California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · January 29, 2004
Student v. William S. Hart Union High School District (consolidated)
SEHO Case No. SN 2146-03, SN03-02146, SN03-02240 · Hearing Officer Judith E. Ganz
Hart Union High School District denied a FAPE in 2002-2004 and must fund Westmark School and compensatory private speech therapy.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision notes that both parties appealed the July 2002 SEHO decision (SN01-02804) and related stay put orders. The Ninth Circuit remanded the stay put question to the federal district court to be considered with the merits appeal, and those matters were pending. The decision reports no appeal or later history of this decision itself.
Summary
The William S. Hart Union High School District filed to show that its May 2003 IEP offered a FAPE to a 16-year-old tenth grader with a specific learning disability. The student filed a cross-case. She attended Westmark School, a nonpublic school, at District expense under a stay put agreement.
For 2002-2003, the Hearing Officer found that the District denied a FAPE. After a hostile four-hour IEP meeting in August 2002, the special education director had teachers write goals separately and sent the resulting offer through the District's lawyers. The team did not meet again for eight months, even though the parent asked it to. This seriously infringed on the parent's participation. Westmark was appropriate, and the District could not recover the tuition it had paid.
For 2003-2004, the Hearing Officer rejected the offer of a special day class at Canyon High School. A class of 15 to 20 students could not give the intensive instruction she needed. The IEP also had several gaps:
- no reading fluency goals
- no stated frequency for counseling
- a weak plan for moving to Canyon
- a transition plan that ignored her interests
- no current speech goals or reassessment
Westmark was the least restrictive environment for her. The District must fund Westmark for the rest of 2003-2004 and ESY, plus transportation. Private therapist Ilene Umen will provide two hours a week of compensatory speech therapy for the time missed and will reassess her. The Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to enforce the 2002 compensatory order.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO treated an IEP offer put together by a director and lawyers, rather than a team, as a procedural denial of FAPE. It also held that a counseling offer must state frequency and duration. And it held that offered compensatory services cannot be withheld until the parent accepts the rest of the IEP.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedIEP procedure
Issue 1. Did the District fail to offer or provide a FAPE during the 2002-2003 school year, as described in the August 21, 2002 IEP?
The special education director compiled an offer from teachers' separate drafts without the team, and the District did not reconvene the IEP team for eight months. This seriously infringed on parent participation and denied a FAPE. Substantive appropriateness was not reached.
- Student prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. If the District failed to offer or provide a FAPE for 2002-2003, is the District required to reimburse the parents for tuition at Westmark, a nonpublic school?
Westmark was appropriate under Burlington and the District conceded this. The parent was entitled to tuition the District had already paid under stay put. No equitable reduction or refund was ordered.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 3. If the District failed to offer or provide a FAPE for 2002-2003, is the District required to provide compensatory educational services?
The student received no speech-language therapy from August 21, 2002 to May 2, 2003. She was awarded two hours a week of compensatory speech therapy for that period, plus reimbursement of the transportation costs the District conceded.
- Not reachedThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue 4. Did the District deny a FAPE when it failed to provide the compensatory speech and language services ordered in the July 2002 decision?
The Hearing Office lacked jurisdiction to enforce its prior final decision, which was on appeal in federal court. No party prevailed on this issue.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 5. Has the District offered a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, as described in the May 2, 2003 IEP and the July 29, 2003 addendum letter? (District-filed)
The offer of a special day class at Canyon High School was substantively deficient and was not the LRE for this student, so the District did not get the FAPE finding it sought.
- Student prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue 5(1). Whether the special day class met the student's academic need for intensive instruction and one-to-one assistance
A special day class of 15 to 20 students would not give her the intensive direct teacher instruction she needed, even with aides and accommodations.
- Student prevailed in partIEP content
Issue 5(2). Whether the IEP omitted goals and objectives in reading fluency and mathematics
The IEP improperly left out reading fluency goals for an undisputed need. The mathematics goals were appropriate.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 5(3). Whether the IEP specified the frequency and duration of counseling
Offering counseling on an "as needed" or "pop-in" basis, without frequency, duration, type, or counselor qualifications, did not meet her needs or the legal requirements. The mental health referral was never made.
- Student prevailedTransition
Issue 5(4). Whether the IEP included an adequate plan to transition from the nonpublic school to the public school
A recommended summer elective class was not a specific plan with the activities needed to support her move to a comprehensive campus and mainstream classes.
- Student prevailedTransition
Issue 5(5). Whether the IEP included an appropriate individualized transition plan
The individual transition plan added in July 2003 had generic goals and did not consider the career interests the student had stated.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 5(6). Whether the IEP included speech and language goals and objectives, and related speech services and assessment
The District made several errors: it did not immediately provide the compensatory speech sessions it had offered, it tied them to acceptance of the whole IEP, it did not do the speech reassessment the parent consented to, and it did not develop current speech goals.
- Student prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue 5(LRE). Whether the offered placement satisfied least restrictive environment requirements
The District did not show that a large comprehensive campus was what she needed. The Hearing Officer held that Westmark was the LRE in which she could receive a FAPE at that time.
- Student prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 6. If the District failed to offer a FAPE for 2003-2004 and ESY, is the student entitled to prospective placement at Westmark for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year and ESY?
Prospective placement at Westmark at District expense was ordered for the rest of 2003-2004 and ESY. The request for 2004-2005, raised in the closing brief, was rejected as untimely and unsupported.
- Student prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue 7. If the District failed to offer or provide a FAPE for 2003-2004 and ESY, is the student entitled to compensatory educational services?
The student was awarded two hours a week of compensatory speech therapy from May 2, 2003 to the decision date, delivered in a clinic setting by private therapist Ilene Umen. Umen was also to consult with teachers and reassess at District expense, and transportation costs were ordered.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Prospective funding of private placement. The District must pay in full for placement at Westmark School for the remainder of the 2003-2004 regular school year and ESY.
- Reimbursement. Within 30 calendar days of receiving an invoice, the District must pay the costs of round-trip transportation from home to Westmark from August 26, 2002 through the end of the 2003-2004 ESY. This includes reimbursing the parent for past costs and funding future costs.
- Compensatory education. The District must contract with speech pathologist Ilene Umen for two hours a week of direct one-on-one speech and language sessions for every week missed from August 26, 2002 through the decision date, except weeks when school was not in session. Sessions must be completed within two years unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. The IEP team, including the parent, may reduce the hours if conditions warrant.
- Order to provide or change services. Umen must consult with the student's teachers two hours a month for the duration of the compensatory period, at District expense. The District must also pay transportation from school to Umen's office and from Umen's office to home.
- Order to assess. Ilene Umen will conduct a speech and language reassessment. The District must reimburse her within 30 calendar days of receiving an invoice, and the parent must make the student reasonably available.
- The Hearing Officer found no basis to require the parent or Westmark to refund to the District the 2002-2003 tuition it had paid under the stay put agreement.
Key authorities
Rowley; School Committee of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; W.G. v. Target Range; Shapiro v. Paradise Valley; Amanda J. v. Clark County; Ms. S. v. Vashon Island; Adams v. Oregon; Student W. v. Puyallup; Gregory K. v. Longview; Roland M. v. Concord; Wyner v. Manhattan Beach
People named in the decision
- Martin Leiberman, director of special education, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Jamie Timmins, supervisor of special education (also spelled Timmons in the decision), William S. Hart Union High School District
- Christopher Jones, school psychologist, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Janet Meier, secretary to the director of special education, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Laurraine Pollard, general education high school English teacher, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Judith (Judy) Davidson, transition specialist, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Susan Wright, speech and language pathologist, William S. Hart Union High School District
- Barbara Barnes, special day class high school teacher and proposed case manager, Canyon High School
- Jari Smith, psychology intern providing private therapy to the student, Private
- Dr. Lisa Abrams, private psychologist and independent assessor, UCLA/H.E.L.P. group
- Dr. Phillip Levin, private psychologist and expert witness for Student, UCLA/H.E.L.P. group
- Daniel DeFinney, mathematics teacher, Westmark School
- Marcelo Frutos, history teacher, Westmark School
- Diane Seaman, tutorial coordinator, Westmark School
- Barbara Fine, tutorial teacher, Westmark School
- Ilene Umen, private speech and language therapist; ordered compensatory provider and reassessor, Private
- Patricia Lindamood, developer of the Lindamood-Bell program; witness for Student, Lindamood-Bell
- Westmark School, nonpublic school, Certified nonpublic school
- Skarda, Hearing Officer in prior case, Special Education Hearing Office
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Judith E. Ganz, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Santa Clarita, California, on November 20-21, 2003, December 3-5, 8-9, 12, and 16, 2003.
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent William S. Hart Union High School District (District) was represented by attorneys Barrett Green and Steven Groode of the law firm of Littler Mendelson. Also appearing on behalf of the District was Martin Leiberman, the District’s director of special education. Ms. Jamie Timmins, supervisor of special education for the District, substituted for Mr. Leiberman on one day of hearing. Respondent/Cross-Petitioner STUDENT (Student or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Steven Wyner, and on one day of hearing by attorney Marcy Tiffany. Also present on Student’s behalf was her mother, MOTHER.
The District questioned the witnesses called on behalf of Student and called the following District employees: Martin Leiberman, director of special education; Christopher Jones, school psychologist; Janet Meier, Mr. Leiberman’s secretary; Jamie Timmins, supervisor of special education; Laurraine Pollard, general education high school teacher; Judith Davidson, transition specialist; Susan Wright, speech and language pathologist; and Barbara Barnes, special day class high school teacher.
