California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 14, 2004

Student v. Bakersfield City Elementary School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2280-03, SN-2280-03 · Hearing Officer Terrence B. Ohler

Bakersfield City Elementary must fund nonpublic school placement and provide 68 hours of one-to-one discrete trial training after an unclear IEP offer.

Split decision: student prevailed on 7 of 15 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None noted. The Hearing Officer struck the 2004 ESY issue as not ripe without barring a later challenge. He also declined to hear the late-raised transportation issue and did not decide whether it could be raised in a later hearing.

Summary

The parent of an 11-year-old boy with autism filed for due process against Bakersfield City Elementary School District. Under a May 2003 mediated agreement, the District funded his placement at Valley Achievement Center (VAC), a nonpublic school, through October 31, 2003. At an October 23, 2003 IEP meeting, the District offered a special day class for students with autism at College Heights Elementary. The parents rejected it. The student was out of school for about three weeks until the Kern County Regional Center began funding VAC.

The Hearing Officer found that the offer did not provide a FAPE. Under Union School District v. Smith, the written offer had to be clear. It said nothing about discrete trial training (DTT), the core teaching method. It did not include or refer to the toileting and sensory plans the District relied on. Its "transition plan" was only a note that the teacher would observe the student at VAC. The hand-biting document was a generic draft that did not meet California's requirements for a behavioral intervention plan. The Hearing Officer rejected claims about other behaviors, "tolerance training," and classroom safety. He treated the social-needs claim as withdrawn.

The District must provide 68 hours of one-to-one DTT within a year. It must finish its behavior assessment and hold an IEP meeting with VAC to write a hand-biting plan. It must also fund VAC's morning program through June 3, 2004.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO applied Union v. Smith strictly. A district could not rely on plans that were not stated, attached, or referenced in the IEP offer. A generic draft behavior report was not a behavioral intervention plan. A parent's expected refusal did not excuse the district from making a complete written offer.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1. Did the District offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year at an IEP meeting held on October 23, 2003?

    The offer was procedurally deficient under Union v. Smith and substantively failed to address the student's needs for DTT, toileting, sensory, transition, and hand-biting; Petitioner was the substantially prevailing party.

  2. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1A. Whether the offer sufficiently described the nature and amount of discrete trial training (DTT) and met the student's need for DTT

    The IEP said nothing about DTT format or frequency. That was a Union violation, and the failure to offer any DTT was also a substantive denial of FAPE.

  3. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1B. Whether the District offered plans addressing the student's toileting and sensory needs

    The earlier toileting and sensory plans were not stated, attached, or referenced in the October 23, 2003 IEP. No plan was offered, so there was a Union violation and a substantive denial.

  4. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1C. Whether the District offered an appropriate transition plan from VAC back to College Heights

    Two sentences about the teacher observing at VAC were only a first step and not a plan. The parents' conduct did not excuse the District, and the lack of a plan was a Union violation and a substantive denial.

  5. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1D(1). Whether the District offered a behavioral intervention plan addressing hand-biting

    The October 21, 2003 'generic' draft report lacked the elements required by 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f) and was too vague to implement. Its use was a Union violation and a substantive denial.

  6. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1D(2). Whether the District was required to address behaviors other than hand-biting (spitting, voluntary vomiting, eloping)

    The evidence did not show these behaviors were active concerns on October 23, 2003, or that the District had reason to know of them.

  7. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 1E. Whether the offer addressed the student's 'tolerance training' needs (waiting and tolerating change)

    The agreed waiting goal addressed waiting. Petitioner's own experts did not support further tolerance training at the time of the offer.

  8. Dismissed / withdrawnPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1F. Whether the District denied FAPE by failing to integrate the student with general education peers at recess and lunch

    Petitioner abandoned the issue as stated in the closing brief. New issues could not be raised in the brief, so the Hearing Officer treated the issue as withdrawn.

  9. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1G. Whether the District denied FAPE by offering a placement in an unsafe environment (electrical outlets, elopement, spreading feces)

    The District had no reason to know the outlet and elopement concerns were current. The campus was secure, and the parent conceded feces-spreading was not a current concern.

  10. Issue 1-2. Did the District's proposed placement comport with STUDENT's IEP?

    Not reached because the offer already failed to provide a FAPE.

  11. Issue 1-3. Did the District's proposed placement provide STUDENT an education in the LRE?

    Not reached because the offer already failed to provide a FAPE.

  12. Dismissed / withdrawnFAPE: services offered

    Issue Withdrawn. Whether the proposed special day class teacher had the required competencies and teaching credential

    Petitioner withdrew the issue on the fourteenth day of hearing.

  13. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Struck. Whether the District offered a FAPE for extended school year 2004

    The District's motion to strike was granted because no 2004 ESY offer had been made yet, so the issue was not ripe. A later challenge was not barred.

  14. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

    The student missed 68 hours of school after District funding ended. The District must provide 68 hours of one-to-one DTT and complete the FAA and a hand-biting BIP for VAC.

  15. Issue 3. Is STUDENT entitled to continued placement at Valley Achievement Center (VAC) for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year?

    VAC was a generally appropriate certified nonpublic school where the student made substantial progress. Given his difficulty with transitions, the District must fund VAC through June 3, 2004.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Compensatory education. The District must provide 68 hours of one-to-one DTT, in addition to the DTT the student receives during the regular school day. The IEP team must schedule the hours so all are delivered within one year of the decision, considering the length of the student's school day (including the VAC after-school program) and his capacity to absorb extra instruction.
  • Order to assess. As compensatory education, the District must finish any additional work needed on the functional analysis assessment (FAA) requested by VAC and presented in Ms. Meagher's October 21, 2003 report within 20 calendar days of the decision, so a BIP for hand-biting at VAC can be developed.
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 10 days after the FAA is complete, the District must convene an IEP meeting that includes a VAC representative to develop an appropriate BIP for the student's placement at VAC, based on the FAA findings.
  • Prospective funding of private placement. The District must fund the student's placement in VAC's morning program for the rest of the 2003-2004 school year, ending June 3, 2004. Tuition must be paid on a timely basis so the parents do not have to advance payment.
  • Reimbursement. If the parents paid for VAC's morning program for any period from February 2004 without being reimbursed (for example, by Kern County Regional Center), the District must fully reimburse each such month within 20 calendar days of receiving proof of payment. No dollar amount was stated.

Total: 68 hours of compensatory services

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Glendale Unified School Dist. v. Almasi; Knable v. Bexley City School Dist.; W.G. v. Target Range School Dist.; Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist.; Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Burlington; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter; Alamo Heights ISD v. State Bd. of Educ.; Honig v. Doe

People named in the decision

  • Micky Hennen, educational advocate for Student, United Cerebral Palsy
  • Donald Dever, director of special education, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Ennio Cipani, Ph.D., licensed psychologist; expert witness for Student, Alliant International University
  • Michelle Ranuschio, special education teacher, Valley Achievement Center (nonpublic school)
  • Justin Thompson, special education teacher (student's VAC teacher), Valley Achievement Center (nonpublic school)
  • Jay Fisher, Ph.D., licensed psychologist; expert witness for Student
  • Timmy Torres, special education teacher, proposed special day class at College Heights Elementary, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Fran Katlett, certification specialist, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Julius Steele, Ed.D., assistant director of special education, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Shirley Nicholas, special education program specialist, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Marcus Shira, Ph.D., licensed educational psychologist; expert witness for District
  • Laird Rasmussen, licensed occupational therapist (part-time contractor), Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Patrick Wadman, speech-language pathologist, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Shelly Meagher, school psychologist; conducted functional analysis assessment, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Melissa Young, school psychologist, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Nick Bordagaray, former special day class teacher at College Heights Elementary, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Karl Czechowski, former special day class teacher (ESY 2002 and spring 2003), Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Wendi Wanner, occupational therapist, Bakersfield City Elementary School District
  • Valley Achievement Center, certified nonpublic school (student's placement)
  • Kern County Regional Center, regional center that funded VAC placement

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Terrence Ohler, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Bakersfield California, on December 16-19, 2003, January 6-9, 13-16, 21-23, and 27-28, 2004.

Petitioner (or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Nicole Misner from the law firm of Anton, Misner & Associates. Also present on the Petitioner’s behalf was his mother (MOTHER) and at times his stepfather (STEPFATHER) and Micky Hennen, United Cerebral Palsy educational advocate. Respondent Bakersfield City Elementary School District (Respondent or District) was represented by attorney Michelle Sullivan of the law firm of Miller Brown & Dannis. Also present on the District’s behalf was Donald Dever, the District’s director of special education, and at times, Deborah Ungar, attorney with the law firm of Miller Brown & Dannis.

The Petitioner called the following witnesses: MOTHER; Ennio Cipani, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist and a psychology professor at Alliant International University; Michelle Ranuschio, a special education teacher at Valley Achievement Center (VAC), a certified nonpublic school; Justin Thompson, a special education teacher at VAC; Jay Fisher, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist; Timmy Torres, a special education teacher for the District at College Heights Elementary School (College Heights); and STEPFATHER.

