California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 15, 2002

Long Beach Unified School District v. Student

SEHO Case No. SN 1937-01 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim

Long Beach Unified loses its own due process case: its assessment missed vision and auditory processing, and its 2001-02 IEP denied FAPE.

Student prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted in the decision. The decision refers to a prior settled case, SN00-01625.

Summary

Long Beach Unified School District filed this case. It asked the Hearing Officer to find that its July 2001 assessments were appropriate and that its IEP offer for 2001-2002 provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The student was a 16-year-old tenth grader eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability in written expression. His parents had placed him at the Winston School, a nonpublic school in Del Mar. On the first day of hearing, the District asked to add parent reimbursement as an issue. The Hearing Officer denied the request because the District had not given the required 10-day notice.

On assessment, the Hearing Officer found that the parties' earlier settlement did not stop the student from challenging the assessments. The District should have assessed vision. The student had a history of visual processing problems and told school psychologist Jeanne Yugar he had trouble focusing on words. The District's assessment of auditory processing was also inadequate. It used only a few subtests, even though the mother had named auditory processing as her concern.

On FAPE, the Hearing Officer found that giving the parents the reports late, or at the July 31 meeting, did not unlawfully limit their participation. However, the IEP did not address the student's eye-movement (oculomotor) and auditory processing needs. Optometrist Beth Ballinger's evaluation documented those needs. The goals also lacked baselines, a spelling goal, dates for meeting objectives, and measurable self-advocacy objectives. Taken together, these problems denied FAPE. All of the District's requests for relief were denied.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO held that a district must assess in every area of suspected disability, even when the parent says the area is not a concern or plans to get a private evaluation. It also shows that several smaller defects in an IEP's goals can together deny FAPE.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1. Did the District appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability?

    The settlement agreement did not prevent a challenge to the assessment. The District should have assessed vision because of the student's history of visual processing problems and reported tracking difficulty, and it did not adequately assess auditory processing, which the parent had raised as a concern.

  2. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 2. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2001-2002 school year?

    Giving the parents the assessment reports late did not violate their right to participate. However, the IEP did not address the student's vision and auditory processing needs. Its goals also lacked baselines, a spelling goal, objective dates and measurable self-advocacy objectives, so the IEP denied FAPE.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • All of the District's requests for relief were denied. The District had asked for an order that its assessment was appropriate and that it offered FAPE for 2001-2002. No relief was ordered for the Student because reimbursement was not an issue at hearing.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23; Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist.; Adams v. State of Oregon; Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ.; Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm.; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.

People named in the decision

  • Jeanne Yugar, Ph.D., school psychologist (psychoeducational assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Jill Jeffery, speech and language specialist and augmentative alternative communication specialist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Christian McGrath, resource specialist teacher, Wilson High School
  • Susan Johnson, high school team leader, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Aime Sundal, high school team leader, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Kathryn Goria, lead occupational therapist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Kathy Bullock, administrative coordinator of related services, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Sandy Blazer, director of special education; former principal of Stanford Middle School, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Susan Melly, SELPA administrator, Long Beach SELPA
  • Nick Davaei, due process liaison, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Steve Glance, speech specialist (speech-language assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Jane Vogel, special education consultant and vision specialist, expert witness for District, Private practice
  • Joseph Voglund, educational audiologist, Long Beach Unified School District
  • Jane Goodsell, occupational therapist (OT assessor), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Susan Berkowitz, private speech and language pathologist, witness for Student
  • Carol Atkins, private clinical audiologist, witness for Student
  • Beth Ballinger, O.D., private optometrist and vision therapist, witness for Student
  • Nancy Markel, Ph.D., private clinical neuropsychologist, witness for Student
  • Claudia McCulloch, Ph.D., private neurodevelopmental assessor (prior report)
  • J. Shohet, Ph.D., private cognitive and educational evaluator (prior report)
  • Jean Saunders, Ph.D., school psychologist (prior 1999 assessment), Long Beach Unified School District
  • Winston School, certified nonpublic school (parents' unilateral placement), Del Mar, California

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Long Beach, California, on November 6, 13-16, and 20, 2001.