Student’s counsel questioned the witnesses called on behalf of the District and called the following witnesses: Jari Smith, psychology intern providing private therapy to STUDENT; Dr. Lisa Abrams, private psychologist; Daniel DeFinney, STUDENT’s mathematics teacher at the Westmark School (Westmark), the nonpublic school (NPS) STUDENT currently attends; Ilene Umen, private speech and language therapist; Patricia Lindamood, developer of the Lindamood-Bell learning program; Dr. Phillip Levin, private psychologist; Marcelo Frutos, STUDENT’s history teacher at Westmark; Diane Seaman, tutorial coordinator at Westmark; Barbara Fine, STUDENT’s tutorial teacher at Westmark; MOTHER, and STUDENT. Following the completion of Dr. Levin’s and Mr. Jones’ testimony, the Hearing Officer re-called both witnesses. Drs. Levin and Jones discussed their respective opinions. Dr. Levin testified by telephone on both occasions.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. Following the receipt of the parties’ closing briefs, on January 13, 2004, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES (Footnote 1)
Issue No. 1: Did the District fail to offer or provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2002-2003 school year, as described in the August 21, 2002 individualized education program (IEP)?
Issue No. 2: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, is the District required to provide STUDENT’s parents with reimbursement for tuition at Westmark, a nonpublic school?
Issue No. 3: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, is the District required to provide STUDENT with compensatory educational services?
Issue No. 4: Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE when it failed to provide compensatory speech and language services as ordered in the previous July 2, 2002 decision?
Issue No. 5: Has the District offered STUDENT a free appropriate education for the 2003-2004 school year and extended school year (ESY), as described in the May 2, 2003 IEP and addendum contained in a letter dated July 29, 2003?
Issue No. 6: If the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, is STUDENT entitled to prospective placement at Westmark from the date of this decision through the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year and ESY?
Issue No. 7: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory educational services?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Student’s contentions are as follows: The August 21, 2002 IEP meeting was adjourned before goals and objectives could be drafted and the District completed the IEP on its own. STUDENT’s parents received the draft IEP in the mail. STUDENT’s parents disagreed with the goals and objectives and placement. Despite parental requests to meet again, the District failed to timely reconvene the IEP team until May 2003. As a result, the District seriously infringed on parental participation in the IEP process. In addition, during the 2002-2003 school year, the District failed to provide STUDENT with speech and language services, including compensatory speech and language services as ordered in a previous decision. The District also failed to provide daily round-trip transportation from STUDENT’s residence to Westmark during the 2002-2003 school year and extended school year. The District’s offer, as described in the May 5, 2003 IEP failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE. The District’s placement offer was predetermined and the District failed to consider the placement recommendations of its own staff as well as those of the independent evaluators that STUDENT should remain at Westmark. The District’s offer failed to include intensive Lindamood-Bell services. The District failed to develop an appropriate plan for STUDENT to transition from Westmark to the District high school. The District also failed to develop an individualized transition plan required for students her age. In the area of designated instructional services, the District failed to specify the frequency or duration of needed counseling services. The amount of offered speech and language services was inadequate. Although the MOTHER consented to an speech and language assessment, the District failed to perform the assessment. STUDENT needs clinic-based speech and language services at District expense. Because a change in placement would cause psychological problems, STUDENT needs to stay at Westmark at District expense. (Footnote 2)
The District’s contentions are as follows: The August 2003 IEP meeting was lengthy and contentious. STUDENT’s delayed the process during the 2002-2003 school year because STUDENT was attending the private school of her choice. Speech and language services were not provided both because the previous hearing decision was on appeal and because STUDENT’s parents did not want services provided by the District. Even if the District committed a violation, the District agreed to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark, pending this due process hearing, for stay put purposes. The District does not want a refund. As for the 2003-2004 school year, the District’s program offer of a special day class at Canyon High School (Canyon) constituted a FAPE. STUDENT would be exposed to typically developing peers. An aide would be assigned to STUDENT’s classes beyond the special day class instructional aide, to provide as needed instructional assistance. As a way to transition from Westmark, the offer included a plan for STUDENT to attend Canyon during the summer of 2003 when fewer students were on campus. Appropriate speech and language, counseling and transportation services were offered.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Student’s Motion for Stay Put. On the third day of the due process hearing, STUDENT’s counsel asked the Hearing Officer for a stay put order to provide for STUDENT’s placement at Westmark and one hour each week of speech and language therapy services to be provided in a private clinical setting. STUDENT’s counsel asserted that the previous hearing decision operated as placement for stay put purposes, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). The District opposed the motion. It argued that Student failed to raise the stay put matter in her statement of issues and that the question of stay put is before the Ninth Circuit pursuant to both parties’ appeal of the previous decision. The previous decision expressly did not award prospective placement at Westmark for the 2002-2003 school year and limited STUDENT’s placement at Westmark to the 2001-2002 ESY. In any event, the District had already agreed to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark for stay put purposes. Student was not entitled to speech and language services because the previous decision, including that award, was on appeal. Nevertheless, the District included speech and language therapy in the August 2002 IEP, but Student rejected the entire offer.
Under federal and State special education law, unless the public educational agency and the parent agree otherwise, a special education student must remain in her then-current educational placement pending the completion of the due process hearing procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j); Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(d). This provision is commonly known as “stay put.” The purpose of the stay put provision is to maintain the status quo of the student’s educational program pending resolution of the due process hearing. Stacey G. v. Pasadena Independent Sch. Dist., 695 F.2d 949, 953 (5th Cir. 1983); Zvi D. v. Gordon Ambach, 694 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1982). For purposes of stay put, a student’s “current educational placement” is typically the placement called for by the student’s IEP which has been implemented prior to the dispute arising. Thomas v. Cincinatti Bd. of Educ., 918 F.2d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 1990.) The stay put question in this case is complicated by virtue of the fact that STUDENT was a transfer-in student from another District. When a student transfers into a new school district, the district must adopt a plan that approximates the student’s old IEP as closely as possible within existing resources. See, Ms. S. v. Vashon Island School District, 337 F.3d 1115, 1133-1135, (9th Cir. 2003.); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a). It is by now well settled that the placement ordered in a hearing decision operates as the placement for stay put purposes when a dispute arises concerning a prospective IEP. See, School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Dept. of Educ. of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
Here, the parties have “agreed otherwise” that Westmark was the appropriate school placement for stay put purposes. (District Exh. 30.) Therefore, it is unnecessary to revisit what was the appropriate school placement for stay put purposes.
The remaining questions are whether speech and language services should have been provided to STUDENT for stay put purposes pending the instant due process proceeding, and if the services were part of the stay put placement, whether the District or a private therapist should provide them. To answer these questions, the Hearing Officer must first determine whether the services were part of STUDENT’s then-current placement under the previous hearing decision (July 2002), the interim placement developed by the District when STUDENT first transferred from Glendale to the District (October 18, 2001 IEP), or the last agreed-upon and implemented IEP that was developed at Glendale (February 18, 2001).
Turning to the previous decision issued on July 3, 2002, by Hearing Officer Skarda, only an award of compensatory speech and language services was made. Mr. Skarda expressly left the question of the amount of speech and language services to provide STUDENT with a FAPE for the coming school year (2002-2003) to the discretion of the IEP team, following completion of ordered reassessments. This Hearing Officer finds that the compensatory award was only for a discrete amount and time. Accordingly, because it was not contemplated by the limited compensatory award that speech and language services were meant to be provided indefinitely, the Hearing Officer finds that the compensatory speech and language services were not part of the “State-ordered” placement for stay put purposes. See, Zvi D. v. Gordon Ambach, 694 F.2d 904 (2nd Cir. 1983).
Because the previous decision did not order speech and language services as part of its placement order, the Hearing Officer looks either to the interim placement or the Glendale IEP. In both instances, one hour of speech and language services one time each week were provided. Accordingly, there appears to be no dispute that STUDENT is entitled to one hour each week of speech and language services for stay put purposes.
The more difficult question is whether the District or a private provider should provide the speech and language services. Under the Glendale IEP that had been agreed upon and implemented before STUDENT moved into the District, STUDENT received speech and language services from a private provider. Upon STUDENT’s arrival, under its interim placement, the District offered to provide one hour of speech and language services by a District speech and language pathologist. In order to make the determination who should provide the services for stay put purposes pending the outcome of this due process hearing, the Hearing Officer would be forced to decide matters that are before the federal district court. On August 20, 2002, pursuant to a separate appeal of stay put orders of the Hearing Office during the pendency of the previous case, the United States District Court of the Central District of California decided that the “then-current educational placement” was the “interim placement offered by the District, pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code section 56325(a).” STUDENT v. William S. Hart Union High School District, citation omitted. (District Exh. 6.) Both parties appealed from that ruling which resulted in a recent order. See, STUDENT v. William S. Hart Union High School District, citation omitted. The Ninth Circuit remanded the stay put issue to be considered together with the appeal of the merits. As the Court aptly stated, the federal district court must make “‘a determination whether it was possible for the District to implement STUDENT’s previous [Glendale] IEP ‘in full’ [for stay put purposes].” This Hearing Officer would have to decide, as did the previous hearing officer, and as now under consideration by a federal district court, whether the District implemented the previous IEP to the extent possible within existing resources, by offering to provide speech and language services by District staff. In addition, the Hearing Officer would have to determine whether it was required for stay put purposes, as Student argued then and now, that the identical services provider, namely a private clinic, should provide the speech and language services to STUDENT.
As the Ninth Circuit held “the appellants [Student] have unnecessarily procedurally complicated the issues in this case.” Citation omitted. Likewise here, Student’s counsel has in effect asked this Hearing Officer to permit another bite at the same apple. Although the time period in this pending case extends past the time at issue in the previous proceeding, to resolve the question requires the exact same legal determination as required in the pending appeal. Consequently, the Hearing Officer will not reach this issue. Notably, Student’s counsel, who did not raise this complex matter until the third day of this due process hearing, and who was given the opportunity to brief the issue in the closing written argument, failed to do so.
In any event, even if the Hearing Officer were to find that the District failed to comply with stay put, the remedy would be to award compensatory educational services. As will be set out below, the Hearing Officer does award STUDENT compensatory speech and language services by a private provider for the failures of the District to offer or provide STUDENT with a FAPE for the time period at issue in this Decision. Further remedy would be duplicative and unnecessary to STUDENT’s educational needs.
