California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 21, 1997
Student v. Fremont Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 217-97 · Hearing Officer Kathleen Peterson
Fremont Unified's special day class offer was appropriate; parents denied reimbursement for nonpublic dyslexia school Stellar Academy.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
The parents of an 11-year-old boy filed for due process against Fremont Unified School District. The boy was eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability in reading. He had also been privately diagnosed with dyslexia and mild attention deficit disorder. He had never attended a District class. Since second grade his parents had placed him at Stellar Academy, a nonpublic school that teaches dyslexic students with the Slingerland method. At a June 1996 triennial IEP meeting, the District offered a special day class for fifth grade. The parents kept him at Stellar and sought reimbursement and continued funding.
The Hearing Officer found that the District did not have to give written notice before the meeting of what it would propose. The IEP did contain the required safeguards, test descriptions, options considered, and reasons. The IEP failed to name the class's location, a technical violation of Union School District v. Smith. That did not deny a free appropriate public education (FAPE) because the parents knew the offer was Patty Tausheck's class at Millard School. Their own expert had observed it. On the merits, Ms. Tausheck was trained in Slingerland and could deliver the multisensory, sequential teaching the student needed. Under Rowley, the choice of method was left to her. The class was on a regular campus, so it was also the least restrictive environment. Reimbursement was denied, and equitable factors separately favored the District.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated a written offer that did not name a location. It was a technical violation of Union v. Smith, but harmless where the parents clearly knew which class was offered. It also shows how SEHO applied Rowley's deference on teaching method when parents preferred one specific dyslexia method.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue I. Did the District meet the written notice procedures contained in 34 C.F.R. 300.504-.505 prior to the June 1996 IEP? If not, was STUDENT denied a FAPE? (Contention that the District had to give written notice before the meeting of the placement it would propose.)
The notice rules did not require the District to give notice before the IEP meeting of what it would propose. The placement decision belongs to the team working together at the meeting, and requiring advance notice would conflict with that process.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue I.A. Did the District provide an explanation of the procedural safeguards available to STUDENT's parents at the IEP meeting in June 1996?
The parents signed an acknowledgment that they received their rights, and no evidence showed otherwise. The safeguards were provided.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue I.B. Did the District provide a description of the evaluations or tests upon which it was basing its proposal at the IEP meeting in June 1996?
The triennial IEP summarized the tests given and their results, which adequately described the evaluations.
- Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure
Issue I.C.1. Did the District's offer of placement at the IEP meeting in June 1996 deny STUDENT a FAPE? (Whether the offer was specific enough under Union School Dist. v. Smith.)
The IEP offered a special day class without naming its location, a technical violation of Smith. It did not deny FAPE because the parents understood the offer was Ms. Tausheck's class at Millard School and took full part in the process.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue I.C.2. Did the District provide written notice of the options it considered when making its recommendation?
The IEP face sheet listed the placement options the team considered, which gave written notice of those options.
- District prevailedIEP procedure
Issue I.C.3. Did the District provide written notice of the reasons it rejected options other than the SDC that it recommended?
The stated need for a structured full-day program explained why general education and resource specialist services were rejected. The parents did not formally ask the District to fund Stellar at the June 1996 meeting.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue II. Was the special day class offered by the District in June 1996 an appropriate placement for STUDENT?
The District offered a FAPE for 1996-97. The special day class met the student's unique needs, was designed to give educational benefit, conformed to the IEP, and was the least restrictive environment.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue II.a. Was the District's proposed placement designed to meet STUDENT's unique needs?
The teacher was trained in Slingerland and would have used the cohesive, multisensory, sequential approach the student needed. Under Rowley, the choice of method was left to the teacher.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue II.b. Was the District's proposed placement for 1996-97 designed to provide educational benefit to STUDENT?
The teacher could have carried out all of the student's goals using an appropriate approach, so the placement was designed to provide some educational benefit.
- District prevailedIEP content
Issue II.c. Did the District's proposed placement conform to STUDENT's IEP?
The IEP recommended a special day class, so the Millard class conformed to it.
- District prevailedPlacement and LRE
Issue II.d. Was the District's proposed placement for 1996-97 designed to provide STUDENT with an education in the least restrictive environment?
The special day class sat on a regular elementary campus with chances to mix with nondisabled peers. The nonpublic school offered none, so the District's placement was the least restrictive.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue III. Was the parents' unilateral placement of STUDENT in Stellar Academy for the 1996-97 school year reasonable and proper, entitling the parents to retroactive reimbursement for tuition and associated costs and prospective placement at Stellar for the remainder of the school year?
Because the District offered a FAPE, reimbursement was denied. As separate grounds, equitable factors also favored the District.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- The order reads: "All of the Petitioner's other claims for relief are denied." Reimbursement and prospective funding of Stellar Academy were denied.
