California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 18, 2004
Student v. Los Angeles Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 2105-03 · Hearing Officer Patrick J. Balucan
Los Angeles Unified must provide 24 hours of compensatory speech services for using outdated goals; other claims denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
A father, representing himself, filed for due process against Los Angeles Unified School District for his nine-year-old son. The boy is eligible for special education with autism and attends Bridgeport School at Village Glen, a nonpublic school. A July 2003 mediation agreement had called for an occupational therapy (OT) assessment, an independent behavior assessment, and new speech-language goals.
The Hearing Officer found the OT assessment appropriate even though the therapist did not talk to the father first. The law did not require it, and she had enough information about his concerns. The Hearing Officer did not decide the claim about a missed IEP meeting on transportation, because the bus problems had been fixed and the father sought no remedy. The district also did not violate the law by not giving the father the behavior report before the September 2003 IEP meeting. He could have reviewed it at the meeting, but he left after a few minutes.
The student won on speech. From July 2, 2003 to early January 2004, the speech therapist kept using vague 2001 goals because she did not know the father had agreed to new ones. The Hearing Officer ordered 24 hours of compensatory speech-language services, about half the 48 hours delivered under the old goals, plus an IEP meeting within 15 days. The request for an independent psychoeducational assessment was denied. The father never consented to the district's own assessment, so there was no district assessment for him to disagree with.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a failure to implement agreed IEP goals as a denial of FAPE even when service minutes stayed the same. The award was about half the affected hours. It also shows SEHO requiring an existing district assessment that the parent disagreed with before ordering an IEE at public expense.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedAssessment
Issue 1. Did the District fail to conduct its September 9, 2003 occupational therapy assessment appropriately by failing to obtain input from Petitioner's parent during the assessment?
No law required the assessor to contact the parent first; the tests were given per instructions and the assessor had enough information on the parent's sensory concerns from the mediation agreement, due process log and assessment plan.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 2. Did the District fail to comply with the procedural requirements of the IDEA by failing to hold an IEP meeting in October of 2003 to discuss transportation issues?
The Hearing Officer made no determination on the District's obligation because the bus problems had been fixed and the father sought no remedy, leaving no issue to decide; the prevailing-party section awards the issue to the District.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 3. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE when it failed to provide Petitioner with the District's behavioral assessment prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting?
No law required giving the report before the meeting; the report was simple, would have been provided at the meeting, and the father left the meeting after a few minutes, so his participation was not infringed.
- Student prevailedImplementation
Issue 4. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from July 3, 2003 to the present by using inappropriate speech and language goals?
From July 2, 2003 to early January 2004 the speech therapist used vague June 2001 goals instead of the consented-to goals from the July 2, 2003 IEP; this was not harmless and denied FAPE.
- District prevailedIndependent educational evaluation (IEE)
Issue 5a. Is Petitioner entitled to an independent psycho-educational assessment at District expense?
Denied because the father never consented to the District's proposed assessment, so there was no District psychoeducational assessment for him to disagree with, and the District had no duty to override his lack of consent.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 5b. Is Petitioner entitled to an IEP meeting to discuss Petitioner's educational program?
The Hearing Officer noted a parent may get an IEP meeting through a written request, but ordered an IEP meeting within 15 days to deliver compensatory services and let the father raise other concerns; the issue was split.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Compensatory education. 24 hours of speech and language services as compensatory education, in addition to the speech and language services already in the IEP, provided so as to minimize impact on the educational program.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. Parties to convene an IEP meeting within 15 calendar days of the decision, at which the District provides the 24 compensatory hours and Petitioner may raise any other concerns about the student's education.
Total: 24 hours of compensatory services
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Burlington; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. Missouri; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.