Student’s Motion to Admit Reporter’s Transcripts in Lieu of Testimony. Student’s counsel argued that in lieu of live testimony from several witnesses, including Jari Smith, Patricia Lindamood, and Dr. Philip Levin, the Hearing Officer should accept transcripts of their testimony from the prior due process hearing as “evidence.” Student maintained that the previous hearing officer had failed to rule on the substantive appropriateness of the 2001-2002 offer from the District and therefore this Hearing Officer needed to admit and consider the entirety of their prior testimony. Student’s counsel acknowledged that the witnesses in question were available to testify. The District opposed the offer of transcripts because it would be denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and the testimony of those witnesses was not relevant to the matters set for this hearing.
In this due process proceeding, technical rules of evidence do not apply. However, the Hearing Officer may admit any relevant evidence “if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper the admission of such evidence over objection in civil actions. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence but shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3082(b).
The Hearing Officer denied Student’s request to admit the transcripts in lieu of live testimony. First, the Hearing Officer found that the previous due process hearing was on appeal and declined to revisit substantive issues which were the subject of that appeal. Reconsideration of that final decision at this administrative level was inappropriate. Second the Hearing Officer found that, where as here, there was no showing by Student that the witnesses were unavailable, the District would have been deprived of its right to cross-examine the witnesses as to their knowledge of STUDENT for the period at issue in the present case. The Hearing Officer would have also been deprived of the opportunity to adjudge the credibility of the witnesses. The Hearing Officer found that admission of the transcripts would be permitted for the limited purpose to show that a witness’ statement at this hearing was either consistent or inconsistent with their previous testimony. Based upon these rulings, Student’s counsel called the witnesses to testify and the Hearing Officer admitted the transcripts for that limited purpose. (Student Exhs. 22A, 23; 23A; 24.)
Student’s Motion to Adjourn Hearing. Student asked the Hearing Officer to adjourn the hearing on several occasions. Student’s counsel argued that the best way for the Hearing Officer to make a decision about STUDENT’s educational placement was to order assessments, reconvene the hearing and then rule on placement. The District asserted that Student’s counsel only made this request to delay the hearing and to have the District continue to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark.
The Hearing Officer may order impartial assessments. See, Cal. Education Code § 56505.1(e). Here, however, the two IEPs at issue are evaluated based upon the information the IEP team had at the time the program offers were made. See, Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). The Hearing Officer observed that the IEP team relied on formal assessments conducted by District staff and independent assessors in January, February and July 2002. In addition at the May 2003 IEP, the Westmark teachers provided progress reports, work samples, and personal input. Moreover, at the due process hearing, the Hearing Officer heard from Westmark teachers regarding STUDENT’s current progress and educational needs. The Hearing Officer further found that the District was entitled to a speedy resolution, in this consolidated case, whether it had offered STUDENT a FAPE in May 2003 based upon information that it had at the time. Consequently, the Hearing Officer denied Student’s motions.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT, age sixteen, lives with her family within the boundaries of the William S. Hart Union High School District. She has been eligible for special education and related services due to a specific learning disability (SLD) since 1997. At the present time, by agreement of the parties, STUDENT attends tenth grade at Westmark, a nonpublic school at District expense for stay put purposes.
STUDENT has been the subject of two previous due process hearings where her earlier school year experiences were described. See, In the consolidated matter of Student vs. Glendale Unified School District, Case No. SN135-99 (1998); In the matter of Student vs. William S. Hart Union High School District, SN01-02804 (2002). By way of summary, STUDENT attended public and nonpublic schools within the boundaries of the Glendale Unified School District until the fourth grade (1997-1998). (Footnote 3) While at Glendale, STUDENT was placed in the regular education program and attended a resource specialist program for reading, spelling and mathematics. Embarrassed by her poor reading skills and need to be removed from class to attend a resource specialist program, and teased by her peers, STUDENT developed anxiety about school, experienced somatic complaints, and frequently was absent or late. For the fifth grade and part of the sixth, STUDENT was home-schooled, but STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, refused to accept academic services offered by Glendale. For the 1998-1999 school year, the Glendale IEP team offered to place STUDENT in a special day class with occupational and speech therapies. Unable to agree on the IEP program offer, both Student and Glendale filed for due process hearing. In the consolidated matter of Student vs. Glendale Unified School District, Case No. SN135-99 (December 7, 1999). (Footnote 4) The Glendale IEP team met in accordance with the hearing officer’s order on February 28, 2001. The Glendale IEP team determined that it was unable to offer or provide STUDENT with a FAPE, and agreed to fund placement at Westmark School, a certified nonpublic school for children with specific learning disabilities. Glendale also agreed to fund speech and language services in the amount of one hour each week in a clinic setting because Westmark did not provide speech and language to its students. The IEP included assistive technology, use of a laptop computer and accommodations for state-standardized tests and extended school year services. (District Exh. 72.)
STUDENT started Westmark in the sixth grade (1999-2000 school year). On or about October 3, 2001, MOTHER moved within the boundaries of the District. (Footnote 5) Unlike Glendale, the District believed that it could provide STUDENT with a FAPE and offered an interim placement on October 18, 2001. (Student Exh. 13.) However, over the course of the 2001-2002 school year no IEP team meetings were held to devise a permanent placement. The District unsuccessfully sought to assess STUDENT, and in the interim, MOTHER paid for private evaluations. STUDENT was assessed by the UCLA/H.E.L.P. group in January 2002 by Dr. Lisa Abrams who was supervised by psychologist Dr. Phillip Levin. (Student Exh. 46.) STUDENT was found to function in the low average range and no significant difference was noted between her verbal ability and performance scores. A scatter of subtest scores revealed areas of cognitive weakness in attention and concentration, and working memory. Academic achievement screening revealed strength in phonetic decoding and weaknesses in reading comprehension, spelling, written language, and mathematics. STUDENT was reading at the second to third grade level. Based upon STUDENT’s neuro-cognitive and processing difficulties which resulted in weaknesses in reading, writing, and mathematics, the assessor concluded that STUDENT had a specific learning disability. STUDENT was also assessed by private speech pathologist Ilene Umen. Based upon STUDENT’s deficits in expressive and receptive language, Ms. Umen concluded that STUDENT would qualify for special education as a child with a speech and language impairment.
Throughout this time, STUDENT remained at Westmark, pursuant to the Glendale IEP. The attorneys for both parties exchanged a series of e-mails and letters but were unable to reach any agreements, even including when to schedule an IEP meeting. STUDENT’s counsel filed for due process alleging that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE and seeking reimbursement for tuition at Westmark. The District asked to assess STUDENT. Before the hearing convened, the Hearing Office denied Student’s request for a stay put order at Westmark. At the due process hearing, the District stipulated that Westmark was an “appropriate” nonpublic school placement under the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). On July 3, 2002, Hearing Officer Skarda decided that the failure of the District to convene an IEP meeting from November 2, 2001 through the date of his decision denied STUDENT a FAPE. Mr. Skarda ordered the District to reimburse Westmark for MOTHER’s obligation to pay STUDENT’s tuition from October 3, 2001 through October 18, 2001 (for failure to timely develop and offer an interim placement upon STUDENT’s enrollment at the District) and from November 2, 2001, through July 3, 2002. The amount was reduced by one-half based upon a finding that STUDENT’s attorney’s dilatory conduct contributed to the District’s failure to convene an IEP meeting. Hearing Officer Skarda further ordered that STUDENT was entitled to prospective placement during the 2001-2002 ESY at Westmark at District expense. Mr. Skarda declined to order the District to prospectively pay for Westmark for the 2002-2003 school year, however, because the school year and not yet begun and an offer from the District had yet to be made. Mr. Skarda also ordered STUDENT’s mother to make STUDENT available for assessment by the District.
Regarding the provision of services, the hearing officer found that during the time period at issue, STUDENT missed all the weekly one-hour speech and language sessions to which she was entitled under the Glendale IEP. Consequently, the District was ordered to provide compensatory educational speech and language therapy services to STUDENT, equal to one hour for every hour she missed, except weeks when school was not in session. Mr. Skarda ordered these speech and language sessions to be over and above whatever STUDENT required prospectively in order to receive a FAPE. Both parties have appealed from the decision as well as separate appeals regarding the stay put order. As discussed above, as of the date of this Decision, these matters are pending.
In accordance with Mr. Skarda’s order, the District conducted its own assessments of STUDENT. School psychologist Christopher Jones conducted additional limited psycho-educational testing of STUDENT in July 2002, so as not to repeat the administration of instruments used by UCLA/H.E.L.P. (District Exh. 14.) Mr. Jones agreed with the findings of the privately obtained evaluation by the UCLA/H.E.L.P. group regarding STUDENT’s cognitive functioning and areas of academic need. STUDENT was also assessed by Susan Wright, the District’s speech and language pathologist in July 2002. (District Exh. 14.) Ms. Wright agreed with the findings of Ilene Umen, who had conducted a private speech and language assessment. (Student Exh. 37.) Ms. Wright found that STUDENT demonstrated both expressive and receptive language delays. Ms. Wright testified, that based upon STUDENT’s test scores, she would also be eligible for special education as a child with a speech and language impairment. The District’s occupational therapist conducted an assessment and observed STUDENT at Westmark, reporting that STUDENT was distracted and frequently “off-task,” although responsive to teacher redirection.