Key authorities
Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; Capistrano Unified School Dist. v. Wartenberg; Letter to O'Connor (OSEP 1996); Landgraf v. USI Film Products
People named in the decision
- Michael Dowler, District program specialist (District representative at hearing), Fremont Unified School District
- Karen Grites, team coordinator; witness for Student, Children's Health Council
- Dr. John M. Davis, director and chief psychologist, licensed clinical psychologist; expert witness for Student, Raskob Institute
- Judy Gray, principal; witness for Student, Stellar Academy (nonpublic school)
- Karen L. Russell, school psychologist, Fremont Unified School District
- Margaret Chakarun, special day class teacher, Fremont Unified School District
- Claire Hintergard, program specialist, Fremont Unified School District
- Patty Tausheck, special day class teacher (proposed placement at Millard School), Fremont Unified School District
- Dr. Joanne Rossi, reading specialist in private practice; witness for District, Foster City Reading and Learning Institute
- Ken Oliver, advocate who accompanied parents at the June 1996 IEP meeting
- JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, Hearing Officer (observer at hearing), California Special Education Hearing Office
- Stellar Academy, nonpublic school (unilateral placement)
- Child Development Center, Children's Hospital Oakland, private evaluator
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Kathleen Peterson, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, in Fremont, California, on April 29 and 30, and June 17, 1997. Present as an observer on April 29 and 30, 1997, was JoAnn Irwin-Eshelman, also a Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorney Michael Zatopa. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf were the following: his mother, Ms. PARENT; his father, Mr. PARENT (on April 30 and part of the day on June 17); and his grandmother, Ms. GRANDPARENT (on April 29 and 30, and part of the day on June 17).
Respondent Fremont Unified School District (hereafter District) was represented by attorney Bridget Flanagan. Also present on the District’s behalf was Michael Dowler, District program specialist.
The following witnesses were called by the Petitioner to testify: Ms. PARENT; Karen Grites, team coordinator for the Children’s Health Council; Dr. John M. Davis, director and chief psychologist of Raskob Institute; and Judy Gray, Stellar Academy principal.
The following witnesses were called by the District to testify: Karen L. Russell, District school psychologist; Margaret Chakarun, District special day class (SDC) teacher; Claire Hintergard, District program specialist; Patty Tausheck, District SDC teacher; and Joanne Rossi, reading specialist in private practice.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of closing arguments. On July 15, 1997, the Hearing Office received the closing arguments, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
I. Did the District meet the written notice procedures contained in 34 C.F.R. Reg 300.504 - .505 prior to the June 1996 IEP? If not, was STUDENT denied a free appropriate public education?
II. Was the special day class offered by the District in June 1996 an appropriate placement for STUDENT?
III. Was the parents’ unilateral placement of STUDENT in Stellar Academy for the 1996-97 school year reasonable and proper, therefore entitling the parents to retroactive reimbursement for the tuition and associated costs of Stellar Academy and prospective placement at Stellar Academy pursuant to the IEP for the remainder of the school year?
BACKGROUND
STUDENT is an eleven-year-old boy who is eligible for special education services because of a specific learning disability in reading. STUDENT has been privately diagnosed as having both dyslexia and attention deficit disorder (ADD). STUDENT has never been enrolled in a District classroom program, although he has received related services from the District. In kindergarten, STUDENT was enrolled in the Prince of Peace Lutheran School. STUDENT’s mother, who has been a teacher within the District since 1977, supervised the District’s home schooling program at the time he was to go into first grade (the 1992-93 school year). In first grade, STUDENT received home schooling administered by the District through the Vista Alternative School program.
In May 1993, at the end of first grade, STUDENT’s parents had him tested at Stellar Academy (hereafter Stellar), a certified nonpublic school specializing in dyslexic children. Stellar concluded that STUDENT was dyslexic and recommended its “summer camp” for him, with fall placement at Stellar pending his performance during the summer session. In June 1993, the District tested STUDENT and concluded that he was eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability in reading in the areas of visual processing and visual motor skills. At an individualized education program (IEP) meeting held on June 9, 1993, the IEP team agreed to have the District provide resource specialist program (RSP) pull-out services for four periods per week. In September 1993, STUDENT’s parents withdrew permission for these RSP services and unilaterally placed him at Stellar for second grade (the 1993-94 school year). STUDENT’s parents wanted a third opinion, and Stellar referred them to the Child Development Center of the Children’s Hospital of Oakland for testing. The Children’s Hospital evaluation, conducted in December 1993, concluded that STUDENT qualified for a diagnosis of either dyslexia or a specific reading disability and that there was evidence of a mild attention deficit disorder, although he was not hyperactive.
The District continued to recommend RSP services at IEP meetings held on the following dates: June 17, 1994; May 24, 1995; and January 3, 1996. Pursuant to these IEP team recommendations, STUDENT received RSP assistance from the District during third and fourth grades (the 1994-95 and 1995-96 school years) while he was unilaterally placed at Stellar. At the IEP meeting held on January 3, 1996, the District also recommended that STUDENT’s parents visit several special day classes (SDCs) for possible placement during fifth grade (the 1996-97 school year), in response to the PARENTs’ concerns regarding the adequacy of RSP services to meet STUDENT’s needs. An IEP meeting was held on February 29, 1996, in which the District suggested a “trial” placement for STUDENT during the remainder of the spring 1996 semester in one of the SDCs his parents visited. STUDENT’s parents requested that Dr. John Davis, director of the Raskob Center, licensed clinical psychologist and school psychologist, first observe the SDC classes, but he did not do so until near the end of the school year, and the trial placement did not occur. Dr. Davis twice visited Stellar and the District’s SDC at Millard School, taught by Patty Tausheck (in May and November 1996), to compare the two, and in reports written to STUDENT’s parents after each visit, he concluded that Stellar was the better placement for STUDENT. By the end of fourth grade, at an IEP meeting held June 12, 1996, the District offered to place STUDENT in an SDC instead of RSP for the 1996-97 school year (fifth grade). STUDENT’s parents did not consent to the District’s proposal at the IEP meeting in June 1996 and kept him at Stellar for fifth grade.