Petitioner Long Beach Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Jeffrey Riel from the firm of Parker & Covert. Also present on the District’s behalf during most of the hearing was Susan Melly, the administrator of the Long Beach Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA), and Nick Davaei, the District’s due process liaison. Sandy Blazer, the District’s director of special education, was present on the District’s behalf on November 15. Respondent STUDENT (STUDENT or Student) was represented by attorney Eric Freedus from the law offices of Frank & Freedus. Also present on the Student’s behalf were his parents, FATHER and MOTHER.

The District called the following witnesses to testify: Jeanne Yugar, Ph.D., a District school psychologist; Jill Jeffery, a District speech and language specialist and augmentative alternative communication specialist; Christian McGrath, a resource specialist teacher at Wilson High School (Wilson); Susan Johnson, a District high school team leader; Aime Sundal, a District high school team leader; Kathryn Goria, the District’s lead occupational therapist; Kathy Bullock, the District’s administrative coordinator of related services; Sandy Blazer, the former principal of Stanford Middle School (Stanford); Ms. Melly; Steve Glance, a District speech specialist; Jane Vogel, a special education consultant; and Joseph Voglund, the District’s educational audiologist.

The Student called the following witnesses to testify: Susan Berkowitz, a speech and language pathologist; Carol Atkins, a clinical audiologist; Beth Ballinger, O.D., an optometrist and vision therapist; Nancy Markel, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsychologist; and Ms. MOTHER.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR HEARING

1. Did the District appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability?

2. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2001-2002 school year?

PROCEDURAL MATTER

On November 6, 2001, the first day of hearing, the District moved to add as an issue for hearing the question of whether the PARENTS are entitled to reimbursement for expenses related to their unilateral placement of STUDENT for the 2001-2002 school year in the Winston School (Winston), a certified nonpublic school located in Del Mar, California. The Student opposed the addition of the reimbursement issue. The Student argued that reimbursement is a claim that only he can raise and he was not asserting a reimbursement claim at the time.

The Hearing Officer denied the District’s motion to add the reimbursement issue as an issue for hearing. The Hearing Officer noted that the District had failed to provide notice that it intended to raise reimbursement as an issue for hearing at least ten days before the hearing, as required by California Education Code section 56505(e)(6). Given that it appeared likely at the time that the hearing would conclude by November 16, the Hearing Officer found that the hearing should proceed on the issues that the District had timely raised and that, in the interests of judicial economy and the timely resolution of the FAPE and assessment issues, the reimbursement issue would not be added as an issue for hearing.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old, tenth-grade student who resides within the boundaries of the District. The District has identified him as eligible for special education and related services because of a specific learning disability (SLD) in the area of written expression.

During the 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 school years, STUDENT attended Stanford Middle School, a District public school, for his seventh- and eighth-grade years. At the beginning of the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally placed him in the Winston School, a certified nonpublic school located in Del Mar, California. Shortly thereafter, in late 2000, STUDENT’s parents filed a request for a due process hearing seeking, among other things, reimbursement for the Winston placement (Case No. SN00-01625). In or about July 2001, the parties settled the issues in SN00-01625 through the execution of a compromise and general release agreement.

In accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement and an assessment plan signed by the parents on June 20, 2001, the parents made STUDENT available for District assessments in July 2001. The District conducted speech and language (S/L), psychoeducational, occupational therapy (OT), and assistive technology (AT) assessments.

On July 31, 2001, the District convened an individualized education program (IEP) meeting to review the assessments that had been completed and to develop an educational program for STUDENT for the 2001-2002 school year. The District offered STUDENT the following program at this meeting: placement in the general education program at a comprehensive high school with one period per day spent in the resource specialist program (RSP) for written language, access to assistive technology devices within the classroom, thirty minutes per month of assistive technology consultive services for eight weeks, and various accommodations and modifications. The District’s recommended program also included a plan to transition STUDENT from Winston to the public school setting. The transition plan included STUDENT’s attendance at freshman orientation, conduction of a site visit, meeting with “primary” adults in the school setting, and the identification of a case manager who could assist in his transition. The parents disagreed with the District’s recommendation and requested that STUDENT be placed at Winston. The parents also requested that another IEP meeting be convened after they had a “reasonable” opportunity to review the assessment reports and at a time when STUDENT could attend.

