California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · August 16, 2001
Student v. Tamalpais Union High School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 2137-00, SN 2094-00 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim
Tamalpais Union High School District failed to offer FAPE and must reimburse parents for 20 extra ESY days at home program.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
None noted. The decision mentions that a separate due process hearing was pending on the District's request to assess the student, and that the Student could file a new hearing request on 2001-2002 issues.
Summary
The Tamalpais Union High School District filed for due process to show that its 2000-2001 offer was a FAPE. The offer was a special day class for students with severe disabilities at Redwood High School, with a one-to-one aide. The parent filed her own case over the number of extended school year (ESY) days. The 18-year-old student, eligible under autism, had attended a private home-based program for about eight years. The District funded it under stay put. The cases were consolidated.
The Hearing Officer found two serious procedural violations. The notice for the September 2000 IEP meeting covered only the parent's ESY request, but the District used most of the meeting to propose a placement change. It also scheduled the meeting with the program director, not the parent. Both violations seriously limited the parent's participation. The offer also failed on substance. The District had never assessed or observed the student and relied on an inadequate 1998 assessment from his prior district. It based the offer on his autism label rather than his individual needs, including his behavior. Other procedural claims failed.
For ESY, the District never made a clear written offer. The Hearing Officer found the student needed 55 days, not 35, to avoid regression. She had doubts about the home program's methods, but it met key needs and gave benefit. The District must reimburse the parents for the 20 extra ESY days.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO handled IEP meeting notices: if the notice leaves out that placement will be discussed, or the meeting is not scheduled with the parent, that can deny FAPE. It also shows that an offer based on a disability label, without current assessment, can fail. Parents could recover costs for a private program that was not ideal.
Issues and holdings
- Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue Procedural ruling. Whether the appropriateness of the home program placement for the 2000-2001 regular school year should be adjudicated (and whether 2001-2002 issues could be added mid-hearing)
The Hearing Officer dismissed as moot the appropriateness of the home program for 2000-2001 because the District funded it all year under stay put; she also refused to let the Student add 2001-2002 issues after seven hearing days, without prejudice to a new filing.
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2000-2001 school year?
No FAPE. The District did not tell the parent the September 2000 IEP meeting would cover placement, and it scheduled the meeting without her. Its SDC offer rested on the autism label rather than the student's unique needs. It had never assessed or observed him, relied on an inadequate 1998 assessment, and did not address his behavior. The Hearing Officer rejected the claims about an unclear written offer and a refusal to discuss ESY.
- Student prevailedIEP content
Issue 2. Is STUDENT entitled to a fifty-five-day extended school year (ESY) during the 2000-2001 school year, rather than the thirty-five-day ESY offered by the District?
The District made no clear written ESY offer for 2001. Crediting the program director's experience with the student's regression and limited recoupment, the Hearing Officer held that he needed a 55-day ESY, so the 35-day offer denied FAPE.
- Student prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 3. Should STUDENT's parents be reimbursed for expenses incurred for the twenty additional days of services provided by the HOME PROGRAM during the 2001 ESY?
Reimbursement ordered for the 20 extra ESY days. The Hearing Officer had concerns about the home program's methods, but it addressed key needs (daily living, social, language) and gave educational benefit. Under Burlington, Carter and Alamo Heights, it did not need to be a perfect placement.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of receiving proof, the District must reimburse the parents for expenses incurred for the 20 additional days of instruction provided by the home program during the 2001 extended school year (dollar amount not stated).
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview; Adams v. State of Oregon; Amanda J. v. Clark County; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Sacramento City Unified v. Rachel H.; Burlington; Florence County v. Carter; Alamo Heights v. State Bd. of Educ.; Hoeft v. Tucson Unified; Mill Valley Elementary v. Eastin; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043
People named in the decision
- Sandra Piotter, Director of instructional services, Tamalpais Union High School District
- Karen Mates, Program manager, Marin County Office of Education
- Samuel Goldman, Program manager, Marin County Office of Education
- Deborah Hemphill, Program manager, Marin County Office of Education
- Kimberley Cochrane, Special day class teacher (severely handicapped SDC), Redwood High School
- Jan La Torre-Derby, Superintendent; witness called by Student, Ross Valley School District
- Fred Hollander, Psychologist; witness called by Student, Napa State Hospital
- Diane Martin, Ph.D., School psychologist who conducted December 1998 assessment, Novato Unified School District
- Bryna Siegel, Ph.D., Private evaluator (1996 follow-up evaluation)
- Jan Tomsky, District counsel, Lozano Smith
- Kimberly Schulist, Attorney present for District
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in San Rafael, California, on January 23 and 24, February 5 and 6, March 1, April 12 and 19, May 3, and June 26 and 27, 2001.
The Tamalpais Union High School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Jan Tomsky from the law firm of Lozano Smith. Also present on behalf of the District was Sandra Piotter, its director of instructional services, and, during portions of the hearing, attorney Kimberly Schulist. STUDENT (Student) was represented at the hearing by PARENT, his mother, and DIRECTOR, his “joint guardian” and director of the HOME PROGRAM (HOME PROGRAM).(Footnote 1) Also present on the Student’s behalf during portions of the hearing were parent advocates PARENT ADVOCATES.
The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Ms. Piotter; Karen Mates, a program manager for the Marin County Office of Education (MCOE); Samuel Goldman, an MCOE program manager; Deborah Hemphill, an MCOE program manager; and Kimberley Cochrane, a special day class teacher at Redwood High School.
The following witnesses were called by the Student to testify: PARENT; DIRECTOR; Ms. Cochrane; Jan La Torre-Derby, Superintendent for the Ross Valley School District; Ms. Piotter; Fred Hollander, a psychologist with the Napa State Hospital; and ADVOCATE.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for the submission of written closing arguments. After the parties' written closing arguments were received, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision.
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PARTIES(Footnote 2)
1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2000-2001 school year?
2. Is STUDENT entitled to a fifty-five-day extended school year (ESY) during the 2000-2001 school year, rather than the thirty-five-day ESY offered by the District?
3. Should STUDENT’s parents be reimbursed for expenses incurred for the twenty additional days of services provided by the HOME PROGRAM (HOME PROGRAM) during the 2001 ESY?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
I. Rulings Issued During the Hearing
On or about April 25, 2001, after seven days of hearing, the Student submitted an amended list of issues which, in addition to the issues noticed and discussed on the first day of hearing, included the following two issues: whether the District offered him a FAPE for the 2001-2002 school year, and whether the District should continue to fund placement for him in the HOME PROGRAM for the 2001-2002 school year. When the hearing reconvened on May 3, 2001, the District indicated that it opposed the Student’s attempt to add issues involving the 2001-2002 school year. The District contended that issues regarding the 2001-2002 school year were not yet ripe because a dispute had arisen regarding whether the District could assess STUDENT, and that the assessment issue had to be resolved before the District could make an offer of placement for the 2001-2002 school year. The District also asserted that it would be prejudicial to add issues regarding the 2001-2002 school year since the parties had already completed a significant number of hearing days.
The Hearing Officer ruled that the Student could not add issues involving the 2001-2002 school year at such a late date. Seven days had already been spent in hearing on the issues identified on the first day of hearing, which did not include any issues involving the 2001-2002 school year. Further, there was no indication that the 2001-2002 school year issues were inextricably intertwined with the issues presently being heard such that it would be necessary to adjudicate the 2001-2002 school year issues in the same proceeding. The Student remains entitled to file a request for another due process hearing to resolve issues involving the 2001-2002 school year.
