California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 13, 2004
Student v. San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
SEHO Case No. SN 1952-04 · Hearing Officer Terrence B. Ohler
San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools prevails; juvenile court school student found not eligible under OHI or SLD.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision refers to the March 13, 2004 SEHO decision in SN04-00376 (district-filed), which upheld the Superintendent's assessments and denied an IEE; Student did not appeal it. No remand, vacatur, or correction is noted.
Summary
An 18-year-old who attended the San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools' juvenile court schools at various times from November 2001 through August 2004 filed for due process. He had never been found eligible for special education. He argued that the Superintendent should have assessed him long before his mother asked for an assessment in October 2003. He claimed he qualified under other health impairment (OHI), based on asthma, Osgood Schlatter's disease (a knee condition), mental health concerns, and ADHD, or under specific learning disability (SLD). He sought compensatory education. An earlier SEHO decision (SN04-00376) had already upheld the Superintendent's January 2004 assessments.
The Hearing Officer dismissed the Section 504 claims because SEHO hears only IDEA claims. The student withdrew a claim against the Probation Department. On the merits, the Hearing Officer found that medication controlled the asthma, and that neither it nor the knee condition limited the student's strength, vitality, or alertness. He ran laps and played basketball almost daily. No competent evidence showed a qualifying mental health condition. Teachers and assessors with special education backgrounds saw no attention problems in class. For SLD, the Hearing Officer rejected private psychologist Dr. Valerie Benveniste's method of estimating "high average" ability from the highest memory and processing scores. He found the student's ability and achievement both average, so there was no severe discrepancy. Because the student was not eligible and the Superintendent had no earlier reason to suspect a disability, it owed no FAPE. All relief was denied.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO separated a medical diagnosis from special education eligibility. Asthma or ADHD alone did not establish OHI without an adverse effect on educational performance. When no IQ test was used, the Hearing Officer rejected building an ability estimate from a student's highest processing scores to show a severe discrepancy.
Issues and holdings
- Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue Preliminary (original issues 9-10). Whether the Superintendent failed to follow the procedural and substantive requirements of Section 504 and failed to provide self-limited PE, medication, and other supports required by the December 16, 2003 504 plan.
Dismissed on the first day of hearing because the Hearing Office has jurisdiction only over IDEA claims, not Section 504 claims.
- Dismissed / withdrawnResponsible agency
Issue Preliminary (original issue 7). Contention against the San Bernardino County Probation Department, which had been dismissed as a party.
Student withdrew this issue on the first day of hearing; Probation had already been dismissed as a party.
- District prevailedChild find
Issue 1. During the relevant periods from November 1, 2001, through August 13, 2004, did the Superintendent meet its obligation to seek and serve Student, and was Student eligible for special education as a student with an other health impairment (OHI) or a specific learning disability (SLD)?
The Superintendent had no reason to suspect a disability before the October 2003 assessment request; asthma, Osgood Schlatter's, claimed mental health problems and ADHD-like symptoms did not limit strength, vitality or alertness so as to adversely affect education (no OHI), and there was no severe ability-achievement discrepancy (no SLD).
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 2. If Student was eligible for special education, did the Superintendent fail to offer and provide Student a FAPE during the relevant time periods?
Because Student was not eligible and there was no child find violation, the Superintendent had no obligation to offer or provide a FAPE.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 3. If Student was denied a FAPE during any of the relevant time periods, is he entitled to compensatory education?
No FAPE obligation existed, so Student was not entitled to compensatory education.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Student's claims for relief were denied.
Key authorities
Letter to Anonymous, 22 IDELR 454 (OSEP 1994); Letter to Cohen, 20 IDELR 73 (OSEP 1993); Student v. San Mateo-Foster City School District, SN02-02682 (CA SEA 2003); San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools, SN04-00376 (March 13, 2004 SEHO decision upholding assessments); Cal. Educ. Code § 56337; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f), (j); Cal. Educ. Code § 56339; Cal. Educ. Code § 56301
People named in the decision
- Valerie Benveniste, Ph.D., clinical psychologist; independent assessor and expert witness for Student, Private
- Jennifer Lee, attorney present for Student
- Pablo Escobar, educational advocate for Student
- Kerrington Osborne, substitute teacher, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Deborah Price, school nurse; conducted health assessment, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Norman Cosme, teacher, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- William Hagerman, teacher (special education credential), San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Sharon Jaques, supervising institutional nurse, San Bernardino County Probation Department
- Javan Rad, attorney representing witness Sharon Jaques
- Lynn Eaves, resource specialist program teacher; academic assessor, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Bobbi Caldwell, alternative education teacher; academic assessor, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Donald Nute, principal of juvenile court schools, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Gary Warren, Ph.D., school psychologist, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Thomas Ryerson, Ph.D., school psychologist (also spelled 'Ryerstand' in decision), San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- Sharon Bolle, administrator for student services; licensed educational psychologist, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools
- John Rico, former school psychologist; conducted psychoeducational assessment, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools (former)
- Gail Lindberg, program manager; representative for the Superintendent, East Valley SELPA
- Balucan, SEHO Hearing Officer in prior case SN04-00376
- Dr. Strauss, medical doctor, San Bernardino County Probation Department
- Mr. Neumayer, teacher interviewed by Student's expert
- Mr. McCorkle, classroom aide interviewed by Student's expert
- Mr. Betts, teacher who wrote letters about Student
- Dr. Glatch, physician referenced in Parent testimony
- Samuel N. Cherny, M.D., physician referenced in Student's expert report
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Terrence B. Ohler, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Colton, California, on August 26-27, September 1-3, and September 8-9, 2004.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT), who was present at times, was represented by attorney Janeen Steel of the Western Law Center for Disability Rights. Also present on his behalf were his mother, MOTHER, and at times, his sister, SISTER, attorney Jennifer Lee, and educational advocate Pablo Escobar. Respondent San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools (Superintendent) was represented at the hearing by Gail Lindberg, program manager for the East Valley Special Education Local Plan Area. (Footnote 1) Also present on behalf of the Superintendent was Sharon Bolle, the Superintendent’s administrator for student services.
Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify: Valerie Benveniste, Ph.D., clinical psychologist; MOTHER; STUDENT; and Kerrington Osborne, substitute teacher for the Superintendent. The Superintendent called the following witnesses to testify: Deborah Price, school nurse with the Superintendent; Norman Cosme, teacher with the Superintendent; William Hagerman, teacher with the Superintendent; Sharon Jaques, supervising institutional nurse for the San Bernardino County Probation Department; (Footnote 2)Lynn Eaves, teacher with the Superintendent; Bobbi Caldwell, teacher with the Superintendent; Donald Nute, principal of juvenile court schools with the Superintendent; Gary Warren, Ph.D., school psychologist with the Superintendent; Thomas Ryerson, Ph.D., school psychologist with the Superintendent; and Sharon Bolle. Oral and documentary evidence was received. After the receipt of written closing arguments, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Petitioner’s ninth and tenth issues, as set forth in his issues statement dated August 16, 2004, related to whether the Superintendent failed to adhere to the procedural and substantive requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and whether the Superintendent failed to provide for self-limited participation in physical education, to provide medication, and to provide other support as required by STUDENT’s 504 plan dated December 16, 2003. (Footnote 3) During the discussion of the issues on the first day of hearing, the Hearing Officer inquired how the Hearing Office has jurisdiction over these issues. Petitioner cited no legal authority to establish the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction over Section 504 issues. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) provides that each state, in return for receiving federal funds under the IDEA, must establish a system of special education due process hearings. (20 U.S.C. § 1415.) The purpose of the hearings is to resolve disputes arising under the IDEA with regard to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free appropriate education to a child. (Id.; Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a).) The Hearing Office has jurisdiction only to hear claims under the IDEA. (See Cal. Educ. Code § 56504.5.) The Hearing Office consistently has held that it does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes other than the IDEA, and it has specifically held that it does not have jurisdiction over Section 504 claims. (See STUDENT v. San Mateo-Foster City School District, SN02-02682 (CA SEA 2003).) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismissed these issues on the first day of hearing.