The District called the following witnesses: Fran Katlett, the District’s certification specialist; Julius Steele, Ed.D., the District’s assistant director of special education; Shirley Nicholas, the District’s special education program specialist; Marcus Shira, Ph.D., a licensed educational psychologist; Laird Rasmussen, a licensed occupational therapist who is contracted by the District on a part-time basis; Patrick Wadman, a licensed speech and language pathologist employed by the District; Shelly Meagher, a District school psychologist; Melissa Young, a District school psychologist; and Mr. Dever.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. Following receipt of written closing arguments, the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

On the first day of hearing, the District brought a motion to strike the issue of whether the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the extended school year (ESY) of 2004. Although the District acknowledged that STUDENT qualified for ESY, the District’s counsel represented that an offer had not yet been made for 2004. The Hearing Officer granted the District’s motion on the basis that the issue of the 2004 ESY was not ripe. The Hearing Officer specifically noted that his ruling would not preclude Petitioner from later challenging the District’s offer for the 2004 ESY in a separate due process hearing.

On the fourteenth day of hearing, Petitioner withdrew an issue regarding the competency and credentialing of Mr. Torres, the classroom teacher at the District’s proposed placement for the 2003-2004 school year. (Footnote 1)

On the sixteenth day of hearing, Petitioner raised the issue of transportation expenses for the first time. Petitioner indicated that he was seeking reimbursement for transportation expenses incurred. He also sought a ruling that the District was obligated to provide Petitioner’s transportation from the date of the decision in this case through the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year. On the next day of hearing, the Hearing Officer ruled that it was too late in the hearing to raise new issues. The Hearing Officer also noted that he was not ruling on whether this specific ruling would preclude Petitioner from raising the issue in a subsequent due process hearing.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING (Footnote 2)

1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2003-2004 school year at an individualized educational program (IEP) meeting held on October 23, 2003? (Footnote 3)

2. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

3. Is STUDENT entitled to continued placement at Valley Achievement Center (VAC) for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year?

CONTENTIONS

Petitioner contends that the District’s offer stated in the October 23, 2003 IEP document does not offer STUDENT a FAPE because it is both procedurally and substantively defective. Procedurally, Petitioner contends that the offer is defective because the District did not provide a clear written offer with respect to a toileting plan, a sensory plan, a transition plan from VAC back to the District’s program at College Heights, or a behavioral support plan. Petitioner also contends that the District’s offer did not sufficiently describe the specifics of the program at College Heights by not indicating the nature and amount of time STUDENT would be receiving discrete trial training (DTT). Substantively, Petitioner contends that the District’s offer does not meet STUDENT’s needs in these same areas, namely his toileting needs, his sensory needs, his transition needs, his behavioral needs, and his need for extensive amounts of DTT. In addition to these areas, Petitioner contends that the offer is deficient because it does not meet his need for “tolerance training,” which relates to tolerating change and waiting, and his need for a safe classroom environment. Petitioner also contends that his needs require maximum utilization of DTT, minimization or elimination of group learning time, assignment of a one-to-one instructional aide, and isolation in a cubicle to minimize distractions. As a result of these alleged procedural and substantive defects, Petitioner contends that he is entitled to sixty-eight hours of compensatory education and to remain in his private placement at VAC for the remainder of the school year.

The District contends that its offer was procedurally and substantively appropriate. The District contends that its October 23, 2003 IEP document is a written offer that provided a FAPE and that the plans noted above were included as part of its offer, even though some plans were contained in separate documents. As to the transition plan in particular, the District contends that STUDENT’s parents prevented the District from developing the plan. Substantively, the District contends that its placement and program would have addressed all of STUDENT’s needs. Because its offer was appropriate, the District contends Petitioner is not entitled to an award of compensatory education or to remain at VAC. Furthermore, it contends VAC is not an appropriate placement for STUDENT and is too costly.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is an eleven-year-old student (born [date redacted]) who is receiving special education because of autism. He also has been diagnosed with severe mental retardation, although this is not a diagnosis noted on his IEP documents. As of the last day of hearing on January 28, 2004, STUDENT was attending Valley Achievement Center (VAC), a certified nonpublic school.

STUDENT was diagnosed with autism when he was approximately fifteen months old. At age three, he entered the public school system in North Carolina. When STUDENT was five years old, his family moved to the State of Washington, where he attended one district and later another district. On October 1, 2001, STUDENT and his family moved to Bakersfield, California, because, in part, his mother had learned about an educational program in Bakersfield, namely VAC, that she thought would be beneficial to STUDENT. On November 9, 2001, STUDENT enrolled in the District and attended a special day class at College Heights Elementary School taught by Mr. Nick Bordagaray. (Footnote 4) Mr. Bordagaray remained STUDENT’s teacher through the remainder of the 2001-2002 school year. During the extended school year 2002, Mr. Karl Czechowski was STUDENT’s teacher. For the 2002-2003 school year, Mr. Bordagaray resumed his role as STUDENT’s teacher until approximately February 25, 2003, when Mr. Czechowski took over Mr. Bordagaray’s class for the remainder of the school year. However, on March 12, 2003, STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, removed STUDENT from Mr. Czechowski’s class because she was concerned that STUDENT had been abused. The parties agreed that the Hearing Officer would not adjudicate whether the abuse allegation was true, and they entered into a stipulation regarding the allegation. (Footnote 5) From March 13, 2003, until May 18, 2003, STUDENT remained out of school.

On May 15, 2003, the parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement. (Agreement; Exhibit S or Exhibit 23. ) (Footnote 6) The Agreement resolved all issues between the parties through the 2002-2003 extended school year. The Agreement provides that as compensatory education, the District agreed to fund STUDENT’s placement at a certified nonpublic school specializing in services for children with autism from May 19, 2003, through October 31, 2003. Accordingly, STUDENT enrolled in and attended VAC’s morning program for that period of time. STUDENT had been attending, and continued to attend, VAC’s after-school program as well. The Agreement further provided that the IEP team would meet on or before September 30, 2003, “to discuss College Heights School’s SDC [Special Day Class] program and consider transitioning STUDENT back to the District.” (Exhibit S-4.) As will be discussed below, the parties dispute whether the District offered an appropriate transition back to the District’s placement and whether the District offered STUDENT an appropriate program from November 1, 2003, through the end of the 2003-2004 school year. STUDENT’s parents never consented to the District’s written offer presented in an IEP document dated October 23, 2003. (Exhibit 37.) However, STUDENT’s parents did consent to goals and objectives listed in an IEP document dated September 11, 2003, which was incorporated by reference into the October 23, 2003 IEP document.

On October 29, 2003, the Hearing Office received Petitioner’s request for this due process hearing. From the time the District’s obligation to fund STUDENT’s private placement ended on October 31, 2003, pursuant to the Agreement, until November 20, 2003, STUDENT did not attend school and had no educational program during the normal school day. However, STUDENT continued attending VAC’s after-school program during this time. After obtaining alternate funding from the Kern County Regional Center, STUDENT resumed attending VAC’s morning program as of November 21, 2003. From then until the date the hearing ended on January 28, 2004, STUDENT attended both VAC’s morning and after-school programs, which continued to be funded by the Kern County Regional Center.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2003-2004 school year at an individualized educational program (IEP) meeting held on October 23, 2003?

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to a child at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State educational agency, include appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education, and are provided in conformity with the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). (Footnote 7) Special education law also requires that a child with a disability be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

Such special education and related services must be tailored to meet the unique needs of the child with a disability by means of an IEP. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3rd Cir.1988). The IEP, which is the “centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system for disabled children,” consists of a detailed written statement that must be developed, reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56343, 56345; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988). The IEP must include a statement of the goals and objectives, special education and related services, and program modifications or supports for school personnel that are to be provided to meet the child’s needs resulting from his or her disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum and be educated and participate with nondisabled children to the maximum extent possible. Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56031, 56345.

In Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., et al. v. Rowley (Rowley) 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the United States Supreme Court determined that a child’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the child with some educational benefit to satisfy the IDEA, but that the school district is not required to provide the child with the best education available or instruction and services that maximize the child’s abilities. Id., at 198-200. The Court held that a school district is required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” consisting of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child. Id., at 201. Consequently, an appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the child. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir.1996). De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2nd Cir.1998). To determine whether a school district substantively offered a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s placement. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the proposed program (1) would have addressed STUDENT’s unique needs, (2) was reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, (3) comported with his IEP, and (4) provided for education in the least restrictive environment (LRE), then the District offered a FAPE, even if the parents prefer another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would likely result in greater educational benefit. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he or she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process do result in the denial of FAPE. Id., at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

A procedural violation that may constitute a denial of FAPE is the failure of a school district to make a specific, written offer of placement in compliance with the IDEA’s procedural requirements. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994) (cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). The Hearing Officer will refer to such a violation as a Union violation. As the Ninth Circuit stated in Union, “this formal requirement [of a written offer of placement] has an important purpose that is not merely technical, and we therefore believe that it should be enforced rigorously.” Id. The Court elaborated on the purposes of the requirement. First, a formal, written offer “creates a clear record that will do much to eliminate troublesome factual disputes many years later about when placements were offered, what placements were offered, and what additional educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement, if any.” Id. Second, the requirement greatly assists parents in presenting their complaints by alerting them of the need to consider seriously the appropriateness of the proposed placement and to decide whether to accept or reject the offer. Id. Third, by presenting a written offer, a school district is more prepared to introduce sufficient relevant evidence to a hearing officer of the appropriateness of its proposed placement. Id. Significantly, the Court also held that “a school district cannot escape its obligation under the IDEA to offer formally an appropriate educational placement by arguing that a disabled child's parents expressed unwillingness to accept that placement.” Id.

