California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · October 30, 1998

Student v. Oxnard Union High School District et al.

SEHO Case No. SN 272-98 · Hearing Officer Edwin Villmoare

Oxnard Union High must reimburse half the cost of a Montana residential placement after child-find and FAPE failures.

Split decision: student prevailed on 7 of 9 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Summary

A 17-year-old's parents filed against Oxnard Union High School District, Conejo Valley Unified School District, and Ventura County Behavioral Health. The events took place in ninth grade. In March 1997 the mother wrote to Oxnard asking for an AB 3632 mental health referral. School psychologist Neal Ortenberg told her the district did not do those evaluations. The district started an assessment only after she sent a second letter in April. At a June 12, 1997 IEP meeting, Oxnard found the student eligible with a learning disability. It offered one period a day of resource English and made no mental health referral. The student then moved to his father's home in Conejo Valley. After that, his parents placed him at Spring Creek Lodge, a residential program in Montana.

Hearing Officer Edwin Villmoare ruled that Oxnard violated child find and should have treated the March letter as a referral. It gave the parents their rights notice too late and held the IEP meeting after the 50-day deadline. The student met the criteria for serious emotional disturbance. The IEP did not address his need for psychological services, and Oxnard made no AB 3632 referral. That denied him FAPE. The claims about summer services failed against both districts. Conejo Valley and the county agency were not liable. There was little evidence about academics at Spring Creek Lodge, and the parents had not shared everything. For those reasons, Oxnard must reimburse 50 percent of the placement, travel, and escort costs.

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Why it matters

This decision shows how SEHO treated a parent's written request for AB 3632 mental health services as a special education referral. It held a district responsible for offering a complete FAPE, including mental health services, within the initial timelines. It also reduced reimbursement for a residential placement because there was little evidence about academics there.

Issues and holdings

  1. Student prevailedChild find

    Issue 1. Should Student have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code § 56300?

    Prior special education history, heavy absences, the counselor meeting, the private psychiatric placement and the mother's request for mental health services were too many red flags; Oxnard failed its child-find duty.

  2. Student prevailedAssessment

    Issue 2. Should the letter of March 5, 1997, from Student's mother requesting an AB 3632 referral have triggered a special education assessment of Student?

    AB 3632 services are special education related services, so the written request was a referral that had to start the assessment process under 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a).

  3. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 3. Did Oxnard Union High School District properly inform Student's parents of their rights?

    Oxnard gave no written child-find notice and handed over the 'Parent Rights' pamphlet only at the start of the June 12, 1997 IEP meeting, violating Education Code § 56301.

  4. Student prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 4. Was the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, unreasonably delayed?

    Using March 5, 1997 as the referral date, the IEP meeting should have occurred by May 25, 1997 at the latest; the June 12 meeting violated Education Code § 56344.

  5. Student prevailedResponsible agency

    Issue 5. Should Oxnard Union High School District have made an AB 3632 referral to Ventura County Behavioral Health?

    Given the assessor's own recommendation of psychotherapy and medication, Oxnard failed in its obligation to seek psychological services by not making an AB 3632 referral.

  6. Student prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 6. Did Oxnard Union High School District fail to provide Student with a free appropriate public education?

    Student met SED criteria, as the assessor admitted; one period of resource English did not address his emotional needs or school avoidance, so the June 1997 IEP denied FAPE.

  7. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 7. Did Oxnard Union High School District improperly fail to inform Student's parents that they could obtain services during the summer of 1997?

    Petitioner cited no persuasive authority; no violation found regarding information about summer services.

  8. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 8. Did Conejo Valley Unified School District improperly fail to inform Student's parents that they could obtain services for him prior to the fall of 1997?

    Nothing in Oxnard's IEP would have alerted Conejo Valley to offer extended school year services; no violation.

  9. Issue 9. Are Student's parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition and other costs surrounding the placement of Student at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, between July 1997 and February 1998, including the costs of travel and escort services?

