California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · April 18, 2003

Student v. San Mateo-Foster City School District

SEHO Case No. SN 2682-02 · Hearing Officer Michael F. Geary

San Mateo-Foster City School District must fund Charles Armstrong School tuition after its October 2002 IEP denied FAPE; earlier claims denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 4 of 10 issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

None stated.

Summary

The parents of a 14-year-old eighth grader filed for due process against San Mateo-Foster City School District. The student left the District after third grade in 1998 and later enrolled at Charles Armstrong School, a nonpublic school for students with learning disabilities. In 1997, the District had found him not eligible. After the parents asked for reassessment in April 2002, the IEP team met on October 23, 2002. It found him eligible as other health impaired due to attention deficit disorder. It offered general education with accommodations and one daily period of resource specialist services. The Hearing Officer barred claims before November 27, 1999, under the three-year statute of limitations. He also dismissed the Section 504 and civil rights claims for lack of jurisdiction. He found the District failed its general child-find duty because the SELPA did not send its private-school notices to Charles Armstrong. He awarded nothing for that failure because the parents had known their rights since 1997 and chose private school. The District had assessed in all suspected areas. The student did not qualify under specific learning disability because no severe discrepancy existed. However, the October 2002 IEP denied FAPE. Its two goals did not cover all of his needs, including attention. It also lacked present levels of performance and a plan for his transition back to public school. The District must reimburse tuition from October 24, 2002, and pay Charles Armstrong directly through the end of 2002-2003. Compensatory education was denied.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO treated students whose parents placed them in private school. The Hearing Officer held that a district need not offer an IEP to every such student. Once parents show genuine interest in a public placement and the district makes an offer, that offer can be reviewed. The decision also separates a child-find failure from compensable harm.

Issues and holdings

  1. Issue Preliminary 1. District motion to dismiss all claims accruing before November 27, 1999, under the three-year statute of limitations (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(j)).

    Parents knew or had reason to know the underlying facts by the 1997 assessment and IEP, and received procedural safeguards notices; claims before November 27, 1999 are barred.

  2. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Preliminary 2. District motion to dismiss claims alleging violation of civil rights and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for lack of Hearing Office jurisdiction.

    The Hearing Office has jurisdiction only over IDEA claims; civil rights and Section 504 claims were dismissed.

  3. Student prevailedChild find

    Issue 1. Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002?

    The District did not show it met its general child-find duty because the SELPA's private-school notices were not sent to Charles Armstrong School and similar nonpublic schools serving many students with disabilities.

  4. Issue 2. If the District did not fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002, is STUDENT entitled to an award of compensatory education and are his parents entitled to tuition reimbursement?

    No causal link between the child-find failure and harm: parents had notice of their rights since 1997 and chose to keep the student in private school, so no compensatory education or reimbursement.

  5. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 3. Did the District assess the Petitioner in all areas related to his suspected disability prior to the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002?

    No evidence suggested a speech-language need, and the District assessed auditory processing with the TAPS-R, which Student's own expert relied on.

  6. District prevailedEligibility

    Issue 4. Should the Petitioner have been found eligible for special education on the basis of a specific learning disability at the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002?

    Using the District's IQ score of 110, only spelling was severely discrepant; no severe discrepancy existed, and the student's needs were to be met regardless of category.

  7. Student prevailedIEP content

    Issue 5. Did the District offer a FAPE to the Petitioner at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting?

    Parents showed genuine interest in a public placement, so the offer was reviewable; the IEP was substantively deficient: its two goals did not address all needs (including attention), and it lacked present levels and a transition plan back to public school. Procedural claims were not reached.

  8. Issue 6. Are Petitioner's parents entitled to reimbursement for tuition expenses incurred for Petitioner's education after October 23, 2002?

    The District conceded Charles Armstrong School met the student's needs; parents reasonably rejected the offer and are reimbursed for tuition from October 24, 2002 through the decision date.

  9. Student prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 7. Is Petitioner entitled to a prospective placement at Charles Armstrong School for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year?

    Too little time remained in the school year to fix the IEP and transition the student, so the District must fund Charles Armstrong School through the end of 2002-2003.

  10. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 8. Is Petitioner entitled to an award of compensatory education for the District's failure to offer a FAPE on October 23, 2002?

    Prospective placement at Charles Armstrong School gives all the relief owed; compensatory education was denied.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. District shall reimburse parents for all amounts paid or owed to Charles Armstrong School for tuition from October 24, 2002 through the date of the Decision, within 15 calendar days of the District's receipt of evidence of payment or obligation.
  • Prospective funding of private placement. District shall pay Charles Armstrong School directly for all tuition due, not covered by the reimbursement order, from the date of the Decision through the end of the regular 2002-2003 school year.

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Key authorities

Rowley; Union School Dist. v. Smith; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ.; Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter; Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist.; Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist.; Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ.; W.G. v. Target Range Sch. Dist.; Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.; OSEP Policy Letter to Champagne (1995); Letter to Miller (1997)

People named in the decision

  • Andrea Shore (also spelled Shor), educational therapist; private assessor and tutor, Peninsula Educational Services
  • Linda Garcia-Shea, school psychologist, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Dorothy Andrews, resource specialist; achievement assessor, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Jim Cox, director of student services, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Jeffrey Bruno, Ph.D., private psychologist; expert witness for Student, Family and Community Enrichment Services, Inc. (FACES)
  • Katherine Eng, Ph.D., private psychologist (independent assessment), Family and Community Enrichment Services, Inc. (FACES)
  • Amy Zerges, educational consultant; independent assessor and expert witness for Student, formerly with FACES
  • Lynn Mason, school counselor, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Mary Stewart-Oliver, sixth grade teacher at nonpublic school, Charles Armstrong School
  • Rosalie Whitlock, chief executive officer / chief administrator of nonpublic school, Charles Armstrong School
  • Cara Gervang, teacher, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Wesley Cedros, former school psychologist; psychological assessor, San Mateo-Foster City School District
  • Pamela Ptacek, SELPA administrator, San Mateo County SELPA
  • Sheila Snyder, Ph.D., private clinical psychologist (1998 evaluation)
  • Charles Armstrong School, certified nonpublic school (student's placement)
  • Family and Community Enrichment Services, Inc. (FACES), private assessment agency
  • Peninsula Educational Services, private educational therapy provider
  • North Peninsula Jewish Day School, private school (fourth grade)

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in San Mateo, California, on March 4, 5, and 6, 2003.

Petitioner STUDENT (Petitioner or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Tania Whiteleather. One or both of STUDENT’s parents, Mr. PARENT and Ms. PARENT, were also present during the hearing. Respondent San Mateo-Foster City School District (Respondent or District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Diane Finkelstein. Jim Cox, the District’s director of student services, was also present at the hearing.

Petitioner called the following witnesses: Andrea Shore, an educational therapist; Linda Garcia-Shea, a District psychologist; Dorothy Andrews, a District resource specialist; Jim Cox; Jeffrey Bruno, Ph.D., a private psychologist; Lynn Mason, a District school counselor; Mary Stewart-Oliver, STUDENT’s sixth grade teacher at the Petitioner’s current nonpublic school (NPS), Charles Armstrong School (CAS); Rosalie Whitlock, the chief executive officer of the NPS; Cara Gervang, a District teacher; Wesley Cedros, a former District psychologist; and Amy Zerges, an educational consultant.

The District called Mr. Cox and Pamela Ptacek, administrator for the San Mateo County special education local plan area (SELPA). It also examined witnesses called by the Petitioner.