Two days later, on August 2, 2001, STUDENT’s parents took him to clinical audiologist Carol Atkins for a diagnostic audiometric evaluation to determine whether he had a central auditory processing disorder (CAPD). Ms. Atkins diagnosed STUDENT with a CAPD and recommended that he undergo specified medical evaluations, a neuropsychological evaluation to assess attention, and a developmental vision assessment to rule out visual processing deficits.

By letter dated August 20, 2001, the parents’ attorney, Eric Freedus, informed the District that the parents would be placing STUDENT at Winston for the 2001-2002 school year and would be seeking reimbursement from the District for expenses related to the placement. Mr. Freedus indicated that the parents’ decision to place STUDENT at Winston was based on their belief that the District had not offered STUDENT a FAPE due to a variety of reasons including, but not limited to, the following: the lack of appropriate and measurable goals, the recommendation of an inappropriate placement, an inadequate offer of designated instruction and services (DIS), and the performance of an inadequate assessment.

On August 25, 2001, STUDENT’s parents had optometrist and vision therapist Beth Ballinger, O.D., evaluate his vision. Dr. Ballinger found that STUDENT had significant deficiencies in fine motor oculomotor control that interfered with his ability to visually process information. She provided recommendations to be implemented in the school setting to address the deficits she found in STUDENT’s visual functional and perceptual abilities. She also recommended that STUDENT receive individual optometric vision therapy a minimum of two times per week in forty-five minute sessions. In her report, she stated that STUDENT would require at least forty visits to maximize his visual-motor ability and visual information processing.

By letter dated August 29, 2001, the District’s attorney, Jeffrey Riel, responded to Mr. Freedus’s August 20 letter. Mr. Riel requested that the parents provide specific information with regard to what they believed was deficient about the District’s assessment and recommended goals, placement, and DIS. Mr. Riel indicated that the District was willing to review the IEP, discuss the parents’ concerns, and modify the IEP as required, but that District personnel had not received a response from the parents with regard to their availability for an IEP meeting.

The following day, on August 30, 2001, the District filed a request for the instant due process hearing.

On August 31, 2001, when the District still had not received from the parents a response with regard to dates available for another IEP meeting, the District sent notice to the parents that it had scheduled an IEP meeting for September 18, 2001. At the parents’ request, the IEP meeting was thereafter rescheduled for October 11, 2001.

On October 11, 2001, the District convened another IEP team meeting for STUDENT. At the meeting, the District recommended that STUDENT be placed at his home school, Wilson, in the general education program and receive ninety minutes of RSP collaborative support in the general education English class, access to assistive technology devices, and assistive technology consultation. The District also proposed an additional goal. The parents again declined the program offered by the District. The parents did not inform the District during the meeting that STUDENT had recently been assessed by Ms. Atkins and Dr. Ballinger. The parents also did not share with the District that clinical neuropsychologist Nancy Markel, Ph.D., had begun a neuropsychological evaluation of STUDENT at their request on September 5.

On October 15, 2001, Dr. Markel completed her evaluation of STUDENT. On October 30, 2001, speech and language pathologist Susan Berkowitz assessed STUDENT at his parents’ request. As with the other assessments they privately obtained, STUDENT’s parents did not share Ms. Berkowitz’s assessment with the District until they disclosed the assessment reports as part of the evidence they intended to produce at hearing.

STUDENT continues to attend Winston at his parents’ expense.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District appropriately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability?

As the petitioner in this matter, the District raised as an issue for hearing the question of whether it had appropriately assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. However, in its closing arguments, the District contended that the assessment issue is “precluded” because of the settlement agreement executed by the parties in or about July 2001. The District asserted that “the Respondent cannot raise the issue of whether STUDENT was assessed in all areas of suspected disability because both the District and the Parents had the opportunity to draft the assessment plan.” Initially, it is noted that it was the District itself, not the Student, who raised the assessment issue. Assuming arguendo that the District’s argument, though inartfully worded, is that the Student is precluded from arguing that the District’s assessment was inappropriate because of the settlement agreement, a review of the language of the settlement agreement proves this argument to be without merit.