    Oxnard alone is liable; the placement addressed primary behavioral needs and notice exceptions applied, but scant evidence on academics and parents' incomplete disclosure warranted 50 percent reimbursement; Conejo Valley and county mental health not liable.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 15 days of receipt of proof from the parents, Oxnard Union High School District shall reimburse the parents for 50 percent of the costs surrounding the placement at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, including travel and escort services. Dollar amount not stated.

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Key authorities

Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education; Florence County School District Four v. Carter; Alamo Heights ISD v. State Board of Education; Capistrano USD v. Wartenberg; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District; Student W. v. Puyallup School District; Lenhoff v. Farmington Public Schools; Education Code § 56300; Education Code § 56301; Education Code § 56321; Education Code § 56344; 5 C.C.R. § 3021; 5 C.C.R. § 3030; Government Code §§ 7570-7588 (AB 3632); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)

People named in the decision

  • Peggy Nadin, Director of Special Education, Oxnard Union High School District
  • Jack Bannon, Associate Director of Special Education, Conejo Valley Unified School District
  • Neal Ortenberg, school psychologist / assessor, Oxnard Union High School District
  • Sylvia Jackson, student counselor, Hueneme High School, Oxnard Union High School District
  • Dr. John Cervantes, private psychiatrist, Private
  • Juliann Giove, MFCC, private counselor, Private
  • Steve Zimmerman, MFCC, program director, private psychiatric facility, Seabridge
  • Dr. John Harrison, Ph.D., assessor contracted by Conejo Valley USD, Missoula Psychiatric Medicine
  • Spring Creek Lodge, private residential facility (unilateral placement), Thompson Falls, Montana
  • Kingsview Center, residential placement, Funded by Conejo Valley USD and Ventura County Behavioral Health
  • Vista del Mar, private psychiatric facility, Private

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Edwin Villmoare, Chief Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO), McGeorge School of Law, at the Oxnard Union High School District office in Oxnard, California, on September 24 and 25, 1998.

Petitioner STUDENT was represented by advocate Anne M. Zachry. Also present on his behalf were his parents, MOTHER and FATHER. Respondent Oxnard Union High School District (OUHSD) was represented by John E. Hayashida of the law firm of Parker, Covert and Chidester. Also present on OUHSD’s behalf was Peggy Nadin, Director of Special Education. Respondent Conejo Valley Unified School District (CVUSD) was represented by attorney Andrew V. Arczynski of the law firm of Filarsky and Watt. Also present on CVUSD’s behalf was Jack Bannon, Associate Director of Special Education. Ventura County Behavioral Health (VCBH), the county mental health agency, elected not to appear.

The following witnesses testified: MOTHER; FATHER; Neal Ortenberg, school psychologist for OUHSD; Sylvia Jackson, student counselor at Hueneme High School; Peggy Nadin, and Jack Bannon.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was left open for the receipt of optional written closing briefs. Briefs were submitted on behalf of OUHSD and CVUSD, and, thereafter, the record was closed and the matter submitted for decision. ISSUES (footnote 1)

1. Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code § 56300?

2. Should the letter of March 5, 1997, from STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, requesting an AB 3632 referral, have triggered a special education assessment of STUDENT? (Footnote 2)

3. Did Oxnard Union High School District properly inform STUDENT’s parents of their rights?

4. Was the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, unreasonably delayed?

5. Should Oxnard Union High School District have made an AB 3632 referral to Ventura County Behavioral Health?

6. Did Oxnard Union High School District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education?

7. Did Oxnard Union High School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services during the summer of 1997?

8. Did Conejo Valley Unified School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services for him prior to the fall of 1997?

9. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition and other costs surrounding the placement of STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, between July 1997 and February 1998, including the costs of travel and escort services?

FACTS

Few facts in this case are in dispute. Those in dispute are resolved to the extent necessary under the Discussion section, below.