The oral and documentary evidence was presented at the hearing. Written closing arguments of the parties were received, and the record was closed on March 21, 2003.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Issues Raised by the District’s Motion to Dismiss

Before opening statements or the taking of any testimony, the District moved to dismiss on several grounds. Those grounds were as follows: 1) the effect of the three-year statute of limitations on Petitioner’s claims; 2) the District’s limited child-find obligation to private school students; 3) the limited rights afforded to private school students by special education laws; and 4) the lack of Hearing Office jurisdiction over claims not specifically based on alleged violations of special education law.

(1) Statute of Limitations

The request for due process was filed in this matter on November 27, 2002. Among other things, Petitioner alleged that the District had denied a him a free, appropriate public education (FAPE) by failing to properly assess and find him eligible for special education and provide him with an appropriate educational program during the 1997-1998 and later school years. The District requested a dismissal of all claims that accrued before November 27, 1999, on the ground that such claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The Petitioner asserted that the statute of limitation does not bar the claims because the District failed to adequately inform the Petitioner and his parents of their legal rights. He further asserted that he had not known the pertinent facts underlying his claim, including the nature of his disability and the effect it had on his learning, until October or November 1999.

A request for a due process hearing must be filed within three years from the date the party initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for the request. Cal Educ. Code § 56505(j).

The Hearing Officer conducted a preliminary evidentiary inquiry regarding the Petitioner’s knowledge of pertinent facts. Because the motion was potentially dispositive of a significant part of the case but did not go to the merits of the Petitioner’s claims, the Hearing Officer ordered the parties to offer evidence of when the Petitioner’s parents knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the claim.

According to the testimony of both of STUDENT’s parents, they knew that STUDENT was having what they believed were significant challenges in school before the District’s assessments in May 1997. The District’s documents showed that the District sent STUDENT’s parents information about the referral for assessment as early as April 17, 1997 and again in early May 1997. Those documents explained that the assessment was to be done to determine whether or not STUDENT needed special education and related services. The documents included a summary of the procedural safeguards. Among the described safeguards were their right to request an independent assessment and to present information regarding an independent assessment in person at an individualized education plan (IEP) meeting or in writing, and their right to request a mediation and/or a due process hearing if they disagreed with the District’s decision regarding eligibility. The same disclosure was included on the assessment plan and the IEP document, both of which were signed by Mr. PARENT. Mr. PARENT, an attorney, testified that he had no recollection of reading these documents.

The Hearing Officer found that STUDENT’s parents knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the claim at and before the time they were informed that STUDENT was not eligible for special education and related services. As early as 1997, they were aware of the difficulties STUDENT was having in school and that the District assessed him in an attempt to determine whether he needed special education services. They were or should have been aware of their right to actively participate in the process having been given a written summary of their procedural rights as early as the time of the initial referral for assessment in May 1977. They were informed in writing of STUDENT’s right to request independent assessments if they disagreed with the assessments conducted by the District. Mr. PARENT, at least, understood that the District members of the IEP team concluded that STUDENT was not eligible for special education. He was informed of STUDENT’s right to request mediation and/or a due process hearing if the parents disagreed with the District’s decision at the IEP meeting. The PARENTs did nothing to preserve STUDENT’s rights.

The Hearing Officer concluded that the three-year statute of limitations barred those claims that accrued before November 27, 1999.

(2) Child-find Obligation to Private School Students

The District asked for a dismissal of Petitioner’s “child find” claims that pertained to events that occurred before Petitioner actually returned to the District in April 2002 to request another assessment. This motion was made on the ground that the District had no continuing obligation to seek out and assess the Petitioner between the date of his unilateral withdrawal from the District placement at the end of the 1997-1998 school year and the date of his return in April 2002 to request reassessment. The Petitioner argued that the District had a continuing duty to conduct child find and that the evidence would show that this duty was breached to the Petitioner’s damage.

All individuals with disabilities who are in need of special education, including those attending private schools, must be identified, located, and assessed as required by the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). The District has the obligation to establish and implement policies and procedures for a continuous child-find system. Cal. Educ. Code § 56301.

The Hearing Officer found that the 1997 denial of STUDENT’s eligibility for special education did not relieve the District of its general child-find obligation. Because the Petitioner’s child find claim, to the extent not barred by the statute of limitations, raised issues of fact that required the taking of evidence at the hearing, the motion was denied.

(3) Limited Rights of Private School Students

The District sought a dismissal of the claim that it had denied the Petitioner a FAPE for the current school year. This motion was based on the ground that the Petitioner was a private school student and had not sought a public school placement for the current school year. The District argued that the PARENTs had no genuine interest in a public school placement for STUDENT in connection with the 2002 assessment and that they planned to keep STUDENT at CAS. It contended that the PARENTs were interested only in a possible placement for the ninth-grade year after STUDENT graduated from CAS.(Footnote 1) The Petitioner argued that he had sought an appropriate public school placement from the District for the current school year.

The Hearing Officer concluded that there were significant questions of fact concerning the intentions of the parties and other matters that required the presentation of evidence at the hearing. On that basis, the motion was denied.

(4) Civil Rights and Section 504 Claims

The District requested dismissal of the claims based upon an alleged violation of Petitioner’s civil rights or his rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) on the ground that the Hearing Office does not have jurisdiction over those claims.(Footnote 2) Petitioner countered that he is required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action for violation of his civil rights and those guaranteed by Section 504. Petitioner alleged that because there is no administrative remedy reasonably available to the Petitioner before any other forum, he sought redress in this hearing.

The Hearing Office has consistently held that it does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes other than the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). (See, e,g., STUDENT v. Hacienda La Puente Unified School District, (1997) 27 IDELR 885; STUDENT v. Capistrano Unified School District, (1999) SN 686-99.) The IDEA provides that each state, in return for receiving federal funds under the Act, must establish a system of special education due process hearings. (20 U.S.C. § 1415.) The purpose of the hearings is to resolve disputes arising under the IDEA with regard to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free, appropriate education to a child. Id.; California Education Code § 56501 (a). The Hearing Office has jurisdiction only to hear claims under the IDEA.

The Hearing Officer concluded that he does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Petitioner’s claims alleging violation of his civil rights and the rights guaranteed by Section 504. The District’s motion to dismiss those issues was granted.

Petitioner’s Motion for Nonsuit

Following opening statements by the parties, but before the presentation of any evidence, Mr. PARENT made what amounted to a motion for nonsuit. He argued that the District had not described sufficient evidence in its opening statement to carry its burden to show that it had complied with the procedural and substantive requirements of the IDEA and that Petitioner was, therefore, entitled to findings in his favor. The District opposed the motion.

The Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to special education due process proceedings, and there is no provision of applicable law that authorizes the kind of summary determination sought by the Petitioner. The Respondent was not required to refer in its opening statement to every fact that it intended to prove. It was apparent to the Hearing Officer that there were issues of fact to be decided and that those required the presentation of evidence at hearing. The Petitioner’s motion was denied.

ISSUES (Footnote 3)

1. Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002?

2. If the District did not fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002, is STUDENT entitled to an award of compensatory education and are his parents entitled to tuition reimbursement?

3. Did the District assess the Petitioner in all areas related to his suspected disability prior to the individualized education plan (IEP) meeting on October 23, 2002?

4. Should the Petitioner have been found eligible for special education on the basis of a specific learning disability at the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002?