Also on the first day of hearing, Petitioner withdrew the seventh issue included in his issues statement dated August 16, 2004. The seventh issue related to a contention against San Bernardino County Probation Department (Probation), which was no longer a party to the action, as explained in a footnote below.
As a consequence of these rulings dismissing two issues, Petitioner’s withdrawal of an issue, and the parties’ discussion of the remaining issues at hearing, the issues presented for hearing have been modified substantially from how they were presented in Petitioner’s issue statement.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING (Footnote 4)
1. During the relevant time periods from November 1, 2001, through August 13, 2004, did the Superintendent meet its obligation to seek and serve STUDENT and was STUDENT eligible for special education as a student with an other health impairment (OHI) or a specific learning disability (SLD)?
2. If STUDENT was eligible for special education, did the Superintendent fail to offer and provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the relevant time periods?
3. If STUDENT was denied a FAPE during any of the relevant time periods, is he entitled to compensatory education?
CONTENTIONS
Petitioner contends that the Superintendent failed in its seek and serve obligation. He asserts that there were signs alerting the Superintendent that he might be eligible for special education but that the Superintendent did not initiate any assessments until his mother, MOTHER, requested an assessment in October 2003. Petitioner contends that if assessments had been conducted prior to MOTHER’s request, he would have been found eligible from when he first enrolled in the Superintendent’s schools on November 1, 2001. Petitioner contends he suffers from asthma, Osgood Schlatter’s disease, mental health problems, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). (Footnote 5) As a consequence of these conditions, Petitioner contends that he should have been found eligible for special education under the category of OHI. Petitioner also contends that he should have been found eligible under the category of SLD. Furthermore, Petitioner contends that the Superintendent failed to offer or provide a FAPE to him to address his unique needs. With respect to a denial of a FAPE, Petitioner asserts the Superintendent failed to provide him with access to grade-level curriculum to prepare him for high school graduation, failed to provide him access to asthma medications, failed to make reasonable accommodations for his asthma, and failed to make reasonable accommodations for his Osgood Schlatter’s disease. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the Superintendent’s failure to provide a FAPE, he is entitled to compensatory education.
The Superintendent denies that it failed in its seek and serve obligation or that STUDENT should have been found eligible for special education. It contends that the assessments it conducted were appropriate and that, as a result of its assessments, the Superintendent members of the individualized education program (IEP) team properly determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education. The Superintendent contends that its position is buttressed by a prior Hearing Office decision dated March 13, 2004, in case number SN04-00376, wherein its assessments were found to be appropriate. The Superintendent disputes that STUDENT has ADHD or that any of his other medical conditions qualify him for special education. The Superintendent contends that because STUDENT is not eligible, it had no obligation to provide him a FAPE. The Superintendent further asserts that even if it is determined that it denied STUDENT a FAPE, no compensatory education is warranted.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eighteen-year-old student who has never been found eligible for special education and related services. At various times during the past three years, STUDENT was enrolled in schools operated by the Superintendent, which are located within the San Bernardino County’s juvenile detention system. The parties stipulated to the time periods at issue, which are reflected in Petitioner’s Exhibit 43. (Footnote 6) At the time of the hearing, STUDENT had been released recently from juvenile hall (on August 16, 2004) and was not enrolled in any school operated by the Superintendent.
During the 2001-2002 school year, STUDENT was in the tenth grade. (Footnote 7) He was enrolled in the Superintendent’s school on the following dates: November 1, 2001, through November 16, 2001; January 21, 2002, through February 1, 2002; February 26, 2002, through March 11, 2002; and March 18, 2002, through July 2, 2002. During the 2002-2003 school year, STUDENT was in the eleventh grade and was enrolled in the Superintendent’s schools on the following dates: March 17, 2003, through April 10, 2003; May 13, 2003, through May 30, 2003; and June 16, 2003, through August 11, 2003. During the 2003-2004 school year, STUDENT was in the twelfth grade and was enrolled in the Superintendent’s schools from October 12, 2003, through August 13, 2004. During nearly all of the periods he attended the Superintendent’s schools, STUDENT attended the Burton Thrall School. From March 18, 2002, to June 3, 2004, STUDENT attended Galaxy Community Day School, which is a community day school maintained by the Superintendent. From January 15, 2004, to May 6, 2004, STUDENT attended the Regional Youth Education Facility (RYEF), which is a treatment program in the juvenile court school system, as opposed to a detention program, that also is operated by the Superintendent.
In October of 2003, MOTHER requested that the Superintendent assess STUDENT to determine whether he was eligible for special education. Prior to this request, STUDENT had never been assessed for special education by the Superintendent or any other entity. On October 24, 2003, the Superintendent prepared an assessment plan based on the request and indicated that the following areas would be tested: academic and pre-academic achievement; cognitive development and learning ability; perception, processing and memory; social, emotional and behavioral development; health and medical development; and career and vocational development. MOTHER consented to the assessments. These series of assessments mark the only time the Superintendent assessed STUDENT for special education. Several persons conducted the Superintendent’s assessments. On January 8 and 9, 2004, Ms. Caldwell and Ms. Eaves conducted the Superintendent’s academic achievement tests for STUDENT. On January 8, Ms. Price completed STUDENT’s health assessment. In addition, John Rico, a school psychologist formerly with the Superintendent, conducted a psychoeducational assessment and prepared a report dated January 12, 2004. On the basis of all the assessments, which included observations and interviews, Mr. Rico concluded in his report that STUDENT did not meet the special education eligibility criteria for OHI or SLD. On January 22, 2004, the Superintendent convened a meeting of the IEP team where the team considered whether STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services. The Superintendent’s members of the IEP team determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education, but MOTHER disagreed with that conclusion.
On February 20, 2004, the Hearing Office received a request for a due process hearing from the Superintendent in a separate case, which was assigned Hearing Office case number SN04-00376. In a decision dated March 13, 2004, Hearing Officer Balucan held that the Superintendent’s assessments of STUDENT were appropriate and that STUDENT was not entitled to an independent educational examination at public expense. Although Hearing Officer Balucan upheld the appropriateness of the assessments, he specifically declined Petitioner’s request to hear the issues of whether he was eligible for special education and of whether the Superintendent had provided a FAPE to him because the case had been filed by the Superintendent and the Superintendent had not raised these additional issues. Petitioner’s counsel confirmed in the current proceeding that Petitioner did not appeal the Decision in case number SN04-00376. The time for filing an appeal of that Decision has passed.
After the Decision in Hearing Office case number SN04-00376 was rendered, Petitioner obtained his own psychoeducational assessment. Petitioner retained Dr. Benveniste, who conducted the independent assessment and prepared a report. She also was the psychologist who appeared as STUDENT’s expert in the prior case between the parties. Dr. Benveniste’s report diagnoses STUDENT as having ADHD and contends that STUDENT is eligible for special education services under the category of OHI due to his asthma and his purported ADHD. Dr. Benveniste’s report does not address whether STUDENT is eligible also under the category of SLD, although she testified that she believes he is.
On July 8, 2004, the Superintendent convened another IEP meeting to consider Dr. Benveniste’s report, including whether STUDENT should be deemed eligible for special education as a result of her findings. Another portion of the meeting was devoted to discussing issues related to STUDENT’s 504 plan, which had been signed on December 16, 2003. STUDENT’s 504 plan addresses methods to accommodate his asthma and Osgood Schlatter’s disease in the educational setting. In spite of Dr. Benveniste’s report and presentation, the Superintendent’s members of the IEP team again determined that STUDENT was not eligible for special education. The Superintendent continued to assert that its assessments performed by Mr. Rico and others were appropriate and that they established STUDENT was not eligible. On August 2, 2004, the Hearing Office received Petitioner’s current request for a due process hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: During the relevant time periods from November 1, 2001, through August 13, 2004, did the Superintendent meet its obligation to seek and serve STUDENT and was STUDENT eligible for special education as a student with an other health impairment (OHI) or a specific learning disability (SLD)?
California special education law provides that “all individuals with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education and related services, shall be identified, located, and assessed.” (Cal. Educ. Code § 56301.) This responsibility, which is commonly referred to as the obligation to “seek and serve” (or as “child find”), rests with school districts, special education local plan areas (SELPAs), and applicable county offices such as the Superintendent. (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56300, 56022.) Similar provisions concerning seek and serve are contained in federal law. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3).) The seek and serve duty is not dependent on any request by the parent for special education testing or referral for services. The duty arises with the local educational agency’s knowledge of facts tending to establish a suspected disability and the need for IDEA special education services.
