California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · November 17, 2004
Student v. San Dieguito Union High School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 2192-04 · Hearing Officer Deborah M. Cooke
San Dieguito and Encinitas districts need not reimburse $2,000 for summer Fast ForWord program never agreed to in IEP.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Summary
A 14-year-old eighth grader eligible for special education as other health impaired filed for due process against San Dieguito Union High School District and Encinitas Union Elementary School District. He attended the Winston School, a nonpublic school in Del Mar. At a June 2002 transition IEP meeting, the parent asked that Fast ForWord, a computer-based program, be provided during summer school (ESY). The IEP notes recorded the request but did not list the program as a service. The parent's written dissent, drafted by her attorney, said that leaving the program out was "essentially" a refusal. Winston speech therapist Julia Kiel provided the program 90 minutes a day that summer. The parent later paid Winston $2,000 and sought reimbursement.
The Hearing Officer found no agreement to provide Fast ForWord. The IEP did not include it, the parent's dissent admitted it was not offered, and no contract or bill went to the districts. Even the parent's witnesses described confusion after the meeting. Because the program was not in the IEP, the question of failing to implement it was not reached. The districts did not give prior written notice of the refusal. The Hearing Officer held that this did not deny a free appropriate public education (FAPE), because there was no lost educational opportunity, the parent took part fully with an advocate, and her dissent showed she knew of the refusal. With no FAPE denial, the Hearing Officer denied reimbursement. The districts prevailed on all issues.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated an IEP like a contract that requires mutual consent. A service discussed at a meeting but left out of the written IEP was not binding. A missing prior written notice did not support reimbursement when the parent's own dissent showed she knew of the refusal and her participation was not impaired.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedIEP content
Issue 1. Did the June 4, 2002 IEP team agree that Student would receive the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 extended school year (ESY)?
No meeting of the minds; the IEP did not include Fast ForWord, and the parent's own dissent acknowledged it was not offered.
- Not reachedImplementation
Issue 2. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did agree to provide Fast ForWord during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents deny Student a FAPE by not funding the program?
Not considered because there was no agreement; districts need not provide a service not in the agreed-upon IEP.
- Procedural violation, no denial of FAPEIEP procedure
Issue 3. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did not agree to provide Fast ForWord during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents provide Petitioner prior written notice of their refusal?
Districts gave no prior written notice, but there was no lost educational opportunity or serious harm to parent participation, and the parent's dissent showed she knew of the refusal.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 4. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement of $2,000.00 for the cost of the Fast ForWord program provided during the 2002 ESY?
No reimbursement because there was no denial of FAPE.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's claims for relief denied.
Key authorities
Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; School Committee of Burlington v. Dept. of Education; 34 C.F.R. § 300.503; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1550, 1565
People named in the decision
- Julia Kiel, speech and language therapist, Winston School
- Lisa Krassny, speech and language therapist, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Kathleen Edwards, educational advocate for parent
- Jennifer Turner, program specialist / administrative designee, Encinitas Union Elementary School District
- Mary Ellen Nest, coordinator of special education; district representative at hearing, San Dieguito Union High School District
- Beverly K. Barrett, director of pupil personnel services; district representative at hearing, Encinitas Union Elementary School District
- Heather Lutz, district staff (recipient of signed assessment plan), San Dieguito Union High School District
- Winston School, nonpublic school, Del Mar, California
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Covina, California, on October 19 and 20, 2004.
STUDENT (hereafter STUDENT or Petitioner) was represented at the hearing by attorney Michael Cochrane. Also present on behalf of Petitioner was his mother, MOTHER. San Dieguito Union High School District (hereafter San Dieguito or Respondent) was represented at the hearing by Mary Ellen Nest, coordinator of special education for San Dieguito. Encinitas Union Elementary School District (hereafter Encinitas or Respondent) was represented at the hearing by Beverly K. Barrett, director of pupil personnel services for Encinitas. (Footnote 1)
The following witnesses were called by Petitioner to testify: MOTHER; Julia Kiel, speech and language therapist at the Winston School; Lisa Krassny, speech and language therapist for San Dieguito; and Kathleen Edwards, educational advocate.
The following witnesses were called by San Dieguito and Encinitas: Jennifer Turner, program specialist for Encinitas; Mary Ellen Nest; and Beverly Barrett.
Oral and documentary evidence was received and the record was left open for the submission of the parties’ written closing arguments, which were timely postmarked. Following receipt of the parties’ closing arguments, the matter was submitted for decision.