The IEP team met on August 21, 2002, two days after the 2002-2003 school year term began to develop a program offer for STUDENT’s ninth grade. (District Exh. 11.) The meeting, which lasted for over four hours, was exceptionally acrimonious. Attorneys for both sides attended the meeting. The discussion centered around STUDENT’s then present levels of performance, a review of academic goals and objectives drafted by STUDENT’s Westmark teachers, and how STUDENT would be prepared to pass the California exit exam. STUDENT’s counsel asked that the goals and objectives should be drafted to comply with California essential content standards. The results of assessments performed by independent evaluators hired by MOTHER, as well as the District’s assessment results, were reviewed. STUDENT’s transition needs were also discussed. Jari Smith, STUDENT’s private therapist, told the IEP team that STUDENT should stay at Westmark because she would suffer anxiety if she had to attend a public school. Westmark teachers told the IEP team that they thought STUDENT should remain at Westmark. Martin Leiberman, director of special education for the District, recalled that some members of the District staff suggested as a compromise that STUDENT might stay at Westmark for the first semester of the fall term.
The IEP team was unable to reach agreement. Sometime later, at Mr. Leiberman’s direction, each teacher individually developed goals and objectives in his or her subject area. Mr. Leiberman compiled the teachers’ reports, prepared a typed summary of the program offer and presented this document to the attorneys for the District. The program offer for STUDENT’s ninth grade was for a special day class at the Canyon High School (Canyon). (District Exh. 11.) It was also recommended that STUDENT receive speech and language therapy twice each week for sixty minutes. The District’s counsel mailed the program offer to STUDENT’s counsel on August 27, 2002. (District Exh. 27.) At her request, MOTHER, along with Dr. Abrams and Ms. Smith visited the proposed school site, Canyon High School, on September 27, 2002. A series of e-mails and letters between counsel for the District and Student’s counsel followed that included Student’s specific challenges to the program offer.
On September 4, 2002, the attorney for the District wrote to STUDENT’s counsel stating that the District would continue to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark “on the assumption that stay put would be invoked...” (District Exh. 30.) In its closing brief, the District explained that it “abandoned its placement efforts” when it concluded that STUDENT could not reasonably transition mid-year. Starting in early October 2002, Student’s counsel provided a list of complaints concerning the offer and requested that the IEP team reconvene to revise the IEP. Student’s counsel wanted the IEP team to hear the opinions of those individuals, including STUDENT’s private therapist and the psychologist who evaluated STUDENT at UCLA, regarding their site visit. Additional e-mails and letters were exchanged between the attorneys, but no further IEP meeting was held until May 2, 2003. (District Exh. 13.) Mr. Leiberman testified that scheduling conflicts prevented the team from meeting sooner. Mr. Leiberman added that the District hoped that the question of what was a FAPE for STUDENT would be resolved in the federal district court that was considering its appeal of Mr. Skarda’s decision.
At the May 2, 2003 IEP meeting, the District offered a program at Canyon for STUDENT’s tenth grade that included a summer school as a means to transition from the nonpublic school to Canyon, and a special day class and designated instructional services for the 2003-2004 regular school year and ESY. (District Exh. 13.) By all accounts, this meeting was more congenial and constructive. STUDENT’s Westmark teachers provided information concerning STUDENT’s present levels of performance. The parties agreed that the goals and objectives of the IEP were appropriate, but continued to disagree over placement. There was additional disagreement over the provision of designated instructional services in the areas of speech and language and counseling. The parties also disagreed whether the transition plan was appropriate and over the provision of transportation services. The Canyon teachers individually refined the goals and objectives and the completed IEP was given to the District’s attorney approximately May 15, 2003. MOTHER requested an additional speech and language assessment and signed a consent form.
On October 13, 2003, the District filed for due process seeking a determination whether its offer for the 2003-2004 school year constituted a FAPE. (SN03-02146). On October 27, 2003, Student requested a due process hearing and a consolidation of the two cases. (SN03-02240). On October 31, 2003, the matters were consolidated and set for hearing. Pursuant to an agreement among the parties, from the date of the last decision to the present, STUDENT has remained at Westmark at District expense.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Issue No. 1: Did the District fail to offer or provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2002-2003 school year, as described in the August 21, 2002 individualized education program (IEP)?
Under both the State law and the IDEA all students with disabilities have the right to a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepares them for employment and independent living. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to the students at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the students’ individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). The term “related services,” referred to as designated instruction and services (DIS) in California, means transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, including language and speech remediation, adaptive physical education, counseling and guidance. Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(b)(1)(5)(9); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). Special education and related services must be tailored to meet the unique needs of the child with a disability. Polk v. Central Susquehana Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3rd Cir. 1988); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(3).
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et. al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 175 (1982), the Supreme Court recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. 458 U.S. at 205. States are required to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each child with a disability receives the FAPE to which he or she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the child’s educational placement. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of FAPE, but procedural violations that result in loss of educational opportunity to the child or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process may constitute a denial of FAPE. W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484; see also, Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990). The analysis is typically a two-part inquiry that involves a discussion of the alleged procedural violations followed by a determination whether the program offer substantively provided the pupil a FAPE. As will be discussed below, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s procedural violation in this matter was sufficiently egregious as to deny STUDENT a FAPE. Consequently, the Hearing Officer does not need to address the substantive appropriateness of the program offer for the 2002-2003 school year. See, for e.g., Shapiro, 317 F.3d at 1079.
The crux of Student’s argument is that the District’s program offer was not the result of an IEP team decision. After an unsuccessful IEP meeting in August 2002 where goals and objectives were not agreed-upon, no further IEP meeting was held until May 2, 2003. According to Student, the District seriously infringed on MOTHER’s ability to participate in the IEP process. The District maintained that it acted appropriately by sending a program offer in the mail to Student’s counsel, and that it was Student’s counsel who caused the delay by insisting that MOTHER visit the proposed high school site and by listing challenges to the IEP in correspondence following the IEP meeting.
At hearing, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that the August 21, 2002 IEP meeting which extended for over four hours was exceptionally acrimonious. Mr. Jones testified that he felt his integrity and ability had been challenged and that his opinions had been “lambasted.” After the August 2002 meeting ended without agreement, the IEP team did not reconvene until a full eight months later. A review of the written transcript and tape recordings reflected vociferous attorney argument that effectively drowned out teacher and parent discussion and any hope of collaboration. After the meeting, according to the District witnesses, the staff was taken to lunch to “debrief.” (Testimony of Leiberman.) However, the District staff did not meet with each other again to review goals and objectives. The testimony established that under orders from special education director Martin Leiberman, each teacher who was responsible for STUDENT’s program, individually crafted goals and objectives. Mr. Leiberman then compiled the independent efforts, typed a program offer and presented the end result to the District’s counsel for review. Not only did the District staff not meet together again, but completely omitted from this process were STUDENT, STUDENT’s mother and STUDENT’s nonpublic school teachers. Mr. Leiberman explained that he thought it was unnecessary to meet again with MOTHER or the Westmark teachers because he already had information from them.
The Hearing Officer finds that Mr. Leiberman’s resulting work product, which bore a stamp of approval only from the District’s attorneys instead of the IEP team, was not a substitute for a program offer derived from a collaborative IEP team effort. Despite the inability of the adults to cooperate, STUDENT was entitled to an offer of an educational program developed by an IEP team, not the special education director or the District’s attorneys. STUDENT was held hostage by the recalcitrance and rancor apparently engendered by the attorneys for both sides. (Footnote 6) The Hearing Officer is aware that, where as here, there was a communication breakdown, a district may use the information developed at prior meetings to develop a plan without parental participation. See, Ms. S. v. Vashon Island School District, 337 F.3d 1115, 1131-1132 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, however, unlike the district in Vashon Island, the District did not provide MOTHER with “repeated” opportunities to participate in the IEP process. Instead, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was unresponsive to parental requests for further meetings to discuss placement alternatives and a transition plan. (Student Exh. 27.)
The Hearing Officer further finds that the District’s explanations for its failure to reconvene an IEP meeting for eight months, namely scheduling conflicts of its attorneys and its hope for a legal determination from a reviewing court that a previous offer amounted to a FAPE, lacked merit. In fact, the District conceded that it abandoned, rather than pursued, efforts to provide an offer for the 2002-2003 school year, because it could not plan a suitable transition. The District’s failure to reconvene the IEP team to offer a program for the 2002-2003 school year that was the result of a collaborative team effort undermined the very essence of the IDEA and was incongruous with its fundamental principles. See, Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified School Dist. No. 69, 317 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003); Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.501 (b); (c).
In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that from August 21, 2002 through May 2, 2003, the procedural violations alone were sufficiently egregious and prejudicial to STUDENT as to deny her a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year. MOTHER’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process was seriously infringed. The Hearing Officer observes that although Mr. Skarda found the District denied STUDENT a FAPE because of its failure to convene an IEP meeting during the previous year, the District appeared to learn little from its past mistakes. As the Supreme Court noted in Rowley, “It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard.” 458 U.S. at 205-206. The procedural safeguards of the IDEA are intended to help ensure that a substantively appropriate IEP may be developed for the child. Id., at 206. Where, as here, important procedural safeguards have been violated, there is little assurance that the District’s offer contained within the August 28, 2002 IEP was substantively appropriate. Therefore, because the Hearing Officer has found above that the procedural violation denied STUDENT a FAPE, it is unnecessary for the Hearing Officer to also address the substantive appropriateness of the August 2002 program offer. See, Shapiro, Amanda J.
Issue No. 2: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, is the District required to provide STUDENT’s parents with reimbursement for tuition at Westmark, a nonpublic school?
The Hearing Officer found above that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE. When a school district denies a child a FAPE, the child is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). The Hearing Officer will next address the appropriate remedy.
Parents are entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the services they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. The Burlington rule of reimbursement is not so narrow as to permit reimbursement only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Education, 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). However, the parents’ placement still must meet certain basic requirements of the IDEA, such as the requirement that the placement addresses the child’s needs and provides her with educational benefit. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1993).
