California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 26, 2001
Student v. Ojai Valley Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 2288-00 · Hearing Officer Mark D. Brylski
Ojai Valley Unified properly carried out a settlement agreement's inclusion services for a preschooler with autism; all claims denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The District's mid-hearing motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (filed May 4, 2001) was denied. No remand, vacatur or correction is noted.
Summary
A five-year-old with autism, through his parents, filed for a hearing against Ojai Valley Unified School District. In January 2001 the parties settled an earlier dispute. The District agreed to fund three afternoons a week at a private preschool, the Ojai Center for Children, with a full-time one-to-one aide. It also agreed to provide a "qualified inclusion specialist" who would assess the student and train the aide, staff and teachers, plus monthly consultations. The family claimed the District broke the agreement and denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The District moved to dismiss, arguing that a compliance complaint was the proper route. The Hearing Officer denied the motion because the family raised a FAPE claim. The Hearing Officer then denied every claim. The agreement set no start date, so the roughly two-week delay before inclusion specialist Margo Yunker, an associate of Richard Clemens, began on February 26, 2001 was reasonable. Program specialist Harriet Clise was qualified to give interim support and was never meant to be the inclusion specialist. The words "assess" and "train" were ambiguous and were read against the family's attorney, who drafted the agreement. Ongoing observations and monthly team meetings satisfied both terms, so no formal two-day assessment or training was required. Teacher testimony showed the student made progress, so the services provided some educational benefit in the least restrictive environment. No compensatory education was ordered.
Why it matters
This decision shows SEHO taking jurisdiction over a settlement dispute framed as a FAPE claim. It then applied California contract rules to read the agreement. Terms with no deadline got a "reasonable time," and ambiguous words like "assess" and "train" were construed against the drafting party. The point for drafters: state specific timelines and formats when they matter.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedImplementation
Issue I(A). Did the District properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services by providing Student with an "inclusion specialist"?
The agreement set no start date, so a reasonable time applied; the roughly two-week delay until the inclusion specialist began on February 26, 2001 was reasonable and in good faith, and the program specialist provided appropriate interim support.
- District prevailedImplementation
Issue I(B). Did the District properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services by evaluating Student for inclusion services?
"Assess" was ambiguous; read with paragraph 5 and construed against the parent-side drafter, it meant ongoing assessment, which the inclusion specialist's monthly observations satisfied. No formal two-day assessment at the outset was required.
- District prevailedImplementation
Issue I(C). Did the District properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services by training the full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents?
The agreement did not require two full days of formal training. Ongoing training at the monthly inclusion team meetings satisfied the term "train," which was construed against the drafter.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue II. Did the District deny Student a FAPE in the LRE by designating a program specialist trainee as an "inclusion specialist" qualified to evaluate Student in his regular education classroom, to provide appropriate training to his full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents, and thereafter to consult on inclusion issues on an as-needed basis?
The issue's premise was factually wrong: the program specialist was not a trainee and was never designated as the inclusion specialist. The inclusion services met Student's unique needs, provided some educational benefit, comported with the IEP, and were delivered in the LRE.
- District prevailedFAPE: services offered
Issue III. If the District did not properly construe and adhere to the settlement agreement regarding inclusion services or provide Student a FAPE for the relevant period, is he entitled to compensatory education services?
Because all claims under Issues I and II were denied, Student was not entitled to compensatory education.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- All of Petitioner's claims for relief were denied.
Key authorities
Board of Education v. Rowley; Gregory K. v. Longview School District; Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District; Brant v. California Dairies, Inc.; Woodbine v. Van Horn; Rainier Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp.; California Civil Code §§ 1636, 1641; Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a)
People named in the decision
- Dr. Martin (Marty) Babayco, Director of student services; signed settlement agreement, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Jarice Butterfield, Director of special education, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Van Riley, District Superintendent, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Harriet Clise, Program specialist; provided interim inclusion support, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Erin Avdeef, Speech-language pathologist, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Tricia Malotte, School psychologist, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Cecilia Hickok, Special day class teacher (summer program), Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Jennifer Fitzgerald, Special day class preschool teacher, Ojai Valley Unified School District
- Richard Clemens, Inclusion specialist (contractor), Contracted by District
- Margo Yunker, Inclusion specialist (associate of Richard Clemens), Contracted by District
- Dr. Anthony J. Attwood, Clinical psychologist; private evaluator and expert witness for Student
- Vivian Carlson, Director of private preschool, Ojai Center for Children
- Fritz Rice, 1:1 aide hired by parents, Ojai Center for Children placement
- Ojai Center for Children, Nonpublic/private preschool placement under settlement
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Mark D. Brylski, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Ojai, California, on March 15 and 16, 2001, May 1, 2, 3, and 4, 2001, June 20, 2001, August 16 and 17, 2001, and September 10, 2001.
Petitioner STUDENT(Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney David L. Jones. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf were his parents, PARENT and PARENT.
Respondent Ojai Valley Unified School District (District or Respondent) was represented by attorney Nancy Stephens of Filarsky & Watt LLP. Also present on the District’s behalf on some hearing dates were Dr. Marty Babayco, the District’s director of student services, and Jarice Butterfield, the District’s director of special education.
