California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 10, 2001

Student v. Desert Sands Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2017-00 · Hearing Officer Maxine R. Benmour

Desert Sands Unified must reimburse parents for 3,500 miles of driving to an IEP placement reached by intradistrict transfer.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 2 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

The parents of an 11-year-old boy filed for due process against Desert Sands Unified School District. He had been eligible for special education since kindergarten because of multiple impairments related to neurological dysfunction. In March 2000 he returned to the District from a private school. The IEP team agreed he needed a special day class (SDC). The District wanted him at Truman Elementary, his neighborhood school. The parents wanted Monroe Elementary. District staff agreed either SDC was appropriate, but they told the parents to file an intradistrict transfer request. The District then refused to provide transportation, saying the parents had chosen Monroe. The parents drove him themselves and asked to be reimbursed.

The Hearing Officer ruled for the student. Everyone agreed he needed transportation, and the District would have provided it at Truman. The District made its offer of Truman only orally. Under Union School District v. Smith, an oral offer does not meet the IDEA requirement of a specific written offer. Every signed IEP named Monroe as the placement. The Hearing Officer found the District's case, Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids, different because there the transfer came after a written IEP offer and no IEP team adopted the new school. The parents had not waived transportation. The District was ordered to pay them, within 20 days, its employee mileage rate for 3,500 miles. A separate claim for an occupational therapy evaluation was withdrawn.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO treated an intradistrict transfer once the IEP team wrote the transferred school into the IEP. The written IEP set the placement. An unwritten offer of the neighborhood school did not let the District deny a related service the student needed, such as transportation.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1. Was Petitioner entitled to receive transportation as a related service from March 2000 through June 2001?

    Because every written IEP showed placement at Monroe and the student needed transportation, the District owed transportation despite the intradistrict transfer; an oral offer of Truman did not count.

  2. Issue 2 (withdrawn). Alleged entitlement to an independent occupational therapy evaluation (withdrawn by Petitioner at the start of the hearing)

    Petitioner withdrew this issue at the beginning of the hearing; it was not decided.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, District must reimburse parents for 3,500 miles of driving (250 days x 14 miles round trip) at the District's standard mileage rate for employees.

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Key authorities

Union School Dist. v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519; Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. (8th Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 968; 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3042(a)

People named in the decision

  • Carolyn Rounsaville, District director of special education, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Maureen Boren, program specialist, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Mary Jane Gilbreath, school psychologist, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Laura Anesko, inclusion/behavior specialist, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Nancy Bucher, speech/language specialist, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Douglas Gillund, director of Child Welfare and Attendance, Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Dena Wanitschke, special day class teacher (Monroe Elementary), Desert Sands Unified School District
  • Learning Tree, private school previously attended by student

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Maxine R. Benmour, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in La Quinta, California, on October 11, 2001.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by attorney Steve Hermanson and law clerk Jim Madden. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf were his parents, MOTHER and FATHER. Respondent Desert Sands Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Jack B. Clarke, Jr. of the law firm Best Best & Krieger. Also present on the District’s behalf was Carolyn Rounsaville, District director of special education.

Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: FATHER, Petitioner’s father, and MOTHER, Petitioner’s mother.

The District called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Maureen Boren, District program specialist; Mary Jane Gilbreath, District school psychologist; Laura Anesko, District inclusion/behavior specialist; Nancy Bucher, District speech/language specialist; Douglas Gillund, District director of Child Welfare and Attendance; Carolyn Rounsaville, District director of special education; and Dena Wanitschke, District special day class teacher.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was kept open for the parties to submit written closing arguments. Upon receipt of the briefs on November 13, 2001, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision. ISSUES(Footnote 2)

Was Petitioner entitled to receive transportation as a related service from March 2000 through June 2001?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is an eleven-year-old student who lives with his family within the boundaries of the District. He has been eligible for special education since kindergarten based upon multiple impairments related to neurological dysfunction. He has also been diagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiance disorder, and a seizure disorder.

From kindergarten through third grade, STUDENT attended a special day class (SDC) at the District’s Truman Elementary School (Truman), his neighborhood school. When STUDENT entered the fourth grade, his parents decided to place him at the Learning Tree, a private school, because they were dissatisfied with the education that he had received at Truman. However, in February 2000, at the end of STUDENT’s fourth-grade year, his parents requested that the District again place STUDENT within a District classroom.

On February 24, 2000, STUDENT’s parents met with District program specialist Maureen Boren to discuss STUDENT’s reentry into the District. At this meeting, the parties discussed placement options for STUDENT, including his neighborhood school at Truman and comparable programs in other District schools. At the conclusion of the meeting, STUDENT’s parents indicated that they would visit various SDC programs within the District prior to an individualized education program (IEP) meeting scheduled for March 6, 2000.