The evidence shows that the District, as part of its agreement to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark for stay put purposes, paid for STUDENT’s tuition from August 2002 to the present. Typically, if a school district funded the student’s nonpublic school placement pending the due process hearing, it would be unnecessary to address the question whether the District is financially liable for the Westmark tuition. However, in light of ambiguous statements whether it would seek a refund in the event it prevailed on Issue No. 1, the Hearing Officer will address the matter of reimbursement. The Hearing Officer has found above, that Westmark is the appropriate placement for stay put purposes based upon the “agreement otherwise” of the parties. The Hearing Officer separately finds that STUDENT’s mother would also be entitled to reimbursement for tuition based upon the failure to provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year as found above.
At hearing, counsel for the District refused to stipulate, as it had in the previous matter, that Westmark is an appropriate placement within the standards enunciated in Burlington. Although there was some testimony that the District was concerned about STUDENT’s limited progress in reading, Mr. Leiberman conceded that STUDENT made progress at Westmark. Ms. Jamie Timmons, who presided over the May 2003 IEP in Mr. Leiberman’s absence, testified that according to reports from Westmark teachers at that meeting, STUDENT had made educational progress. According to Patricia Lindamood, who reviewed STUDENT’s reading tests and Westmark progress reports and spoke to a teacher at Westmark, STUDENT made progress in phonemic awareness. Westmark teachers testified that STUDENT made progress in social development. No evidence was presented by the District that Westmark was an inappropriate placement under this standard. Moreover, in its closing brief, the District conceded that Westmark is “Burlington appropriate” (District Closing Brief at pp. 44-45). Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER would be entitled to reimbursement for tuition at Westmark for the separate reason that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE and that the Westmark program was appropriate under Burlington.
Equitable considerations may be taken into account in fashioning a remedy, including the conduct of the parties, and courts have broad discretion in granting relief. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; Student W. v. Puyallup, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). The District argues in its closing brief that the extended correspondence from Student’s counsel during the 2002-2003 school year was a “dilatory” tactic attempting to perpetuate STUDENT’s placement at Westmark. The Hearing Officer declines to make such a finding. It was reasonable for MOTHER to request a visit to the proposed school site. The Hearing Officer further observes that Student’s counsel requested another IEP meeting so that the results of the school observation could be further discussed with the IEP team on October 27, 2002. (District Exh. 41.) Although the District’s counsel wrote on November 11, 2002 that it would convene an IEP meeting and “coordinate schedules” (District Exh. 42), the next correspondence provided to the Hearing Officer regarding an IEP meeting was not until April 4, 2003 when the District scheduled the meeting for the following month in May 2003. (District Exh. 45.) Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds the District’s argument surprising in light of the District’s inconsistent assertion, both at hearing and in its closing brief, that it would not seek any refund of tuition from MOTHER.
In addition, the District did not convene an IEP meeting for the 2002-2003 school year until after the school term started. It acknowledged, as early as September 2002, that it was unable to develop an appropriate transition plan for the 2002-2003 school year to meet STUDENT’s needs and consequently abandoned its efforts and agreed to fund STUDENT’s placement at Westmark pending this due process hearing. The Hearing Officer finds that it was Student who requested additional IEP meetings and it was the District, with the responsibility to do so, which did not reconvene the IEP team for eight months because of “scheduling conflicts.” The District did not effectively explain why it failed to reconvene the IEP team after MOTHER’s visit in September 2002 near the start of the school year, or why it chose instead to rely upon a program offer that was created by the special education director and the District’s counsel rather than the IEP team, or why it failed to seek appropriate legal relief. See, Cal. Educ. Code § 56501. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds no basis to reduce or deny this award or to order MOTHER or Westmark to refund the costs of tuition to the District.
Issue No. 3: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, is the District required to provide STUDENT with compensatory educational services?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. In addition, equitable considerations may be weighed in granting relief and courts have broad discretion to fashion a remedy which helps a student overcome lost educational opportunity. Burlington; Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489, 1496 (9th Cir. 1994). There is no obligation to provide day-for-day or hour-for-hour compensation. “Appropriate relief is relief designed to ensure that the petitioner is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497.
Student’s counsel requests that STUDENT receive compensatory education speech and language services in the amount of two hours per week for all of the sessions she missed from August 26, 2002 through May 2003. As found above, the District denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year. During that time period, STUDENT received no speech and language therapy. (Footnote 7) As will be set out more fully in Issue No. 5, there is no dispute that STUDENT continued to have significant speech and language delays. The assessors for both the District and Student agreed that STUDENT’s deficits qualified her for special education as a student with a speech and language impairment. Ms. Umen testified that the failure of STUDENT to receive speech and language services for so many years resulted in a loss of educational opportunity. At the time that Ms. Umen assessed STUDENT, she needed intensive intervention. Although Ms. Umen acknowledged that she was unaware of STUDENT’s current needs, she testified credibly that it was likely STUDENT had regressed. Ms. Umen reviewed the District’s speech and language assessment results obtained in July 2002, and although the test instruments used were different, Ms. Umen testified that STUDENT did not exhibit a lot of progress. The District’s assessment demonstrated that STUDENT continued to exhibit the same areas of need that Ms. Umen had identified earlier. (District Exh. 14.) The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to provide speech and language services for this period of time had an adverse impact on STUDENT’s learning needs, her ability to attend, her ability to express herself verbally and in writing and her reading comprehension. (Testimony of Umen, Lindamood.)
The August 2002 IEP program offer included the provision of speech and language services. The program offered two one-hour speech and language sessions each week, with one to be provided individually and one in the classroom. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory education in the amount of two hours of speech and language therapy each week for every week she missed from August 21, 2002 through May 2, 2003, except weeks that school was not in session. (Footnote 8) The matter of who shall provide these services shall be addressed below in Issue No. 7.
Student also requests reimbursement for the costs of round-trip transportation from home to Westmark. The District concedes that MOTHER is entitled to be reimbursed for the costs of the round-trip transportation. Within thirty calendar days, upon receipt of an invoice, the District shall reimburse MOTHER for the costs of round-trip transportation from home to Westmark for the period from August 26, 2002 through May 2, 2003.
Issue No. 4: Did the District deny STUDENT a FAPE when it failed to provide compensatory speech and language services that had been ordered in the July 2002 decision?
There is no dispute that the District failed to implement the order contained within the previous decision (July 2002) to provide speech and language compensatory educational services. The District maintains that STUDENT is not entitled to these services while the previous decision is on appeal. Pursuant to a compliance complaint brought by Student, the Compliance Office of the California Department of Education decided that the District was in compliance with the Hearing Office’s order. (District Exhs. 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 89, 90.) Student asks the Hearing Officer to enforce the previous decision.
The Hearing Officer does not have jurisdiction to enforce the previous compensatory education order. The order issued in In the matter of Student vs. William S. Hart Union High School District, SN01-02804 (2002), was the final administrative determination of the matter by the Hearing Office. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(g); Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District, 223 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). Student’s counsel has sought relief in a court with competent jurisdiction to decide the issue by appealing the July 2002 decision and will not be denied due process. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i). As explained above, all matters in the previous decision, including the award of compensatory education, are presently before a federal district court. See, STUDENT v. William S. Hart Union High School District, citation omitted.
Issue No. 5: Has the District offered STUDENT a free appropriate education for the 2003-2004 school year and extended school year (ESY), as described in the May 2, 2003 IEP and addendum contained in a letter dated July 29, 2003?
In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et. al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 175 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that to receive a FAPE, the student’s IEP must be designed to meet the unique needs of the student and be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit. The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or instruction or services that maximize the students’ abilities. (Id., at 198-200.) De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some benefit.” Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2nd Cir.1998). A child’s academic progress must be viewed in light of the limitations imposed by his or her disability and must be gauged in relation to the child’s potential. Mrs. B. v. Milford Board of Education, 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997).
A stated purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). Additionally, education is the ability to be successful outside the classroom and incorporates much more than merely traditional academics. Ash v. Lake Oswego School District, 980 F.2d 585, 587 (9th Cir. 1992).
To determine whether the District’s program offered STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the program. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s program is designed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, is reasonably calculated to provide her with some educational benefit, and comports with her IEP, the District offered a FAPE, even if her parents prefer another placement and even if her parents’ preferred placement would result in greater educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program for the 2002-2003 school year must meet the following requirements to constitute a FAPE for STUDENT: be designed to meet STUDENT’s unique educational needs, be reasonably calculated to provide her with some educational benefit, and prepare STUDENT for employment and independent living. (Footnote 9)
Special education law also requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that removal of a student from the regular education environment occur only when the nature or severity of the student’s disability is such that education in regular education classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A): 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.
The Program Offer. The District’s program offer for the 2003-2004 school year was described in the May 2, 2003 IEP. (District Exh. 13.) STUDENT would be placed at Canyon High School (Canyon), an integrated campus of two thousand seven hundred students, in a special day class (SDC) for core academic subjects, along with fifteen to twenty students who had similar learning disabilities and processing disorders as STUDENT. Each class period is fifty minutes and the special day class students change class periods at the same times as their typical peers. Each special day class has one teacher and one assistant. Texts used meet California content standards but are at reading levels lower than grade level. According to Mr. Leiberman and the District’s regular education English teacher Laurraine Pollard, Canyon was chosen over STUDENT’s neighborhood school because some of Canyon’s teachers were trained to use the same Lindamood-Bell teaching method that had been used at Westmark. The offer included a specially assigned teaching assistant who would act as STUDENT’s “shadow aide” and accompany her to each class to explain assignments, answer questions and provide individual feedback. STUDENT would be mainstreamed into elective classes for one-third of her schoolday.
The offer also included school-related counseling services. The IEP did not specify the frequency and duration of the counseling but Mr. Leiberman testified that counseling services are usually provided on an “as needed” and “pop-in” basis. The IEP provided that referrals would be made to the Child Family Center through an AB3632 referral. Because the school was not STUDENT’s neighborhood school, round-trip transportation would be provided curb-to-curb from STUDENT’s home to school. Accommodations were provided for class assignments and testing. The offer included two hours each week for speech and language services and an additional sixty hours of speech and language as compensatory education. The offer included a recommendation that STUDENT attend an elective class in the summer as a way to transition from Westmark to Canyon.