Petitioner called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Dr. Martin Babayco, director of student services; Mr. Richard Clemens, inclusion specialist (in person and by telephone); Erin Avdeef, speech/language pathologist for the District; Ms. Harriet Clise, program specialist for the District; PARENT, father of Petitioner; PARENT, mother of Petitioner; and Dr. Anthony J. Attwood, a clinical psychologist (by telephone).
Respondent called the following witnesses to testify at the hearing: Dr. Martin Babayco, director of student services for the District; Harriet Clise, program specialist for the District; Erin Avdeef, speech/language pathologist for the District; Tricia Malotte, school psychologist for the District; Jarice Butterfield, director of special education for the District; Cecilia Hickok, special day class teacher for the District; and Jennifer Fitzgerald, special day class teacher for the District.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was kept open for the parties to submit written closing briefs. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for a decision.
ISSUES(Footnote 1)
I. Did the District properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services (A) by providing STUDENT with an “inclusion specialist”?
(B) by evaluating STUDENT for inclusion services?
(C) by training the full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents?
II. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) by designating a program specialist trainee as an “inclusion specialist” qualified to evaluate STUDENT in his regular education classroom, to provide appropriate training to his full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents, and thereafter to consult on inclusion issues on an as-needed basis?
III. If the District did not properly construe and adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services or provide STUDENT a FAPE for the relevant period, is he entitled to compensatory education services?
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
STUDENT is a five-year-old boy who lives with his parents in Ojai, California, and currently attends kindergarten within the District. STUDENT was first found eligible for special education and related services by the District in October 1999 as a preschool student with autism. Based upon the District’s 1999 assessment, STUDENT showed “slight developmental delays in the physical, pre-academic, and communication development with more significant delays in self-help and social skills...[and showed] repetition on toy use and does not appear to engage in social interactions with others.” The District recommended that STUDENT be enrolled in a preschool special class and receive Speech/Language and Occupational Therapy, and determined that STUDENT “would benefit from a structured teaching approach that is visual, predictable, and organized.” (Test. of Ms. Malotte and Pet. Exhs. 42 and 43).
On November 4, 1999, the IEP team agreed to an IEP which provided STUDENT with eligibility for special education and services as a student with autism. STUDENT was placed in a special day class preschool five times per week for three hours each morning and was given speech and language and occupational therapy twice per week in thirty minute-sessions. Goals and objectives in the areas of classroom participation, social, communication skills, motor abilities and/or recreation, and play were adopted, and on May 16, 2000, the IEP team met again and agreed upon an IEP, continuing the prior placement with new goals and objectives. (Pet. Exhs. 39 and 40)
On September 21, 2000, STUDENT was observed and evaluated by Dr. Anthony J. Attwood, a clinical psychologist, at the PARENTS’ request. Dr. Attwood confirmed the original diagnosis of autistic spectrum disorder after observing STUDENT at play for fifteen or twenty minutes and after interviewing STUDENT’s parents for 45 minutes. (Test. of Dr. Attwood) In a one-page report dated October 2, 2000, Dr. Attwood observed that “I am delighted with his progress in a number of areas, particularly in relationship to language and cognition.” Dr. Attwood indicated within the report that he had discussed with STUDENT’s parents the importance of social play and strategies (including the opportunity for adults to “act” like a three or four-year-old boy) and the importance of videotaping aspects of school, therapy and home life to observe appropriate social behaviors. Dr. Attwood stressed strategies for improving communication skills, and recommended that the PARENTS audiotape these strategies to be listened to by those who work with STUDENT. (Pet. Exh. 51)
On November 1, 2000, an IEP team meeting was convened at the request of STUDENT’s parents. STUDENT’s parents presented an “IEP Agenda” which outlined the items to be discussed, including a review of previous IEPs, a review of Dr. Attwood’s “assessment on tape,” STUDENT’s need for a typical environment, and his speech/language and occupational therapy progress. (Dist. Exh. 3 and Test. of PARENTS and Ms. Fitzgerald) STUDENT’s parents also submitted an outline of goals for STUDENT to be addressed. (Dist. Exh. 4) The IEP meeting was continued to November 15, 2001, to allow completion by the District of additional assessments requested by the parents. On November 15, the IEP meeting was reconvened, but the assessment was not completed, and the meeting was continued to December 20, 2000. (Pet. Exh. 31) Each IEP meeting was two to two and one-half hours in length. (Test. of PARENT)
On December 20, 2000, the IEP team convened to review the assessment completed by the District on December 18. The District offered integration activities with kindergarten children on campus for 20% of the day, including structured play activities with typically developing peers in preschool, outside and in the classroom. The offer was rejected by the
PARENTS, who requested that STUDENT be placed in a regular preschool with typically developing peers while being accompanied by a one-to-one aide. (Pet. Exh. 31 and Test. of PARENTS, Ms. Malotte, Ms. Fitzgerald and Ms. Clise)
On January 9, 2001, David L. Jones, attorney for Petitioner, met with Dr. Martin Babayco at Mr. Jones’s office to discuss the terms of a written settlement agreement prepared by Mr. Jones. Dr. Babayco signed the agreement on that date without reviewing the agreement with counsel but after conferring with District Superintendent Van Riley.(Footnote 2) (Test. of Dr. Babayco) The agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows: STUDENT’s placement, at District expense, beginning on January 15, 2001, at the Ojai Center for Children (OCC) (a nonpublic preschool) on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., “where STUDENT will attend preschool with typically developing peers.” The agreement also provided for a full-time, exclusive, one-to-one aide for STUDENT at the OCC and for specified inclusion services at District expense. (Test. of Dr. Babayco and Pet. Exh. 3) Dr. Babayco testified that he told Mr. Jones that he would need more time (beyond January 15, 2001) in order to hire an aide because the District was obligated to follow certain hiring rules. Dr. Babayco also stated that he would not have signed the settlement agreement if he felt that a delay past January 15 would become an issue. (Test. of Dr. Babayco)
On January 17, 2001, program specialist Harriet Clise sent by facsimile to Petitioner’s attorney a proposed IEP which included terms of the settlement agreement for implementation. A formal IEP meeting was not convened to discuss as a team the terms of the agreement in order to incorporate the terms of settlement into an IEP document. (Pet. Exh. 30 and Test. of Ms. Clise) The parties wrangled over language to be included in the implementing IEP. On or about January 25, 2001, STUDENT’s parents signed the revised IEP, and on or about January 29, 2001, the other IEP team members signed the revised IEP. (Pet. Exh. 25 and Dist. Exh.1). On January 30, 2001, Ms. Clise sent the signed revised IEP to Petitioner’s attorney. (Pet. Exh. 23)
On January 31, 2001, the first full-time aide hired by the District to be STUDENT’s aide reported for work at the Ojai Children’s Center (OCC). The aide had one and a half years of experience working as an aide within the District and had previously worked at the OCC. Ms. Clise testified that she observed a “smooth transition” for STUDENTon his first day at the OCC.