ISSUES
1. Did the June 4, 2002 individualized education program (IEP) team agree that STUDENT would receive the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 extended school year (ESY)?
2. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did agree to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by not funding the program?
3. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did not agree to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents provide Petitioner prior written notice of their refusal?
4. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement of $2,000.00 for the cost of the Fast ForWord program provided during the 2002 ESY?
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner contends that the June 4, 2002 IEP team agreed that he would be provided the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, but Respondents failed to fund the services. According to Petitioner, the parent, educational advocate, and speech therapist all left the June 2002 IEP meeting believing that Respondents had agreed to provide Fast ForWord that summer. Petitioner does not argue that he required the Fast ForWord program to substantively receive a FAPE; instead, he argues that Respondents denied him a FAPE by failing to fund the Fast ForWord services in accordance with his IEP. In the alternative, if the Hearing Officer finds that there was no such agreement by the IEP team to provide the program, Petitioner contends that Respondents were required to provide prior written notice of their refusal of the parent’s request to provide the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY.
Petitioner contends he is entitled to reimbursement of the cost of the Fast ForWord program on either of two grounds. If the Hearing Officer finds that Respondents authorized the Fast ForWord program for the 2002 ESY at the June 2002 IEP meeting, then reimbursement to the parent for funding that service is appropriate because Respondents should have paid the cost in the first instance. If the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner was denied a FAPE due to a procedural error by not being provided notice of Respondents’ refusal to fund the program, then Petitioner argues that he is entitled to reimbursement because the program addressed his needs and provided him educational benefit.
Respondents contend there was no agreement at the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting to provide the Fast ForWord program and an absence of that agreement in the IEP meeting notes proves that fact. According to Respondents, since Petitioner was transitioning into the high school district, they proposed to first conduct an evaluation and, based on evaluation data, to determine the instructional strategies, programming, and support services STUDENT required. Additionally, Respondents argue that the parent’s June 10, 2002 dissent acknowledges the Respondents’ refusal to fund Fast ForWord. Respondents also argue that the absence of an agreement was also supported by the fact that Respondents did not have a contract or service agreement with Winston School to provide Fast ForWord, and that Winston did not present a bill for the service.
Respondents also contend that if the Hearing Officer finds a procedural error and reimbursement is to be considered, it should not be awarded to Petitioner’s parents because the services Petitioner received were not appropriate and there was no measurable progress in STUDENT’s areas of need. Additionally, Respondents argue that the parents are not entitled to reimbursement because they failed to provide ten days’ written notice of their intent to withdraw STUDENT from school and place him in Fast ForWord for 90 minutes each day. According to Respondents, the parents at no time noticed them of their intent to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program and seek reimbursement.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fourteen-year-old eighth-grade student who is eligible for special education services under the eligibility category of other health impaired. STUDENT is currently enrolled in the San Dieguito Union High School District, having transferred from the Encinitas Union Elementary School District upon his graduation from sixth grade in or about August 2002. STUDENT currently attends the Winston School, a nonpublic school located in Del Mar, California, pursuant to his IEP.
During the 2001-2002 school year, STUDENT was in the sixth grade and then eligible for special education services under the category of emotionally disturbed. On February 25, 2002, Petitioner and Encinitas entered into a settlement agreement in another due process matter (SN01-02140). In that settlement agreement, Petitioner and Encinitas agreed that Encinitas would fund his placement at the Winston School for the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year and that a transition IEP meeting would be held in June 2002 to determine, among other things, appropriate placement and services for STUDENT within the San Dieguito Union High School District for the 2002 ESY and the 2002-2003 school year. The parties also agreed that a representative of San Dieguito would be invited to this IEP meeting.
An annual/transition IEP meeting was held on June 4, 2002, at the Winston School. In attendance were STUDENT’s classroom teacher and speech therapist from Winston, STUDENT’s mother, parent advocate, an administrator from San Dieguito, and a program specialist/administrative designee from Encinitas. At this meeting, the Respondents agreed to continue STUDENT’s placement in a special day class at Winston for the 2002 ESY and until an evaluation by the Respondents was completed. Transportation was also offered, along with designated instruction and services of speech and language consultation, one time per week for thirty minutes until the follow-up IEP meeting reconvened to review assessment results. The June 2002 IEP meeting notes reflect the parent’s request that Fast ForWord, a computer-based program, be implemented for STUDENT at Winston during summer school in 2002. Moreover, various witnesses at the hearing testified that there was considerable discussion about the provision of this program during the IEP meeting. The IEP document, however, does not reflect whether the IEP team agreed to provide the Fast ForWord program during the summer school session. This omission is the source of the current dispute.