People named in the decision
- Laura Marrero, attorney for District, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Dennis Sproule, due process specialist, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Guillermo Arevalo-Farias, clerk, due process division, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Anne M. Kaplan, coordinator of nonpublic school psychological services, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Merilee Glick, school psychologist and administrative designee at IEP meeting, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Karolyn Lagasse, occupational therapist (OT assessor), Los Angeles Unified School District
- Dafna Stromberg-Kent, special education teacher, Bridgeport School at Village Glen (nonpublic school)
- Anita Allardice, principal, Bridgeport School at Village Glen (nonpublic school)
- Jennifer Kaplan, speech and language pathologist, The HELP Group
- Kathryn Peckham-Hardin, independent behavior assessor
- Donnalyn Jacque-Anton, associate superintendent, Los Angeles Unified School District
- Alice Parker, state official to whom parent wrote, California Department of Education
- Bridgeport School at Village Glen, nonpublic school
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 16 and 20, 2004.
Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented at the hearing by his father, FATHER. Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (Respondent or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Laura Marrero. Also present on the District’s behalf was Dennis Sproule, a due process specialist with the District. Present on behalf of the District on some days was Guillermo Arevalo-Farias, a clerk with the District’s due process division.
FATHER was the sole witness on Petitioner’s behalf in this matter. The District called the following witnesses to testify: Anne M. Kaplan, the District’s coordinator of nonpublic school (NPS) psychological services; Merilee Glick, a school psychologist with the District; Karolyn Lagasse, an occupational therapist with the District; Dafna Stromberg-Kent, a special education teacher at Bridgeport Elementary School; Anita Allardice, principal at Bridgeport; and Jennifer Kaplan, speech and language pathologist with the HELP group.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. Oral closing arguments were heard on January 20, 2004. After closing arguments the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING (Footnote 1)
1. Did the District fail to conduct its September 9, 2003 occupational therapy assessment appropriately by failing to obtain input from Petitioner’s parent during the assessment?
2. Did the District fail to comply with the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by failing to hold an IEP meeting in October of 2003 to discuss transportation issues?
3. Did the District deny Petitioner a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) when it failed to provide Petitioner with the District’s behavioral assessment prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting?
4. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from July 3, 2003 to the present by using inappropriate speech and language goals?
5. Is Petitioner entitled to the following remedies:
a. An independent psycho-educational assessment at District expense; and b. An IEP meeting to discuss Petitioner’s educational program?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a nine-year-old child eligible for special education with a diagnosis of autism. He currently attends the Bridgeport School at Village Glen, a nonpublic school (NPS). STUDENT has been attending school at Bridgeport since September of 2002 pursuant to an individualized education plan (IEP) from the District. Bridgeport is a school developed to provide specialized education for students diagnosed with autism.
This is not the first due process hearing between these parties. On July 2, 2003, Petitioner and the District entered into a mediation agreement to resolve a prior dispute that was the subject of a due process hearing request. Pursuant to the mediation agreement, the District agreed to conduct an Occupational Therapy assessment that would focus on sensory integration and an independent behavioral assessment, and to provide two hours per week of speech and language services. On that date, the parties also held an IEP meeting to implement the terms of the mediation agreement, including new speech and language goals and objectives. While FATHER withheld consent to implement the OT services pending the outcome of the OT evaluation, he provided his consent to implement all other portions of the IEP.
Kathryn Peckham-Hardin conducted the behavior assessment called for in the mediation agreement and prepared a report dated August 14, 2003. According to Ms. Peckham-Hardin’s report, the assessment focused on developing behavioral interventions that would address challenging behaviors that STUDENT displayed in class. These included running out of the classroom, yelling, displaying aggression, and throwing objects. In addition to continuing the behavior strategies already in place, Ms. Peckham-Hardin recommended that the District employ strategies to introduce change to STUDENT slowly, to let STUDENT self-monitor his behavior, to continue to carefully monitor behavior incidents, to begin fading the behavior specialist, and to increase interaction with his peers.
On September 9, 2003, Karolyn Lagasse conducted the occupational therapy (OT) assessment required by the mediation agreement. The purpose of the assessment was to address parental concerns regarding sensory processing. The assessment determined that STUDENT performed school tasks with ease. The assessment noted that STUDENT was able to follow directions and responded quickly to the various requests made of him. While he did possess some sensory deficits, he was able to perform school related tasks such as writing, cutting, sitting at his desk, and got around the classroom and school campus with ease. Ms. Lagasse determined that STUDENT’s sensory processing deficits affected gross motor tasks, and that those were addressed by adapted physical education (APE). She did not recommend school-based occupational therapy for STUDENT.
