California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 18, 2002

Student v. Carlsbad Unified School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2474-02 · Hearing Officer Judy F. Hirano

Carlsbad Unified must reimburse parents' private vision assessment, but first grader was not eligible for special education as of October 2001.

Split decision: student prevailed on 1 of 4 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The decision references a related District-filed case, SN01-02672. A February 15, 2002 decision in that case allowed the District to complete its assessment without parental consent. It also notes an April 11, 2002 CDE compliance report.

Summary

Parents of a 7-year-old first grader at Magnolia Elementary School in Carlsbad Unified School District filed for due process. They claimed their son was eligible for special education with a specific learning disability (SLD) as of an October 18, 2001 IEP meeting. They sought occupational therapy (OT), vision therapy, and reimbursement for private vision therapy and transportation. Before that meeting, the District had done only adapted physical education and OT assessments. A private developmental optometrist, Dr. Susan Daniel, had found weak visual perceptual skills.

The Hearing Officer found the District's fall 2001 assessment inappropriate. Visual perception and processing, cognitive ability, academic achievement and a possible learning disability were all suspected areas, and no qualified person had assessed them. The District was ordered to reimburse the cost of Dr. Daniel's assessment.

However, the student did not meet the SLD criteria in October 2001. He had no ability or achievement testing and no finding of a processing disorder. His delays also reflected limited kindergarten experience, much of it not in English, and his young developmental age. In addition, regular classroom accommodations and twice-weekly reading tutoring were helping him progress. His teacher said he was ready for second grade. Because he was not eligible, he was not entitled to OT or vision therapy as related services, or to reimbursement for vision therapy. All other claims were denied.

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Why it matters

The decision shows how SEHO separated a flawed assessment from the eligibility question. A district's failure to assess all suspected areas supported reimbursing a parent's private assessment. It did not establish eligibility. SLD eligibility still required a severe discrepancy that regular education could not fix, and limited prior schooling weighed against that finding.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailed in partAssessment

    Issue 1(a). Did the District conduct an appropriate assessment prior to the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting?

    The District's fall 2001 assessment, limited to adapted PE and OT, was inappropriate because it did not assess visual perception/processing, cognitive ability, academic achievement or a suspected learning disability. The parents were awarded reimbursement for their private developmental vision assessment. Otherwise, the District prevailed on Issue 1.

  2. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 1(b). Did Petitioner meet the SLD eligibility criteria in October 2001?

    No severe discrepancy was shown under the standardized-score method or the IEP-team-finding method. Delays reflected limited kindergarten experience, much of it not in English, and developmental youth. The delays were being addressed through regular education accommodations and tutoring.

  3. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2. If Petitioner was eligible for special education in October 2001, did a FAPE from October 2001 to the end of the 2001-2002 school year require vision therapy and occupational therapy as related services?

    Because the student was not eligible in October 2001, he was not entitled to vision therapy or OT as related services.

  4. Issue 3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of vision therapy he received, including the cost of transportation?

    Because the student was ineligible and not entitled to vision therapy as a related service, no reimbursement for vision therapy or transportation was owed.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • IEE at public expense. Within 20 calendar days of the decision, Petitioner must submit proof of the cost of the September 2001 developmental vision assessment by Susan Daniel, O.D. Within 25 calendar days of receiving that proof, the District must reimburse the cost. The decision does not state a dollar amount.

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Key authorities

Cal. Educ. Code § 56320; Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b); Cal. Educ. Code § 56337; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4); 34 C.F.R. § 300.541; Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist.

People named in the decision

  • Sharon Popp, director of pupil personnel services, Carlsbad Unified School District
  • Robert Roice, educational consultant representing District, Carlsbad Unified School District
  • Beth Thomason, summer school kindergarten teacher, Magnolia Elementary School
  • Juanita Collins-Cripe, first-grade general education teacher, Magnolia Elementary School
  • James Boone, principal, Magnolia Elementary School
  • Joe Barry, adapted physical education specialist, Carlsbad Unified School District
  • Sue Schwander, former teacher in Switzerland, witness for Student, School in Switzerland
  • Karen Hoffman, occupational vision therapist, witness for Student, Private provider
  • Christine Martinez, registered occupational therapist, Nonpublic agency
  • Lance Miyashiro, occupational therapist (OT assessor), Nonpublic agency
  • Richard Stiavelli, Ed.D., school psychologist, Carlsbad Unified School District
  • Susan Daniel, O.D., private developmental (behavioral) optometrist, assessor, Private provider

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Judy Hirano, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Carlsbad, California, on June 11 and 12, 2002. STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by his parents, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondent Carlsbad Unified School District (District) was represented by educational consultant Robert Roice. Also present on the District’s behalf was Sharon Popp, director of pupil personnel services.