5. Did the District offer a FAPE to the Petitioner at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting?

6. Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for tuition expenses incurred for Petitioner’s education after October 23, 2002?

7. Is Petitioner entitled to a prospective placement at Charles Armstrong School (CAS) for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year?(Footnote 4)

8. Is Petitioner entitled to an award of compensatory education for the District’s failure to offer a FAPE on October 23, 2002?

BACKGROUND

STUDENT is fourteen years old. He lives with his parents, Mr. and Ms. PARENT, within the geographical boundaries of the District. Since October 2002, STUDENT has been identified as eligible for special education in a District placement under the category “other health impairment” (OHI) due to an attention deficit disorder (ADD). However, he has not been in a District placement since the end of his third grade year in 1997. Since withdrawal from a District placement, STUDENT has been enrolled in private schools, first the North Peninsula Jewish Day School (JDS) for fourth grade, and since then at CAS. CAS is described as a first- through eighth-grade college preparatory school specifically for students with learning disabilities. It follows the Slingerland methodologies, which includes the repetitive and cumulative delivery of information to the students through multisensory channels in a highly structured environment. STUDENT will be going to high school in the 2003-2004 school year.

STUDENT began to have some difficulties at school as early as the first grade (1995-1996 school year). His progress report indicated that he frequently did work of high quality but he had some difficulty, at least early in the school year, following directions, staying focused, and taking responsibility for completing his work. He finished that year at grade-level expectations in reading and slightly behind that mark in speaking/listening and writing.

STUDENT’s difficulties persisted in the second grade (1996-1997 school year). In addition to the problems with attention, behavior issues were emerging. STUDENT was aggressive toward other children. In 1997, STUDENT’s second-grade teacher referred him for a special education assessment. She was concerned about his apparent lack of motivation, his general level of academic achievement, and his difficulty sustaining attention, following directions, and timely completing school work. She was also particularly concerned about his aggressive behavior. The assessment was completed with the consent of STUDENT’s parents in May 1997. The results demonstrated that STUDENT was a child with average intelligence. His full-scale intelligence quotient (I.Q.) score on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-III (WISC-III) was 97, in the forty-second percentile. Scores from the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT) and other tests led the assessor to conclude that STUDENT did not qualify for special education.

At an IEP meeting on May 27, 1997, the District members of the IEP team agreed that STUDENT did not qualify for special education. Mr. PARENT was present at the IEP meeting but neither agreed nor disagreed with that determination. STUDENT’s parents had been advised in writing that they could request an independent assessment and present the results of that assessment or other information to the IEP team. They were also told that they could request mediation or a due process hearing if they disagreed with the eligibility determination. They did not pursue these procedural safeguards.

In spite of some continuing struggles, STUDENT finished second grade meeting the grade-level expectations in all areas. He returned to the District school for third grade in the 1997-1998 school year. His difficulties with attention, timely completion of work, and behavior continued. Nevertheless, he finished the year at grade-level expectations in reading and slightly below that level in speaking/listening and writing. STUDENT’s parents remained pessimistic about the ability of the District to meet the academic and emotional needs of their son. They decided to remove him from the District placement at the end of his third-grade year and enroll him in fourth grade at the JDS.

The PARENTs’ concerns about STUDENT’s motivation and progress persisted during his year at JDS. At the recommendation of his fourth-grade teacher, STUDENT was taken to educational therapist Andrea Shor of Peninsula Educational Services in late October 1998 for assessment and advice. On the basis of her assessment, Ms. Shor concluded that STUDENT suffered from severe dyslexia, a slow processing speed, and other difficulties. She recommended that STUDENT be evaluated for nervous tics that she observed during testing and for possible attention deficit disorder (ADD) that might have been affecting his educational progress. She recommended three hours weekly of educational therapy and one-on-one tutoring through her organization and suggested that the parents consider placement at CAS.(Footnote 5) Ms. Shor also suggested that STUDENT’s parents ask for some accommodations at school. Those included unspecified accommodations to address work completion, the development of pre-writing strategies, a behavior management plan to address STUDENT’s motivation to do his work, a study carrel or earplugs to reduce distractions, books on tape, preferential seating, one-on-one modeling for instructions that STUDENT does not understand, and “chunking” assignments (breaking them up into more manageable pieces). There was no consideration given at the time to returning STUDENT to the District. It was Ms. Shor’s understanding that the PARENTs planned to keep STUDENT at the JDS. The District was not advised of Ms. Shor’s assessment or recommendations.

Clinical psychologist Sheila Snyder, Ph.D., evaluated STUDENT in November 1998. She did not testify, but her report is in evidence. Dr. Snyder administered the WISC-III, which produced a full scale I.Q. score of 109. She also administered the Test of Variables of Attention (TOVA), which produced an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ADHD score of –2.86 (–1 to +1 being the normal range). The WISC-III revealed that STUDENT’s pattern of weaknesses was the same as it had been when the District tested him, although his I.Q. score was twelve points higher. Dr. Snyder believed that his profile indicated possible ADD. She described him as “neurologically hyperaroused.” Dr. Snyder found that STUDENT’s TOVA scores suggested ADHD, but Dr. Snyder believed that distractibility, and not hyperactivity, was the main component. The doctor was of the opinion that STUDENT also met the criteria for Tourette’s Disorder on the basis of present and/or past verbal and physical tics. Dr. Snyder recommended that STUDENT undergo a qualitative EEG to identify the areas of STUDENT’s brain that might be over- or under-aroused and counseling to help STUDENT better understand and proactively manage his disorders. She also opined that a behavior intervention plan with appropriate rewards and consequences would help him. The District was not informed about Dr. Snyder’s assessment.

Following the recommendation of Ms. Shor, STUDENT’s parents enrolled him at CAS beginning the with 1999 summer session following his fourth grade year.

There was no significant contact between the PARENTs and the District from the time of STUDENT’s withdrawal from a District school in June 1998 until April 2002. Mr. PARENT explained that between January and March 2002 he attended a seminar on special education presented by an attorney who spoke about parent rights. This information encouraged him to pursue the matter further with the District. One of the first steps he took in furtherance of his plan was to arrange for another private assessment of STUDENT by Family and Community Enrichment Services, Inc. (FACES). Jeffrey Bruno, Ph.D., Katherine Eng, Ph.D., and Amy Zerges conducted that assessment beginning on April 9, 2002.

On April 10, 2002, Mr. PARENT informed the District that STUDENT had been diagnosed with dyslexia and ADD and requested another assessment by the District for special education and Section 504 eligibility. The District responded with an assessment plan that indicated STUDENT would be assessed in the areas of academic achievement, intellectual development, social/adaptive behavior, and psycho-motor development, but not in the area of communication. The assessment plan was signed and returned on May 8, 2002.