In October 1996, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the District conducted a speech and language assessment of STUDENT. The speech and language pathologist recommended consultation to the classroom teacher to develop specific language-based instruction for STUDENT, as well as the possibility of direct therapy to remediate mild misarticulations. After this assessment, an IEP meeting was held on November 15, 1996, in which the District continued to recommend an SDC, but added speech and language therapy services (both consultative and direct) pursuant to the speech and language pathologist’s recommendations. STUDENT’s parents did not agree to the proposed SDC placement and services, and requested that the District fund STUDENT’s placement at Stellar. At the time of the hearing, STUDENT was still attending Stellar under a unilateral placement by his parents. The parties dispute which placement is appropriate for STUDENT -- Stellar or the District SDC at Millard School with Ms. Tausheck. Stellar, which specializes in teaching dyslexic students, utilizes one method (Slingerland), which involves multisensory, group teaching. The District SDC teacher, Ms. Tausheck, uses different approaches with different students, depending on their individual needs.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Did the District meet the written notice procedures contained in 34 C.F.R. Reg 300.504 - .505 prior to the June 1996 IEP? If not, was STUDENT denied a free appropriate public education?
The Petitioner contends that the District committed a procedural violation by failing to meet the written notice procedures before the IEP meeting held in June 1996, and that this procedural violation denied STUDENT a FAPE for the 1996-97 school year. The District contends that it provided the necessary notice, and that, if any failure to provide notice did occur, such failure did not result in the loss of educational opportunity to STUDENT or the loss of parental participation in the IEP meeting and, therefore, did not deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE).
Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and federal regulations implementing the IDEA.(Footnote 1) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq.) The Supreme Court noted in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District, et al. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (1982), that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.” (458 U.S. 176, 205-206.) Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural violations which do not result in educational loss for the student or an infringement upon parental participation in the IEP process are insufficient to support a finding that the student has been denied a FAPE. (Id.)
Although it is somewhat unclear from the Petitioner’s closing brief, apparently the Petitioner contends that the District failed to provide written notification a reasonable time before it proposed at the IEP meeting in June 1996 to take an action regarding STUDENT’s education for the 1996-97 school year. In essence, the Petitioner contends that the District should have notified STUDENT’s parents before the IEP meeting in June 1996 that it was going to propose to change STUDENT’s placement to the Millard SDC at that meeting.
The District contends that the requirement of notice does not mandate that it must provide information as to its proposed change before the IEP meeting but need only provide such information at the meeting itself. The District contends that it provided the necessary written notice regarding its proposal for the Millard SDC for STUDENT’s 1996-97 school year at the IEP meeting in June 1996. The District contends that the requirement of a collaborative IEP team process makes it impossible to do what the Petitioner is suggesting -- that is, to require the District to provide notice before the meeting of its “decision.” The District asserts that a determination of the child’s placement before the IEP meeting would itself be a procedural violation because of the requirement of taking into consideration the entire IEP team’s information (including that of the parents).
The District is correct. The purpose of an IEP meeting is to allow the entire IEP team to come to a collaborative decision about the actions to be taken regarding a special education student’s placement. (34 C.F.R. § 300.343(a).) The IEP team (including the parents) is to meet, discuss the child’s needs and abilities, and attempt to come to a consensus regarding the proper goals, objectives, placement, and services required for the child to benefit from his or her education. (34 C.F.R. § 300.343 - .346.) Generally, actions are not to be taken unless all members of the IEP team agree on the placement and services and write an IEP documenting that agreement. (34 C.F.R. § 300.342.) To suggest that the District should have made those decisions prior to the IEP meeting and given notice to the parents about such a unilateral decision and the basis for it completely ignores the requirement of collaboration in the IEP process. Unilateral decisions by a school district are not within the spirit of the IDEA.
In addition, the federal Office for Special Education Programs (OSEP) has indicated that the notice requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 300.504-.505 do not apply to IEP meetings. (Letter to O’Connor, OSEP 1996, 26 IDELR 320.) The Petitioner has presented no evidence that the District should have submitted the content of its proposed placement before the IEP meeting, along with the reasons for its “decision,” when, in fact, the decision is to be made by the IEP team in collaboration at the meeting. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not commit a procedural violation by failing to give written notice before the IEP meeting in June 1996 of what it intended to propose at that meeting.