On the very next day, in a “To Whom It May Concern” letter dated February 1, 2001, Vivian Carlson, the director of the OCC, stated that the aide’s “teaching style is not a good fit with our classroom environment.” (Dist. Exh. 15) The aide did not return to the OCC after just one day of service at the OCC. (Test. of Ms. Clise) On February 2, 2001, the Hearing Office received a letter from Mr. Jones requesting “that this matter be put back on calendar and a new hearing date assigned.” By letter dated February 2, 2001, to program specialist Harriet Clise, Mr. Jones informed Ms. Clise that the PARENTS had hired Fritz Rice to act as STUDENT’s aide, and that Mr. Rice would begin work at the OCC on Monday, February 5, 2001. Members of the school board were copied in. (Pet. Exh. 22). Fritz Rice was nineteen years old and had no experience working as an aide. (Test. of PARENTS and Ms. Clise)
On February 7, 2001, Ms. Clise telephoned STUDENT’s parents requesting their approval to use Richard Clemens’ associate, Ms. Margo Yunker, as the inclusion specialist, since Mr. Clemens was not available to provide inclusion services, given other work commitments. Ms. Yunker is an associate of Mr. Clemens. Mr. PARENT called Ms. Clise and agreed, and stated that he would discuss the matter that evening at a workshop with Mr. Clemens. (Test. of Ms. Clise and Mr. Clemens) Ms. Clise went to the OCC to help facilitate inclusion services for Fritz Rice until the inclusion specialist was available. (Test. of Ms. Clise)
By letter dated February 14, 2001, to Ms. Watt, Mr. Jones referred to “the district’s secret hiring more than one week ago of Rick Clemens and Margo Yunker to evaluate and provide inclusion consultation” for STUDENT, and further acknowledged that the initial meeting for the inclusion team would be held on February 26, 2001. Mr. Jones stated in his letter that “Ms. Clise is not to enter STUDENT’s preschool class at the Center for Children again without prior written approval from the PARENTS. She has eroded their trust in her. If the district fails to adhere to this, we will be forced to file for a restraining order. Until further notice, the only district personnel authorized to visit STUDENTat the Center for Children are Jennifer Fitzgerald and STUDENT’s speech therapist, Erin.” (Pet. Exh. 16)
On March 15, 2001, this matter proceeded to hearing.
On May 4, 2001, during the course of the convened due process hearing and after five days of testimony, the District submitted a “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,” and on May 21, 2001, the Hearing Office received the District’s supplement to its motion to dismiss. The District argued that the Petitioner’s issues were compliance issues which “should be referred to the California Department of Education Compliance Office.” The District also argued that the issues were not “ripe” for adjudication by SEHO until the CDE had investigated Petitioner’s claims that the District had failed to implement the terms of settlement. The District acknowledged that “while the settlement agreement reached in the instant case...may contain ambiguities which may indeed result in the development of a corrective action plan and the eventual mandated filing for due process hearing by the District, the required process of filing a compliance complaint detailed in California’s Title 5 regulations has not been completed,” and until then, “SEHO does not have jurisdiction as to this matter.”
The Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss and argued that SEHO has jurisdiction to interpret the terms of the settlement agreement reached in the instant case, and that SEHO cases cited by the District were not on point because in those cases, SEHO had issued a final order which ordered the parties to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement reached at a due process hearing.
The Hearing Officer denied the District’s motion to dismiss, finding that while the Petitioner did not seek to add any services not already expressed within the January 9, 2001, settlement agreement or within the January 29, 2001, IEP, the Petitioner had expressed a denial of FAPE issue within the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction. Thus, the issue as expressed exceeded a simple request for compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement and required an evidentiary due process hearing.
