California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 3, 2004

Student v. San Diego County Office of Education et al. (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 2364-02, SN02-02363, SN03-02497 · Hearing Officer Jessica Katz

Student's claims against San Diego County Office of Education and others before October 1999 are time-barred; Lakeside and Cajon Valley dismissed.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The decision resolves only the statute-of-limitations issue. It orders the underlying FAPE matter to proceed to hearing ten calendar days later.

Summary

A 20-year-old student with significant cognitive and physical disabilities, including cerebral palsy, sought compensatory education for alleged denials of FAPE going back to 1985. He named the San Diego County Office of Education, California Children's Services (CCS), Lakeside Union School District and Cajon Valley Union School District. He argued that CCS never attended his IEP meetings or shared its assessments. Because of that, he said, his foster mother, surrogate parent and social workers could not have known he needed more occupational and physical therapy. The County Office filed its own case asking for a ruling that its March 2003 IEP offered FAPE. The cases were combined, and this first hearing dealt only with the three-year statute of limitations.

The Hearing Officer held that all claims before October 21, 1999 were barred. She did not consider the years before age three, because the Hearing Office had no authority over infant services. The foster mother attended or signed every IEP from 1988 to 1995. She received procedural safeguards and knew CCS was absent and what therapy was offered. After 1995, the social worker and surrogate parent were just as informed. Under a 1987 Ninth Circuit decision and Education Code section 56505(j), they knew the facts behind the claims when the claims arose. The Hearing Officer also refused to apply equitable tolling, finding it would undercut the IDEA's goal of resolving disputes quickly. Lakeside and Cajon Valley were dismissed, and the remaining FAPE claims were set for hearing.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO applied the three-year limitations period when a foster child's educational rights holders were informed participants in IEP meetings. It also shows that a student's own later claims were not tolled. SEHO treated a rights holder's knowledge that CCS never attended IEP meetings as starting the time limit.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue 1. Does the three-year statute of limitations bar Student's claims arising prior to October 21, 1999?

    Claims before October 21, 1999 are time-barred because the foster parent, surrogate parent and social workers who held educational rights attended or signed every IEP, received procedural safeguards, and knew CCS was absent; equitable tolling does not apply.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Student's claims arising before October 21, 1999 (three years before filing) are barred by the statute of limitations.
  • Lakeside Union School District and Cajon Valley Union School District dismissed as parties because they have not served the Student since 1995.
  • Remaining FAPE matter to proceed to hearing ten calendar days from the date of the decision, or the next available Hearing Office date.

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Key authorities

Alexopulos v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 817 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1987) (case name appears as 'Studentopulos' in the redacted text); Education Code section 56505(j); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536 (1989); Adler v. Educ. Dept. of the State of New York, 760 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1985); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1999); Government Code section 7575

People named in the decision

  • Gene Gallegos, Principal, Friendship School; witness, San Diego County Office of Education
  • Pamela MacLeod, Director of special education; witness, Lakeside Union School District
  • Wendy Vaughn, Director of special education and pupil services; witness, Cajon Valley Union School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Jessica Katz, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s, McGeorge School of Law, in San Diego, California, on January 13-14, 2004.

Petitioner and Cross-Respondent Student (Student) was represented at the hearing by attorneys Michael Cochrane and Thomas Nelson. Respondent and Cross-Petitioner San Diego County Office of Education (SDCOE) was represented at hearing by attorneys Jack Clarke and Kristina Lupariello. Also present on SDCOE’s behalf was Gene Gallegos, principal of Friendship School. Respondent California Children’s Services (CCS) was represented at hearing by attorney Wendy Matulich. Respondents Lakeside Union School District (Lakeside) and Cajon Valley Union School District (Cajon Valley) were represented by attorney Deborah Ungar. Also present on behalf of Lakeside was the director of special education Pamela MacLeod. (Footnote 1) Present on behalf of Cajon Valley was director of special education and pupil services Wendy Vaughn.

The Student did not call any witnesses.

SDCOE and CCS called Gene Gallegos and SURROGATE PARENT, surrogate parent, as their witnesses.