The Hearing Officer now turns to the issue of whether the District provided written notice of its proposal for STUDENT’s 1996-97 school year at the IEP meeting in June 1996. Federal regulations require written notice to be provided by a school district a “reasonable time before” the district takes certain steps concerning a special education student. (34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a).) Included within this requirement are proposals to initiate or change the evaluation, identification, or placement of a child, or refusals to do so. (Id.) The content of this notice must include an explanation of the procedural safeguards available to the child’s parents, a description of the evaluations or tests upon which the District is basing its proposal or refusal, the options considered and reasons why they were rejected, a description of the action that the District is proposing or is rejecting, and the reasons for that proposal or refusal. (34 C.F.R. § 300.505(a).)
A. Did the District provide an explanation of the procedural safeguards available to STUDENT’s parents at the IEP meeting in June 1996?
According to the IEP document dated June 12, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. PARENT were present and participated in the meeting, and agreed with the "developed IEP," although they did not agree with the recommended program placement. Their signatures are listed under the statement saying "I have been informed of parent and student rights and have received a copy of this information." (Pet. Exh. 16, p. 1.) No one testified that STUDENT’s parents were not provided a copy of the procedural safeguards. No evidence was submitted tending to show that they did not receive such a parents’ rights document, and Margaret Chakarun, District SDC teacher, testified that the District provided parents’ rights to the PARENTs at the IEP meeting in June 1996. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District provided an explanation of the procedural safeguards available to STUDENT’s parents at the IEP meeting in June 1996.
B. Did the District provide a description of the evaluations or tests upon which it was basing its proposal at the IEP meeting in June 1996?
The IEP document dated June 12, 1996, has “triannual” marked as its purpose. (Pet. Exh. 16, p. 1.) Included in the IEP document from the meeting held on June 12, 1996, is a description of several tests used in STUDENT’s triennial evaluation discussed at this meeting. (Pet. Exh. 16, p. 2.) This information is termed as a summary of STUDENT’s assessment reports and his present levels of educational performance. It includes results from a vision screening, the Beery Test of Visual Motor Integration, the Visual-Aural Digit Span Test, and the Woodcock-Johnson Psychoeducational Batter--Revised Tests. Ms. Chakarun testified that the IEP document dated June 12, 1996, summarizes prior testing and that STUDENT’s parents were provided copies of the tests and assessment results. The descriptions are not lengthy, but they adequately address the general nature of the tests given to STUDENT. Furthermore, no one testified that the IEP document did not contain a description of the evaluations or tests upon which the District was basing its proposal. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District provided a description of the evaluations or tests upon which it was basing its proposal at the IEP meeting in June 1996.
C. Did the District provide written notice of the options considered at the IEP meeting held in June 1996, and reasons why they were rejected?
1. Did the District’s offer of placement at the IEP meeting in June 1996 deny STUDENT a FAPE?
Although the Petitioner’s contention in this regard is somewhat unclear, the Hearing Officer views it as asserting that the District failed to give notice at the IEP meeting of the specific placement the District was recommending. The District contends that any failure to comply with the requirements of written notice did not rise to the level of a denial of FAPE to STUDENT.
The IEP document dated June 12, 1996, indicates that the District’s placement recommendation for the 1996-97 school year was for a “Special Day Class Program.” The IEP document does not identify a specific SDC or location. Therefore, the Hearing Officer will construe the Petitioner’s contentions as arguing that the District failed to identify a proposed placement with sufficient particularity to be considered a placement offer under Smith v. Union School District, 15 F.3d 1519 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994).
In Smith, the court held that the school district failed to make a sufficient offer of placement in the IEP document itself, and that making an offer of a specific placement at the due process hearing was too late and insufficient to comply with written notice procedures. (Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526.) In California, “placement” has been defined as follows:
Specific educational placement means that unique combination of facilities, personnel, location or equipment necessary to provide instructional services to an individual with exceptional needs, as specified in the individualized education program, in any one or a combination of public, private, home and hospital, or residential settings.
(California Code of Regulations § 3042(a).)
Therefore, in California, in order to satisfy Smith, a school district’s written placement offer should include not only the type of special education placement (e.g., regular education, RSP, SDC), but also the location of that placement. Here, although the IEP dated June 12, 1996, states that the District proposed placing STUDENT in an SDC for the 1996-97 school year, it does not include the location of that SDC. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that District failed to satisfy Smith. However, the existence of this technical procedural violation does not mean that the Petitioner is automatically entitled to a private placement paid for by the District. As stated above, only those procedural violations which cause the student to lose educational opportunity or which seriously infringe upon the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process will support a finding that the student was denied a FAPE. (W.G., 960 F.2d 1479, 1484.)
The Hearing Officer notes that STUDENT’s parents were not prevented from participating in the IEP process because of the lack of clarity in the IEP document. STUDENT’s parents were deeply involved in the process. Ms. PARENT has been a teacher for the District since 1977. (Testimony of Ms. PARENT.) The PARENTs gathered substantial knowledge of the District’s proposed placement, to the point of hiring their own expert, Dr. Davis, to observe both Stellar and Ms. Tausheck’s SDC before the IEP meeting in June 1996. (Testimony of Ms. PARENT; Pet. Exh. 18.) There is no evidence that Dr. Davis observed any other SDCs for the PARENTs.