Meanwhile, the FACES assessment team administered the Stanford-Binet, 4th Edition (SB-4) to measure STUDENT’s cognitive ability. According to Dr. Bruno, it took an unusually long time for him to complete the various subtests.(Footnote 6) Dr. Bruno believes that allowing STUDENT as much time as he needed resulted in a more accurate measure of his abilities. The test composite score of 117, considered by the doctor to be the best measure of overall intelligence, put STUDENT at the eighty-sixth percentile. FACES also administered the Dyslexia Screening Test (DST), which indicated that STUDENT was not at risk for the disorder. However, Dr. Bruno stated that STUDENT might have used his strong verbal skills to compensate on the DST for his weakness in written language. Amy Zerges administered the Woodcock-Johnson Test of Achievement-III (WJ-III). Several of STUDENT’s standard scores on subtests and clusters were below 95, including his scores on the reading and math fluency, spelling, and letter-word identification subtests and the broad reading, broad written language, math calculation and written expression cluster test scores.(Footnote 7)

Dr. Bruno diagnosed STUDENT with a disorder of written expression that is due primarily to problems with the mechanics of writing, such as spelling and the production of text, and the development of a symbol system. He also believed that STUDENT had a weakness in the area of auditory processing and a slow processing speed. In his opinion, these latter findings warranted a diagnosis of learning disorder, not otherwise specified.(Footnote 8) Doctor Bruno made a number of recommendations, among them regular “student-led” parent-teacher conferences, weekly progress reports, extra time to do work, preferential seating, modeling of the more complex instructions/tasks, assistance with structuring complex tasks, a structured and consistent schedule, and regular positive feedback.

Ms. Zerges prepared her own report with findings and recommendations.(Footnote 9) She believed that STUDENT had a relative weakness in the area of auditory processing, as evidenced by his difficulties remembering abstract or unrelated arbitrary information. She also agreed with Dr. Bruno’s opinion that STUDENT needed some assistance with written expression and fluency in all areas. Among her recommendations were that STUDENT be provided the Lindamood Bell (LmB) Visualization-Verbalization program, phonetic multi-sensory strategies, such as the Slingerland techniques or the LmB phoneme sequencing (LiPS) and symbol imagery programs, the use of organizational and reminder strategies, and additional assistance with reading, writing, and math.

During the time that FACES was conducting its independent assessments of STUDENT, the District was also trying to conduct its assessment. The District’s psychologist, Wesley Cedros, conducted the psychological part of the District’s assessment on June 11, 2002. Using the Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-BIT), Mr. Cedros reported an I.Q. score of 110. On the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills, Revised (TAPS-R), STUDENT demonstrated some weakness (eighteenth percentile) on the auditory number memory-forward subtest but performed in the average range or better on all others. A District resource specialist, Dorothy Andrews, administered the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test (WIAT), on September 24, 2002. Only STUDENT’s spelling score (80) was severely discrepant when compared to his I.Q. score of 110.

Mr. PARENT asked that an IEP meeting be scheduled for October 23, 2002, to discuss the assessment results. A notice of that IEP meeting was sent to Mr. PARENT via facsimile on October 22, 2002. It stated that the purpose of the meeting was to “review the private school plan.” The IEP meeting was convened on October 23, 2002. Mr. and Ms. PARENT were present with an advocate and Ms. Zerges. They also had arranged for the attendance of the head counselor at CAS, who was knowledgeable regarding STUDENT’s performance at CAS. Mr. Cox, a general education teacher, and a school psychologist also were present.(Footnote 10)

The purpose of the IEP meeting is described in the IEP narrative in terms consistent with the notice. It states that STUDENT’s parents planned for him to finish the eighth grade at CAS and that they were interested in a possible enrollment in a District high school the following year. The IEP team agreed that STUDENT was qualified for special education under the category OHI because of his ADD. Ms. Zerges argued that STUDENT also should be found eligible under the category “specific learning disability” (SLD), but the District members of the team disagreed.

The District members of the team found that STUDENT’s difficulties with attention and sequential auditory memory required the services of the resource specialist program (RSP) as well as accommodations and modifications in the regular classroom. In spite of the meeting’s stated purpose of addressing a private school plan and STUDENT’s 2003-2004 school year, the District offered a special education placement for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year with thirteen accommodations or modifications in the regular classroom and one period per day (220 minutes per week) of RSP services. Goals were written in two areas: written expression and assignment completion. The IEP also contained what Mr. Cox characterized as a private school plan, which consisted of a statement that STUDENT would be provided with services to the extent of his proportionate share of funding pursuant to Part B of the IDEA. STUDENT’s parents expressed their dissatisfaction, starting with what they believed was the District’s failure to adequately serve the needs of their son in 1997. They refused to accept the District’s proposed IEP and requested reimbursement for tuition costs for the previous three years and District funding for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year at CAS. The District declined both requests.

STUDENT has continued to attend CAS since the IEP meeting. He requested this due process hearing on November 27, 2002.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002?

The Petitioner alleges that the District failed to fulfill its obligation to timely identify him as a child who required special education services. The District asserts that it fulfilled its general child-find obligation and that it had no additional obligation to STUDENT, who had been removed from a District setting in 1998 and not returned for reconsideration of eligibility and services until April 2002.

The IDEA, as amended in 1997, and State law impose upon each school district the duty to actively and systematically identify, locate, and assess all children with disabilities, including children with disabilities who are not enrolled in a public school program, who require special education services. 20 U.S.C. § (a)(10)(A)(ii) (formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C)); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56171, 56300, and 56301. Under State law, the school district must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child-find system. Cal. Educ. Code § 56301. The policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of their rights and the procedure for initiating a referral for assessment. Id. Identification procedures shall include systematic methods of referrals of students by teachers, parents, agencies, appropriate professional persons, and members of the public. Cal. Educ. Code § 56302.

The District offered little evidence of how it fulfilled its general child-find obligation. Mr. Cox testified that the SELPA assisted the District (and twenty-three other school district members) to fulfill child-find responsibilities by posting notices in newspapers, sending approximately 250 notices to private schools, and distributing brochures to the offices of doctors and others that serve the disabled population of school-aged children. Pamela Ptacek, administrator for the San Mateo County SELPA, confirmed most of Mr. Cox’s testimony. However, she clarified that the notices to private schools were not sent to CAS, as Mr. Cox had believed. She explained that the SELPA does not send such notices to certified nonpublic schools, such as CAS, because these institutions function primarily to serve children with disabilities. The SELPA believes that the administration and staff of such schools are aware of the benefits and protections afforded by the IDEA and State special education law and therefore need not receive the notice.(Footnote 11) In addition to the published and mailed notices, informational notices are provided to hospitals and medical professionals that are likely to serve disabled children.

Rosalie Whitlock, the chief administrator of CAS, also provided testimony on this issue. Ms. Whitlock testified that at least twelve students in her school were placed there and funded by public school districts, so it was clear that at least some administrators, staff, and teachers who implement the IEPs for those students are aware of the availability of assessments and services through public school districts. Nevertheless, roughly ninety-five percent of the two hundred thirty-one students at CAS are privately funded. There was no evidence that CAS ever informed parents regarding the procedure for initiating a referral for a special education assessment by their public school districts or that it ever referred a student for such an initial assessment. Ms. Whitlock testified that such matters are simply not discussed between the school and the parents, though she suspected that the parents discussed such matters among themselves. However, she said that if she had received the notice sent by the SELPA to private schools, she would have passed it along to all the parents.

According to Cal. Educ Code § 56302, one of the goals of the required notification procedures is to inform parents.(Footnote 12) The Hearing Officer finds that publication of a notice in a newspaper of general circulation is a reasonable step toward that goal, though not necessarily sufficient in and of itself to satisfy the child-find obligation. There was no testimony regarding why notices were sent to private schools other than certified NPSs. The logical inference is that the notices were intended to inform administration and staff of those schools that they should notify the appropriate district if they suspected that one of their students had a disability and required special education. The Hearing Officer finds that notification mailed to private schools is reasonably calculated to further the child-find objective. However, having made the determination that such notification to private schools was appropriate, the District’s decision not to send the notices to CAS and other similar schools that serve a substantial population of “disabled” children was not reasonably calculated to further the child-find objective.(Footnote 13) Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District failed to show that it properly fulfilled its general child-find obligation between November 27, 1999 and October 23, 2002.