In light of the substantial factual overlap between Petitioner’s procedural and substantive allegations, the Hearing Officer will address Petitioner’s procedural contentions within the framework of discussing Petitioner’s substantive contentions. Petitioner’s contentions of alleged procedural violations are all Union violations related to alleged deficiencies in the District’s October 23, 2003 offer.

1. Was the District’s proposed program designed to meet STUDENT’s unique individual needs and reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit?

The Hearing Officer must initially determine if the District’s offer of October 23, 2003, was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs at that time. Therefore, the Hearing Officer must first determine what STUDENT’s unique needs were at the time. The parties agree that STUDENT has autism and that he is eligible for special education and related services as a result of his disabilities. In addition, the parties agree STUDENT has severe mental retardation, although it does not appear this condition is reflected on his IEP documents. STUDENT is essentially non-verbal. MOTHER estimated that he speaks, at most, approximately six words, and she gave a rough estimate that STUDENT may have a receptive vocabulary of approximately 100 words, although she indicated it is very difficult to know what STUDENT understands. The parties agree in effect that STUDENT’s needs are basic and extensive, covering the areas of academics, communication, functional-living, self-help, motor-skill, speech and language, toileting, sensory, transition, behavioral, and social and that STUDENT needs a structured environment as he is easily distracted and has difficulty with change. Nevertheless, the parties have disputes over whether the District’s program was designed to meet his needs in some areas.

Significantly, the parties generally agree not only regarding what STUDENT’s needs are but also regarding the appropriateness of STUDENT’s thirty-one goals and corresponding objectives stated in the September 11, 2003 IEP document, which is referenced in the October 23, 2003 IEP document. (Footnote 8) These goals and objectives cover most of STUDENT’s areas of need including academics (e.g., identifying letters, identifying numbers, writing his name, and identifying shapes), communication (e.g., identifying actions from picture cards, imitating actions, asking for items using the Picture Exchange Communication System (PECS), and identifying persons such as staff members), functional living (e.g., spreading items on bread, cutting, setting table, washing dishes, following a visual schedule), self-help (e.g., using zippers, snaps, buckles, washing hands and face, using deodorant, combing hair, brushing teeth), motor skills (e.g., cutting with scissors, using a glue stick), and behavioral (e.g., waiting). (See Exhibit 32.) In addition, the parties agree that STUDENT’s speech and language needs were addressed in the District’s offer through speech therapy. Accordingly, there is no need to elaborate upon whether the District’s program would have addressed STUDENT’s academic, communication, functional-living, self-help, motor-skill, and speech and language needs.

The dispute centers on whether the District offered sufficient one-to-one DTT time and whether the District’s proposed program would have met STUDENT’s toileting needs, sensory needs, transition needs, behavioral needs, “tolerance training” needs, social needs, and his safety concerns. (Footnote 9) Accordingly, after identifying the general nature of the District’s offer, the Hearing Officer will address whether the District’s offer sufficiently described the nature and amount of DTT and whether the proposed program would have addressed these alleged needs and safety concerns.

As to the offer, the District made a formal, written offer in its October 23, 2003 IEP document. (Exhibit 37.) To summarize the October 23, 2003 IEP document, it specifies that the District was offering a special day class at College Heights and that Mr. Torres was the teacher of the class. The document states that the “special day class program” was “designed for children with autism spectrum disorders as the least restrictive environment.” It also specifies that the class is at a public integrated facility for the full day and that STUDENT needs a “modified program to achieve success.” It indicates that the class has “a low student to staff ratio.” It further states the amount of occupational therapy and the amount of speech and language therapy that was being offered. As mentioned above, the document states that the goals and objectives from the September 11, 2003 IEP are to continue. A reference is made to a behavior plan, although none is stated in or attached to the IEP document. The parties dispute whether the document contains a transition plan. There are no other documents attached to or referenced in the IEP document.

A. Nature and amount of discrete trial training (DTT)

The parties generally agree that STUDENT needs DTT. As described by the teacher of the College Heights program (Mr. Torres), DTT was a core component of the District’s program, as it was used throughout the school day in both one-to-one and group formats. However, the parties disagree regarding how much DTT was required for STUDENT to benefit from his education.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District committed a Union violation by not specifying the nature and amount of DTT in its offer. Every IEP document is required to provide “a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services to be provided to the child….” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). The document must also state the anticipated frequency, location, and duration of the special education services. 34 Code of Federal Regs (C.F.R.) § 300.347(a)(6); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(6); see also, 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix A, Question 35. Yet, the October 23, 2003 IEP document is silent on the subject of DTT. It uses vague language to describe the program such as stating that the placement is a “special day class program,” which is “designed for children with autism spectrum.” No mention is made of what type of instruction STUDENT would receive. Without a description of the format and frequency of DTT in the District’s written offer, STUDENT’s parents were not in a position to effectively evaluate what the District was offering from a reading of the IEP document itself. For example, material considerations for STUDENT’s parents in deciding whether to accept or reject the offer was whether the District was offering group DTT time, one-to-one DTT time, or both, and whether the District was offering twenty minutes or twenty hours of one-to-one DTT time per week.

The need for a specific written description of the District’s program is especially acute in this case given MOTHER’s testimony regarding the 2002-2003 school year in which she described the discrepancy between what was orally described as the District’s program (e.g., a DTT intensive program) and what she witnessed during the 2002-2003 school year (e.g., nearly no DTT). In fact, Mr. Torres also testified regarding the radical changes he had made to the program compared to STUDENT’s former teacher. For example, he indicated that the prior teacher, Mr. Bordagaray, only collected minimal data on students’ performance, did not use aides to perform DTT, and engaged in individualized DTT for only about thirty minutes per day per student. Mr. Torres opined that there is not much one can do in thirty minutes a day. Yet, even a minimal description of the purportedly improved DTT program is not contained in the District’s offer to STUDENT’s parents.

While MOTHER had a class schedule and spent approximately one hour with Mr. Torres before the October 23, 2003 offer was made, there is no indication that she learned how much DTT STUDENT would have received in Mr. Torres’s class, including the amount of one-to-one DTT time. The class schedule and the information she learned from Mr. Torres were generally applicable to his class and not the equivalent of a District offer of a specific type and amount of DTT services for STUDENT. In fact, Mr. Torres testified that his students sometimes receive fifty minutes or more of one-to-one DTT during the two-hour period after lunch depending upon whether a student needs “extra help.” How much additional one-to-one DTT, if any, STUDENT would have received after lunch is not reflected in the written offer and remains unknown even after hearing. MOTHER’s one hour with Mr. Torres does not overcome the District’s Union violation and its attendant prejudice. In short, the District did not offer a clear, coherent proposal of DTT that STUDENT’s parents reasonably could evaluate and decide whether to accept or appeal. (See Glendale Unified School District v. Almasi, 122 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1108 (C.D. Calif. 2000) (Almasi).)

Because the District failed to offer any DTT in its written offer, the Hearing Officer must also conclude that the District failed to substantively offer a FAPE to the extent it did not address STUDENT’s need for DTT. (Footnote 10)

B. Toileting and sensory needs

As to toileting needs, the parties generally agree that STUDENT has certain needs, although they disagree over whether the needs were addressed in the District’s offer and whether they should have been addressed in more detail. STUDENT is still in “pull-ups,” which are a type of diapers for older babies or toddlers, defecates in his pull-ups but not the toilet, and has a sacral dimple that must be cleaned after bowel movements. As to sensory needs, the parties agree that STUDENT needs a sensory plan. With respect to both STUDENT’s toileting and sensory needs, the parties disagree over whether the District offered plans to address these needs for the 2003-2004 school year.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District did not offer a toileting plan or a sensory plan. As to a toileting plan, the District contends that Exhibit J is the toileting plan that was offered, which is a document dated February 28, 2002. As to a sensory plan, the District contends Exhibit 21 was the sensory plan that was offered, which is a document dated January 6, 2003. However, neither document is attached or even referenced in the October 23, 2003 IEP document. Furthermore, neither document was discussed in the October 23, 2003 IEP meeting. (Testimony of Ms. Nicholas.) MOTHER credibly testified that she believed the District’s offer for the 2003-2004 school year consisted of only two documents: the September 11, 2003 IEP document as to goals and objectives and the October 23, 2003 IEP document as to placement and services. The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents had no reason to know that the purported plans were part of the District’s October 23, 2003 offer. (Footnote 11) Despite the District’s contention that the IEP document that constitutes the District’s offer need not include toileting or sensory plans in the IEP document, the Hearing Officer notes that every IEP document is required to provide a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services to be provided to the child, as mentioned above. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(3). This rule is particularly important where the IEP document itself constitutes the District’s offer. If the District intended to include a toileting or sensory plan in its offer, then each plan should have been specifically stated in or attached to the October 23, 2003 IEP document. By not stating, attaching, or at least referencing a toileting plan and a sensory plan in the October 23, 2003 IEP document, the District created the kind of confusion that the Union Court hoped to avoid. The requirement of a written offer “creates a clear record to eliminate troublesome factual disputes” over, among other things, what additional educational assistance was offered to supplement a placement. Union, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526. (Footnote 12) The Hearing Officer finds that the District violated Union by not offering a clear, coherent toileting plan or sensory plan in its offer that STUDENT’s parents reasonably could evaluate and decide whether to accept or appeal. (See Almasi, 122 F.Supp.2d at 1108.)