Neither was STUDENT denied educational opportunity because of the IEP team’s failure to specifically note which SDC was being offered. The Petitioner’s parents have indicated that they understood the District’s offer as being Ms. Tausheck’s SDC, yet chose to keep him at Stellar precisely because they did not like certain aspects of that SDC -- specifically, a “whole language” approach described by Dr. Davis in his report of his observation, in the form of a letter he wrote to STUDENT’s parents. (Testimony of Ms. PARENT; Pet. Exh. 18.) Ms. PARENT testified that receiving this letter describing the SDC was what led to the dispute with the District.
One of the main concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Smith in addressing the issue of a written offer was the concern for avoiding later conflict over what was actually offered at an IEP meeting. (Smith, 15 F. 3d 1519, 1526.) The school district in Smith conceded that it never formally offered the student the placement that it, in court, argued was appropriate. (Id.) Unlike the situation in Smith, the Petitioner here concedes -- even argues -- that the District offered Ms. Tausheck’s SDC, but that it was inappropriate and that, therefore, STUDENT’s placement at Stellar should be paid for publicly.
The Hearing Officer notes that there can be no mistake that the Petitioner understood that the placement offered at the IEP meeting in June 1996 was for Ms. Tausheck’s SDC at Millard School. In fact, the Petitioner’s arguments in issues II and III indicate that no one disputes that the District’s offer for the 1996-97 school year was for Ms. Tausheck’s SDC. There was no testimony presented which tended to show that the Petitioner did not understand that the District’s offer at the IEP meeting in June 1996 was for Ms. Tausheck’s SDC at Millard School. The Hearing Officer finds that, given the unique facts and circumstances of this case, the technical procedural violation of failing to identify the location of the SDC on the IEP dated June 12, 1996, did not deny STUDENT a FAPE because it did not deny him educational opportunity and did not prevent his parents from participating in the IEP process.
2. Did the District provide written notice of the options it considered when making its recommendation?
On the face sheet of the June IEP document, there is a space to indicate "[p]lacements considered by IEP Team in determining LRE," and written in that space are the numbers “1, 2, 6." An asterisk directs the reader to a note indicating that the coding or explanation of these numbers is on the back of the page; however, the back of the page was not submitted into evidence. Ms. Chakarun testified that these numbers refer to types of placement, as follows: "1" refers to regular education; "2" refers to RSP; and "3" refers to an SDC. Ms. Chakarun indicated that there is no separate number for an NPS, so "3" could also refer to a nonpublic school (NPS). Based on the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that the IEP document dated June 12, 1996, contains written notice of the options the District considered when making its recommendation.
3. Did the District provide written notice of the reasons it rejected options other than the SDC that it recommended?
Under the “rationale for placement” section of the IEP, the following is written:
The IEP team is meeting today to review triannual progress. STUDENT continues to demonstrate average cognitive ability with strengths in the area of his verbal reasoning skills. Visual sequential memory skills, visual motor functioning and auditory memory skills are areas of weakness for STUDENT. At this time the IEP team recommends a special day class to provide a structured full day program to meet his individualized needs.
(Pet. Exh. 16, p. 1.)
Ms. Chakarun testified that the reasons for rejecting regular education and RSP services were discussed by the IEP team as part of the process, but were not specifically written into the IEP document. The Hearing Officer notes that by stating that STUDENT requires a structured, full day program to meet his needs and by recommending an SDC, the District has, in fact, given notice of the reasons it rejected regular education and RSP, since the latter types of placements do not provide a full day program. Additionally, If the Petitioner’s contention can be construed as arguing that STUDENT’s parents had asked for Stellar to be funded at the IEP meeting in June 1996, and that the District failed to indicate in writing its reasons for rejecting such a request, the Hearing Officer notes that the District need not consider funding a nonpublic school (NPS) if it is able to provide an appropriate public placement. (34 C.F.R § 300.551; Burlington School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al., v. Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985).) Furthermore, there is no evidence that the PARENTs requested Stellar to be funded at this IEP meeting. According to a later IEP document (dated November 15, 1996), the parents stated their exception to the recommended placement and requested Stellar Academy. (Pet. Exh. 22, p. 2.) However, although STUDENT’s parents were both at the June IEP meeting (accompanied by advocate Ken Oliver) and disputed the offered placement, no such exception or request for funding is noted on the relevant IEP (dated June 12, 1996). (Pet. Exh. 16, p. 1.) Ms. Chakarun testified that STUDENT’s parents did not formally request funding of Stellar at the IEP meeting in June 1996, and that, therefore, it was not an option that was formally considered and rejected. The Hearing Officer finds, based on the evidence presented, that the District formally considered regular education, RSP, and an SDC at the IEP meeting in June 1996, and that the District provided written notice of the options considered at the IEP meeting in June 1996 and the reasons some of those options (regular education and RSP) were rejected and an SDC was recommended instead.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer finds that although the District did not violate the written notice procedures contained in 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 - .505 prior to the IEP in June 1996, it committed a technical procedural violation by failing to indicate the location of the SDC. However, this technical violation did not result in a loss of educational opportunity for STUDENT, and did not seriously infringe upon his parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was not denied a FAPE.