On March 6, 2000, the District convened an IEP meeting to discuss placement and services for STUDENT. The IEP team, including District personnel and STUDENT’s parents, agreed that STUDENT required placement in an SDC. However, they disagreed regarding the location of the placement. The District believed that STUDENT should again be placed at Truman. However, the parents disagreed that Truman was an appropriate placement for STUDENT and requested that he be placed instead in an SDC at Monroe Elementary School (Monroe). The District members of the IEP team agreed that an SDC class at either Truman or Monroe would be appropriate for STUDENT. However, because STUDENT’s neighborhood school was Truman, the District advised the parents that they would have to request an intradistrict transfer in order to place STUDENT at Monroe.

Pursuant to the District’s request, STUDENT’s parents completed a Request for Intradistrict Transfer for the 1999-2000 school year.(Footnote 3) On the transfer request form, FATHER wrote, “Parents request child to be transported to Monroe.” In addition, Ms. Boren wrote on the document, “At this time parents will transport.” At the conclusion of the IEP meeting on March 6, 2000, Ms. Boren signed the form, indicating that she approved the transfer request. On March 7, 2000, Douglas Gillund, the District’s director of Child Welfare and Attendance, approved the intradistrict transfer.

On May 18, 2000, the District convened another IEP meeting to finalize goals and objectives for STUDENT. The May 18, 2000 IEP document stated, “IEP written for continued placement in SDC. Parents prefer Monroe in place of home school and STUDENT is attending Monroe on an Intradistrict Transfer. STUDENT has been successful in his current placement . . . . Parents were explained that transportation would not be provided when parents choose to have STUDENT at a program different from the one available at his neighborhood school. Parents do not agree.” All parties signed the document, which stated that STUDENT’s placement was in an SDC class at Monroe.

On October 17, 2000, the District convened another IEP meeting to further discuss services for STUDENT. This document stated, “Parents again are requesting transportation even though they have STUDENT on an Intradistrict Transfer. Parents prefer the Monroe placement because they feel this SDC is a more appropriate placement. They felt that the Truman program SDC was inappropriate.” The parents also indicated their disagreement with the District’s failure to provide transportation and wrote, “I disagree with the decision not to provide transportation due to my belief the placement at Monroe is the only appropriate placement offered.” All parties again signed the document, which stated that STUDENT’s placement remained an SDC class at Monroe.

On November 13, 2000, STUDENT’s parents filed a request for due process hearing with the Special Education Hearing Office. They disagree with the District’s decision that STUDENT was not entitled to transportation from his home to Monroe as a related service from March 2000 through June 2001.(Footnote 4) They request reimbursement for their costs in transporting STUDENT to school.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Was Petitioner entitled to receive transportation as a related service from March 2000 through June 2001?

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge, that meet the standard of the state education agency, and that conform with the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25).

As part of an appropriate education, the child is also entitled to related services. The term “related services” includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services which may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). California Education Code § 56363 similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.”

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to transportation from his home to Monroe as a related service that he requires to benefit from his education. He further contends that the IEP team agreed to his placement at Monroe and the District is thus obligated to provide this service. The District contends that Petitioner is not entitled to transportation as a related service because he attended Monroe pursuant to his parents’ choice and not because he required placement at Monroe in order to receive a FAPE.

It is undisputed that STUDENT requires the related service of transportation from home to school because of his severe disabilities. In fact, director of special education Carolyn Rounsaville testified that, had STUDENT attended school at Truman from March 2000 through June 2001, the District would have provided him with transportation services. The only reason for the District’s refusal to provide transportation services was STUDENT’s parents’ request that he attend Monroe rather than Truman.

A review of the evidence reveals that STUDENT’s parents were dissatisfied with the SDC program at Truman based upon his prior attendance at the school and their recent observation of the SDC classroom proposed for STUDENT. After visiting other SDC classrooms within the District, the parents decided that they preferred that STUDENT be placed instead in an SDC class at Monroe. Several District witnesses, including director of special education Ms. Rounsaville, Monroe SDC teacher Dena Wanitschke, inclusion/behavior specialist Laura Anesko, school psychologist Mary Jane Gilbreath, and speech and language specialist Nancy Bucher, testified that the SDC classrooms at Monroe and Truman were comparable, and that either program would have been appropriate to meet STUDENT’s needs. As a result, the District agreed to place STUDENT at Monroe if his parents completed, and the District approved, a request for an intradistrict transfer. The parents completed such a request, and on March 7, 2000, the District approved STUDENT’s transfer. Thereafter, when the IEP team met again on May 18, 2000, and October 17, 2000, the team agreed and documented that STUDENT’s placement would be at Monroe for the remainder of the 1999-2000 and the 2000-2001 school years.