STUDENT is a seventeen-year-old male pupil attending Kingsview Center, a residential placement. STUDENT’s current district of residence is Conejo Valley Unified School District (CVUSD), where his father, FATHER, lives. CVUSD, along with Ventura County Behavioral Health (VCBH), funds STUDENT’s placement. STUDENT was classified in his IEP of March 13, 1998, as seriously emotionally disturbed (SED).

Prior to May 27, 1997, STUDENT was a resident of Oxnard Union High School District (OUHSD) where he attended school and lived with his mother, MOTHER. On that date, the Superior Court for the County of Ventura entered an order at the request of STUDENT’s parents changing custody from MOTHER to FATHER. STUDENT’s parents had separated when he was approximately seven months old, and divorced when he was two years old.

STUDENT has a long history of educational, behavioral, and psychological difficulties. MOTHER reported that when STUDENT was four he showed signs of attention deficit. When he was four or five years old, he received play therapy for urinating in a laundry hamper. Shortly thereafter, he again received play therapy, this time for aggressive behavior. In the subsequent years, MOTHER reported, STUDENT engaged in many physically aggressive behaviors, including breaking doors, knocking holes in walls, breaking lamps, and hitting his mother. In December 1992, when STUDENT was eleven years old, he was found eligible for special education by the Hueneme Elementary School District and received mental health services from VCBH for aggressive and disruptive behavior in the classroom. (Footnote 3) STUDENT’s psychological diagnosis throughout this treatment period was undifferentiated deficit attention disorder with accompanying symptoms of conduct disorder and depression. He received medication for his attention deficit disorder. STUDENT was discharged from special education and mental health services in 1994 as a result of improvement in behavior, anger management, and school functioning.

In February 1996, STUDENT began to see Dr. John Cervantes, a private psychiatrist, for recurrent major depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiance disorder. In March 1996, STUDENT was involuntarily hospitalized at Vista del Mar, a psychiatric facility with a youth unit, for threatening suicide.

In the fall of 1996, STUDENT enrolled as a ninth-grader at Hueneme High School within OUHSD. During the fall semester, he achieved Bs, Cs, and one D as grades in courses that included college preparatory work. In October 1996, and again in February 1997, STUDENT was suspended for fighting. In one of the incidents, he was labeled the nonaggressor but suspended anyway pursuant to school policy. During this same period, STUDENT missed part or all of the school day on approximately 44 occasions (approximately 30 percent of the school days) for illnesses, suspensions, tardies, cutting classes, and unverified absences. Soon thereafter, STUDENT was arrested for shoplifting. The arresting officer informed MOTHER that STUDENT had been truant from school for the two previous weeks.

In early March 1997, STUDENT and his mother attended a meeting with Sylvia Jackson, a counselor for OUHSD, to discuss STUDENT’s intense dislike of regular school and his desire for alternative schooling. Ms. Jackson told STUDENT that the school offered no programs that would satisfy his desires. During the hearing, there was disputed testimony over whether STUDENT then "blew up" at Ms. Jackson, and whether Ms. Jackson replied that STUDENT needed to learn to control his anger and depression.

During the first week of March, on the advice of Dr. Cervantes, MOTHER contacted Neal Ortenberg, school psychologist for OUHSD, to discuss STUDENT’s situation and explore the possibility of a mental health assessment for STUDENT. Mr. Ortenberg’s recollection was that MOTHER spoke about possible services from VCMH but said nothing about special education or a residential placement. Mr. Ortenberg testified that he raised the possibility of assembling a student study team to examine STUDENT’s problems. (Footnote 4) In a letter dated March 5, 1997, apparently received by Ms. Jackson and forwarded to Mr. Ortenberg, MOTHER wrote:

I would like to formally request a 3632 evaluation for my son, STUDENT, as soon as possible. This would be an administrative IEP since he had a previous evaluation.