Petitioner asserts that the Superintendent should have identified him as a child possibly eligible for special education and assessed him for special education eligibility long before his mother requested a special education assessment in October 2003. Petitioner contends he should have been identified and then evaluated from the time he first entered the Superintendent’s schools on November 1, 2001, and on each subsequent re-entry into the Superintendent’s schools thereafter. In support of this assertion, Petitioner points to things such as his numerous disciplinary actions, his taking of prescription medications, his inability to stay focused, and the discrepancy between his relatively strong reading ability as compared to his math ability. Petitioner contends that if the Superintendent had met its obligation to seek and serve in his case, the Superintendent would have found that he was eligible for special education. In contrast, the Superintendent asserts that it had no cause to reasonably suspect that STUDENT was a child with a suspected disability for purposes of special education prior to the time his mother requested an assessment in October 2003, that the Hearing Office upheld the validity of its assessment in the April 13, 2004 Decision, and that STUDENT is not eligible for special education.
For the reasons that follow, the Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent did not have an obligation to assess STUDENT for special education before his mother requested an assessment in October 2003 and that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services. For the time periods at issue, two possible eligibility categories were alleged by Petitioner: OHI and SLD.
Other Health Impairment (OHI)
To be eligible under the category of OHI, a student must have limited strength, vitality, or alertness due to chronic or acute health problems that adversely affect the student's educational performance. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9).) The chronic or acute health problems may include, but are not limited to, a heart condition, cancer, leukemia, rheumatic fever, chronic kidney disease, cystic fibrosis, severe asthma, epilepsy, lead poisoning, diabetes, tuberculosis and other communicable infectious diseases, and hematological disorders such as sickle cell anemia and hemophilia. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f); 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9).)
With respect to health problems, Petitioner’s presentation at hearing was that he has suffered a history of medical problems from birth. Petitioner asserts that he was born prematurely, remained in the hospital for approximately four months because of respiratory problems, and that his right lung was underdeveloped. Petitioner also asserts that he suffers from asthma for which he takes medications. His mother reports that he has been hospitalized fifteen or more times for respiratory issues between the ages of four months and fourteen years. In addition, Petitioner asserts that he has suffered three “stroke-like” episodes where he experienced some temporary paralysis: (1) the first occasion occurred when he was age six or seven; (2) the second occasion occurred when he was age eight or nine and resulted in a hospital stay of six to eight days; and (3) the third occasion occurred when he was age twelve or thirteen and resulted in a hospital stay of nine to fourteen days. MOTHER testified that the cause of these “stroke-like” episodes has never been determined. (Footnote 8) Furthermore, Petitioner asserts that he was diagnosed with Osgood Schlatter’s disease at age fifteen. For purposes of the hearing, Petitioner identified four purportedly chronic or acute health problems that qualify him for special education under the OHI category: asthma, Osgood Schlatter’s disease, mental health problems, and ADHD. (Footnote 9)
-- Asthma
Although the parties agree that STUDENT has asthma, the parties disagree whether it qualifies him for special education. The Superintendent does not dispute that it knew STUDENT had asthma or that the condition was chronic. Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that while California law regarding OHI identifies “severe asthma” as an enumerated medical condition that can qualify a child for special education services under the OHI category, federal law only refers to the condition as asthma, omitting the term “severe.” (Compare Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(f) with 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9)(i).) If a child is eligible for special education applying a federal definition, a more restrictive state definition cannot be used to prevent the student from being deemed eligible. (See Letter to Anonymous, 22 IDELR 454 (OSEP 1994).) Accordingly, the analysis of whether STUDENT qualifies because of his asthmatic condition should not hinge upon whether his asthma can be labeled as “severe” asthma.
For the reasons that follow, the Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent did not have cause to suspect that STUDENT’s asthma was a reason why he might need special education services and that this condition did not make him eligible for special education during any of the time periods at issue. As opposed to what is required for a finding of OHI, STUDENT often demonstrated strength, vitality, and alertness. With respect to physical education, for example, STUDENT testified that he is able to run for at least a few minutes and that he can play basketball. (Footnote 10) STUDENT’s mother estimated that he can play basketball for about twenty-five or thirty minutes before needing to take a break. Mr. Hagerman, STUDENT’s teacher in parts of 2003 and 2004, previously testified that STUDENT was “always one of the leaders of the pack” when students ran laps and that STUDENT loved to play basketball, which he did just about every day. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00798.) Mr. Rico, the Superintendent’s psychologist who assessed STUDENT, observed STUDENT during physical education in approximately December 2003. He noted in his report that STUDENT “demonstrated appropriate physical strength and endurance during each of the three observations.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, P00032.)
Furthermore, Ms. Jaques, the supervising nurse for San Bernardino County Probation Department, testified regarding “peak flows” that were obtained from STUDENT, which test a person’s volume of exhaled air. From the peak flows that were performed in approximately January through March of 2004, which yielded results well within the normal range for persons who do not have asthma, Ms. Jaques testified that STUDENT was doing very well with his asthma. (Footnote 11)
In addition, Ms. Price, a school nurse employed by the Superintendent, stated that both STUDENT and his mother reported in January 2004 that STUDENT’s asthma was under control with the medications he was taking. STUDENT was never hospitalized for an asthma attack while at the Superintendent’s schools, and his mother reported that he had not been hospitalized for an asthma attack since he was twelve years old. The evidence also reflects that STUDENT did not have a history of absences from the Superintendent’s schools due to asthma or any other cause.
The evidence reflects very few occasions in the recent past where STUDENT needed supplemental asthma medication during classroom time. While at school, students were not permitted to carry medications on their person. Consequently, if STUDENT needed an asthma medication while at school, he was to make a request to the teacher who would then obtain the medication from probation staff. Mr. Hagerman and Mr. Cosme credibly testified that STUDENT never requested asthma medication from either of them in the combined six months they taught STUDENT in 2003 and 2004. Although STUDENT stated that Mr. Hagerman denied him access to asthma medication on multiple occasions when requested after 2:00 p.m., the Hearing Officer finds Mr. Hagerman’s testimony more credible in light of Mr. Hagerman’s position as an educator, STUDENT’s tendency to exaggerate (as discussed elsewhere in this Decision), and STUDENT’s reference to Mr. Hagerman as a “cool” and “good guy.” It is unlikely STUDENT would have had such positive comments about Mr. Hagerman if the teacher had denied STUDENT access to asthma medication on multiple times of need.
Petitioner devoted much testimony to his contention that there was a long history of him not receiving his asthma medications as prescribed. Petitioner developed a theme that because he remained uncertain whether he would receive his medications when needed, he suffered anxiety and often was distracted in class, during as much as half of his class time. He testified that when he did not get his medications, he had no “safety net,” nothing to save him in the event of an asthma attack. He testified that as a consequence he would not want to do anything in order to stay safe.
Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that any concern STUDENT had about receiving asthma medications does not establish his eligibility under the OHI category. It is the chronic or acute health condition itself – the asthma – that must cause limited strength, vitality, or alertness in a way that adversely impacts his educational performance. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT likely exaggerated the impact of the asthma on his ability to concentrate and on his educational performance. Although STUDENT testified that his fear of an asthma attack caused him to be distracted as much as half of the time and that he did not want to do anything so that he could “stay safe,” the evidence is that he routinely participated in running and basketball. As noted above, Mr. Hagerman indicated that STUDENT often was among the leaders of the pack when running laps. It is not credible to believe that a person who could and did routinely engage in strenuous physical activity was so concerned about an asthma attack that he could not concentrate and fully participate in the classroom.
The Hearing Officer also is not persuaded that the quantity or strength of STUDENT’s asthma medications should have alerted the Superintendent to STUDENT’s eligibility for special education or otherwise establishes STUDENT’s eligibility. Although asthma is a listed condition that “may” qualify a student for special education, not all students who have asthma will qualify for special education. The law requires that the medical condition adversely impact the student’s strength, vitality, or alertness and his educational performance. The quantity or strength of medications does nothing to answer how STUDENT’s asthma bore on these key legal elements. (Footnote 12) Moreover, as stated above, STUDENT was physically functioning quite well.