The Student then requested that the issues regarding the 2000-2001 school year, excluding those issues related to the 2001 ESY, be dismissed as moot. The Student argued that because the hearing was not scheduled to conclude until the end of June 2001, the issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school session would be moot by the time a decision could be rendered. The District opposed dismissal of the issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school year. The District argued that the 2000-2001 school year issues met the legal standard of issues capable of repetition, yet evading review, and therefore should be adjudicated. The Hearing Officer denied the Student’s motion to dismiss issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school year.
On May 16, 2001, the Student submitted a written motion to dismiss issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school year. The Student again contended that the Hearing Officer should dismiss the issue of FAPE for the 2000-2001 regular school year because the final days of hearing were scheduled for June 26-29, 2001, and a decision could not be rendered before June 30, 2001, the end of the current school year. The Student asserted that the issues regarding FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year were therefore moot. He also argued that, although the District had not yet made an offer of placement for the 2001-2002 school year, its offer for the 2001-2002 school year would in all likelihood not be the same as that proposed for the 2000-2001 school year given his age. The Student stated that, should the issue regarding FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year be dismissed, the related issue of whether the HOME PROGRAM was an appropriate program for the 2000-2001 school year should also be dismissed. On May 22, 2001, the District filed an opposition to the motion. The District contended that the issue regarding FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year should not be dismissed because, like the litigation in the case of Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994), the issue was not moot because “the conduct giving rise to the suit is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
On June 13, 2001, the Hearing Officer issued a written order denying the Student’s motion to dismiss issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school year. Briefly, the Hearing Officer did not find persuasive the District’s argument that the 2000-2001 school year issues were “capable of repetition, yet evading review” because no showing had been made as to what the District’s offer of placement for the 2001-2002 school year would consist of, and thus no showing that the same sort of dispute would arise between the parties for the 2001-2002 school year. Additionally, unlike appeals to the circuit courts of appeal, a special education due process hearing may be completed within the period of one school year since a decision in a special education due process hearing is to be written and mailed to the parties within forty-five days of the receipt of the request for hearing, excepting continuances and extensions for good cause. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f). However, the Hearing Officer found that, unlike the litigants in the typical civil case, parties to a special education due process often have an ongoing relationship with each other and ongoing obligations arising out of that relationship. Where, as here, the school district continues to be the district of residence and therefore continues to be responsible for providing the student with educational services, a finding with regard to FAPE for a particular school year may have implications beyond the conclusion of that school year. For example, a finding that a school district offered the child an appropriate program may allow the district to cease funding the parents’ preferred private program, notwithstanding the parents’ lack of consent to the district’s proposed program. Therefore, the Student’s motion to dismiss issues involving the 2000-2001 regular school year was denied.(Footnote 3)
II. Issue of Appropriateness of HOME PROGRAM for 2000-2001 Regular School Year
When the Student moved to dismiss the FAPE issue for the 2000-2001 school year, he contended that the issue of whether HOME PROGRAM was an appropriate program for the 2000-2001 school year also should be dismissed if the FAPE issue was dismissed. In ruling on the motion to dismiss issues, the Hearing Officer denied Student’s motion to dismiss issues without distinguishing between the issue of FAPE and the issue of the appropriateness of the HOME PROGRAM placement for the 2000-2001 school year. While the issue of FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year should not be dismissed, the Hearing Officer finds that the issue of whether HOME PROGRAM was an appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 school year should be dismissed.(Footnote 4)
Unlike the FAPE issue, the issue of the appropriateness of the HOME PROGRAM placement for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 school year is moot for all purposes. The 2000-2001 regular school year terminated before the hearing in this matter concluded and a decision could be rendered, thereby rendering moot any claim that the District should prospectively fund STUDENT’s placement in HOME PROGRAM during the 2000-2001 school year. Additionally, because the District paid for the HOME PROGRAM placement during the entire 2000-2001 regular school year pursuant to its obligations under the stay put provision, there are no issues of reimbursement for the 2000-2001 regular school year. Further, the issue of the appropriateness of the HOME PROGRAM placement for STUDENT is not one that should be adjudicated because it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” as set forth in Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). There was no showing that the same sort of dispute would arise between the parties for the 2001-2002 school year and, unlike appeals to the circuit courts of appeal, a special education due process hearing may be completed before the end of the school year. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f). Finally, a finding with regard to the appropriateness of the HOME PROGRAM placement for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 school year would not have any implications beyond the conclusion of the 2000-2001 regular school year.
Therefore, the Hearing Officer dismisses as moot the issue of whether the HOME PROGRAM placement was appropriate for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 regular school year.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eighteen-year-old student who is currently identified as eligible for special education and related services because of pervasive developmental delays resulting from autism. He has been identified as eligible for special education under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) since the age of three. STUDENT first entered the District in September 1999, when he moved with DIRECTOR to a residence within the District’s jurisdictional boundaries.(Footnote 5) Since about April 1993, STUDENT has lived with DIRECTOR, either on a part- or full-time basis, and has attended the HOME PROGRAM (HOME PROGRAM), a program founded and directed by DIRECTOR.(Footnote 6) STUDENT’s parents presently reside within the boundaries of the Albany Unified School District.
Immediately prior to residing within the boundaries of the District, STUDENT had been served by the Novato Unified School District (NUSD). According to an IEP dated January 7, 1999, the last IEP completed by NUSD for STUDENT, NUSD had recommended that STUDENT continue his placement at HOME PROGRAM. Although not certified to provide special education services, the certification requirement had been waived by the State Department of Education for HOME PROGRAM for the 1998-1999 school year, as it had been since 1993.
On October 21, 1999, the District convened its first IEP meeting for STUDENT. According to the IEP document generated at the meeting, the District recommended that STUDENT be placed in the special day class for severely handicapped students (SH-SDC) at Redwood High School (Redwood) with additional direct classroom support for the length of the school day for classroom and community-based instruction. The SH-SDC teacher, Kimberley Cochrane, described her classroom and the opportunities available for her students to participate in the general education program (i.e., mainstreaming opportunities). PARENT and DIRECTOR indicated that they would visit the SH-SDC and the classes available for mainstreaming, but requested that the District continue STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM. They also requested that STUDENT be mainstreamed for one to two classes. According to the IEP document, the team agreed that arrangements would be made for the District’s special education staff to observe STUDENT and that the team would reconvene later to complete the IEP.
Additionally, it was noted on the IEP generated on October 21, 1999, that the administrator of the Marin Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA) had been informed the week prior by NUSD personnel that, prior to STUDENT’s move out of NUSD, NUSD and the parent had agreed to submit a referral to the State Diagnostic School in Fremont (Diagnostic School) for STUDENT to be assessed. According to the IEP document, NUSD personnel had indicated that NUSD’s most recent assessment, which had been performed in December 1998, was inadequate and that a comprehensive evaluation by the Diagnostic School should be pursued. The parent indicated at the meeting on October 21, 1999, that while information regarding a Diagnostic School assessment had been pursued, there had been no agreement for the Diagnostic School to assess STUDENT. The team noted that the issue of whether a further assessment by the Diagnostic School should be pursued would be addressed at the next IEP meeting.
