California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · February 4, 2002

Student v. Redondo Beach Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2283-00 · Hearing Officer Paul E. Lacy

Redondo Beach Unified must reimburse Summit View School tuition and transportation for 2000-2001; 1998 eligibility claim denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 2 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The district's pre-hearing motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied in a Summary Order on June 13, 2001, and its renewed motion at hearing was also denied.

Summary

The parents of an 11-year-old boy filed for due process against Redondo Beach Unified School District. He attended the district's Tulita Elementary through first grade, then a private parochial school. A district assessment in fall 1998 found no severe gap between ability and achievement and no processing disorder, and in December 1998 an IEP team found him not eligible. In 1999 his mother withdrew a new assessment request after a call with the special education director. In June 2000 the parents asked again for an assessment. In September 2000 they wrote that the district could not provide a FAPE and enrolled him at Summit View School, a nonpublic school. In October 2000 the district found him eligible under specific learning disability and language impairment. It offered only a private school service plan, saying it had no duty to offer FAPE.

The Hearing Officer held that, based on what the district knew in 1998, the student was not eligible at that time. The parents therefore could not recover the costs of their private assessments. On the second issue, the Hearing Officer found the parents chose private school because FAPE was in dispute, not out of preference. The district never answered their letter or offered FAPE. The Hearing Officer also rejected the district's argument that reimbursement requires prior public special education services, relying on Burlington. The district had agreed Summit View was appropriate. The district must reimburse tuition and transportation from October 23, 2000, through the end of 2000-2001.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO handled a district's claim that it owed no FAPE offer to a parentally placed child. The parents had said in writing that FAPE was the reason for the private placement, and the district never answered. The Hearing Officer also read the 1997 IDEA reimbursement provision as not limited to children who had already received public special education.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 1. Was STUDENT eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability in December 1998?

    Judged by the information available to the district in fall 1998, when standardized testing showed no severe ability-achievement discrepancy and no processing disorder, the student was not eligible then; the request for reimbursement of private assessments therefore failed.

  2. Issue 2. Was the District required to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?

    The parents placed the student privately because FAPE was in dispute, not by preference, so the district had to develop an IEP and offer FAPE; reimbursement is available even though the student never received public special education services before.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 20 calendar days of receiving the parents' invoices, the district must reimburse tuition and transportation costs at Summit View School from October 23, 2000, through the balance of the 2000-2001 school year. No dollar amount stated.

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Key authorities

Adams v. Oregon (9th Cir. 1999) 195 F.3d 1141; School Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ. (1985) 471 U.S. 359; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.403; 34 C.F.R. § 300.450-300.487; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 3030(j); OSEP letter, 34 IDELR 263

People named in the decision

  • Frank DeSena, Director of special education, Redondo Beach Unified School District
  • Ms. Ungaro, First grade teacher, Tulita Elementary School
  • Fred Marsee, Principal, Tulita Elementary School
  • Ms. Blanco, Second grade teacher, Tulita Elementary School
  • Ms. Federwitz, First grade teacher (private school), Riviera Hall Lutheran School
  • Ms. Steeves, Second grade teacher (private school), Riviera Hall Lutheran School
  • Ms. Merritt, Third grade teacher (private school), Riviera Hall Lutheran School
  • Ms. Balin, School psychologist, Redondo Beach Unified School District
  • Susan T. Kelly, Speech-language pathologist, Redondo Beach Unified School District
  • Dr. Alan M. Solomon, Private licensed psychologist (psychoeducational evaluation), Privately retained by parents
  • Dr. Sylvia Kennedy, Private clinical psychologist, Privately retained by parents
  • Janice DeMore, Private speech pathologist, Privately retained by parents
  • Summit View School, Nonpublic school (parental placement)
  • Riviera Hall Lutheran School, Private parochial school previously attended

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Paul E. Lacy, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, on July19, 20, September 6, 7, and November 28, and 29, 2001, in Redondo Beach, California.

STUDENT (hereinafter “STUDENT” or “Petitioner”) was represented by attorney Andrea Tytell. Also present on his behalf were his parents and his aunt. Redondo Beach Unified School District (hereinafter “District” or “Respondent”) was represented by attorney Nancy Finch-Heuerman. Frank DeSena, the District’s director of special education, was also present on behalf of the District.

The Hearing Officer received oral and documentary evidence during the course of the proceedings. On January 9, 2002, the parties submitted written closing briefs and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES

1. Was STUDENT eligible for special education in December 1998 as a child with a specific learning disability?

2. Was the District required to offer STUDENT a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2000-2001 school year?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT was born on [date redacted], and was 11 years old at the time the hearing closed. He presently lives at home in Redondo Beach, California, with his parents. STUDENT is currently eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability and a speech and language impairment. At the time of the hearing, STUDENT was attending the fourth grade at Summit View School, a certified nonpublic school, and he was not receiving any special education services from the District.

STUDENT was initially enrolled at Tulita Elementary School in the Redondo Beach Unified School District, where he attended kindergarten during the 1995-1996 school year. He continued at Tulita during the 1996-1997 school year, where he completed the first grade in Ms. Ungaro’s class. On February 19, 1997, Ms. Ungaro completed a Skills Review Report for STUDENT. The report noted that STUDENT was not yet reading. Ms. Ungaro’s report also made the following observations regarding STUDENT’s academic performance: STUDENT was below average in recognizing sight words. He was below average in decoding skills involving short vowel sounds, long vowel sounds, blends, and suffixes and prefixes, although he recognized all of his letters and 75% of his consonant sounds. STUDENT had virtually no reading comprehension skills. From his reading, he could not recall facts, could not understand passages, could not discuss ideas, and could not paraphrase what he had read. Ms. Ungaro’s report also indicated that STUDENT was below average in all areas of writing, including capitalization, punctuation, spelling, expressing continuity of thought, sequencing events, and creative expression. In math, Ms. Ungaro noted that STUDENT was only 25% accurate in addition and subtraction facts. She indicated that he also could process or calculate addition and subtraction problems only 25% of the time. Her report noted that he was below average in reasoning and processing word problems, as well as in telling time.

