the Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland programs, provided by an individual trained and knowledgeable in the particular program. District staff shall consult with staff at Stanislaus Learning Academy, staff at Modesto City School District, and one or both of STUDENT’s parents to determine when and how the one-hundred and sixty-eight hours of tutoring should be provided, in light of his current school obligations, to ensure that the tutoring does not overload him or increase his absences from school.(Footnote 13)
ORDER
1. The District shall provide STUDENT with a total of one-hundred and sixty-eight (168) hours of tutoring in either the Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland programs, provided by an individual trained and knowledgeable in the particular program.
2. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:
1. Did the District provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1999-2000 school year, including the 2000 extended school year (ESY)?
Petitioner prevailed regarding the claim of denial of FAPE for the 1999-2000 regular school year. The District prevailed regarding the claim for the 2000 extended school year (ESY).
2. Did the District provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?
Petitioner prevailed on this claim.
3. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?
Petitioner prevailed to the extent that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education of one hundred and sixty-eight (168) hours of tutoring using the Orton-Gillingham or Slingerland methods. The District prevailed to the extent that Petitioner was not awarded the remaining tutoring hours he sought.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (California Education Code § 56505(i).)
DATED: March 11, 2002 ___________________________________ Suzanne B. Brown Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. MOTHER states that she did not believe that STUDENT needed to be assessed again, since he had been eligible for special education in Gilroy since 1995. 2. MOTHER testified that she believed no interim placement was ever implemented prior to the IEP meeting in January 2000. However, the Hearing Officer gives greater weight to Ms. Mead’s testimony on this point because Ms. Mead was able to personally observe STUDENT in his interim placement, while MOTHER formed her opinion based on information told to her by others. 3. Neither party submitted any evidence regarding the occupational therapy assessment, although Ms. Mead testified that she believed the assessment had been completed. Petitioner asserts that “there is no evidence that an occupational therapy assessment was ever done.” (Petitioner’s Closing Statement, p. 6.) 4. Petitioner contends that MOTHER pleaded “no contest” to the misdemeanor because she could not afford the attorney fees necessary to contest the charge. 5. Although not specifically addressed by the parties, it appears from the IEP that the responsibility for funding the residential placement was with the county mental health agency, not the District. 6. Ms. Hollibaugh testified that STUDENT’s poor handwriting was due to dysgraphia, a handwriting disorder characterized by difficulty with graphomotor control of the pen/pencil and with forming the letters of the alphabet. On the other hand, Ms. Hollibaugh also acknowledged that the handwriting in many of STUDENT’s writing samples was legible. In Ms. Dimond’s testimony, she discussed whether STUDENT’s writing samples may or may not be indicative of dysgraphia, although she did not offer a definitive diagnosis. For purposes of this Decision, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT had some difficulty with handwriting but was able to write legibly. (See Respondent’s Exh. pgs. 70-165; testimony of MOTHER, Ms. Mead, Ms. Dimond.) Given the evidence at hearing, the Hearing Officer does not reach any determination as to whether or not STUDENT’s handwriting difficulties are due to dysgraphia. 7. There was some evidence at hearing to indicate that STUDENT’s difficulties with reading decoding may have been due to dyslexia. (Testimony of Patricia Dimond, Ms. Hollibaugh.) 8. Ms. Dimond testified that the BIP was never implemented because STUDENT was not in attendance. To the extent that Ms. Dimond’s report is correct, it does not contradict the impression that the program was not designed to meet the student’s behavioral needs. 9. Ms. Mead explained that the District did not have a policy at that time regarding finding a student eligible for special education during summertime, although such a policy has since been implemented. SELPA director Patricia Dimond testified that, in fall 1999, the District had problems complying with section 56325. Ms. Dimond explained that she was therefore involved in establishing a procedure wherein the District obtains telephone verification of a new student’s special education status from the student’s previous school district, so that the student’s interim placement is implemented immediately. Ms. Dimond stated that this new procedure was established at the District by January 2000. 10. Neither party argued that the agreement should not be admitted into evidence due to confidentiality and, in any event, the terms of the independent study placement were contained in the January 18, 2001 IEP. 11. While Ms. Dimond appeared to have been specifically referring to the independent study placement in January 2001, her testimony appears similarly applicable to the earlier independent study placement in fall 2000. 12. Additionally, Petitioner contends that the District should have developed an individual transition plan (ITP) after STUDENT turned fourteen years old in April 2000. Instead, no ITP was drafted until June 2001, when STUDENT was fifteen years old. While Education Code section 56345.1 provides that transition service needs shall be included in the IEP beginning at age fourteen, in the present case there was no evidence that the delay in drafting the ITP had any actual effect on STUDENT’s education or future transition out of high school; thus, there is no apparent remedy for the delay in drafting the ITP. In any event, given the previous findings regarding denial of FAPE for both school years at issue, the resolution of this issue would not affect the remedy awarded to the student. 13. For example, although the award is calculated using the number of weeks in the school year, this calculation does not prevent delivery of some of the tutoring hours during the summertime, if that is appropriate in light of STUDENT’s needs and current placement.
