California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 21, 2003

Student v. Roseville City Elementary School District

SEHO Case No. SN 1951-02 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu

Roseville City Elementary need not let a privately placed student attend its special day class part-time; Hearing Officer denies all relief.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of an eight-year-old second grader filed for due process against Roseville City Elementary School District. The student is eligible for special education under the category then called mental retardation. His parents had placed him at Sierra Christian Academy, a private parochial school. They wanted him to stay there in the mornings and attend a District special day class in the afternoons. The District refused to allow this kind of dual enrollment. It offered a full-day special day class at Spranger School. As an alternative, it offered a private school service plan of 18 half-hour speech and language sessions. The parents rejected both offers.

The parties agreed to have the case decided on briefs and documents. Hearing Officer Van T. Vu ruled for the District on both issues. Under the IDEA and California law, students whom parents place in private schools have no individual right to special education. The District owed them only a proportionate share of federal funds as a group, and it had broad discretion over who receives services. The Hearing Officer rejected the student's reliance on the Pennsylvania Veschi case, which turned on Pennsylvania law that gives private school students more than federal law does. He found the student was really seeking services left out of his service plan. Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.457, those disputes go through the state complaint process, not due process. All relief was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA rules for students whose parents place them in private schools. It held that these students had no individual right to choose parts of a district's offer, such as a part-time special day class. It also held that disputes over a private school service plan belonged in the state complaint process, not a due process hearing.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue I. s the District required to permit Petitioner to be enrolled in the District on a part-time basis?

    Parentally placed private school students have no individual entitlement to special education under federal or California law, so the District need not allow part-time enrollment in its special day class; disputes over the service plan belong in the state compliance process, not due process.

  2. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue II. If yes, is Petitioner entitled to select among the placement and services offered by the District?

    Because the student is not entitled to the District's offered placement and program, he is not entitled to select among its parts; Education Code section 56346 partial consent applies only to public school students pending dispute resolution.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Petitioner's requests for relief denied.

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Key authorities

Veschi v. Northwestern Lehigh School District (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.; K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp.; Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259; Russman v. Board of Ed.; Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.454, 300.455, 300.457; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i); Education Code §§ 56173, 56346, 56041

People named in the decision

  • Michael Rosenberg, advocate for Student, Developmental Disabilities Area Board III
  • Anne Sherlock, attorney for District, Girard and Vinson
  • Sierra Christian Academy, private parochial school (parental placement), Rocklin, California
  • Spranger School, District school offered for special day class placement, Roseville City Elementary School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter convened by telephone before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, on December 20, 2002.(footnote 1)

Petitioner STUDENT (STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented during the telephone hearing by advocate Michael Rosenberg from Developmental Disabilities Area Board III and his father, FATHER. Respondent Roseville City Elementary School District was represented by attorney Anne Sherlock of the law firm of Girard and Vinson.

Rather than calling witnesses to testify at hearing, the parties agreed to submit to the Hearing Office legal briefs and documents establishing the facts of the case. The record was then closed at the end of the telephonic hearing, and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES

I. Is the District required to permit Petitioner to be enrolled in the District on a part-time basis?

II. If yes, is Petitioner entitled to select among the placement and services offered by the District?

BACKGROUND FACTS

The key facts of this case are undisputed. Petitioner STUDENT is an eight-year-old second grade student. STUDENT has Down’s Syndrome and is eligible for special education and related services as a child with mental retardation. Since approximately the fall of 1999, STUDENT has attended school at Sierra Christian Academy, a private parochial school located in Rocklin, California. STUDENT and his parents reside within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Roseville Elementary School District.

In late May 2002, STUDENT’s parents requested special education services from the District for the 2002-2003 school year. Sometime during the summer of 2002, the PARENTS notified the District that they intended to continue STUDENT’s placement at Sierra Christian Academy for the 2002-2003 school year during weekday mornings, but they were also interested in placing STUDENT in a District special day class on a part-time basis during the afternoons. Soon thereafter, the District notified the PARENTS that it did not allow parentally placed private school students to be dually enrolled in the District and to select and accept only a portion of the services offered. Disagreeing with the District’s position that he may not be dually enrolled in both a private and public school and receive only a portion of a District program, Petitioner requested a due process hearing on August 27, 2002.