In addition, the Hearing Officer highlights two significant deficiencies in the toileting plan the District contends was part of its offer. Exhibit J does not mention that STUDENT has a sacral dimple that must be cleaned after bowel movements and does not specifically address that STUDENT continued and continues to have bowel movements in his pull-ups, not the toilet. Although the District contends that it did not know or have reason to know of these specific concerns during the IEP process, the Hearing Officer finds that the District either knew or should have known of these concerns. MOTHER testified that she had frequent dialogues with STUDENT’s former teacher at College Heights, Mr. Bordagaray, regarding STUDENT’s toileting issues during the 2002-2003 school year and that STUDENT’s sacral dimple and bowel movement problems were “common knowledge.” The sacral dimple is noted in some of STUDENT’s previous IEP documents, which specifically note that the dimple “needs to be monitored and kept clean during toileting.” (See February 19, 2002 IEP document, Exhibit 12-3; see also, March 8, 2002 IEP document, Exhibit 13-3.) STUDENT’s bowel movement problems are noted on a prior IEP. (See January 22, 2002 IEP document, Exhibit G-8, which notes that STUDENT often urinates in the toilet “but has not yet had a bowel movement in the toilet.”) While it may have been helpful for MOTHER to inform the IEP team on a more frequent basis of STUDENT’s toileting needs, which may have included attaching her own written comments to the IEP documents, there can be little doubt that these toileting concerns should have been addressed. Mr. Torres, in fact, noted that an infection could result if STUDENT’s sacral dimple is not kept clean.

Because no toileting plan or sensory plan was offered, the Hearing Officer must also conclude that the District failed to substantively offer a FAPE to the extent that it failed to address his toileting and sensory needs.

C. Transition needs

There is no dispute that STUDENT needed a transition plan to address his anticipated transfer from VAC to College Heights. Numerous witnesses testified that STUDENT has difficulty with change, including an increase in maladaptive behaviors such as spitting, vomiting, urinating in his pants, and crawling on and under tables. Mr. Dever testified that the District anticipated developing a transition plan for Student’s return to the District as far back as the date of the Agreement on May 15, 2003. Petitioner contends that the District did not offer a specific written transition plan. The District contends that it provided a transition plan in the October 23, 2003 IEP document, but that the plan was not fully developed because STUDENT’s parents failed to cooperate. The October 23, 2003 IEP document contains a box identified as “transition plan” on page two. In handwriting, it states, “[t]ransition from VAC to BCSD” and refers the reader to page five of the document. Page five states: “Mr. Torres will schedule visitations at VAC to observe STUDENT’s program and progress as a transition to prepare class, program at C. Heights for STUDENT’s return. Parent will provide signed authorization for VAC visitation / observation.” (Exhibit 37-5.) The document does not state anything further with respect to a transition plan.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to offer a clear transition plan violates Union. The IEP document simply states the first step in developing a plan that never materialized prior to the commencement of the due process hearing. The IEP document does not in any way describe how the transition was to occur. STUDENT’s parents had no way of knowing what steps or accommodations would be made to address STUDENT’s difficulty with change. Although the District’s brief now refers to the two sentences in the October 23, 2003 IEP document as a “transition plan,” even the District’s witnesses do not support this interpretation. Ms. Nicholas stated that although the team began writing the transition plan at the October 23, 2003 IEP meeting, they stopped writing it. She also testified that the length of transition period would need to be addressed when a plan was developed, suggesting, without explicitly so stating, that, in her view, no plan at all was offered at the October 23, 2003, IEP meeting. In addition, Mr. Torres testified that he believed his visit to VAC was intended to only be a “first step.” Through observing STUDENT at VAC, he thought he would understand STUDENT and his programs, and then Ms. Nicholas or Dr. Steele would take the next steps. The District did not offer a clear, coherent proposal that Petitioner’s parents reasonably could evaluate and decide whether to accept or appeal. (See Almasi, 122 F.Supp.2d at 1108.)

Contrary to the District’s assertions, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the PARENTS’ conduct excused it from developing the transition plan. The District indicates that it initially scheduled a meeting for September 29, 2003, to develop a transition plan, but it did not challenge MOTHER’s satisfactory explanations for missing that meeting (i.e., because of the birth of her granddaughter) or for missing the reconvened meeting of October 23, 2003 (i.e., because she was experiencing severe back pain for which she sought medical treatment). MOTHER testified that of all the IEP meetings that had occurred from the beginning of the 2002-2003 school year to the date of her testimony, she had only missed those two IEP meetings. The District blames Mr. and MOTHER for not returning an authorization for Mr. Torres to visit VAC so that a plan could be developed or, from the District’s point of view, further developed. However, the October 23, 2003 IEP was the first time the IEP team had discussed a transition plan. (Testimony of Ms. Nicholas.) It was also the first time the District had requested an authorization from the parents pertaining to the development of a transition plan. (Testimony of MOTHER.) Even though the District could have made such a request during any period of time from the date of the Agreement on May 15, 2003, it waited until eight days before STUDENT’s placement at VAC was to end (October 31, 2003) to make the request. This left little time for Mr. Torres to make his observation/s of STUDENT, for a plan to be developed, and for the IEP team to consider such a plan. Therefore, even if an authorization had been provided, it is difficult to envision how the District could have offered a transition plan to STUDENT prior to the time he was scheduled to return to the District, on November 3, 2003.

The District’s method of presenting the request for an authorization is also inherently confusing under the circumstances. Rather than presenting a simple authorization request form to STUDENT’s parents for signature, the request for an authorization is placed in an IEP document that was not consented to by STUDENT’s parents and at an IEP meeting that was not attended by MOTHER. Although STEPFATHER attended the meeting, there is no proof that he even orally consented to this specific provision. Furthermore, STEPFATHER indicated to the IEP team at the October 23, 2003 meeting that he would not authorize anything at the meeting because he needed to talk it over with his wife and attorney. (Testimony of STEPFATHER and Ms. Nicholas.) In addition, the District was well aware that MOTHER, not STEPFATHER, was the one primarily involved in STUDENT’s educational meetings. Yet, no one from the District ever brought the authorization request specifically to MOTHER’s attention or followed through on asking MOTHER to provide the authorization. (Footnote 13)

Dr. Steele, the assistant director of special education, testified that the District stopped developing the transition plan any further because it was clear to him that “the parent” would not consent to anything other than a VAC placement. Yet, even if one assumes that MOTHER would not accept a transition plan even after it had been fully developed, the law requires school districts to provide an appropriate written offer even if a parent has expressed unwillingness to accept that placement. (Footnote 14) Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. Although the District’s witnesses orally presented at hearing a more detailed proposed transition plan, such a plan cannot be considered for the purpose of determining whether the District offered a FAPE. (See Knable v. Bexley City School District, 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 2001) [although “there was evidence in the record indicating what could have been provided at [a school site], only those services identified or described in the draft IEP should have been considered in evaluating the appropriateness of the program offered”].) Because the Hearing Officer has determined that no transition plan was offered, the Hearing Officer must also conclude that the District failed to substantively offer a FAPE to the extent it failed to address STUDENT’s transition needs.

D. Behavioral needs (1) Hand-biting

At least with respect to STUDENT’s hand-biting behavior, the parties agree that STUDENT needs a behavioral intervention plan (BIP). (Testimony of Ms. Meagher.) In its most severe form, STUDENT’s hand-biting was described by Ms. Meagher as a “definite and deliberate bite during a state of high agitation which results in breaking of skin.” (Exhibit Y-2.) STEPFATHER testified that STUDENT has scars on both hands due to hand-biting. Clearly, STUDENT’s hand-biting is a significant problem. Petitioner contends that the District failed to offer a BIP, while District contends that it did. The October 23, 2003, IEP document references a “behavior plan” dated October 23, 2003, although the document being referenced was actually dated October 21, 2003, and was not attached to the IEP as suggested by the form. The parties agree that the document being referenced is the one contained in Exhibit Y, which was prepared by Ms. Meagher, a school psychologist for the District. The document will be referred to as the October 21, 2003 report. It resulted from a request for a functional analysis assessment (FAA) by VAC personnel at the August 20, 2003 IEP meeting, which is also when MOTHER gave her consent to the FAA. (See Exhibit 29-5.) A controversy exists over whether the report constitutes an actual plan to address STUDENT’s particular needs or whether, instead, it is merely a compilation of general suggestions that does not set forth a plan as the term is defined by law. The Hearing Officer will briefly discuss the law pertaining to BIPs before further analyzing the report.