After the meeting on October 21, 1999, the District continued to fund STUDENT’s placement in HOME PROGRAM because no agreement had been reached with the parent regarding any other placement.
In early December 1999, the District noticed an IEP meeting for December 16, 1999. The meeting scheduled for December 16 was postponed. Another IEP meeting was scheduled in January 2000, but was also postponed. The IEP team eventually was able to reconvene on February 10, 2000.
On February 10, 2000, according to the IEP produced on that date, the IEP team agreed to placement in the SDC and HOME PROGRAM, with a transition to the SDC on the comprehensive high school campus. The team agreed that the transition would begin on April 1, 2000, and would involve the following. DIRECTOR and an assistant would meet with the teachers in advance of the transition; STUDENT would attend the general education ceramics class three times per week; and, within two weeks of his beginning the ceramics class, STUDENT would spend time in the SDC participating in a structured activity to practice social skills. The IEP also indicated that the District would purchase a personal communication device (PCD) for STUDENT. Additionally, the IEP stated that STUDENT would receive extended school year (ESY) services consisting of thirty-five days in an SDC on a nonpublic school campus, the specific campus to be determined later. The parent signed the IEP to indicate that she had reviewed it and consented to its provisions.
In spite of the agreement to transition STUDENT to the high school campus, STUDENT continued his District-funded HOME PROGRAM placement after the IEP meeting on February 10, 2000, and did not attend any classes at Redwood.
By letter dated September 12, 2000, PARENT requested that an IEP meeting be convened immediately to address the number of days of ESY. PARENT contended in her letter that STUDENT had always received fifty-five days during the ESY in accordance with the HOME PROGRAM calendar, but that the District’s business office had indicated that it was willing to pay HOME PROGRAM for only thirty-five days. PARENT stated that she had asked DIRECTOR to meet with the District and “to represent [them] as STUDENT’s joint guardians” if PARENT was unable to attend the meeting herself.
On November 18, 2000, the District provided the parent with notice that an IEP meeting would be held on September 27, 2000, pursuant to her request. During a telephone conversation with Karen Mates on September 22 and through a letter dated September 26, PARENT informed the District that she would not be attending the meeting because of a scheduling conflict but was appointing DIRECTOR to represent her at the meeting.
On September 27, 2000, the IEP team met as scheduled. The District again recommended placement in Ms. Cochrane’s SDC on the Redwood campus. The IEP noted that the recommended placement would include a one-on-one aide and participation in the general education program for physical education (PE), lunch, recess, passing periods, and extra-curricular activities. The District provided a written description of a typical day in the program being recommended for STUDENT, which consisted of placement in the SDC for the entire school day with the exception of PE and possible placement in the general education ceramics class. The written description also contained a notation that STUDENT would participate in the “Friendship Club” at Redwood one afternoon per week. DIRECTOR stated her belief that STUDENT was not ready to be placed on the high school campus and indicated that PARENT would not agree to the Redwood placement. As for the ESY issue, the District agreed to pay the four extra days of services already provided by DIRECTOR, and indicated that its agreement was made “only in the interest of good faith” and was done without the admission of any wrongdoing. The District indicated that it would continue to pay DIRECTOR in accordance with STUDENT’s current IEP which, according to the District, called for a thirty-five-day ESY and not a fifty-five-day ESY. DIRECTOR signed the IEP but did not provide her consent for implementation of the District’s recommended program.
On October 4, 2000, Ms. Piotter sent a letter to PARENT and DIRECTOR detailing a five-week plan to transition STUDENT from HOME PROGRAM to the SDC at Redwood. Ms. Piotter stated in her letter that the District was ready and willing to implement the transition plan beginning October 9, 2000. Ms. Piotter also stated that if the parent wanted another opportunity to discuss these issues, another IEP team meeting could be convened. Ms. Piotter requested that the parent inform her by October 13 if she did not want to meet again.
Through a letter sent to Ms. Piotter dated October 11, 2000, PARENT stated her belief that the HOME PROGRAM placement met STUDENT’s IEP needs and that the SDC did not. PARENT informed Ms. Piotter that her suggestion that STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM be discontinued came as a “complete shock” since the September IEP meeting had been requested to discuss the number of ESY days. PARENT stated that Ms. Mates had made no effort to schedule the meeting on a day on which PARENT could attend, and that there had been no indication that the District wanted to discuss other matters at the meeting.
On November 27, 2000, the District filed with the Hearing Office a request for a due process hearing (Case No. SN 2094-00). The District identified as the issue for hearing whether it had offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year at the IEP meetings convened on February 10 and September 27, 2000. That same day, the District forwarded a copy of its request for a hearing to the parents. In a letter accompanying the hearing request, the District informed the parents that the District would not fund STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM after December 14, 2000.
On December 4, 2000, PARENT filed her own hearing request (Case No. SN 2137-00). PARENT indicated that she wanted a hearing to resolve the issue of the appropriate number of ESY days.
On December 18, 2000, the Hearing Office granted the District’s motion to consolidate the two cases. Two days later on December 21, the Hearing Office granted the Student’s stay put motion and ordered the District to maintain STUDENT’s placement in HOME PROGRAM during the pendency of the due process proceedings, unless the parties agreed otherwise. Thereafter, the District continued to fund STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM for the remainder of the 2000-2001 school year. The District indicated at hearing that, pursuant to its stay put obligations, it intended to fund STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM for thirty-five days during the 2001 ESY.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2000-2001 school year?
Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, students with disabilities have the right to a FAPE in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56000, 56031. A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the student’s IEP.(Footnote 7) 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).
In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. Id. at 198-200. The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Id. at 201.
The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Id. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he/she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). The procedural rights that extend to parents include the right to be informed in writing when the educational agency proposes to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child; the right to participate in the development of the child’s IEP; the right to examine all relevant educational records; and the opportunity for mediation and a due process hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1997) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1994)). Procedural flaws do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of a FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).
Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. Id. The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefit. Id. at 207. The school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994). Here, the Student alleged that the District failed to observe the procedural safeguards of the IDEA and failed to offer him a substantively appropriate program.
I. Compliance With Procedural Requirements
As an initial matter, the Student contended that the District failed to follow procedural requirements when it convened the IEP meeting on September 27, 2000. Specifically, the Student asserted that the District failed to give notice that it intended to propose a change of placement at the meeting, failed to make efforts to ensure the parents’ attendance at the meeting, refused to discuss the issue for which the parent requested the meeting (i.e., the number of ESY days STUDENT required), failed to provide a clear written description of its proposed placement at the meeting, and thereafter attempted to change STUDENT’s placement without the parents’ consent. The District denied these contentions and asserted that it followed all procedural requirements in convening the IEP meeting on September 27, 2000, and that the change of placement discussed at the September 2000 meeting was simply a reiteration of a proposal made at earlier IEP meetings to transition STUDENT from HOME PROGRAM to the SDC at Redwood. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
First, in convening an IEP meeting, a school district is required to provide to the parents of the individual with exceptional needs a notice indicating the purpose of the meeting, among other things. 34 C.F.R. § 300.354(b)(i); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(c). The notice the District provided to the parent for the IEP meeting on September 27, 2000 indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to address the parent’s request for a meeting. The parent had requested an IEP meeting only to discuss the issue of the number of school days for which HOME PROGRAM should be paid during the 2000 ESY.