On September 10, 2003, the District convened a meeting of the IEP team, as required by the July 2003 mediation agreement, to review the behavioral intervention and occupational therapy assessment results. FATHER was present at this meeting. However, at the beginning of this meeting, FATHER expressed his concerns that the OT assessment had been done just two days prior to the meeting and that he had just received the report. In addition, FATHER complained that the behavior assessment did not comply with the mediation agreement because he believed that the District should have conducted its own assessment in addition to the independent assessment that it funded. After approximately 5-15 minutes, FATHER walked out of the meeting. The District continued the IEP meeting without him. The District team members concluded that STUDENT did not require OT services, and that his classroom behavior support plan was appropriate and his behavior intervention services should be faded.
Petitioner requested this due process hearing via letter dated October 1, 2003.
On October 13, 2003, FATHER sent a letter to the District, addressed to Donnalyn Jacque-Anton, the District’s associate superintendent, requesting a psychological assessment and an IEP meeting to discuss this assessment. In his letter, FATHER stated that “his current IEP need to be modified to address his individual needs.” The letter went on to mention that there should be a statement of measurable annual goals and objectives in his son’s IEP. (Footnote 2) On October 22, FATHER sent another letter, this time to Alice Parker of the California Department of Education, again requesting an IEP meeting to discuss transportation issues related to STUDENT’s school bus.
The District responded to these requests via letter dated October 24, 2003. Anne Kaplan, the NPS coordinator with psychological services, sent a letter to FATHER indicating that she was the contact person for any of the concerns that were raised in his letter. The District’s response also included an assessment plan to test STUDENT in the following areas: social/emotional development, cognitive development, academic achievement, perceptual development, motor development, and communication/language. Ms. Kaplan informed FATHER that they would convene an IEP meeting within 30 days of his request to go over STUDENT’s IEP if needed, or when the assessments were completed. The assessment plan requested FATHER’s consent to conduct the assessment. FATHER never provided his consent to conduct the assessments in this plan.
On October 29, 2003, FATHER sent another letter, addressed to Ms. Jacque-Anton, reiterating his request for an IEP meeting and assessments. In a letter dated that same day, Ms. Jacque-Anton indicated that Ms. Kaplan would be the appropriate contact for that request and that, in any event, Ms. Kaplan had already responded to that request.
On November 3, 2003, the District sent FATHER a letter attempting to schedule an IEP meeting on November 11 or 17, 2003. On November 19, 2003, FATHER sent a third letter to Ms. Jaques-Anton, indicating that he still wanted the District to conduct assessments and to hold an IEP meeting. On that day, FATHER sent another letter to Ms. Jaques-Anton indicating that the dates the District proposed to hold the requested IEP meeting were not acceptable, and that he was proposing to hold the IEP meeting on December 18 or 19, 2003. He also sent another letter to the California Department of Education, requesting once again his desire to hold an IEP meeting in order to discuss his son’s transportation issues. On December 3, 2003, FATHER sent another letter to the Ms. Jaques-Anton, indicating once again that December 18 and 19 were acceptable dates for IEP meetings. On December 9, 2003, the District sent a letter to FATHER indicating that they would hold the IEP meeting on December 18, 2003.
In a telephone call on or about December 11, 2003, FATHER indicated he was not sure whether he would attend the scheduled meeting. Ms. Kaplan informed him that he should confirm with the District three days prior to the meeting whether he would attend or not. On December 15, 2003, FATHER sent another letter to Alice Parker of the Department of Education indicating the problems he was having with scheduling an IEP meeting. On December 16, 2003, having received no confirmation from FATHER that he would attend the scheduled meeting, the District sent a letter to him stating that the IEP meeting was cancelled. The parties then proceeded to the due process hearing to resolve their dispute.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Issue No. 1: Did the District fail to conduct its September 9, 2003 occupational therapy assessment appropriately by failing to obtain input from Petitioner’s parent during the assessment?