The evidence demonstrates that STUDENT’s asthma was controlled by his medications and that there was no reason for the Superintendent to reasonably suspect the asthma was adversely affecting his educational performance to the extent that he required special education or related services. In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer also finds that STUDENT’s asthma did not render him eligible under OHI because it did not adversely impact his strength, vitality, or alertness or adversely impact his educational performance to the extent that he required special education or related services during any of the time periods at issue.
-- Osgood Schlatter’s Disease
Petitioner contends that he has Osgood Schlatter’s disease and that this condition should qualify him for special education under OHI. The Superintendent contends this condition does not make STUDENT eligible. STUDENT’s mother, who works in the healthcare field as a certified nurse assistant, defined the disease as bone and tendon inflammation in the knees that can cause severe pain. She testified that STUDENT was diagnosed with the disease when he was fifteen. (Footnote 13)
The Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent did not have cause to suspect that STUDENT’s Osgood Schlatter’s disease was a reason why he might need special education services and that this condition did not make him eligible for special education during any of the time periods at issue. Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that much of the analysis above relating to asthma also applies to the discussion of STUDENT’s Osgood Schlatter’s disease. For example, STUDENT was able to participate in strenuous athletics and has not had a recent history of hospitalizations or absences because of the disease. In addition, Petitioner spent little time at hearing developing why this condition is one that the Superintendent should have suspected made him eligible for special education or one that ultimately makes him eligible. The only evidence regarding how Osgood Schlatter’s disease affects STUDENT at school related to the amount of time STUDENT can participate in physical education and the need to have a blanket available in case he needed to keep his knees warm. Yet there was no testimony that these concerns could not be adequately addressed by reasonable accommodations such as self-limited physical education and having a blanket available. In fact, the evidence was that a 504 plan was developed to address these very concerns.
Moreover, STUDENT’s own testimony demonstrated that he has grossly exaggerated how the disease affects him. When asked at a prior hearing how the disease affects him, STUDENT stated, “And I’m always in pain.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00965.) Yet, a few questions later when asked how Osgood Schlatter’s disease and asthma affect his ability to run before it starts to be painful, STUDENT stated, “probably about fifteen minutes or something.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00966.) Clearly, these answers are inconsistent as one cannot both be “always in pain” and yet be able to run fifteen minutes before it becomes painful. In the current hearing, STUDENT indicated that he told Dr. Strauss, a medical doctor for Probation, that the Osgood Schlatter’s causes him to hurt when he runs for a long time but not when he plays basketball. (Footnote 14) Furthermore, as part of the Superintendent’s assessment, Ms. Price, a nurse, interviewed STUDENT. He informed her that Osgood Schlatter’s disease was simply being treated with Advil as needed.
The evidence did not demonstrate that the Superintendent should have reasonably suspected STUDENT’s Osgood Schlatter’s disease was a basis for eligibility. Nor has Petitioner demonstrated how the disease adversely impacted his strength, vitality, or alertness or how it adversely impacted his educational performance to the extent that he required special education or related services. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s Osgood Schlatter’s disease did not qualify him for special education during any of the time periods at issue.
-- Mental Health Problems
The Superintendent’s assessment of STUDENT’s mental health was upheld by Hearing Officer Balucan’s March 13, 2004 Decision in case number SN04-00376. Hearing Officer Balucan specifically rejected Petitioner’s argument that the Superintendent had not done a sufficient job in assessing his mental health needs. In spite of that former Decision and its findings, Petitioner contends he is eligible, even though he failed to present any competent evidence to establish that he has a chronic or acute health condition related to mental health issues. None of Petitioner’s witnesses addressed whether STUDENT has a chronic or acute mental health condition.
The mere fact that STUDENT apparently took Risperdal and Cogentin from time to time to control his anger does not establish that STUDENT had an eligible mental health problem or an otherwise eligible condition. (Footnote 15) Dr. Benveniste’s report makes a passing reference to “Anger Syndrome,” but she is not the one who made the purported diagnosis, and no testimony was elicited from Dr. Benveniste or any other witness to establish what this syndrome is or even whether STUDENT has the syndrome. With regard to STUDENT’s general behavior while in school, Mr. Rico’s report specifically applauds STUDENT stating that “information obtained from probation staff indicates that the student is maintaining model behavior while incarcerated. … Within the classroom the student has demonstrated similar behavior. Teaching staff has stated that the student’s behavior is often exemplary.” (Underlining in original.) The Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent did not violate its obligation regarding seek and serve and that STUDENT was not eligible under the category of OHI due to any purported mental health condition during any of the time periods at issue.
-- ADHD
A student whose educational performance is adversely affected by a suspected or diagnosed attention deficit disorder (ADD) or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and demonstrates a need for special education and related services by meeting eligibility criteria for OHI, serious emotional disturbance (ED), or SLD may be eligible for special education services. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56339.) A student who contends he is eligible under OHI because of his ADHD must prove that (1) he has limited alertness (or strength or vitality) due to a chronic or acute health problem, (2) his educational performance is adversely affected because of the limited alertness (or strength or vitality), and (3) he requires special education and related services. (See Letter to Cohen, 20 IDELR 73 (OSEP 1993)(discussing ADD).) Furthermore, the phrase “limited alertness” has been construed by the Office of Special Education Programs in the ADHD related context: “if evaluators determine that a child's heightened alertness to environmental stimuli results in limited alertness with respect to educational performance, the ‘limited alertness’ criterion of the OHI category would be satisfied.” (Id.)
Petitioner contends his purported ADHD and attention issues made him eligible for special education under the categories OHI and SLD. He has not alleged eligibility under the category of ED. The Superintendent contends Petitioner has not proven that he had ADHD or that he otherwise satisfied the eligibility criteria for OHI or SLD. As explained below, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was not eligible under the category of OHI due to his purported ADHD or attention issues during any of the time periods at issue.
Initially, there is a question whether STUDENT actually had been diagnosed with ADHD prior to the diagnosis made by Dr. Benveniste in her report dated June 2004. During the hearing, Petitioner alluded to two separate occasions when he had been diagnosed with ADHD. (Footnote 16) Yet, no medical documentation was presented to substantiate Petitioner’s claim of a prior ADHD diagnosis. If STUDENT had been diagnosed with ADHD prior to Dr. Benveniste’s June 2004 report, one would expect that MOTHER would have informed the Superintendent’s assessors when they interviewed her or, at the least, Petitioner’s own expert, Dr. Benveniste. Yet, there is no reference to a prior diagnosis of ADHD in any of the Superintendent’s assessments or even in Dr. Benveniste’s report. In his brief, Petitioner has chosen to ignore any evidence related to an ADHD diagnosis prior to Dr. Benveniste’s report. In short, the Hearing Officer finds there is no credible evidence that STUDENT was ever diagnosed with ADHD prior to Dr. Benveniste’s report in June 2004, despite testimony that STUDENT was seen by psychiatrists three times before being sent to juvenile hall and at least twice while in juvenile hall and despite a long history of being under various physicians’ care for asthma or other medical conditions. (Footnote 17)
Dr. Benveniste testified that STUDENT has ADHD, which she categorized as being moderate in severity. In her testimony and report, she referenced the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV). Her report indicates that the DSM-IV states that the “essential feature of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder is a persistent pattern of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity that is more frequent and severe than is typically observed in individuals at a comparable level of development.” The Hearing Officer notes that in spite of Dr. Benveniste’s use of the DSM-IV, a clinical diagnosis of ADHD under the DSM-IV does not establish special education eligibility. Local educational agencies such as the Superintendent are bound by IDEA and California law, and eligibility under OHI is not dependent upon whether or not a clinical diagnosis of ADHD has been demonstrated. As mentioned above, special education eligibility under OHI requires a finding that a student must have limited strength, vitality, or alertness due to chronic or acute health problems that adversely affect the student's educational performance. Irrespective of whether Dr. Benveniste has demonstrated that STUDENT had a clinical diagnosis of ADHD, the weight of the evidence is that STUDENT’s ADHD-like symptoms did not limit his strength, vitality, or alertness in such a way that his educational performance was adversely affected.
