California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 19, 2001
Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 2030-00 · Hearing Officer Paul R. Gant
Los Angeles Unified must reimburse Westmark School tuition and mileage because its RSP offer did not specify the service setting.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
A footnote states the decision was amended to correct word processing formatting errors, with no substantive changes, and that the original decision issued December 17, 2001. The amended decision is dated December 19, 2001.
Summary
A parent filed for due process against Los Angeles Unified School District after moving into the District and placing her nine-year-old son at Westmark School, a state-certified nonpublic school. The student was eligible for special education under specific learning disability, with delays in reading comprehension and written expression. He also had attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder. At the November 7, 2000 IEP meeting, the District offered a second grade general education class with resource specialist program (RSP) support. The parent asked the District to fund Westmark instead.
The District argued it owed no FAPE offer because the student was already in private school and the parent sought only funding. Hearing Officer Paul R. Gant disagreed. The parent had asked for an assessment and an IEP, named the local public school as his home school, and sought a placement at public expense because she believed he needed one, not just as a personal preference.
The Hearing Officer found the offer procedurally deficient. The IEP did not say whether RSP services would happen inside or outside the general education class, or in what size group. That mattered because the student was highly distractible. The District left this choice to the RSP teacher after enrollment, so the parent could not judge the offer. This seriously limited her participation and denied FAPE. Westmark was appropriate, the student made progress there, and its lack of mainstreaming did not bar reimbursement. The District must reimburse $25,735 in tuition, plus mileage at $0.34 per mile.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO applied Union v. Smith's requirement of a specific written offer. An IEP offering "general education, resource specialist services" without stating the setting or group size was found to deny FAPE for a highly distractible student. Parents who place a child privately but seek a public-expense placement can still be owed a FAPE offer.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue I. Was the District required to offer a FAPE to Student, a student who was enrolled in a private school prior to the District's assessment and initial IEP meeting?
The parent asked for assessment and an IEP and sought a special education placement at public expense, not just a private placement of personal preference, so the District had to offer a FAPE.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue II. Did the District's proposal to place Student in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a FAPE for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
The IEP did not say whether RSP services would be delivered in or out of the general education classroom or in what group size. Given the student's attention needs, this seriously infringed the parent's participation and denied FAPE.
- Student prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue III. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of Student's placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001?
Westmark met the student's unique needs and he made progress there. The lack of mainstreaming did not bar reimbursement where the District denied FAPE.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days, District shall pay the parents $25,735 for reimbursement of Westmark tuition for November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001. (The remedies discussion calculated $25,297.50 as the average tuition, but the order states $25,735.)
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days, District shall reimburse the parents for mileage (31 miles round trip per day attended) from November 7, 2000 to November 7, 2001 at $0.34 per mile. Within 10 calendar days, the parents must give the District a signed declaration under penalty of perjury from a Westmark administrator stating the exact number of days attended.
Total: $25,735 ordered
Key authorities
Rowley; School Committee of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Glendale Unified School Dist. v. Almasi; W.G. v. Target Range Sch. Dist.; Clyde K. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.; Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School Dist. v. Boss; Warren G. v. Cumberland County Sch. Dist.; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.
People named in the decision
- Harriet Watson, due process specialist, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Joe Vandenbussche, resource specialist (RSP teacher), West Hollywood School, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Nancy Graff, school psychologist (District educational psychologist), Los Angeles Unified School District
- Cathy Girgis, private school kindergarten teacher, Newbridge School
- Patty Thomas, teacher, Hawthorne Elementary School, Beverly Hills Unified School District
- Kristen Thompson (also referred to as Kristen Thomas, PhD), private assessor / expert witness for Student, Retained by parents
- Leslie Barnaby, director, nonpublic school, Westmark School
- Kristy Thesiah, nonpublic school teacher (2000-2001), Westmark School
- Jamie Stangell, nonpublic school teacher (2001-2002), Westmark School
- Westmark School, nonpublic school
- Newbridge School, private school
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Los Angeles, California, on October 16, 17, and 18, 2001. Further testimony was received during telephone conference calls convened on October 24 and 29, 2001.
STUDENT was represented by Jodi Ossen Bynder, attorney at law, of the law firm Newman, Aaronson & Vanaman. MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother, also appeared on his behalf. Los Angeles Unified School District (District) was represented by Jonathan Read, attorney at law, of the law firm Lozano Smith. Harriet Watson, due process specialist for the District, also appeared.
Oral and documentary evidence was received, written closing arguments were presented by the parties, and the case was submitted for decision on November 13, 2001.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)1
I Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled in a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial Individualized Education Program (IEP) meeting?
II Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a FAPE for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
III Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a nine-year-old boy who at all time pertinent to this decision has been eligible for special education services as a student with a specific learning disability (SLD), with significant delays in reading comprehension and written expression. STUDENT also has been diagnosed with attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). From September 2000 through the date that the hearing was completed, STUDENT has attended Westmark School, an NPS certified by the State of California to provide special education services to children from kindergarten through the twelfth grade.
STUDENT was initially assessed for special education services in November 1997 while attending a preschool program at Hawthorne Elementary School (Hawthorne) in the Beverly Hills Unified School District (BHUSD). At an IEP meeting convened by the BHUSD on January 14, 1998, STUDENT was determined to be eligible for special education services under the category of learning disabled because of a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement in pre-academic skills, a functional deficit in visual motor skills, and receptive and expressive language delays.