From the weight of the evidence, the Hearing Officer is persuaded that the IEP team agreed to place STUDENT at Monroe from March 2000 through June 2001. It is undisputed that at the initial IEP meeting on March 6, 2000, the District orally offered STUDENT placement at Truman. It is further undisputed that his parents disagreed that Truman was appropriate and indicated that they wanted STUDENT to attend Monroe instead. In addition, District witnesses testified that they all agreed that Monroe would be an appropriate placement for STUDENT. However, the District advised the parents that it would not place STUDENT at Monroe unless the parents requested, and the District approved, an intradistrict transfer. Moreover, the evidence also reveals that once the District approved the intradistrict transfer, the IEP team agreed in writing to place STUDENT at Monroe. This fact is evident from both of the IEP meetings held subsequent to the initial meeting on March 6, 2000. On May 18, 2000, and October 17, 2000, the IEP documents, signed by the parents and all District participants, stated that STUDENT’s placement would be at Monroe.

The evidence further reveals that the District has an intradistrict transfer policy that applies equally to special education and regular education students. However, the District has failed to provide support for its argument that this policy applies to the present case. As Child Welfare and Attendance director Douglas Gillund testified, the District’s intradistrict transfer policy has nothing to do with the IEP process. When his office receives a transfer request, it approves a transfer based solely upon a determination that there is space available in the requested classroom.

The District cites Timothy H. v. Cedar Rapids Community School District (8th Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 968 in support of its argument that the District properly refused to provide transportation to STUDENT because he attended Monroe pursuant to an intradistrict transfer. The court in that case held that a district policy of refusing to provide transportation to intradistrict transfer students was proper when applied to a special education student who had requested a transfer. However, in the Timothy H. case, the district made a written offer of placement at the student’s neighborhood school, as reflected in the IEP document. After attending the District’s offered placement for one school year, the student requested an intradistrict transfer. The District approved the transfer and denied the request for transportation because of its policy regarding intradistrict transfers and transportation. There was no subsequent IEP meeting in which the IEP team agreed to the new placement. The new placement was made strictly pursuant to the intradistrict transfer procedure. Thus, the court found that the district properly refused to provide transportation services to the student.

In this case, although the District required the parents to apply for an intradistrict transfer in order to place STUDENT at Monroe, the IEP team ultimately agreed with the transferred placement. Both of the IEP documents subsequent to the March 6, 2000 meeting, and the testimony of the District witnesses, indicate that the District agreed that Monroe was appropriate for STUDENT. This is not the situation of Timothy H., where the district made an offer, the district documented the offer in an IEP, and the parents subsequently requested an intradistrict transfer. Rather, the IEP documents in this case reflect that the District’s offer of placement was Monroe. Although the District argues that it made a specific offer of placement at Truman, none of the IEP documents reflect that offer. Rather, although the parents and several District witnesses testified that the District orally offered a placement at Truman, all of the IEP documents reflect a written offer of placement at Monroe. Moreover, an oral offer of placement at an IEP meeting does not satisfy the legal requirements of the IDEA that a District make a specific written offer of placement. Union School District v. Smith (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1519, 1526, cert den., 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994). See also Cal. Code Regs., Title 5, § 3042(a).

Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer concludes that in March 2000, the District offered STUDENT a placement in an SDC at Monroe. The Hearing Officer also concludes that STUDENT required transportation from home to school as a related service based upon his unique needs from March 2000 through June 2001. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was entitled to transportation services as part of the educational program provided by the District from March 2000 through June 2001, and that the parents did not waive that entitlement. MOTHER testified credibly that STUDENT’s parents drove him from home to Monroe for a total of 250 days, and that Monroe is fourteen miles round-trip from their home. The parents thus drove STUDENT between Monroe and their home a total of 3,500 miles. Therefore, the District shall reimburse STUDENT’s parents for 3,500 miles at the standard rate that the District reimburses its employees for mileage.

ORDER

Within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of this decision, the District shall reimburse STUDENT’s parents for mileage of 3,500 miles at the District’s standard rate for mileage reimbursement to District employees.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: Petitioner prevailed on the sole issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(I).

Dated: December 10, 2001 ____________________________________ Maxine R. Benmour, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

Footnote 1: Please note that the Hearing Office has recently changed its format for numbering cases. The case number now begins with the year the case was filed and is followed by a five-digit reference number.

Footnote 2: At the beginning of the hearing, Petitioner withdrew a second issue relating to his alleged entitlement to an independent occupational therapy evaluation.

Footnote 3: The parties dispute the date of the request for the intradistrict transfer. FATHER testified that the parents completed the request prior to the IEP meeting on March 6, 2000, and brought the form with them to the meeting. However, Ms. Boren testified that she recalled that the parents completed the form at the meeting. She also testified that she believes that the date of February 6, 2000, on the form is an error, and that it should have been dated March 6, 2000, the date of the meeting.

Footnote 4: The 2001-2002 school year is not at issue in this proceeding as STUDENT last attended Monroe in June 2000. He currently attends an SDC at the District’s Cauhilla Desert Academy.