On or about June 12, 2002, San Dieguito received STUDENT’s mother’s written dissent to the June 4, 2002 IEP. Although titled a dissent, STUDENT’s mother agreed to most of the IEP, including the goals and objectives in the IEP, STUDENT’s placement at Winston School, extended school year, transportation to Winston, and speech services one time per week for thirty minutes. Also included at the end of that dissent was a statement by the mother reminding the Respondents that she had requested that Fast ForWord be a part of STUDENT’s summer program. The dissent also stated that although there had been much discussion about the Fast ForWord program, it was not listed as a designated instructional service in the IEP. The dissent then stated that “essentially, this is a refusal to my request.” There was no testimony or documents indicating that there was a response to MOTHER’s statement in the dissent regarding the Fast ForWord program.
STUDENT attended summer school at Winston from June 20, 2002, through August 2, 2002, missing one day on July 22, 2002. During that period, Winston’s speech therapist provided the Fast ForWord program to STUDENT for 90 minutes each day. The Fast ForWord program was an added cost of $2,000.00 to Winston’s base tuition. (Footnote 2)
By letter dated June 25, 2002, Mary Ellen Nest, on behalf of San Dieguito, had forwarded to MOTHER an evaluation plan for her approval and signature. By letter dated August 20, 2002, Kathleen Edwards, educational advocate for the parent, responded to Ms. Nest’s letter and asked why San Dieguito wanted to reassess STUDENT in order to determine a placement. In that letter, Ms. Edwards reminded Ms. Nest that the mother had already agreed to the placement but that San Dieguito had not yet authorized an individual contract with the Winston School for STUDENT. There was no mention of the Fast ForWord program in the letter. In addition, enclosed with her letter, Ms. Edwards forwarded another copy of MOTHER’s dissent to the June 4, 2002 IEP; however, this version did not include the reference to the Fast ForWord program that was included on the first version of the dissent initially forwarded to San Dieguito. MOTHER signed the evaluation plan on September 20, 2002, and forwarded it in a letter dated September 23, 2002, to Heather Lutz at San Dieguito.
According to MOTHER, Winston School advised her during the summer of 2003 that it had been unable to collect the fees due for the Fast ForWord program provided to STUDENT during the 2002 ESY and would therefore bill her. It is not clear from the record which Respondent Winston attempted to bill for payment. However, on or about July 25, 2003, MOTHER paid the $2,000.00 to Winston and requested her advocate, Kathleen Edwards, to write Encinitas to request reimbursement for her payment for the Fast ForWord program.
By letter dated October 13, 2003, to Beverly Barrett at Encinitas, Ms. Edwards informed Encinitas that STUDENT had received Fast ForWord during the summer between his sixth and seventh grades and that the mother was requesting reimbursement of the $2,000.00 she had paid to Winston for the program. MOTHER believed the service had been agreed upon in an IEP meeting with both Encinitas and San Dieguito representatives present. The letter included a Winston invoice for the Fast ForWord program; however, the dates indicated on the invoice were for the year 2003 ESY. (Footnote 3)
Ms. Barrett responded to Ms. Edwards by letter dated October 23, 2003, stating that Encinitas did not fund programs for children who have left the elementary district and are in the seventh grade.
According to Ms. Nest, Ms. Edwards did not write to San Dieguito requesting that it reimburse the parent for Fast ForWord and, to her knowledge, Winston did not write to San Dieguito to collect payment for the Fast ForWord program. The record is, therefore, unclear as to whether Winston ever billed San Dieguito for the Fast ForWord service and whether Petitioner ever requested reimbursement for Fast ForWord from San Dieguito prior to naming it as a respondent in the instant matter.
Having failed to receive reimbursement of the $2,000.00 from either school district, on August 31, 2004, Petitioner requested a due process hearing, naming both the high school and elementary school districts as respondents and seeking reimbursement of the $2,000.00 payment for Fast ForWord.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Did the June 4, 2002 individualized education program (IEP) team agree that STUDENT would receive the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 extended school year (ESY)?
Petitioner contends that he was denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) because the June 4, 2002 IEP team agreed that he would receive instruction in the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, but the Respondents failed to fund that program. Petitioner argues that an agreement to provide Fast ForWord is supported by the testimony of three witnesses - MOTHER, Kathleen Edwards, and Julia Kiel.