Numerous witnesses credibly testified that they did not observe in STUDENT many of the traditional indicators of ADHD or of a chronic/acute attention problem. Mr. Cosme taught STUDENT during the time period of January 15, 2004, through May 6, 2004, a span of over three months. Mr. Cosme testified that during that time, he did not notice that STUDENT had an attention span problem. Mr. Cosme did not observe STUDENT having difficulty shifting from one assignment to another or completing assignments. In addition, Mr. Cosme, who has worked in the juvenile hall court schools for seven years, indicated that he did not believe that STUDENT was any more impulsive than other eighteen year olds.
Mr. Hagerman taught STUDENT on two separate occasions: (1) during the period of May 13, 2003, through May 30, 2003, and (2) for forty-seven school days during the period of November 2003 through January 14, 2004. Of all the teachers STUDENT commented upon, STUDENT made the most favorable references to Mr. Hagerman, stating Mr. Hagerman was “cool” and a “good guy.” Mr. Hagerman stated he has a special education credential and that he has worked with in excess of one thousand special education students. He also testified that approximately fifty to sixty of those children had ADHD diagnoses. Mr. Hagerman stated that he did not notice a problem with STUDENT’s attention span and that he did not view STUDENT as a student who had trouble focusing. Mr. Hagerman acknowledged that he believes most ADHD students have difficulty completing assignments and that STUDENT did not complete many assignments in his class, as indicated by the number of “non-productive” (or NPs) STUDENT received in his class. However, Mr. Hagerman testified that he believed STUDENT willfully failed to complete assignments in that he chose to do only what he wanted to do. Mr. Hagerman provided an illustration. He stated STUDENT often did not do work in science or history because those subjects did not interest him and that he often liked to draw instead of doing work. However, Mr. Hagerman credibly testified that when STUDENT chose to work, he could work on math for two hours without a break.
Ms. Eaves is a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher for the Superintendent who assessed STUDENT on two days, January 7-8, 2004. She also observed STUDENT in Mr. Hagerman’s class. She has a master’s degree in curriculum instruction with a minor in special education, and she has a special education credential. She has thirteen years experience as a teacher. She testified that she has worked with ADHD students and is familiar with the common characteristics of the disease which she described as an inability to stay on task, being easily distracted, needing to get up and move around, and talking at inappropriate times. Ms. Eaves testified that when she observed STUDENT, she did not witness these symptoms. Her notes on STUDENT’s testing material include comments that he follows multi-step complex directions and follows conversations with complex details. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 7, P00083.)
Ms. Caldwell is an alternative education teacher for the Superintendent who assessed STUDENT on two days, January 15-16, 2004. She also observed STUDENT in class, in the library, and during physical education. Ms. Caldwell has a master’s degree in special education, has special education credentials, taught a special day class for four years, and has significant special education experience during her twelve years with the Superintendent. She testified that she has taught students who have ADHD diagnoses and that she is familiar with the characteristics of ADHD. After identifying some of the common characteristics she finds in ADHD students such as an inability to focus, constantly having to shift or move around, twiddling, an inability to attend, or sometimes just drifting off, she testified that she did not see those characteristics in STUDENT. To the contrary, she testified that he was focused, attentive, responsive, and cooperative. Her assessment indicates that STUDENT demonstrated “good attention to task,” was “able to focus on assigned tasks for extended periods of time,” and “generally persisted with difficult tasks, particularly language arts tasks.” (Footnote 18) (Superintendent’s Exhibit 14-1.)
Significantly, no witness who observed STUDENT in the classroom testified that STUDENT demonstrated particular problems with inattentiveness, hyperactivity, or impulsivity. Although he did not testify in the current proceeding, Mr. Rico’s report indicates that during his observation of STUDENT in the classroom, STUDENT demonstrated “on task behavior” and “attentive behavior.” (Footnote 19) The testimony of Mr. Hagerman, Ms. Eaves, and Ms. Caldwell is particularly significant in this regard given their respective educational backgrounds and/or experience in special education. Furthermore, both Mr. Cosme and Mr. Hagerman worked with STUDENT for many weeks without observing STUDENT’s purported ADHD characteristics. In contrast, Dr. Benveniste never observed STUDENT in the classroom setting.
Although Dr. Benveniste pointed to occasions during her own assessment where STUDENT appeared to “zone out” and to Mr. Rico’s indication that STUDENT was distracted by external noises during an assessment, the weight of the evidence is that STUDENT was able to focus sufficiently. Mr. Rico stated in his report that although a “slight weakness” was noted in the area of attention during testing, this “weakness was not observed . . . in the classroom learning environment.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4, P00036.) Also, as mentioned, both Ms. Eaves and Ms. Caldwell testified that STUDENT was able to follow complex directions and stay on task during their respective assessments of STUDENT.
While Petitioner contends that he worked below grade level, had poor productivity as reflected in some report cards, and had a disciplinary record and that these points are indications that his ADHD-like symptoms adversely affected his educational performance, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that his ADHD-like symptoms or attention problems are the cause of these concerns. First, as stated above, the testimony of numerous witnesses establishes that STUDENT did not demonstrate ADHD-like symptoms in the school setting. Second, credible evidence indicates other causes for STUDENT’s poor educational performance as reflected in some report cards and elsewhere. For example, Dr. Benveniste’s report indicates that STUDENT was “frequently absent” throughout his school career. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, P00004; see also MOTHER’s testimony.) In addition, Mr. Hagerman credibly testified that STUDENT had a tendency to work only when he wanted to. STUDENT’s own testimony in the former hearing supports Mr. Hagerman’s view. When asked why he received a “D” in English from Mr. Hagerman, STUDENT replied, “Probably because I didn’t like [to] do any writing – a lot of writing.” (Footnote 20) (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00957.) However, Mr. Hagerman also testified that when STUDENT wanted to work, he was capable of focusing on school work for two hours at a time. Numerous absences, combined with a student’s tendency to work on only preferred tasks, are likely to result in poor educational performance and increasing difficulty in demonstrating age-appropriate academic skills.
Third, STUDENT’s behavioral difficulties have not been shown to be a consistent problem or to be directly attributable to ADHD. As noted above, Mr. Rico’s report states that STUDENT maintained “model behavior while incarcerated,” even if there was testimony regarding sporadic episodes of misbehavior while in school. In addition, brief testimony from Dr. Benveniste and from STUDENT, as well as the reference to “Anger Syndrome” in Dr. Benveniste’s report, indicates that STUDENT has experienced problems with anger. Yet, no testimony was presented that STUDENT’s purported ADHD was the cause of his anger, and no persuasive testimony was presented that STUDENT’s ADHD was the cause of his behavioral difficulties.
In summary, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that STUDENT’s purported ADHD-like symptoms demonstrate that he has limited strength, vitality, or alertness that affected his educational performance. Even though Dr. Benveniste testified that STUDENT is distracted easily by extraneous stimuli, numerous credible witnesses simply did not find that he was inattentive or distracted during their assessments or observations of STUDENT. Dr. Benveniste’s conclusions regarding STUDENT’s attention and impulsivity thus are not supported by the numerous assessors who observed STUDENT in the school setting or by the witnesses who taught him. Regardless of whether STUDENT actually has ADHD, the weight of the evidence is that he did not possess limited strength, vitality, or alertness that adversely affected his educational performance to the extent that he required special education or related services.
Also based largely on the foregoing discussion, the Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent had no basis to reasonably suspect STUDENT had ADHD or a chronic or acute attention problem and that even if it did, there was no prejudice given there was no reasonable basis to conclude STUDENT should have been found eligible on the basis of ADHD-like symptoms.
*****
In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent did not have an obligation to assess STUDENT to determine his special education eligibility prior to STUDENT’s mother’s request in October of 2003 or at any subsequent time following the Superintendent’s assessment, which was upheld by the March 13, 2004 Decision in case number SN04-00376. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was not eligible under the category of OHI during any period of time at issue.
Specific Learning Disability (SLD)
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) defines “specific learning disability” as a “disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” (20 U.S.C. § 1401(26).) Three requirements must be met to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability. (Footnote 21) First, there must be a severe discrepancy between the intellectual ability and achievement in oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, or mathematics reasoning. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(a).) Second, the discrepancy must be due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(b).) Basic psychological processes include attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, and cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization, and expression. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030 (j)(1).) Third, the discrepancy must not be correctable through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(c).)