However, the testimony of District personnel, such as Ms. Mates and Ms. Cochrane, established that the District knew well before September 27 that it intended to discuss placement issues at the meeting. Ms. Mates testified that before the IEP meeting, she and other staff members had decided to discuss the District’s recommendation to transition STUDENT from HOME PROGRAM to the SDC at Redwood during the IEP meeting. In fact, Ms. Mates included Ms. Cochrane on the meeting notice as one of the persons invited to the meeting. COE program manager Samuel Goldman testified that when he asked why Ms. Cochrane was going to be at the meeting, he was told that her program was going to be discussed as a possible placement for STUDENT. Further, Ms. Cochrane testified that, in preparation for the September 2000 IEP meeting, she met with Ms. Mates approximately one week before the IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT’s possible placement in her classroom. According to Ms. Cochrane, this was when she was asked to write the program description that she later presented to DIRECTOR at the IEP meeting. The transcript of the September 2000 IEP meeting established that the majority of the meeting was spent discussing the District’s recommendation to change STUDENT’s placement to the SDC at Redwood, and that only a small portion of the meeting was spent discussing the number of ESY days STUDENT required.(Footnote 8) PARENT testified that she did not feel that her presence was required at the September 2000 meeting because, as far as she was aware, only the number of ESY days was to be discussed. According to PARENT, she would have insisted on being present at a meeting during which the District intended to discuss a change of placement for STUDENT.
The Hearing Officer finds unavailing the District’s argument that it was not required to provide notice that it intended to review STUDENT’s placement at the meeting because the placement it recommended at the September 27, 2000 meeting was a reiteration of recommendations made at prior IEP meetings. The testimony of COE program manager Deborah Hemphill, the only District or COE representative present at STUDENT’s previous IEP meeting who testified at the hearing, established that the placement agreed to at the prior IEP meeting was not the same as that proposed at the September 27, 2000 meeting. Ms. Hemphill testified that at the meeting held on February 10, 2000, the IEP team had agreed that STUDENT would remain in HOME PROGRAM but would slowly transition to Redwood so that eventually he could attend two general education classes and obtain some social skills instruction in the SDC setting, such as during the Friendship Club run by Ms. Cochrane after school. Additionally, Ms. Hemphill testified that she understood from the February meeting that PARENT wanted STUDENT to remain at HOME PROGRAM, but was willing to look at other possibilities and did not agree to placement in the SDC except for the very limited purpose of obtaining some social skills training.
The testimony of PARENT and DIRECTOR, both of whom attended the February meeting, corroborated Ms. Hemphill’s testimony that the agreement had been for STUDENT to attend general education classes on the Redwood campus and perhaps obtain some social skills training through the SDC while remaining in HOME PROGRAM. Neither Ms. Hemphill, PARENT, nor DIRECTOR testified that the team had agreed to cease entirely the HOME PROGRAM placement. In fact, the IEP signed by PARENT on February 10, 2000, indicated that the team agreed to placement at the SDC at Redwood and HOME PROGRAM, and that the transition to the Redwood campus would involve a gradual introduction into the SDC to participate in a structured activity to provide social skills training and into a general education ceramics class three times per week. No contrary evidence was presented by the District to demonstrate that the IEP team agreed at the February 2000 meeting to cease STUDENT’s placement at HOME PROGRAM in favor of the SDC at Redwood, as was proposed at the September 2000 meeting. Additionally, while the District did recommend at its first IEP meeting for STUDENT in October 1999 that he be fully transitioned to the SDC at Redwood, this fact did not reasonably put the parents on notice that the District might thereafter raise its initial placement recommendation again at any and all future IEP meetings held for STUDENT. This is especially true where, as here, the parties agreed at the second, intervening IEP meeting to a program other than the one initially proposed by the District.
In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District improperly failed to notify the parent that one of the purposes of the meeting was to discuss changing STUDENT’s placement. The Hearing Officer also finds that, given PARENT’s undisputed and credible testimony that she would have attended the IEP meeting had she known of the District’s intention to discuss placement issues, the District’s failure to inform PARENT of the purpose of the meeting seriously infringed on her opportunity to participate in the IEP process.
The Hearing Officer also finds that the District failed to ensure the parents’ attendance at the September 2000 IEP meeting, as required. In convening an IEP meeting, a school district is required to take steps to ensure that one or both of the parents of the individual with exceptional needs are present at each IEP meeting or are afforded the opportunity to participate in the IEP process. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(a). To this end, a school district must schedule IEP meetings at a time and place mutually agreed upon by the parent and the school district. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(c). Moreover, specifically with regard to meetings during which decisions about educational placement are to be made, the Education Code requires that a school district ensure that the parent of an individual with exceptional needs is a member of any group that makes decisions on the educational placement of the individual with exceptional needs. Cal. Educ. Code § 56342.5.
Ms. Mates testified that when she received PARENT’s request for a meeting in September 2000, she understood that DIRECTOR was STUDENT’s caretaker and guardian, that DIRECTOR was authorized to make educational decisions on STUDENT’s behalf, and that DIRECTOR had to be invited to any IEP meeting convened for STUDENT. Ms. Mates testified that, in accordance with this understanding, she contacted DIRECTOR to arrange a mutually agreeable time and place for the IEP meeting. Ms. Mates testified that she did not contact PARENT to determine PARENT’s availability for the meeting. Ms. Mates provided no reason for her failure to contact either of STUDENT’s parents to arrange a mutually agreeable time for the meeting, except for her understanding that an “immediate” meeting was necessary and that she had to contact DIRECTOR to ensure her availability for the meeting. A review of the two prior IEP meetings held by the District for STUDENT shows that PARENT had been in attendance at both of those meetings.
Ms. Mates’s act of contacting DIRECTOR to arrange a mutually agreeable time for the meeting did not satisfy the requirement that the meeting be scheduled at a time mutually agreed upon by the parent and the school district. 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(a)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56341.5(c); see also Cal. Educ. Code § 56028 and 34 C.F.R. § 300.20. Here, the child’s natural parents had legal custody of the child, requested the IEP meeting, and indicated an intention to attend the IEP meeting. PARENT’s request for an IEP meeting indicated only that DIRECTOR could represent the parents’ interests if PARENT herself was unable to attend the meeting. No evidence was presented that PARENT waived her right to have an IEP meeting at a time mutually agreed upon by her or her husband, or otherwise waived her right to be present at the IEP meeting. PARENT testified that after she realized that she would not be able to attend the meeting because of a conflicting commitment, she did not ask for the meeting to be rescheduled. It was her understanding that only the issue of payment for HOME PROGRAM services during the ESY would be discussed and she felt that the issue needed immediate resolution. PARENT’s testimony in this regard is credible and in accordance with the fact that she attended the prior IEP meetings which were convened for the express purpose of reviewing STUDENT’s program. In light of the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that the District improperly failed to schedule the IEP meeting requested by PARENT in September 2000 at a time agreed upon by the parent and thereby failed to ensure the parent’s attendance at a meeting during which decisions about STUDENT’s educational placement were made. The Hearing Officer finds that, given PARENT’s undisputed and credible testimony that she would have been present at an IEP meeting where placement issues were discussed, the District’s failure to schedule the IEP meeting at a time agreed upon by PARENT seriously infringed on her opportunity to participate in the IEP process.(Footnote 9)
As for the remainder of the Student’s allegations of procedural violations, the evidence presented at hearing did not support the allegations or establish that they constituted procedural violations which resulted in serious infringement of the parents’ right to participate in the IEP process or in loss of educational opportunity. With regard to the Student’s allegation that the District refused to discuss the issue for which the parent requested the IEP meeting, the transcript of the September 2000 IEP meeting shows that the issue was discussed. In fact, the issue of whether the District would pay for the four days of services already rendered by HOME PROGRAM during the 2000 ESY was resolved. While there was no resolution of the issue of whether STUDENT required ESY services consisting of thirty-five or fifty-five days of services, the lack of resolution of an issue does not constitute a procedural violation under the IDEA.