Functional analysis assessments (FAA) and behavioral intervention plans (BIP) for individuals with exceptional needs are governed by California Education Code sections 56520 - 56524 (the “Hughes Bill”) and the implementing regulations set forth in Title 5 of the California Code of Regulations (C.C.R.). The law requires, in pertinent part, that a school district conduct an FAA whenever a student demonstrates a “serious behavior problem.” A “serious behavior problem” is defined as when a student exhibits behaviors which are self-injurious, assaultive, or cause serious property damage and other severe behavior problems that are “pervasive and maladaptive” for which “instructional/ behavioral approaches specified in the student’s IEP are found to be ineffective.” 5 C.C.R. § 3001(aa). After an FAA is performed, a written report of the assessment results must be prepared and a copy provided to the parent. 5 C.C.R. § 3052(b)(2). The FAA report must include, among other things, “recommendations for consideration by the IEP team which may include a proposed plan as specified in Section 3001(f),” which is the section defining a BIP. 5 C.C.R. § 3052(b)(2)(D). The IEP team must meet to review the results of the FAA “and, if necessary, to develop a behavioral intervention plan, as defined in Article 1, Section 3001(f) of these regulations.” 5 C.C.R. § 3052(c). Furthermore, the BIP shall become a part of the IEP “and shall be written with sufficient detail so as to direct the implementation of the plan.” Id. Primarily, the formal requirements for a behavioral intervention plan are found in 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f). Among the items that must be included in the plan is “a detailed description of the behavioral interventions to be used and the circumstances for their use.” 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f)(4).

The October 21, 2003 report indicates on its face that it is a second “draft.” (Exhibit Y-1.) The document also states that it is a “generic” plan: the “preceding behavior support plan is generic and will have to be adapted to the needs of STUDENT and the staff in his educational environment.” (Exhibit Y-8.) With respect to the use of the term “generic” in the plan, Ms. Meagher testified that it does not mean that the plan was not tailored to STUDENT. She stated that when a person does an FAA pursuant to the California Education Code, she may propose a plan, but the plan is supposed to be done after the presentation of the assessment. She further stated that it would be unethical for her to come up with a plan by herself, meaning without the input of the IEP team. She explained the plan must be created by the IEP team or, at the least, by a team that will implement the plan, if different from the IEP team. Additionally, Ms. Meagher stated that she would need to observe STUDENT in the environment of College Heights before being able to make the plan specific to STUDENT. Ms. Meagher indicated that the Hughes Bill requires an assessor to consider a student’s environment. (See 5 C.C.R. § 3052(b)(1)(D).) However, she also testified that if the team had agreed that College Heights was the placement, she could have drafted what she called a “preliminary behavioral intervention plan,” even without having observed STUDENT at College Heights.

MOTHER testified that she did not know the District had offered any behavioral plan. With respect to the October 21, 2003 report, MOTHER believed that the District would do something with it, but she believed that it was not specific enough or functional as written. She assumed that it would be made functional somewhere down the line.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District did not offer a clear behavioral plan, whether preliminary or otherwise, for the 2003-2004 school year in violation of Union. The October 23, 2003 IEP document references a “behavior plan.” Yet, the October 21, 2003 report does not qualify as a BIP. Many of the items required by 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f) are simply nowhere to be found in the document. For example, the required items identified in 5 C.C.R. § 3001 (f)(5), (f)(6), and (f)(8) are completely missing. (See footnote above stating 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f) in its entirety.) Nor does the plan “describe the frequency of the consultation to be provided by the behavioral intervention case manager to the staff members and parents who are responsible for implementing the plan,” as required by the regulation.

Furthermore, a BIP is required to have “a detailed description of the behavioral interventions to be used and the circumstances for their use.” 5 C.C.R. § 3001(f)(4). The document does not provide an analysis of when a particular behavioral intervention should be used to address a particular reason or function of STUDENT’s hand-biting. As Dr. Cipani described in his testimony, the document essentially contains a number of “laundry lists” that are not linked together. There is no matching of a particular function of a behavior to a “prescription” of how to solve the problem. The October 21, 2003 report identifies numerous reasons for why STUDENT hand-bites without describing how staff should respond when STUDENT is thought to be biting for a given reason. For example, when STUDENT is suspected of biting because it is hypothesized that STUDENT wants to escape (for any one or more of a number of reasons; see Exhibit Y-4), there is no description of what staff should do in response. Over thirty intervention strategies are identified, but the reader is not instructed on when to use which strategy. Ms. Meagher herself indicated that not all strategies would be used for each occurrence of hand-biting. She also stated that her report was not designed to be implemented immediately. In short, the reader is left wondering what a person supervising STUDENT should do when STUDENT hand-bites for any given reason or reasons. This lack of clarity also violates the requirement that a BIP “be written with sufficient detail so as to direct the implementation of the plan.” 5 C.C.R. § 3052(c). The alleged plan is too vague to be able to know how to implement it. The District did not offer a clear, coherent proposal that STUDENT’s parents reasonably could evaluate and decide whether to accept or appeal. (See Almasi, 122 F.Supp.2d at 1108.)

The District may not have been able to offer a formal BIP as to STUDENT’s placement at College Heights until after he could be observed in that setting. However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that this excused the District from developing and then offering to STUDENT’s parents at least a “preliminary” BIP or usable recommendations that would have adequately addressed STUDENT’s hand-biting through the time of STUDENT’s transition to College Heights. In fact, Ms. Meagher testified that a preliminary plan could have been developed before she observed STUDENT at College Heights and that she did not anticipate that there would be great changes to a plan after observing STUDENT at College Heights. Yet, as mentioned, Ms. Meagher’s report does not offer specific proposals for addressing STUDENT’s hand-biting. The law requires an FAA report to include, among other things, “[r]ecommendations for consideration by the IEP team which may include a proposed plan as specified in Section 3001(f),” which is the section defining a BIP. 5 C.C.R. § 3052(b)(2)(D). The FAA should have included usable written recommendations to address at least some of the circumstances in which hand-biting occurred. (Footnote 16)

Contrary to the District’s argument, the law does not relieve the District of the obligation to address serious behavioral problems during transition periods. As Ms. Meagher herself stated, STUDENT needed a behavioral plan of some type regardless of whether he stayed at VAC or returned to College Heights. Without the offer of a coherent plan for addressing a student’s behavior, serious behavioral problems could continue for a long period without redress. (Footnote 17) Yet, no viable plan capable of being implemented was presented on October 23, 2003. The Hearing Officer notes that as an alternative to developing a plan specific to College Heights, a proposed behavioral plan could have been developed for STUDENT’s then current placement at VAC and then modified when and if STUDENT returned to College Heights.

Dr. Steele’s testimony made clear that the District simply stopped working on any behavioral support plan after the October 23, 2003, meeting. Given Dr. Steele’s perception that STEPFATHER had made clear that “the parent” would not be consenting to the IEP document, Dr. Steele testified that he did not see any need to pursue finalization of the behavioral support plan. (Footnote 18) Yet, as noted above with respect to the transition plan, the District still had an obligation to make an offer of FAPE, even if STEPFATHER had indicated an unwillingness to accept the District’s proposed placement at College Heights. (Footnote 19) (See Union, 15 F.3d at 1526.)

The absence of clear BIP, preliminary behavior plan, or usable recommendations to address hand-biting constitutes a Union violation. Furthermore, because the District failed to address STUDENT’s hand-biting behavior, the Hearing Officer must also conclude that the District failed to substantively offer a FAPE to the extent it failed to address this behavior.

(2) Behavioral needs other than hand-biting

In addition to hand-biting, MOTHER testified that she thought that the District should have addressed other behaviors in its offer, including STUDENT’s spitting, voluntary vomiting, and eloping. However, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to address STUDENT’s additional behavioral needs, if any, in its offer. Taken as a whole, MOTHER’ own testimony leaves considerable doubt as to whether these behaviors were active concerns as of October 23, 2003. In at least two different portions of her testimony, MOTHER explained that STUDENT’s behaviors change over time. At one point, she indicated his behaviors come and go, and at another she indicated his behaviors appear and then disappear. Moreover, in response to the Hearing Officer’s questioning, MOTHER identified spitting, voluntary vomiting, and eloping as the additional behaviors that the District should have addressed, but at an earlier point, she had also listed sticking objects into electrical outlets and head-banging. This inconsistency raises doubt regarding which behaviors were of active concern. Furthermore, MOTHER’s testimony with respect to the specific behaviors of spitting, voluntary vomiting, and eloping also leaves doubt. As to spitting, she indicated that the behavior had decreased greatly since July of 2003. As to vomiting, she indicated she was unsure if STUDENT was engaged in vomiting behaviors around the time the September 11, 2003, IEP document. As to elopement or running away, she testified that she was unsure whether there had been a discussion about elopement in any IEP meeting during the 2003-2004 school year, except that she thought her husband mentioned it at the October 23, 2003, IEP meeting.

The evidence also reveals that the District did not have reason to suspect that the behaviors, if any, were of active concern. Because STUDENT had not been attending the District from March 13, 2003, forward, it would have been difficult for the District to know, without the parent specifically informing it, that a particular behavioral problem was of concern at the time the District was making its offer seven months later on October 23, 2003. Ms. Meagher testified that MOTHER did not raise concerns about STUDENT’s spitting, voluntary vomiting, or eloping when she spoke with MOTHER on August 20, 2003, and on September 16, 2003, and that MOTHER did not ask her to investigate behaviors other than hand-biting. In addition, MOTHER testified that she did not request that the District address behaviors that were part of a prior BIP (see Exhibit 9), which included spitting and running away, after STUDENT began attending VAC on March 13, 2003. (Footnote 20) This testimony reflects that MOTHER was not keeping the District informed of STUDENT’s behavioral issues after March 13, 2003.