The Hearing Officer notes that this case involves a denial of FAPE issue within the purview of California Education Code § 56501(a). In its determination of FAPE issues, the Hearing Office may also resolve issues arising out of settlement agreements which directly relate to special education and related services and the provision of FAPE. Administrative agencies have such powers as may fairly be implied from the statute granting the express powers. Crawford v. Imperial Irr. Dist., (1927) 200 Cal. 318, 253 P. 726; Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1, (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 151 P.2d 505, cert. den. (1945) 324 U.S. 869, 65 S.Ct. 1013; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush, (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 135, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 113.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Did the District properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services (A) by providing STUDENTwith an “inclusion specialist”?
(B) by evaluating STUDENTfor inclusion services?
(C) by training the full-time aide and staff?
The California Supreme Court has held that “where the terms of an agreement are set forth in writing, and the words are not equivocal or ambiguous, the writing or writings will constitute the contract of the parties, and one party is not permitted to escape from its obligations by showing that he did not intend to do what his words bound him to do.” Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal. 2d 128, 134, 48 P.2d 13 (Cal 1935). In this case, the Petitioner and Respondent entered into a settlement agreement on or about January 9, 2001. In accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of the settlement agreement, the District agreed to provide STUDENTwith inclusion services at the Ojai Children’s Center (OCC), a private preschool.
Paragraph 4 provides as follows: “The district will provide a qualified inclusion specialist who will, for both regular and summer session, assess STUDENT’s educational needs and train the aide, staff, and teachers in the appropriate methods of interacting with and teaching STUDENT. The inclusion specialist will also instruct peers and interface with STUDENT’s parents.” (Pet. Exh. 3, emphasis added) Paragraph 5 provides as follows: “In addition to the above use of an inclusion specialist, the district will provide a once per month consultation (with teacher, aide, staff, and parent) or more frequently as circumstances dictate (i.e., troubleshooting).” (Pet. Exh. 3)
The parties dispute whether the settlement agreement provisions were satisfied relating to (1) the provision of services from an “inclusion specialist,” (2) the nature, timing and extent of the assessment or evaluation performed by the inclusion specialist, and (3) the nature, timing and extent of training provided by the District to the full-time aide, staff, and teachers at OCC. In this case, the Hearing Officer will discuss each of the three above provisions for inclusion services to determine whether the District’s provision of the respective services satisfied the terms of the settlement agreement.
(1) Did the District provide an appropriate inclusion specialist for STUDENTS?
The settlement agreement requires the provision of a “qualified inclusion specialist.”(Footnote 3) The parties do not dispute the appropriateness of Margo Yunker or Richard Clemens to act as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist during the period February 26, 2001, through August 26, 2001.(Footnote 4) What is disputed is whether the District adhered to the settlement agreement although an inclusion specialist was not in place until February 26, 2001. The Hearing Officer notes that paragraphs 4 and 5 of the settlement agreement do not specify a date by which the inclusion specialist is to begin providing services. Where a contract does not specify the time for performance by a party, a reasonable time is implied by law. Woodbine v. Van Horn, (1946) 29 Cal.2d 95, 173 P.2d 17. Therefore, the issue here is whether the District acted reasonably in obtaining the services of Margo Yunker and whether the District acted in good faith in accordance with the contract by having Harriett Clise facilitate inclusion services on an interim basis from January 31, 2001, until February 14, 2001, when she was threatened with a restraining order by the Petitioner.
At the time of the settlement agreement, the parties envisioned that the inclusion specialist services would be provided by Richard Clemens, who had previously contracted with the District to provide inclusion services for other students. The PARENTS clearly wanted Mr. Clemens to perform the inclusion services. (Test. of Dr. Babayco and Mr. PARENT.) However, Mr. Clemens could not act as STUDENT’S inclusion specialist at the time the settlement agreement was entered into because he was not available to provide services to STUDENT at that time due to other work commitments. Mr. Clemens credibly testified that he needed at least one month before he could see STUDENT because of a work backlog. He stated that his associate, Margo Yunker could see STUDENT sooner. Petitioner contends that Ms. Clise should have contacted Mr. Clemens at the time the settlement agreement was entered into in early January. Ms. Clise credibly testified that she sent an email to Mr. Clemens on January 26, 2001, about whether Mr. Clemens could see STUDENT on February 8 when Mr. Clemens was scheduled to see three other students within the District, and that Mr. Clemens replied by email on January 30, 2001, and indicated that observing four students in one day would definitely be too much. Ms. Clise testified that she attempted again to re-schedule Mr. Clemens for February 19, but because that day was a school holiday, it was decided that the initial meeting would be held on February 26. On February 7, 2001, Ms Clise obtained the PARENTS’ consent that Ms. Yunker could act as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist. (Dist. Exh. 23 and Test. of Ms. Clise and Mr. Clemens)
The Hearing Officer notes that even if Ms. Clise had been able to reach Mr. Clemens on January 10, 2001, and made arrangements with him on that date, Mr. Clemens could not have begun his services until February 10, 2001, based upon Mr. Clemens’ backlog of at least thirty days. The additional delay until February 26, 2001, when his associate Margo Yunker made her first observations of STUDENT at the OCC, was just sixteen days. If a few days are factored in for the District to make the necessary arrangements with Ms. Yunker, the District at most delayed services to STUDENT for two weeks. The Hearing Officer also finds that the threat of a restraining order on February 14, 2001, complicated the District’s efforts in deciding how to proceed. The threat certainly resulted in Ms. Clise’s decision not to go to the OCC, a private school, and effectively cut off communication between Ms. Clise and the PARENTS. The Hearing Officer also finds that the two-week delay, when compared with the remainder of time available for the services to be rendered (a six-month period from February 26 to August 26), was not a significant one and likely did not result in a detriment to STUDENT.