The appropriateness of the District’s offer should be viewed in light of the evidence that the IEP team had at the time the offer was made. See, Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the IEP team relied on progress reports from STUDENT’s Westmark teachers and their input at the IEP meeting, as well as a review of the previous assessments conducted by District staff in July 2002 and by independent assessors in early 2002. The parties generally agreed that the present levels of performance and measurable goals and objectives set forth in the IEP were appropriate, although Student’s counsel objected that the IEP omitted goals in reading fluency and mathematics. The crux of the dispute centered around the proposed placement, and the offer of school-related counseling, speech and language and transportation services, and the lack of an adequate transition plan from the NPS to Canyon. To determine the appropriateness of the District’s program offer, the Hearing Officer turns first to a discussion of STUDENT’s unique needs.
STUDENT’s Unique Needs. The parties generally agreed that STUDENT’s intelligence is in the low average to average range, and that STUDENT has been eligible for special education under the category of a specific learning disability since 1997. Although the District found that STUDENT’s testing revealed “borderline” differences rather than a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement, the District agreed that STUDENT demonstrated difficulties in attention, visual and auditory memory, and auditory processing, and remained eligible for special education under this category. (Testimony of Leiberman, Barnes; District Exh. 13.) The parties agreed that STUDENT’s attention and auditory processing disorders manifested in difficulty with oral and written expression, listening comprehension, math calculation and reasoning, and basic reading and comprehension skills.
The parties were in general agreement regarding STUDENT’s learning style and needs. Assessments by the District, independent evaluators, and STUDENT’s teachers consistently reported STUDENT’s academic performance as approximately three to six years below her grade level in reading, writing and mathematics. STUDENT’s teachers at Westmark testified uniformly that STUDENT needed intensive instruction in order to remediate these deficits, as well as frequent repetition of instructions and redirection to focus on task. (Testimony of Frutos, De Finney, Fine.) Mr. Jones concluded that as a result of STUDENT’s academic and cognitive deficits, she needed “special attention” in math, written expression and speech and language. Speech and language assessors from both sides testified that STUDENT had considerable expressive and receptive language delays. Ms. Wright and Ms. Umen agreed that their testing results qualified STUDENT for special education as a child with a speech and language impairment. Speech and language areas of need included word knowledge, word usage and complex language formulation, following orally given directions, understanding semantic relationships and recalling information from orally presented material, sequencing events, and drawing inferences and conclusions. STUDENT presented with other areas of deficit in vocabulary development, increasing the length and complexity of sentences, thought organization and topic maintenance. There was no dispute that STUDENT needed speech and language services to address these needs. (District Exh. 14; Testimony of Wright, Umen.)
In the area of social/emotional development, the undisputed record reflected that when STUDENT had attended Glendale she had been teased by her classmates because of her learning problems and that she felt “stupid.” In addition, during that time period, STUDENT developed somatic complaints and was frequently absent from school. There was also credible evidence that the lack of speech and language services to remediate her considerable expressive language delays contributed to STUDENT’s feelings of anxiety and low self-esteem. (District Exh. 12.) The parties generally agreed that STUDENT remained a timid and vulnerable girl, but she had begun to make some progress at Westmark. Daniel De Finney, STUDENT’s math teacher at Westmark, testified that he had seen “tremendous” improvement in STUDENT’s social development and that STUDENT more frequently participated in his class. STUDENT testifiedthat she had friends at Westmark, including a current boyfriend. Ms. Smith testified that STUDENT’s self-esteem had improved while at Westmark. In 2002, both District and Student assessors made consistent observations that STUDENT seemed more comfortable and less anxious since attending Westmark. (Testimony of Jones, Umen.)
The Hearing Officer finds persuasive Dr. Abrams’ testimony that it was highly unlikely STUDENT would have been “cured” of the anxiety combined with severe learning difficulties she observed since the completion of her assessment. Although Dr. Abrams had not seen STUDENT since January 2002, her testimony was corroborated by the current observations of STUDENT’s Westmark teachers. In addition, Marcelo Frutos, STUDENT’s tenth grade history teacher, testified that STUDENT appeared tentative. Moreover, when tested by Mr. Jones in July 2002, STUDENT demonstrated anxiety during testing, particularly when asked to perform tasks that she perceived as difficult. (District Exh. 14.) Taken together, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was only just beginning to make headway toward developing friendships and positive self-esteem, and a willingness to contribute in class. Moreover, there was credible testimony from witnesses from both sides, that STUDENT, as she recalled her earlier negative experiences at Glendale, expressed anxiety about a potential return to a public school campus. (Testimony of STUDENT, MOTHER, Smith, Jones.) (Footnote 10) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s unique needs required a program that included adequate counseling to address these social/emotional needs if she were to return to the dramatically different environment of a comprehensive high school campus.
STUDENT expressed her desire to continue her education after high school and identified a variety of career interests that included teaching and modeling. The parties disputed whether the environment at Westmark was too “sheltered” to foster independence, or whether STUDENT needed the larger public school campus and a “typical adolescent experience” as a stepping stone to pursue her career goals. (Testimony of Jones, Levin.) The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT required an individualized transition plan to prepare her for independent living and makes no finding whether a “larger” campus is inherently superior to a smaller, nonpublic school to prepare her for independent living at this time in her education. The Hearing Officer does not find it useful to assess the offered educational program measured by what “typical adolescents” need, and instead focuses the analysis on STUDENT’s unique and individual needs.
In sum, STUDENT needs an intensive academic program to remediate her significant deficits with one-on-one attention for redirection and prompting in the areas of reading, writing, and mathematics. To meet STUDENT’s expressive and receptive language deficits, STUDENT needs speech and language services. To meet STUDENT’s social/emotional needs, STUDENT requires a specific order of counseling and a particularized plan to transition her to a public school campus. To foster her independence, STUDENT needs an individualized transition plan. Finally, because the recommended high school campus is not STUDENT’s neighborhood school, STUDENT requires curb-to-curb transportation.
Was the program offer designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and reasonably calculated to provide her with educational benefit?
In light of STUDENT’s needs discussed above, the next question is whether the special education program offered by the District is designed to meet those needs and to provide her with educational benefit. Student’s counsel asserted that the program offer failed to: (1) meet STUDENT’s academic need for intensive instruction and one-to-one assistance in a special day class; (2) include goals and objectives in STUDENT’s areas of academic deficit, namely reading fluency and mathematics; (3) specify the frequency and duration of counseling; (4) include an adequate plan to transition to the public school; (5) include an individualized transition plan; and (6) include speech and language goals and objectives. The District asserted that its program offer would meet STUDENT’s needs and provide her with educational benefit. The Hearing Officer will discuss each of Student’s assertions in turn.
(1) Special day class. As discussed above, there is no disagreement among the parties that STUDENT continues to exhibit significant areas of academic deficit and needs an intensive program with a low student-teacher ratio to meet her needs. In addition, there was no dispute that STUDENT had difficulty attending and was easily distracted. Student’s counsel asserted that the District’s offer of placement in a special day class would not meet STUDENT’s needs because STUDENT would be lost in a class of fifteen to twenty students. Based upon her assessment in January 2002 and observation of Canyon’s special day class in September 2002, Dr. Abrams told the IEP team in May 2003, that STUDENT’s severe learning disabilities required a small class size and recommended that STUDENT remain at Westmark. (District Exh. 13.) According to the teachers at Westmark, who testified regarding STUDENT’s current academic deficits, STUDENT required time during the teaching period for one-on-one academic assistance, frequent prompting to focus and the repetition of directions and instructions. The teachers uniformly testified that they were able to successfully meet this need because of the low student-teacher ratio.
Ms. Barnes testified that in her special day class, comprised of fifteen to twenty students, she routinely divided the class into smaller groups of four to five students for reading instruction. However, the Hearing Officer finds that even though the student-teacher ratio is reduced in this manner, STUDENT would not receive the direct teacher instruction for a full class period each day that she needs. Moreover, the District presented no evidence whether the other academic core classes were taught in a similar manner. While the instructional aides and accommodations included in the program offer would assist STUDENT to attend, the Hearing Officer finds that the weight of the evidence established STUDENT needed intensive academic teacher instruction in addition to prompts and redirection and accommodations. (Testimony of Frutos.) The IEP meeting notes confirmed that STUDENT continued to need intensive teacher instruction even though Westmark provided accommodations such as shortening assignments, longer time on tests, and preferential seating. (District Exh. 13.) Barbara Fine, STUDENT’s tutor at Westmark, testified credibly that STUDENT continued to require intensive one-on-one tutoring in writing and other English skills, because so much energy had been devoted to help STUDENT improve her reading skills. Although the District urges the Hearing Officer to reject the placement recommendations of Dr. Abrams, the Hearing Officer assesses the program offer based upon the information available to the IEP team at the time the offer was made. Here, the offer was made in May 2003, seven months after Dr. Abrams’ observation of the Canyon special day class. Moreover, the Hearing Officer finds Dr. Abrams’ testimony was corroborated by the more contemporaneous observations of STUDENT’s Westmark teachers. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the special day class was not designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs or provide her with educational benefit.
(2) Omission of goals and objectives. Student’s counsel asserted that the IEP omitted goals and objectives in the areas of reading fluency and mathematics. There was no dispute that STUDENT was reading at a slow rate, well below her grade level, and at a rate that interfered with her ability to comprehend what she read. According to Westmark teachers and Patricia Lindamood, STUDENT was only reading ninety words per minute, with three hundred words being the average rate for a student her age. That amount had to be increased in order for her to enjoy reading and improve her comprehension. (District Exh. 12; Testimony of Lindamood.) The Hearing Officer agrees with Student and finds that the District failed to effectively explain why it omitted goals and objectives in this undisputed area of need that STUDENT required to benefit from her education. See, 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(2)(ii). However, the Hearing Officer finds that the May 2003 IEP appropriately included mathematics goals and finds no basis for this assertion.