On February 20, 1997, during his first grade year, a student study team (SST) met to address STUDENT’s academic performance. The study team observed that STUDENT was unable to read or write, recognized sight words only 10% of the time, did not recognize sounds in words, could not subtract, did not understand the basic concept of addition, could not write legibly, and could only copy words. STUDENT’s mother informed the team at that time that she had provided STUDENT with a tutor but that he was still making slow progress. The study team noted that interventions and strategies that had previously been tried for STUDENT included specialized books, modified assignments, Project Read, in-class RSP services, and magnetic letters. The team also indicated that additional strategies previously had been implemented for both writing and behavior.

On April 28, 1997, the student study team met again. The team documented essentially the same concerns as those it identified in the previous meeting held in February. At this meeting, the team recommended a psycho-educational assessment, and a referral was made the same day. On May 27, 1997, STUDENT’s parents signed an assessment plan. Along with the plan, STUDENT’s mother returned a “Parent Questionnaire” form provided to her by the District. In the questionnaire, STUDENT’s mother reported that she frequently had to repeat directions to STUDENT and he could not follow more than one direction at a time. She observed that his difficulty in following directions was a result of being distracted or due to a loss of attention. STUDENT’s mother also reported that STUDENT had twice failed a vision test at Tulita because he was distracted and had difficulty keeping his attention on the test. STUDENT’s mother also reported that STUDENT had had a history of chronic ear infections from age six months. She explained that STUDENT had to have tubes placed in his ears. STUDENT’s mother also informed the District that she had provided tutoring services to STUDENT twice a week between June and September 1996 and again between February and May 1997. She also recorded that he was unusually fearful and dependent as well as bossy, happy, affectionate, and friendly. STUDENT’s mother noted that STUDENT had little confidence in his abilities and became disruptive when he had difficulty understanding a lesson. She also explained that STUDENT had difficulties in preschool and he did not understand what was going on in kindergarten. STUDENT’s mother added that STUDENT gave up very easily on his homework when he needed to concentrate.

On the same day that STUDENT’s mother returned the assessment plan, she sent a letter to the principal of Tulita school, Fred Marsee, requesting that STUDENT be placed the following school year in Ms. Blanco’s second grade class. In her letter, STUDENT’s mother informed Mr. Marsee that she believed Ms. Blanco’s class was more structured and would better address STUDENT’s needs than the other available classes. STUDENT’s mother was informed by the school, however, that STUDENT would not be placed in Ms. Blanco’s class the following year. Notwithstanding STUDENT’s academic difficulties in the first grade at Tulita, he was given passing marks and recommended for promotion to the second grade. At the conclusion of the 1996-1997 school year, STUDENT’s mother withdrew STUDENT from the Redondo Unified School District and enrolled him in a nonpublic school. She also withdrew her request to have the District assess STUDENT.

After STUDENT completed the first grade at Tulita in June 1997, his parents enrolled him for the 1997-1998 school year at Riviera Hall Lutheran School, a nonpublic parochial school. At Riviera Hall, STUDENT repeated the first grade and was assigned to Ms. Federwitz’s class. Although he was repeating the first grade, Ms. Federwitz observed that STUDENT performed below average in her class and that, while STUDENT could perform tasks at the first grade level earlier in the year, he was “struggling to make it work” by the end of the year. Ms. Federwitz gave STUDENT mostly passing grades in her class, but she testified that her grades were subjective and based mostly on participation rather than on academic achievement. The report card form indicated that E represented “excellent,” an S represented “satisfactory,” and an N represented “improvement needed.” Ms. Federwitz assigned STUDENT several E’s and S’s as well as an S- grade in overall reading, reading comprehension, and phonics. Ms. Federwitz said that in her mind an S- indicated that remediation was required.

On April 19, 1998, STUDENT’s mother again requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education. An assessment plan was signed by STUDENT’s mother and returned to the District on June 3, 1998.

STUDENT was promoted to the second grade for the 1998-1999 school year and was assigned to Ms. Steeves’ class. Ms. Steeves observed that STUDENT continued to struggle in her class. She testified that by the second quarter she modified some of his grades in order to keep him from being too discouraged. Ms. Steeves testified that after she spent extra time working with STUDENT he made some improvement, but that by the end of the year he was still “way below” the rest of the other students in the class.

On October 21, 1998, after STUDENT had been in Ms. Steeves’ second grade class for two months, the District completed STUDENT’s psychoeducational assessment, which it had begun on July 14, 1998.(Footnote 1) As part of the evaluation, The District’s psychologist, Ms. Balin, administered several assessment tests, and issued a report on November 3, 1998, outlining her findings. As part of the assessment, STUDENT was given the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III) to assess his intellectual ability. STUDENT received a full scale score of 99, with no significant discrepancy between his verbal and performance scores. To measure his performance skills and academic achievement, STUDENT was given the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT-III), the Detroit Tests of Learning Aptitude (DTLA-3), the Developmental Tests of Visual Motor Integration (Beery), the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Tests of Achievement, and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Tests (WIAT)–Screener. The standardized testing instruments did not reveal any severe discrepancies between ability and achievement. STUDENT was also given the Jordan Left-Right Reversal Test. He scored below normal limits on this test. STUDENT’s standardized test scores were normed to correspond to his then present grade.