At the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT attended kindergarten at Hawthorne. However, after several weeks, STUDENT’s teacher recommended that STUDENT go back to preschool as he was not yet ready for kindergarten. For the remainder of that school year, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him at a private preschool, and BHUSD continued to provide STUDENT with RSP support and speech and language services.
For the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT re-entered kindergarten at Hawthorne with continued RSP support and speech and language services. On May 6, 1999, BHUSD convened an IEP meeting to address STUDENT’s program for the 1999-2000 school year. At that time, the IEP team determined that STUDENT no longer met eligibility criteria as SLD. However, the team agreed that STUDENT should continue to receive special education services because of his ongoing attentional problems. Subsequent to this IEP, STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, determined that STUDENT would benefit more from a class size smaller than the twenty-student class offered at Hawthorne. She therefore enrolled STUDENT in a private institution, Newbridge School, which offered a class size of ten students. Following a period of enrollment at Newbridge, in which STUDENT did not make substantial progress, MOTHER decided to enroll him at Westmark School, which, unlike Newbridge, offered an array of specialized instructional methods for children with special education needs.
During spring 2000, STUDENT and his parents relocated to their residence within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District. On June 22, 2000, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education needs and convene an IEP meeting. The District advised the parents that summer break was to begin the next day in the District and that STUDENT’s assessment and IEP meeting would therefore follow the District’s summer recess. By letter dated August 6, 2000, MOTHER advised the District that she was unilaterally placing STUDENT at Westmark School and that she intended to pursue funding of that placement through the IEP process.
Following the summer break, MOTHER and the District executed an assessment plan and the District conducted a psycho-educational assessment, an occupational therapy assessment, a speech and language assessment, and academic testing of STUDENT. Thereafter, on November 7, 2000, the District convened STUDENT’s IEP meeting. At the meeting, the team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education services in connection with his delays in reading and written expression. The team drafted an IEP in which the District offered STUDENT placement in a District second grade regular education classroom with RSP support. The IEP team fashioned goals and objectives in the areas of reading, decoding, reading comprehension, written language, staying on task, and following instructions. (Dist. Exh. 2). The team also agreed that STUDENT required instructional accommodations consisting of frequent breaks, small units of work, a multisensory/modality approach, teacher scaffolding, modeling, and compensatory strategies. STUDENT’s mother agreed with the goals and objectives of the IEP; however, she told the team that she felt that STUDENT should continue to attend Westmark School, as the least restrictive appropriate educational placement.
On November 12, 2000. MOTHER requested a due process hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. I: Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled at a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial IEP meeting?
Under State and federal law, students with disabilities have the right to a FAPE. California Education Code §56000; 20 U.S.C. §1400. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) defines “free appropriate public education” as special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. §1401(8). “Special education” means specially designed instruction at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S. C. §1401(25). The term “related services” includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. §1401 (22). California Education Code
§ 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Ed. Code §56363(b).
In general, the IDEA requires a District to provide special education and related services for all qualified children within its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, a District in not required to pay for the cost of special education and related services for a student at a private school or facility “if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility.” 20 U.S. C. § (a)(10(C)(i). The District contends that it had no obligation to offer STUDENT a FAPE at all because: (1) he was enrolled in a private school at the time the parents requested that the District provide special education services; and (2) the parent’s request for services was limited to funding for the private placement.
There are three situations in which a child with a disability may attend a private school, and the obligations of a local educational agency (LEA) changes with each of the situations. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (1997). The first situation involves an LEA placing a child with a disability in a private school because the LEA has determined that the private school can provide the child with a FAPE. In this first situation, the private placement comes at no cost to the parents. 20 U.S.C. §1412 (a)(10)(B)(1) (1997). In the second situation, the parents place the child in the private school, because they believe that the LEA has denied their child a FAPE. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ, (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 370-371, 105 S.Ct. 1996. In such a case, where the provision of a FAPE is at issue, the LEA may be liable for the costs of the private placement if the LEA denied the child a FAPE and the private placement is educationally appropriate. Burlington, supra, 471 U.S. at 371;(ii) (1997). The third and final situation also involves a unilateral parent decision to place the child in a private school, but differs in that the parent elects to place the child in a private school as a matter of personal preference and seeks only related services from the LEA. In this third situation, the student has no individual right to special education services and no right to a due process hearing regarding the failure of the LEA to provide a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).
Contrary to the District’s position, the evidence presented in this matter does not support the conclusion that the parents enrolled and maintained STUDENT at Westmark merely as a matter of personal preference. On June 22, 2000, MOTHER requested that the District assess STUDENT and conduct an IEP for STUDENT. (Dist. Exh. 24) At that time, STUDENT was enrolled in Newbridge School, which did not provide special education or related services. MOTHER did not indicate that she intended to maintain STUDENT at Newbridge or any other private school. Nor did MOTHER limit her request to related services from the District. Rather, MOTHER specified that West Hollywood School in the District was STUDENT’s home school. Furthermore, on two occasions during the 1999-2000 school year, MOTHER visited the West Hollywood School to observe their educational program. These facts strongly support the conclusion that at the time MOTHER requested special education services from the District, she was considering enrolling him in a public school in the District. It is true that on August 6, 2000, prior to the District’s offer of placement at the November 7, 2000 IEP meeting, MOTHER notified the District that she intended to place STUDENT at Westmark, a private school. (Dist. Exh.23). In her notice, MOTHER also indicated that she intended to seek funding for the placement from the District. At hearing, MOTHER testified that her visits to West Hollywood School had convinced her that the District could not offer him a FAPE at the home school and that she believed STUDENT should attend Westmark in order to receive an appropriate education. Thus, prior to the IEP meeting held by the District, STUDENT’s mother clearly expressed her interest in having the District provide STUDENT a placement at public expense. MOTHER reiterated this request at the November 7, 2000 IEP meeting. The IEP notes under the topic “Parent Concerns and Comments” that “parent feels that non-public school is the least restrictive appropriate special education placement for STUDENT.” Where a private school placement is necessary to provide a child with a FAPE, school districts may decide to place such a child at a private school to fulfill its obligations under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56365(a), 56366. Accordingly, it would be illogical to conclude that a parent’s request to have a private placement at public expense is insufficient to invoke a school district’s obligation to offer a FAPE, unless facts surrounding the request indicate that the decision by the parents to place the child at the private placement is solely a function of personal preference. In this case, the evidence established that STUDENT’s mother requested funding for Westmark because she believed he needed that placement in order to receive an appropriate education. While she may well have had concurrent motivations other than special education concerns for wanting STUDENT to attend Westmark, MOTHER unequivocally expressed interest in obtaining a special education placement from the District at public expense. Therefore, the District had an obligation to offer STUDENT a FAPE.