Issue No. 2: If the District did not fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002, is STUDENT entitled to an award of compensatory education and are his parents entitled to tuition reimbursement?

Although the District failed to fulfill its general child-find obligation, the Hearing Officer finds that this failure did not cause a compensable loss to STUDENT or his parents. The evidence established that STUDENT’s parents had been or should have been aware of the procedures for initiating a referral for a special education assessment since May 1997. STUDENT and his parents had been through the referral and assessment process. On more than one occasion, Mr. and Ms. PARENT had been given a written summary of the rights and procedural protections afforded them by the IDEA and State special education law. They chose not to request an independent assessment, mediation, or due process hearing in connection with the eligibility determination in 1997. Mr. PARENT testified that he did not learn until 2002 that it might be possible to secure public funding for STUDENT’s continued placement at CAS. The Hearing Officer is aware of no requirement that this information be communicated as part of the child-find effort.

There was evidence that STUDENT’s parents were dissatisfied with the way that STUDENT was treated by the District and made a conscious and informed decision not to seek further assessment or consideration from the District. Mr. PARENT was particularly critical of the principal of STUDENT’s former school. He also was unhappy that STUDENT had not been found eligible for special education in 1997 and became increasingly concerned that his son’s needs had not been met. These concerns led to STUDENT’s withdrawal from the District school and enrollment at private school. Even after Ms. Shor, Dr. Snyder and others had assessed STUDENT at the parents’ request and informed the PARENTs that STUDENT met the criteria for Tourette’s syndrome, ADD/ADHD, dyslexia, and possibly other disorders, the PARENTs chose not to return to the District with this information. Ms. Shor testified that she understood, obviously from Mr. or Ms. PARENT, that STUDENT’s parents simply preferred to keep him in private school. The evidence as a whole supports the conclusion that this was their intent and that their preference had nothing to do with a lack of understanding of their rights.

The Hearing Officer finds that, regardless of the District’s imperfect efforts to search out and serve children with disabilities, the PARENTs had adequate notice of their rights. They simply preferred to keep STUDENT in the private and nonpublic schools of their choice because they believed he was better served there. There is no causal connection between the District’s failure to fulfill its general child-find obligation and the decision of STUDENT’s parents not to return him to the District for another assessment.

The Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT is not entitled to an award of compensatory education and are his parents entitled to tuition reimbursement for the District's failure to fulfill its general child-find obligation between November 27, 1999 and October 23, 2002.

Issue No. 3: Did the District assess the Petitioner in all areas related to his suspected disability prior to the individualized education plan (IEP) meeting on October 23, 2002?

The Petitioner contends that the District failed to assess him in all areas related to his suspected disability when he returned for reassessment in April 2002. He specifically alleges that he was not properly assessed in the areas of speech and language and auditory processing.(Footnote 14) The District asserts that it properly assessed STUDENT in 2002.

The law requires that a student be assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability. If appropriate, assessment must include health and development, language function, general ability, academic performance, and social and emotional status. Calif. Educ. Code § 56320(f). The purpose of the assessment is to gather all relevant information that will assist the IEP team to identify the student as a child with a disability and to provide the team with the information it will need to develop an appropriate individualized education program. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (b)(2)(A). The persons conducting the assessment should select tests and other assessment tools to assess specific areas of educational need and not just to provide a single general IQ score. Calif. Educ. Code § 56320(c).

Speech and Language

When Mr. PARENT asked the District to reassess STUDENT in April 2002, he explained that his son had been diagnosed with ADD and dyslexia. There was no indication that STUDENT had any difficulty that required a speech and language assessment. The assessment plan that was signed by Mr. PARENT provided that STUDENT was to be assessed in the areas of academic achievement, intellectual development, social/adaptive behavior, and psycho-motor development. It indicated that STUDENT would not be assessed in the area of communication development. None of the Petitioner’s experts identified any specific speech and language deficit or testified that the District should have identified one. Nor did any of Petitioner’s experts recommend that STUDENT should receive speech and language therapy. In short, there was no evidence to suggest that STUDENT should have been assessed in the area of speech and language. It appears to the Hearing Officer that the only reason this was raised as an issue was that Dorothy Andrews stated in her assessment summary that STUDENT’s oral language was “age/grade appropriate.” The Petitioner argued that this determination had no valid basis. In fact, it has no significance to the issues presented. The Hearing Officer finds that the District’s failure to perform a formal speech and language assessment of STUDENT did not render its assessment deficient.

Auditory Processing

Wesley Cedros , formerly a psychologist for the District, administered the Test of Auditory Perceptual Skills, Revised (TAPS-R) as part of the District’s assessment. The Petitioner did not dispute the appropriateness of the District’s reliance on this test. On the contrary, Ms. Zerges, one of STUDENT’s own experts, also relied on the results of Mr. Cedros’s TAPS-R as part of her independent assessment. She testified that, in her opinion, those scores were valid. The Hearing Officer finds that the District did assess STUDENT in 2002 in the area of auditory processing.

The Hearing Officer finds that the District assessed the Petitioner in all areas related to his suspected disability prior to the individualized education plan (IEP) meeting on October 23, 2002.

Issue No. 4: Should the Petitioner have been found eligible for special education on the basis of a specific learning disability at the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002?

The IEP team found that STUDENT was eligible for special education on the basis of an OHI (ADD) at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting. The Petitioner contends that he should also have been found eligible on the basis of an SLD. The District denies that such a finding was necessary or appropriate.

The IDEA defines “specific learning disability” as a “disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in a imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26). Four requirements must be met in order to satisfy eligibility criteria for a specific learning disability. The first three requirements are set out in Cal. Educ. Code Section 56337. First, there must be a severe discrepancy between the intellectual ability and achievement in oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skills, reading comprehension, mathematics calculation, or mathematics reasoning. Second, the discrepancy must be due to a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes and not the result of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages. Basic psychological processes include attention, visual processing, auditory processing, sensory-motor skills, cognitive abilities including association, conceptualization, and expression. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030 (j)(1). Third, the discrepancy must not be correctable through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instructional program. In addition to these, there is a fourth requirement, one that applies to all persons who seek special education services pursuant to the IDEA: that the student requires special education, as opposed to services that can be provided through modifications to or accommodations in the regular school program. Cal Educ. Code § 56026(b); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030.

A severe discrepancy can be established either through a formula using standardized test scores, by alternative means when standardized tests are considered invalid, or through a determination by an IEP team that such a discrepancy exists. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(4)(A) – (C). When the required severe discrepancy between ability and achievement is to be established through valid, standardized tests, the comparison must be of common standard scores, using a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of fifteen. A difference equal to or greater than one and one-half standard deviations, adjusted by one standard error of measurement, indicates a severe discrepancy when corroborated by other assessment data. The other assessment data may include other tests, scales, instruments, observations, and work samples. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030(j)(A). In determining eligibility, the IEP team “shall take into account all the relevant material which is available on the pupil. No single score or product of scores shall be used as the sole criterion for the decision.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 3030.