In her report, Ms. Balin noted that STUDENT’s overall reading skills were at the mid-second grade level. She observed that he was able to read several sight words and worked hard to sound out unfamiliar words. Ms. Balin described how when STUDENT was asked to read short passages, he “read very slowly and painstakingly.” Despite his slow pace, Ms. Balin noted that STUDENT was able to use context clues to help him comprehend what he was reading. Ms. Balin reported that STUDENT’s overall math skills were at the beginning second grade level and that he was able to add and subtract simple math facts. She also indicated that he could tell time and knew the value of coins. Ms. Balin also reported that STUDENT’s overall written language skills were at the beginning second grade level. She also observed that STUDENT had difficulty with spelling, irregular plurals, and superlatives. Ms. Balin recounted that when STUDENT was asked to write sentences in response to picture prompts, he wrote “simple sentences with very few details.” She noted that he had numerous spelling errors and did not use beginning or ending punctuation.

Ms. Balin recorded in her report that Ms. Steeves completed the Burks Behavior Rating Scale to evaluate STUDENT’s social-emotional development.(Footnote 2) According to the report, Ms. Steeves’ response did not indicate to Ms. Balin any significant concern regarding STUDENT’s behavior or social adjustment. Ms. Steeves’ responses to the Burks evaluation did denote that STUDENT had “difficulty in taking risks in learning or approaching new situations, perhaps indicating a lack of confidence.” Ms. Balin’s report did not mention whether she discussed STUDENT’s academic abilities with Ms. Steeves, or whether she had contacted STUDENT’s first grade teachers, Ms. Ungaro and Ms. Federwitz, to discuss his performance in their classes. In her report, Ms. Balin concluded that STUDENT did not manifest a significant discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement and that he did not demonstrate a processing disorder. She recommended that STUDENT remain in the regular education program. On December 2, 1998, an IEP team meeting was convened and the team found that STUDENT was not eligible for special education. STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, signed the IEP document and indicated on the form that she agreed with the determination at that time.

After STUDENT completed the second grade, he continued at Riviera Hall during the 1999-2000 school year, where he attended Ms. Merritt’s third grade class. In Ms. Merritt’s class, STUDENT continued to struggle with virtually the same academic difficulties that he had struggled with since the first grade at Tulita.

On October 8, 1999, while STUDENT was in Ms. Merritt’s third grade class, his parents again informed the District that STUDENT was having difficulty learning and requested that he be assessed for special education. On October 21, 1999, STUDENT’s mother had a telephone conversation with Mr. DeSena. Mr. DeSena’s phone log indicates that he informed STUDENT’s mother of the eligibility criteria and she asked that her request for an assessment be withdrawn. STUDENT’s mother recalled that after she requested STUDENT be assessed again for special education services, Mr. DeSena called her and discouraged her from seeking another assessment. According to STUDENT’s mother, Mr. DeSena told her that STUDENT did not qualify for special education after the last assessment and he was not likely to qualify now. After the phone conversation with Mr. DeSena, STUDENT’s mother withdrew her request to have STUDENT assessed. No one from the District contacted STUDENT’s teachers or took any other steps to determine the nature and extent of STUDENT’s educational problems.

STUDENT continued to fail in the third grade, and he began to exhibit signs of social withdrawal. According to Ms. Merritt, he frequently sat in class and looked down without participating. In March of 2000, STUDENT’s parents privately retained Dr. Alan M. Solomon, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, to conduct a psychoeduactional evaluation of STUDENT. Dr. Solomon administered standardized tests to STUDENT to measure his intellectual ability and academic achievement at that time. In his report, Dr. Solomon concluded that STUDENT had average intellectual ability, but that he had weaknesses in the area of attention, rote memory, and the manipulation of data. Dr. Solomon opined that STUDENT’s academic skills were below or at low grade level and somewhat below his intellectual ability. He also administered a personality assessment that revealed STUDENT to be anxious, fearful, and sad. Dr. Solomon also reported that STUDENT suffered from an attention deficit disorder. He recommended that STUDENT be transferred to a public school or another private school and that another IEP meeting be held(Footnote 3). Dr. Solomon also referred STUDENT to Dr. Sylvia Kennedy, a clinical psychologist, to evaluate his need for further testing. Dr. Kennedy reviewed Dr. Solomon’s and Ms. Balin’s reports, and she concluded at that time that STUDENT had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, a reading disorder, a disorder of written expression, and a phonological disorder. She recommended STUDENT receive educational therapy in the coming year.

In the spring of 2000, STUDENT took the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills a third time. STUDENT scored below average in reading comprehension (14), total reading (21), spelling (4), capitalization (17), usage and expression (13), total language (12), social studies (16), and science (19).(Footnote 4) In several other areas, STUDENT scored in the low average range.

On June 16, 2000, STUDENT’s parents sent the District a letter requesting that the District assess STUDENT yet again for special education services. Their letter informed the District that STUDENT had continued to struggle at Riviera Hall, and that the school would not accept him back for the next term–fourth grade. STUDENT’s parents stated that notwithstanding the District’s prior finding of ineligibility, they believed STUDENT was eligible for special education and that the District was required to provide those services. In their letter, STUDENT’s parents referenced Dr. Solomon and Dr. Kennedy’s findings. STUDENT’s parents also stated that they believed they were discouraged from having STUDENT reassessed in 1999, and that they no longer agreed with the District’s prior finding of ineligibility in 1998. On June 22, 2000, STUDENT’s aunt, AUNT, also sent the District a letter. In her letter, STUDENT’s aunt suggested that Ms. Balin may not be the appropriate person to conduct STUDENT’s assessment, opined that the District had erred by not finding STUDENT eligible in for special education in 1998, and conveyed to the District, in essence, her belief that STUDENT was suffering from depression and had regressed in his educational program as a result of the District’s past failures.