II. Was the special day class offered by the District in June 1996 an appropriate placement for STUDENT?
The Petitioner contends that the District failed to offer an appropriate placement for the 1996-97 school year. The Petitioner asserts that because of STUDENT’s dyslexia and ADD, he requires the use of a cohesive, sequential, multisensory approach. The Petitioner contends that the SDC the District offered (Ms. Tausheck’s class at Millard School) would have been inappropriate for STUDENT because the program was designed for a multitude of different types of disabilities and the SDC teacher would have used an “eclectic” approach -- i.e., no one approach -- with STUDENT.
The District contends that it offered STUDENT an appropriate placement for the 1996-97 school year. The District asserts that the SDC taught by Ms. Tausheck at Millard School was appropriate precisely because Ms. Tausheck uses a multitude of approaches with her students, depending on their individual needs, and that she would have been able to use multisensory approaches with STUDENT. The District also contends that the SDC is the placement in the least restrictive environment because it is located on a regular elementary school campus. The District states that STUDENT would have had opportunities to be mainstreamed with nondisabled peers on this campus, opportunities which he does not have at Stellar because all Stellar students have a disability.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and federal regulations, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). (20 U.S.C. § 1400(c); 34 C.F.R. § 300.1(a).) Federal and state law mandates that all children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that includes special education and related services to meet their unique needs. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.1; California Education Code § 56000.) Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18), "free appropriate public education" is defined as special education and related services that meet state standards and are provided at public expense and in conformity with an appropriate individualized education program (IEP). (34 C.F.R. § 300.8.)
In Rowley, the Supreme Court decided the appropriate level of instruction and services that must be provided to students with disabilities in order to satisfy the IDEA. The Court held that the IDEA does not require that a student be provided with the best available special education instruction or services, or that those services maximize a student's potential. The Court stated that "the 'basic floor of opportunity' provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child." (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200.)
Here, the District’s offer for STUDENT for the 1996-97 school year was an SDC, and no one disputes that the placement was to be in Ms. Tausheck’s SDC at Millard School. The standard for determining whether the District substantively proposed an appropriate placement for STUDENT involves four factors, as follows:
a. Whether the District’s proposed placement was designed to meet the student’s unique needs; b. Whether the District’s proposed placement was designed to provide educational benefit to the student; c. Whether the District’s proposed placement conformed to the student’s IEP; and d. Whether the District’s proposed placement was designed to provide the student with an education in the least restrictive environment.
(20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.)
a. Was the District’s proposed placement designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs?
1. What are STUDENT’s unique needs?
At the end of first grade, District school psychologist Karen Russell concluded that STUDENT suffered from a specific learning disability in reading in the areas of visual processing and visual motor skills. (Dist. Exh. 9, p. 1.) The District presented this testing conclusion at the IEP meeting in June 1993, and the team agreed. (Dist. Exh. 10, p. 1.) The team noted that STUDENT’s strengths were in auditory discrimination, that his learning style was multisensory, and that he needed frequent cues to keep his attention on the task at hand because he tends to become sidetracked. (Id.)
Stellar’s evaluation of STUDENT after first grade concluded that he suffered from dyslexia(Footnote 2), and that he had relative strengths in sound-symbol relationships, although he had significant difficulty with both visual and auditory short-term memory, as well as attentional problems. (Pet. Exh. 2, p. 5.) Karen Grites, team coordinator for the Children’s Health Council, defined "dyslexia" as a language-based learning disability which usually manifests itself in reading and written language, and which usually has as its basis an auditory processing problem and phonemic awareness. (Testimony of Ms. Grites.) Ms. Grites stated that she believes STUDENT is dyslexic because he has auditory processing and phonemic awareness problems, and that he also has attentional problems.
The Children’s Hospital evaluation, conducted in the middle of second grade, indicated that STUDENT had learning weaknesses in visual fine motor skills, visual processing, auditory and visual memory, and word recall. (Pet. Exh. 4, p. 4.) The evaluation concluded that STUDENT had mild ADD (without hyperactivity) and dyslexia. (Id.)
At the end of fourth grade (the 1995-96 school year), the District’s triennial evaluation by school psychologist Karen Russell concluded that STUDENT continued to suffer from a specific learning disability in reading that was due to a disorder in visual processing and sensory motor skills. (Dist. Exh. 46, p. 4.) At the IEP meeting in June 1996, the District noted that STUDENT had very strong verbal and nonverbal reasoning skills, but had weaknesses in auditory memory and visual sequential memory.
In December 1996, Joanne Rossi, Ed.D., reading specialist and owner of Foster City Reading and Learning Institute, provided a ten-page report to the District regarding her opinion as to STUDENT’s needs and the appropriate placement for him. (Dist. Exh. 55.) In her report, Dr. Rossi noted weaknesses in auditory memory, auditory processing, visual sequential memory, visual processing, and attention. She also found that STUDENT had average to above average expressive language ability. Dr. Rossi indicated that although STUDENT also has average to above average cognitive ability, he has not yet mastered the whole reading process because he does not have all three necessary pieces: the syntactical components/grammatical structure component; the semantics (meaning) component; and the grapho-phonemic (sound-symbol relationships) component. She states in her report that STUDENT had phonemic awareness and decoding skills that helped with writing, but that these only “marginally” help him with reading.