On September 26, 2002, the District presented Petitioner with an “Administrative Offer of Placement.” The District’s offer included placement for the entire school day in a District special day class at Spranger School. In the event Petitioner refused the District’s offer of a full-time public school placement, the District also offered Petitioner a Private School Service Plan consisting entirely of 18 half-hour sessions of speech and language therapy. The PARENTS refused to consent to either of the District’s offers.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Is the District required to permit Petitioner to be enrolled in the District on a part-time basis?

Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. ' 1400; Education Code ' 56000. The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student=s individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. ' 1401(a)(18). Generally, for a student like STUDENT who is under the age of 18 and who has not been emancipated, the school district where the parents reside is responsible for ensuring that the student receives a free appropriate public education. Education Code ' 56041.

However, a school district=s responsibility for providing a student with a FAPE is limited by federal and State law. Specifically, students who were offered a FAPE by their local educational agency but are placed instead in private schools by their parents as a matter of educational preference have no individual entitlement to any special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.454(a)(1); see also Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 233(5th Cir. 1997); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. Denied, 118 S.Ct. 1360 (1998); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Russman v. Board of Ed., 150 F3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1998); Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 153 F3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1998). Rather, school districts are required only to expend a proportionate amount of federal funds on these children as a group. 20 U.S.C. ' 1412(a)(10)(A)(i); Cal. Educ. Code § 56173. Although districts are required to consult with representatives of private schools with children with disabilities regarding the special education needs of these children, districts have broad discretion and final decision-making authority to determine which children within the group are provided services, the type and level of services to be provided, and the location of those services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.454. The amount of services provided to an individual private school child may be different from the level of services provided to children in the public school. 34 C.F.R. § 300.455(a)(2). Districts must develop a “service plan” that describes the services to be provided for each private school student chosen to receive services from the proportionate amount of federal funds. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.452(b) and 300.454. Special education due process procedures are not available to resolve disagreements with the districts’ use of proportional federal funds or with service plans. 34 C.F.R. § 300.457.

In this case, Petitioner contends that special education law requires the District to allow him to be dually enrolled and to opt to receive only a portion of the placement and program that was offered him. Petitioner also contends that the District cannot deny him special education services simply because he is enrolled in a private school by his parents. In support of his positions, Petitioner cites the Pennsylvania state court opinion of Veschi v. Northwestern Lehigh School District, 772 A.2d. 469 (2001), which held that “students could remain enrolled at the private school while simultaneously receiving special education services from the district.” The District disputes Petitioner’s interpretation of the law and the applicability of Veschi, and argues instead that STUDENT has no individual entitlement to any special education services as a parentally-placed private school student. The Hearing Officer agrees with the District’s position.

There is no dispute that Petitioner is a parentally-placed private school student and that the District’s September 2002 Administrative Offer of Placement is appropriate. As discussed above, special education law makes clear distinctions between public school students and private school students and to what services each of these classes of students are entitled. Again, according to the IDEA and equivalent California law, publicly-placed special education students are individually entitled to a FAPE whereas parentally-placed private school students are eligble as a group to a minimum level of services derived from a proportionate amount of federal funds received for such students. Although districts are required to appropriately address all of a publicly-placed disabled student’s unique and individual special education needs, districts have broad discretion as to whether the proportionate funds should be spent on any particular parentally-placed private school student. If the law is interpreted as Petitioner suggests, the distinctions in the law between these groups of children and the responsibility of districts in providing them services would be rendered meaningless. In essence, Petitioner reads into the law an individual entitlement to special education services for parentally-placed private school students that simply does not exist. Although Section 56346 of the California Education Code enables parents to consent to the implementation of only a portion of an offered IEP, that provision only governs the educational programs of public school children and the partial implementation of the program is only allowed pending due process procedures or mediation to resolve the parties’ dispute with the remaining portions of the program. Hence, that provision is inapplicable here and no comparable provision exists that allows private school students to select only portions of an offered program.