E. “Tolerance training” needs

Although the parties generally agree that STUDENT has difficulty accepting changes to his routine and “waiting,” they disagree over what was required of the District’s offer in these areas. Petitioner contends the District’s program did not address his needs in these areas, which Dr. Cipani referenced as the need for “tolerance training.” (Footnote 21) The District contends that Petitioner never raised the need for tolerance training in any IEP meetings from February 6, 2003, through October 23, 2003, but that it, nevertheless, addressed some areas of tolerance training in its offer.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District did address waiting and that the District was not required to address other areas of tolerance training in its offer. The parties specifically agreed upon a goal, with corresponding objectives, as to waiting. (See Exhibit 32-32.) Furthermore, Petitioner’s own experts do not support his contention that more was required in the area of tolerance training at the time of the District’s offer. Dr. Cipani’s report itself, which is dated October 31, 2003, recommends that the staff at VAC initiate tolerance training only “subsequent to a few more months of stability with this placement.” (Exhibit AA-7.) Therefore, at the time of the District’s offer of October 23, 2003, Dr. Cipani’s own report does not support Petitioner’s contention that tolerance training was appropriate, even if one assumes STUDENT was to remain at VAC. Furthermore, both Dr. Cipani and Petitioner’s other expert witness, Dr. Fisher, stressed the importance of establishing stability in and structure to STUDENT’s program. In addition to the sentence from Dr. Cipani’s report just mentioned, Dr. Fisher specifically states in his report that, although “Dr. Cipani recommended tolerance training to desensitize STUDENT to changes in routine, this would represent the crème de la crème of programming for STUDENT. It is most important that STUDENT have structured programming, especially at this juncture in his education.” (Exhibit FF-2.)

F. Social needs

Petitioner’s contentions with respect to STUDENT’s social needs, as well as to the least restrictive environment (LRE), have become hopelessly confused, especially in light of Petitioner’s closing brief. As stated in Petitioner’s issues statement dated December 5, 2004, the issue presented for hearing was the following: “has the [District] offered STUDENT a [FAPE] by offering, but failing to make available on a regular and historic basis, STUDENT’s integration with regular education peers by not providing recess during the regular education recess and providing lunch at the same time as regular education peers, but by physically segregating the special day class students from the regular education students during lunch?” The issue remained the same throughout the entire seventeen days of hearing. However, in Petitioner’s closing brief, Petitioner proclaims that the “issue presented in the Petitioner’s issue statement is incorrect as stated given the needs expressed by Petitioner’s experts and testimony.” (Petitioner’s brief, p.21, lines 21-22.) At another point in his brief, Petitioner suggests that an “appropriate program for STUDENT may include reverse mainstreaming,” and at another point, Petitioner states that “the problem is that it [the College Heights program] may not be restrictive enough.” (Id., at p.22, line 9 and p.23, line 11 (italics added).) In short, Petitioner indicates that his issue is incorrectly stated without ever clarifying it. Even if Petitioner had clearly stated in his brief what he believes the issue should now be, Petitioner may not raise new issues in his closing brief. (See Education Code § 56505(e)(6), which requires a party to inform the other of the issues at least 10 days prior to hearing.) Clearly, permitting a substantial change in the issue would not give the District a fair opportunity to address it through either testimony or argument. Whatever Petitioner may now be contending with respect to STUDENT’s social needs and the LRE, which is far from clear, the Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner has withdrawn the issue as it was stated for hearing. (Footnote 22)

G. Consideration of Petitioner’s safety concerns

Petitioner’s issues statement contends that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE by offering a placement in an unsafe environment. At the beginning of the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel defined Petitioner’s safety issues as involving concerns about electrical cords and plugs, STUDENT’s ability to escape the classroom, and STUDENT’s ability to spread feces around the class. (Footnote 23) However, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to address these concerns in its offer.

With respect to the issue of unsafe electrical cords and outlets, MOTHER indicated that STUDENT generally likes to stick objects into electrical sockets, and she surmised that STUDENT may enjoy the sensation of an electrical shock. MOTHER did not explicitly indicate what was defective with respect to the District’s cords and outlets, except that it may be inferred that the outlets are not covered with a child-proofing device to prevent STUDENT from inserting an object. Despite MOTHER’s alleged concerns regarding cords and outlets, the record does not indicate that the District had reason to know this was an issue for the 2003-2004 school year. Petitioner’s counsel referred MOTHER to an IEP document dated February 19, 2002, which states that administrators or special education staff “will check into electrical cords and how to secure the plugs.” (Exhibit 12-4.) However, this document, which was written during the 2001-2002 school year, is far removed from when the IEP team was considering STUDENT’s placement for the 2003-2004 school year. None of the numerous IEP documents dated from February 6, 2003, through October 23, 2003, reflect any concern about cord and outlet issues. Furthermore, Mr. Torres testified that as far as he is aware, no one had raised any safety concerns about his classroom at College Heights, which by implication suggests that no one raised concerns about cords and outlets at the IEP meetings during the 2003-2004 school year. In short, the District did not have reason to know that electrical cords and outlets remained a concern.

With respect to STUDENT’s ability to escape the classroom, the Hearing Officer has already determined above that the District was not obligated to address STUDENT’s elopement behavior as part of its offer for the 2003-2004 school year because MOTHER’ testimony leaves considerable doubt as to whether such behavior was an active concern at the time the District presented its offer and because the District did not have reason to suspect it was still a concern. These same rationales also apply with respect to the elopement issue as it is raised as a safety concern. In addition, the Hearing Officer finds that the College Heights campus was sufficiently secure to protect STUDENT from his elopement behavior, if any. Petitioner did not present any evidence that STUDENT ever actually managed to escape the school grounds or was otherwise unsupervised during the time he attended College Heights. Furthermore, Mr. Dever testified that College Heights is a closed campus that has a chain link fence around it. Students can only enter and exit the school through the office. Although it could be argued that STUDENT could climb the fence, this possibility becomes insignificant in light of Mr. Torres’ testimony that he and his staff have always been able to retrieve a student with similar elopement behavior within a few seconds and within a short distance from the classroom door. The student never left the school premises. The low student-to-staff ratio enables Mr. Torres and his staff to be keenly aware of when a student attempts to escape the classroom. (Footnote 24)

With respect to the spreading of feces, MOTHER testified that she did not believe the District needed to offer services to address this behavior because it was not a concern at the time of the District’s offer. (Testimony of MOTHER on January 27, 2004.) Accordingly, there was no need for the District to offer recommendations to address a behavioral or safety issue that was not an active concern.

2. Did the District’s proposed placement comport with STUDENT’s IEP?

Because the Hearing Officer has found that the District’s program did not offer STUDENT a FAPE due to deficiencies in the areas of DTT, toileting, sensory, transition, and behavior as to hand-biting, he does not reach this issue.

3. Did the District’s proposed placement provide STUDENT an education in the LRE?

Similarly, because the Hearing Officer has found that the District’s program did not offer STUDENT a FAPE due to deficiencies in the areas of DTT, toileting, sensory, transition, and behavior as to hand-biting, he does not reach this issue.

*****

In summary, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. Procedurally, the District failed to provide a clear written offer in violation of Union. The October 23, 2003 IEP document presented confusing proposals in the areas of DTT services, the transition plan, and the behavioral plan. The testimony of the District’s own witnesses demonstrated just how confused the District’s offer was. Of all of the District’s witnesses, Ms. Nicholas, as “the keeper of the forms,” appeared to be in the best position to know what the District’s offer was. She was the witness the District’s counsel used to trace the history of the District’s offer. Yet, even Ms. Nicholas often had difficulty identifying what comprised the District’s offer. For example, she took several minutes trying to identify whether a given document was or was not part of the offer, stated that a particular toileting plan was part of the offer (i.e., Exhibit 5) but later recanted and specified a different one (i.e., Exhibit J), and identified a behavioral intervention plan (i.e., Exhibit 9) as part of the offer that the District does not now contend, in its closing brief, was part of the offer. (Footnote 25) Furthermore, the District’s insistence that a toileting plan and a sensory plan were part of its offer, even though they were not stated, attached, or even referenced in the October 23, 2003 IEP document, violates Union’s mandate that the written offer be clearly stated. Parents should not be required to wind through a labyrinth of IEP documents and/or other documents in an attempt to find what a school district is offering.

A primary rationale for the Union Court’s holding is that having a clear written offer will aid parents in considering whether to accept or oppose the offer and “alert” them of the need to seriously consider the offer. Union, 15 F.3d at 1526. Without having all the components of a school district’s offer presented to the parents in a reasonably clear manner, parents may be denied access to the very information necessary to evaluate whether to accept the offer. STUDENT’s parents were denied the opportunity to fully participate in the IEP process in that they were deprived of a clear understanding of what the District was offering. This case has illustrated the kind of “troublesome factual disputes” that the requirement of a specific written offer was intended to avoid. Union, 15 F.3d at 1526.