Respondents argue that there was no agreement at the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting to provide Fast ForWord, which is verified by an absence of such agreement in the IEP meeting notes, by the mother’s June 10, 2002 dissent to the IEP, and the lack of any contract or service agreement between the Respondents and Winston, or a bill for Fast ForWord service presented to the Respondents.
Under the IDEA and Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 207-208, 102 S.Ct. 3034, the Respondent=s proposed program must have met the following three requirements in order to have constituted a FAPE: (1) been designed to meet STUDENT=s unique needs; (2) been reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit; and (3) comported with his IEP. Petitioner does not dispute that Respondents’ program was designed to meet his needs and reasonably calculated to provide him educational benefit. Rather, Petitioner argues that Fast ForWord was a part of his IEP and that the Respondents failed to meet its obligation under the third prong above, by not providing Fast ForWord in conformity with his IEP.
The Hearing Officer first looks to the June 4, 2002 IEP document to determine whether any agreement to provide Fast ForWord was memorialized in writing. If Fast ForWord was a part of STUDENT’s IEP, then Respondents would be obligated to provide that program in conformity with his IEP. The only reference to Fast ForWord in the June 2002 IEP is the following statement that was included in the IEP meeting notes: “The family is requesting Fast Forword be implemented at Winston School for summer school.” (Encinitas’s Exh. 6, pg. 17.) There is no specific notation in the IEP document as to how or whether the Respondents responded to the parent’s request for Fast ForWord. However, it is clear from the face of the IEP document that the IEP team did not memorialize in writing any agreement to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program. Moreover, the parent’s written dissent to the June 2002 IEP further appears to acknowledge that there was no agreement to provide Fast ForWord. On or about June 10, 2002, MOTHER submitted a written dissent to the June 4, 2002 IEP, which included the following three sentences:
I would also like it noted that I requested that Fast Forward be a part of STUDENT’s summer school program. Although there was much discussion about it, Fast Forward was not listed as designated instructional services. Essentially, this is a refusal to my request.
(Encinitas’s Exh. 7, pg. 22.)
The dissent was written by MOTHER’s attorney, Michael Cochrane, who did not attend the June 2002 IEP meeting. MOTHER testified that her statement in the dissent did not mean that she understood that the Respondents had refused her request. According to MOTHER, the last two sentences of her dissent were added after she faxed the June 4, 2002 IEP notes to her attorney and told him that the IEP team had agreed to provide Fast ForWord. After reviewing the notes, Mr. Cochrane told her that Fast ForWord was not included in the IEP, so he drafted a dissent. MOTHER testified that after submitting the dissent, she expected that the Respondents would either correct the IEP meeting notes or tell her that they did not intend to provide Fast ForWord. Neither of these expected events occurred. Nevertheless, in spite of this uncertainty, as discussed further below, MOTHER instructed the speech therapist at Winston School, Julia Kiel, to provide STUDENT instruction in the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY.
The Hearing Officer concludes that not only does the June 2002 IEP document not include Fast ForWord as a service to STUDENT, but the June 10, 2002 parent dissent acknowledges that the program was requested by the mother, discussed by the team, and not listed in the IEP document as an offered service. Moreover, in the dissent, MOTHER appears to acknowledge that Respondents refused her request for the Fast ForWord program.
The Hearing Officer next turns to discuss whether the Respondents were obligated otherwise to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program. An IEP can be likened to a contract in that it is an agreement between the school district and the student’s parents about the educational program that will be provided to the student. The essential element of an enforceable contract includes consent by the parties. (Cal. Civ. Code § 1550.) Moreover, the consent of the parties to a contract must be free, mutual, and communicated by each to the other. (Cal. Civ. Code. § 1565.)
MOTHER testified that during the June 2002 IEP meeting, the IEP team discussed STUDENT’s being pulled out of class for 90 minutes each day to receive instruction in the Fast ForWord program. According to MOTHER, everyone at the IEP meeting agreed that STUDENT needed Fast ForWord and she requested that the program be provided during the 2002 ESY. MOTHER stated that she understood that STUDENT would receive the Fast ForWord services during his summer program as part of the Respondents’ FAPE offer. MOTHER also testified, however, that after the meeting, some questions arose about the way the IEP was written and Winston had expressed concern about whether the school districts would pay for Fast ForWord. MOTHER conferred with her educational advocate, Kathleen Edwards, about this concern and Ms. Edwards recommended that if there was a problem with payment, she (the parent) should go ahead and pay for Fast ForWord and then file a due process complaint against the school districts for reimbursement. (Footnote 4) MOTHER then informed Winston to provide the Fast ForWord program to STUDENT and assured Winston that if the school districts did not pay for the program, then she would pay for it and file a due process claim against the Respondents for reimbursement.