Prior to the District’s completing its assessment, STUDENT’s parents obtained a speech and language evaluation by Janice DeMore, a speech pathologist. Ms. Demore determined that STUDENT had significant language deficits in understanding ambiguous and figurative language, auditory processing problems, phonological processing problems, and deficits in high-order language skills including inferences. Ms. Demore recommended that STUDENT receive speech and language therapy.

In the summer of 2000, STUDENT’s mother discussed with District staff STUDENT returning to Tulita for the fourth grade. Although the District had not yet assessed or found STUDENT eligible for special education, STUDENT’s mother understood the District to be offering to place STUDENT at the District’s learning center. She understood the learning center to be a special education program where students with varying disabilities learned together, and she explained that she had heard from other parents that it was not a successful program. STUDENT’s mother testified that she believed the learning center was inadequate to meet STUDENT’s needs, and because she believed that he was so far behind, she did not want to take a chance on it as a placement. According to Mr. DeSena’s phone log, he requested that STUDENT’s parents’ representative make a request in writing to have STUDENT placed in the learning center. The learning center in fact was not a special education program, but rather, a tutoring center.

On September 13, 2000, STUDENT’s parents sent a letter to the District informing them that they believed that the District could not offer STUDENT a FAPE to meet his unique needs and, that therefore, they were placing STUDENT at Summit View School, a nonpublic school. The District did not respond to STUDENT’s parents’ letter or in any way refute their belief regarding FAPE. At about the same time, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him at Summit View School, a nonpublic school that serves learning disabled students.

On October 23, 2000, the District completed its own assessment of STUDENT. Ms. Balin again assessed STUDENT for special education. Her report found that STUDENT exhibited a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement in the area of written language and a moderate discrepancy in the area of reading. She also found that STUDENT demonstrated auditory and phonological processing disorders. She noted that STUDENT was diagnosed with ADHD, for which he was receiving medication. Ms. Balin concluded that STUDENT had been eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability. Susan T. Kelly, the District’s speech and language pathologist, administered a speech and language assessment to STUDENT. Ms. Kelly found that STUDENT exhibited relative deficits in auditory memory and language formation.

On October 23, 2000, an IEP meeting was held for STUDENT. Both STUDENT’s parents and District representatives were present at the meeting. The team found STUDENT eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability and a language impairment. The District also noted that STUDENT’s parents had placed him in a private school at the beginning of the school year, and it took the position it was not required to offer STUDENT a FAPE. The District did offer STUDENT a private school service plan, and STUDENT’s parents rejected the District’s offer.

On December 22, 2000, STUDENT’s parents filed for due process hearing.

POSITION OF THE PARTIES

STUDENT contends that in December 1998, he was eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability. STUDENT takes the position that the District erred by not finding him eligible for special education in December 1998, and that as a result, the District is required to reimburse him for the costs of the subsequent assessments that he obtained in the spring and summer of 2000. Additionally, STUDENT alleges that after he was found eligible for special education in December 2000, the District was required to offer him a FAPE and failed to do so. As a result, STUDENT contends, he is entitled to reimbursement for his educational and transportation costs at Summit View School.

Regarding STUDENT’s eligibility for special education services in December 1998, the District counters that STUDENT did not have a specific learning disability or speech and language impairment at that time, and thus he was not eligible for special education services. The District also takes the position that even if STUDENT did qualify for special education services as of December 1998, it is not required to reimburse STUDENT’s privately obtained assessments because they were largely duplicative of the assessments done by the District in the same relative time period.

As to the issue of FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year, the District contends that it was not required to offer STUDENT a FAPE for two reasons: First, STUDENT’s parents unilaterally placed STUDENT in a nonpublic school as a matter of preference and not because FAPE was at issue. Second, even if FAPE was at issue, the District asserts that it was not required to offer STUDENT a FAPE because he had not previously received special education services from a public agency.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue Number 1: Was STUDENT eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability in December 1998?

Applicable Law

A child is eligible for special education services if he has a specific learning disability, and for that reason, needs special education and related services. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A); Cal. Ed. Code § 56026(a).) Additionally, the California Code of Regulations sets forth the criteria for determining a specific learning disability. Section 3030(j) of the regulations states in its pertinent part:

A pupil has a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which may manifest itself in an impaired ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations, and has a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement in one or more of the academic areas specified in Section 56337(a) of the Education Code. For the purpose of Section 3030(j):

This regulation also defines a processing disorder and specifies the methods for determining whether a student has a severe discrepancy or otherwise qualifies for special education as a child with a specific learning disability. (See C.C.R. § 3030(j).)

Evidentiary Analysis

To determine whether STUDENT was eligible for special education in 1998, the Hearing Officer must consider the evidence presented at the hearing and determine whether STUDENT met the criteria for eligibility under State or federal law as described above.(Footnote 5)

The District assessed STUDENT for special education in the fall of 1998 and found that he was not eligible for services. STUDENT contends that notwithstanding his average test scores on the formal assessment instruments administered by the District’s psychologist, Ms. Balin, in the fall of 1998, his poor academic performance and learning difficulties in the classroom established that he had a learning disability. Ms. Federwitz, STUDENT’s first grade teacher at Riviera Hall, testified on his behalf. In support of STUDENT’s contention, she explained that he was performing below average in her class and that while STUDENT could perform tasks at the first grade level earlier in the year, he was “struggling to make it work” by the end of the year. She said that STUDENT exhibited a memory problem that was consistent with problems he had with reading. Ms. Federwitz specifically noted that STUDENT had difficulty retaining vocabulary words in his memory. She also recounted how STUDENT could not name the letters “y” and “e”, and he could not name “b” sounds. Ms. Federwitz stated that when she gave the class directions, STUDENT just sat and thought about what he had to do while the rest of the class got started on their work; she had to personally give STUDENT direction.