Substantively, the District’s program did not offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year because it did not address STUDENT’s need for DTT, because it was not designed to meet STUDENT’s toileting needs, sensory needs, transitioning needs, and hand-biting behavior, and because it was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit in these areas. (Footnote 26)

ISSUE NO. 2: Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

If a district fails to provide a FAPE, then a child is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369 (hereafter Burlington). Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief which may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. (See, for example, Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist. (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496-1497.) Nevertheless, there is no obligation to provide day-for-day or hour-for-hour compensation for time missed. Id., at 1497.

Because the District did not offer a program that addressed STUDENT’s needs, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents were justified in not enrolling STUDENT in the District’s program and that an award of compensatory education is appropriate. At hearing on January 6, 2004, Petitioner’s counsel clarified that Petitioner was requesting a total of sixty-eight hours of compensatory education for the period of time between October 31, 2003, the date the District funded placement at VAC ended, and November 21, 2003, the date STUDENT returned to VAC’s morning program. STUDENT received no formal instruction during this period, except for STUDENT’s continued participation in VAC’s after-school program. (Footnote 27) The evidence is clear that STUDENT missed sixty-eight hours of schooling. Given that STUDENT is progressing in his education very slowly and in light of the evidence indicating that STUDENT benefits from one-to-one DTT (including, particularly, the testimony of Mr. Thompson), the Hearing Officer shall order the District to provide STUDENT sixty-eight hours of one-to-one DTT, which must be provided in addition to the DTT instruction he receives during the regular school day. The Hearing Officer will reserve to the IEP team the task of scheduling the compensatory education so that the instruction is completed within one year from the date of this Decision. (Footnote 28)

Furthermore, as part of compensatory education, the Hearing Officer finds that the District must offer a BIP to address STUDENT’s hand-biting at VAC. At the time the FAA was requested by VAC on August 20, 2003, STUDENT was attending VAC, the private placement STUDENT’s parents chose pursuant to the parties’ Agreement of May 15, 2003. Although the District began preparing an FAA and BIP prior to the time the parties’ Agreement ended on October 31, 2003, the Hearing Officer concluded above that no usable plan or written recommendations were offered. As Ms. Meagher herself noted, STUDENT needed a BIP to address his hand-biting regardless of where he attended school. The District should not be absolved of the responsibility to address STUDENT’s hand-biting simply because the Agreement expired before the District offered usable recommendations to STUDENT’s parents.

ISSUE NO. 3: Is STUDENT entitled to continued placement at Valley Achievement Center (VAC) for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year?

The equitable remedies afforded by Burlington at its progeny are not so narrow as to permit relief only when the placement or services chosen by the parent are found to be the exact proper placement or services required under the IDEA. (See Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).) The Alamo court explained the rationale behind Burlington is that parents not receive an “empty victory” when their view on the inappropriateness of a school district’s placement is wholly or in part vindicated by the court. (Id., citing Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.) In Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993), the Supreme Court expressly exempted parents from having to meet certain requirements of the IDEA in their unilateral placements. For example, parents are not required to conform their unilateral placement to the content of the student’s IEP or provide a placement that is certified by the State. Id. at 13-14. Although the Court recognized that the parents’ placement does not have to meet a standard as high as that required of a school district, the parents’ placement must still meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student educational benefit. Id.

The Hearing Officer finds that VAC was and is a generally appropriate placement for STUDENT during the 2003-2004 school year. The parties stipulated that VAC is a certified nonpublic school. In addition, STUDENT’s placement in VAC’s morning program from May 19, 2003, through October 31, 2003, was initially funded by the parties’ Agreement. Although the Agreement did not list VAC by name, the District agreed to fund STUDENT’s placement at a “local nonpublic school” (NPS), indicating that “this funding will be based upon the NPS’s provision of basic education services.” (Exhibit S-3.) The October 23, 2003 IEP document reflects that STUDENT is attending VAC “as agreed through mediated agreement through 10/31/03” (see Exhibit 37-2), and the District has reimbursed STUDENT’s parents for tuition expenses, pursuant to the Agreement, knowing that STUDENT was attending VAC. (Footnote 29) Even though the District’s argument is not technically inconsistent, it seems disingenuous that the District is now arguing that VAC is an inappropriate placement. Furthermore, STUDENT’s teacher at VAC, Mr. Thompson, testified at great length regarding the progress STUDENT has made while at VAC, discussing progress on most, if not all, of STUDENT’s thirty-one goals from the September 11, 2003 IEP document. Mr. Thompson’s testimony suggested that he is well-versed in DTT techniques and also appears to be an effective teacher. According to the testimony of both STEPFATHER and MOTHER, STUDENT has made substantial progress at VAC. Even the District’s witnesses had some positive things to state about VAC. Mr. Torres acknowledged telling MOTHER that VAC is a “good program,” while also indicating to her some items he perceived as deficiencies. Ms. Meagher indicated that she thought VAC’s staff was “wonderful” and that STUDENT seemed to be doing very well at VAC.

Although the District has expressed concerns about whether VAC is too restrictive and costly, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that these are reasons for denying STUDENT his continued placement at VAC, given that the District’s offer was deficient and that STUDENT has made substantial progress at VAC. (Footnote 30) In addition, STUDENT’s continued placement at VAC, through the remainder of the school year, is warranted by STUDENT’s need for structure and routine and his difficulty with transitions. By the close of testimony, STUDENT had been attending VAC for nearly all of the prior eight months. Currently, less than two months remain in the 2003-2004 school year. The Hearing Officer finds that it would be inappropriate to move STUDENT from VAC at this late date. Consequently, the District shall maintain STUDENT’s placement at VAC for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year by paying STUDENT’s tuition at VAC through June 3, 2004. (Foonote 31)

ORDER

1. The District shall provide STUDENT sixty-eight (68) hours of one-to-one DTT as compensatory education. These sixty-eight (68) hours must be provided in addition to the DTT instruction STUDENT would ordinarily receive during the regular school day. The IEP team shall develop a schedule for the delivery of the sixty-eight (68) hours of compensatory education so that STUDENT receives all such services within one year of the date of the Decision. In scheduling the compensatory education, the IEP team shall consider the length of STUDENT’s school day, including the hours he participates in the after-school program at VAC, and whether STUDENT has the capacity to effectively absorb additional instruction after his school day.

2. As part of the award of compensatory education, the District shall do the following:

A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the date of this Decision, the District shall finish conducting any additional work that may be needed on the FAA originally requested by VAC and initially presented in Ms. Meagher’s October 21, 2003, report, such that a BIP can be developed to address STUDENT’s hand-biting at VAC.

B. Within ten (10) days of the completion of the FAA, the District shall convene a second IEP meeting, which shall include a representative of VAC, to develop an appropriate BIP for STUDENT’s placement at VAC in accordance with the findings of the FAA.

3. The District shall fund STUDENT’s placement in the morning program at VAC for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year, which ends on June 3, 2004. The District shall arrange to pay STUDENT’s tuition at VAC on a timely basis. The arrangement shall ensure that STUDENT’s parents are not required to advance payment to VAC. If STUDENT’s parents have paid for STUDENT’s placement in the morning program at VAC for any period of time from February 2004 without being reimbursed (such as by the Kern County Regional Center), then the District shall also fully reimburse STUDENT’s parents for each such month within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of proof of payment.

4. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY

Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

1. Did the District offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2003-2004 school year at an individualized educational program (IEP) meeting held on October 23, 2003?

Petitioner is the substantially prevailing party on this issue.

2. Is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

3. Is STUDENT entitled to continued placement at Valley Achievement Center (VAC) for the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year?

Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: April 14, 2004 ____________________________________ Terrence B. Ohler, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

As stated in Petitioner’s issues statement dated December 5, 2003, the first issue was: “Has the [District] failed to offer an appropriate education by offering a special day class with a teacher that does not meet the necessary competencies as required under the law, including, but not limited to the appropriate teaching credential, to teach a special day class for severely handicapped children?”

2 The issues listed here differ in numbering and content from those noticed by Petitioner prior to the hearing. Particularly in light of the clarification of issues and the rulings at hearing, changes were made for the purposes of organization and appropriate analysis. The Hearing Officer does not address issues that were not specifically accepted by the Hearing Officer at the hearing.

3 The District’s offer relates to the period of time from November 1, 2003, through the end of the District’s regular school year on June 3, 2004. The parties agree that a settlement agreement resolved STUDENT’s placement and services issues through October 31, 2003, for purposes of this due process hearing. The Hearing Officer will use the term “program” to refer to placement and services collectively

4 On December 3, 2001, STUDENT also enrolled in VAC’s after-school program and has attended that program ever since, including all extended school years. In this hearing, Petitioner only seeks a ruling that would permit STUDENT’s continued enrollment in VAC’s morning program; VAC’s after-school program is not at issue. 5 The parties’ stipulation provides, in its entirety, that “the following is not offered for the truth, but rather is offered as explanation concerning STUDENT’s removal from College Heights on March 12, 2003: MOTHER states that she withdrew her son, STUDENT, from the Bakersfield City School District based on her concerns for his safety. She states she believed that abuse by the classroom teacher took place. The Bakersfield Police Department’s investigation into this matter resulted in no further action on their part. The Bakersfield City School District states their investigation into the allegation found the abuse allegation to be unsubstantiated.” (See Exhibit 46.)