Furthermore, Petitioner’s reliance on Veschi is misplaced. In Veschi, a local educational agency refused to provide speech and language services to a parentally-placed private school student unless the student enrolled exclusively in the public school. The school district’s decision to make speech and language services contingent on the student’s exclusive enrollment in the public schools was found to be appropriate by a state hearing officer, and the hearing officer’s decision was later affirmed by the Special Education Due Process Appeals Review Panel of the Pennsylvania Department of Education (Appeals Panel). On appeal, the decision of the state hearing officer and Appeals Board was reversed by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. Acknowledging that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA provide that the class of parentally-placed private school students is only entitled to a proportionate amount of federal funds, the court concluded that Pennsylvania’s more expansive laws afforded such students the right to services beyond the federal minimum requirements. Specifically, the court cited Title 24 of the Pennsylvania Public Schools Code at Section 502, which states that “no pupil shall be refused admission to the courses in these additional schools or departments, by reason of the fact that his… education is being… received in a school other than a public school.”

The Veschi opinion was a decision of a Pennsylvania state court that relied heavily on Pennsylvania state laws in reaching its conclusions. Because the Veschi court is not within our jurisdiction and its opinions are not precedents in California, its conclusions are not binding on this case. Additionally, the Veschi opinion is not persuasive authority because the court’s conclusions took into account Pennsylvania law that is distinct from California law. Specifically, the court was persuaded by Pennsylvania law that provided for the “equal opportunity” of private school students to participate in specialized educational assistance programs as their public school counterparts, and law that expanded private school students’ entitlement to special education services beyond that required by federal law. In comparison, California law regarding the provision of services to private school students is substantially similar to federal law and does not provide for a right to services beyond the federal minimum requirements. Because the legal framework in California is significantly different from that of Pennsylvania’s, the court’s conclusions are not persuasive and have no relevance here.

Finally, the Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner is not actually seeking dual enrollment as he contends. He acknowledges that he intends to enroll full-time at the Sierra Christian Academy and has no interest in the District’s full placement and program at Spranger School. Because it was concluded above that Petitioner is not individually entitled to special education services, his dispute involves the appropriateness of the services offered to him as a private school student. Thus, although Petitioner contends that he wishes dual enrollment, he is essentially only requesting specific services that were not offered in his service plan. Any dispute Petitioner has with the appropriateness of the services offered in the service plan must be brought under the State’s compliance procedures and is not appropriately raised through the due process hearing procedures. 34 C.F.R. § 300.457.

In conclusion, parentally-placed private school students have no individual entitlement to special education services under federal or California law. Accordingly, the District is not required to allow Petitioner to select portions of its offer of placement and services or allow the student to be enrolled in its district on a part-time basis. Because Petitioner is a parentally-placed private school student, he has no individual entitlement to any of the services offered by the District in its “Administrative Offer of Placement,” including any portion of the placement at a special day class at Spranger School. Rather, Petitioner is only eligible for services through the service plan that was offered to him, which includes 18 half-hour sessions of speech and language therapy.

II. Is Petitioner entitled to select among the placement and services offered by the District?

As was discussed above, as a parentally-placed private school student, Petitioner has no individual entitlement to special education and related services that he would have received had he enrolled in the public school. Because Petitioner is not entitled to the placement and program offered by the District, he is also not entitled to select among the services offered by the District.

ORDER

Petitioner’s requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The District prevailed on the issues decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Education Code § 56505(i).

DATED: January 21, 2003 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Prior to the telephonic hearing, the parties submitted to the Hearing Office a request that this matter be decided on the basis of each party’s briefs and supporting documents, without the need for an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the file and information submitted by the parties, the Hearing Officer determined that the issues presented by the parties involved purely legal issues and that no factual issues remained that required an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the parties’ request was granted.