Soon thereafter, in response to MOTHER’s letter, Mr. Ortenberg called MOTHER and explained that the district did not perform AB 3632 evaluations and that a referral to VCBH could occur only if the school district first assessed STUDENT, found him eligible, and then determined that a referral to VCBH was called for. Mr. Ortenberg testified during the hearing that MOTHER spoke only about a residential placement, not a special education assessment or special education services. Mr. Ortenberg said that he recommended that she write a note requesting a special education assessment and, according to Mr. Ortenberg, she indicated that she would do so. MOTHER recalled that Mr. Ortenberg never asked her why she wanted mental health services or a residential placement. She testified that she concluded from Mr. Ortenberg’s replies that residential placements were not available through special education.

By letter dated April 3, 1997, MOTHER stated that she was making a "formal request to do testing for special education for my son, STUDENT. He has been diagnosed with ADHD in the past and has been on an SB [sic] 3632 program status at previous schools."

An assessment plan, dated April 8, 1997, was sent to MOTHER. The plan included testing in the "social/emotional" domain but contained no reference or referral to VCBH.

Shortly thereafter, STUDENT was placed by his mother at Seabridge, a psychiatric facility, in response to his expression of suicidal ideation. MOTHER informed OUHSD that STUDENT was at Seabridge and arranged for him to continue his school work there through independent study. MOTHER regularly picked up STUDENT’s assignments from Hueneme High School and then returned them after STUDENT had completed them. It was not clear from the testimony at the hearing who at the school district knew STUDENT was at Seabridge, or knew why he was there.

MOTHER signed her consent to the assessment on April 11, 1997, but the school district did not receive the written consent until April 23, 1997.

In early or mid May, STUDENT was again hospitalized at Vista del Mar after assaulting his mother. STUDENT’s parents then agreed that STUDENT should live with FATHER, although FATHER insisted on a formal change of custody as part of the move. The court order changing custody was entered on May 27, 1997.

Mr. Ortenberg conducted the assessment of STUDENT from May 27, 1997, through June 4, 1997. During the assessment, Mr. Ortenberg learned of STUDENT’s history of depression and misbehavior. Specifically, he learned that STUDENT had been at Seabridge and Vista del Mar, and that he had been seeing counselor Juliann Giove, MFCC, once a week and Dr. Cervantes once a month for suicidal ideation, oppositional problems, school truancy, and conflicts at home.(footnote 5) Mr. Ortenberg spoke to Dr. Cervantes who, according to Mr. Ortenberg, discussed depression, misconduct, and the need for small class size, but did not discuss residential placement. Mr. Ortenberg also testified that he spoke to a counselor at Seabridge who also said nothing about residential placement. Petitioner’s evidence contained letters from Steve Zimmerman, MFCC, program director of Seabridge, dated May 9, 1997, and from Dr. Cervantes, dated May 12, 1997. Both letters indicated that STUDENT was in need of treatment in a residential placement. (Footnote 6)

Mr. Ortenberg’s assessment noted poor behavior, including poor school attendance, and symptoms of depression over a long period of time and to a marked degree. However, Mr. Ortenberg rejected a finding that STUDENT was SED. In his report, Mr. Ortenberg wrote:

... At this time, it appears that STUDENT’s deficits in reading and spelling achievement are primarily due to his deficits in attention and auditory processing. However, the primary reasons for his lack of school success at this time appears to be not only his achievement and processing deficits, but a combination of those deficits and his poor school attendance, drug use, and his other exhibited oppositional and poor conduct behaviors. His symptoms of depression appear to be a secondary reason for his poor school success.

STUDENT’s severe deficits in achievement and his psychological processing deficits do not appear to be the result of environmental, cultural, language or economic factors. His deficits in achievement do not appear to be primarily the result of limited school experience, poor school attendance, depression, or other severe emotional characteristics as defined in the Education Code. It does not appear that this [sic] poor achievement and processing deficits can be corrected through other regular or categorical services offered within the regular instruction program.

Therefore, STUDENT meets the Special Education criteria as a person with a specific learning disability, and he does not meet the criteria of a person who is Seriously Emotionally Disturbed.