Based on the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT has weaknesses in auditory and visual memory, auditory and visual processing, phonemic awareness, and sensory (visual) fine motor skills. The Hearing Officer also finds that STUDENT suffers from mild ADD without hyperactivity, but that he has at least average cognitive ability and strengths in verbal and nonverbal reasoning skills and expressive language. The Hearing Officer notes that the parties agreed that STUDENT requires the use of a cohesive, multisensory, sequential teaching approach to his learning; therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT requires the use of such an approach in his education.
2. What did the District offer for the 1996-97 school year?
As noted above, the District proposed a placement in an SDC with Ms. Tausheck at Millard School for the 1996-97 school year. Ms. Tausheck testified regarding her class and what she would have offered STUDENT, had he attended her class. Ms. Tausheck stated that she uses different methods with different students in her class (instead of one method with all the students) because she must consider each student’s individual needs and IEP requirements. Ms. Tausheck has completed a six-week training session in the Slingerland method (which uses a cohesive, multisensory, sequential teaching approach), as well as training in teaching learning disabled students as part of her LH (learning handicapped) credential. She stated that she would have used such a multisensory method of teaching with STUDENT. Ms. Tausheck had twelve students in her SDC class during the 1996-97 school year, eleven of whom (like STUDENT) were eligible because of specific learning disabilities and one who was eligible because of an other health impairment.
Ms. Tausheck stated that she had the assistance of an aide in her class during the 1996-97 school year. She also testified that another teacher assisted her by team-teaching on Fridays, utilizing the Read, Write, and Type program. The Petitioner’s own witness, Dr. Davis, praised the Read, Write, and Type program in his testimony. Ms. Tausheck’s class had a lower student-to-teacher ratio than did Stellar, as well as computers available. Other activities that are available on a regular campus would have been open to STUDENT as well, including club activities, sports, and music (in which STUDENT has talent).
3. Would Ms. Tausheck’s SDC have met STUDENT’s unique needs?
The Petitioner asserts that because STUDENT suffers from dyslexia and ADD, he requires a cohesive, sequential, and multisensory approach to learning to read and that the District’s proposed placement would have provided an “eclectic” approach instead of one, cohesive approach. The District does not dispute that STUDENT needs a cohesive, sequential, and multisensory approach, or that Ms. Tausheck uses different approaches with different students in her SDC. The District asserts, however, that Ms. Tausheck would have used the approach that was necessary for STUDENT to meet his unique needs.
Ms. Tausheck testified that she would have been able to meet STUDENT’s needs in her SDC during the 1996-97 school year. Ms. Tausheck stated that she uses different approaches with different students because each student has unique needs. There is no reason not to believe Ms. Tausheck’s testimony, which was supported by the testimony of Dr. Rossi. Dr. Davis, the Petitioner’s expert, stated in a letter to the PARENTs that he felt that Stellar was the “better” placement for STUDENT. (Pet. Exh. 18.) The Hearing Officer notes that whether Stellar was a “better” placement is not the issue -- the issue is whether the District’s proposed placement was appropriate.
The Hearing Officer further notes that the Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Davis, observed Ms. Tausheck’s class once in May 1996 before the June IEP meeting at a time when the school was putting on a multicultural dance festival, and he ended up talking to Ms. Tausheck in the staff room for approximately half an hour, since the class was at the festival. He did not observe her providing direct instruction to the class on that day. (Testimony of Ms. Tausheck.) Dr. Davis’s relatively limited exposure to Ms. Tausheck’s SDC on that day lessens the weight of his opinion of her class after that first observation.
In fact, after a second visit (November 1996) and seeing how Ms. Tausheck provided instruction, Dr. Davis noted in a letter to the PARENTs that her class was well-structured and that the students were respectful and cooperative and praised Ms. Tausheck’s rapport with her students and the use of the Project Read program. (Pet. Exh. 20.) Dr. Davis testified at the hearing that he felt Stellar was “more appropriate” for STUDENT than the District SDC, although he even acknowledged that due to the admittedly slow progress STUDENT has shown in reading (he is still essentially a nonreader), the services at Stellar should be intensified. Dr. Davis also testified that he essentially did not disagree with anything in Dr. Rossi’s report regarding STUDENT. Dr. Davis’ main concern about the District SDC seems to be focused on methodology. The Hearing Officer notes that, if the District’s placement can meet STUDENT’s unique needs, choice of methodology is left to the teacher’s discretion. (Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 208.) Here, credible evidence shows that Ms. Tausheck’s SDC would have met STUDENT’s unique needs, had he attended her class for the 1996-97 school year. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District offered a placement for the 1996-97 school year which would have met STUDENT’s unique needs.
b. Was the District’s proposed placement for 1996-97 designed to provide educational benefit to STUDENT?
The Petitioner contends that the District’s proposed placement for the 1996-97 school year was not designed to provide educational benefit to STUDENT because an "eclectic" approach would have been used in that class, since different students had different needs. The District contends that its proposed placement for the 1996-97 school year was designed to provide educational benefit to STUDENT because Ms. Tausheck would have used the approach that was appropriate for STUDENT according to his needs.