Additionally, STUDENT’s second grade teacher, Ms. Steeves, testified that although STUDENT had completed the first grade twice, he was not performing at second grade level in her class. Ms. Steeves recalled that when STUDENT read aloud he didn’t know the words, stumbled over them, and had difficulty pronouncing them. She recalled that STUDENT was obviously struggling compared to the rest of the class. Ms. Steeves said that she expected second-graders to pronounce sight words, or if they sounded a word out once, to recall it the next time. She also described how she evaluated students’ abilities for reading comprehension. Ms. Steeves recalled that STUDENT could answer questions orally or by filling in bubbles on a worksheet regarding reading comprehension, but it was more difficult for him to write the answers down. She also noted that it was difficult to get a thought down in a complete sentence as opposed to saying it orally. He could talk it out, but could not write it down. Sentence and grammar were difficult for STUDENT, but forming the idea for the sentence was STUDENT’s biggest problem in writing. Ms. Steeves explained that phonics was the simplest subject for her students–most of whom received A’s–because it merely required adding or removing a letter from a word, but she recalled that STUDENT was “up and down” on this skill. Ms. Steeves testified that STUDENT adequately learned spelling words for the quiz, but he could not apply them. He consistently misspelled words when writing sentences, as well as made mistakes in capitalizations and punctuation. In her opinion, by the end of the school year, STUDENT was still trying to sound out words. He didn’t know how to spell any of them on sight; he just tried to sound them out like a first-grader would. STUDENT simply couldn’t recall how to spell words he should know. Ms. Steeves specifically remembered talking to other teachers about STUDENT’s problems in this area.

Additionally, Ms. Steeves pointed out that most of STUDENT grades were subjective and only partially based on objective scores. Ms. Steeves testified that by the second quarter she modified some of STUDENT’s grades in order to keep him from being too discouraged, and although she did not note it on his report card with the asterisk, she modified those same grades for the rest of the year. She described how after she spent extra time working with STUDENT he made some improvement, but by the end of the year he was still “way below” the rest of the other students in the class.

The District, however, argues that while STUDENT was subsequently found eligible for special education services in the fall of 2000, the standardized test administered by Ms. Balin in the fall of 1998 did not find a processing disorder or reveal a severe discrepancy between his intellectual ability and achievement at that point. Ms. Balin pointed out that the assessment tests indicated that STUDENT was of average intelligence and his achievement was also average. She pointed out that STUDENT’s lowest achievement score demonstrated only a 6-point discrepancy. She explained that a 23-point discrepancy generally constitutes a severe discrepancy between ability and achievement. Ms. Balin stated that in reaching her conclusion, she also considered information presented by STUDENT’s mother and his teachers. Ms. Balin pointed out, however, that while both Ms. Federwitz and Ms. Steeves may have articulated at the hearing many of STUDENT’s problems in their classes, that information was not made available to her at the IEP team meeting in 1998. The teachers at Riviera Hall also acknowledged that Riviera Hall maintained higher academic standards than public schools, and both Ms. Federwitz and Ms. Steeves testified that STUDENT did in fact progress in their classes. Ms. Steeves noted that STUDENT received passing excellent and satisfactory grades in every academic subject. Ms. Balin noted that STUDENT had only been in Ms. Steeves’ second grade class a few weeks when he was assessed. She noted, however, that Ms. Steeves also noted that STUDENT progressed in her class, and that she gave STUDENT passing non-modified grades during the first semester, which was the time frame for which STUDENT was assessed.In determining whether STUDENT was eligible for special education, the Hearing Officer must consider the information available to the District at the time the decision was made. (Adams v. Oregon (9th Cir. 1999) 195 F.3d 1141. 1149.) Although subsequent facts may be considered as a factor in determining the appropriateness of the District’s decision, its findings cannot be judged exclusively in hindsight. (Ibid.) The question is what was objectively reasonable when the issue was decided, that is, whether there was sufficient evidence in the fall of 1998 for the IEP team to find STUDENT eligible at that time. As discussed above, STUDENT’s teachers, Ms. Ungaro, Ms. Federwitz, and Ms. Steeves, each articulated–in reports or testimony–the academic difficulties that STUDENT exhibited in their respective classes. At the time STUDENT was initially assessed, he continued to display academic weaknesses, particularly in the area of written expression. However, there is no evidence that the IEP team was made aware of the specific academic difficulties STUDENT experienced in Ms. Federwitz’s and Ms. Steeves’ classes, at least not to the extent it was brought out at the hearing. Additionally, at the time STUDENT also demonstrated progress in his classes and received passing grades up to that point. It was in this context that STUDENT was assessed in the fall of 1998.

In 1998, the District administered standardized assessment tests to evaluate STUDENT and determine whether he exhibited any speech and language or learning impairments. The test results at that time did not reveal any speech or language disorders, processing disorders, or discrepancies between ability and achievement. As the District pointed out, STUDENT’s tests scores, including each sub-test that he took, did not demonstrate a discrepancy between intellectual ability and achievement greater than six points, which is not a severe discrepancy. Moreover, the tests at that time, which included sub-tests to measure memory, written expression, and reading, did not reveal any significant weaknesses that would reasonably call into question the adequacy of the tests selected or their results.

Thus, while STUDENT’s educational difficulties became more pronounced over time, and hindsight suggests that his learning impairments may have actually existed in 1998, the information available to the District did not establish that STUDENT was eligible for special education services at that time. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the evidence in 1998 indicates that STUDENT was not eligible for special education services at that time.