During examination at the hearing, Mr. Ortenberg acknowledged that at the time of the assessment STUDENT met all the SED criteria for depression contained in 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a). Specifically, Mr. Ortenberg admitted that STUDENT exhibited a general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression that had existed over a long period of time and to a marked degree and that adversely affected his educational performance. Mr. Ortenberg indicated that, pursuant to a California Department of Education handbook, he understood that a student should be found eligible only according to his or her primary disability.

Mr. Ortenberg’s actual written report was not completed and delivered to the parents until October 1997. Thus, it was not available for the critical IEP meeting of June 12, 1997. Despite the conclusion that STUDENT was not SED, the report recommends "a mental health treatment plan which includes both psychotherapy and medication treatment."

On May 30, 1997, STUDENT was released to his father from Vista del Mar but continued his independent studies for his second semester, for which he earned two Ds and a C.

At the IEP meeting of June 12, 1997, STUDENT’s parent received for the first time the District’s pamphlet entitled "Parent Rights." Dr. Ortenberg reported orally on his assessment. The IEP team found STUDENT eligible on the basis of a specific learning disability and offered one period per day of resource specialist program (RSP) in English with a regular class placement. The IEP team did not offer extended school year services. The IEP is mute on the subject of mental health services. Mr. Ortenberg testified that at the IEP meeting the parents did not raise concerns over STUDENT’s conduct or express interest in a residential placement. Mr. Ortenberg was unclear why the IEP team did not make an AB 3632 referral, since the recommendations in his report called for mental health services. He indicated that an AB 3632 referral was discussed at the meeting, but he could not remember why a referral was not made. He conjectured that unaccountably either the IEP team rejected such a referral or the parents declined such a referral.

During the hearing, STUDENT’s parents acknowledged that when they attended the IEP meeting they were afraid to disclose STUDENT’s attack on his mother for fear that the school district would then deny eligibility. They also acknowledged that they did not ask for residential placement, in part because MOTHER believed Mr. Ortenberg had indicated that OUHSD had no obligation in this regard. Both parents emphatically denied that mental health services or an AB 3632 referral were ever mentioned at the IEP team meeting. The parents also acknowledged that they did not disclose the change in STUDENT’s residency for fear of stopping a process that had already taken over three months. They indicated that their hope for the IEP meeting was merely to establish eligibility and seek services thereafter. They testified that they did not understand the IEP process, the school district’s obligations, or parent/pupil rights in general. They indicated that during the IEP team meeting there was no time to read the eight and one-half pages of single-spaced text that comprised the "Parent Rights" pamphlet. They testified that they were not informed about the possibility of receiving services during the summer.

On June 16, 1997, STUDENT’s father registered him at Westlake High School in CVUSD and informed the school that STUDENT had an IEP. He was told to return in August for a review of STUDENT’s needs and a possible new IEP team meeting.

On June 22, 1997, STUDENT assaulted his father. STUDENT had a hammer in his hand during the assault, although it was not clear what role the hammer played. STUDENT was immediately returned to Vista del Mar for a third stay, where his diagnosis included major depressive disorder, confusion, and agitation.

On July 26, 1997, when the parents’ private insurance coverage that paid for STUDENT’s stays at Vista del Mar was exhausted, his parents enrolled STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge in Thompson Falls, Montana, a private residential facility they had learned about. To pay for the cost of Spring Creek Lodge, the parents pooled the money they had set aside for STUDENT’s education, along with some of their retirement funds.

On October 1, 1997, STUDENT’s parents, with their advocate, Ms. Anne M. Zachry, requested an IEP team meeting from CVUSD. The meeting was held on October 29, 1997. After that meeting, CVUSD developed an assessment plan, to which the parents consented, and arranged for Dr. John Harrison, Ph.D., of Missoula Psychiatric Medicine, to conduct an assessment of STUDENT in Montana. Dr. Harrison, in his report dated January 21, 1998, diagnosed STUDENT as suffering from: (1) dysthymic disorder, early onset with a history of major depressive disorder, recurrent; (2) attention deficit hyperactive disorder, predominantly inattentive type; (3) opposition defiant disorder; and (4) reading and spelling disorders. Dr. Harrison also found that "the strong behavioral approach" of Spring Creek Lodge was appropriate for STUDENT, and indicated that STUDENT was responding favorably to the regimen.