The Student’s argument that the District improperly failed to provide a clear written description of the proposed program is equally unpersuasive. The IEP prepared at the September 27, 2000 meeting described the proposed placement as the SDC operated by Ms. Cochrane at Redwood. The IEP also described the placement as including a one-on-one aide and participation in the general education curriculum with nondisabled peers for PE, lunch, recess, passing periods, and extra-curricular activities. Additionally, Ms. Cochrane provided to the IEP team a written description of her program, which included information regarding the students in the SDC, the number of SDC staff, and other detailed information regarding the daily components of her program. The Student argued in his closing brief that the program description should have included information such as the credentials of the teacher and the training of the aide. The Hearing Officer is aware of no authority, and the Student presented none, which would have required the District to provide additional information such as the teacher’s credentials and the aide’s training in its written program offer. The Hearing Officer finds that the written program description provided by the District was sufficiently clear and detailed to allow the parents to seriously consider the District’s offer for the 2000-2001 regular school year, in compliance with the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3); see also Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 15, 19, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994).
Finally, while the District did attempt to change STUDENT’s placement without having obtained the parent’s consent for the change, any violation in this regard did not result in any loss of educational opportunity to STUDENT. An individual with exceptional needs is not required to participate in all or part of any special education program unless the parent has been informed of the program in writing and has consented in writing to its implementation. Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(a). Where the parent refuses to consent to all or part of a school district’s proposed special education program and the district determines that the program is necessary to provide a FAPE, the district is obligated to initiate a due process hearing. Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(b). During the pendency of the due process proceeding, the individual with exceptional needs is entitled to remain in his or her then-current placement, unless the parent and the district agree otherwise. Cal. Educ. Code § 56346(b). Consequently, when STUDENT’s parents refused to provide their written consent to the change in placement recommended by the District on September 27, 2000, the District was without authority to institute its recommended change in placement. Notwithstanding the parents’ lack of consent, the District subsequently informed the parents on November 27, 2000, that it intended to cease funding HOME PROGRAM on December 15, 2000. However, because of the pending due process hearing and the subsequent issuance of a stay put order, the District continued to fund HOME PROGRAM throughout the remainder of the 2000-2001 school year. Therefore, STUDENT did not lose any educational opportunity during the 2000-2001 school year as a result of the District’s attempt to change his placement without his parents’ consent.
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed procedural violations which seriously infringed on the parents’ opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP process when it failed to inform the parents that it intended to propose a change of placement at the IEP meeting held on September 27, 2000, and failed to ensure the parents’ attendance at a meeting during which the District expected the IEP team to make decisions about STUDENT’s educational placement. The Hearing Officer did not find evidence of any other procedural violations.
II. Substantive Appropriateness of Proposed Program
To determine whether the District offered STUDENT a substantively appropriate program, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s proposed program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program was designed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, was reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, and comported with his IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if his parents prefer another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would result in greater educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. The District was also required to offer STUDENT a program which educated him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of his disabilities was such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services could not be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program the District proposed for the 2000-2001 school year must have met the following four requirements to constitute an appropriate educational program for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 school year: be designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, be reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, comport with his IEP, and provide him an education in the least restrictive environment.
The Student claimed that the District’s offer for the 2000-2001 school year was substantively deficient because it failed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, was not reasonably calculated to enable him to receive educational benefit, and failed to offer him placement in the least restrictive environment (LRE). The Student also argued that the District could not have made an appropriate offer because it had not observed him since he entered the District, gathered information about his present levels or educational needs from his parents or DIRECTOR, or otherwise made any efforts to understand his needs. The District argued that its offer of placement was appropriate and that it obtained information regarding STUDENT’s needs from the assessment performed by NUSD in December 1998, STUDENT’s educational records, and conversations with PARENT and DIRECTOR at IEP meetings.
To determine whether the District’s proposed program for the 2000-2001 school year was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it is necessary to have some understanding of what unique educational needs the District knew or should have known about at the time it made its placement offer. See Adams v. State of Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that review must focus on adequacy of proposed program at time it was drafted). “‘In striving for ‘appropriateness,’ an IEP must take into account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable ... at the time the IEP was drafted.’” Id. (quoting Fuhrmann v. East Hanover Bd. of Educ., 993 F.2d 1031, 1041 (3d Cir. 1993)).
When the IEP meeting convened on September 27, 2000, the IEP team was generally aware that STUDENT was a seventeen-year-old student who, as a result of autism, was exhibiting severe developmental delays in social skills, emotional functioning, self-help and prevocational skills, receptive and expressive language, and academic achievement. Apart from such generalities, the evidence established that the District knew little else about STUDENT and his unique needs at the time of the September 2000 IEP meeting.
The District and COE members of the IEP team testified that prior to the September 2000 meeting, they gained knowledge about STUDENT’s needs by reviewing his educational records, including past IEPs and assessment reports, and through comments made by PARENT and DIRECTOR at past IEP meetings. However, the last assessment of STUDENT had taken place in about December 1998 and had been performed by NUSD. STUDENT had not been assessed by the District by the date of the September 27, 2000 meeting or, for that matter, by the conclusion of the 2000-2001 school year.(Footnote 10) In spite of the District’s reliance on the information provided by the assessment report by NUSD, no evidence was presented to establish the appropriateness of the assessment performed by NUSD. The only evidence that supported NUSD’s assessment was DIRECTOR’s testimony that, based on her experience working with STUDENT at the time, she felt that the assessment report’s statements about STUDENT’s then-present levels of performance were accurate. Moreover, it was noted on the District’s first IEP for STUDENT, dated October 21, 1999, that NUSD staff had informed Ms. Hemphill the week prior that NUSD’s December 1998 assessment was “inadequate” and that, consequently, NUSD had been pursuing an assessment by the State Diagnostic School in Fremont before STUDENT’s move out of NUSD’s boundaries. The October 21, 1999 IEP also noted that at the next IEP meeting the District would also be recommending that STUDENT be referred for an assessment by the State Diagnostic School. There is no evidence that the topic of assessing STUDENT was raised at either of the subsequent IEP meetings.