Issue Number 2: Was the District required to offer STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year?

Applicable Law

Federal law provides that a local educational agency is not required to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of a child with a disability at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate public education available to the child and the parents elected to place the child in such private school or facility. (20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(i).)

The Code of Federal Regulations separate the rights and duties of local agencies and parents in situations where the parents have enrolled their child in a private school without a public agency placement or referral. (C. F. R. § 300.403; § 300.450-300.487.) Section 300.403(a) makes clear that a local educational agency (LEA) is not required to pay for the cost of special education and related services, if the LEA offered FAPE and the parents elected to place a child in a private school. This regulation reiterates the statutory requirement stated in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i).

As to which disputes may be resolved in a due process hearing, section 300.403(b) specifies that if there is a disagreement between a parent and a public agency regarding the availability of a program available for the child and the question of financial responsibility, the dispute is subject to a due process hearing. However, while section 300.457 expressly excludes disputes that arise under sections 300.452-300.462, it does not exclude disputes that arise under section 300.403. Moreover, 20 U.S.C. §1415(f) provides for a due process hearing in any matter where FAPE is an issue–excluding those issues that arise under C. F. R. § 300.450-300.487. Additionally, Federal statues and regulations also provide remedies for parents whose child has been denied a FAPE. (20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)((B)(iii); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); C. F. R. § 300.403(c).)

Evidentiary Analysis

There is no question in this case that STUDENT, who attended a private school for the 2000-2001 school year, was eligible for special education services in the fall of 2000. There is also no question that the District did not prepare an IEP or offer STUDENT a FAPE at that time. The questions are whether in light of STUDENT’s private school placement the District was required to offer STUDENT a FAPE in the fall of 2000, and if so whether his parents are entitled to receive reimbursement for that placement.

Was FAPE an Issue in the Fall of 2000

The District asserts that STUDENT’s parents placed him in a private school in September 2000 merely as a matter of personal preference, rather than because FAPE was an issue. Thus, the District argues, it was not required under federal law to develop an IEP for STUDENT or offer him a FAPE. (District’s Closing Brief (DCB): 19-23, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10) et seq.; 34 C. F. R. § 300.401-300.462; and 34 IDELR 263, 978, Question 8.) The District adds that FAPE was not an issue because (1) STUDENT’s parents chose to enroll him in a private school, (2) STUDENT’s mother testified at the due process hearing that she wanted STUDENT to remain at that school, and (3) by the time of the IEP meeting she probably would not have removed him from there after only a month. As a result, the District argues that Hearing Office does not have jurisdiction under C. F. R. § 300.457 to rule on the issue.(Footnote 6)

STUDENT countered that FAPE was very much an issue when his parents enrolled him in Summit View private school in September of 2000. STUDENT alleges that his parents initially made it clear to the District that they were interested in having it provide him with special education services, and that they placed him in a private school only when they came to believe that the District would not or could not provide him a FAPE.

In support of his contention, STUDENT points out that on June 16, 2000, his parents requested that the District assess STUDENT for special education. In their letter requesting an assessment, STUDENT’s parents note that they informed the District that STUDENT could no longer remain at Riviera Hall, the private school he had been attending since 1997, and that they believed he was eligible for special education services in the District at Redondo Beach. In a letter to the District from STUDENT’s aunt, STUDENT’s aunt, sent a few days later on June 22, she requested that the assessments begin as soon as possible because she believed that to place STUDENT back in the “school system” without proper interventions would be extremely harmful to STUDENT’s emotional and mental well-being. STUDENT’s aunt’s communication on STUDENT’s behalf clearly indicated the STUDENTS family’s concern that if STUDENT was going to return to the District, it would have to provide him special education services as soon as possible. Mr. DeSena, the District’s director of special education, testified that as a result of his communications with STUDENT’s parents, he believed that STUDENT was in fact going to be attending school in the District. He recalled being surprised when STUDENT did not enroll on the first day of school.

Additionally, STUDENT’s mother testified that she believed that the District’s offer to provide STUDENT with services in Tulita’s learning center was intended to be its offer of “placement” should he return to the District. She said she considered the “offer” entirely inadequate in light of STUDENT’s severe deficits. Instead of re-enrolling STUDENT in the District, STUDENT’s mother said that she enrolled him at Summit View School, a nonpublic school that specializes in educating learning disabled children. STUDENT’s mother testified that she enrolled STUDENT at Summit View because she believed that the District failed to appropriately identify STUDENT as eligible for special education in 1998, that the District had discouraged her from seeking a second assessment in 1999, and that it only intended to offer STUDENT tutoring services in Tulita’s learning center. She explained that she believed it was necessary to immediately place STUDENT at Summit view because he was academically so far behind and beginning to suffer emotionally as a result. STUDENT’s mother added that she did not believe she could wait for the IEP meeting because the District had been so unwilling to serve STUDENT in the past.

STUDENT’s parents pointed out that they specifically informed the District that they were placing STUDENT in a private school because FAPE was an issue. In their letter to the District, they stated that STUDENT was being placed in Summit View because they did not believe the District could provide him with a FAPE. Both STUDENT’s mother and Mr. DeSena testified that no one from the District responded to the letter or otherwise told the GUARDIAN’s that they were wrong, that the District could and would provide STUDENT with a FAPE if he qualified for special education services. STUDENT’s mother also recalled that at the IEP meeting in October, after STUDENT was in fact found eligible for special education, the District not only did not offer STUDENT a particular program or placement, it did not even inform her that it could and would offer to provide STUDENT with a FAPE if the parents so desired. STUDENT’s mother admitted at the due process hearing that by October 2000, she wanted STUDENT to stay at Summit View and probably would not have removed STUDENT from Summit View. But she also testified that when she attended the IEP meeting, she was open to what the District had to offer. First, there is ample evidence that STUDENT’s parents expressed interest in returning STUDENT to the District. STUDENT’s parents informed the District on June 16, 2000 that STUDENT could not remain at Riviera Hall due to his academic failures and asked that he again be assessed for special education services. STUDENT’s parents also commented that STUDENT was regressing and showing signs of depression and that they believed he was eligible for services. A few days later, on June 22, STUDENT’s aunt sent a letter to the District expressing the family’s dilemma of having to send STUDENT “back into the school system without an active intervention to provide special education....” (Emphasis added.) Thus, June 2000, the District was fully aware–or should have been–of STUDENT’s parents’ concerns regarding STUDENT’s educational difficulties.