Petitioner contends that the District failed to conduct its September 9, 2003 occupational therapy assessment appropriately because it did not speak with his parents prior to completing the assessments. FATHER testified that he wanted to share his concerns regarding STUDENT’s gross and fine motor skills and obtain some feedback from the OT regarding his concerns. The District admits that it did not talk to FATHER prior to conducting the assessment. Ms. Legasse, the District’s assessor, testified that she started the assessment two days prior to the scheduled IEP meeting on September 10, 2003. She stated that she attempted to contact FATHER, but never received a response to a phone message she left with him.
The District’s OT assessment must conform to the requirements set forth in California Education Code sections 56320 and 56322. California Education Code section 56320, subsections (a) through (d), state in relevant part that testing and assessment materials and procedures must be selected and administered so as not to be racially, culturally or sexually discriminatory; provided and administered in the student’s primary language or other mode of communication; be validated for the purposes for which they are used; administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; tailored to assess specific areas of need; and selected and administered to best ensure that, when administered to a pupil with impaired speaking skills, the test produces results that accurately reflect the student’s aptitude, achievement level, or any other factors the test purports to measure and not the student’s impaired speaking skills. California Education Code section 56320 (e) requires that no single procedure be used as the sole criterion for determining the appropriate educational program for an individual with exceptional needs. California Education Code section 56320 (f) requires that the pupil is assessed in all areas of suspected disability. Pursuant to subsection (g), the assessment must be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the student’s disability. California Education Code section 56322 also requires that the assessments be conducted by persons competent to perform the assessments. (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56320, subs. (e) and (f) (West 2003).) In this case, FATHER essentially contends that the District could not determine STUDENT’s areas of suspected disabilities because it did not speak to him prior to conducting the assessment.
The Hearing Officer also notes that nothing in State special education law requires the District to contact FATHER before conducting an assessment. The law only requires that assessments be administered in conformance with test instructions. (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56320(b)(3) (West 2003).) Ms. Legasse testified that the assessment tools she chose tested STUDENT for all areas of need related to sensory integration. None of these assessment tools required that she obtain parental input. Furthermore, she relied on teacher interviews and clinical observations in forming her opinion, neither of which required the input of STUDENT’s parents. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that the assessments were administered in accordance with the test instructions even though the District did not contact FATHER prior to conducting the OT assessment
Notwithstanding the fact that the District did not have to contact FATHER prior to administering the OT assessment, the evidence shows that the District possessed enough information to determine STUDENT’s suspected areas of disability with regard to his OT needs. The OT assessment was conducted as part of the mediation agreement reached on July 2, 2003. As part of that agreement, the District was to conduct assessments in order to evaluate STUDENT’s needs in the area of sensory integration. Thus, by the very terms of the agreement between the parties, the District’s OT assessment was confined to very specific parameters. Furthermore, Ms. Legasse testified credibly that when she undertook her assessment, she had both a District due process log and the assessment plan, which provided her with enough information to determine the parents concerns regarding STUDENT’s occupational therapy needs. Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer determines that the District possessed enough information to determine STUDENT’s areas of suspected disability with regard to OT without first consulting with FATHER.
In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to contact FATHER prior to conducting the OT assessment, and that it had sufficient information to determine STUDENT’s suspected areas of need. Thus, the District conducted its OT assessment appropriately despite not contacting FATHER prior to the assessment.
Issue No. 2: Did the District fail to comply with the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by failing to hold an IEP meeting in October of 2003 to discuss transportation issues?
In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. (Id. at 198-200.) The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. (Id. at 201.)
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. (Id. at 205.) Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. (W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of a FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process. (Id.) Petitioner contends that the District has committed a procedural violation of State and federal law by failing to hold an IEP meeting when he requested it beginning in October of 2003. FATHER testified that shortly after the beginning of the school year, STUDENT’s pick-up times in the morning and drop-off times in the evening had become erratic. (Footnote 3) In addition, FATHER voiced his concern that the bus was leaving before STUDENT could sit down and that there was another boy on the bus who was picking on him. FATHER contends the District should have convened an IEP meeting to discuss his concerns regarding STUDENT’s transportation.