ISSUE II: Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA (now IDEA 1997). The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. Id at 200. According to Rowley, the IDEA does not require a school district to provide special education students the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor or opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id at 201.
In short, under the IDEA and Rowley, a school district must provide an educational program that is designed to meet the student’s unique needs and is reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. In an administrative due process proceeding, the District has the burden of demonstrating that it has complied with the IDEA by providing a FAPE to the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Seattle School District, No. 1 v. B.S., et al, 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir. 1996); Alan Norton v. Orinda Union School District, 29 IDELR 1069 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. At 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he or she is entitled and that the parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484; see also Roland M. vs. Concord Sch. Comm. 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
In Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court held that “the IDEA explicitly requires written prior notice to parents when an educational agency proposes, or refuses, to initiate or change the educational placement of a disabled child. Id. at 1526; See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). The requirement that the District make a formal written offer includes that the offer be specific. Glendale Unified School District v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The requirement of a formal, specific, written offer is “enforced rigorously,” in part, because it alerts the parents to serious consideration of the proposed placement and provides them with an opportunity to accept or reject the offer. Smith, supra, 15 F.3d at 1526.
The Petitioner contends that the District’s offer of placement in a regular education classroom with RSP support was procedurally deficient because the IEP did not specify whether the RSP services were to be provided in the regular education classroom or in a small-group setting outside the regular education classroom. Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his parents were not given adequate information to fully participate in the IEP process and reasonably determine the appropriateness of the proposed program. The District asserts that its offer of placement was procedurally sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA.
The IEP dated November 7, 2000 (containing the District’s offer of placement for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001), designated the “District School of Residence” as STUDENT’s location for services. The witnesses at hearing agreed that all the members of the IEP team understood this to refer to Hawthorne School. Furthermore, under the heading “instructional setting,” the IEP stated “general education, resource specialist services.” The IEP did not specify whether these services, which were intended to support STUDENT in reading and written expression, were to be provided inside or outside the regular education classroom. Nor did the IEP indicate the size of the group in which STUDENT would receive the services.
Several witnesses for the District, including Harriet Watson, the District’s due process specialist, and Joe Vandenbussche, the resource specialist at West Hollywood, testified that the District offers RSP services in a variety of modalities depending on the unique needs of the student. These include: (1) a “pull out model,” wherein a small group of students or a single student is taken to a separate classroom for specialized instruction; (2) small group instruction in the general education classroom at a set of desks set up at one side of the class, and (3) collaboration within the classroom as a whole, whereby the RSP teacher and his assistant work with the classroom teacher in modifying the curriculum and developing the instructional methods for the special education students.
All witnesses at the hearing agreed that at STUDENT’s IEP meeting, the District offered STUDENT RSP services along with his placement in the general education classroom, but did not indicate the specific modality of the services. In fact, Joe Vandenbussche testified that such a determination would generally be deferred until the child actually enters the program, at which time the RSP teacher will make the decision as to which model of service delivery is appropriate for the student.
The modality of the RSP services was particularly important for STUDENT given the undisputed evidence at hearing that he suffers from attention deficits and is significantly affected by the amount of stimulus in his environment. Nancy Graff, the District educational psychologist, testified that at the time of assessment STUDENT had great difficulty focusing, attending, and sustaining attention and concentration, that he was in constant motion, and that he was easily distracted by auditory and visual stimuli. [Dist. Exh. 18]. STUDENT’s teacher at Newbridge for the 1999-2000 kindergarten year, Ms. Cathy Girgis, recommended that STUDENT remain in a small academic setting because of his attentional problems. [Pet. Exh. 21]. According to MOTHER, Ms. Girgis also reported that in her class STUDENT experienced “excitability” and difficulty doing things in front of the group. Teacher Patty Thomas told MOTHER that at Hawthorne, STUDENT had difficulty in groups but did better one on one. Dr. Kristen Thompson, who assessed STUDENT on behalf of the parents, recommended that STUDENT receive his instruction in a small structured classroom designed for children with learning disabilities and that he receive individual assistance on a consistent basis. (Dist. Exh. 7). Thus, the testimony of all pertinent witness established that both the size of the group in which STUDENT was to receive instruction and the amount of stimulus to which he would be subjected were significant factors in designing his educational program. The District’s failure to define the setting in which RSP services would occur therefore rendered its placement offer incomplete. To constitute a specific offer of placement, the IEP should also have identified where and in what size group STUDENT would be receiving such services. Accordingly, the District did not offer a distinct, coherent offer of placement selected to meet STUDENT’s unique attentional needs and implement his IEP goals and objectives. Thus, the offer of placement did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3).