Petitioner and the District called the following witnesses: Beth Thomason, Magnolia Elementary School (Magnolia) summer school teacher; Juanita Collins-Cripe (Collins), Magnolia grade 1 teacher; Ms. Popp; James Boone, Magnolia principal; and Joe Barry, District adapted physical education (APE) specialist. Petitioner also called the following witnesses: MOTHER, his mother; Sue Schwander, his teacher in Switzerland; Karen Hoffman, occupational vision therapist; and Christine Martinez, registered occupational therapist. Respondent called the following witness: Richard Stiavelli, Ed.D., District school psychologist. Oral and documentary evidence was received, and the parties presented oral closing arguments. Thereafter, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for a decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

On the first day of hearing, Petitioner objected to the District’s proposed Exhibits 12 through 15 being admitted into evidence. These exhibits were related to the District’s spring 2002 assessment of STUDENT and included the April 2002 IEP finding him ineligible for special education. Petitioner argued that these documents were irrelevant because the issue was his eligibility for special education in October 2001, not April 2002. The District argued that its spring 2002 assessment results were relevant because without them, there was no evidence of processing test results, IQ, academic scores, or any discrepancy. The District also stated that Petitioner sought remedies that he claimed should have been provided since October 2001.

The Hearing Officer noted that the eligibility issue raised by Petitioner was limited to the October 2001 IEP but ruled that the exhibits would be admitted, with the proviso that in determining eligibility in October 2001, only the evidence relevant to that time period would be considered (Footnote 1). The Hearing Officer explained, first, that if the argument was that all evidence after the October 18 IEP meeting should be excluded, some of Petitioner’s exhibits, such as the fall 2001 semester grade report, should be excluded. The Hearing Officer indicated, however, that an informed decision would rest upon having sufficient evidence, and the proposed exhibits had probative value worth considering though obtained after the initial assessment period. Further, the Hearing Officer stated, Petitioner argued that in October 2001, the District had failed to assess beyond the assessments reviewed at the September and October IEP meetings, and the District should have the opportunity to respond to this argument, with its proposed exhibits.

ISSUES (Footnotes 2)

1. Was Petitioner eligible for special education at the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting because of a specific learning disability (SLD)?

(a) Did the District conduct an appropriate assessment prior to the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting?

(b) Did Petitioner meet the SLD eligibility criteria in October 2001?

2. If Petitioner was eligible for special education in October 2001, did a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from October 2001 to the end of the 2001-2002 school year require vision therapy and occupational therapy as related services?

3. Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of vision therapy he received, including the cost of transportation?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a 7-year-old first-grade student who resides within the District. In fall 2001 and in April 2002, the District determined that he was not eligible for special education as having a specific learning disability (SLD). According to an occupational therapy (OT) assessment, he displayed fine motor, handwriting, and visual perception difficulties. A developmental visual assessment found underdeveloped skills in tracking, jump fixations, and eye-teaming, and he received private vision therapy from October 2001 to April 2002.

When STUDENT’S family lived in Switzerland, he attended preschool and kindergarten, until approximately November 2000, at a school in which the academic instruction was in Swiss-German. Ms. Schwander, his teacher in Switzerland, testified that English was his primary language, and, according to a November 9, 2000 report she wrote, he was able to express himself confidently in English. In German, he knew the letters and sounds of the alphabet and had started reading words phonetically. She recommended a developmental assessment because of both fine and gross motor delays.

At the end of the 2000-2001 school year, the family moved to the District, and STUDENT attended a summer school kindergarten class at Magnolia. A December 7, 2001 letter from his summer school teacher, Ms. Thomason, states that she assessed her students in the Reading Mastery sounds and in numbers. STUDENT knew few sounds and could not blend them, knew numbers up to 10 but not all between 11 and 40, and had much difficulty writing letters and numbers. Due to his deficient reading and fine motor skills, she recommended that he enroll in kindergarten rather than first grade. His parents disagreed, and he started grade 1 in fall 2001.

On August 31, 2001, APE specialist Mr. Barry conducted an APE assessment when STUDENT was age 6 years, 2 months, to address parental concerns about his motor skills, basic movement, and handwriting. On the Primary Motor Evaluation, his average gross motor functioning level was 5.2 to 5.5 years. He displayed 4.0-year locomotor and 4.5-year eye-hand coordination skills. He held a pencil with a quadrapod (not a mature tripod) grasp and changed his preferred hand during stacking and stringing activities. He exhibited age-level skills on the Motor Development Screening. Mr. Barry concluded that he displayed overall gross motor skills in the normal range but that his eye-hand coordination ball skills were below age and grade expectations. He recommended an OT assessment to address fine motor concerns but no APE.