Lakeside and Cajon Valley called former foster parent MS. FOSTER PARENT, Wendy Vaughn, and Pamela MacLeod as their witnesses.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was closed upon receipt of final written arguments and the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

In Case Number SN02-02363, the Student asserts that he was denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by SDCOE, CCS, Lakeside, and Cajon Valley from the 1985-1986 school year through the present. In Case Number SN03-02497, SDCOE seeks a determination that it offered Student a FAPE in the proposed IEP dated March 23, 2003. On November 21, 2003, Cajon Valley and Lakeside submitted motions for dismissal on the grounds that the relief sought against them by Student was time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. On November 26, 2003, SDCOE filed a motion for consolidation. On December 16, 2003, the Hearing Office issued a consolidation order and ruled that the consolidated matter would proceed to hearing on January 8, 2004. The December 16, 2003 order also stated that an evidentiary hearing was required to resolve the statute of limitations issue and ordered a telephonic prehearing conference. During the prehearing conference on December 19, 2003, Lakeside and Cajon Valley jointly requested that the matter be continued from January 8, 2004 to January 13, 2004, due to the unavailability of witnesses. The Hearing Officer ordered that the matter be continued to January 13, 2004, and reiterated that the matter would proceed solely on the issue of the applicability of the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer ordered that following the issuance of the decision regarding the statute of limitations, the matter would be set for hearing ten calendar days later.

ISSUE

Does the three-year statute of limitations bar Student’s claims arising prior to October 21, 1999?

CONTENTIONS

The Student contends that his foster parents, surrogate parents, and/or social workers either failed to exercise his special education due process rights or were unaware of the critical facts necessary to determine occupational therapy (OT), physical therapy (PT), and speech and language (SP/L) services because CCS was not present at the individual education program (IEP) meetings and did not provide updated assessments to the IEP team. (Footnote 2) The Student asserts that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled and that he is eligible for compensatory education as a remedy for CCS’ lack of involvement resulting in a loss of educational opportunity.

Respondents jointly contend that the statute of limitations time-bars all claims prior to October 1999 because the Student’s educational representatives knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis of the claims at the time the claims arose. Furthermore, the Respondents contend that Student’s educational representatives were present at each IEP meeting, received information regarding procedural rights, and signed indicating their consent to each and every IEP.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Student is 20 years old. He has been diagnosed with profound mental retardation, cerebral palsy, orthopedic impairment, and seizure disorder. Student was removed from his parents’ home prior to the age of two and placed in foster care. In 1987, he was placed in the foster home of Mr. and MS. FOSTER PARENT, who specialized in special needs foster children. Student remained with the FOSTER PARENTs until 1995 when he was placed in the Friendship Home and School, operated by SDCOE for students with severe to profound cognitive and/or physical disabilities and where he remains today.

From the time Student was placed in the FOSTER PARENT home, either Ms. FOSTER PARENT or Student’s county social worker, or both, attended all of Student’s IEP meetings. Goals and objectives were formulated in the areas of OT and PT and notice of due process rights were given at each IEP meeting. Although CCS was not present at any of the IEP meetings, each and every IEP document listed “CCS consult for OT and PT services” as a related service for Student. “CCS consult” was described as consultative services to Student’s teachers in the school environment on an as needed basis in the area of OT and PT.

Once Student was placed in the Friendship Home, a new educational surrogate, SURROGATE PARENT, was appointed to represent Student’s educational interests. Student was represented at all the IEP meetings by either MS. SURROGATE PARENT, his county social worker, or both who not only attended but also signed and agreed to all of his IEPs. Student continued to have goals and objectives in the areas of OT and PT and continued to have “CCS consult for OT and PT.” Though, once again, CCS neither attended an IEP meeting nor provided documentation of its assessments to the IEP team.

In April 2002, Student’s current conservators, CONSERVATOR 1 and CONSERVATOR 2, became Student’s educational advocates. (Footnote 3) In November 2002, CONSERVATOR 1 filed for due process requesting compensatory education for a denial of a FAPE for the three years prior to filing. In July 2003, the Student added CCS as a party. In September 2003, the Student amended his issues alleging that CCS and SDCOE denied him a FAPE upon his initial placement in Friendship School in 1995. He is therefore requesting compensatory education for his loss of educational opportunity. In October 2003, the Student amended his claim again, and added Lakeside and Cajon Valley as Respondents, alleging that he had been denied a FAPE dating back to 1985 for which he is requesting compensatory education.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Prior to the enactment of a statute of limitations under the California Education Code in January 1999, a three-year statute of limitations for actions arising under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) had been applied by the Ninth Circuit Court Appeal in Studentopulos v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 817 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1987).