The evidence also demonstrates that STUDENT’s mother misunderstood the District’s proposal of providing STUDENT services at the learning center as a formal offer of placement.(Footnote 7) Although the Hearing Officer does not assume that the District was aware of STUDENT’s mother’s mistaken belief, they were clearly aware that STUDENT’s parents “intended” to send STUDENT to a private school because they believed that the District could not provide him with a FAPE. STUDENT’s parents made this point expressly clear in their September 13, 2000 letter to the District. The District admits that they did not respond to the GUARDIAN’s September 13 letter, nor did they inform them that the District could and would provide STUDENT with a FAPE if he were found eligible.

Furthermore, the Hearing Officer notes that the District documented on the October 23, 2000 IEP form itself that the parents’ “priorities and concerns” regarding STUDENT were to ensure that he was “eligible for special education,” “develop appropriate goals and objectives,” and “develop [an] appropriate placement.”

The Hearing Officer finds that the communications between the parties and the circumstances and history surrounding those communications establish that STUDENT’s parents placed STUDENT in a private school not because of personal preference, but because FAPE was an issue. STUDENT’s parents’ communications to the District in 2000 indicate both an interest in having STUDENT return to the District (i.e., his aunt’s August 2000 letter during the assessment process expressing the families concern that STUDENT not return to the school system without an appropriate placement to meet his needs) and their doubts as to the District’s ability to provide him a FAPE. In contrast to parents who choose to send their child to a private school regardless of whether the district offers them a FAPE, STUDENT’s parents chose to send STUDENT to a private school because they believed the District would not and could not provide him a FAPE. More importantly, STUDENT’s parents expressly communicated their belief to the District, and the District did not attempt to correct or contradict STUDENT’s parents’ belief–either at the time it was communicated or five weeks later at the IEP meeting. Additionally, STUDENT’s parents never communicated to the District that they would not consider or accept a free and appropriate public education from the District if it were offered. Had the District made such an offer and STUDENT’s parents rejected it, they would have no claim for reimbursement.

Interestingly enough, the District also cites a published letter from the Office of Special Education programs for the premise that the District is not required to develop an IEP for a child whose parents make clear their intention to enroll their child at a private school and also make clear that they are not interested in a public program or placement. (34 IDELR 263, 978, Question 8.) But the letter from OSEP goes on to specifically opine that the private school regulations found in C. F. R. § 300.450-300.462 apply to the district “if the parents choose not to accept the public agency’s offer to make FAPE available to their child.” The premise of the letter is that the regulations–C. F. R. § 300.450-300.462–govern children placed in private placements at their parents request and where the parents chose not to accept the District’s offer of FAPE. Implicit in that premise, is the assumption that the District in fact offered FAPE, and the parents chose a private placement instead.

Notwithstanding the fact that OSEP understands federal law as not requiring districts to develop an IEP for children whose parents chose private placement in lieu of a district’s actual offer of FAPE, the Hearing Officer finds the facts in this case establish that STUDENT was placed in a private school not as a matter of personal choice, but because FAPE was at issue. Therefore, the District was required to develop an IEP for STUDENT and offer him a FAPE.

Are STUDENT’s Parents Barred From Receiving Reimbursement Because STUDENT did not Previously Receive Special Education Services Under the Authority of a Public Agency

The District also argues that even if STUDENT’s parents placed STUDENT in a private school as a result of a dispute over FAPE, they are not permitted to receive reimbursement for STUDENT’s placement because he had not previously received special education services under the authority of a public agency. (DCB: 23-28 citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); C. F. R. §300.403(c).)

The District contends that even if STUDENT was placed in a private school under circumstances where FAPE was an issue, 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. § 300.403(c) bars STUDENT’s parents from being reimbursed for that placement because STUDENT had not previously received special education services under a public agency. The District understands 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a)(10)(C)(ii) to limit a parent’s right to receive reimbursement to those circumstances where the child was denied a FAPE and received prior special education services under the authority of a public agency.

However, 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not limit a parent’s right to reimbursement to those circumstances where a child has previously received special education services under authority of a public entity. The statute, and its corresponding regulation, C. F. R. §300.403(c), provides that a parent may be reimbursed when those specified conditions exist. But the statute and regulation do not prohibit a Hearing Officer or court from reimbursing a parent when conditions other than those specified in 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. §300.403(c) exist, i.e., in a circumstance where a child has been denied FAPE and he has not previously received special education services under a public agency. There are three reasons that 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. §300.403(c) cannot be read to limit the discretion of a Hearing

Officer or a court from reimbursing the parents of a child who has been placed in a private school because he was not offered FAPE and where the child did not previously receive special education services under the authority of a public agency.