A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized test scores, by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid, or through a determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030 (j)(4)(A)-(C).) In this case, both parties used alternative means to assess STUDENT’s ability, including to determine whether a severe discrepancy exists.
Petitioner contends he is eligible on the basis of SLD, while the Superintendent contends he is not. As explained below, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was not eligible for special education on the basis of an SLD during any of the time periods at issue.
For the following reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT did not qualify under the category of SLD because the evidence does not show that a severe discrepancy existed between STUDENT’s intellectual ability and his achievement. Initially, the Hearing Officer notes that on March 13, 2004, Hearing Officer Balucan upheld the appropriateness of the Superintendent’s assessments, and the time for appealing that Decision has passed. (Footnote 22) Accordingly, this Hearing Officer need not determine whether the Superintendent’s assessments were legally appropriate.
In the prior proceeding, Petitioner made specific challenges to the Superintendent’s assessments, including, for example, that the Superintendent should have administered a standardized intelligence test to measure his intellectual ability, that the Superintendent improperly used Piagetian Tasks to determine his intellectual ability, and that the Superintendent’s assessment was insufficient because it failed to take into account his prior school records. Hearing Officer Balucan specifically rejected each of these arguments in the March 13, 2004 Decision.
In addition, the evidence supports the Superintendent’s conclusion regarding STUDENT’s ineligibility under SLD. In essence, the Superintendent concluded that STUDENT has average intellectual ability and demonstrates average achievement. Accordingly, the Superintendent found no severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s intellectual ability and his achievement. Mr. Rico’s report of January 12, 2004, indicates that alternative procedures were used to estimate STUDENT’s ability and skills, including observations, interviews, the administration of criterion referenced tasks, and the administration of portions of selected standardized tests as appropriate. Ms. Eaves and Ms. Caldwell administered assessment tests to STUDENT regarding his achievement and conducted interviews and observations. Mr. Rico, who has a master’s degree in educational psychology, approximately twenty years experience as a school psychologist, and extensive experience conducting assessments, assessed both STUDENT’s intellectual ability and his achievement. Mr. Rico previously testified regarding the testing he administered to STUDENT, including the nature of the tests and the results of his testing. (See Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00854-P00892.) He also conducted interviews and observations. The information provided by Ms. Eaves, Ms. Caldwell, and Mr. Rico establishes that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between his ability and his achievement. (Footnote 23) Analysis of the evidence, which is explored more fully below, supports the Superintendent’s conclusion. The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the report and testimony of Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Benveniste, compels a different result.
The Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Benveniste’s report does not address whether STUDENT is eligible on the basis of SLD. She testified that she believed eligibility under OHI was clearly documented and “unquestionable,” that eligibility only needed to be established under one category, and that SLD is open to interpretation, although she also testified she thought STUDENT’s eligibility under SLD was clear. At hearing, Dr. Benveniste testified that she believed there was a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s intellectual ability and achievement in the areas of written expression, mathematics, and spelling. She later acknowledged that spelling is not a separate category and should be considered part of written expression. She did not specify whether the purported severe discrepancy in mathematics applied to mathematics calculation, mathematics reasoning, or both.
The weight of the evidence demonstrates there was not a severe discrepancy between STUDENT’s ability and achievement. The core problem with Petitioner’s analysis is that the evidence does not support his view regarding his ability. While the Superintendent found STUDENT’s ability to be in the average range, Petitioner asserts that his ability level is in the “high average” range. Dr. Benveniste, as well as the Superintendent, used alternative methods in lieu of standardized intelligence tests to establish STUDENT’s ability level. She characterized STUDENT’s intellectual ability as “high average” or, as she testified, in a standard score range of 110 to 115. (Footnote 24) The Hearing Officer next considers the evidence related to how Dr. Benveniste came to her conclusion.
-- Determining Cognitive Ability
Among the alternative means Dr. Benveniste employed to determine STUDENT’s ability was the analysis of processing test scores. Dr. Benveniste presented STUDENT’s processing and achievement test results in a chart. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 1, P000014.) In one column she presented processing tests. Among the processing tests she considered were: (1) Comprehensive Trail-Making Test (CTMT), (2) Motor Free Visual Perception Test – Third Edition (MVPT), (3) Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning (WRAML)-Learning, (4) WRAML-Verbal, (5) WRAML-Visual, (6) Learning Efficiency Test (LET)-Visual, and (7) LET-Auditory. She also reviewed the WRAML General, which is not its own test but a composite of the other WRAML subtests. Dr. Benveniste also gave and considered selected subtests from the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Achievement - Third Edition (WJ-III) that she characterized as processing tests. (Footnote 25) However, the parties disagree whether these specific subtests are properly characterized as processing tests, although it is unnecessary to resolve that dispute in this case. (Footnote 26)
Dr. Benveniste’s central premise was that because four of the processing test scores fell into the “high average,” “above average,” and “superior” ranges, these processing scores demonstrate STUDENT has “high average” intellectual ability. (Footnote 27) However, the premise is flawed for several reasons. First, all of the scores in the high average range and above reflect only one component of the spectrum of skills that comprise intellectual ability. Dr. Benveniste’s own description of the WRAML-Verbal, WRAML-Visual, and LET tests was that they are memory tests. Both Dr. Ryerson and Ms. Bolle credibly testified that it would be inappropriate to draw a general conclusion about ability from tests that reflect only one area of intellect. For example, Dr. Ryerson, who teaches psychoeducational assessment courses, testified that intellectual ability comprises many skills such as verbal expression and linguistic abilities, vocabulary, spatial orientation, and perceptual motor skills. Ms. Bolle, who has twenty-seven years of experience in special education and is a licensed educational psychologist, added that intellectual ability includes abstract reasoning or problem solving skills, which would not be taken into account by these WRAML and LET tests.
Second, credible evidence was presented that the two LET scores, LET-Auditory (standard score 115) and LET-Visual (standard score 131), should not have been reported by Dr. Benveniste independent from the range from which they were derived. Dr. Benveniste testified that she obtained these numbers by converting the high scores in the range of scores presented by Mr. Rico. Mr. Rico reported a range for the LET-Visual of “63rd to 98th percentile” and a range for the LET-Auditory “37th to 84th percentile.” Both Dr. Warren, who has seventeen years experience as a school psychologist and teaches assessment courses, and Ms. Bolle testified that it is simply inappropriate to pluck out a single score from the reported range. Dr. Warren testified that there are six subtests in each of the LET-Auditory and LET-Visual and that it would not make sense to select only one of the six subtest scores and treat that as the measurement for the whole test. By reporting each range of scores as a single number, the significance of the LET scores has been artificially inflated. In addition, if the LET scores are removed, only the WRAML-Verbal and WRAML-Visual scores support her central premise because those scores are the only ones remaining in the “high average, “above average,” or “superior” categories.
Third, Dr. Benveniste’s approach of selecting the highest processing scores as the measure of ability has not been justified. STUDENT’s processing scores include low scores in addition to the high scores. The CTMT was in the “deficient” range (standard score of approximately 72), the MVPT was in the “below average” range (standard score of 81), and the WRAML-Learning was in the “average” range (standard score of 102). Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that the WJ-III scores that Dr. Benveniste contends are processing scores are in fact processing scores (as opposed to achievement scores), then there are an additional six processing scores that would fall in the “low average” or “average” category. Dr. Benveniste opined that the justification for choosing the highest processing scores is that one would expect that the highest scores reflect what STUDENT’s actual potential is. Yet, even Dr. Benveniste did not seem to accept her own logic as she readily dismissed the very highest score and then the next two highest scores to be “nice.” Moreover, the underlying logic of the proposition has not been demonstrated. As discussed above, it makes no sense that only one area of intelligence would be used to estimate an overall level of intellectual ability. But even if this was a case where numerous standardized intelligence tests were available for review, one cannot blindly assume that the test that yields the highest number is necessarily the one that most accurately reflects the student’s true ability.