On September 14 and 17, 2001, a developmental visual assessment of STUDENT was conducted by developmental optometrist Susan Daniel, O.D., to rule out a visual perceptual problem because he had reversals and a writing difficulty. He obtained below age-expectant scores on the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills-Revised. Dr. Daniel concluded that he had underdeveloped tracking, jump fixations, and eye-teaming skills and difficulty with laterality and directionality concepts. She recommended an OT assessment to address postural, writing, and laterality skills and vision therapy to improve visual efficiency and perceptual skills (Footnote 3).

A Student Study Team (SST) Referral form completed by STUDENT’S teacher, Ms. Collins, indicates problems with dysgraphia and limited handwriting ability (Footnote 4). STUDENT had begun to show letter-to-sound recognition and was starting the Edmark program, which precedes the Reading Mastery program used in grade 1; was at a starting level in math; and was permitted to take the spelling test orally. According to the notes of a September 26, 2001 SST meeting, his teacher had indicated that he “simply can’t write,” and he was referred to an SST because of dysgraphia. The notes state that a health screening and developmental history were to be obtained, an assistive technology or OT assessment arranged, and his progress monitored.

A September 27, 2001 IEP meeting was held to review the APE assessment results (Footnote 5). The IEP notes that parental concerns were fine motor, visual-motor, reading, and writing skills. The IEP states that APE was not recommended because STUDENT’S gross motor skills were within age expectations, but an OT referral had been initiated because of a fine motor delay. The IEP notes that accommodations were made in classroom seating position and the nature and quantity of writing activities and that the IEP team was given a copy of Dr. Daniel’s vision therapy report. From October 4, 2001, to April 22, 2002, STUDENT received weekly vision therapy. On October 5, 2001, upon the District’s referral, occupational therapist Lance Miyashiro conducted an OT assessment. According to the report, the optometry assessment noted difficulty with pursuit and saccadic eye movements and laterality and directionality skills. In the visual perception area, he was able to complete an integrated puzzle with assistance and increased time. In the fine motor area, he had impaired palm-to-finger translation skills and impaired opposition skills (thumb touching each finger alternately). He used a quadrapod (not a tripod) grasp when writing and had problems with letter reversals, size, and formation. In the visual-motor area, STUDENT displayed difficulty tracking objects visually. On the Developmental Test of Visual-Motor Integration (VMI), he obtained the following standard scores: VMI, 94; visual, 96; and motor, 80. The report summarized that he displayed difficulty with fine motor and visual perception skills and handwriting, and his visual-motor score was low. The report recommended OT, a handwriting program, and a sensory evaluation to determine if a “sensory diet” would be beneficial (Footnote 6). (Pet. Exh. 4; Testimony of Ms. Martinez.)

An October 18, 2001 IEP indicates that the OT testing revealed low VMI scores and fine motor skills and difficulty with visual-motor tasks consistent with the vision therapy report. The IEP states that STUDENT did not have a qualifying condition to be eligible for special education.

The District developed an assessment plan dated October 31, 2001, to assess STUDENT in cognitive functioning; academic achievement; psycho-motor development; language, speech, and communication development; social and emotional adaptive behavior; and health. The parents did not consent to the assessment plan. On November 12, 2001, they filed for due process in this case on the ground that the District had failed to find STUDENT eligible for special education services. They requested occupational and vision therapy.

On November 20, 2001, the mother consented to administering only the intelligence test and the Draw a Person/Draw a Family test (Footnote 7). On November 21, 2001, Dr. Stiavelli gave STUDENT a Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (WISC-III) subtest, the Draw a Person test, and the Developmental Test of VMI. However, he ceased testing when he learned that the parents had consented to only the WISC-III and Draw a Person and Draw a Family tests (Footnote 8). (Dist. Exh. 4.) On December 4, 2001, the District filed for due process to assess STUDENT without the parents’ consent (SN01-02672). On February 15, 2002, a Decision was issued in the District’s case, finding the District entitled to complete its assessment pursuant to the October 31 plan.

STUDENT’S grade 1 first-semester grades were as follows: Reading, 1+; Writing, 1; Grammar and mechanics, 1; Spelling, 4; Mathematics conceptual understanding and problem solving, 2; and Mathematics computation, 4 (Footnote 9). The teacher’s comments were that he was making steady progress but required continued guidance in reading acquisition and comprehension.