As noted above, Ms. Tausheck would have been able to use the appropriate teaching approach with STUDENT. Ms. Tausheck also testified that she could have implemented all of STUDENT’s goals and objectives in her SDC. Therefore, because Ms. Tausheck’s class could have been able to meet STUDENT’s objectives, and she would have used an approach the parties agreed was appropriate for STUDENT, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s proposed placement for the 1996-97 school year was designed to provide some educational benefit to STUDENT, as required under Rowley.
c. Did the District’s proposed placement conform to STUDENT’s IEP?
Here, the District’s proposed placement in Ms. Tausheck’s SDC at Millard School conforms to the IEP dated June 12, 1996, because that IEP recommends placement in an SDC. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s placement conformed to STUDENT’s IEP.
d. Was the District’s proposed placement for 1996-97 designed to provide STUDENT with an education in the least restrictive environment?
Another question that is necessary to consider is whether the District’s proposed a placement in the least restrictive environment. The Petitioner contends that STUDENT requires a placement in a nonpublic school, Stellar (at which he has no mainstreaming with nondisabled peers). The District contends that its proposed placement for 1996-97 was the placement in the least restrictive environment because it was on the campus of a regular education elementary school, providing mainstreaming with nondisabled peers for STUDENT.
The preference in special education law is to place children with disabilities in the least restrictive environment possible, considering their unique needs. (34 C.F.R. § 300.550.) Therefore, a child should not be placed in a more restrictive environment if a less restrictive placement could meet the child’s needs. The District’s proposed placement for 1996-97 was Ms. Tausheck’s SDC, which is located on the Millard School campus, a regular elementary school. STUDENT would have had the opportunity to mainstream with nondisabled students in the District’s proposed placement, even though it was an SDC, simply because of its location. No one contended that STUDENT could be educated in anything less restrictive than an SDC. In fact, the Petitioner contends that Stellar, an NPS at which there are no nondisabled students or opportunity for mainstreaming, is the appropriate placement. The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s proposed placement for 1996-97 was designed to provide STUDENT with an education in the least restrictive environment.
In conclusion, the Hearing Officer has found that the District’s proposed placement for the 1996-97 school year was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs and provide him with educational benefit, conformed to his IEP, and would have placed him in the least restrictive environment. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District offered a free appropriate public education for STUDENT for the 1996-97 school year.
III. Was the parents’ unilateral placement of STUDENT in Stellar Academy for the 1996-97 school year reasonable and proper, therefore entitling the parents to retroactive reimbursement for the tuition and associated costs of Stellar Academy and prospective placement at Stellar Academy pursuant to the IEP for the remainder of the school year?
Under Burlington School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts, et al., v. Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996 (1985), the Supreme Court held that if a school district failed to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE), the child’s parents may seek reimbursement for an appropriate private placement.
The Hearing Officer found above that the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1996-97 school year and that the technical violation of Smith did not deny STUDENT a FAPE; therefore, it is unnecessary to consider whether Stellar also provided an appropriate placement for STUDENT for that school year. The Hearing Officer denies the Petitioner’s request for reimbursement for STUDENT’s placement at Stellar for the 1996-97 school year.
The Hearing Officer notes that retroactive reimbursement requests are subject to equitable considerations. (Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 374; W.G., 960 F.2d 1479, 1486.) Here, even if the Hearing Officer had found STUDENT had been denied a FAPE (procedurally or substantively), those equitable considerations are in favor of the District. These equitable considerations include the following: STUDENT’s parents understood the offer for the 1996-97 school year as Ms. Tausheck’s SDC; the PARENTs had substantial knowledge and experience with the District, as STUDENT’s mother worked for the District since 1977; and the District made a good faith effort to offer an appropriate placement to a child never before enrolled in a District class. Therefore, on these separate grounds, the Petitioner is also denied reimbursement for STUDENT’s placement at Stellar for the 1996-97 school year.
ORDER
1. All of the Petitioner's other claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement:
I. Did the District meet the written notice procedures contained in 34 C.F.R. Reg 300.504 - .505 prior to the June 1996 IEP? If not, was STUDENT denied a free appropriate public education?
The Respondent substantially prevailed on this issue.
II. Was the special day class offered by the District in June 1996 an appropriate placement for STUDENT?
The Respondent prevailed on this issue.
III. Was the parents’ unilateral placement of STUDENT in Stellar Academy for the 1996-97 school year reasonable and proper, therefore entitling the parents to retroactive reimbursement for the tuition and associated costs of Stellar Academy and prospective placement at Stellar Academy pursuant to the IEP for the remainder of the school year?
The Respondent prevailed on this issue.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).
DATED: November 21, 1997 ___________________________________ Kathleen Peterson Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1:Amendments to the IDEA were signed into law on June 4, 1997. The request for this hearing was received before any of the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA became effective. The parties made no argument that the amendments apply here. Additionally, according to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), retroactive application of such amendments are not favored. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer will apply the law as it stood at the time of the hearing request. Footnote 2: The debate over whether dyslexia is to be considered as a basis for special education eligibility is irrelevant when, as here, the student has already been found eligible for special education services. Once STUDENT was found eligible for special education, all of his unique educational needs (including dyslexia) must be addressed, if necessary for him to benefit from his special education. (34 C.F.R. §§ 300.8 and 300.16; Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995.); Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.)