In Studentopulos, appellant requested an administrative hearing claiming a denial of FAPE in 1979, six years before the filing of the claim. When the District alleged that some of those claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations, the student claimed that he did not know he had the purported claim and argued that the statute of limitations did not bar his actions. The hearing officer held that the claims were time-barred. The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that “Congress’ desire to obtain timely and appropriate education for handicapped children by conferring substantial substantive and procedural rights on parents and guardians on behalf of their children clearly indicates that it did not intend to authorize the filing of claims on behalf of children many years after the alleged wrongdoing occurred. It is reasonable to assume that Congress expected and intended the child’s representative to file actions and apply for hearings on his behalf near the time the contested event occurred. The child may not later come before a court and invoke the tolling provisions of state statutes.” Id, at 556. The concern regarding timely resolution of special education matters expressed by the Studentopulos court is applicable to the present case, considering the Student is raising issues pertaining to the provision of special education services as far back as 1985.

The applicable statute of limitations in this case, Section 56505(j) of the California Education Code, which codified Studentopulos, requires that due process hearings be brought within three years from the date the initiating party knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request. The Student contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his educational advocates throughout the past eighteen years did not have the critical information that they needed in order to know of all of the facts underlying the basis of his claims. The Student alleges that had he been provided with appropriate OT and PT services during his entire education, he would be able to walk and have better communication skills.

The Student asserts that the Hearing Office should consider evidence dating back to 1985. Student’s birthday is [date redacted]. According to California Education Code section 56001, any child who is younger than age three years and is potentially eligible for special education is afforded the protections provided pursuant to California Early Child Interventions Services Act Title 14 (commencing with Section 95000) of the Government Code and Section 1439 of Title 20 of the United States Code and implementing regulations. The Hearing Office does not have authority over special education dispute involving a child under the age of three; therefore the Hearing Officer will only consider evidence from February 1987 to the present.

There is no dispute that Student has been eligible for special education since age three. There is also no dispute that Ms. FOSTER PARENT, Student’s foster mother from 1987 through 1995, held his educational rights in accordance with the California Education Code and Welfare and Institutions Code in order to advocate on behalf of Student in the IEP process. (Footnote 4)

1987-1991

Student was enrolled in Cajon Valley from 1987-1991 while residing in the FOSTER PARENT’S foster home. The FOSTER PARENTs were foster parents of special needs children for 23 years and had 53 foster children placed in their home, all requiring special education services. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that she attended over 150 IEP meetings for her own children and as a foster parent. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that she held Student’s educational rights when Student was placed with her, she understood his needs and advocated for his education. (Footnote 5) When Student was first placed in the FOSTER PARENT’S home, Ms. FOSTER PARENT placed him in Cajon Valley instead of his home District, Lakeside, because it had a program that was more appropriate to meet Student’s educational needs. Ms. FOSTER PARENT participated in, signed, and agreed to IEPs dated January 29, 1988, February 21, 1989, February 21, 1990, and February 13, 1991. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that she received her procedural safeguards and understood that if she did not agree with the IEP she could file for due process. Further, each IEP sets forth goals in the area of OT and PT. Ms. FOSTER PARENT also testified that she knew CCS consult was part of the IEP and that CCS was not present at any of the IEP meetings. She also understood the nature of the services being offered and what was required on the IEP. She testified that Student was in a wheelchair and understood that he had many needs in the areas of OT and PT.

The Student contends that had CCS appeared at any of the IEP meetings, than Ms. FOSTER PARENT would have understood the full extent of Student’s needs in regards to OT and PT. However, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded by this argument. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that she fully understood his needs. Further, she was aware that CCS was not present at any of the IEP meetings. She was personally aware of Student’s OT and PT needs while he was placed in her home. Ms. FOSTER PARENT clearly knew of the facts underlying the basis of the claim (that CCS was not present at the IEP meetings nor did it provide a report) at the time the claim arose. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that Students claims between 1987 and 1991 are barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in Studentopulos.