Fourth, Dr. Benveniste appeared to place too much emphasis on the ability to compare the processing scores to the achievement scores. While acknowledging that processing scores are not the equivalent of standardized intelligence tests scores, she readily treated processing scores as if they were standardized intelligence test scores when comparing the processing scores with STUDENT’s achievement test scores. She pointed out numerous examples where processing scores differed from miscellaneous achievement test numbers by approximately 22.5 points or 1.5 standard deviations. However, as Dr. Warren explained, the processing tests were never meant to be a measure of ability, and they are not loaded with questions designed to test for intellectual functioning. Therefore, he stated that the processing tests may be used only in a very gross way to measure ability. Petitioner has not demonstrated why a difference of 1.5 standard deviations is legally significant as to processing tests, which are not the practical or legal equivalent of standardized intelligence tests.
In sum, Dr. Benveniste’s method for determining STUDENT’s intellectual ability, on the basis of his processing test scores, is seriously flawed and does not demonstrate that STUDENT has a “high average” ability. To the contrary, the foregoing analysis of the processing test scores supports the Superintendent’s position that STUDENT’s intellectual ability is in the “average” range.
Dr. Benveniste indicated that she also used standardized achievement test scores as a method to determine that STUDENT’s ability fell in the “high average” range. However, only one of the twenty-three achievement test scores she lists in her chart fell into the “high average,” “above average,” or “superior” ranges. Dr. Benveniste’s own report acknowledges that the “predominance of achievement tests yields overall achievement scores in the average to low average range.” Assuming for the sake of argument that achievement tests may properly be considered a measure of ability, Petitioner has not demonstrated why only one score is an accurate reflection of overall ability or why the highest of the scores is the one that should be chosen. The Hearing Officer also notes that the one test score that is in the “high average” range (i.e., the Peabody Individual Achievement Test – Revised-Normative Update (PIAT-R/NU)-Reading Comprehension subtest with a standard score of 110) barely meets the 110-standard-score threshold for that range (as described by Dr. Benveniste) and that the next highest score is clearly outside the range (i.e., the WJ-III Passage Comprehension subtest with a standard score of 104).
Dr. Benveniste testified that her opinion of STUDENT’s “high average” ability was derived also from conversations with a teacher (Mr. Neumayer), a classroom aide (Mr. McCorkle), and letters from another teacher (Mr. Betts) (see Petitioner’s Exhibit 28, P00485-P00486). Dr. Benveniste’s premise was that people do not talk about students in the positive light these individuals did if a student is merely “average.” Yet, this is extraordinarily weak evidence of STUDENT’s intellectual ability. The Hearing Officer cannot accept Dr. Benveniste’s premise at face value. The Hearing Officer has no way of knowing what precisely was meant by the statements. Nor did Petitioner offer a means by which to evaluate each person’s competence to assess STUDENT’s ability level. Furthermore, many of the comments made by those persons do not necessarily have any direct relation to ability, and many of the comments that arguably do relate to ability are vague (e.g., a “sharp kid”; a very capable student; a “great student”). None of these persons testified at hearing, and Dr. Benveniste did not even interview Mr. Betts. Finally, no witness at hearing, other than Dr. Benveniste, testified that STUDENT’s ability level was anything other than “average.”
In sum, Dr. Benveniste’s use of other alternative methods does not establish that STUDENT has “high average” ability.
-- Lack of Severe Discrepancy
Petitioner failed to establish his contention that he has “high average” intellectual ability. Rather, the weight of the evidence is consistent with Mr. Rico’s report that STUDENT has average intellectual ability. Because the Hearing Officer affirms the Superintendent’s finding that STUDENT’s intellectual ability is “average,” the standardized achievement tests cannot fairly be interpreted to suggest a severe discrepancy in any of the categories at issue (i.e., written expression, mathematics reasoning, and mathematical calculation). The Hearing Officer notes that Dr. Benveniste specifically recognized in her report that the achievement test scores are predominantly “in the average to low average range.” Accordingly, by definition, it is difficult to find a severe discrepancy when STUDENT has been determined to have “average” ability and his achievement test scores are similarly within the “average” to “low average” range.
With respect to “calculating” a severe discrepancy, the parties have provided no authority, and the Hearing Officer is not aware of any, that requires the IEP team to pick a number for intellectual ability when alternative means are used to determine whether a severe discrepancy exists. A pertinent California Code of Regulation suggests that an IEP team is not required to pick a specific number for intellectual ability. The specific calculation of 1.5 standard deviations is to be used when standardized tests are considered to be valid for a specific pupil. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(A).) However, when such tests are “considered to be invalid for a specific pupil,” another subsection of the regulation provides that “the discrepancy shall be measured by alternative means as specified on the assessment plan,” but it does not make any reference to the 1.5 standard deviations test. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(B).) Furthermore, in spite of Dr. Benveniste’s argument that Mr. Rico could have selected a number for intellectual ability but chose not to at the expense of STUDENT being found ineligible, Dr. Ryerstand made a persuasive argument that he does not know of any reliable method to derive such a number, “either statistically or psychometrically,” when using alternative means to determine cognitive ability.
Although Petitioner asserts that writing samples and other class work reflect poorer quality of work than he is capable of doing and that he was behind grade level, this is not particularly convincing evidence of a severe discrepancy in light of the achievement test scores placing him squarely in the average range. Furthermore, the Superintendent’s assessment previously was determined appropriate by another hearing officer and supported by the testimony of Mr. Rico as well as other witnesses in the prior hearing. In the current hearing, the testimony of, in particular, Dr. Warren, Dr. Ryerstand, and Ms. Bolle all buttressed Mr. Rico’s determination that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. In sum, under the totality of the facts in this case, the Hearing Officer finds that the information presented at hearing would not have required the IEP team to exercise its discretion in favor of finding a severe discrepancy. As noted above, in order for a student to qualify under the SLD category, three distinct elements must be satisfied: (1) there must be a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the enumerated categories, (2) the discrepancy must be due to a processing disorder and not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages, and (3) the discrepancy must not be correctable through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56337.) Accordingly, if any one of the three SLD elements is not satisfied, a student does not qualify under the SLD eligibility category. Because the foregoing analysis has demonstrated that STUDENT did not have a severe discrepancy between his intellectual ability and his achievement, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was not eligible for special education under the category of SLD. The Hearing Officer notes that even if he had determined that Petitioner met the second and third elements of the SLD analysis, Petitioner would not have been eligible under the SLD category because he did not have a severe discrepancy between his intellectual ability and his achievement. Accordingly, there is no need to address the second and third elements for SLD eligibility. The Hearing Officer also finds that the Superintendent had no basis to reasonably suspect STUDENT had an SLD and that even if it did, there was no prejudice given there was no reasonable basis to conclude that he should have been found eligible on the basis of SLD during any of the time periods at issue.
ISSUE NO. 2: If STUDENT was eligible for special education, did the Superintendent fail to offer and provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the relevant time periods?
Because the Hearing Officer previously has determined that the Superintendent did not violate its seek and serve obligations and that STUDENT was not eligible for special education, the Hearing Officer finds that the Superintendent had no obligation to offer or provide STUDENT with a FAPE.
ISSUE NO. 3: If STUDENT was denied a FAPE during any of the relevant time periods, is he entitled to compensatory education?
Because the Hearing Officer previously has determined that the Superintendent did not have an obligation to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is not entitled to compensatory education.
ORDER
All of Petitioner STUDENT’s claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY
Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: the Superintendent prevailed on all issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).)
Dated: October 13, 2004 ____________________________________ Terrence B. Ohler, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools is the local educational agency that operates the juvenile court schools located in San Bernardino County.
2 During her testimony, Ms. Jaques was represented by attorney Javan Rad.
3 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is located at 29 U.S.C. § 794. Petitioner’s ninth and tenth issues also stated the same claims against the San Bernardino County Probation Department (Probation). However, the Hearing Office previously had dismissed Probation as a party to the case in a “Summary Order re: Motion to Dismiss” dated August 23, 2004. On the first day of hearing, the presiding Hearing Officer denied Petitioner’s oral motion to reconsider that ruling because Petitioner had failed to demonstrate a basis for his motion to reconsider.
