California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · March 7, 2002

Student v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2415-01 · Hearing Officer Vincent L. Pastorino

Saddleback Valley Unified: Hearing Officer quashes pre-hearing document subpoena, denies sanctions, and orders evaluator to bring test protocols to hearing.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 3 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Footnote 2 notes that earlier motions were all denied. These were the district's February 1, 2002 motion to strike the reimbursement claim and exclude Dr. Majors' report, the student's motion to compel the name and vitae of the district's neuropsychologist, and the district's request for an order compelling release of the protocols. The December 2001 hearing date was continued.

Summary

This is a pre-hearing order on motions, not a decision on the merits. The student filed for due process against Saddleback Valley Unified School District over assessment and eligibility for special education. The district wanted the test protocols (the raw test records) from a September 2001 neuropsychological evaluation. Dr. Majors, a private neuropsychologist, did that evaluation for the student. In December 2001 the Hearing Office issued a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena for documents). It ordered the student to send the protocols to the district's attorney before the hearing. Dr. Majors released some protocols. She said her professional ethics let her release the rest only to a licensed professional. A dispute followed over Dr. Lechuga, the neuropsychologist the district named as its expert.

The student moved to quash the subpoena and asked for sanctions. The Hearing Officer granted the motion to quash. Under the regulation then in effect, a document subpoena could require production only at the hearing, not before it. The Hearing Officer denied sanctions because both sides' experienced attorneys shared blame for the "paper war" over a simple exchange of highly relevant protocols. The Hearing Officer granted the district's new request for a subpoena because the protocols were material and the district could not get them another way. The new subpoena required Dr. Majors herself to bring all of the protocols to the first day of hearing.

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Why it matters

The order shows how SEHO read 5 C.C.R. 3082(c)(2). It allowed no general discovery, and a document subpoena could require production only at the hearing. The party asking for one had to show the records were material and could not be obtained another way. The order also shows that directing a subpoena to the wrong person can put a private evaluator in an ethical bind.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue 1. Petitioner's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum issued December 11, 2001, requiring Petitioner to produce Dr. Majors' test protocols to the Respondent's attorney before the due process hearing.

    Granted: 5 C.C.R. 3082(c)(2) does not allow general discovery or document production before the hearing, so the December 11 subpoena wrongly set a pre-hearing production date.

  2. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 2. Petitioner's request for sanctions against Respondent for allegedly misleading the Hearing Office and Petitioner about Dr. Lechuga's role and for an unjust "paper war."

    Denied: the Hearing Officer found both parties responsible for the "paper war" and for failing to cooperate on a simple exchange of test protocols.

  3. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue 3. Respondent's request for a subpoena duces tecum requiring Dr. Majors to produce, on the first day of hearing, all neuropsychological protocols relating to her assessment of Petitioner.

    Granted: the protocols are material, and the district showed it could not get them another way, so a subpoena issued for production at the hearing.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • December 11, 2001 subpoena duces tecum requiring pre-hearing production of test protocols quashed.
  • Subpoena duces tecum to issue requiring Dr. Majors to produce all neuropsychological protocols relating to her assessment of Petitioner on the first day of hearing.

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Key authorities

Title 5, C.C.R. Sec. 3082(c)(2); Title 5, C.C.R. Sec. 3088(b); Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 11455.30

People named in the decision

  • Dr. Majors, private neuropsychologist; independent evaluator and expert for Student, Private
  • Dr. Lechuga, neuropsychologist disclosed as expert witness for District, Disclosed by Saddleback Valley Unified School District

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

On February 27, 2002, the Hearing Office received a motion from STUDENT (Petitioner) to quash a subpoena duces tecum (SDT) that had been issued pursuant to an order dated December 11, 2001. On February 27, the Hearing Office also received a request from the Petitioner for sanctions against Saddleback Valley Unified School District (Respondent) in connection with representations and actions by the Respondent during efforts by the parties to obtain and/or produce the test protocols identified in the SDT. On March 5, 2002, the Hearing Office received the Respondent’s reply to the Petitioner’s motion. Included within the Respondent’s reply was a new request for issuance of an SDT.

BACKGROUND

The issues in this matter arise from a dispute regarding assessment and the Petitioner’s eligibility for special education and related services. On December 4, 2001, the Hearing Office received a request from the Respondent for an SDT compelling the production of, among other items, all protocols related to all tests reflected in Dr. Majors’ Neuropsychological Evaluation Report dated September 22, 2001. The SDT request did not specify to whom the SDT was to be directed. On December 11, 2001, the Hearing Office issued an order for an SDT requiring the Petitioner to produce the protocols of tests reflected in Dr. Majors’ neuropsychological report dated September 22, 2001. The order further stated that the Petitioner was to provide copies of those items to the Respondent’s attorney by December 13, 2001. The December 13 date was five business days prior to the date scheduled for the first day of hearing. The hearing date was subsequently continued.