FATHER’s request for an IEP meeting imposed upon the District certain obligations to insure that that IEP meeting is scheduled. (See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56343.5 (West 2003); 34 C.F.R. 300.345 (2003).) The District had received two letters from FATHER: the first letter, dated October 13, 2003, requesting assessments and an IEP meeting; and a copy of a second letter, dated October 22, 2003, to Alice Parker of the California Department of Education requesting an IEP to discuss transportation issues. In response to these requests, the District sent FATHER a letter indicating that they could schedule an IEP within 30 days if there were any immediate concerns, or wait until after they had conducted the assessments requested. On November 3, the District sent another letter suggesting dates for a meeting. However, these dates were unacceptable to FATHER. The parties then agreed to schedule an IEP meeting for December 18, 2003, which FATHER indicated he might not attend. (Footnote 4) That meeting was cancelled.
However, the Hearing Office makes no determination as to whether the District met its obligations to hold that IEP meeting. FATHER testified that shortly after he voiced his concerns, the bus supervisor fixed his problems. He testified that the bus supervisor restored his original drop off and pick up times, and that STUDENT was no longer experiencing any problems riding the bus. FATHER testified at hearing that he currently has no issues with the transportation services being provided by the District. Thus, there currently exists no dispute regarding the transportation services the District provides, and FATHER is not seeking any remedy for the failure to provide those services or hold the IEP meeting. Thus, the Hearing Officer concludes that there does not exist any issue to decide.
Issue No. 3: Did the District deny Petitioner a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) when it failed to provide Petitioner with the District’s behavioral assessment prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting?
Petitioner contends that the District committed a procedural violation by not providing him with a copy of Ms. Peckham-Hardin’s behavioral assessment report prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting. However, nothing in State or federal special education law requires that that assessment report be provided to Petitioner’s parent prior to the IEP meeting. Thus, the District did not commit a procedural violation by not mailing that report to FATHER.
While it would have been realistic and perhaps even appropriate for the District to have provided that report to FATHER prior to the IEP meeting, the evidence before the Hearing Officer indicates that FATHER’s right to participate in the IEP meeting was not infringed by the District’s failure to provide to him that report. The September 10, 2003 IEP meeting was convened pursuant to the mediation agreement, specifically, to discuss the OT and behavior assessments called for in that agreement. Ms. Glick, the District’s psychologist and the administrative designee at that meeting, testified that a copy of that report would have been provided to FATHER at the meeting. The report itself was not complex, such that FATHER could have been provided additional time at the IEP meeting to review the report and become knowledgeable about its contents. The record also shows that FATHER was in contact with the independent assessor, Ms. Peckham-Hardin, prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting. Thus, if FATHER had any concerns regarding the assessment or the recommendations being made, those could have been brought up at that IEP meeting. However, FATHER attended that IEP meeting only briefly. After stating several objections to the way that the District was conducting the IEP meeting, he walked out. The District continued the meeting without him and went over the results of the assessment. The assessment report, along with several other documents, was mailed to FATHER after the IEP meeting. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that FATHER’s opportunity to participate in the IEP was not infringed by not having the behavior assessment report prior to the meeting.
Issue No. 4: Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from July 3, 2003 to the present by using inappropriate speech and language goals?
Petitioner further contends that the District has not provided him with a FAPE because it was not implementing appropriate goals and objectives for speech and language. FATHER testified that as part of the June 2, 2002 mediation agreement and subsequent IEP meeting, he provided his consent to implement new IEP goals and objectives. However, when he received progress reports regarding STUDENT’s speech services, he noticed that they were still using goals and objectives developed in June of 2001.
To determine whether the District substantively offered STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program is designated to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, is reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, and comports with his IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if his father preferred another program and even if the preferred program would result in greater educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.) The District is also required to offer STUDENT a program which educates him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of her disabilities is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56031 (West 2003).) Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program the District proposed for STUDENT must meet the following four requirement to constitute an appropriate educational program for him: be designed to meet his educational needs, be reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, comport with his IEP, and provide him education in the least restrictive environment.