4 The parties stipulated that the following time periods are at issue: November 1, 2001, through November 16, 2001; January 21, 2002, through February 1, 2002; February 26, 2002, through March 11, 2002; March 18, 2002, through July 2, 2002; March 17, 2003, through April 10, 2003; May 13, 2003, through May 30, 2003; June 16, 2003, through August 11, 2003; and October 12, 2003, through August 13, 2004. These time periods relate to the dates STUDENT was enrolled in the Superintendent’s schools.
5 Testimony revealed that Osgood Schlatter’s disease is defined as a disease that causes bone and tendon inflammation in the knees, which can cause pain. Petitioner also raised the issue of his attention, which is discussed below as part of ADHD.
6 Both parties chose to number their exhibits. Exhibit page numbers are referenced by a dash. For example, page 4 of Exhibit 10 is referenced as “Exhibit 10-4.” However, if a Bates stamp number is available (which is on most of Petitioner’s exhibits), it has been used instead.
7 The Hearing Officer’s references are to STUDENT’s age-appropriate grade level, not to his standing in terms of credits toward graduation.
8 The Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner never linked how these “stroke-like” episodes relate to the issues presented for hearing. Accordingly, the episodes are not specifically discussed below.
9 Petitioner also raised the issue of Petitioner’s attention, which is discussed below as part of ADHD.
10 In the hearing in SN04-00376, STUDENT testified he can run for about fifteen minutes before his asthma and/or Osgood Schlatter’s becomes painful. (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00965-P00966.)
11(See Petitioner’s Exhibit 40-37 through 40-39 for STUDENT’s peak flow numbers.) The Hearing Officer notes that the evidence regarding peak flows also casts doubt on Petitioner’s claim that he has, essentially, only one functioning lung. Petitioner submitted no medical documentation to substantiate this claim, even after Ms. Jacques testified about X-ray results that refute the claim.
12 Accordingly, the Hearing Officer also gives little weight to Petitioner’s argument that he should qualify for special education because he has used systemic steroids for greater than a two-week period. This definition for “severe asthma” is stated by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care’s Clinical Guidelines for Correctional Facilities, Asthma Chronic Care (see Petitioner’s Exhibit 41-4). Petitioner offered no evidence to suggest that this definition is what was intended by California or federal law makers by their reference to “severe asthma” or “asthma” in the applicable California and federal regulations implementing the IDEA.
13 Although Ms. Jacques, Probation’s supervising nurse, questioned the diagnosis, she did not testify that STUDENT does not have Osgood Schlatter’s disease. Furthermore, the Superintendent has not challenged Petitioner’s assertion that he has the disease or that it is a chronic condition. Therefore, for purposes of this Decision, the Hearing Officer will assume STUDENT has the disease, even though no direct medical documentation was submitted to establish that fact.
14 Petitioner’s Exhibit 33, P00547, suggests that STUDENT’s meeting with Dr. Strauss occurred on July 7, 2004.
15 There is conflicting evidence regarding why STUDENT took Risperdal and Cogentin given MOTHER’s testimony that it was taken for ADHD and Dr. Benveniste’s testimony that it was taken for anger. Although the Hearing Officer determines below that MOTHER’s testimony on this point was not credible, no treating psychiatrist or physician was called to establish why these drugs were prescribed. 16 At one point, Petitioner introduced a psychologist or psychiatrist report dated December 20, 2003, which contains references to ADHD (see Petitioner’s Exhibit 40-48 through 52). However, it is unclear who prepared the report or whether a diagnosis of ADHD was made in the report. In fact, one page of the report suggests that STUDENT was not diagnosed with ADHD: “at this time, he does not have ADHD….” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 40-48.) On another occasion, MOTHER testified that a Dr. Glatch diagnosed STUDENT with ADHD in 2000. However, Petitioner did not introduce medical documentation or Dr. Glatch’s testimony to support this assertion. Moreover, MOTHER’s testimony was inconsistent with regard to whether STUDENT had ever been diagnosed with ADHD prior to Dr. Benveniste’s report. When asked when STUDENT was diagnosed as ADHD or hyperactive, she first stated, “When Dr. Benveniste did her assessment.” Yet, a few questions later, MOTHER stated that Dr. Glatch was the one who made the primary diagnosis of ADHD or hyperactivity. When MOTHER was asked, “So Dr. Glatch diagnosed him with ADHD prior to Dr. B,” she replied, “Yeah, because he is the one who prescribed the medication for him.” The medications MOTHER referred to were Risperdal and Cogentin, which were not proved at hearing to be ADHD medications. Contrary to MOTHER’s testimony, the credible evidence is that these medications are anti-psychotic medications that were used to treat STUDENT’s anger, not STUDENT’s purported ADHD. For example, Dr. Benveniste stated the following in her report: “STUDENT was prescribed Risperdal for ‘Anger Syndrome’ by Samuel N. Cherny, M.D., on December 17, 2002, as well as Cogentin to control the side effects of Risperdal.” (See also Dr. Benveniste’s testimony in the current case and the former hearing (Petitioner’s Exhibit 37, P00944-P00945); see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 18, P00199 (setting forth the pharmacological description for Risperdal).)
16 MOTHER testified STUDENT had been seen by psychiatrists when he was age five for behavioral issues, in 1995 or 1996 for anger issues, and in 2000 for hyperactivity. As previously discussed, MOTHER’s testimony that STUDENT was diagnosed with ADHD in 2000 by Dr. Glatch is not credible. STUDENT testified he was seen by two separate psychiatrists while in juvenile hall.
17 While both Ms. Eaves and Ms. Caldwell noted that STUDENT became tired at the end of their respective testing sessions, there is no persuasive evidence that his fatigue was caused by ADHD.
18 The Superintendent’s representative indicated that Mr. Rico is no longer an employee of the Superintendent. However, Mr. Rico testified in the prior hearing, described above, where another Hearing Officer upheld the appropriateness of Mr. Rico’s assessment.
19 Other documentary evidence also reflects a history of STUDENT choosing to work only when he wanted to. Some comments from teachers STUDENT had during the 1998-1999 school year include the following. “Rarely completes assignments or homework. Has not turned in notebook.” (Petitioner’s Exhibit 28, P00501.) “His absence has caused him to miss assignments[,] and he has made little attempt to make them up.” (Id., P00502.)
20 In addition to those requirements of the specific learning disability category, there is also a requirement that applies to all students who seek special education under the IDEA. The student’s impairment must be such that he needs special education instruction or services, as opposed to mere modifications to or accommodations in the regular school program. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56026(b); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030; 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(a)(1).)
21 The March 13, 2004 Decision states that “in sum, the Hearing Officer finds that SBCSOS appropriately conducted its assessment pursuant to the October 24, 2003 assessment plan. The [Superintendent’s] evaluation assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability, appropriately tested his intellectual functioning, and possessed sufficient information about his functioning in order to form its conclusions.”
22 The finding of no severe discrepancy also is buttressed by the credible testimony of Dr. Warren, Dr. Ryerstand, and Ms. Bolle, as described more fully below. 23 Dr. Benveniste orally defined the descriptive categories as follows, with standard scores in brackets: (1) “deficient” [below 75], (2) “below average” [75-85], (3) “low average” [85-90], (4) “average” [90-110], (5) “high average” [110-115], (6) “above average” [115-130], and (7) “superior” [above 130].
24 The WJ-III subtests Dr. Benveniste characterized as processing tests, with the standard scores in brackets, include: (1) Listening Comprehension Cluster [88], (2) Oral Language Cluster [82], (3) Immediate Story Recall [86], (4) Understanding Directions [84], (5) Oral Comprehension [94], and (6) Story Recall Delayed [104].
25 If one assumes the WJ-III subtests at issue are properly considered processing tests as Dr. Benveniste asserts, the scores are not beneficial to her position because none of them fall into the “high average” or other intellectually superior categories. If one assumes they are simply achievement tests as the Superintendent’s experts assert, then those scores merely add to an abundance of other achievement test scores that fall into the average range and do not add anything material to the case.
26 The four tests, with standard scores in brackets, are: (1) WRAML-Verbal [112]; (2) LET-Auditory [115]; (3) WRAML-Visual [116]; and (4) LET-Visual [131]. The Hearing Officer has not included the WRAML General as a fifth score because it is not its own test but a composite score for the other WRAML scores.