According to the District’s assessment results and using Mr. Cedros’s I.Q. measure of 110 for comparison, only the spelling ability score of 80 was severely discrepant from STUDENT’s I.Q. score. The Hearing Officer was not persuaded by Dr. Bruno’s testimony that the I.Q. index score of 117 from the SB-4 was an appropriate measure of STUDENT’s ability for comparison. Mr. Cedros’s results from the KBIT were consistent with those of the Petitioner’s independent assessor, Dr. Snyder, on the WISC-III. Furthermore, Districts and parents commonly rely upon the KBIT and the WISC-III to determine cognitive ability.

It was reasonable for the District members of the IEP team to give little weight to the reported findings of Drs. Bruno and Eng of FACES. The doctors were not present at the IEP meeting. Their report was not presented before or during the meeting.(Footnote 15) The report of Ms. Zerges, their former associate, was presented at the IEP meeting. However, in her report and her testimony, Ms. Zerges deferred to the FACES psychologists, Drs. Bruno and Eng, for opinions regarding I.Q. testing and diagnoses. All that the District had at the time of the October 2002 IEPwas a letter dated September 24, 2002, in which Mr. PARENT informed the District about the test composite I.Q. score of 117 and part of Dr Bruno’s diagnosis. STUDENT’s parents intentionally withheld the report of the findings of those psychologists, just as they had withheld the reports of the other people who had assessed STUDENT between 1997 and 2002. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the District to use the scores obtained by Mr. Cedros and Ms. Andrews.

The Hearing Officer finds that at the time of the October 2002 IEP meeting, the available information supported a finding that the first required element, a severe discrepancy, did not exist. Even after considering the report and testimony of Dr. Bruno, as well as all of the other evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was not eligible for special education under the category SLD.

Regardless of the disability category under which a child qualifies for special education, the placement and services that the student will receive are based on the child’s unique needs and not on his or her disability. 34 C.F.R. § 300.300(a)(3)(ii). The parties do not dispute that STUDENT’s needs were accurately identified in the IEP. Those needs were attention, organization, sequential auditory memory and planning, spelling, and written expression.(Footnote 16) It is of little consequence that Petitioner’s experts might attribute some of these needs to underlying problems with auditory processing, a slow processing speed, or difficulties with development of symbol or coding systems. Having found STUDENT eligible for special education because of his ADD, an IEP for STUDENT would have to meet the statutory requirements.(Footnote 17) Among other requirements, it would have to meet all of STUDENT’s unique needs, including his need for assistance with attention, organization, sequential auditory memory and planning, spelling, and written expression.

Issue No. 5: Did the District offer a FAPE to the Petitioner at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting?

Before addressing the question of whether or not the District offered a FAPE at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting, the Hearing Officer will consider the District’s argument that it was not required to offer a FAPE following its 2002 assessment of STUDENT. The District asserts that the Petitioner’s return for an assessment in April 2002 was motivated by two goals: 1) to find out if STUDENT would qualify for services if he returned to a public high school the following year; and 2) to secure public funding of STUDENT’s continued education at CAS for the 2002-2003 school year. The District argues that it was not required to make an offer of a FAPE to STUDENT because STUDENT’s parents never had a genuine interest in a public school placement for the 2002-2003 school year. The Petitioner claims that the District was required to make an appropriate offer of a FAPE at the October 23, 2003 IEP meeting. He contends that he was presented in good faith for assessment and that if the District had offered him a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year, he would have accepted the offer and returned to an appropriate public school placement. He argues that his decision to reject the District’s offer and remain at CAS was justified because an appropriate offer of a FAPE was not made.

In crafting the laws that govern special education, Congress, and in turn the California Legislature, recognized that parents have the right to choose to educate their children in private schools, but as a matter of policy they placed significant limitations on special education and related rights that would be provided to students enrolled by their parents in private schools. This legislative policy decision resulted in statutes and regulations that treat public school students substantially differently than private school student and provided funding accordingly. (See: 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10); 34 C.F.R. Part 300, Subpart D (§§ 300.400-300.487); Cal. Educ Code, Part 30, Chapter 2, Article 5.6. (§§56170-56177).) Some of these differences will be discussed below.

Private school children are not entitled to the same benefits and protections afforded to children enrolled in public schools. For example, federal regulations provide that private school children with disabilities have no individual right to receive the same special education and related services that they would be entitled to receive if enrolled in a public school. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.454(a) and 300.455(a)(2)-(3). Disabled private school students do not have the due process rights that are guaranteed to public school students. 34 C.F.R. § 300.457. That regulation makes clear that, with the possible exception of child-find and assessment complaints, a private school student who has not been offered special education or related services by the public school district has no right to a due process hearing on a claim that he or she has been denied a FAPE. (See also: OSEP Policy Letter to Champagne (1995) 22 IDELR 1136.) These and other differences are reflected in the funding that has been provided for special education for private school students. Federal and State law provides for a proportionate share of the federal state grant funds to be spent on private school students. However, there is no provision for the use of any of the State’s portion of the funding, which is a significant part of the total funding, for private school students. (See: See: 20 U.S.C. § 1411; 34 C.F.R. § 300.453; Cal. Educ Code § 56173.)

Though the law requires, as discussed above, that public school districts seek out and serve children with disabilities who are enrolled in private schools, the obligation is to actively and systematically identify, locate, and assess all children with disabilities who require special education services. Cal. Educ. Code § 56171.(Footnote 18) The statute does not require that an IEP be developed and offered to the children so assessed. Furthermore, a school district is generally not required to pay for the cost of education, including special education and related services, of a disabled child that attends private school if the district made a FAPE available and the parents elected to place the child in the private school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C); Cal. Educ. Code § 56174. The Hearing Officer does not construe this statute as requiring that every public school district to make a formal offer of placement and services to every disabled child who is attending a private school. Letter to Miller (1997) 25 IDELR 1214; School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 370-371, 105 S.Ct. 1996.

Every IEP must constitute a specific offer of a FAPE. Union School District v. Smith, (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3d 1994, 1524, cert. denied 513 U.S. 965 (1994). To require districts to develop and offer an IEP to every private school student would defeat the whole purpose of the different treatment accorded private school students and place an onerous burden on school districts that are already taxed beyond their means by the demands placed upon them. Once an IEP is developed and offered, the child becomes entitled to rights and protections to which the child would not otherwise be entitled as a private school student. As stated by OSEP in its Policy Letter to Champagne, supra, “However, parents of children parentally-placed in private schools who are dissatisfied with the nature and extent of the services actually offered to their child by the public agency may initiate an impartial due process hearing on these educational placement issues.” (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the statutory scheme that in order for the private school student with no specific entitlement to special education to be treated like a public school student with the rights and protections attendant to that status, there must be some substantial action taken by the parents of the disabled child that can be reasonably and objectively construed as a genuine interest in a public school placement. If and only if such action is taken, the public school district must stand ready to develop and offer an IEP.

It has at least been suggested that the obligation to develop an IEP and provide a FAPE to a private school child should only be triggered by actual re-enrollment of the child in the public school. (See OSEP’s analysis of comments and changes to the final regulations for IDEA ’97 at 64 Fed. Reg. P. 12601.) The Hearing Officer is not convinced re-enrollment is required in every instance. For example, if a district chooses to convene an IEP meeting and offer an IEP during the summer vacation, there would be no reason to require the parents to enroll their child in order to be able to reject the IEP if it is inadequate.(Footnote 19) However, the Hearing Officer is convinced that more than a casual expression of interest in an IEP is necessary to require the district to convene an IEP meeting and make a specific offer of a FAPE. There should at least be a genuine interest in a public school placement and an expression of that interest to the district. If the interest is there, the district should have the obligation to make an offer of a FAPE.