A review of NUSD’s 1998 assessment report unfortunately does not dispel concerns about its inadequacy. NUSD’s assessor, psychologist Diane Martin, Ph.D., wrote a scant five-page report that contained only cursory analyses of STUDENT’s functioning in the areas of self-help, social, communication, and academic skills. There is no evidence that STUDENT’s receptive and expressive language skills was assessed by a speech and language therapist or anyone else qualified to assess in the area, even though language is one of STUDENT’s major areas of deficit. Additionally, Dr. Martin’s findings regarding STUDENT’s functioning consisted mainly of generalities and qualitative comparisons without the benefit of supporting facts. For example, she often used words such as “more,” “less,” and “improved” to describe his functioning but then frequently failed to provide specific information as to what level of functioning was seen at the time. She also did not provide any analysis with regard to STUDENT’s abilities or the type of specialized instruction he needed because of his unique needs. In fact, Dr. Martin’s only recommendations were that STUDENT needed “very tight limits and boundaries in order to control his behavior” and that he required a “specialized educational placement in order to continue his social and academic learning.” Prior to Dr. Martin’s assessment in December 1994, STUDENT had last been assessed by a school district in April 1994.(Footnote 11)
Given the paucity of information available to the District when it made its placement recommendation, the Hearing Officer finds compelling the Student’s argument that the District based its placement recommendation solely on STUDENT’s label of autism. The testimony provided by District and COE personnel further supported this conclusion. Testimony was introduced at the hearing to establish the District’s understanding of STUDENT’s severely depressed levels of functioning and District and COE staff members’ knowledge and understanding of autism. However, there was no evidence that District or COE staff had an understanding of STUDENT’s unique and individual needs, except to the extent that they were aware that he was autistic and functioned at a one- to six-year-old level. Although STUDENT is certainly autistic, as recently reiterated by the Ninth Circuit, “[e]ach child has different needs, different skills, and a different time frame for effective treatment.” Amanda J. v. Clark Co. Sch. Dist., __ F.3d __, 2001 WL 902125 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, as the testimony of District and COE personnel indicated, autism is a spectrum disorder that manifests itself in many different ways and is not characterized by any single behavior. See also id. “The services and placement needed by each child with a disability to receive FAPE must be based on the child’s unique needs and not on the child’s disability.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(ii).
In this case, the District was attempting to serve an individual with exceptional needs with whom its staff had never worked with, assessed, or even observed. Additionally, by the time of the September 2000 IEP meeting, STUDENT had been placed in essentially the same program for the last eight and a half years. During this time, he had been instructed using an approach found by District and COE staff to be, at best, unconventional, an approach that DIRECTOR referred to as “emotionally appropriate” rather than age appropriate. DIRECTOR described her approach as one that rewards the autistic child for behavior that demonstrates advances in terms of the child’s emotional stage of development, rather than expecting age appropriate behavior. She also described the use of nonsexual body contact to nurture the child’s emotional development, including “baby time,” during which the child may be allowed to sit on the instructor’s lap and be cradled like a baby or be provided with other forms of body contact appropriate for a baby. STUDENT’s almost nine-year history of instruction using DIRECTOR’s “emotionally appropriate” approach doubtless has affected STUDENT in ways presently unknown to the District. The Hearing Officer was not persuaded that the District did enough to acquaint itself with STUDENT’s unique needs to allow it to develop an appropriate program for this particular child.
Instead, the District appears to have determined that because of STUDENT’s diagnoses of autism and mental retardation and because of his severely low levels of functioning, he belonged in the severely handicapped SDC in which other autistic and multiply handicapped children with similar levels of functioning were placed. To impress this point, Ms. Cochrane was asked at hearing repeatedly about the levels of functioning of the other students in her classroom and whether STUDENT’s levels of functioning fit within the range seen in her classroom. For a placement to be appropriate, however, it must do more than contain other children with the same diagnoses and the same levels of functioning. It must meet the individual child’s unique needs. The District failed to prove that it knew what STUDENT’s unique needs were and, consequently, failed to prove that its proposed placement met those unique needs.(Footnote 12)
As an example, the evidence demonstrated that STUDENT has significant behavioral issues that impede his ability to learn and which may affect the ability of others to learn. The District’s review of Dr. Martin’s December 1998 assessment report should have put the District on notice that STUDENT had significant behavioral issues which adversely affected his ability to learn. Dr. Martin noted in her assessment report that in December 1998 STUDENT’s behavior was still quite impulsive, that it was difficult to keep his attention, and that he needed very tight limits and boundaries to control his behavior. DIRECTOR’s testimony established that in September 2000 STUDENT continued to have behavior problems that affected his learning and could affect the learning of others. For instance, DIRECTOR testified that STUDENT occasionally throws tantrums like a two-year-old child, screams, yells, pinches, grabs, and displays other aggressive and self-injurious behavior. In the case of a child whose behavior impedes his learning or that of others, the IEP team is required to consider, when appropriate, strategies, including positive behavioral interventions, strategies, and supports to address the behavior. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(2)(i).
According to the February 10, 2000 IEP, the IEP team realized that STUDENT had behavioral issues and requested that DIRECTOR provide the team with a copy of the behavior intervention plan that she used with STUDENT. However, the District never developed its own behavioral plan for use in the SDC placement and never agreed to adopt DIRECTOR’s behavior plan for use in its proposed SDC placement. In fact, the testimony of Ms. Cochrane and other District personnel established that the District was unwilling to use the same methods DIRECTOR used to control STUDENT’s behavior. For instance, DIRECTOR testified that when STUDENT starts to display aggressive behavior or self-stimulatory behavior, she puts STUDENT in her lap for increased body contact and “cuddling.” Ms. Cochrane testified that she would not use such methods in her classroom. Additionally, while the District proposed to assign a one-on-one aide to support STUDENT throughout the school day, the District did not provide any evidence to show that the aide assigned would be able to appropriately address STUDENT’s behaviors in the classroom.
* * * *
In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District committed both procedural and substantive violations of the IDEA in making its placement offer for the 2000-2001 regular school year. Specifically, the District failed to ensure the parents’ attendance at the IEP meeting held on September 27, 2000, and failed to put the parents on notice that STUDENT’s placement would be reviewed at the September 2000 meeting. Additionally, the District did not identify or meet STUDENT’s unique needs or demonstrate a likelihood that its proposed program was reasonably calculated to meet those needs. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to prove that it offered STUDENT a free appropriate public education for the 2000-2001 school year.
ISSUE NO. 2: Is STUDENT entitled to a fifty-five-day extended school year (ESY) during the 2000-2001 school year, rather than the thirty-five-day ESY offered by the District?
Extended school year (ESY) programming is educational programming that extends instruction beyond the normal school year to prevent serious regression over the summer months. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b). In California, a school district is required to provide a special education student with ESY programming when the student requires special education and related services in excess of the regular academic year or the IEP team has determined the need for ESY programming. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3043; compare with 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(a)(2). Section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations defines such students in the following manner:
Such individuals shall have handicaps which are likely to continue indefinitely or for a prolonged period, and interruption of the pupil’s educational programming may cause regression, when coupled with limited recoupment capacity, rendering it impossible or unlikely that the pupil will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his or her handicapping condition.
Where a child has been determined eligible for ESY services by his or her IEP team, the written IEP must include an ESY program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(b)(3); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b)(1)(ii).
There is no dispute that STUDENT’s needs entitle him to an ESY program during the summer of 2001. The parties’ primary dispute with regard to the 2001 ESY centered on whether STUDENT requires thirty-five days, as offered by the District, or fifty-five days of instruction during the 2001 ESY. However, to resolve the issue of whether the District made an appropriate offer of services for the 2001 ESY, the analysis must first focus on what the District specifically offered STUDENT for the 2001 ESY for, at the heart of this dispute, was an underlying controversy regarding the appropriateness of the SDC placement proposed by the District.