To result in a denial of FAPE, however, a procedural violation must seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process or result in the loss of educational opportunity. W.G., supra, at 1484. In the instant case, the District’s failure to identify the setting in which STUDENT’s RSP services would be delivered denied STUDENT’s parents a legally sufficient opportunity for participation in the IEP process. It is not enough that Joe Vandenbussche, the RSP teacher who was designated to provide STUDENT’s services, ultimately intended to provide them in a pull out, small-group setting as he testified at hearing. Even if such a service delivery model would reasonably have provided STUDENT a FAPE, there was no evidence that MOTHER, at any time prior to the due process hearing, was advised of the proposed service delivery model. Mr. Vandenbussche admitted that it was not his policy or the policy of the District to make that determination prior to the actual entry of the student into the placement. Indeed, on one of her visits to the school site to observe a general education classroom at West Hollywood, MOTHER observed students whom she assumed to be special education students receiving RSP services in the same classroom as the general education students, though pulled to the side of the classroom. She assumed that this was how STUDENT would receive his RSP services at West Hollywood. Even though this assumption may well have been erroneous, the District did not provide MOTHER any other information on which to form a reasoned conclusion regarding the environment in which STUDENT would receive RSP services.
Accordingly, it is determined that the District’s failure to identify in the IEP the setting in which STUDENT was to receive his RSP services seriously infringed on MOTHER’s opportunity to participate in IEP process, and thus denied STUDENT a FAPE.
ISSUE No. III: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. §1415(i). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parents are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated that “the rationale behind Burlington's holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an ‘empty victory’." As stated by the Court, if "appropriate relief" in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed," the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parent's right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete." Id.
In light of the finding that the District failed to make a legally sufficient offer of a FAPE to STUDENT for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001, it must be determined whether the program provided by STUDENT’s parents for that period was proper under the IDEA. In Florence County Sch. Distr. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the child’s IEP or provide an educational placement that is certified by the state. Id. At 13-14. Although the courts have recognized that the parent’s placement does not have to meet a standard as high as that of the school district’s, the parent’s placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that is designed to address the child’s unique needs and is reasonably calculated to provide the child educational benefit.
The evidence presented at hearing established that the program that STUDENT has been receiving at Westmark School is, in all material respects, an appropriate placement for him during the period at issue in this case. As previously noted, it is undisputed that for the period beginning November 7, 2000, STUDENT required special instruction in the of areas of reading, decoding, reading comprehension, written language, staying on task, and following instructions. (Dist. Exh. 2). It was also incontrovertible that, in accordance with the agreement of the November 7, 2000 IEP team, STUDENT required instructional accommodations consisting of frequent breaks, small units of work, a multi-sensory/modality approach, teacher scaffolding, modeling, and compensatory strategies.
At hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of the director of Westmark, Leslie Barnaby, as well as two teachers, Kristy Thesiah (teacher for 2000-2001) and Jamie Stangell (teacher for 2001-2002). Their undisputed testimony established that Westmark is State-certified to provide private instruction to special education students. The Westmark teachers testified that their methods include the teaching strategies listed in STUDENT’s IEP. The teachers also testified that the classroom instruction is individualized to each child’s academic level, that social skills are provided, and that there is rigid class schedule which gives predictability to students with attentional deficits.
Kristen Thomas, PhD., evaluated STUDENT on behalf of the parents. She observed STUDENT at Westmark, and spoke with his teacher regarding how STUDENT’s educational needs were met in the classroom. Based on her evaluation of STUDENT, observation of the program, and interview with the teacher, Dr. Thomas concluded that Westmark offered STUDENT appropriate instruction to address behavior and academics, positive reinforcement, structure, social skills training, and special education teaching techniques. Dr. Thomas stated that the Westmark program would be likely to provide STUDENT an appropriate education.
The evidence also established that STUDENT has made educational progress during his enrollment at Westmark. Kristy Thesiah testified that during the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT made progress in all academic areas, especially, reading, math, and social skills. Similarly, Jamie Stangell testified that STUDENT has made continued progress in academic and social skills during the 2001-2002 school year. She testified that STUDENT is making progress in reading decoding and comprehension, though he is not yet using the comprehension strategies as effectively as she would like. STUDENT is also progressing in his use of capital letters and articles. According to Ms. Stangell, STUDENT is becoming progressively stronger in math, reading, decoding, background knowledge, social studies and science. Although STUDENT is more distractible when performing writing tasks, and needs more progress in writing and reading comprehension, Ms. Stangell testified that she believes the educational program she is presenting will allow STUDENT to make continued progress in these areas.
Although the District presented nothing to rebut Petitioner’s evidence that STUDENT is receiving a program designed to meet his unique needs and to provide educational progress at Westmark, the District argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the private placement because the NPS does not provide STUDENT with mainstreaming opportunities and is therefore not the least restrictive environment. However, several federal circuit courts of appeal have held that, where a District has not offered a FAPE, a parent’s right to reimbursement for a private placement is not barred because of any failure to meet the mainstreaming requirement imposed on public agencies. Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School Distr. V. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1998); accord Warren G. Cumberland County Sch. Distr. 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3rd Cir. 1999). The District has cited no relevant authority that an alleged failure by the a private school to meet a student’s mainstreaming needs justifies denial of reimbursement to the parents where the District has denied a FAPE.
For the reasons stated, it is concluded that the program at Westmark was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and calculated to provide educational benefit sufficient to justify reimbursement for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001.