The District argued that the assessment issue is precluded because of the provisions in the settlement agreement that called for (1) the parents to bring STUDENT to the District for a “full educational assessment” to be completed by no later than July 31, 2001; (2) the District and the parents to develop an assessment plan; (3) the parents to return the assessment plan signed with the signed settlement agreement, and (4) an IEP meeting to be convened by no later than July 31, 2001. The District’s reliance on the foregoing provisions regarding the parents’ participation in the development of an assessment plan is misplaced. In the agreement, the parents only agreed to develop an assessment plan with the District and sign the assessment plan; nowhere in these provisions was there a waiver of the parents’ right to thereafter contest the adequacy of the District’s “full educational assessment,” or a stipulation that the District’s assessment would constitute an appropriate assessment. Additionally, although the District placed great stock in the settlement agreement’s provisions regarding parent participation in the development of and review of the assessment plan, these rights are guaranteed to parents even without the benefit of a settlement agreement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321, 56381. Therefore, nothing in the settlement agreement precluded the assessment issue from being raised or precluded the Student from challenging the appropriateness of the District’s “full educational assessment.”

With regard to the substantive aspects of the issue at hand, the Student stipulated that the manner in which the District’s assessments were conducted was proper, but contended that the assessments failed to assess him in all areas related to the suspected disability. Specifically, the Student asserted that the District should have assessed him, but did not assess him, in the areas of vision and auditory processing (AP) or central auditory processing (CAP). Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, when a school district reevaluates a child for special education services, the school district is required to assess the child in all areas related to the suspected disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(2) and (b)(3)(iii)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(g); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(f), 56381(a). Areas related to a suspected disability may include health and development, vision (including low vision), hearing, motor abilities, language function, general intelligence, academic performance, communicative status, self-help, orientation and mobility skills, career and vocational abilities and interests, and social and emotional status. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(g); Cal. Educ. Code § 56320. Since the parties’ dispute regarding the appropriateness of the District’s assessment centered on vision and AP/CAP, this analysis will address those two areas.

I. Vision

The District argued that vision was not an area of concern for either the parents or the District at the time of the assessment in July 2001. The District pointed out that, although STUDENT stated during his assessment with Dr. Yugar that he was to have his eyes checked privately later in the month, during the July 31 meeting MOTHER informed the IEP team that vision was not a concern.

The Student argued that the District knew or should have known that he suffered from an ocular motor deficit.(Footnote 1) The Student pointed to the following assessment reports that were in the District’s possession at the time it assessed in July 2001: a neurodevelopmental assessment report by Claudia McCulloch, Ph.D., dated March 29 and April 15, 2000, which was obtained privately by the parents and indicated that he had visual-motor speed deficits and some visual tracking difficulties; a cognitive and educational evaluation report by J. Shohet, Ph.D, dated July 11, 1999, which was also obtained privately by the parents and indicated that he demonstrated deficits on the Test of Visual-Perceptual Skills and the Test of Visual-Motor Skills; and a psychological assessment report by District school psychologist Jean Saunders, Ph.D., dated January 28, 1999, which noted that the Los Alamitos Unified School District had found in 1993 that STUDENT qualified for special education services because of an SLD associated with a visual processing disorder (Dr. Saunders found that he continued to compensate for a learning disability in visual processing at the time of her assessment). The Student also contended that he exhibited a number of symptoms that should have put the District on notice that there was a possible vision problem, such as his difficulties with tracking from one line of text to the next, copying from the blackboard, and copying from a piece of paper placed next to him.

From the evidence produced at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that given the information the District had available to it at the time of the assessment, the District should have known that STUDENT had possible visual ocular motor issues and should have assessed him in that area. During the psychoeducational assessment, STUDENT shared with Dr. Yugar that he had trouble focusing on just one thing or focusing on words on paper, and was going to have his vision checked soon. However, there is no indication that Dr. Yugar made any attempt to explore this issue further with STUDENT (for example, by clarifying with him what visual difficulties he was having and how the difficulties were affecting his academic performance, if at all). The Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive the District’s argument that it had no obligation to assess in this area because MOTHER indicated later at the IEP meeting that this was not an area of concern for the parents. The law requires the District to assess in all areas of suspected disability, not only the areas for which the parents express concern.