6 The District’s exhibits are numbered; Petitioner’s exhibits are lettered. Exhibit page numbers are referenced by a dash. For example, page 4 of Exhibit S is referenced “Exhibit S-4.”

7 “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); 5 Cal. Code Regs. (C.C.R.) § 3001(z).

8 Accordingly, the Hearing Officer’s future references to the District’s offer of October 23, 2003, encompasses both the October 23, 2003 IEP document and the goals and objectives stated in the September 11, 2003 IEP document. There is no dispute that the September 11, 2003 IEP document was part of the District’s offer for the 2003-2004 school year.

9 “Tolerance training,” discussed below, is an expression used by Petitioner’s expert, Dr. Cipani, to describe a student’s need to adapt to changes in routine and to patiently wait.

10 In light of the Union violation, the Hearing Officer need not address how much DTT STUDENT needed in order to benefit from his education. Nevertheless, the Hearing Officer notes that none of the three expert witnesses (Dr. Cipani, Dr. Fisher, and Dr. Shira), nor any other witness, came close to answering precisely how much DTT, whether in a one-to-one format or otherwise, would have been required in order for STUDENT to obtain some educational benefit.

11 The Hearing Officer also notes that there was much confusion among numerous witnesses regarding the ending date for some of the plans. A parent cannot be expected to know that any particular plan will continue to remain in effect when an offer is made by a school district. Even if the plan does not make clear its own duration, the offer should clearly identify the plans that are part of the offer and the period of time the offer covers. For example, an IEP document is required to state the duration of special education and related services, as noted above. 34 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 300.347(a)(6); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a)(6). The District’s argument that STUDENT’s parents should have just known that a plan continued from a prior offer flies in the face of the clarity demanded by Union.

12 Even Ms. Nicholas, the person who wrote out many of STUDENT’s IEP documents and was the self-proclaimed “keeper of the forms” for STUDENT’s IEP documents, demonstrated substantial confusion over what toileting plan the District had purportedly offered, first identifying Exhibit 5 and then changing her testimony to identify Exhibit J instead.

13 MOTHER acknowledged in testimony that she knew VAC would need an authorization from her prior to Mr. Torres being allowed to observe STUDENT at VAC and that neither she nor her husband provided an authorization after the October 23, 2003 meeting. However, she explained that she did not believe she was bound by that provision because she would not have signed the October 23, 2003 IEP or consented to any parts of it had she been at the meeting. Nevertheless, she further indicated that she did not have a problem with Mr. Torres observing STUDENT at VAC.

14 There is no evidence that the PARENTS requested the District to stop work on the transition plan.

15 5 C.C.R. section 3001(f) states that a “behavioral intervention plan” is:

“a written document which is developed when the individual exhibits a serious behavior problem that significantly interferes with the implementation of the goals and objectives of the individual's IEP. The "behavioral intervention plan" shall become part of the IEP. The plan shall describe the frequency of the consultation to be provided by the behavioral intervention case manager to the staff members and parents who are responsible for implementing the plan. A copy of the plan shall be provided to the person or agency responsible for implementation in noneducational settings. The plan shall include the following:

(1) a summary of relevant and determinative information gathered from a functional analysis assessment;

(2) an objective and measurable description of the targeted maladaptive behavior(s) and replacement positive behavior(s);

(3) the individual's goals and objectives specific to the behavioral intervention plan;

(4) a detailed description of the behavioral interventions to be used and the circumstances for their use;

(5) specific schedules for recording the frequency of the use of the interventions and the frequency of the targeted and replacement behaviors; including specific criteria for discontinuing the use of the intervention for lack of effectiveness or replacing it with an identified and specified alternative;

(6) criteria by which the procedure will be faded or phased-out, or less intense/frequent restrictive behavioral intervention schedules or techniques will be used;

(7) those behavioral interventions which will be used in the home, residential facility, work site or other noneducational settings; and (8) specific dates for periodic review by the IEP team of the efficacy of the program.”

16 Ms. Meagher testified that she engaged in extensive work to prepare the October 21, 2003 report. She interviewed MOTHER in person and spoke with her on the phone. She did not indicate that MOTHER was in any way uncooperative, except to the extent, perhaps, that MOTHER did not authorize an in-home observation of STUDENT. The District has cited no authority indicating that MOTHER was required to allow such a visit. She conducted interviews with the District’s speech and language therapist, Mr. Wadman, and with the District’s College Heights teacher, Mr. Torres. She also met with Mr. Thompson, STUDENT’s teacher at VAC, while he accompanied her at three observations of STUDENT at VAC. Ms. Meagher testified that she spent approximately seven hours observing STUDENT at VAC.

17 The Hearing Officer’s review of the exhibits reflects that hand-biting was indicated on STUDENT’s IEP documents at least as far back as January 22, 2002. (See Exhibit 13-5.) Notes from the February 6, 2003 IEP document indicate that Ms. Wendi Wanner, a District occupational therapist, had reported at the IEP meeting that she “noticed hand biting increased – not sure why – has tried giving him rubber tubing to bite on.” (Exhibit 14-18.) Yet, there is no indication in the record that any FAA was ever initiated by the District to address STUDENT’s hand-biting.

18 Recall that the same rationale was given by Dr. Steele for why the District stopped work on the development of a transition plan.

19 There is no evidence that the PARENTS requested the District to stop work on the FAA or BIP. In fact, Ms. Meagher testified that she had anticipated the IEP team would reconvene to develop the plan but that nothing further happened, which she described as “anticlimactic.”

20 There was great confusion among the District’s witnesses with respect to whether Exhibit 9 was part of the District’s offer for the 2003-2004 school year. Neither the October 23, 2003 IEP nor the September 11, 2003 IEP contains any reference to it, although both Ms. Nicholas and Ms. Young testified that they believed it continued to be offered as of October 23, 2003. Yet, Ms. Meagher testified that she was unaware of whether STUDENT had a behavior plan in effect at the time she was preparing her own October 21, 2003 report. Given that the District’s brief did not identify this plan as part of the District’s offer but did identify the October 21, 2003 report as part of its offer (see District’s brief, p.13 and p.61), the Hearing Officer presumes that the District is now contending that Exhibit 9 was not part of the District’s offer, despite explicit testimony from Ms. Nicholas, the District’s “keeper of the forms,” to the contrary.

21 The term “tolerance training” appears to be a phrase not commonly used among special educators. Dr. Cipani acknowledged that it is a phrase that he created. As Dr. Cipani defined the term, “tolerance training” relates to teaching a student how to wait while something else is happening and also relates to increasing a student’s ability to handle changes in his/her routine or schedule. He indicated that tolerance training falls under the general category of behavioral interventions.

22 The Hearing Officer is also perplexed by Petitioner raising concerns about College Heights not meeting STUDENT’s social needs given Mr. Torres’ undisputed testimony that MOTHER did not want the IEP team to focus on socialization needs because those could be worked on at home

23 MOTHER also testified regarding alleged incidents that included (1) two instances in which former teacher or teachers of STUDENT had not kept the school or parents advised of where STUDENT’s class had gone and (2) two instances in which MOTHER noticed bruising and/or a black eye after STUDENT got off the bus. However, these allegations were not mentioned as present concerns, and none of these incidents are mentioned in Petitioner’s closing brief. Nor were these contentions specifically identified in Petitioner’s issues statement or during the clarification of the issues. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer will not address them.

24 The Hearing Officer’s statements regarding campus safety should not be interpreted to mean that the District has no obligation to address STUDENT’s elopement behavior should it arise in the future.

25 In addition to Ms. Nicholas’ evident confusion over what comprised the District’s offer, the Hearing Officer finds it significant that neither Dr. Steele nor Mr. Torres, both of whom played major roles on STUDENT’s IEP team, identified many of the documents the District now contends were part of its offer. For example, neither witness identified any sensory plan, toileting plan, or behavioral plan as part of the offer.

26 In light of this disposition, the Hearing Officer sees no need to address Petitioner’s additional contentions regarding whether the District could have effectively implemented STUDENT’s goals and objectives without the elimination of group time, without the assignment of a one-to-one instructional aide, and without STUDENT being isolated in a cubicle to minimize distractions.

27 As noted above, Kern County Regional Center began funding STUDENT’s enrollment in VAC’s morning program as of November 21, 2003, in addition to continuing to fund STUDENT’s enrollment in VAC’s after-school program.

28 The relatively long period of one year is ordered in recognition of the fact that STUDENT already has a long school day in light of his continued enrollment in VAC’s after-school program. While the order gives the IEP team flexibility, the team should endeavor to schedule the instruction soon so that STUDENT can immediately benefit.

29 Petitioner contends that the District still owes his parents money pursuant to the Agreement. However, the parties specifically agreed during the hearing that this is not an issue for this due process hearing.

30 Mr. Dever testified that VAC costs $168 per day.

31 The Hearing Officer expresses no opinion with respect to STUDENT’s placement beyond June 3, 2004. Presumably, the District will soon present a written offer for the 2004 ESY to STUDENT’s parents.