In March and April 2002, school psychologist Dr. Stiavelli conducted a psychological assessment when STUDENT was in grade 1.7. His WISC-III IQ scores were Verbal, 113; Performance, 98; and Full Scale, 106. He displayed a slow speed of pencil-and-paper operations, suggesting deficient visual tracking and short-term memory-related functions that would hamper completing written assignments. He obtained grade-level or higher scores on the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Achievement-Revised (WJ-R) (Footnote 10). He had a 100 Developmental Test of VMI standard score and age-appropriate handwriting. Dr. Stiavelli found no severe discrepancy between IQ and WJ-R scores and no basic psychological processing delay and concluded that he did not qualify for special education as having an SLD. An April 30, 2002 IEP indicates that the assessment results were reviewed, and the teacher reported that STUDENT had made very good progress in reading, spelling, and written language and had matured a great deal. The IEP states that he communicated well orally and had a 2.1 grade-equivalent written language score. The IEP team, except for the parents, found him not eligible for special education.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

ISSUE 1: Was Petitioner eligible for special education at the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting because of a specific learning disability (SLD)?

Under California special education law, an individual with exceptional needs is one who meets the definition of a child with a disability, as set forth in the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) at 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i), and, as a result of the impairment, requires instruction, services, or both which cannot be provided with modification of the regular education program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56026(a), (b). The disabilities identified in the IDEA are mental retardation; hearing, speech or language, visual, orthopedic, and other health impairments; emotional disturbance; autism; traumatic brain injury; and specific learning disabilities. 20 U.S.C. §1401(3)(A)(i); see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(a)-(j).

Petitioner asserts that he was eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability from the date of the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting. Before the eligibility issue is addressed, an initial question raised by Petitioner is the appropriateness of the District’s assessment in fall 2001 (Footnote 11).

(a) Did the District Conduct an Appropriate Assessment Prior to the October 18, 2001 IEP Meeting?

The October 18, 2001 IEP states that STUDENT did not have a qualifying condition and thus was ineligible for special education. Petitioner contends, in essence, that the District’s assessment prior to the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting was inappropriate because the District conducted only APE and OT assessments and did not offer additional assessments until after expiration of the initial 50-day period required by California Education Code Section 56344 for conducting an assessment and holding an IEP meeting following receipt of the parent’s consent. (Pet. Exh. 14.) The District asserts that it offered further assessment in the October 31, 2001 assessment plan, but the parents did not consent.

The appropriateness of the District’s assessment is governed by the requirements set forth at California Education Code Sections 56320, 56322, and 56324. Tests and other assessment materials must be provided and administered in the pupil’s primary language or other mode of communication; must be administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions; and must be validated for the specific purpose for which they are used. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(b). The pupil must be assessed in all areas of suspected disability including, where appropriate, health and development; vision, including low vision; hearing; motor abilities; language function; general ability; academic performance; self-help; orientation and mobility skills; career and vocational abilities and interests; and social and emotional status. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(f). The assessment shall be conducted by persons knowledgeable of the suspected disability. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(g). Assessment materials must assess specific areas of educational need and not merely provide a single general intelligence quotient. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(c). Further, no single procedure shall be used as the sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for a special education child. Cal. Educ. Code § 56320(e). Moreover, psychological assessments, including individually administered tests of intellectual or emotional functioning, must be administered by a credentialed school psychologist. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56320(b)(3), 56324. Assessments must be conducted by persons competent to perform the assessments, as determined by the school district, county office, or special education local plan area. Cal. Educ. Code § 56322.

The question is whether, by the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting, the District had assessed STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. Petitioner, in effect, asserts that the District failed to do so because in October 2001, it had not yet assessed cognitive ability, academic achievement, and areas suggested by other assessments. He asserted at the hearing that the vision assessment indicated a visual processing problem (Footnote 12).

APE specialist Mr. Barry testified that he received a message that STUDENT’S parent had concerns about his motor skills, handwriting, and basic movement. Mr. Barry conducted an APE assessment and found overall normal gross motor skills but recommended an OT assessment to address fine motor concerns. At a September 2001 IEP meeting, Mr. Barry reviewed the APE assessment results. The IEP indicates that parental concerns were fine motor, visual-motor, reading, and writing skills. The IEP notes that an OT assessment was pending and that the IEP team had received a copy of the vision therapy report by Dr. Daniel.

In September 2001, optometrist Dr. Daniels had conducted a developmental visual assessment to rule out a visual perceptual problem. STUDENT’S percentile scores on all but one subtest of the Test of Visual Perceptual Skills-Revised were between 1 and 10 percent. School psychologist Dr. Stiavelli testified that these scores indicated inadequate visual perceptual skills. He testified that a low score in this area would indicate a visual problem that did not affect the motor area and could indicate a visual processing problem. Thus, the evidence established that prior to the October IEP meeting, the visual perceptual area was an area of suspected disability. Moreover, the Hearing Officer concludes from the following evidence that the District did not assess this area before the October IEP meeting.