The Hearing Officer finds that the District attempted in good faith to procure the services of Mr. Clemens, and then Margo Yunker, and that the relatively brief delay was a reasonable one primarily due to scheduling difficulties for the inclusion specialists the PARENTS wanted the District to use. The Hearing Officer also finds that Ms. Clise attempted to provide the following interim services to STUDENT at the OCC to facilitate inclusion until Ms. Yunker could begin her services: reviewing STUDENT’s IEP goals and objectives with Mr. Rice; providing Mr. Rice with information on autism and how Mr. Rice can help STUDENT interact with peers; beginning to take baseline data; and arranging for Ms. Fitzgerald to provide assistance to Mr. Rice . (Test. of Ms. Clise) However, the threat of the restraining order prevented Ms. Clise from assisting STUDENT during the period February 14, 2001, to February 26, 2001.
The Hearing Officer also finds that the District never intended that program specialist Harriet Clise would act as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist. Dr. Babayco and Ms. Clise credibly testified that there was no intention that Ms. Clise act as STUDENT’s “inclusion specialist.” Moreover, the record is clear that Ms. Clise first attempted to have Mr. Clemens, and then Ms.Yunker, act as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist.(Footnote 5)
.
The Hearing Officer also finds that Ms. Clise possessed the necessary background and experience to provide interim services to STUDENT until Ms. Yunker was available. Ms. Clise credibly testified that she holds three California credentials, including a clear specialist instruction in special education, and that she has nineteen years of experience teaching in special and regular education. Ms. Clise also has a Master’s degree in Mild and Moderately Handicapped. Ms. Clise also testified that she has served as the chairperson of the District inclusion team and that she has undergone twelve hours of training from Behavioral Education for Children with Autism (BECA) and 10.5 hours of training from Dr. Attwood. (Test. of Ms. Clise) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Clise possessed the necessary experience and qualifications to facilitate inclusion services for STUDENT and to provide interim assistance to his aide until Margo Yunker could begin her services on February 26.(Footnote 6)
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District properly construed and adhered to the settlement agreement by providing interim support and an inclusion specialist for STUDENT during the relevant period.
Did the District evaluate STUDENT for inclusion services?
The Hearing Officer notes that the term “assess” is used in the settlement agreement and the term “evaluate” is used in the implementing IEP. It is undisputed that the parties used the two terms interchangeably. It is also undisputed that the type of assessment contemplated by the parties is not the standardized assessment procedure set forth within the Education Code. The parties do not dispute that the assessment or evaluation to be performed had as its purpose to provide assistance for STUDENT’s inclusion into the general education classroom at the OCC. However, Petitioner contends that the assessment for inclusion was to be a formal, two-day assessment at the very outset of inclusion services and that the District failed to perform such an assessment of STUDENT. In contrast, the District contends that the assessment is an ongoing one, not a single event, and that a formal, two-day assessment was not contemplated. Rather, the District understood assessment to consist of ongoing monthly classroom observations conducted by the inclusion specialist.
The Hearing Officer finds that the parties have different interpretations of the term “assess,” and that the term assess is therefore ambiguous. Special education law does not provide rules for the interpretation of settlement agreements. Therefore, the Hearing Officer must turn to California law regarding the interpretation of contracts. Under contract law principles, when a term of a contract is ambiguous, a contract must be interpreted to effectuate the intentions of the parties at the time the agreement was reached. California Civil Code § 1636. When practicable, the whole of the agreement must be taken together in order to give effect to each part, each paragraph helping to interpret the other. California Civil Code § 1641. When language in an agreement is ambiguous, it must not be given an absurd interpretation. Heidlebaugh v. Miller (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 35, P.2d 557. One must also avoid interpretations that would make an agreement extraordinary, harsh, unjust, or inequitable. Strong v. Theis (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 913, 232 Cal.Rptr. 272. When the extrinsic evidence is either lacking or is insufficient to resolve what the parties intended the terms of the agreement to mean, the ambiguities are resolved against the drafter of the agreement to be applied. Rainier v. Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 255, 217 Cal.Rptr. 291.
The Hearing Officer notes that Petitioner’s insistence that he contemplated a formal, two-day assessment at the very outset of the inclusion services is inconsistent with the introductory language of paragraph 4, which states that the inclusion specialist will, for both regular session and summer session, assess STUDENT’s educational needs. This language implies at least two assessments, not one. At no time did any witness testify that two, and not one formal assessment would be needed, one for the regular session, and one for the summer session. (Test. of PARENTS, Dr. Babayco, Ms. Clise, and Mr. Clemens) Only Mr. Clemens testified to a formal two-day assessment, which he termed a “program assessment.” The term program assessment is not found within the settlement agreement, nor was it added to the implementing IEP. As if to highlight the confusion over these terms, Dr. Attwood stated that observation “obviously involves watching and making notes, and at the end of that observation and making notes, you make an evaluation of an interpretation of that observation.” Dr. Attwood also testified that observations are “a crucial form of assessment.”