Kathleen Edwards, who represented STUDENT at the June 2002 IEP meeting, testified that the school district representatives told STUDENT’s speech and language therapist, Julia Kiel, to go ahead and provide the Fast ForWord program; however, there was confusion over which school district was responsible for the ESY. According to Ms. Edwards, she left the IEP meeting with the understanding that Fast ForWord would be provided by the speech therapist at Winston School and paid for by one of the school districts, only she was not sure which one.
Julia Kiel, who also attended the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting, testified that not many conclusions were reached at the IEP meeting and that “everything was pretty vague.” Because of this confusion, Ms. Kiel stated that she asked for clarification about whether she should provide STUDENT instruction in the Fast ForWord program since she typically does not provide the program without clear agreement by the team. According to Ms. Kiel, the school district representatives present at the IEP meeting responded by either saying “Yes” or nodding their heads in the affirmative. However, Ms. Kiel testified that she spoke with MOTHER after the meeting because there had been a great deal of disagreement about Fast ForWord as they left the IEP meeting. According to Ms. Kiel, MOTHER reassured her that she (the parent) would take care of paying for Fast ForWord if the disagreement continued or if problems later arose with the school districts.
Mary Ellen Nest attended the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting as San Dieguito’s representative. Ms. Nest stated that she wrote the IEP meeting notes and that the Respondents did not intend to provide Fast ForWord during the 2002 ESY. Ms. Nest testified that she did not recall Ms. Kiel asking her if she was authorized to provide Fast ForWord to STUDENT and did not recall any agreement to include Fast ForWord in STUDENT’s IEP. According to Ms. Nest, the intent of San Dieguito was to first assess STUDENT, since San Dieguito did not have the information it needed to make a good recommendation regarding instructional methods. Ms. Nest testified that the IEP team discussed Fast ForWord and she told the parent that they would not make a determination regarding Fast ForWord, or any other supports and services, until the evaluation was completed. She stated that when she received the parent’s June 10, 2002 dissent, she believed that MOTHER understood that the Respondents would not provide Fast ForWord.
After receiving the June 10, 2002 dissent, Ms. Nest testified that she had no other exchanges with MOTHER about Fast ForWord. In fact, in a June 25, 2002 letter and evaluation plan sent to MOTHER, Ms. Nest did not mention the Fast ForWord program. (San Dieguito’s Exh. 7.) When Ms. Edwards responded by letter dated August 20, 2002, on behalf of the parent to Ms. Nest, she, likewise, did not mention anything about Fast ForWord and referred only to San Dieguito’s request to assess. (Pet.’s Exh. 7.) It is noted that Ms. Edwards enclosed with her letter a revised version of the parent’s June 10, 2002 dissent, which did not include the last three sentences regarding the Fast ForWord program. (Footnote 5) A September 23, 2002 letter from MOTHER to San Dieguito in which she forwarded the signed assessment plan also fails to mention any concern about the Fast ForWord program. (San Dieguito’s Exh. 4.)
Program specialist Jennifer Turner, who attended the June 2002 IEP meeting as the administrative designee for Encinitas, testified that the IEP team discussed a number of issues, but she did not have a specific recollection of a discussion about Fast ForWord. Ms. Turner also did not recall Ms. Kiel asking her if she should implement the Fast ForWord program for STUDENT. Ms. Turner testified that she wrote most of the IEP document, except for the meeting notes, and recalled that the IEP team wanted to do an assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability before recommending an educational program, including the supports and services, since he had been attending Winston.
The Hearing Officer finds that the evidence persuasively establishes that there was no meeting of the minds at the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting regarding the provision of the Fast ForWord program and, therefore, no agreement. Although the parent, Ms. Kiel, and Ms. Edwards all testified that it was their understanding that the Respondents had agreed to provide Fast ForWord, each of them also indicated that after the IEP meeting, there was still some confusion about whether the Respondents had agreed to fund the program. Moreover, the parent’s dissent acknowledges that the program was only discussed at the IEP meeting and not written into the IEP. The dissent also appears to acknowledge the Respondents’ refusal to provide Fast ForWord. Additionally, the lack of any service agreement between the Winston School and the Respondents to provide Fast ForWord and the lack of any bill to the Respondents from Winston School for Fast ForWord services rendered also support the conclusion that there was no agreement by the June 4, 2002 IEP team to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program.