1991-1995

In the 1991-1992 school year, Ms. FOSTER PARENT transferred Student to his home district, Lakeside, because a new program had been developed that was appropriate for Student. Student was enrolled in Lakeside from 1991-1995 while he continued to reside in the FOSTER PARENT’S foster home. Ms. FOSTER PARENT continued to actively participate in the IEP process and signed and agreed to the IEPs dated October 11, 1991, March 12, 1992, March 23, 1993, April 5, 1994, and March 2, 1995. On the few occasions that Ms. FOSTER PARENT could not attend an IEP meeting the county social worker was present. Ms. FOSTER PARENT received the IEP document at a later date and signed and agreed to the implementation of the IEP. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that she received a copy of her procedural safeguards at each of the IEP meetings. Furthermore, beginning in 1994, Lakeside began printing the procedural safeguards on the back of the IEP documents, and therefore Ms. FOSTER PARENT had a copy of the procedural safeguards attached to her copy of the IEP. Additionally, on each IEP there were goals and objectives in the areas of OT and PT and “CCS consult for OT and PT” as a related service.

Student again contends that had CCS appeared at any of the IEP meetings or provided an assessment to the IEP team, then Ms. FOSTER PARENT would have known the full extent of Student’s disabilities and would have been better able to advocate on his behalf. Ms. FOSTER PARENT testified that between 1991 through 1995, she was fully aware of Student’s fine and gross motor skills and felt that the goals and objectives were appropriately designed to meet his needs in those areas. The Hearing Officer finds that Ms. FOSTER PARENT was present or signed and agreed to all of Student’s IEPs and understood that CCS was not present at the IEP meetings and that there no report from CCS. She was an active participant in the IEP meetings and fully understood Student’s disability. Ms. FOSTER PARENT knew and understood the nature of the services offered by Lakeside to Student. The Hearing Officer is convinced that this foster parent took her role as Student’s educational advocate seriously and that had she felt it necessary to file for due process while Student was placed in her home, she would have taken that route. Therefore, Ms. FOSTER PARENT clearly understood the basis of the claim (that CCS was not present at the IEP meetings nor did it provide a report) at the time the claims arose, and subsequently, the Student’s claims during the years of 1991-1995 are time-barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in Studentopulos.

The Hearing Officer finds that from 1987 to 1995, the Student’s claims against Cajon Valley and Lakeside are barred by the statute of limitations because Ms. FOSTER PARENT knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis of the claims when she first attended the IEP meetings on behalf of Student. Accordingly, Lakeside and Cajon Valley are dismissed as parties to the present action.

1995-October 21, 1999

Student was placed in the Friendship Home prior to the 1995-1996 school year. Student’s first IEP meeting was held on August 17, 1995. CONSERVATOR 1 prepared the IEP and Student’s county social worker attended, signed, and agreed with the IEP and was also given the procedural safeguards on the back of the IEP document. Student’s annual IEP meeting was held on February 21, 1996, and CONSERVATOR 1 again prepared the document. Student’s county social worker attended the IEP meeting, was given a copy of the procedural safeguards on the back of the IEP document, agreed to the goals and objectives, and signed in agreement.

In 1997, SURROGATE PARENT was appointed by the Friendship Home as Student’s educational advocate. MS. SURROGATE PARENT served in this role through 2002 when CONSERVATOR 1 and CONSERVATOR 2 became Student’s educational advocates and conservators. MS. SURROGATE PARENT testified that she received the procedural safeguards at each IEP meeting and understood those safeguards. She also testified that she agreed with the goals and objectives and signed each IEP document in agreement. Mr. Gallegos testified that MS. SURROGATE PARENT has served as an educational advocate for many students placed at Friendship Home and that she always appeared to understand her role as an educational advocate. Mr. Gallegos, who was also present at all of Student’s IEP meetings since his placement at Friendship School, testified that OT and PT were discussed during the IEP meetings and no one ever raised the issue that additional OT and PT services were needed beyond the CCS consult listed as a designated instruction and service and the goals and objectives regarding OT and PT. Furthermore, all IEP team members including MS. SURROGATE PARENT and CONSERVATOR 1 (Student’s former teacher and present educational advocate) were in agreement with the level of OT and PT services that were offered and subsequently provided.

