California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 19, 2003

Student v. Poway Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1863-03 · Hearing Officer Trevor Skarda

Poway Unified prevails: no evidence it blocked a parent from contacting teachers; claims after a refused, ordered assessment dismissed.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A 15-year-old ninth grader's mother represented him herself in this hearing against Poway Unified School District. He is eligible for special education with a learning disability in math and written language, with auditory processing and planning deficits. His IEP placed him in the resource specialist program at Westview High School. However, his parents had kept him home since early in the 2002-2003 school year. The mother claimed the District denied him a FAPE by blocking her from talking directly with his proposed teachers. She asked for Lindamood Bell reading and writing services and occupational therapy.

At the start of the hearing, the Hearing Officer narrowed the claim. Res judicata and collateral estoppel barred claims for January 17 through March 4, 2003, because of earlier SEHO decisions between the same parties. Claims after April 17, 2003, including extended school year, were dismissed. The parents had refused to make the student available for assessments ordered in an earlier decision. That left only March 4 through April 17, 2003.

On that period, the Hearing Officer found no evidence the District stopped the mother from contacting anyone. The District's system for tracking her heavy correspondence did not bar direct contact. She also recalled no contact attempts during the period. Even if there had been a violation, she never asked for an IEP meeting. The student lost no educational opportunity because the parents had already rejected the program. All relief was denied.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO handled repeat filings. It used res judicata to bar claims the family could have raised in earlier hearings. Under Gregory K., it treated the parents' refusal of a hearing-ordered assessment as ending the student's right to services. It also held that a district system for routing parent correspondence was not a procedural violation.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue Procedural ruling A. District motion to dismiss Petitioner's claim for the period January 17, 2003, through March 4, 2003, under res judicata and collateral estoppel

    The claim for January 17 to March 4, 2003 was barred because the student could have raised the alleged procedural violation in the earlier hearing (SN03-00116).

  2. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Procedural ruling B. District motion to dismiss Petitioner's claim for the period after April 17, 2003, including ESY 2003, because the parents refused to make the student reasonably available for a Hearing Office-ordered assessment

    Because the parents refused to make the student available for the assessments ordered in SN03-00295, he was not entitled to special education after April 17, 2003, and that part of the claim, including ESY 2003, was dismissed.

  3. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1. Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE by failing to allow STUDENT's mother to communicate with his proposed teachers at West Valley High School from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003?

    There was no evidence the mother was kept from contacting teachers. No law gives parents unlimited access to proposed teachers. Even if there had been a violation, the student lost no educational opportunity and the mother's IEP participation was not affected.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All relief sought by Petitioner was denied.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District; Vander Malle v. Ambach; Allen v. McCurry; People v. Sims; Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control; Parris v. Zolin

People named in the decision

  • Emily Shieh, due process program specialist; ran the correspondence tracking system; witness, Poway Unified School District
  • Mr. Hunt, proposed pre-algebra teacher, Westview High School, Poway Unified School District
  • Deborah Cooke, SEHO Hearing Officer in prior decision SN02-01698, Special Education Hearing Office
  • Suzanne Brown, SEHO Hearing Officer in prior decisions SN03-00116 and SN03-00295, Special Education Hearing Office

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Poway, California, on November 13, 2003. Petitioner STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by his mother, MOTHER. Respondent Poway Unified School District (Poway or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Justin R. Shinnefield. Also present on behalf of the District was Emily Shieh, due process program specialist.

The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: MOTHER and Emily Shieh. The District questioned the Petitioner’s witnesses and called no witnesses of its own.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. Following the District’s oral closing argument, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision. (Footnote 1)

ISSUE

Did the District deny STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to allow STUDENT’s mother to communicate with his proposed teachers at West Valley High School from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003? (Footnote 2)

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The District’s Motion to Dismiss

At the beginning of the hearing, Petitioner’s mother, MOTHER, clarified her issue for hearing as follows: whether the District committed a procedural violation that denied STUDENT a FAPE from January 17, 2003, through the end of the 2002-2003 school year, as well as the 2003 extended school year (ESY). MOTHER’s specific allegation was she was not allowed to communicate with STUDENT’s teachers, and therefore was not allowed to participate in STUDENT’s individualized education program (IEP) during this time period. As a result, according to MOTHER, STUDENT was home-schooled and lost educational opportunity. As a remedy, MOTHER sought the following: (1) Lindamood Bell services addressing deficits in the areas of reading and writing, four hours each day, five days each week, for five months; (2) occupational therapy addressing fine motor deficits, two hours each day, five days each week, for five months.