Here, the District was presented with a student who not only expressed difficulty with focusing on words on a page, which has obvious educational implications, but who also had a history of visual processing difficulties to the extent that at one time he had been found eligible for special education services because of a visual processing disorder. Moreover, there were many indications that STUDENT had visual problems during July 2001. Dr. Yugar testified that she found that one of STUDENT’s processing issues was visual-motor processing and that during her assessment she observed that he was having difficulty reading because of tracking issues. She testified that she suggested that he use a card or something else to help him keep his place. Additionally, occupational therapist Jane Goodsell stated in her report and at the July 31 meeting that STUDENT reported having difficulty copying from the board or from a worksheet next to him and filling out bubble sheets, such as those used on the SAT-9, because he starts to lose his place after the ninth or tenth question.

In spite of these indications, Dr. Yugar testified that the District did not assess for visual issues because it was her understanding that the parent was going to have STUDENT’s vision assessed. While a school district is required to consider the results of an independent educational evaluation presented to the IEP team by a parent (Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b)), a parent’s statement that she plans on obtaining an assessment in an area of suspected disability does not relieve the District of its obligation to assess in that area.(Footnote 2) Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that the District improperly failed to assess STUDENT in the area of vision.

II. Auditory Processing and Central Auditory Processing

With regard to the Student’s dispute regarding CAP, the District contended that a CAP evaluation was not required because CAP is not a disorder recognized by the Education Code as a qualifying condition and because the parents did not express a concern regarding CAP. With regard to AP, the District asserted that it was fully aware that STUDENT had AP difficulties and that it assessed STUDENT’s AP needs through both its psychoeducational and speech and language assessments, as well as its review of prior assessments. The District also argued that, even if it is found that the District’s July 2001 assessment did not evaluate AP, the District met its reassessment obligation by considering and using information from prior assessments that did specifically address AP in making its determinations regarding STUDENT’s unique needs.

The Student contended that his past assessments, educational history, and then-current performance should have put the District on notice that he had an AP problem. The Student argued that the District had an obligation to assess to determine the cause of his AP/CAP problem and not just deal with its symptoms. The Student asserted that only by knowing the cause of his AP/CAP problem could the District effectively deal with its implications for the educational setting.

Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that the testimony produced at hearing indicated that, in spite of some controversy in the field, AP and CAP are generally considered to be synonymous (i.e., to refer to the same constellation of skills necessary to process what is heard). MOTHER’s undisputed testimony established that she specifically informed the District’s speech specialist, Steve Glance, that AP was a concern for her when he called her on July 17, 2001, to set up STUDENT’s speech and language assessment. Further, there is no dispute that STUDENT has a history of AP problems noted in prior assessment reports and that STUDENT currently has AP problems. In fact, Dr. Yugar testified that she was aware at the time she assessed STUDENT that he had AP problems, and that after her assessment she concluded he had processing disorders in AP and attention that negatively affected him in the educational setting. Therefore, as AP clearly was an area of suspected disability, there is no question that the District should have assessed in this area.

However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the District adequately assessed STUDENT in this area. The District’s assertion that Dr. Yugar and Mr. Glance fully assessed in this area was not supported by the evidence. Dr. Yugar administered no measures specifically designed to assess any aspects of AP except for two subtests on the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement - Third Edition (WJ-III), the Story Recall and Understanding Directions subtests. According to Mr. Glance, the only part of his assessment that tapped into AP was the Concepts and Directions subtest of the Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals - Third Edition (CELF-3). The subtests administered by Dr. Yugar and Mr. Glance evaluated only two aspects of AP – auditory memory and the ability to follow oral directions. The District’s assessment did not, as Dr. Yugar conceded, even attempt to evaluate the source of STUDENT’s AP deficits, nor did the assessment evaluate the nature and/or severity of all of STUDENT’s AP difficulties. First, determining the source of a child’s processing disorder may be just as important as assessing the extent to which those deficits impact the child in the educational setting. As the testimony of audiologist Carol Atkins and others established, determining the source of a child’s AP deficits is necessary to determine the proper interventions, modifications, and accommodations to address or work around the deficits in the educational setting. Second, because the District’s assessment did not include AP measures apart from the three subtests noted above, the District’s assessment did not evaluate a number of STUDENT’s AP difficulties, some of which were known to the District. For example, Dr. Yugar testified that she was aware that STUDENT has difficulty working in noisy environments, yet the District did not assess the degree of his difficulty discriminating speech sounds when presented with conflicting environmental noise.