REMEDIES
At hearing Petitioner presented evidence that established the cost of tuition at Westmark for the 2000-2001 school year as $24,860, and for the 2001-2002 school year as $25,735. As the period to be reimbursed covers a full calendar year falling within both school years, the Hearing Office concludes that the sum of $25, 297.50, which is the average tuition for the two years during which STUDENT has attended Westmark, represents the cost of STUDENT’s tuition for the period at issue in this case. Petitioner also established that the parents incurred thirty-one miles round trip for each day that STUDENT attended Westmark for the period November 7, 2000, to November 7, 2001. As the transportation was necessary for STUDENT to attend Westmark, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner should be reimbursed for this mileage.
ORDER
Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall pay Petitioner’s parents the sum of $25,735 for reimbursement of Westmark tuition for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001. Within ten calendar days of the date of this Decision, the parents shall forward to the District a signed declaration under penalty of perjury from an authorized administrator at Westmark indicating the exact number of days that STUDENT attended Westmark during the period November 7, 2000 to November 7, 2001. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall reimburse the parents for the total mileage incurred during this period at the rate of $0.34 per mile.
PREVAILING PARTY OF EACH ISSUE
1. Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled in a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial IEP meeting?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a FAPE for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
3. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code §56505(j).
Dated: December 19, 2001 ________________________________ Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
This matter was heard before Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Los Angeles, California, on October 16, 17, and 18, 2001. Further testimony was received during telephone conference calls convened on October 24 and 29, 2001.
STUDENT was represented by Jodi Ossen Bynder, attorney at law, of the law firm Newman, Aaronson & Vanaman. MOTHER, STUDENT’s mother, also appeared on his behalf. Los Angeles Unified School District (District) was represented by Jonathan Read, attorney at law, of the law firm Lozano Smith. Harriet Watson, due process specialist for the District, also appeared.
Oral and documentary evidence was received, written closing arguments were presented by the parties, and the case was submitted for decision on November 13, 2001.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)1
I Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled in a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial Individualized Education Program (IEP) meeting?
II Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a FAPE for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
III Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a nine-year-old boy who at all time pertinent to this decision has been eligible for special education services as a student with a specific learning disability (SLD), with significant delays in reading comprehension and written expression. STUDENT also has been diagnosed with attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). From September 2000 through the date that the hearing was completed, STUDENT has attended Westmark School, an NPS certified by the State of California to provide special education services to children from kindergarten through the twelfth grade.
STUDENT was initially assessed for special education services in November 1997 while attending a preschool program at Hawthorne Elementary School (Hawthorne) in the Beverly Hills Unified School District (BHUSD). At an IEP meeting convened by the BHUSD on January 14, 1998, STUDENT was determined to be eligible for special education services under the category of learning disabled because of a significant discrepancy between ability and achievement in pre-academic skills, a functional deficit in visual motor skills, and receptive and expressive language delays.
At the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT attended kindergarten at Hawthorne. However, after several weeks, STUDENT’s teacher recommended that STUDENT go back to preschool as he was not yet ready for kindergarten. For the remainder of that school year, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him at a private preschool, and BHUSD continued to provide STUDENT with RSP support and speech and language services.
For the 1999-2000 school year, STUDENT re-entered kindergarten at Hawthorne with continued RSP support and speech and language services. On May 6, 1999, BHUSD convened an IEP meeting to address STUDENT’s program for the 1999-2000 school year. At that time, the IEP team determined that STUDENT no longer met eligibility criteria as SLD. However, the team agreed that STUDENT should continue to receive special education services because of his ongoing attentional problems. Subsequent to this IEP, STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, determined that STUDENT would benefit more from a class size smaller than the twenty-student class offered at Hawthorne. She therefore enrolled STUDENT in a private institution, Newbridge School, which offered a class size of ten students. Following a period of enrollment at Newbridge, in which STUDENT did not make substantial progress, MOTHER decided to enroll him at Westmark School, which, unlike Newbridge, offered an array of specialized instructional methods for children with special education needs.
During spring 2000, STUDENT and his parents relocated to their residence within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Los Angeles Unified School District. On June 22, 2000, STUDENT’s parents requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education needs and convene an IEP meeting. The District advised the parents that summer break was to begin the next day in the District and that STUDENT’s assessment and IEP meeting would therefore follow the District’s summer recess. By letter dated August 6, 2000, MOTHER advised the District that she was unilaterally placing STUDENT at Westmark School and that she intended to pursue funding of that placement through the IEP process.
Following the summer break, MOTHER and the District executed an assessment plan and the District conducted a psycho-educational assessment, an occupational therapy assessment, a speech and language assessment, and academic testing of STUDENT. Thereafter, on November 7, 2000, the District convened STUDENT’s IEP meeting. At the meeting, the team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education services in connection with his delays in reading and written expression. The team drafted an IEP in which the District offered STUDENT placement in a District second grade regular education classroom with RSP support. The IEP team fashioned goals and objectives in the areas of reading, decoding, reading comprehension, written language, staying on task, and following instructions. (Dist. Exh. 2). The team also agreed that STUDENT required instructional accommodations consisting of frequent breaks, small units of work, a multisensory/modality approach, teacher scaffolding, modeling, and compensatory strategies. STUDENT’s mother agreed with the goals and objectives of the IEP; however, she told the team that she felt that STUDENT should continue to attend Westmark School, as the least restrictive appropriate educational placement.
On November 12, 2000. MOTHER requested a due process hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. I: Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled at a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial IEP meeting?