The OT assessment report states that the District referred STUDENT for an OT assessment because of concerns about fine motor and visual perceptual skills. The report states that in the visual-motor area, STUDENT exhibited difficulty tracking objects visually and also exhibited some difficulty with visual perception skills. The report recommends, in part, OT and visual perceptual activities. (Pet. Exh. 4; Testimony of Ms. Martinez.) Occupational therapist Ms. Martinez, from the same nonpublic agency as the OT assessor, reviewed the OT assessment results and recommendations at the October IEP meeting. Although Ms. Martinez, a certified and registered occupational therapist, is knowledgeable in the area of OT needs and assessment, there is no evidence that she is qualified to diagnose a visual-perceptual or visual processing disorder. Director of pupil personnel services Ms. Popp, who attended the October IEP meeting as an administrator, testified that she is not qualified to interpret visual perceptual test results. Dr. Stiavelli testified that he is qualified to assess for a visual processing or perceptual-motor deficiency but that he did not attend either the September or October IEP meeting because at that time, he had not yet been involved in assessing STUDENT. Thus, the evidence is that at the time of the October IEP meeting, no one qualified to assess for and diagnose a visual perceptual or visual processing disorder had assessed STUDENT in this area, although this was an area of suspected disability. Thus, the District’s assessment was inappropriate to that extent.

Moreover, it is undisputed that in October 2001, the District had not yet administered to STUDENT standardized tests to assess his cognitive ability and academic achievement. The testimony of teacher Ms. Collins established his level of functioning in fall 2001. In September 2001, he had great difficulty with, and, in fact, was unable to complete, the first writing activity involving a prompt. If he had continued at this level, Ms. Collins would have been concerned, but he subsequently showed progress. During the November 2001 writing activity, he revealed the ability to give information, although he still exhibited some reversals and a spacing problem. He was also at the beginning stage of reading, the sound level. The Reading Mastery program is used in the District when students are already reading, but STUDENT needed practice with letter-sound recognition and sight words and thus started with the Edmark program, which focuses on sight words. In December 2001, he was just able to blend sounds and put words together, which was below the basic District standard. Thus, he received a first-semester reading grade of 1+ (below the basic level) (Footnote 13). He also received the lowest academic grade, 1, for writing and grammar and mechanics. At the end of the first semester, out of the 20 students in his class, 5 or 6 were at the 1 academic grade level. (Testimony of Ms. Collins.)

Although Ms. Collins testified that she saw nothing out of the ordinary in STUDENT’S reading and writing level, he was still at the lowest grade level (below basic level) at the end of the first semester. His parents sought special education services because of concerns about his fine motor, visual-motor, reading, and writing skills, according to the September 27 IEP. Further, as discussed above, the visual perceptual or visual processing area was an area of suspected disability before the October 18 IEP meeting. Thus, cognitive ability, academic achievement, and an SLD were areas of suspected disability before the October IEP meeting (Footnote 14). To the extent that the District failed to assess these areas, its assessment was inappropriate (Footnote 15).

The question is what remedy, if any, is available to Petitioner. A parent has the right to obtain an independent educational assessment of the student from a qualified specialist, at public expense, if the parent disagrees with an assessment obtained by the District, unless the District shows at a due process hearing that its assessment is appropriate. Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b). In September, the District had offered to do APE and OT assessments but had not offered to assess cognitive ability, academic achievement, or visual processing, although the parents had reading and writing concerns. The parents obtained a developmental visual assessment by Dr. Daniel which raised visual perceptual skills as an area of suspected disability, an area that Dr. Stiavelli acknowledged at the hearing the District had not yet assessed (Footnote 16). The evidence is that Dr. Daniel is a board-certified behavioral optometrist and is a qualified assessor in this area. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56329(b) (Footnote 17). Thus, Petitioner should be entitled to reimbursement for the cost of Dr. Daniel’s assessment (Footnote 18).

(b) Did Petitioner Meet the SLD Eligibility Criteria in October 2001?

Petitioner contends that by the October 18, 2001 IEP meeting, he was eligible for special education because of a specific learning disability under California Code of Regulations, title 5, Subsections 3030(j)(4)(A) and (C).

A specific learning disability (SLD) is defined as a “disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). Basic psychological processes include “attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization and expression.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(1). For a child to qualify for special education as having an SLD, he must meet three requirements. First, a severe discrepancy must exist between intellectual ability and achievement in the areas of oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, or mathematics reasoning. 34 C.F.R. § 300.541(a)(2); Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(a). Second, the severe discrepancy must be due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and must not be primarily the result of an environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage. 34 C.F.R. § 300.541(b)(3),(4); Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(b). Last, the discrepancy cannot be ameliorated through “other regular or categorical services” offered within the regular education program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56337(c); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.543(a)(6). The determination of whether a severe discrepancy exists is to be made by the IEP team, taking into account all available relevant information. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4). No “single score or product of scores, test or procedure shall be used as the sole criterion” in determining a child’s eligibility for special education. Id. A severe discrepancy can be established through a formula using standardized tests, by alternative means when standardized tests are considered to be invalid, or by a finding of the IEP team that a severe discrepancy exists. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(A), (B), (C). No evidence was presented that standardized tests are invalid to assess STUDENT’S ability or achievement. Thus, to determine if a severe discrepancy exists, his scores on standardized intellectual ability and academic achievement tests can be compared (Footnote 19). As discussed above, however, by the October 2001 IEP meeting, no cognitive ability or academic achievement standardized tests had yet been administered to STUDENT. Thus, a severe discrepancy cannot be established at that time under Subsection 3030(j)(4)(A) using standardized test scores.