The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive the District’s argument that its review of prior assessments excused any inadequacies of its July 2001 assessment in the AP area. The District’s reliance on the provisions of the IDEA and State law that allow a school district to forego further testing in areas of suspected disability based on prior assessment data is misplaced under the facts of this case. The provisions that allow reliance on prior assessment data without the need for new testing apply only when, as a group, the IEP team and other qualified professionals review existing evaluation data (including evaluations and information provided by the student’s parents, current classroom-based assessments and observations, and observations by teachers and related service providers) and, on the basis of that review and input from the child’s parents, determine that no additional data is needed. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533; Cal. Educ. Code § 56381. The District did not solicit input from STUDENT’s parents as to whether additional assessment data were needed in the AP area. To the contrary, when Mr. Glance asked the parents prior to conducting his assessment what their concerns for STUDENT were, they indicated that their concern was AP.

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to adequately assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, namely the areas of vision and AP. The District’s failure to appropriately assess STUDENT’s vision and AP needs resulted in its failure to properly identify STUDENT’s deficits in these areas. The significance of the District’s failure in this regard will be discussed below.

ISSUE NO. 2: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2001-2002 school year?

Pursuant to the IDEA and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201. The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. Id. The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit. Id. at 207. The school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the Student alleged that the District failed to observe the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and failed to offer him a substantively appropriate program.

I. Compliance with Procedural Requirements

The Student contended that the District violated the procedural requirements of the IDEA by seriously infringing the parents’ opportunity to participate meaningfully in the development of the IEP at the July 31, 2001 meeting. The Student argued that the District did not allow the parents a reasonable opportunity to review the assessment reports prior to the meeting. The Student argued that the District’s infringement of the parents’ right to meaningful participation was compounded when the District refused the parents’ request to continue the meeting until they had a chance to review the assessment reports.

The District argued that the assessments could not be completed until shortly before the IEP meeting of July 31 because District personnel had difficulty scheduling dates for the assessments, but that the reports were provided to the parents as soon as possible after the completion of the assessments. Additionally, the District contended that the July 31 meeting could not have been continued because the settlement agreement mandated that the meeting be held by that date. The District argued that, in spite of the belated production of the assessment reports, the parents were given a full opportunity to participate in the development of the IEP. The District asserted that the parents were continually asked for their input at the July 31 meeting, and that the District offered to reconvene a second meeting to discuss any concerns or questions the parents might have after reviewing the assessment reports.

The evidence at hearing established that the OT and speech and language assessment reports were provided to the parents by the weekend before the Tuesday, July 31 meeting, but that the psychoeducational and AT assessments were not provided to the parents until the meeting. Dr. Yugar testified that the last day she evaluated STUDENT was July 24 but that she was not able to complete her assessment report until Friday, January 27. According to the AT assessment report, the AT specialist did not evaluate STUDENT until a couple days before the meeting.

There is no specific requirement that all assessment reports be provided to parents prior to the reports being reviewed at an IEP meeting. However, “to the extent that preliminary information is available in the agency that may affect discussions and decisions at the meeting related to their child’s IEP, it is expected that the information would be provided to the parents sufficiently in advance of the meeting so that they can participate meaningfully in those discussions and decisions on an equal footing with other members of the IEP team.” 64 Fed. Reg. 48, pp. 12587 (1999). Given the short time available to the District to have STUDENT assessed by four different assessors and convene an IEP meeting, as called for in the settlement agreement executed by the parties in June 2001, and the unavailability of the assessment reports until shortly before the meeting, the Hearing Officer finds that the District acted within the requirements of the IDEA with regard to ensuring meaningful participation by the parents. When possible, the District sent the assessment reports to the parents in advance of the meeting. Additionally, the District reviewed the assessment reports at the meeting in the parents’ presence and offered to reconvene the IEP meeting at a later date to address any concerns the parents might have after reviewing the assessment reports. The District’s decision to proceed with the meeting on July 31 did not, standing alone, violate the IDEA, especially since (according to Ms. Melly’s testimony) the new school year was to start on September 5, 2001, and the District would not have had sufficient personnel available to convene an IEP meeting during the month of August. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) (providing that school district shall have IEP in effect for each child with disability at the beginning of each school year).