Under State and federal law, students with disabilities have the right to a FAPE. California Education Code §56000; 20 U.S.C. §1400. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) defines “free appropriate public education” as special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform to the student’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. §1401(8). “Special education” means specially designed instruction at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S. C. §1401(25). The term “related services” includes transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. §1401 (22). California Education Code
§ 56363(a) similarly provides that designated instruction and services (DIS), California’s term for related services, shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Ed. Code §56363(b).
In general, the IDEA requires a District to provide special education and related services for all qualified children within its jurisdiction. Nonetheless, a District in not required to pay for the cost of special education and related services for a student at a private school or facility “if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility.” 20 U.S. C. § (a)(10(C)(i). The District contends that it had no obligation to offer STUDENT a FAPE at all because: (1) he was enrolled in a private school at the time the parents requested that the District provide special education services; and (2) the parent’s request for services was limited to funding for the private placement.
There are three situations in which a child with a disability may attend a private school, and the obligations of a local educational agency (LEA) changes with each of the situations. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (1997). The first situation involves an LEA placing a child with a disability in a private school because the LEA has determined that the private school can provide the child with a FAPE. In this first situation, the private placement comes at no cost to the parents. 20 U.S.C. §1412 (a)(10)(B)(1) (1997). In the second situation, the parents place the child in the private school, because they believe that the LEA has denied their child a FAPE. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ, (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 370-371, 105 S.Ct. 1996. In such a case, where the provision of a FAPE is at issue, the LEA may be liable for the costs of the private placement if the LEA denied the child a FAPE and the private placement is educationally appropriate. Burlington, supra, 471 U.S. at 371;(ii) (1997). The third and final situation also involves a unilateral parent decision to place the child in a private school, but differs in that the parent elects to place the child in a private school as a matter of personal preference and seeks only related services from the LEA. In this third situation, the student has no individual right to special education services and no right to a due process hearing regarding the failure of the LEA to provide a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i).
Contrary to the District’s position, the evidence presented in this matter does not support the conclusion that the parents enrolled and maintained STUDENT at Westmark merely as a matter of personal preference. On June 22, 2000, MOTHER requested that the District assess STUDENT and conduct an IEP for STUDENT. (Dist. Exh. 24) At that time, STUDENT was enrolled in Newbridge School, which did not provide special education or related services. MOTHER did not indicate that she intended to maintain STUDENT at Newbridge or any other private school. Nor did MOTHER limit her request to related services from the District. Rather, MOTHER specified that West Hollywood School in the District was STUDENT’s home school. Furthermore, on two occasions during the 1999-2000 school year, MOTHER visited the West Hollywood School to observe their educational program. These facts strongly support the conclusion that at the time MOTHER requested special education services from the District, she was considering enrolling him in a public school in the District. It is true that on August 6, 2000, prior to the District’s offer of placement at the November 7, 2000 IEP meeting, MOTHER notified the District that she intended to place STUDENT at Westmark, a private school. (Dist. Exh.23). In her notice, MOTHER also indicated that she intended to seek funding for the placement from the District. At hearing, MOTHER testified that her visits to West Hollywood School had convinced her that the District could not offer him a FAPE at the home school and that she believed STUDENT should attend Westmark in order to receive an appropriate education. Thus, prior to the IEP meeting held by the District, STUDENT’s mother clearly expressed her interest in having the District provide STUDENT a placement at public expense. MOTHER reiterated this request at the November 7, 2000 IEP meeting. The IEP notes under the topic “Parent Concerns and Comments” that “parent feels that non-public school is the least restrictive appropriate special education placement for STUDENT.” Where a private school placement is necessary to provide a child with a FAPE, school districts may decide to place such a child at a private school to fulfill its obligations under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(B)(i); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56365(a), 56366. Accordingly, it would be illogical to conclude that a parent’s request to have a private placement at public expense is insufficient to invoke a school district’s obligation to offer a FAPE, unless facts surrounding the request indicate that the decision by the parents to place the child at the private placement is solely a function of personal preference. In this case, the evidence established that STUDENT’s mother requested funding for Westmark because she believed he needed that placement in order to receive an appropriate education. While she may well have had concurrent motivations other than special education concerns for wanting STUDENT to attend Westmark, MOTHER unequivocally expressed interest in obtaining a special education placement from the District at public expense. Therefore, the District had an obligation to offer STUDENT a FAPE.
ISSUE II: Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA (now IDEA 1997). The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. Id at 200. According to Rowley, the IDEA does not require a school district to provide special education students the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor or opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id at 201.
In short, under the IDEA and Rowley, a school district must provide an educational program that is designed to meet the student’s unique needs and is reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. In an administrative due process proceeding, the District has the burden of demonstrating that it has complied with the IDEA by providing a FAPE to the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); Seattle School District, No. 1 v. B.S., et al, 82 F.3d 1493, 1498 (9th Cir. 1996); Alan Norton v. Orinda Union School District, 29 IDELR 1069 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. At 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he or she is entitled and that the parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. Id. at 1484; see also Roland M. vs. Concord Sch. Comm. 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
In Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court held that “the IDEA explicitly requires written prior notice to parents when an educational agency proposes, or refuses, to initiate or change the educational placement of a disabled child. Id. at 1526; See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). The requirement that the District make a formal written offer includes that the offer be specific. Glendale Unified School District v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The requirement of a formal, specific, written offer is “enforced rigorously,” in part, because it alerts the parents to serious consideration of the proposed placement and provides them with an opportunity to accept or reject the offer. Smith, supra, 15 F.3d at 1526.