The Hearing Officer also notes that paragraph 4 does not indicate when the assessment is to occur, and yet paragraph 3 provides that the District was obligated to provide a one-to-one aide by January 15, 2001, and if not, the District was obligated to reimburse the aide the PARENTS obtained thereafter. Petitioner’s attorney drafted the agreement, and where there is a doubt, the agreement must be construed against the party who drafted the agreement. Since the Petitioner did not indicate a date for the assessment in paragraph 4, a reasonable interpretation is that Petitioner did not intend the assessment to occur on a particular date, or as Petitioner contends, at the very outset of the inclusion services. In fact, it is undisputed that the District provided an experienced aide on January 31, 2001, just a few days after the IEP was signed, and the PARENTS provided a replacement aide beginning on February 5, 2001. It is also undisputed that the District made arrangements for the inclusion specialist to begin her services on February 26, 2001. (Test. of Ms. Clise). Since paragraph 4 does not state, in so many terms, when the assessment was to occur, the Hearing Officer finds that paragraph 4, when read with paragraph 5, suggests that “assess” was intended to be an ongoing process that dovetailed with the once per month consultations (with teacher, aide, staff, and parents) provided for within paragraph 5. In fact, the undisputed testimony is that Ms. Yunker made observations of several hours duration on three separate occasions at the OCC (in February, March, and April), and on each of these occasions, team meetings were held immediately after and where the observations were discussed. The Hearing Officer finds no meaningful distinction between these observations, which Dr. Attwood testified are a crucial “form of assessment” and the term “assess.” Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District properly construed and adhered to the term “assess” within the settlement agreement through the monthly observations made of STUDENT at the OCC.
Did the District train the full-time aide, staff and teachers?
The Petitioner contends that the inclusion specialist did not train STUDENT’s full-time, one-to-one aide, staff, and teachers. The Petitioner also contended that the training contemplated by the Petitioner involved two full days of training at the outset of inclusion services and that this was never done by the District. The District contends that the training occurred during the monthly team meetings held with Margo Yunker and the full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents.
The Hearing Officer notes that the settlement agreement simply uses the word “train.” There is no reference in the agreement to two full days of training for the inclusion team members. There was credible testimony that training did occur during the monthly meetings Margo Yunker held immediately after she made five hours of observations exclusively of STUDENT at the OCC, both in February and March, 2001. (Test. of Ms. Clise) Ms. Clise credibly testified that she communicated with Ms. Yunker as part of her duties as the District’s program specialist. Although the PARENTS insisted that formal training of STUDENT, either one full day or two full days, had not occurred, PARENT acknowledged during testimony on September 10, 2001, that training had occurred during the team meetings, during “brainstorming” with the inclusion specialist. PARENT stated that he missed only one meeting. PARENT testified that Ms. Yunker consulted with Fritz Rice about her observations. Moreover, PARENT acknowledged that Ms. Yunker would say at the meetings, “Okay, Fritz, at this point you could do this.” PARENT did not consider that training, but PARENT also stated that she did not question Ms. Yunker at the meetings about when her assessment or her training of the aide, staff and teachers would occur. The Hearing Officer finds no meaningful distinction between the inclusion specialist making recommendations to Fritz about how to handle a particular situation, and training, or Ms. Yunker consulting with Fritz about her observations, and training.
The Hearing Officer also notes that the agreement does not state when the training was to occur. Based upon the prior finding that the assessment process was an ongoing one, the Hearing Officer finds that the training process was also an ongoing one. Moreover, Ms. Fitzgerald’s credible testimony that STUDENT had made progress in the area of social interaction with peers during the period February, 2001 to June 14, 2001, supports the inference that training in fact had occurred. The Hearing Officer also notes that in those cases in which extrinsic evidence is either lacking or is insufficient to resolve what the parties intended by a term of the contract to mean, the rule that ambiguities are resolved against the drafter of the contract is to be applied. Rainer Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 255, 217 Cal.Rptr. 291.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the word “train” in the settlement agreement must be construed against the Petitioner’s interpretation of that term. The Hearing Officer finds that the District properly construed and adhered to the settlement agreement regarding inclusion services by training the full-time aide, teachers, staff and parents at the monthly inclusion meetings.
II. Did the District deny STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE) by designating a program specialist trainee as an “inclusion specialist” qualified to evaluate STUDENT in his regular education classroom, to provide appropriate training to his full-time aide, staff, teachers and parents, and thereafter to consult on inclusion issues on an as-needed basis?(Footnote 7)
In accordance with the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(D); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A “free appropriate public education” is one which provides special education and related services to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meets the State educational standards and conforms to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). “Special education” is specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the student. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).
To determine whether the District offered or provided STUDENT a FAPE, the proper focus is on the adequacy of the District’s placement. Gregory K. v. Longview School District, 811 f.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the District’s proposed program reflects STUDENT’s needs, provides some benefit, and comports with his IEP, the District has offered or provided a FAPE, even if the parent or guardian prefers another program, and even if the preferred program would have resulted in a greater educational benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314. While the school district is required under Rowley to provide to a child with a disability a meaningful access to education, it does not require the district to guarantee success. Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court in Rowley concluded that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. The Court stated that district are only required to provide a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley at 207-08. However, a de minimis benefit or only trivial advancement is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some benefit.” Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F.3d at 130 (2d Cir. 1998).