The Student again contends that had CCS appeared at any of the IEP meetings MS. SURROGATE PARENT would have understood the full extent of Student’s disabilities, and therefore, she did not know the facts underlying the basis of the claim. As previously explained above, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded by this argument. MS. SURROGATE PARENT was present at the IEP meetings and was aware that CCS was not present at the IEP meetings and that no report from CCS was made available to the IEP team during the IEP meetings. Furthermore, Student has been living and attending school at the Friendship Home since 1995 and had representatives from the Home present at the IEP meetings. CONSERVATOR 1 was his special education teacher and wrote goals and objectives in the area of OT and PT with the assistance of others, including a speech and language therapist and the staff at Friendship Home. CCS consult was also specified in Student’s IEP as a related service for CONSERVATOR 1 to utilize in her classroom on an as needed basis. Additionally, the majority of the goals and objectives were specifically related to his fine and gross motor skills and the development and reinforcement of those skills. MS. SURROGATE PARENT clearly had knowledge of the facts underlying the basis of the claims (that CCS was not present at the IEP team meetings) at the time the claims arose. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that claims that arose prior to January 1999 are barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in Studentopulos.

In regards to the claims that arose between January 1999 and October 21, 1999, the Hearing Officer finds that MS. SURROGATE PARENT knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis of the claims in accordance with California Education Code section 56505(j). MS. SURROGATE PARENT attended the February 25, 1999 IEP meeting, CCS was not present, but CCS consult for OT and PT services was listed as a designated instruction and service, and no report was provided by CCS. Further, goals and objectives were created in the area of OT and PT and all members of the IEP team agreed and consented to the goals and objectives. MS. SURROGATE PARENT clearly knew that no one from CCS was present at the IEP team meeting and therefore the Hearing Officer finds that the Student’s claims between January 1999 and October 21, 1999 are time-barred by the statute of limitations in accordance with California Education Code section 56505(j). (Footnote 6)

Equitable Tolling

The Student argues that equitable tolling should apply in this matter because circumstances existed beyond the Student’s control. Specifically, the Student argues that because CCS was neither present at the IEP meetings nor provided a report to the IEP meetings, the foster and surrogate parents were unaware that OT and PT services provided by CCS were part of the IEP. The Student further contends that had CCS appeared at any of the IEP meetings, the parties would have had all of the facts necessary to make an appropriate educational plan for Student. However, because CCS failed to appear, Ms. FOSTER PARENT and MS. SURROGATE PARENT did not know the full extent of Student’s physical disabilities and, therefore, did not know of the facts underlying the basis of the claim. The Student additionally contends that his educational advocates were not specifically given notice of the statute of limitations on the procedural safeguards and that the requisite procedural safeguards were not given to the educational advocates.

The Respondents contend that the equitable tolling doctrine does not apply in these circumstances because it would defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations and the IDEA. Further, Respondents argue that the Student’s educational advocates attended the IEP meetings, were given a copy of the procedural safeguards, understood the contents of the IEP, and signed in agreement with the recommendation of the District members of the IEP team.

As discussed above, State law governs the statute of limitations for claims filed under the IDEA and California Code of Education. It is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations which codified Studentopulos is a three-year statute of limitations set for in California Education Code section 56505(j). It is also undisputed that the Student raises claims beyond that three-year statute of limitations. According to the Student, equitable tolling applies when extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevent him from filing a petition on time. Miles v. Prunty 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (1999). However, this is the rule applied to habeas corpus cases. The Supreme Court has clarified that equitable tolling may apply unless to do so “would defeat the goals of the federal statute at issue.” Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). One of the fundamental goals of the IDEA is to promote expeditious resolution of education disputes. See Adler v. Educ. Dept. of the State of the New York, 760 F.2d 454, 459-460 (2nd Cir. 1985). Application of equitable tolling would defeat this purpose of the IDEA by permitting claims to be brought long after their accrual date. There are no circumstances in this case that would destroy the statute of limitations as set forth in section 56505(j) and Studentopulos.

In Studentopulos, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejects an argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled. The Court stated that tolling in favor of the student with a disability would permit him to pursue a claim in his own name after his parent’s claims were time-barred erodes the IDEA’s policy of prompt assertion of rights and parental involvement. Id, at 55. This reasoning applies in this case.