The Petitioner contends that the District’s offer of placement in a regular education classroom with RSP support was procedurally deficient because the IEP did not specify whether the RSP services were to be provided in the regular education classroom or in a small-group setting outside the regular education classroom. Accordingly, Petitioner argues that his parents were not given adequate information to fully participate in the IEP process and reasonably determine the appropriateness of the proposed program. The District asserts that its offer of placement was procedurally sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA.
The IEP dated November 7, 2000 (containing the District’s offer of placement for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001), designated the “District School of Residence” as STUDENT’s location for services. The witnesses at hearing agreed that all the members of the IEP team understood this to refer to Hawthorne School. Furthermore, under the heading “instructional setting,” the IEP stated “general education, resource specialist services.” The IEP did not specify whether these services, which were intended to support STUDENT in reading and written expression, were to be provided inside or outside the regular education classroom. Nor did the IEP indicate the size of the group in which STUDENT would receive the services.
Several witnesses for the District, including Harriet Watson, the District’s due process specialist, and Joe Vandenbussche, the resource specialist at West Hollywood, testified that the District offers RSP services in a variety of modalities depending on the unique needs of the student. These include: (1) a “pull out model,” wherein a small group of students or a single student is taken to a separate classroom for specialized instruction; (2) small group instruction in the general education classroom at a set of desks set up at one side of the class, and (3) collaboration within the classroom as a whole, whereby the RSP teacher and his assistant work with the classroom teacher in modifying the curriculum and developing the instructional methods for the special education students.
All witnesses at the hearing agreed that at STUDENT’s IEP meeting, the District offered STUDENT RSP services along with his placement in the general education classroom, but did not indicate the specific modality of the services. In fact, Joe Vandenbussche testified that such a determination would generally be deferred until the child actually enters the program, at which time the RSP teacher will make the decision as to which model of service delivery is appropriate for the student.
The modality of the RSP services was particularly important for STUDENT given the undisputed evidence at hearing that he suffers from attention deficits and is significantly affected by the amount of stimulus in his environment. Nancy Graff, the District educational psychologist, testified that at the time of assessment STUDENT had great difficulty focusing, attending, and sustaining attention and concentration, that he was in constant motion, and that he was easily distracted by auditory and visual stimuli. [Dist. Exh. 18]. STUDENT’s teacher at Newbridge for the 1999-2000 kindergarten year, Ms. Cathy Girgis, recommended that STUDENT remain in a small academic setting because of his attentional problems. [Pet. Exh. 21]. According to MOTHER, Ms. Girgis also reported that in her class STUDENT experienced “excitability” and difficulty doing things in front of the group. Teacher Patty Thomas told MOTHER that at Hawthorne, STUDENT had difficulty in groups but did better one on one. Dr. Kristen Thompson, who assessed STUDENT on behalf of the parents, recommended that STUDENT receive his instruction in a small structured classroom designed for children with learning disabilities and that he receive individual assistance on a consistent basis. (Dist. Exh. 7). Thus, the testimony of all pertinent witness established that both the size of the group in which STUDENT was to receive instruction and the amount of stimulus to which he would be subjected were significant factors in designing his educational program. The District’s failure to define the setting in which RSP services would occur therefore rendered its placement offer incomplete. To constitute a specific offer of placement, the IEP should also have identified where and in what size group STUDENT would be receiving such services. Accordingly, the District did not offer a distinct, coherent offer of placement selected to meet STUDENT’s unique attentional needs and implement his IEP goals and objectives. Thus, the offer of placement did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3).
To result in a denial of FAPE, however, a procedural violation must seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process or result in the loss of educational opportunity. W.G., supra, at 1484. In the instant case, the District’s failure to identify the setting in which STUDENT’s RSP services would be delivered denied STUDENT’s parents a legally sufficient opportunity for participation in the IEP process. It is not enough that Joe Vandenbussche, the RSP teacher who was designated to provide STUDENT’s services, ultimately intended to provide them in a pull out, small-group setting as he testified at hearing. Even if such a service delivery model would reasonably have provided STUDENT a FAPE, there was no evidence that MOTHER, at any time prior to the due process hearing, was advised of the proposed service delivery model. Mr. Vandenbussche admitted that it was not his policy or the policy of the District to make that determination prior to the actual entry of the student into the placement. Indeed, on one of her visits to the school site to observe a general education classroom at West Hollywood, MOTHER observed students whom she assumed to be special education students receiving RSP services in the same classroom as the general education students, though pulled to the side of the classroom. She assumed that this was how STUDENT would receive his RSP services at West Hollywood. Even though this assumption may well have been erroneous, the District did not provide MOTHER any other information on which to form a reasoned conclusion regarding the environment in which STUDENT would receive RSP services.
Accordingly, it is determined that the District’s failure to identify in the IEP the setting in which STUDENT was to receive his RSP services seriously infringed on MOTHER’s opportunity to participate in IEP process, and thus denied STUDENT a FAPE.
ISSUE No. III: Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is "appropriate" in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. §1415(i). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Burlington rule is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parents are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated that “the rationale behind Burlington's holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an ‘empty victory’." As stated by the Court, if "appropriate relief" in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed," the child's right to a free appropriate public education, the parent's right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete." Id.
In light of the finding that the District failed to make a legally sufficient offer of a FAPE to STUDENT for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001, it must be determined whether the program provided by STUDENT’s parents for that period was proper under the IDEA. In Florence County Sch. Distr. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court specifically exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the child’s IEP or provide an educational placement that is certified by the state. Id. At 13-14. Although the courts have recognized that the parent’s placement does not have to meet a standard as high as that of the school district’s, the parent’s placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that is designed to address the child’s unique needs and is reasonably calculated to provide the child educational benefit.