In this case, the District has failed to provide STUDENT an educational program that comports with his IEP. Ms. Kaplan, STUDENT’s speech and language therapist since July of 2002, testified that she developed two speech and language goals and objectives for STUDENT as part of the April 22, 2003 IEP meeting. However, FATHER did not provide his consent at the meeting to implement those goals and objectives. Instead, FATHER filed for a due process hearing. As part of a mediation agreement reached in July of 2003 to resolve that due process hearing request, the parties entered into a mediation agreement, and the District convened an IEP meeting in order to implement the provision of that agreement. As part of the July 2, 2003 IEP meeting, FATHER provided his consent to implement the goals and objectives that Ms. Kaplan had presented at the April 22, 2003 IEP meeting. However, Ms. Kaplan was not made aware that FATHER had provided his consent to implement goals and objectives until a week before this due process hearing, in approximately early January of 2004. Prior to that time, Ms. Kaplan testified that he had in fact been implementing goals and objectives developed in June of 2001. Thus, from July 2, 2003 to early January 2004, the District was not implementing the speech and language goals that FATHER agreed to at the July 2, 2003 IEP meeting.
The District argues, however, that STUDENT was not harmed by this omission. Ms. Kaplan testified that the goals she was working on essentially targeted the same areas as those that FATHER consented to, and that there was no change in the amount of speech and language therapy that was being provided. However, these arguments are unpersuasive. First, Ms. Kaplan herself testified that the goals and objectives from June 2001 were vague and did not provide specific targets in order to reach their objectives. Thus, the June 2001 goals and objectives in themselves were admittedly not appropriate. Moreover, by not implementing the goals and objectives from the July 2, 2003 IEP meeting, the District failed to provide STUDENT with a program that ensured he was receiving educational benefit. FATHER’s chief complaint at hearing regarding the speech and language goals was that STUDENT was repeatedly working on the same things over and over again. He stated that STUDENT’s goals should be updated. Implementing the speech and language goals that FATHER and the IEP team had agreed to would have ensured that STUDENT was working on different skills to address his speech and language needs. Thus, the failure to implement the agreed-to goals and objectives from the July 2, 2003 IEP was not merely harmless error.
In sum, the District failed to provide STUDENT with a FAPE from July 2, 2003 to early January of 2004 to the extent that it failed to implement the speech and language goals and objectives from the July 2, 2003 IEP.
Issue No. 5: Is Petitioner entitled to the following remedies: a. An independent psycho-educational assessment at District expense; and b. An IEP meeting to discuss Petitioner’s educational program?
A parent has the right to obtain, at public expense, an independent educational assessment of the student if the parent or guardian disagrees with an assessment obtained by the public education agency. (CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56329(b) (West 2003).) However, if an educational agency establishes at a due process hearing that its assessments were appropriate, it is not required to pay for the independent evaluation. (Id.) Petitioner contends that he is entitled to an independent psycho-educational assessment at District expense. However, as a prerequisite to obtaining an assessment at public expense, the parent or guardian must disagree with an assessment performed by the District. In this case, FATHER has not provided his consent to allow the District to perform its psycho-educational assessment. In response to FATHER’s request for assessment, the District provided him with an assessment plan on October 24, 2003, which requested his consent to assess in the areas outlined in his letters to the District. FATHER testified at hearing that he never provided consent to conduct those assessments. Thus, there was no psycho-educational assessment from the District that FATHER disagreed with. The Hearing Officer does note that the District has affirmative obligations to override a parent’s lack of consent if the assessments are necessary. (CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56321(c), 56501(a)(3), 56506(e) (West 2003); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (a)(1)(C)(ii).) However, these assessments were requested by the parents, with the District agreeing to conduct the assessment to accommodate the parent’s request. Thus, the District had no duty to override FATHER’s lack of consent for an assessment. Petitioner’s request for an independent psycho-educational evaluation is denied.
As for his request for an IEP meeting, the Hearing Officer notes that FATHER does not have to proceed to due process to obtain an IEP meeting. FATHER merely has to provide his request in writing to the District. (CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56343.5 (West 2003).) That IEP meeting must then be held within 30 days of FATHER’s request. (Id.)