Student has failed to show that equitable tolling applies under the IDEA. Furthermore, the Student’s argument is meritless because his educational rights have been protected at each and every IEP meeting since he was placed in Ms. FOSTER PARENT’s foster home.

As previously found, both of Student’s educational advocates were active participants in the IEP process. They attended his meetings, agreed with the goals and objectives, understood their procedural rights, and signed the IEP documents in agreement. Further, both of his educational advocates were aware of the lack of involvement of CCS and were aware that CCS consult was part of Student’s IEP. Additionally, Student’s current educational advocate/conservator wrote the IEPs from 1995 until she became his advocate in 2002 and was fully aware of Student’s needs and that CCS was not present at the time of his IEPs. The Student has failed to make an argument that equitable tolling should apply in this case because at all times, the Student has had someone representing his interests, who was aware of and participated in IEPs, and also had been informed of the procedural rights. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer is not aware of any IDEA-related case, nor did the Student provide any authority, in which the Ninth Circuit has applied the doctrine of equitable tolling in IDEA-related claims.

Based on the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer grants Respondents’ motion to dismiss all claims that arose prior October 21, 1999.

ORDERS

1. The Student’s claims prior to October 21, 1999, three years from the date of filing are barred by the statute of limitations.

2. Respondent Lakeside and Cajon Valley are hereby dismissed from this matter, as they have not provided any services to the Petitioner since 1995.

3. The underlying FAPE matter shall proceed to hearing ten calendar days from the date of this decision, unless that date is not available on the Hearing Office’s calendar and then the matter shall proceed to hearing on the next available hearing date.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code section 56507 (d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with the statute: Respondents prevailed in the one issue heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Education Code § 56505 (i).

Date: March 3, 2004 ______________________________________Jessica Katz, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office

FOOTNOTES:

Throughout the body of this decision, the Hearing Officer will refer to SDCOE, CCS, Lakeside, and Cajon Valley collectively as the “Respondents.”

2 The Student contends that he was not provided appropriate speech and language services because CCS was not present at the IEP meetings. CCS’s responsibility for providing special education services is limited to medically necessary OT and PT. California Government Code Chapter 26.5 section 7575. SP/L is not the responsibility of CCS. Because the Student failed to present any evidence regarding the statute of limitations and speech and language, the Hearing Officer will only consider evidence pertaining to CCS and OT and PT.

3 CONSERVATOR 1 was STUDENT’s special education teacher from the 1995-1996 school year through 2002 when she became his educational advocate. CONSERVATOR 1 drafted the goals and objectives on each of STUDENT’s IEP documents and participated in every IEP meeting from 1995-2002.

4 Prior to 2002, there was no specific requirement for a dependent child to have a court appointed special education advocate, however, a school district was required to assign a surrogate parent to represent a child with special needs during the IEP process. Since 2002, there have been several pieces of legislation affecting the rights of foster children with IEPs. SB 1677 (Alpert 2002) and AB 886 (Simitian 2002) became effective in 2003 and specifically required that a District’s appoint a surrogate parent to represent a child’s educational interests if a court limited the rights of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions. Further, this bill amended the definition of “parent” under the California Education Code to include foster parent. Further AB 490 (Steinberg 2003), just enacted on January 4, 2004 imposes additional responsibilities on the person holding the educational rights of a foster child. However, the recent changes to the law do not affect Ms. FOSTER PARENT’s and subsequently MS. SURROGATE PARENT’s previous roles as STUDENT’s educational advocates.

5 In the Student’s brief, his attorneys inaccurately state that, “Unlike special needs children who have parents, the foster parents…did not have the benefit of observing STUDENT at home.” STUDENT lived with the FOSTER PARENTs for eight years until he became too big for Ms. FOSTER PARENT to transfer him in and out of his wheelchair. Mr. Cochrane appears to be misinformed about the role of STUDENT’s foster parents

6 CCS argues that it was not joined as a party until July 2003, and therefore the statutory time should begin on that date. However, California Education Code section 56505(j) requires that due process hearings be brought within three years from the date the initiating party knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request. (Emphasis added) Therefore, the statutory time frame begins to run once the action is filed for due process.