The Petitioner alleges in his motion that following the issuance of the SDT order, the Petitioner’s counsel facilitated the provision of the protocols to the Respondent’s attorney, that some of the protocols had been released to the Respondent, and that Dr. Majors indicated she would release the remainder of the neurological testing protocols to a duly licensed professional as her rules of professional ethics permit. The Petitioner also alleges that on or about February 13, 2002, the Respondent subsequently disclosed Dr. Lechuga as an expert witness in the matter; that on or about February 15, the Petitioner’s attorney informed the Respondent’s attorney that the Respondent merely needed to have Dr. Lechuga contact Dr. Majors to request the protocols; and that on or about February 21, having not heard from Dr. Lechuga, Dr. Majors contacted Dr. Lechuga and was told that Dr. Lechuga knew nothing about the case and that Dr. Lechuga had not been contacted by the Respondent regarding the case.

The Petitioner now asserts that the SDT should be quashed because SDTs issued by the Hearing Office cannot compel the production of documents prior to the first day of a due process hearing. The Petitioner requests sanctions on the grounds that the Respondent allegedly misled the Hearing Office and the Petitioner regarding the capacity of Dr. Lechuga as the Respondent’s representative in this matter. Sanctions are also requested by the Petitioner in connection with what has been generally described by the Petitioner as an unjust “paper war” instigated by the Respondent.

The Respondent has replied by labeling Dr. Majors’ concern about violating certain ethical considerations as “convenient.” The Respondent asserts that it has no legal obligation to use Dr. Lechuga in this matter, and that neither Dr. Majors nor the Petitioner can utilize their concern over Dr. Majors’ ethical obligations to “trump” the mandate of the SDT. The Respondent has requested that an SDT be issued to compel Dr. Majors to produce, on the first day of hearing, all neuropsychological protocols relating to her assessment of the Petitioner.

DISCUSSION

An SDT may be issued by the Hearing Office upon a showing of reasonable necessity by a party. Title 5, C.C.R. Sec. 3082(c)(2). The Hearing Office has traditionally construed the term “reasonable necessity” to require that the requesting party show that it cannot obtain the documents or papers by some other means and that the documents or papers sought are material to the issues involved in the case. Section 3082(c)(2) does not allow for generalized discovery, nor does it allow for the production of documents or papers other than at the due process hearing.

The Hearing Officer finds that December 11, 2001 order for issuance of an SDT incorrectly specified that the documents were to be produced on a date prior to the commencement of the due process hearing. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s motion to quash is granted.

With regard to the Petitioner’s request for sanctions, Title 5, C.C.R. Sec. 3088(b) provides that only the presiding Hearing Officer may initiate contempt sanctions and/or place expenses at issue.(Footnote 1) The Hearing Officer observes that directing the SDT to the Petitioner instead of Dr. Majors created a dilemma for Dr. Majors with respect to professional rules of ethics restricting the circumstances by which she could release information. However, the above facts do not demonstrate why experienced attorneys for both parties have been unable to cooperatively accomplish the ostensibly simple task of exchanging test protocols that are highly relevant to the core issues raised in this due process matter. Since the Hearing Officer considers both parties to be responsible for the so-called “paper-war” afflicting the progress of this case, the Petitioner’s request for sanctions is denied.(Footnote 2)

Meanwhile, the Respondent has shown that the test protocols are material to the issues involved in the case, and the Respondent has established an inability to obtain the test protocols by some means other than an SDT. Accordingly, an SDT shall issue requiring Dr. Majors to produce, on the first day of hearing, all neuropsychological protocols relating to her assessment of the Petitioner.

ORDER

1. The motion by Petitioner to quash the subpeona duces tecum ordering the provision of test protocols prior to the due process hearing is granted.

2. The Petitioner’s motion for sanctions is denied.

3. The Respondent’s request for an SDT ordering the provision of test protocols on the first day of hearing is granted. An SDT shall issue requiring Dr. Majors to produce, on the first day of hearing, all neuropsychological protocols relating to her assessment of the Petitioner.

Dated: March 7, 2002 ____________________________________ Vincent L. Pastorino, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The term “expenses” in Sec. 3088(b) is a reference to Cal. Gov. Code Sec. 11455.30 (part of the Administrative Procedure Act), wherein a presiding officer is empowered to order a party, the party’s attorney, or other authorized representative, or both, to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or intended to cause unnecessary delay. 2. On February 1, 2002, the Respondent filed a “Motion to Strike Petitioner’s Claim for Reimbursement for Privately Funded Independent Educational Assessment, and To Exclude All Evidence Relating to Dr. Major’s Report.” The motion was requested as a remedy for the Respondent not having received the test protocols referenced in the SDT. On February 7, 2002, the Petitioner filed his response to the Respondent’s motion, and the Petitioner made his own “Motion to Compel the Name and Vitae of the District’s Employed Neuropsychologist.” According to the Petitioner, his motion was made so that his expert, Dr. Majors, “could release the neurologically based protocols without violating the APA ethics code, and so that the District’s licensed neuropsychologist could be called as a witness.” On February 12, 2002, the Respondent filed a response to the Petitioner’s motion, and the Respondent filed its own “Request for Order Compelling the Release of All Neuropsychological Protocols Relating to Dr. Major’s Assessment to the District.” On February 14, the Petitioner filed his “Rebuttal to Request for Order Compelling Release of All Neuropsychological Protocols Relating to Dr. Majors’ Assessment.” All of the above-described motions were denied. The latter motion was denied on the grounds that according to the documents filed with the Hearing Office, the Petitioner had already indicated that Dr. Majors would release the remaining protocols to a duly licensed professional upon receipt of the name and qualifications of that individual, and that the name and qualifications of such a professional had been produced.