However, there does remain the issue of the appropriate remedy for STUDENT to address the District’s denial of FAPE from July 2, 2003 to early January of 2004. When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).) Court decisions subsequent to Burlington also have extended relief in the form of compensatory education to students who have been denied a FAPE. (See, e.g. Lester H. v. K Gilhool and the Chester Upland Unified School District (3d Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 865; Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 749.) As noted above, the District failed to implement goals and objectives that FATHER had agreed to at the July 2, 2003 IEP meeting. Neither party presented any evidence regarding an appropriate remedy to address this denial of FAPE. However, the Hearing Officer previously determined that STUDENT suffered harm by the District’s failure to implement speech and language goals. Therefore, STUDENT should be provided some compensatory education for the District’s denial of FAPE. The Hearing Officer will next determine the appropriate amount of compensatory education to be provided to STUDENT.
It is clear that the District did not implement STUDENT’s agreed-to speech and language goals from July 2, 2003, until the first week of January 2004. The record is also clear that STUDENT was receiving speech and language therapy two hours per week, and that his educational program was being provided to STUDENT for 48 weeks out of the year. Thus, for the six months after FATHER agreed to the speech and language goals, the District provided him with approximately 48 hours of speech services that did not use those updated goals. As noted above, no party presented any evidence regarding the appropriate remedy to address the District’s denial of FAPE. While it is not possible to determine the exact loss of educational benefit attached to the District’s denial of FAPE, the Hearing Officer finds the District should provide 24 hours of speech services as compensatory education. First, there is no obligation to compensate the child by providing a day of education for each educational day lost. (See Student W. v. Puyallup School District, No. 3 (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1497.) Additionally, during this six-month period, the District continued to provide speech and language goals that generally addressed STUDENT’s speech and language needs, and therefore STUDENT was not totally without services during this time. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that 24 hours of speech services is sufficient to compensate STUDENT of the District’s denial of FAPE.
ORDER
1. Within 15 calendar days of the date of this Decision, the parties shall convene an IEP meeting. At that meeting, the District shall provide STUDENT with 24 hours of speech and language services as compensatory education. 2. services already in STUDENT’s IEP, and shall be provided in such a way as to minimize The hours of compensatory speech and language services shall be provided in addition to the speech and language the impact on STUDENT’s educational program.
3. Petitioner shall be allowed to raise any other concerns he may have regarding STUDENT’s education at this IEP meting.
4. All other of Petitioner’s requests for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code §5607(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute:
1. Did the District fail to conduct its September 9, 2003 occupational therapy assessment appropriately by failing to obtain input from Petitioner’s parent during the assessment? The District prevailed on this issue.
2. Did the District fail to comply with the procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by failing to hold an IEP meeting in October of 2003 to discuss transportation issues? The District prevailed on this issue.
3. Did the District deny Petitioner a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) when it failed to provide Petitioner with the District’s behavioral assessment prior to the September 10, 2003 IEP meeting? The District prevailed on this issue.
4. Did the District deny Petitioner a FAPE from July 3, 2003 to the present by using inappropriate speech and language goals? Petitioner prevailed on this issue.
5. Is Petitioner entitled to the following remedies:
a. An independent psycho-educational assessment at District expense; and b. An IEP meeting to discuss Petitioner’s educational program? The District and Petitioner split this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code §56505(i).
Date: March 18, 2004 Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office
These issues are a restatement of the issues Petitioner presented for hearing, based upon the discussion of the issues held at the beginning of the hearing.
2 However, the letter makes no mention of the specific problem FATHER had with STUDENT’s IEP goals and objectives.
3 FATHER testified that, in the morning, STUDENT was to be picked up at 8:27. However, shortly after the beginning of the school year, he was being picked up at 8:45-8:50 a.m. On some mornings, STUDENT was late for school. In the afternoon, FATHER stated that STUDENT was to be dropped off at 3:30, but at times, he was not getting home until 3:45-3:50, making him later for therapies he starts at 4:00.
4 FATHER’s allegations regarding this issue were apparently made under the mistaken belief that the District would convene one IEP meeting to discuss his requested assessments, and one to discuss the transportation issues. The District offered to hold IEP meetings in November and December of 2003 in response to his request for assessment It appeared that this issue was raised by Petitioner because no IEP was convened specifically to discuss transportation issues. However, Ms. Kaplan testified that FATHER could have raised any issue he had regarding STUDENT’s education, including the transportation issue.