A public school district should not be relieved of its obligation to make an offer of a FAPE simply because the parents believe that their child’s private school placement is the appropriate placement. Although the parents or guardian have a moral obligation to act in good faith when seeking publicly funded services for their disabled child, there is nothing in the IDEA or State special education law that prohibits them from arguing on their child’s behalf that a FAPE requires placement at a private school. However, the parents must still have a genuine interest in a public school placement if that will provide their child with a FAPE.

The question then becomes whether or not the PARENTs had a genuine interest in a public school placement when they returned to the District for assessment in April 2002. Although there was some evidence that they preferred not to return STUDENT to a public school placement for the 2002-2003 school year, there was substantial evidence that they had a genuine intrest in a public school placement. Those indications of interest in fact caused the District to complete the IEP process and develop and offer an IEP for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year. In any event, once the District convened the IEP meeting and made its offer of placement and services for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year, that offer was subject to being accepted by the PARENTs or rejected and later subjected to scrutiny in this due process matter. OSEP Letter to Champagne, supra.

The Petitioner contends that that the District’s offer of a placement and services at the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002 was not an appropriate offer of a FAPE because it was flawed in several respects. Substantively, he alleges that the goals and objectives were not adequate to meet his unique needs, neither of the two goals that were developed were based on reliable present levels of performance, and the goals were not objectively measurable. Petitioner also alleged that the IEP was the result of a process that was procedurally defective. He asserts that the team was not given an adequate report of the achievement testing by Ms. Andrews, that the team failed to give fair consideration to the opinions of the independent assessors, and the District failed to have a teacher from CAS in attendance.(Footnote 20) The District denies the Petitioner’s claims and asserts that the October 2002 IEP was substantively and procedurally appropriate.

A FAPE is special education and related services that are available to a student at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State educational agency, and are provided in conformity with the student’s IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). It includes special education and related services that are designed to meet the child’s unique needs that cannot be met with modification of the regular instructional program. Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. It must enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum and provide the opportunity to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible (often referred to as least restrictive environment or LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.

An appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the student. Seattle School District No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996); Union School District v. Smith, supra, at 1524. Moreover, the focus of the inquiry should not be on whether the student may obtain greater benefit in the placement that is preferred by the parents but, rather, whether the school district’s proposed placement is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the student. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034; Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).

In summary, to be substantively appropriate, an IEP must (1) be designed to meet the student’s unique needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit; (3) conform with the student’s IEP; (4) enable the student to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum; and (5) provide the student with the opportunity to be educated and participate with nondisabled students to the maximum extent possible.(Footnote 21)

An IEP must include, among other things, the following information: (1) the present levels of the student’s educational performance, including how the disability affects the pupil’s involvement and progress in the general curriculum; (2) measurable goals and objectives for meeting the pupil’s needs; (3) a specific description of the special educational instruction and related services to be provided; and (4) a clear statement regarding how the student’s progress toward annual goals will be measured. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(a). In addition to these, when appropriate, the IEP shall also include a provision for the transition of the student into the regular class program if the pupil is to be transferred from a special class or nonpublic, nonsectarian school. Cal. Educ. Code § 56345(b).

Petitioner did not dispute the areas of need identified in the IEP: attention, organization, sequential auditory memory and planning, spelling, and written expression. The District proposed two goals to address these needs. The first goal states simply that “STUDENT will develop a three-paragraph essay incorporating correct organization and conventions with eighty per cent accuracy as measured by work samples.” The first goal was to be met by June 2003. The first benchmark states that “STUDENT will develop a three-paragraph essay including: (1) Intro, body and conclusion with one hundred per cent accuracy within on [sic] period in any academic discipline.”(Footnote 22) The second benchmark reads: “STUDENT will self-edit for (2) punctuation and capitalization with eighty per cent accuracy.” The third benchmark states only, “(3) spelling with seventy-five per cent accuracy.” The second goal states, “By June 2003, STUDENT will complete and return all assignments promptly with ninety per cent accuracy as measured by teacher’s records.” The two short-term benchmarks for this goal were as follows: (1) record daily homework assignments in a designated notebook one hundred per cent of the time; and (2) maintain an organized binder, filing work by subject matter, with ninety per cent accuracy.

Ms. Andrews testified that the IEP team discussed goals in all areas of need but wrote goals only in the areas of written expression and organization. She later testified that the two goals were intended to address all of STUDENT’s areas of need. There was no other evidence offered to show how these two goals adequately addressed STUDENT’s several areas of need. The specific area of need served is not identified for either of them. Although the first goal deals specifically with two of STUDENT’s identified areas of need, spelling and written expression, it clearly did not address attention and the Hearing Officer was not persuaded that it addressed organization or sequential auditory memory and planning. The Hearing Officer was also not persuaded that the second goal adequately addressed any of STUDENT’s areas of need. Finally, attention deficits are the stated reason for STUDENT’s eligibility and may be greatest impediment to his learning, but there was no goal to address this area of need.

In addition to the lack of goals to address all areas of need, the IEP does not contain the information required by Cal. Educ. Code § 56345. There are no present levels of performance provided with respect to any goal or objective, with the possible exception of spelling.(Footnote 23) There is no statement of how STUDENT’s disability affects his progress in the general curriculum. In response to this inquiry, the IEP merely provides that STUDENT’s attention and auditory memory problems require accommodations and modifications. None of the short-term benchmarks contain reference dates, and without reliable present levels of performance and other measuring criteria, it is difficult to see how the person responsible for measuring progress, the special education teacher, is to fairly accomplish that measurement and report the results to the IEP team.(Footnote 24)

Finally, the IEP contains no provision to address STUDENT’s need for some transition back into the public school environment. It was clear from the testimony that STUDENT’s self-esteem suffered while he was in the public school as a result of his belief that he was “stupid.” Other children teased him, and the teasing was at least one of the causes of his aggressive behavior that resulted in the first referral for assessment in 1997. Since entering CAS in the summer of 1999, STUDENT has been in classes where all of the children have learning difficulties. According to his parents and his former teacher, he has improved significantly, both academically and behaviorally. If STUDENT was to be transitioned from that environment where he obviously feels safe and good about himself and back into a District placement, some provision should have been included to address STUDENT’s need to minimize the anxieties and other difficulties that were certain to arise from the anticipation and implementation of that plan.

The Hearing Officer finds that the October 23, 2002 IEP was substantively deficient in significant respects and failed to offer a FAPE to STUDENT. Having determined that a substantive denial of a FAPE occurred, it is unnecessary for the Hearing Officer to address the claims of procedural defects.

Issue No. 6: Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for tuition expenses incurred for Petitioner’s education after October 23, 2002?

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services are determined to be proper under IDEA and are reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the child. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., supra ; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496. Burlington does not require that the placement or services chosen by the parent be the exact proper placement or services required under the Act. Alamo Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., (5th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1153, 1161. Although the parent’s placement does not have to meet a standard as high as a school district’s, the parent’s placement must meet other requirements of the IDEA, such as providing a placement that addresses the student’s needs and provides the student with educational benefit. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, (1993) 510 U.S. 7, 13.