The District then moved to dismiss Petitioner’s issue in its entirety under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel or, alternatively, because the Petitioner had refused to make STUDENT reasonably available for a Hearing Office-ordered assessment. The Hearing Officer considered the arguments of the parties, and he granted the District’s motion to dismiss in part. He dismissed Petitioner’s issue from January 17, 2003, through March 4, 2003, applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. He also dismissed Petitioner’s issue for the period after April 17, 2003, reasoning that STUDENT was not entitled to a FAPE after that date because of his parents’ refusal to make STUDENT reasonably available for assessment. Each of these rulings will be discussed in more detail below.

Dismissal of the Issue for the period from January 17, 2003, through March 4, 2003

The Hearing Office has issued three decisions in cases involving same parties during the current year. In the first decision, STUDENT v. Poway, SN02-01698 (March 4, 2003), Hearing Officer Deborah Cooke found generally that the District had offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year. In the second decision, STUDENT v. Poway, (March 26, 2003) SN03-00116, Hearing Officer Suzanne Brown found generally that several alleged procedural violations related to an IEP team meeting held on January 17, 2003, did not deny STUDENT a FAPE. In the third decision, Poway v. STUDENT, (March 28, 2003) SN03-00295, Hearing Officer Suzanne Brown found that the District was entitled to conduct proposed assessments of STUDENT pursuant to a January 17, 2003 evaluation plan, despite the PARENTS’ refusal to consent. In that hearing, Hearing Officer Brown ordered STUDENT’s parents to “make [STUDENT] reasonably available for the reassessments.”

Federal and state courts have traditionally adhered to the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980); see 7 Witkin, California Procedure (4th Ed.), Judgment § 280 et seq.) Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their agents from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. (Allen, 449 U.S. at 94.) Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case. (Id.) The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel serve many purposes, including relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encouraging reliance on adjudication. (Id.)

While collateral estoppel and res judicata are judicial doctrines, they are frequently applied to determinations made in the administrative settings. (See Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 55 Cal.2d 728, 732, 361 P.2d 712 (1961).) As the California Supreme Court explained, "[c]ollateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made by administrative agencies '[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.’ People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 479, 651 P.2d 321 (1982) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545 (1966).)

In the present matter, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner’s issue was clearly barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, at least for the period from January 17, 2003, through March 4, 2003 (the first day of the hearing in the matter STUDENT v. Poway, (March 26, 2003) SN03-00116). Petitioner had the opportunity to litigate the alleged procedural violation along with all of the other alleged procedural violations he raised in that hearing. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismissed the Petitioner’s issue for that period.

However, although it appeared from MOTHER’s own evidence that any “new” alleged procedural violations actually took place before March 4, 2003 (and therefore should have been raised in the previous hearing), the Hearing Officer ruled out of an abundance of caution that the issue was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel for the period after March 4, 2003.

Dismissal of the Issue for the period after April 17, 2003, including the ESY 2003

As discussed above, Hearing Officer Suzanne Brown issued a second decision on March 28, 2003, and found that the District was entitled to conduct its proposed assessment of STUDENT pursuant to the January 17, 2003 evaluation plan, and she ordered STUDENT’s parents to “make [STUDENT] reasonably available” for the reassessment. After it received that decision, the District sent a letter to STUDENT’s parents dated April 8, 2003, in which it proposed dates for STUDENT’s reassessment (STUDENT had been unilaterally removed by his parents from school for all but a few days at the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year). MOTHER testified that she never responded to the District’s letter. She testified further that she refused to make STUDENT available for assessment, as ordered, because she believed Hearing Officer Brown’s decision was wrong. As a result, the District had not been allowed to conduct its assessments.

In Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 F.2d 1307, 1315 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “if the parents want Gregory to receive special education under the Act, they are obligated to permit such testing.” Similarly, in Andress v. Cleveland Independent School District, 64 F.3d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit concluded that “a parent who desires for her child to receive special education must allow the school district to evaluate the child...there is no exception to this rule.” (See, also Vander Malle v. Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2nd Cir. 1983).)

Because the PARENTS refused to make STUDENT reasonably available for an assessment and to permit the District to assess STUDENT as ordered in the previous decision, the Hearing Officer found that STUDENT was no longer entitled to special education services after April 17, 2003. (Footnote 3) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismissed the Petitioner’s issue for the period after April 17, 2003, including the ESY 2003.

In sum, it was found at the beginning of the hearing that Petitioner could pursue his claim that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, but only for the period from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003.

The Petitioner’s Motion to Recuse Hearing Officer Skarda

Near the end of the due process hearing, MOTHER moved to recuse the presiding Hearing Officer. She asserted that the Hearing Officer was biased against her because he had sustained District objections and denied her objections. The Hearing Officer considered the arguments of the parties, and denied MOTHER’s request as without merit.

Petitioner’s Motion to Continue

Before she abandoned her own hearing, MOTHER requested a continuance. The grounds for her request were generally that she had failed to serve several witness subpoenas, and that she required a continuance to serve the subpoenas. The Hearing Officer considered the arguments of the parties and denied the continuance; MOTHER’s failure to subpoena her own witnesses or otherwise secure their appearance did not constitute good cause to continue the hearing. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f).

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old student who has qualified for special education since 1990. He is currently eligible for special education because of a severe learning disability due to a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement in math and written language with auditory processing and planning processing deficits. Currently, STUDENT does not attend school and instead receives home instruction from his mother, although his IEP placement continues to be in the ninth grade resource specialist program (RSP) at the District’s Westview High School (Westview), with designated instruction and services (DIS) of counseling, occupational therapy, vision therapy and transportation. STUDENT has not attended school in the District for a significant period of time since May 2002. In mid-May of 2002, a few weeks before the end of the school year, STUDENT’s mother removed him from school for the remainder of the school year. MOTHER requested that the District allow STUDENT to be enrolled in the off-campus home instruction program; however, the District never agreed to that proposal. At the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year, STUDENT enrolled in ninth grade at Westview but only attended between six and eight school days before his parents, once again, removed him. He has not returned to school since that time.

MOTHER requested the instant due process hearing on August 27, 2003, identifying as an issue that the District had “created a civil procedure/restricting me from communicating directly with STUDENT’s special education teachers at West View High School.” The due process hearing was originally scheduled to convene on September 18, 2003; however, a continuance was granted upon a showing of good cause, and the matter was rescheduled for November 13, 2003. On November 10, 2003, MOTHER submitted a “request to take matter of calendar.” (Footnote 4) However, on November 12, 2003, MOTHER submitted another document in which she wrote, “I am fully prepared to go into hearing – November 13, 2003.” The hearing convened and completed on November 13, 2003.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE: Did the District deny STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to allow STUDENT’s mother to communicate with his proposed teachers at West Valley High School from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003?

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400; Cal. Educ. Code § 56000.) The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student=s individualized educational program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18).)

ASpecial education@ is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).) The term Arelated services@ includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) California Education Code section 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California=s term for related services, shall be provided Awhen the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.@

In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District, et al., v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Federal special education law requires states to establish certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives a free appropriate public education and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student=s individualized educational program. (W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1483.) Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of FAPE. However, procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent=s opportunity to participate in the IEP process may constitute a denial of FAPE. (Id. at 1484.)