In addition, special education law requires that a student be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE) and that a child be removed from the regular education environment only when the nature or severity the child’s disability is such that education in regular education classes with the use of supplementary aide and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.
To summarize, under the IDEA and Rowley, the District’s proposed program for STUDENT must meet the following four requirements to constitute an appropriate educational placement: (1) be designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit; (3) comport with his IEP; and (4) be provided in the least restrictive environment (LRE).
Were the District’s services to STUDENT in the area of inclusion designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs?
The Hearing Officer has determined that the District properly construed and/or adhered to the terms of a settlement agreement regarding inclusion services. The Hearing Officer also notes that the form of the issue, implying that Ms. Clise was a program specialist trainee is erroneous. The Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Clise served the District as a program specialist. Moreover, the form of the issue implies that the District’s failure to not designate Ms. Clise as the inclusion specialist resulted in a denial of FAPE for STUDENT. The Hearing Officer has already determined that the District never intended that program specialist Harriet Clise act as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist. Therefore, the issue as stated by Petitioner is factually in error. Out of an abundance of caution, the Hearing Officer will nevertheless discuss whether the inclusion services were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.
The parties agreed that STUDENT is autistic, and that STUDENT would be placed three afternoons per week at the OCC so that STUDENT could interact with typically developing peers. (Test. of PARENTS, Ms. Malotte, and Dr. Attwood and Pet. Exhs. 32 and 51) It is also undisputed that STUDENT’s needs were primarily in the area of social interaction with peers, language development, and fine and gross motor development. (Test. of Ms. Fitzgerald, Ms. Malotte, Ms. Clise, and PARENTS) Moreover, Jennifer Fitzgerald, STUDENT’s Special Day Class teacher during the period November 1999 through June 14, 2001, credibly testified that STUDENT needed help with transitions into other activities and that STUDENT needed structure, a common need for autistic children.(Footnote 8)
The Hearing Officer has found that the District provided STUDENT with a placement at the OCC, in addition to a morning placement at the District’s SDC preschool. The credible evidence shows that by design, and as provided, STUDENT was given the assistance of a one-to-one aide, and that the aide received training at the inclusion team meetings. The Hearing Officer also notes that the undisputed testimony is that STUDENT was observed for five hours in February, five hours in March, and a few hours in April by inclusion specialist Margo Yunker. (Test. of Ms. Clise). Moreover, PARENT testified that inclusion specialist Richard Clemens observed STUDENT a full day on August 23, 2001. These observations were appropriately designed and performed to provide team members with timely information on how to assist STUDENT in his social interactions with typically developing peers at the OCC.
It is undisputed that the inclusion specialist provided consultations on an as-needed basis. Accordingly, based upon the weight of credible evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s services in the area of inclusion were designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.
Were the District’s services in the area of inclusion reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit?
The Petitioner did not argue that the District’s services in the area of inclusion, as set forth in the IEP, were not reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit. To the contrary, it was Petitioner’s contention that STUDENT needed the inclusion placement at the OCC and the inclusion services there, and the District agreed to pay for the placement and provide the inclusion services at the OCC. As stated above, the District argued that the inclusion services called for by the IEP were provided, and the Hearing Officer has found that the District properly construed and/or adhered to those terms of the settlement agreement in dispute.
The District also provided evidence that the inclusion services and placement at the OCC did provide STUDENT with some educational benefit. The Hearing Officer finds persuasive the testimony of STUDENT’s special education teacher, Jennifer Fitzgerald, who testified credibly to the progress STUDENT had made on IEP goals and in the areas of language and in his social interactions with his peers during the period February 2001 to mid June 2001. (Test. of Ms. Fitzgerald) Ms. Fitzgerald’s testimony is particularly persuasive because of Ms. Fitzgerald’s experience with STUDENT since November 1999, and because Ms. Fitzgerald stated that STUDENT had received a benefit not only from her SDC class, but also from the OCC program, during the period February 2001, through June 2001. Ms. Cecilia Hickok, STUDENT’s SDC teacher during the summer program, testified that she taught STUDENT during the period June 25, 2001, to July 25, 2001. Ms. Hickok stated that she was assisted by two aides, and that it was their job to help STUDENT engage in activities with his peers. Ms. Hickok observed progress and stated that “towards the end of the summer, he seemed to enjoy it.” Ms. Hickok credibly testified that STUDENT was more interested in working with the other kids in the other games and more able to take turns and that by the end of the summer program, STUDENT was much more social, much more engaged in activities, and seemed much more comfortable being there.
It is undisputed that the inclusion specialist provided consultations on an as-needed basis. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the credible evidence establishes that the District’s services in the area of inclusion were reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit.
Did the District’s program of inclusion services comport with the IEP?
Petitioner contends that the District did not perform the inclusion assessment as provided for in the settlement agreement and within the implementing IEP signed by the IEP team members on January 25 and 29, 2001. Petitioner’s contentions in this regard have already been discussed under Issue I, and the Hearing Officer has decided that the District properly construed and/or adhered to the terms of the settlement agreement regarding inclusion.
The Hearing Officer also finds that Petitioner’s attempt to insist that the District sign an agreement stating that Harriet Clise would not be acting as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist, the person referred to in Petitioner’s Third Amended Issue statement as a “program specialist trainee,” was an attempt to interfere with the District’s prerogative to hire who it felt had the necessary qualifications. Moreover, Ms. Clise was acting in accordance with her responsibilities as the program specialist.(Footnote 9) Therefore, the District was under no legal obligation to respond to Petitioner’s demand for a statement from the District that Harriet Clise would not be acting as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist.