In response to Dr. Harrison’s assessment, CVUSD held an IEP meeting on January 30, 1998, at which STUDENT was classified as SED. CVUSD then made a referral to VCBH for a possible residential placement. VCBH declined to arrange for STUDENT’s mental health assessment at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, insisting that STUDENT be returned to the County for assessment. VCBH offered no safe place to keep STUDENT during the assessment. Therefore, the assessment was delayed until STUDENT’s parents discovered that the new calendar year allowed for their private insurance to once again cover a stay for STUDENT at Vista del Mar.

On March 13, 1998, the IEP team, with participation by VCBH, found STUDENT in need of a residential placement. On March 23, 1998, STUDENT was placed at Kingsview Center, where he remains. STUDENT’s parents indicated during the hearing their satisfaction with Kingsview and with the conduct of CVUSD and VCMH, notwithstanding the delays surrounding VCMH’s assessment.

DISCUSSION

1. Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code § 56300?

2. Should the letter of March 5, 1997, from STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, requesting an AB 3632 referral have triggered a special education assessment of STUDENT?

3. Did Oxnard Union High School District properly inform STUDENT’s parents of their rights?

California law imposes detailed and demanding requirements on school districts to ensure that students who may be disabled are promptly and appropriately assessed. School districts must systematically seek out all individuals with exceptional needs. Education Code § 56300. Districts must establish written policies and procedures for a continuous child-find system, and the policies and procedures must include written notification to all parents of procedures for initiating a referral for assessment. Education Code § 56301. All referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process and must be documented. 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a). When an oral referral is made by a parent, the staff of the school district must offer assistance in reducing the request to writing. Id. Clearly, California requires districts to take a proactive role in seeking out and assessing children with possible disabilities.

The accumulation of information and events preceding MOTHER’s letter of April 3, 1997, should have alerted OUHSD to the possibility that STUDENT was a pupil with emotional and behavioral problems who should have been referred for special education assessment. Apparently, during this period no one at the school knew specifically that Dr. Cervantes had recommended a residential placement. However, STUDENT’s history of special education and related mental health services, the meeting with Ms. Jackson (regardless of whose version of that meeting is accurate), the extensive amount of school STUDENT missed during the ninth grade for one reason or another (including two weeks of truancy prior to his arrest for shoplifting), MOTHER’s report to OUHSD that STUDENT was attending Seabridge, MOTHER’s arrangement with OUHSD for STUDENT’s independent study at Seabridge, and her initial phone call to Mr. Ortenberg seeking mental health services constitute simply too many red flags for the District to justifiably overlook. Particularly telling (and disturbing) was Mr. Ortenberg’s testimony that he never asked MOTHER why she wanted mental health services for STUDENT. Requests for such services are not to be taken lightly. Common sense indicates that they often signal the parent’s belief that the pupil is in emotional or behavioral trouble. Indeed, since mental health services are a special education related service, Mr. Ortenberg should have asked MOTHER the nature of STUDENT’s problem and then offered her assistance in making an immediate written referral.

In this case, OUHSD failed in its proactive responsibilities; indeed, it ignored critical indications of possible disability. Such passivity (or indifference) is the opposite of what the law requires: the active and systematic seeking out of pupils who may be eligible for special education. OUHSD failed in its statutory obligation to assess STUDENT pursuant to the child-find requirements and, therefore, as discussed below, failed to find him eligible within statutory timelines.

Assuming, arguendo, that the District cannot be held responsible for failing to commence the assessment process pursuant to the child-find requirements, MOTHER’s letter of March 5, 1997, should have triggered the assessment process. Mr. Ortenberg’s testimony that he told MOTHER that districts do not perform AB 3632 mental health assessments was disingenuous at best, misleading at worst. Services provided pursuant to AB 3632 are special education related services. All written referrals for special education and related services must initiate the assessment process. 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a). Moreover, her letter, however inartful, referenced a previous IEP and a previous evaluation. Clearly, she wanted an AB 3632 assessment and had special education in mind. By failing to immediately begin the assessment process in response to MOTHER’s letter of April 3, 1997, OUHSD violated the requirements of 5 C.C.R. § 3021(a).