The question, then, is whether a severe discrepancy can be established under Subsection 3030(j)(4)(C). Even if standardized tests do not reveal a severe discrepancy between intellectual ability and academic achievement, the IEP team may nevertheless find that a severe discrepancy exists if it documents in a written report that the severe discrepancy results from a basic psychological processing disorder and states the area, degree, and basis and method used in determining the discrepancy. The report must contain the information considered by the team, including standardized assessment data; information from the parent and current teacher; evidence of the student’s class performance in the form of observations, work samples, and group test scores; the student’s age; and any other relevant information. The discrepancy must not be primarily the result of limited school experience or poor school attendance. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(C).

Petitioner asserts that his eligibility at the time of the October 2001 IEP meeting is supported by the APE, OT, and vision assessments; his classroom performance; prior reports; parental input; the Student Study Team’s observations; and other information provided at the September and October 2001 IEP meetings. After a careful review of the evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that in this case, a severe discrepancy is not established under Subsection 3030(j)(4)(C). First, as discussed above, STUDENT had not been assessed for an SLD prior to the October IEP meeting. Thus, there was not only no evidence of a severe discrepancy stemming from a comparison of standardized ability and achievement test scores but also no finding by a qualified assessor of a disorder in a basic psychological process. Thus, a finding that a severe discrepancy resulted from a basic psychological processing disorder was unwarranted at that time. Less than two weeks after the October IEP meeting, the District offered to conduct a psychoeducational assessment of STUDENT. However, because the parents granted only partial consent, no assessment of cognitive ability, academic achievement, or psychological process was conducted at that time.

Petitioner argues that although STUDENT’S IQ scores obtained in spring 2002 indicating average intellectual ability remain constant and reflect his cognitive ability in fall 2001, his educational achievement scores likely were higher in the spring than they would have been in the fall (Footnote 20). The evidence here, however, does not support a finding that a severe discrepancy existed between his ability and achievement in fall 2001 considering information from his parents and teacher, his class performance, his age, and the fact that the discrepancy must not be primarily the result of limited school experience. According to STUDENT’S teacher, Ms. Collins, his reading and writing skills were at a beginning level that was below the basic level of entering first-grade students, particularly those who had attended a full year of kindergarten within the District. However, the evidence is that he attended kindergarten, taught in the Swiss-German language, only until approximately November 2000 of the 2000-2001 school year. Thus, he had limited kindergarten experience, and the limited amount of kindergarten instruction he received was in Swiss-German, not English. Moreover, Ms. Collins testified that as a first-grader, he required extra practice in fine motor, writing, and reading skills and time to mature developmentally.

In summary, in October 2001, there was no finding by a qualified assessor of a basic psychological processing disorder that could cause a severe discrepancy. Furthermore, the evidence did not support a finding of a severe discrepancy considering STUDENT’S classroom performance as well as the fact that he was a developmentally young first grader with limited educational experience in kindergarten and little, if any, formal instruction in the English language. Thus, an SLD was not established under Subsection 3030(j)(4)(C).

Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that a severe discrepancy existed as a result of a basic psychological processing disorder, the evidence does not support a finding that any discrepancy could not be ameliorated through “other regular or categorical services” offered within the regular education class. Compared to most of the other students who had started first grade at a higher skill level, at the end of the first semester STUDENT was still at a below-average level under District standards. However, as Ms. Collins testified, he showed progress through practice, exposure to what he was doing in the classroom and at home, and the maturing process of just getting older. According to her, by November 2001, despite the presence of reversals and the need to work on spacing, he was already showing progress in writing. By spring 2002, he was performing at a higher level in class, according to Petitioner’s own witness, Ms. Hoffman, who explained that the vision therapy was terminated in April 2002 in part because of the parent’s report of improvement in STUDENT’S classroom performance (Footnote 21). Ms. Hoffman’s testimony was corroborated by Ms. Collins, who testified that during the second semester, STUDENT was doing well in reading and was able to do the writing activities, with consistent spacing, although he still needed practice. Although evidence of his improved performance in the spring was not available in fall 2001, this evidence has probative value and should be considered in light of the third SLD eligibility criterion which provides the District the opportunity to correct any educational problems with services offered within the regular education class (Footnote 22).