The evidence presented at hearing established that the program that STUDENT has been receiving at Westmark School is, in all material respects, an appropriate placement for him during the period at issue in this case. As previously noted, it is undisputed that for the period beginning November 7, 2000, STUDENT required special instruction in the of areas of reading, decoding, reading comprehension, written language, staying on task, and following instructions. (Dist. Exh. 2). It was also incontrovertible that, in accordance with the agreement of the November 7, 2000 IEP team, STUDENT required instructional accommodations consisting of frequent breaks, small units of work, a multi-sensory/modality approach, teacher scaffolding, modeling, and compensatory strategies.
At hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of the director of Westmark, Leslie Barnaby, as well as two teachers, Kristy Thesiah (teacher for 2000-2001) and Jamie Stangell (teacher for 2001-2002). Their undisputed testimony established that Westmark is State-certified to provide private instruction to special education students. The Westmark teachers testified that their methods include the teaching strategies listed in STUDENT’s IEP. The teachers also testified that the classroom instruction is individualized to each child’s academic level, that social skills are provided, and that there is rigid class schedule which gives predictability to students with attentional deficits.
Kristen Thomas, PhD., evaluated STUDENT on behalf of the parents. She observed STUDENT at Westmark, and spoke with his teacher regarding how STUDENT’s educational needs were met in the classroom. Based on her evaluation of STUDENT, observation of the program, and interview with the teacher, Dr. Thomas concluded that Westmark offered STUDENT appropriate instruction to address behavior and academics, positive reinforcement, structure, social skills training, and special education teaching techniques. Dr. Thomas stated that the Westmark program would be likely to provide STUDENT an appropriate education.
The evidence also established that STUDENT has made educational progress during his enrollment at Westmark. Kristy Thesiah testified that during the 2000-2001 school year, STUDENT made progress in all academic areas, especially, reading, math, and social skills. Similarly, Jamie Stangell testified that STUDENT has made continued progress in academic and social skills during the 2001-2002 school year. She testified that STUDENT is making progress in reading decoding and comprehension, though he is not yet using the comprehension strategies as effectively as she would like. STUDENT is also progressing in his use of capital letters and articles. According to Ms. Stangell, STUDENT is becoming progressively stronger in math, reading, decoding, background knowledge, social studies and science. Although STUDENT is more distractible when performing writing tasks, and needs more progress in writing and reading comprehension, Ms. Stangell testified that she believes the educational program she is presenting will allow STUDENT to make continued progress in these areas.
Although the District presented nothing to rebut Petitioner’s evidence that STUDENT is receiving a program designed to meet his unique needs and to provide educational progress at Westmark, the District argued that the parents should not be reimbursed for the private placement because the NPS does not provide STUDENT with mainstreaming opportunities and is therefore not the least restrictive environment. However, several federal circuit courts of appeal have held that, where a District has not offered a FAPE, a parent’s right to reimbursement for a private placement is not barred because of any failure to meet the mainstreaming requirement imposed on public agencies. Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School Distr. V. Boss, 144 F.3d 391, 399 n. 7 (6th Cir. 1998); accord Warren G. Cumberland County Sch. Distr. 190 F.3d 80, 84 (3rd Cir. 1999). The District has cited no relevant authority that an alleged failure by the a private school to meet a student’s mainstreaming needs justifies denial of reimbursement to the parents where the District has denied a FAPE.
For the reasons stated, it is concluded that the program at Westmark was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and calculated to provide educational benefit sufficient to justify reimbursement for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001.
REMEDIES
At hearing Petitioner presented evidence that established the cost of tuition at Westmark for the 2000-2001 school year as $24,860, and for the 2001-2002 school year as $25,735. As the period to be reimbursed covers a full calendar year falling within both school years, the Hearing Office concludes that the sum of $25, 297.50, which is the average tuition for the two years during which STUDENT has attended Westmark, represents the cost of STUDENT’s tuition for the period at issue in this case. Petitioner also established that the parents incurred thirty-one miles round trip for each day that STUDENT attended Westmark for the period November 7, 2000, to November 7, 2001. As the transportation was necessary for STUDENT to attend Westmark, the Hearing Officer concludes that Petitioner should be reimbursed for this mileage.
ORDER
Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall pay Petitioner’s parents the sum of $25,735 for reimbursement of Westmark tuition for the period November 7, 2000 through November 7, 2001. Within ten calendar days of the date of this Decision, the parents shall forward to the District a signed declaration under penalty of perjury from an authorized administrator at Westmark indicating the exact number of days that STUDENT attended Westmark during the period November 7, 2000 to November 7, 2001. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall reimburse the parents for the total mileage incurred during this period at the rate of $0.34 per mile.
PREVAILING PARTY OF EACH ISSUE
1. Was the District required to offer a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to STUDENT, a student who was enrolled in a private school prior to the District’s assessment and initial IEP meeting?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
2. Did the District’s proposal to place STUDENT in a general education classroom with the support of a resource specialist program (RSP) teacher constitute an offer of a FAPE for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
3. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Westmark School, a nonpublic school (NPS), for the period November 7, 2000, through November 7, 2001?
-The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code §56505(j).
Dated: December 19, 2001 ________________________________ Paul R. Gant, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
.
Footnote 1: This decision has been amended to correct word processing formatting errors. No substantive changes have been made to the original decision which issued on December 17, 2001.