In light of the fact that there is no provision in the June 4, 2002 IEP for Fast ForWord and no persuasive evidence outside of the IEP document establishing that the Respondents had consented to provide the program, the Hearing Officer concludes that the June 4, 2002 IEP team did not agree that STUDENT would receive the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY.
2. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did agree to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by not funding the program?
Given the Hearing Officer’s conclusion above that there was no agreement to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, the Hearing Officer need not consider whether STUDENT’s educational program comported with his June 4, 2002 IEP. The Respondents were not required to provide STUDENT a service that was not a part of his agreed-upon IEP.
3. If the June 4, 2002 IEP team did not agree to provide STUDENT the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY, did Respondents provide Petitioner prior written notice of their refusal?
Petitioner argues that Respondents were required to provide him prior written notice if they refused the parent’s request to provide him the Fast ForWord program during the 2002 ESY. According to Petitioner, Fast ForWord was related to his special education placement and the provision of a FAPE, thus triggering the prior written notice duty.
Parents of children with disabilities are provided procedural protections under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and federal regulations implementing the IDEA, including the protection that requires a school district to provide the parent with prior written notice a reasonable time before the district refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child or the provision of a FAPE to a child. (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq; 34 C.F.R. § 300.503.) The Supreme Court noted in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 205-206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, that “Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation” at every step “as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP.”
The Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents did not provide the parents with prior written notice of their refusal to provide the Fast ForWord program.
Although the Supreme Court in Rowley has recognized the importance of procedural protections, not all procedural violations result in a denial of a FAPE. Procedural violations which result in a “loss of educational opportunity” or which “seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process clearly result in the denial of a FAPE.” (W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).) Petitioner did not provide persuasive evidence that he lost educational opportunity because of the lack of prior written notice of the refusal.
There was also no showing that Petitioner’s parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP formulation process was seriously infringed. MOTHER was represented at the June 4, 2002 IEP meeting by an educational advocate, she received the notice of procedural safeguards, and her attorney reviewed the IEP document and drafted her June 10, 2002 dissent (both versions). There was no persuasive evidence that the parent did not have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in the IEP formulation process.
Additionally, the Hearing Officer finds that the parent’s June 10, 2002 written dissent, in which she acknowledges the Respondents’ refusal to provide the Fast ForWord program to STUDENT, demonstrates that Petitioner had sufficient notice that the Respondents had not agreed to provide Fast ForWord. Moreover, Respondents’ witnesses testified that not only was there no agreement to provide Fast ForWord, but there had been no outright refusal to provide Fast ForWord at some future time because a final determination regarding Fast ForWord and any other supports and services for STUDENT was not intended to be made until the Respondents had reassessed STUDENT and reviewed the assessment data. (Testimonies of J. Turner, M. Nest, and B. Barrett.)
In light of the above, the Hearing Officer finds that there was no denial of a FAPE.
4. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement of $2,000.00 for the cost of the Fast ForWord program provided during the 2002 ESY?
Parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for services they have procured for their child when a school district failed to provide a FAPE, and the services provided by the parents are determined to be proper under the IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(c).) The Hearing Officer determined above that there was no denial of a FAPE. Therefore, Petitioner’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement of $2,000.00 for the cost of the Fast ForWord program.
ORDER
All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this requirement.
Respondents prevailed on all issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (California Education Code § 56505(i).)
Dated: November 17, 2004 __________________________________ Deborah M. Cooke, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
The Hearing Officer refers to Encinitas and San Dieguito collectively as “Respondents” because the school districts presented their respective cases and closing arguments together and indicated at hearing that the views stated by either district were representative of the views of both districts. Additionally, Respondents indicated that if there were a finding that the parent is entitled to reimbursement, then both districts would assume responsibility for payment.
2 According to Mary Ellen Nest, Encinitas funded STUDENT’s base tuition at Winston during the 2002 ESY up to July 1, and San Dieguito funded the base tuition beyond July 1, 2002.
3 MOTHER testified that during the summer of 2003, Winston sent her the invoice for payment of the Fast ForWord program when Winston realized that after one year of attempting to collect payment, Respondents were not going to pay the bill. According to MOTHER, although the invoice is dated 2003, the bill is actually for Fast ForWord services provided during the 2002 ESY.
4 According to Ms. Nest, the parent did not sign the IEP document at the meeting, but took it home for review and discussion.
5 Although Petitioner’s attorney acknowledged that the second version of the dissent did not include the Fast ForWord language, Petitioner did not provide an explanation as to why the revised dissent was later forwarded to the District.