The evidence is that starting in September 2001, modifications and accommodations were implemented in the regular education classroom. APE specialist Mr. Barry testified that STUDENT’S desk was adjusted and a foot rest and inclined writing surface were provided to assist him to be able to write correctly. He was seated near the teacher, and it was recommended that he be given copies of activities to copy at his desk instead of having to copy from the board. Teacher Ms. Collins testified that at first, he was given the spelling test orally but after 2 or 3 times revealed the ability to take written spelling tests like the other students. For the journal writing, she initially used a colored pencil to write down his thoughts and had him trace over the letters. Beginning in November or December 2001, he received small-group tutoring in reading from a school tutor twice weekly and also participated in a program whereby he read one-on-one to an adult. Ms. Collins testified that although STUDENT had started at the 1 academic grade level, he had shown improvement and was ready to move on to the second grade. Thus, the evidence does not support the conclusion that any discrepancy or any delays he exhibited initially could not be ameliorated through modifications and services in the regular education class.

In conclusion, the evidence does not establish that in October 2001, STUDENT met the SLD eligibility criteria under either Subsection 3030(j)(4)(A) or (C).

ISSUE 2: If Petitioner was eligible for special education in October 2001, did a free appropriate public education (FAPE) from October 2001 to the end of the 2001-2002 school year require vision therapy and occupational therapy as related services?

It was concluded above that STUDENT was not eligible for special education in October 2001. Consequently, he was not entitled to a FAPE, including vision therapy and occupational therapy as related services, at that time under federal and State special education law.

ISSUE 3: Is Petitioner entitled to reimbursement for the cost of vision therapy he received, including the cost of transportation?

In light of the determination that STUDENT was ineligible for special education in October 2001 and was not entitled to vision therapy as a related service at that time, he is not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of vision therapy he received from fall 2001 to spring 2002.

ORDER

1. Petitioner did not meet the eligibility criteria for special education and related services as a student with a special learning disability as of October 18, 2001.

2. Within twenty calendar days of the date of this Decision, Petitioner shall submit to the District proof of the cost of the September 2001 developmental vision assessment by Susan Daniel, O.D. Within twenty-five calendar days of receipt of proof, the District shall reimburse Petitioner for the cost of the assessment.

3. All of Petitioner’s other claims for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to California Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

Respondent prevailed on the following issues:

Issue 1, except to the limited extent that Petitioner was awarded reimbursement for the vision assessment by Susan Daniel, O.D.; Issue 2; and Issue 3.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. California Education Code § 56505(i).

Dated: July 18, 2002 ____________________________________ Judy Hirano, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. Petitioner argued that although his spring 2002 IQ scores likely remained constant and reflected his IQ in fall 2001, his spring academic achievement scores did not necessarily reflect his fall educational performance. The Hearing Officer stated that he could make that argument and present supporting evidence.

2. The issues have been clarified to facilitate the analysis. On the first day of hearing, Petitioner made clear that a sub-issue related to the eligibility issue was the District’s failure to assess areas such as cognitive ability and academic achievement during the initial assessment period which ended in October 2001. Petitioner also requested reimbursement for costs incurred related to the hearing such as loss of income, communication costs, and babysitting expense. However, the Hearing Officer lacks the authority to award reimbursement for such costs.

3. Dr. Daniel also suggested that STUDENT sit at the front of the classroom, use a sloping work surface, do minimal board-to-desk copying, and follow the line of print with his finger when reading.

4. According to APE specialist Mr. Barry, an SST referral addresses a student’s problems within the regular education classroom. Ms. Collins testified that dysgraphia is learning-related problems with regard to writing.

5. The September 27, 2001 meeting did not appear to be an IEP meeting, as it was called, because no assessment for a special education eligibility category had been completed at that time.

6. Mr. Miyashiro developed a goal that STUDENT be able to print the alphabet in the upper and lower case using correct letter formation and size and a dynamic tripod grasp with 90 percent accuracy in 5 out of 5 trials.

7. In a November 20, 2001 memo to school psychologist Dr. Stiavelli, the mother also consented to two achievement tests and indicated that he could contact Ms. Martinez regarding the prior VMI testing.

8. An April 11, 2002 California Department of Education (CDE) compliance report found the District to be out of compliance regarding allegations of a failure to obtain prior written consent before conducting an assessment and a failure to include a regular education teacher in the IEP team. The District was found to be in compliance regarding the allegation of a failure to provide the required written notice before initiating, changing, modifying, or denying services, and there was insufficient evidence of a failure to ensure parental participation in the IEP process. It is noted that a CDE compliance report’s findings and conclusions do not have collateral estoppel or res judicata effect in a due process hearing. Following a complaint investigation, a party may still pursue a due process hearing on the same issues, and the hearing decision will prevail over a conflicting compliance report determination. Lucht v. Molalla River School Dist., 57 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1065 (D. Ore. 1999) (discussing OSEP policy letter); see SEHO Order, Fremont Unified School Dist. v. Student, Nos. SN 793-00/1770-00 (Nov. 13, 2000).