(3) Counseling services. As described above, STUDENT was a timid, vulnerable and anxious student. Although there was some disagreement over the extent of STUDENT’s anxiety illustrated by Mr. Jones’ opinion that STUDENT’s anxiety was not so marked as to impact her ability to access her education, witnesses from both sides agreed that STUDENT needed appropriate counseling supports if she was to successfully adjust to the program at Canyon. The IEP team determined that STUDENT needed counseling and a mental health referral. The Hearing Officer finds from the weight of the credible evidence that if STUDENT were to attend Canyon, STUDENT required regular and on-going counseling in order to meet her unique social/emotional needs discussed above. (Testimony of Levin, Abrams, STUDENT.) The program offer, however, failed to specify the frequency or duration of the needed counseling as the law requires. 34 C.F.R. § 300.347(a)(6); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051 (a)(2). The amount of services to be provided must be stated in the IEP, so that the level of the agency’s commitment of resources will clear to parents and other IEP team members. 34 C.F.R. Part 300, App. A., Q. 35. The Hearing Officer finds that Mr. Leiberman’s assertion that the counseling would be on a “pop-in” basis neither satisfied STUDENT’s social/emotional needs nor the legal standard cited above. In addition, the IEP failed to specify whether the counseling was educational or personal, or identify the qualifications of the counselor. See, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3051.9. Furthermore, as of the last date of hearing in this matter, no mental health referral had been made.
(4) Transition plan. Both parties agreed that STUDENT needed a specific plan if she was to make the transition to Canyon. Here, the offered placement anticipated that STUDENT would both transition to a comprehensive high school as well as to attend mainstream classes for part of her schoolday. At the time the offer was made in May 2003, summer school had not yet begun. The District’s recommendation that STUDENT attend a summer school course as a way to ease into the Canyon placement may have been an appropriate starting point. Ms. Barnes acknowledged, however, that beyond that recommendation, no specific plan or activities needed to support STUDENT’s move from an NPS to a public school or to mainstream classes was provided. See, Cal. Educ. Code § 56345 (b)(4)(A)(B). (Footnote 11)
Indeed, Ms. Barnes admitted that when another student transitioned into her class, he was provided with little more than extra time at the computer after he expressed reluctance to join other students. It was clear from the testimony that STUDENT’s self-esteem suffered while she was in public school, resulting in her belief that she was “stupid.” Since entering Westmark, STUDENT has been in classes where all the other students have learning difficulties. According to STUDENT, MOTHER, and STUDENT’s teachers, STUDENT’s self-esteem has improved. If STUDENT was to be transitioned from the environment where she feels safe and good about herself to a District comprehensive high school, more than an offer of an elective class would have to be included in her IEP to minimize her anxieties and other difficulties that would arise from the anticipation and implementation of that plan.
The District asserted that the offered counseling services provided a means to help STUDENT transition. The Hearing Officer agrees with the District that STUDENT needed counseling to help her make a successful transition. However, the Hearing Officer finds that the lack of specificity as to either the frequency or duration of the counseling discussed above made the offered transition plan that much less effectual.
(5) Individualized Transition Plan (ITP). When a student reaches age sixteen, a statement of the needed transition services of the student must be included in the IEP. The term “transition services” means a coordinated set of activities for the student that promotes movement from school to post-school activities, is based on the student’s needs, takes into account the student’s preferences and interests, and provides for a functional vocational evaluation. The ITP is “designed within an outcome-oriented process” that includes instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives and the acquisition of daily living skills. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(b); (c).
STUDENT has just turned sixteen and, accordingly, the District must consider her unique needs to be provided with skills to obtain employment and live independently. The IEP team added an ITP to its program offer on July 29, 2003. (District Exh. 50.) Judy Davidson, the District’s transition specialist who prepared the ITP, testified that she did not attend the May 2003 IEP meeting. The ITP provided that STUDENT would investigate career choices by completing surveys and developing a list of available community resources. Although STUDENT did not attend the May 2003 IEP meeting, available to Ms. Davidson and the IEP team were surveys that STUDENT completed as part of Mr. Jones’ assessment. There she named areas of interest in modeling and psychology. (Student Exh. 67.) There was no evidence that Ms. Davidson considered the interests STUDENT identified. While neither federal nor State special education law requires a particular degree of specificity, the Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Davidson failed to consider STUDENT’s particular preferences when it developed these general goals.
(6) Speech and language services. The parties agreed that STUDENT had deficits in speech and language that were significant enough to qualify her as a child with a speech and language impairment. (Testimony of Wright, Umen.) There was also no dispute that STUDENT had not received speech and language therapy services from the District since October 2001. (Student Exh. 13.) The program offer provided for speech therapy twice each week by the District, one hour individually and one hour in a group/classroom setting. Thirty additional one hour individual sessions were added to make up for the speech and language missed pursuant to the July 3, 2002 decision, as well as thirty additional one hour sessions to make up for the missed speech and language therapy from August 21, 2002 to May 2, 2003, the date of the IEP. (District Exh. 13.) At hearing, the parties disputed whether Student had accepted the offer of speech services, with Student arguing that she had, and the District maintaining Student had not. However, a review of the evidence demonstrated a dispute continued to exist, and the Hearing Officer finds that the services were not accepted. (District Exhs. 50-58; Student Exh. 28.)
The Hearing Officer finds that the award of compensatory education included within the May 2003 IEP to make up for the lost sessions from August 21, 2002 to May 2, 2003 should have been immediately implemented. There is no requirement that an award of compensatory education must be tied to a program offer or await the acceptance of part or all of the offered program.
There was no dispute that the program offer did not include current speech and language goals and objectives, but the parties agreed to rely on the goals and objectives contained within the August 2002 IEP. (District Exh. 49.) The IEP meeting notes indicated only that “speech and language objectives will be finalized at a later time.” The evidence demonstrated that speech and language was deferred pending a reassessment that had been requested by and consented to by MOTHER. Both Ms. Wright and Ms. Umen testified that a more current assessment was needed in order to determine STUDENT’s needs because she has been without these services for two and one-half years. To date, the District has not reassessed STUDENT.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to immediately provide the compensatory speech and language services, to conduct a reassessment to identify STUDENT’s current speech and language needs, and to develop goals and objectives was not designed to provide STUDENT with educational benefit.
In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that the program offer for the 2003-2004 school year was substantively deficient. The special day class would not provide the necessary intensive academic instruction and one-on-one assistance to meet STUDENT’s needs and provide her with educational benefit. The IEP omitted goals in reading fluency, the frequency and duration of counseling services, an individualized transition plan that reflected a consideration of STUDENT’s preferences, a specific plan to transition from the nonpublic school to Canyon, and speech and language goals. Finally, the District failed to immediately implement the compensatory education speech sessions and conduct an assessment. (Footnote 12)
The placement must also satisfy the least restrictive environment (LRE) requirements. See, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56364. The crux of the District’s position was based upon Mr. Jones’ opinion that pupils like STUDENT need to attend a large comprehensive high school campus to get ready for a larger college campus. Ms. Barnes added that a pupil like STUDENT needed to take the risk of being on a larger campus to prepare her for the real world. If STUDENT had been offered an appropriate program and planning, Canyon might be suitable to satisfy LRE requirements. However, not only did the District fail to make an offer of FAPE, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to present persuasive evidence that a comprehensive campus is what STUDENT needs at this time. Thus for example, while the District’s program offer provided that STUDENT would participate in the regular education program for one third of her schoolday, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP team did not identify areas of cognitive strengths in any subject that would allow STUDENT to benefit from instruction in regular education classes at this time. The Hearing Officer observes that Westmark offers a range of activities including school dances and sports teams. (Testimony of STUDENT.) Dr. Levin explained that the Westmark campus is in an urban setting and that the school makes use of community resources. The teachers at Westmark testified that many of the Westmark students go on to two and four year colleges. The Hearing Officer observes that Canyon is not STUDENT’s neighborhood school. Accordingly, benefits inherent in such a placement, such as the opportunity to socialize with neighborhood friends, do not apply. STUDENT testified that she has friends at Westmark, including a boyfriend. In addition, she has started attending a dance class after school and continues to see a few friends from Glendale.
The IDEA presumes that children with disabilities should be mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate. See, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56364. Here, however, Student successfully overcame that presumption. Consequently, the Hearing Officer finds that Westmark is the least restrictive environment where STUDENT can receive a FAPE at this time in her education.
Issue No. 6: If the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, is STUDENT entitled to prospective placement at Westmark from the date of this decision through the remainder of the 2004-2005, including the ESY?
It has been found above that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, in the least restrictive environment. When a school district denies a Student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA, which may include prospective placement at a nonpublic school at district expense. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. The Hearing Officer has already found above in Issue No. 1, that Westmark is an appropriate placement under the standards enunciated in Burlington. There is no dispute that Westmark is a certified, nonpublic school. In sum, STUDENT is entitled to prospective placement at Westmark for the remainder of the 2003-2004 regular school year and ESY at District expense. (Footnote 13)
Issue No. 7: If the District failed to offer or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year and ESY, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory educational services?
Student’s counsel requests that STUDENT receive two hours for each week of speech sessions she missed from August 26, 2002 to the date of this decision. The question presented is whether STUDENT is entitled to compensatory speech and language services, whether these services should be provided by the District or a private provider, and whether the District or an independent assessor should conduct the speech reassessment.