MOTHER contends that the District failed to provide STUDENT with a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) during the brief period at issue because the District refused to allow Petitioner to communicate with STUDENT’s proposed teachers. This procedural violation resulted in prejudice to STUDENT because he “had to be home-schooled,” according to MOTHER. The District contends that (1) MOTHER was not prevented from communicating with anybody; (2) any such action could not, as a matter of law, have resulted in a denial of FAPE; (3) STUDENT never lost educational opportunity because he never attended school during the period in question.

The Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER’s contention – that she was prevented from directly communicating with STUDENT’s proposed teachers – is not supported by the evidence. There was simply no evidence whatsoever that MOTHER was prevented from directly communicating with anybody – she testified only that two teachers did not return phone calls or provide information following her inquiries in late February 2003 (before the time period in question). Even that factual assertion was contradicted by MOTHER’s own evidence packet; MOTHER submitted a document which originated from Mr. Hunt, one of the teachers she alleged did not respond to her inquires. Mr. Hunt was STUDENT’s proposed pre-algebra teacher. (Petitioner’s Exh. K). The document Mr. Hunt forwarded to MOTHER (in February 2003) included a course description, course requirements, grading scale, homework policy, standard assessment information, as well as his contact information, including Mr. Hunt’s phone number and email address. Moreover, MOTHER was unable to recall any specific contact attempts during the period in question (March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003).

Although unclear, what may have resulted in MOTHER’s perception that she was barred from contacting teachers directly was the tracking system that the District instituted in November 2001. The tracking system is designed to efficiently track and respond to MOTHER’s voluminous correspondence with District personnel. Emily Shieh, the due process program specialist for the District, testified that one of her duties include tracking and coordinating responses to MOTHER’s frequent emails, phone messages, faxes and letters to various individuals employed by the District. Each time an email, letter, facsimile or phone message is received from MOTHER, the following information is noted: (1) the persons to whom the correspondence or request is addressed; (2) a short statement of the nature of the issue or MOTHER’s request; (3) the date of the response (if any); and (4) the name of the person who responded. Ms. Shieh explained that the unique tracking system became necessary because of the volume and nature of MOTHER’s correspondence up to that time. MOTHER sent so many requests, each often addressed to several people, that District staff were duplicating efforts. (Footnote 5) (Testimony of Shieh).

One example of how the tracking system may have confused MOTHER relates to the document she received from Mr. Hunt. That document, which describes Mr. Hunt’s pre-algebra class, was first routed to Ms. Shieh who then forwarded it to MOTHER. MOTHER may have mistakenly believed because she received the document from Ms. Shieh instead of directly from Mr. Hunt, that she was somehow barred from calling, emailing, or otherwise communicating directly with Mr. Hunt. But there was simply no evidence that MOTHER was prevented from directly communicating with Mr. Hunt or anybody in the District. (Footnote 6)

In sum, it has been found that MOTHER’s factual allegation, that she was prevented from directly contacting proposed teachers during the period in question, is unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there was no persuasive evidence that she even tried to contact STUDENT’s proposed teachers during this period. Accordingly, STUDENT was not denied a free and appropriate education in the manner alleged by MOTHER.

Assuming, arguendo, that MOTHER was prevented from directly contacting STUDENT’s teachers during the period in question, there is no authority in state or federal law requiring that a parent must have unfettered access to a child’s proposed teachers. A parent may communicate directly with teachers at annual individualized education program (IEP) team meetings (the law requires that at least one regular education teacher and one special education teacher attend a student’s IEP team meetings). (Cal. Educ. Code § 56341). There was no evidence, however, that MOTHER ever requested an IEP team meeting during this period. (Footnote 7)

Assuming, arguendo, that the District prevented STUDENT from directly contacting the proposed teachers outside of the IEP process, and that this violated state law or the IDEA, only procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or that seriously infringe on the parent=s opportunity to participate in the IEP process may constitute a denial of FAPE. There was no persuasive evidence of either in this case: MOTHER never requested an IEP (and therefore, her opportunity to participate in the IEP process was never implicated). Moreover, the PARENTSs had long before rejected the District’s program; STUDENT did not therefore lose educational opportunity.