The Hearing Officer has already found that the District did not cause any compensable loss to STUDENT or his parents by its failure to fulfill its general child-find obligation from November 27, 1999 to the date of the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002. Petitioner’s parents are not entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred on or before that latter date. However, the October 23, 2002 IEP did not offer a FAPE to STUDENT. The District agreed that STUDENT’s needs are being met at CAS and that he is receiving an educational benefit from that placement, thus conceding the appropriateness of the private placement. The Hearing Officer also finds that it was reasonable for the Petitioner to reject the District’s offer and remain at CAS. The District must reimburse STUDENT’s parents for the tuition and other required expenses incurred for STUDENT’s education at CAS from the date following the IEP meeting, October 24, 2002, to and including the date of this Decision.

Issue No. 7: Is Petitioner entitled to a prospective placement at Charles Armstrong School for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year?

There is not enough time remaining in the current school year to allow the District the opportunity to cure the defects in the IEP and provide for an appropriate transition to a District placement. The Hearing Officer believes that there would be little opportunity for STUDENT to receive educational benefit from such a hurried move. It is more likely that he would suffer from not being allowed to complete the last few weeks of his education at CAS with his classmates. If the District had made an appropriate offer on October 23, 2002, this would not have been the case. Although the Petitioner did not clearly request prospective placement at CAS, having spoken in terms of reimbursement only, it was clear from the allegations and the evidence that the Petitioner was seeking to keep STUDENT at CAS for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year. The parties acknowledged that CAS is a certified nonpublic school with approximately five per cent of its student body being placed by school districts pursuant to IEPs. Hearing Officers have broad discretion in granting such relief. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, supra; Student W. v. Puyallup School District, supra, at 1496. There is adequate justification for the Hearing Officer’s prospective placement of STUDENT at CAS. In view of the fact that the District failed in its obligation to offer a FAPE to STUDENT, the Hearing Officer finds that the District should be required to fund STUDENT’s prospective placement for the remainder of his final year at CAS.

Issue No. 8: Is Petitioner entitled to an award of compensatory education for the District’s failure to offer a FAPE on October 23, 2002? The prospective placement at CAS for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year provides STUDENT all of the relief to which he is entitled. The request for an award of compensatory education is denied.

ORDER

1. The District shall reimburse the Petitioner’s parents for all amounts paid by them or that they are personally obligated to pay to CAS for tuition for Petitioner’s education from October 24, 2002 through date of this Decision. Payment shall be made within fifteen calendar days of the District’s receipt of evidence of such payment or obligation.

2. The District shall pay directly to CAS all amounts due for tuition for Petitioner’s education, not already provided for in paragraph 1 of this Order, from the date of this Decision through the end of the regular 2002-2003 school year.

3. All of the Petitioner’s other claims to relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

Issue No. 1: Did the District fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 2: If the District did not fulfill its child-find obligations between November 27, 1999, and October 23, 2002, is STUDENT entitled to an award of compensatory education and are his parents entitled to tuition reimbursement?

The District prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 3: Did the District assess the Petitioner in all areas related to his suspected disability prior to the individualized education plan (IEP) meeting on October 23, 2002?

The District prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 4: Should the Petitioner have been found eligible for special education on the basis of a specific learning disability at the IEP meeting on October 23, 2002?

The District prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 5: Did the District offer a FAPE to the Petitioner at the October 23, 2002 IEP meeting?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 6: Are Petitioner’s parents entitled to reimbursement for tuition expenses incurred for Petitioner’s education after October 23, 2002?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 7: Is Petitioner entitled to a prospective placement at Charles Armstrong School for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year?

The Petitioner prevailed on this issue.

Issue No. 8: Is Petitioner entitled to an award of compensatory education for the District’s failure to offer a FAPE on October 23, 2002?

The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: April 18, 2003 Michael F. Geary, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1. The District also argued later that the PARENTs were attempting to secure public funding of their son’s education at CAS. 2. All references to Section 504 are to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794). The issues are not listed specifically as stated on the first day of hearing. The Hearing Officer has organized them for the purposes of adjudication. 3. Although Petitioner did not expressly pray for an order placing STUDENT at CAS for the remainder of the 2002-2003 school year, it was clear to the Hearing Officer that the parties understood that the entire 2002-2003 school year was in issue and that the Petitioner’s attorney inartfully used the term reimbursement in reference to payments not yet made. 4. Ms. Shor did provide one-on-one tutoring to STUDENT from November 1998 to May 1999. 5. According to Dr. Bruno, only one of the subtests had to be timed according to the test instructions. 6. A standard score of less than 95 could be statistically significant, as explained more fully in the Hearing Officer analysis of the issues, below. 7. The doctor was not convinced from the historical data that STUDENT had an attention deficit disorder, and he disagreed with Ms. Shor’s opinion that STUDENT was dyslexic. 8. Ms. Zerges did a separate report that was dated three months after Dr. Bruno’s report. 9. Mr. Cedros was not available, so another school psychologist attended. 10. Ms. Ptacek said that her SELPA does communicate with NPSs such as CAS regarding rates of reimbursement for privately placed students pursuant to Cal. Educ. Code § 56173. 11. The statute states that “the procedures shall include, but need not be limited to, written notification of all parents . . ..” (Emphasis added.) The Hearing Officer does not interpret this provision as requiring mailed notice to all parents, but rather some reasonable method of providing notification to parents, including publication and targeted mailings. 12. One might argue that a school that specifically serves the needs of children with learning disabilities should be particularly targeted to receive the mailed notice because of the needs of the students it serves. If CAS is a fair example, it may also be that the administrations of such schools are not likely to take the initiative to inform parents that special education assessment services may be available to their children at no cost through their public school districts. 13. In his statement of issues filed on February 21, 2003, the Petitioner asserted that he was not assessed in the area of behavior in October 2002. On the first day of hearing, however, when issues were clarified, this was not presented as an issue to be addressed at the hearing. 14. The psychological report was not provided to the District until evidence was disclosed just prior to the hearing in this matter. 15. The terms “sequential planning” and “sequential auditory memory” are used in the IEP to describe one of STUDENT’s areas of need. 16. ADD is also a processing disorder.

17. The same obligation applies to all children.

18. There are other circumstances where a strict enrollment standard should not be applied, but those will not be delineated here. 19. Petitioner also claimed that the District failed to give proper written notice, but the only evidence or argument offered regarding that claim related to the events in 1997 that were beyond the statute of limitations. Petitioner’s closing argument addresses other claimed deficiencies, such as an untimely assessment plan and the lack of a classroom observation of STUDENT by the assessors, but these were not identified as issues to be addressed at the hearing. 20. In addition to the substantive FAPE requirements, the United States Supreme Court has held that the IDEA requires certain procedural protections that will allow the student and parents to effectively participate in the IEP process. Rowley, supra, at pp. 206-207. Not every procedural flaw is critical, but one that results in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringes on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process may in and of itself constitute a denial of a FAPE. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23 (9th Cir. 1992) 960 F.2d 1479, 1483-1484. To be procedurally appropriate, the IEP process must not have seriously infringed on the rights of the student and his parents to participate in the process or resulted in the loss of educational opportunity. The school district has the burden of proving at the administrative hearing that it complied with the IDEA. Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 1396, 1398. However, because the Hearing Officer determines, below, that the subject IEP was substantively inadequate, it is unnecessary to determine whether there also were procedural defects. 21. The Hearing Officer believes that the reference should be to “one period.” 22. Ms. Andrew’s testified that STUDENT’s baseline for spelling was the standard score of 88 from the WJ-III administered by Ms. Zerges. That report was referred to and incorporated into the IEP by reference. 23. The inadequacy of the goals and objectives cannot be cured by working backward from a specific description of the special education services to be provided because the IEP simply offers one period daily of RSP services