9. The academic ratings are 1, below basic (beginning understanding and skills); 2, basic (approaching grade-level standard); 3, proficient (meets grade-level standard); and 4, advanced (exceeds grade-level standard).

10. STUDENT’S WJ-R standard and grade-equivalent scores, respectively, were as follows: Letter-Word Identification, 120, 2.3; Passage Comprehension, 118, 2.5; Calculation, 121, 2.3; Applied Problems, 123, 2.8; Dictation, 120, 2.5; and Written Samples, 110, 1.7. Dr. Stiavelli testified that one-on-one WJ-R administration (in contrast to classroom group testing) could account for the relatively high scores in comparison with STUDENT’Slow first-semester grades. The Burks’ Behavior Rating Scale responses completed by teacher Ms. Collins indicated no serious emotional disability.

11. The appropriateness of the District’s spring 2002 assessment and its determination of STUDENT’Sineligibility for special education at the April 30, 2002 IEP meeting are not at issue in this hearing.

12. Petitioner asserts that the SST notes suggested an assistive technology or OT assessment, and the OT assessment recommended a further sensory evaluation. An OT assessment was in fact completed in October 2001, but its recommendations were not reviewed until the October 18 IEP meeting, so any sensory assessment likely would not have been completed before that time.

13. The first semester ran from September 2001 to January 2002. STUDENTstarted the Reading Mastery program in approximately mid-February or early March in the second semester but also continued with the Edmark program. (Testimony of Ms. Collins.)

14. Dr. Stiavelli testified that STUDENT was referred for APE and OT assessments because of a suspected perceptual-motor problem, but he did not know why assessment for an eligibility category was not recommended since establishing eligibility is a prerequisite to receiving special education. On October 31, 2001, the District offered to assess ability, achievement, and VMI but was unable to complete its assessment until spring 2002.

15. This conclusion is supported by the District’s due process filing to “complete an evaluation” of STUDENT to determine eligibility for special education. In a February 2002 Decision finding that the District had the right to complete its assessment, the Hearing Officer noted that the District’s assessment thus far (in the “areas of APE, [OT], and a review of health history”) was “very limited” and “not comprehensive.” (Dist. Exh. 10.)

16. According to Dr. Stiavelli, the perceptual-motor area was an area of suspected disability. He did not assess further in the visual area because STUDENT obtained an average VMI score, APE specialist Mr. Barry reported no perceptual-motor problem, and the teacher reported satisfactory classroom performance. (See Dist. Exh. 4.) In spring 2002, the District assessed visual-motor integration but not visual perceptual skills or a visual processing problem that did not affect the motor area. (District Exhs. 3, 12; Testimony of Dr. Stiavelli.)

17. It does not appear that any regulations define a qualified specialist. However, the definition of “qualified” is that “a person has met federal and state certification, licensing, registration, or other comparable requirements which apply to the area in which he or she is providing special education or related services . . . and adheres to the standards of professional practice established in federal and state law or regulation, including . . . the California Business and Professions Code.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3001(y).

18. Although Petitioner did not specifically mention reimbursement for the cost of the vision assessment, he sought reimbursement for “all [incurred] vision therapy expenses,” which would include cost of the assessment. (Pet. Exh. 14.)

19. When standardized tests are considered valid for a student, a severe discrepancy can be demonstrated by computing the difference between a student’s ability and achievement test standard scores. The required difference for a severe discrepancy has commonly been interpreted to be at least 22.5 points, adjusted by one standard error of measurement not to exceed 4 common standard score points, or between 18.5 to 26.5 points. A severe discrepancy exists when the computed difference in scores “is corroborated by other assessment data which may include other tests, scales, instruments, observations and work samples, as appropriate.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(A).

20. Petitioner argues that the testimony of Ms. Schwander, his teacher in Switzerland, and summer school teacher Ms. Thomason revealed his low achievement in reading and writing, compared to his average IQ. Dr. Stiavelli acknowledged that STUDENT’Sspring 2002 achievement scores likely did not reflect his achievement in the fall because some growth would be expected.

21. Petitioner argues that any improvement was due to the vision therapy he received. Ms. Hoffman testified that the vision therapy contributed to his improvement in classroom performance but acknowledged that the progress could also be attributed in part to his teacher and tutor working with him on reading.

22. The Hearing Officer makes no determination as to the specific amount of time the District would have to attempt to ameliorate problems in educational performance within the regular education classroom.