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not violate the procedural requirements of the IDEA by failing to provide the assessment reports until shortly before the IEP meeting and at the IEP meeting.

II. Substantive Appropriateness of Proposed Program

To determine whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program is designed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, is reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, and comports with his IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if his parents prefer another program and even if his parents’ preferred program would result in greater educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. The District was also required to offer STUDENT a program which educates him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of his disabilities is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program the District proposed for the 2001-2002 school year must meet the following four requirements to constitute an appropriate educational program for STUDENT: be designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, be reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, comport with his IEP, and provide him an education in the least restrictive environment.

To determine whether the District’s proposed program for the 2001-2002 school year was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it is necessary to have some understanding of what unique educational needs the District knew or should have known about at the time it made its placement offer. See Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that review must focus on adequacy of proposed program at time it was drafted). The District cannot be held responsible for information it had no basis for knowing at the time it developed the IEP. Id. However, “‘[i]n striving for ‘appropriateness,’ an IEP must take into account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable ... at the time the IEP was drafted.’” Id. (quoting Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Initially, it is noted that it already has been determined in Issue No. 1 that the District failed to conduct an appropriate assessment of STUDENT in July 2001. Without the necessary information about STUDENT’s AP and vision deficits, the District was unable to develop an educational program for him that appropriately addressed his unique educational needs in these areas. See W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484-1485 (9th Cir. 1992). For instance, Dr. Ballinger, whose testimony established that she has been an optometrist for twenty-three years and was fully qualified to assess STUDENT’s visual oculomotor ability, presented persuasive testimony that STUDENT suffers from impaired foundational oculomotor abilities.(Footnote 3) Dr. Ballinger described STUDENT’s oculomotor gathering mechanism as unstable and found that it interfered with his basic visual input and visual uptake of information. Dr. Ballinger stated in her report that her findings demonstrate that STUDENT has delays in his fine motor oculomotor control for saccades (the ability to move the eyes from one stationary target to another), focusing, eye teaming (the ability of the two eyes to work as one or the degree of binocular cooperation), and reorganizing visual control, efficiency, accuracy, and speed from distance to near and at near. Dr. Ballinger testified that these oculomotor difficulties cause STUDENT numerous problems in the school setting, including blurring and double vision, and result in increasing fatigue over the course of the school day. Dr. Ballinger testified that a number of accommodations and modifications could alleviate the negative impact of STUDENT’s oculomotor deficiencies in the educational setting, including limiting the time for sustained reading, allowing STUDENT to take breaks to rest his eyes, and teaching him strategies such as using his finger to aid in tracking. The testimony of the District’s expert, Ms. Vogel, confirmed that there are accommodations and modifications to address oculomotor difficulties, as well as bypass strategies that can be taught to students to assist them in dealing with such difficulties. Thus, because the District did not assess STUDENT for oculomotor issues, the District’s proposed IEP contained no specialized instruction, modifications, accommodations, or other services to address STUDENT’s unique oculomotor difficulties.

An IEP is an educational package that must target all of a student’s unique educational needs that relate to the disability. Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1089 (1st Cir. 1993). Having failed to evaluate adequately STUDENT’s AP and vision needs, the District failed to fully take these needs into consideration when developing its proposed IEP and thereby failed to offer STUDENT a program designed to address all of his unique educational needs, as required by the IDEA.

Furthermore, the Hearing Officer finds compelling the Student’s argument that the District violated the requirements regarding goals and objectives. The Student contended that the goals and objectives developed by the District lacked baselines, measurable objectives, and expected dates of achievement, as required by law. The District argued that it was unable to determine baselines for the language arts goals because it did not receive writing samples from Winston, as requested, and that the baselines would have been determined by STUDENT’s RSP teacher at the beginning of the school year.