Unfortunately, the District provided neither argument nor specific evidence to establish what its placement offer was for STUDENT for the 2001 ESY. The evidence that was available at hearing failed to demonstrate with any certainty what the District’s placement offer was for the 2001 ESY. At STUDENT’s last IEP meeting on September 27, 2000, when the team was discussing the number of ESY days for the 2000 ESY, the District indicated that it would continue to pay DIRECTOR for thirty-five, and not fifty-five, days of ESY services in accordance with the “current IEP.” It is unclear whether the District meant to offer STUDENT placement at HOME PROGRAM for the 2001 ESY by this statement. However, it is unlikely that this was the District’s intention, since the District was attempting to change STUDENT’s placement from HOME PROGRAM to the SDC at Redwood at this meeting, the statement was made in the midst of the team’s discussion regarding the 2000 ESY, and the District and COE representatives stated at the meeting that the issue of the number of ESY days could not be resolved until the placement issue was resolved. To further muddy the issue, the “current IEP” referred to was the IEP dated February 10, 2000, which stated that the District was recommending thirty-five days of ESY services in a nonpublic school “to be determined.” No further clarification was made in the February 2000 IEP, or in any subsequent writing, as to what nonpublic school the District was offering for ESY services in the February 2000 IEP.
In short, the District failed to prove that it made a clear written offer of placement for the 2001 ESY, as required by the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3); Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. The Ninth Circuit has stated that the requirement for a clear written offer serves an important purpose and should be enforced rigorously. Id. Failure to adhere to this requirement is among the procedural violations that may constitute a denial of FAPE. Id. The courts have continued to vigorously apply Union. See, e.g., Mill Valley Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Eastin, 32 IDELR 140 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
As the parties’ ESY dispute centered primarily around the number of instructional days, however, the Hearing Officer is wary of resolving the ESY issue solely on the basis of a procedural violation, no matter how significant. Therefore, in order to give the District the benefit of the doubt, the analysis will be taken further to determine whether an offer of thirty-five ESY days was appropriate for either the SDC at Redwood or HOME PROGRAM. If it were to be assumed that the District’s ESY offer was for thirty-five days at the Redwood SDC, as with the regular school year, there was no persuasive evidence that the SDC placement would have met STUDENT’s needs. If, on the other hand, the District’s ESY offer was for thirty-five days of instructional services provided by HOME PROGRAM, the analysis must focus on the requisite number of instructional days rather than the appropriateness of the placement, since HOME PROGRAM was the parents’ preferred placement.
The Student argued that he requires an additional twenty instructional days (essentially one month of additional instruction) beyond that offered by the District. The District argued that a thirty-five-day ESY program is sufficient to meet STUDENT’s needs. The District calendars submitted establish that a thirty-five-day ESY program would require that a student miss less than a week of instructional services between the end of the regular school year and the beginning of the ESY, two days during the July 4th holidays, and over two weeks between the end of the ESY and the beginning of the 2001-2002 school year.(Footnote 13) According to the HOME PROGRAM calendars, HOME PROGRAM’s fifty-five-day ESY provides for three breaks, the first for three days, the next for one day, and then the final break for a little over a week.
According to PARENT, STUDENT has received a fifty-five-day ESY program since he began attending the PRIVATE SCHOOL in 1992. DIRECTOR, who has worked directly with STUDENT for the last nine years, testified that STUDENT has severe deficits and has difficulty retaining the lessons he is taught. She testified that because of STUDENT’s history of regression, it is necessary that his schooling include breaks of only short duration, such as those that her program provides. Ms. Hemphill testified that with an autistic child, she would only be concerned about regression and limited recoupment if there was a break of more than three weeks. Ms. Cochrane, the only other District or COE staff member to testify about this ESY issue, testified that based on her experience with her SH-SDC students, she finds that students are rather eager to come back to school because they miss their friends and school and that, although it may take them a couple of days to get comfortable again with the routine of school, there is generally no regression. Ms. Cochrane also testified that she did not think there would be a problem with regression should STUDENT have a two-week break from school.
The Hearing Officer finds the testimony of DIRECTOR persuasive on the issue of the number of days of instruction STUDENT requires for the 2001 ESY. DIRECTOR’s testimony was based on her direct experience of working with STUDENT over the last nine years and first-hand experience with STUDENT’s difficulty retaining lessons. The testimony of Ms. Hemphill and Ms. Cochrane, on the other hand, did not reflect a knowledge of STUDENT’s unique needs but those of other children and of facts generally held true for autistic children. The Hearing Officer finds that it is more likely than not that, because of STUDENT’s handicaps and limited recoupment capacity, an interruption of over two weeks of his educational programming would cause regression that would render it impossible or unlikely that he would attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence that would otherwise be expected in view of his handicapping condition, in accordance with section 3043 of Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT is entitled to a fifty-five-day ESY during the 2000-2001 school year. The District, having failed to provide the parents with a clear and coherent offer of placement for the 2001 ESY and having failed to offer STUDENT a fifty-five-day ESY, failed to prove that it offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 2001 ESY.
ISSUE NO. 3: Should STUDENT’s parents be reimbursed for expenses incurred for the twenty additional days of services provided by the HOME PROGRAM (HOME PROGRAM) during the 2001 ESY?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). Thus, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
It was concluded in Issue No. 2 that STUDENT was entitled to fifty-five instructional days during the 2001 ESY and that the District failed to offer STUDENT an appropriate program for the 2001 ESY. It was stipulated at hearing that the District intended to pay HOME PROGRAM for thirty-five days of instructional services during the 2001 ESY pursuant to its stay-put obligations. PARENT testified that because of the District’s refusal to pay for the twenty additional days of ESY services, she would pay HOME PROGRAM for the additional twenty days of services and seek reimbursement. To determine whether reimbursement is warranted, the Hearing Officer must determine whether the program provided by HOME PROGRAM during the ESY was proper under the IDEA.
The Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). The Alamo court stated the following about the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Burlington:
The rationale behind Burlington’s holding is that parents who elect to risk shouldering the costs of what they perceive to be a more appropriate placement, and whose judgment is wholly or in part vindicated by the district court, should receive more than an “empty victory.” [Footnote omitted.] As stated by the Court, if “appropriate relief” in the form of reasonable reimbursement is not allowed, “the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parent’s right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards would be less than complete.” [Footnote omitted.]
Id.
In Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361 (1993), the Supreme Court expressly exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student’s IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the State. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet a standard as high as that required of a school district, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.
In this case, the parents elected to shoulder the cost of the additional twenty days of services provided by HOME PROGRAM during the 2001 ESY because of their belief that STUDENT required the additional days of instruction. The parents’ belief that STUDENT required the additional days of instruction was vindicated; the available evidence demonstrated that the severity of STUDENT’s disabilities, when combined with his difficulty in retaining information, made it necessary for STUDENT to receive fifty-five days of instructional services during the 2001 ESY. The parents’ choice to shoulder the risk was made in the face of the District’s failure to make a clear written offer of any appropriate ESY program for the summer of 2001. It would be, as the courts have stated, an “empty victory” if the parents were not awarded appropriate relief. See Alamo, 790 F.2d at 1161.