The Hearing Officer has found above that the District failed to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. The Hearing Officer has further found above that the District failed to provide the speech and language compensatory award contained within the May 2003 IEP (services from August 21, 2002 to the present) and impermissibly tied the provision of those separate services to Student’s acceptance of all or part of its program offer. In addition, although the parties agreed that because STUDENT had not received these needed services for two and one-half years and that STUDENT needed to be reassessed in the area of speech and language, the District failed to perform that assessment. The Hearing Officer finds from the weight of the evidence that the District’s failure to provide these speech and language services for the period of time at issue in this proceeding, exacerbated STUDENT’s lost educational opportunity. The Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT is entitled to compensatory speech and language services in the amount equal to the May 2003 program offer, namely two hours each week for every week she missed from May 2, 2003 to the date of this decision, except weeks when school is not in session, over and above the award of compensatory speech therapy sessions awarded above.
Turning to who should provide these services, the parties disputed whether STUDENT should receive some of the offered speech and language therapy in the classroom setting, or whether STUDENT should receive all the therapy in the private clinic setting. Susan Wright, the District’s speech pathologist recommended that STUDENT receive one-hour each week of the offered services in a group or classroom setting. Ms. Wright testified that typically high school students have received a wealth of speech and language services in an individual setting, and that by the high school level, they need peer feedback and support. In addition, Ms. Wright testified that the classroom setting offered the additional benefit of integrating speech and language therapy into the curriculum. The Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Wright’s recommendation did not take STUDENT’s individual needs or educational history into account. As noted above, STUDENT has not received speech and language services since August 21, 2002, and in all, has not received services since October 2001. Moreover, STUDENT was home-schooled for two years at a time when MOTHER rejected Glendale’s offer of academic assistance. Unlike Ms. Wright’s other students, STUDENT did not benefit from years of individual remediation in speech and language therapy before high school. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT needs to receive these services in a clinic setting. The Hearing Officer further finds that Ilene Umen, who provided speech and language therapy to STUDENT before, is in the best position to provide these services, as she is familiar with STUDENT and her needs. The District shall contract with Ms. Umen to provide these services. In addition to the direct services to STUDENT, Ms. Umen shall consult with STUDENT’s teachers for two hours each month for the duration of the compensatory education period, at District expense. Lastly, the District shall pay for the costs of transportation from STUDENT’s school to Ms. Umen’s office, and from Ms. Umen’s office to STUDENT’s home.
Turning to the question of a reassessment, the Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Umen, who provided speech and language therapy to STUDENT from 1999 through October 2001, can more readily conduct the reassessment than District staff because she has more intimate knowledge of STUDENT’s baseline from which to determine her current needs. The Hearing Officer makes this award because the District did not effectively explain why it failed to conduct a speech and language assessment of STUDENT, even though MOTHER consented to the assessment. Accordingly, Ilene Umen will conduct a reassessment of STUDENT at District expense.
The Hearing Officer is aware that the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grades are fairly demanding and that STUDENT’s schedule and needs should be taken into account in implementing this award. These therapy sessions shall be completed no later than two years from the date of this Decision, unless the parties agree in writing otherwise. The IEP team, including MOTHER, may in its discretion reduce the number of hours of compensatory education if conditions so warrant.
Student’s counsel also requests reimbursement for the cost of round-trip transportation from STUDENT’s home to Westmark. As stated above, the District concedes that MOTHER is entitled to be reimbursed for the costs of the round-trip transportation. The Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER is entitled to reimbursement for the costs of transportation from May 2, 2003 through the date of this Decision. In addition, the District is ordered to fund the prospective costs of round-trip transportation from the date of this Decision through the end of the 2003-2004 ESY. Within thirty calendar days, upon receipt of an invoice, the District shall reimburse MOTHER for the costs of round-trip transportation from May 2, 2003 to the end of the 2003-2004 ESY.
ORDER
1. The District is ordered to pay for STUDENT’s placement in full at Westmark for the remainder of the 2003-2004 regular school year and ESY.
2. Within thirty calendar days of the receipt of an invoice, the District is ordered to pay the costs of round-trip transportation from home to Westmark from August 26, 2002 through the end of the 2003-2004 ESY.
3. As compensatory education, the District shall contract with speech pathologist Ilene Umen to provide speech and language services in the amount of two hours direct one-on-one sessions for every week STUDENT has missed from August 26, 2002 through the date of this Decision, except weeks when school was not in session. These therapy sessions shall be completed no later than two years from the date of this Decision, unless the parties agree in writing otherwise. The IEP team, including MOTHER, may in its discretion reduce the number of hours of compensatory education if conditions so warrant. In addition to the direct services to STUDENT, Ms. Umen shall consult with STUDENT’s teachers for two hours each month for the duration of the compensatory education period, at District expense. The District shall pay for the costs of transportation from STUDENT’s school to Ms. Umen’s office, and from Ms. Umen’s office to STUDENT’s home.
4. Within thirty calendar days of the receipt of an invoice, the District is ordered to reimburse Ilene Umen for the costs of a speech and language reassessment.
5. MOTHER shall make STUDENT reasonably available for the speech and language assessment, ordered above.
PREVAILING PARTY
Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code section 56507(d) , the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:
Except for Issue No. 4, Student prevailed on the issues heard and decided. As to Issue No. 4, the Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to decide the matter and there was no prevailing party.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Dated: January 29, 2004 _________________________________ Judith E. Ganz, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. The issues have been reworded and reorganized for purposes of analysis.
2. Student’s counsel also asserted that notations on the IEPs at issue, indicating STUDENT’s severe discrepancy was “borderline,” evidenced the District’s position that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services as a child with a specific learning disability (SLD). Student’s counsel’s suspicion that the District failed to consider STUDENT as eligible for special education and related services was unfounded. (Testimony of Leiberman, Timmins.) The Hearing Officer declines to rule on matters that are unnecessary to a determination of the appropriate placement to meet STUDENT’s educational needs.
3. STUDENT attended kindergarten and first grade in a public school within the boundaries of Glendale Unified School District. Glendale assessed STUDENT at MOTHER’s request, but did not find her eligible for special education. For the second grade, STUDENT’s mother placed STUDENT in a nonpublic school so that STUDENT could be taught reading using phonics. In December 1996, MOTHER returned STUDENT to the public school for the third grade. (1996-1997). Glendale conducted another assessment at MOTHER’s request and, in February 1997, the Glendale IEP team determined that STUDENT was eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability. For the 1997-1998 school year, Glendale provided speech and language services and STUDENT was placed in a resource specialist program for reading. For the fourth grade (1997-1998), STUDENT was provided with resource specialist assistance for reading, speech, math, and written expression. Glendale also provided occupational therapy.
4. In the decision dated December 7, 1999, the hearing officer found that MOTHER’s refusal to accept academic services during the time she home-schooled STUDENT, “greatly contribut[ed]” to STUDENT’s lost educational opportunity. However, the hearing officer determined that Glendale’s offer omitted an appropriate reading goal (in the area of phonemic awareness) and that the District failed to assess STUDENT’s social/emotional needs. The hearing officer further found that the District should provide eighty hours of Lindamood-Bell services and conduct the necessary assessment. Student’s request for placement in a nonpublic school was denied because Student failed to show that the District’s offered placement with these additional services would be inadequate to provide her with educational benefit.
5. The parties continued to dispute, as they had during the previous hearing, the date MOTHER actually moved with the boundaries of the District. The Hearing Officer declined to rehash the earlier controversy and found the matter irrelevant to a determination of STUDENT’s educational needs for the time periods at issue for this hearing.
6. The attorneys displayed similar enmity toward each other throughout this due process hearing despite warnings from the Hearing Officer that the attorneys wasted substantial time haggling with each other over petty matters. Although parents and school districts have the right to advocate vigorously on behalf of their respective positions, the focus of interaction should be on STUDENT’s educational needs.
7. As noted above, Westmark does not provide speech and language services to its students.
8. The offer included thirty additional hours as compensatory education ordered in the previous hearing decision in July 2002. (District Exh. 12.) As set forth in Issue No. 4, the Hearing Officer does not have jurisdiction to enforce the award of compensatory education that was contained in the August 2002 IEP.
9. Because the program offer has not been implemented, there is no issue whether the placement conformed to the IEP.
10. There was some dispute among the parties as to the potential affect of STUDENT’s anxiety on her ability to access her education and what was the proper placement. There was no dispute, however, that STUDENT was anxious over her possible return to a public school campus.
11. These provisions require the IEP to include “(4) Provision for the transition into the regular class program if the pupil is to be transferred from a special day class or nonpublic school, nonsectarian school into a regular class in a public school for any part of the schoolday, including the following: (A) A description of activities provided to integrate the pupil into the regular education program. The description shall indicate the nature of the activity, and the time spent on each activity each day or week. (B) A description of the activities provided to support the transition of pupils from the special education program into the regular education program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56345 (B)(4)(A)(B).
12. Student asserted that STUDENT required the exclusive use of Lindamood-Bell teaching method and that only the teaching staff at Westmark were sufficiently trained to provide such instruction. The District maintained that it selected Canyon because members of its staff, including Ms. Barnes who was assigned as STUDENT’s case manager and special day class English/reading teacher, were adequately trained to continue to use the Lindamood-Bell method, as needed. Moreover, the District contended that it did not intend to scrap the entire program, but that it had developed an intensive literacy program that incorporated many aspects of the Lindamood-Bell program. It is generally recognized that the choice of methodology is within the discretion of the school district. While parents may prefer a particular methodology for their child and believe it would confer more educational benefit on her than would the program offered by a school district, the law requires the district “to provide an appropriate placement, not the best possible placement. Moreover, when a district is providing an appropriate placement, the parents do not have the right to compel the district to provide a particular educational program or methodology.” See, Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990). In light of the findings set out above, it is not necessary to determine whether the District needs to employ the Lindamood-Bell method of instruction in order to meet her unique needs or to provide her with a FAPE.
13. In his closing brief, Student’s counsel raises issues regarding the 2004-2005 school year and ESY. These matters were not presented in Student’s issues for hearing and are raised too late. In addition, there is no basis under the law or facts of this case to order the District to fund a prospective placement at Westmark. The District has made no offer for the 2004-2005 school year and there is no way to know, based upon the present record, whether it can offer a FAPE for the 2004-2005 school year.