With regard to the Petitioner’s contention that the District was obligated by the agreement to be provide a formal two-day assessment, the Hearing Officer notes that Mr. Clemens, when he testified in May 2001, stated that he did not believe STUDENT needed two days, since STUDENT had already been observed by Margo Yunker for several hours on three occasions prior to his testimony. Mr. Clemens stated that STUDENT could use one additional day of assessment. Since PARENT testified credibly on September 10, 2001, that Mr. Clemens had performed a one-day assessment of STUDENT on August 23, 2001, prior to the end of the summer ESY, the Hearing Officer is satisfied that the District provided two days of assessment sought by the Petitioner, notwithstanding the parties’ disagreement over the meaning of the term “assess” in the settlement agreement.
It is undisputed that the inclusion specialist consulted on inclusion issues on an as-needed basis. Accordingly, the credible evidence establishes that the District provided inclusion services that comported with the IEP.
Were the District’s inclusion services to STUDENT in the LRE?
Neither party disputed whether the inclusion services to STUDENT were provided in the LRE, since the parties had agreed, within the settlement agreement, that STUDENT would attend pre-school, three days per week, at the OCC, and that part of the settlement agreement was implemented.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not deny STUDENT a FAPE by using program specialist Harriet Clise to facilitate inclusion services on an interim basis to STUDENT in his regular education classroom.
III. If the District did not properly construe and/or adhere to the terms of the settlement agreement regarding inclusion services or did not provide STUDENT a FAPE regarding inclusion services for the relevant period, is he entitled to compensatory education services?
1. Since all of Petitioner’s claims for relief under Issues I and II are denied, Petitioner is not entitled to compensatory education services.
ORDER
1. All of Petitioner’s claims for relief are denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
In accordance with California Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The Respondent District prevailed on all issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code Section 56505(i).
Dated: October 26, 2001 _____________________________________ Mark D. Brylski, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
1. The Hearing Officer has the authority to determine the issues raised by the parties. The parties engaged in lengthy discussions at the outset of the hearing and on several occasions during the hearing concerning the meaning and effect of a settlement agreement reached by the parties on or about January 9, 2001. Petitioner stated that the issue embraced the period beginning with the date of the Settlement Agreement, January 9, 2001, through the extended school year, August 26, 2001. Out of an abundance of caution, the Hearing Officer has designated as Issue II, Petitioner’s denial of FAPE issue, which is Petitioner’s Third Amended Statement of Issues, slightly reworded to facilitate analysis and discussion
2. According to Petitioner’s brief, “[o]nly paragraphs 4 and 5 of the agreement and the IEP document signed by parents [on] January 25, 2001, are directly involved in this case.” Paragraphs 4 and 5, relate to the provision of inclusion services and are set forth within the discussion, infra. (Pet. Exh. 3)
3. The Hearing Officer finds that there is no generally accepted qualification for an inclusion specialist. It is undisputed that there is no California state credential or recognized certification for an inclusion specialist. (Test. of Dr. Babayco, Ms. Clise, Mr. Clemens, and Dr. Attwood) Nor does the Hearing Officer have the authority to decide what qualifications are necessary to perform inclusion services in general, a task appropriate for the state legislature.
4. Mr. Clemens testified that his associate Margo Yunker has the necessary qualifications to act as an inclusion specialist, citing the need for an SH credential and a master’s degree is special education, and knowledge of inclusive education and the specific disability of the student. Dr. Attwood and Ms. Butterfield did not agree that a particular credential or degree was necessary. (Test. of Dr. Attwood and Ms. Butterfield) However, Mr. Clemens also acknowledged that if “someone had a lot of background knowledge and experience in educating kids with severe disabilities and in working in the general education classroom, I wouldn’t say that person couldn’t do the job.”
5. Scant evidence exists, other than a single hearsay reference which refers to Ms. Clise, along with Mr. Clemens and Ms. Yunker, as inclusion specialists within a letter dated March 1, 2001 from the attorney for the District to Mr. Jones to support Petitioner’s contention that the District held Ms. Clise out as STUDENT’s inclusion specialist. (Dist. Exh. 55). Moreover, the District’s ongoing relationship with Mr. Clemens and his associate Margo Yunker, both before and after March 1, 2001, supports the opposite conclusion.
6. The Hearing Officer also notes that Ms. Clise, as the District’s program specialist, was responsible for providing program support and instructional assistance to regular and special education teachers. (Pet. Exh. 50 and Test. of Ms. Clise)
7. Out of an abundance of caution, the Hearing Officer discusses the denial of FAPE issue as presented by the Petitioner, even though the Hearing Officer has already determined that the District properly construed and/or adhered to the terms of the settlement agreement regarding inclusion services. The Hearing Officer also notes that the Petitioner’s issue refers to the District’s designation of a “program specialist trainee” as the “inclusion
8. Ms. Fitzgerald testified that she has four years of experience as a pre-kindergarten SDC teacher and that she possesses an early childhood special education teaching credential and is working towards a Master’s degree in special education.
9. California Education Code § 56368(b)(3) provides that a program specialist may participate in each school’s staff development, program development, and innovation of special methods and approaches.