The placement for which the parents seek reimbursement is one that STUDENT has been attending since 1993 and that the District has been funding since STUDENT’s entry into the District in 1999. The evidence presented at hearing did not establish that HOME PROGRAM was a wholly appropriate program. As expressed earlier, the Hearing Officer was not persuaded that DIRECTOR’s “emotionally appropriate” approach was supported by any credible research or generally supported by any appropriately credentialed practitioners in the field of autism. There were also concerns regarding DIRECTOR’s lack of formal education in autism or educational practices and possible bias. However, the parents are not expected to provide the child with the exact proper placement required under the IDEA in order to be awarded reimbursement, especially in the face of the lack of any offer by the school district. See Alamo, 790 F.2d at 1161.
Moreover, the available evidence established that HOME PROGRAM is designed to address a number of STUDENT’s most critical needs, including those in the areas of daily living skills, social interaction, and language development. There is no dispute that STUDENT has major deficits in his daily living skills. The testimony of DIRECTOR established that her program addresses these deficits in a number of ways, including frequent trips into the community where STUDENT is taught to count change for food and other purchases and to order food at restaurants. With regard to social interaction, DIRECTOR testified that STUDENT is frequently taken on community outings where he interacts with others, including trips for horseback riding, to stores, and to restaurants. DIRECTOR testified that, during such trips, STUDENT’s social goals of making appropriate eye contact and expressing appropriate greetings are worked on. Finally, according to DIRECTOR’s testimony, STUDENT’s language impairments are a constant focus at HOME PROGRAM. DIRECTOR testified that STUDENT is asked questions about all the activities he participates in throughout the day, he is exposed to unfamiliar people throughout the week in order to reduce his anxiety about communicating with unfamiliar people, and he frequently uses his facilitated communication device. The available evidence also established that the HOME PROGRAM placement is reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit. The testimony of PARENT and DIRECTOR indicated that STUDENT has made progress during his placement in HOME PROGRAM. Specifically, DIRECTOR’s testimony regarding STUDENT’s progress on his current goals and objectives showed that he has been able to totally or partially meet a number of the objectives listed in his IEP through his placement in her program.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the parents are entitled to reimbursement for the twenty additional days of instruction provided by HOME PROGRAM during the 2001 ESY.
ORDER
1. Within twenty calendar days of receipt of proof, the Tamalpais Union High School District shall reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the expenses incurred for the twenty additional days of instruction provided by the HOME PROGRAM during the 2001 extended school year.
2. The parties’ remaining claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: The Student prevailed on all issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Date: August 16, 2001 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1.PARENT and DIRECTOR both identified DIRECTOR as STUDENT’s “joint guardian.” PARENT testified that she delegated to DIRECTOR the rights of a joint guardian so that DIRECTOR could make decisions on STUDENT’s behalf, but that no formal or legal measures had been taken to recognize DIRECTOR as a joint guardian. 2.The issues listed here differ slightly in numbering and wording from those noticed by the parties before the hearing. Changes were made for purposes of clarification and appropriate analysis, and to reflect discussions regarding issues that were held with the parties during the course of the hearing and dismissal rulings. The issues listed also reflect the Student’s withdrawal, on June 26, 2001, of the issue of whether the HOME PROGRAM should continue to be funded until some other appropriate placement is identified if there is no clear resolution regarding placement at the conclusion of this hearing process. This issue was not noticed by the Student until June 5, 2001, and its withdrawal was not opposed by the District. 3. Because the District continued to fund the parents’ preferred placement, HOME PROGRAM, during the pendency of the due process proceedings pursuant to its stay put obligation, there are no claims for compensatory education or reimbursement, except to the limited extent set forth in Issue No. 3. 4.In its closing brief, the District argued that the issue of the appropriateness of HOME PROGRAM for STUDENT for the 2000-2001 school year should not be adjudicated but it cited another ground, the specifics of which do not require detailing here. 5.There is no dispute that the District has been responsible for providing educational services to STUDENT since September 1999. At the District’s request, DIRECTOR completed a caregiver affidavit in order to establish District responsibility under Education Code § 48204(d). 6.Prior to attending the HOME PROGRAM, STUDENT had attended the PRIVATE SCHOOL, another private program founded and operated by DIRECTOR, from January 1992 until its closure in early 1993. 7.Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a student to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a). 8.The transcript was prepared by PARENT using the audiotape recordings made of the September 27, 2000 meeting by ADVOCATE and the District. The District presented neither argument nor evidence to dispute the accuracy of PARENT’s transcription 9.The District also argued that PARENT’ inability to attend the IEP meeting on September 27 was not prejudicial to her ability to participate in the IEP process because, by letter dated October 4, 2000, Ms. Piotter informed PARENT of the District’s willingness to conduct another IEP meeting should PARENT want “another” opportunity to discuss the issue of placement. The Hearing Officer is at a loss to understand how this conferred any greater right on PARENT than those accorded any parent of an individual with exceptional needs. PARENT, like all parents of individuals with exceptional needs, was clearly entitled to request an IEP meeting to develop, review, or revise the IEP, notwithstanding Ms. Piotter’s October 4 letter. Cal. Educ. Code § 56343(c). Moreover, it was the District’s responsibility to ensure that PARENT or her husband were present at any meeting where the District expected that decisions regarding STUDENT’s educational placement would be made, not the parents’ responsibility to request an IEP meeting because the prior meeting was held in their absence. Cal. Educ. Code § 56342.5. This the District failed to do. 10.There was some evidence that the District requested the parents’ consent to assess STUDENT in March 2001 but that the parent refused to provide consent for the District to assess at that time. The parties’ dispute regarding the District’s right to assess STUDENT is the subject of another due process hearing. This decision in no way intends to speak to whether the District should be allowed to assess STUDENT. 11. STUDENT had also been assessed in August 1996 by Bryna Siegel, Ph.D., at his mother’s request. However, Dr. Siegel, who had first assessed STUDENT at the age of four, conducted only a follow-up evaluation in a clinic setting. Dr. Siegel’s evaluation did not assess STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability in accordance with Education Code section 56320(f) and was not educational in nature. 12.Without the benefit of an appropriate assessment or other reliable information about STUDENT’s current needs, it is impossible to determine with specificity all of STUDENT’s unique needs. While PARENT and DIRECTOR were able to shed some insight into STUDENT’s present levels of functioning, neither PARENT nor DIRECTOR hold the requisite credentials to offer expert testimony regarding STUDENT’s unique needs as they relate to the obligations of the District under the IDEA. See Cal. Evid. Code § 720. DIRECTOR has been working with autistic and other special needs children for over thirty years, but she does not have a college degree or any other formal training to work with autistic children. While DIRECTOR’s extensive years of experience working with autistic children is not to be undervalued, the importance of appropriate educational credentials in the field of psychology or other fields related to the research and treatment of autism cannot be underestimated. Additionally, there is a concern that the opinions DIRECTOR offered at hearing were biased by her strong advocacy for an emotionally appropriate approach in working with autistic children. No evidence was presented at hearing that her emotionally appropriate approach was supported by any credible research or accepted by any appropriately credentialed practitioners in the field of autism. Finally, the Hearing Officer would be remiss if she failed to note that, as HOME PROGRAM’s director, DIRECTOR has an undeniable financial interest in STUDENT’s continued placement in HOME PROGRAM. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56042. 13.While Ms. Hemphill testified that the student would miss only seven to eight days of instruction after the end of the ESY, Ms. Hemphill’s testimony constituted only a rough approximation since she did not have the benefit of a calendar during her testimony and based her calculation on rough estimates of when the ESY ends and the new school year begins.