First, the language of sections 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. §300.403(c) are permissive and their construction does not limit the authority of a Hearing Officer or court from granting reimbursements when conditions other than those set forth exist. The construction of these sections may be contrasted to the language in sections 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(i) and C. F. R. § 300.403(a). Under these sections, the language employed actually limits the responsibility of local educational agencies, and states that they are not required to fund a child’s private placement if a FAPE was offered. In short, if the two conditions are met–the agency offered FAPE and the parents chose to send their child to a private school–the agency does not have to fund the placement. The sections at issue here that address reimbursement, state that when certain conditions exist, a Hearing Officer or court may award reimbursement. But as stated above, the language of the sections does not prohibit the Hearing Officer or court from awarding reimbursement when other conditions exist.

Second, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is not the only statute under the IDEA that addresses remedies. Section 1415(i)(2)((B)(iii) provides that a court shall grant appropriate relief if it is supported by the evidence. Under this section, “appropriate” relief does not even reference cases where the child previously received special education services under the authority of a public agency. Moreover, unlike the discretionary remedy found in 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. § 300.403(c), the remedy under §1415(i)(2)((B)(iii) is mandatory, i.e., the court “shall” grant relief when it is appropriate. Indeed, it was this very language that the Supreme Court relied on in School Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-370. In that case, the Court held that the language in this section means whatever relief is appropriate in light of the purposes of the act.(Footnote 8) It is important to note that when Congress amended the IDEA in 1997, it left intact the statutory language that the Court relied on in Burlington. Had congress intended to limit the broad equitable remedies identified by the Burlington Court in § 1415(i)(2)((B)(iii) (then §1415(e)(2), it would have deleted or amended them. Congress did not. Instead, while it added a discretionary remedy, it left intact the broad equitable remedies mandated under the act.

Third, to read 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. § 300.403(c) as limiting reimbursement to parents for private school placements when a district does not offer FAPE and only where the child previously received special education services under the authority of a public agency would be absurd and undermine the policy objective of the IDEA. The result of such a reading would allow local educational agencies to deny FAPE with impunity to all initial applicants. A district could merely deny eligibility or not offer an eligible child FAPE as a matter of practice, knowing that if a parent challenged its decision in a due process hearing it would not risk having to reimburse the parents for placing their children in private schools. Any reading of 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) and C. F. R. § 300.403(c) that limits reimbursement only to those cases where the child previously received special education services would completely undermine the notion, which permeates the very fabric of the IDEA, that a district’s failure to offer an eligible child a FAPE is not a risk-free endeavor. Courts will not interpret statutes in such a way as to lead to unreasonable or absurd results, or to otherwise undermine the policy underlying a statutory scheme. (Ozawa v. United States 260 U.S. 178, 194; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services et al. 492 U.S. 490, 515; Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564, 575; American Tobacco Company v. Patterson 456 U.S. 63, 71.)

The District stipulated that if the District was required to offer STUDENT a FAPE, for purposes of reimbursement, Summit View was an appropriate placement to met STUDENT’s educational needs. Thus, the Hearing Officer has authority to award STUDENT’s parents reimbursement for their tuition and transportation costs at Summit View School.

ORDER

Within 20 calendar days of receiving invoices from STUDENT’s parents, the District is required to reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the cost of is tuition and transportation at Summit View School from October 23, 2000, through the balance of the 2000-2001 school year.

PREVAILING PARTY

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statue:

1. Was STUDENT eligible for special education as a child with a specific learning disability in December 1998? The District prevailed on this issue.

2. Was the District required to offer STUDENT a FAPE fo the 2000-2001 school year? STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties in this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).)

Date: February 4, 2002 ___________________________________ Paul E. Lacy, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Mr. DeSena’s telephone log indicates that he informed STUDENT’s mother that the assessment would need to be postponed because the RSP teacher was on medical leave. He asked STUDENT’s mother to sign a waiver for the 50 day time line, which she did. 2. In her testimony, Ms. Balin said that in addition to the information she received from Ms. Steeves on the Burks Rating Scale, she personally talked with her regarding STUDENT. She did not indicate in her testimony, however, that she discussed STUDENT’s academic performance with Ms. Steeves. Ms. Steeves testified that she did not recall talking to Ms. Balin. 3. Dr. Solomon, in his report, noted that he was recommending an IEP meeting not because he thought it was likely that STUDENT would qualify special education services, but for the purpose of obtaining adjustments to STUDENT’s educational program. 4. Ms. Merritt testified that the scores on this test were standard scores that had been normed and were utilized for comparison purposes. 5. In their closing briefs, the parties argued whether the District in 1998 assessed in all suspected areas of disability. However, the parties agreed at hearing to narrow the issues to those stated above as issue number one and issue number two. 6. Prior to the hearing, the District filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s claim on the ground that the Hearing Office did not have jurisdiction over the issue because STUDENT’s parents had unilaterally placed him in private school when FAPE was not an issue. The motion was denied in a Summary Order issued by the Hearing Officer on June 13, 2001. The District renewed its motion at hearing, and the Hearing Officer again denied the motion for substantially the same reasons. The basis for denying the motion were FAPE was not an issue set forth in more detail in the Hearing Officer’s analysis of issue number two. 7. STUDENT’s mother’s mistake was not entirely unreasonable inasmuch as Mr. DeSena’s telephone notes refer his expectation that STUDENT’s mother’s representative, Ms. Tytell, would send in a written request to have STUDENT “placed” in the learning center. 8. The Court also noted that it considered the absence of other references when it defined “appropriate” relief. (School Comm. of Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., supra, 471 U.S. at p. 370.) At first glance, one may be tempted to consider the addition of section 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10(C)(ii) as the “other reference.” However, such a reading is inconsistent with the language of the two provisions. As noted above, the Congress was aware of the Supreme Court’s holding. Had it wished to limit the High Court’s interpretation of §1415(i)(2)((B)(iii), it would not have done so by merely providing the discretionary, non-limiting language of §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).