In sum, it has been found above that there is absolutely no factual, legal or logical basis for MOTHER’s claim that STUDENT was denied a FAPE from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003. She was never prevented from speaking directly with District staff. There is no legal basis for her claim. Even if she was prevented from speaking directly with staff, STUDENT did not lose educational opportunity, and MOTHER’s right to participate in the IEP process was unaffected.

ORDER

All relief sought by Petitioner is denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: Respondent prevailed on the sole issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

DATED: December 19, 2003 ________________________ Trevor Skarda, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. MOTHER walked out of the hearing at approximately 3:00 p.m. after her belated request for a continuance was denied (the continuance request followed a request that the Presiding Hearing Officer recuse himself, which was also denied). The Hearing Officer notes that MOTHER’s behavior of walking out of her own hearing is the sort of behavior that could warrant the initiation of contempt proceedings. There is authority for the imposition of sanctions on a party who has obstructed or interrupted the due course of a hearing during the proceeding, or failed or refused, without substantial justification, to comply with an order of the presiding officer. 5 CCR § 3088; Cal. Gov. Code § 11455.10 et seq. The purpose of a contempt proceeding arising from conduct in the course of an administrative proceeding is to maintain the dignity of the administrative tribunal and enforce its orders. Parris v Zolin (1996) 12 Cal 4th 839, 50 Cal Rptr 2d 109, 911 P2d 9. (Citing former Cal. Gov. Code § 11525, from which the current sanction authority was derived.) The presiding officer is authorized by statute to initiate a contempt proceeding or to order a party, the party's attorney or other authorized representative, or both, to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay as defined in Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Cal. Gov. Code § 11455.30. Nonetheless, the Hearing Officer declines to initiate contempt sanctions or shift costs for MOTHER’s behavior, at this time. In any event, because MOTHER abandoned her own hearing, she forfeited her right to provide a closing argument. After she left, the District provided its oral closing argument, and the matter was closed and submitted for decision. Three days later, MOTHER requested a continuance of the hearing “for just cause.” The new continuance request was not heard because the matter had already been closed and submitted for decision. The Hearing Officer notes that MOTHER’s continuance request contained no new facts, changed circumstances or new law which would have warranted reconsideration of the previous denial of her request for a continuance.

2. The Petitioner stated at the beginning of the Hearing that the alleged procedural violation denied STUDENT a FAPE from January 17, 2003, through the end of the 2002-2003 school year, as well as the 2003 extended school year (ESY). However, as discussed below in the Procedural Matters section of this decision, the Hearing Officer dismissed the issue for all but the period from March 4, 2003, through April 17, 2003.

3. The Hearing Officer determined that April 17, 2003, was the cut-off date, because, as of that date STUDENT’s parents had ample time to make STUDENT “reasonably available” for the Hearing Office-ordered assessments. Again, MOTHER testified that she has never complied with the order, and never intends to do so. Unfortunately for STUDENT, unless and until the PARENTS make STUDENT reasonably available for the ordered assessment, STUDENT is not entitled to special education services.

4. Hearings cannot be taken off calendar unilaterally by one party; there must be agreement of all parties. A single party may, however, request a continuance, which is granted only upon a showing of good cause. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f).

5. Since the District started tracking MOTHER’s correspondence in November 2001, it has received at least 698 separate correspondence from MOTHER. Many were several pages long and addressed and sent to multiple people in the District.

6. Ms. Shieh also testified that she examined the communication log for the period at issue and she found that there were 37 separate requests from MOTHER during that period. None were requests to directly contact teachers.

7. The law also anticipates regular communications between teachers and parents of disabled children at least as often (and arguably, in the same manner, e.g., face-to-face) as teachers meet with nondisabled children. According to the regulations accompanying the IDEA, parents of children with disabilities must be regularly informed of their child’s progress at least as often as parents of nondisabled children (through report cards or other means). (34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(7)). However, STUDENT never attended school during the entire period at issue (indeed, he did not attend for the entire year, excepting eight days). Therefore, assuming STUDENT’s proposed teachers met, in person, with the parents of other students to discuss progress between March 4, 2003, and April 17, 2003, they would have no reason to meet with MOTHER.