An IEP is required to contain a statement of measurable annual goals, including benchmarks or short-term objectives, related to meeting the child’s needs that result from his disability to enable him to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum, and to meeting each of the child’s other educational needs that result from his disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(2). The Department of Education has provided the following guidance in its implementing regulations with regard to annual goals:

Measurable annual goals, including benchmarks or short-term objectives, are critical to the strategic planning process used to develop and implement the IEP for each child with a disability. Once the IEP team has developed measurable annual goals for a child, the team (1) can develop strategies that will be most effective in realizing those goals and (2) must develop either measurable, intermediate steps (short-term objectives) or major milestones (benchmarks) that will enable parents, students, and educators to monitor progress during the year, and, if appropriate, to revise the IEP consistent with the student’s instructional needs.

64 Fed. Reg. 48, pp. 12471 (1999).

A number of deficiencies existed in the IEP goals and objectives proposed by the District on July 31 and October 11. Neither of the language arts goals written on July 31 had a baseline statement of present level of performance. The Hearing Officer finds disingenuous the District’s argument that it was unable to write baselines for the language arts goals because Winston had not provided the District with writing samples. Dr. Yugar’s psychoeducational assessment contained writing samples; further, by the time of the October 11 meeting, the District had in its possession copies of writing samples provided by Winston during the observation performed by two District employees on October 8. Second, Dr. Yugar testified that STUDENT’s SLD negatively impacts him in the area of spelling, yet no goal was written to address spelling. Unpersuasive is Dr. Yugar’s testimony that the goal to promote STUDENT’s ability to self-correct and edit his writing assignments using a variety of mechanisms was meant to indirectly address spelling. There is nothing in this goal that would measure any improvement in STUDENT’s spelling. Third, none of the objectives for the four goals listed in the July 31 IEP have expected dates of achievement. The purpose of requiring the inclusion of short-term objectives or benchmarks is to enable a child’s teachers, parents, and others to gauge, at intermediate times during the year, how well the child is progressing toward achievement of the annual goal. Id. Finally, no satisfactory explanation was offered to demonstrate that progress on the self-advocacy objectives proposed by the District could be measured. The objectives listed for self-advocacy are that STUDENT will convey his needs to teachers seventy, eighty, and then ninety percent of the time. While standing alone none of these deficiencies may rise to the level of a procedural violation that results in a loss of educational opportunity, standing together these violations result in a set of goals and objectives that were not measurable and did not allow for periodic checks of progress. Consequently, the District failed to develop goals and objectives that addressed STUDENT’s needs resulting from his disability and thereby failed to address his unique needs.

In summary, the District’s proposed program failed to include measurable annual goals and objectives to address the needs arising out of STUDENT’s disability, and was not designed to address his unique educational needs. Because the District’s proposed program failed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it also was not reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District committed significant violations which denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year.

ORDER

All of Petitioner Long Beach Unified School District’s requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: Respondent STUDENT prevailed on all issues heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Date: January 15, 2002 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Ballinger described visual ocular motor ability (also known as “visual acquisition”) as the ability to gather information from a page and the visual skills needed to interact in the environment. 2. An exception to this may apply if the school district and parent agree. 3. The District called Jane Vogel, a special education consultant and vision specialist in private practice, to testify regarding Dr. Ballinger’s assessment and findings. While Ms. Vogel questioned portions of Dr. Ballinger’s assessment, Ms. Vogel’s testimony did not call into question Dr. Ballinger’s findings with regard to the nature and severity of STUDENT’s oculomotor difficulties. Although Ms. Vogel criticized Dr. Ballinger for relying on the findings of assessors in other disciplines in her assessment report, Dr. Ballinger did not rely on the findings of other assessors to determine the nature and severity of STUDENT’s oculomotor difficulties; her determinations in this regard were based on her own evaluation of STUDENT’s oculomotor system. Further, while Ms. Vogel criticized the evaluation because the basis of the doctor’s conclusions were not apparent from the face of the report, Dr. Ballinger described the methods she used to assess STUDENT’s oculomotor abilities during the course of her testimony and there was no evidence that the methods described were anything but appropriate for use in evaluating oculomotor issues.