Evidence presented by the parents and unrebutted by the District establishes that the District failed to provide the parents with the required written notice of child-find procedures or the "Parent Rights" pamphlet until the beginning of the IEP team meeting on June 12, 1997. In short, the District left the parents in the dark about their rights until the information provided was of no practical use. By doing so, the District failed to properly inform the parents of their rights in a timely manner in violatation of Education Code § 56301. Had OUHSD distributed the "Parent Rights" pamphlet earlier, thereby enabling the parents to make their requests with greater clarity and participate in the IEP meeting of June 12, 1997, in an informed manner, the District might have spared STUDENT, his parents, and the District itself much grief, as discussed below. (Footnote 7)

4. Was the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997 unreasonably delayed?

Within fifteen days of a referral for a special education assessment, the parents shall be given a proposed assessment plan in writing. Education Code § 56321(a). The parents have "at least fifteen days" from receipt of the proposed assessment plan to decide whether or not to consent to the plan. Education Code § 56321(c). An IEP team meeting, required to offer an appropriate individualized educational program as a result of the assessment, must occur within fifty days from the date of the receipt of the parents’ written consent for assessment. Education Code § 56344.

In this case, it has been concluded that the referral for assessment should have occurred no later than MOTHER’s first telephone conversation with Mr. Ortenberg, which occurred several days before MOTHER’s letter of March 5, 1997. However, for purposes of analyzing timelines using a date certain for the referral, the Hearing Officer adopts March 5, 1997, as the referral date, the date of MOTHER’s first letter and the date OUHSD acknowledged receiving this letter in its closing brief.

Under a worst-case scenario, OUHSD would have taken fifteen days to produce the assessment plan, MOTHER’s fifteen days to consent to it, and the District fifty days to assess and hold the IEP team meeting. The IEP team meeting and the required offer of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) would then have occurred no later than May 25, 1997, two days before STUDENT’s court-ordered change of residence.

Under a scenario that reflects much of what in fact happened, the assessment plan would have been produced five days after the referral, MOTHER would have taken thirteen days to return her signed consent to the assessment, and the IEP meeting would have occurred fifty days after receipt of MOTHER’s consent. The IEP team meeting then would have occurred on approximately May 12, 1997, around the time STUDENT assaulted his mother and was rehospitalized for the third time at Vista del Mar. Under either scenario, the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, was held after the fifty day timeline had run, in violation of Education Code § 56344. Under either scenario, STUDENT would have been a resident of OUHSD. Therefore, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was entitled to receive from OUHSD, no later than May 25, 1997, an appropriate IEP and an offer of FAPE that, as discussed below under Issues 5, 6 and 9, included appropriate mental health services. It should be noted that any referral to VCBH would have remained in effect had STUDENT changed residence to CVUSD because VCBH services the pupils of CVUSD.

5. Did Oxnard Union High School District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education?

6. Should Oxnard Union High School District have made an AB 3632 referral to Ventura County Behavioral Health?

Under state and federal law, pupils with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education ( FAPE). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq; California Education Code § 56000 et seq. Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8), "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services that conform with the student’s individualized education program. "Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction at no cost to the parent or guardian to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability..." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25). "Designated instruction and services" (California’s term for "related services") shall be available when they are necessary for the pupil to benefit from his or her instructional program. California Education Code § 56363(a). These services include psychological services. California Education Code § 56363(b).

The dispute on this issue centers on psychological services and possible residential placement. Although there was apparently little, if any, discussion on this matter during the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, the Pupil’s Educational Performance section of STUDENT’s IEP under the "social/emotional" heading contained the following: "....elevated depression and anxiety. Many conduct and oppositional behaviors. Difficulty with attention and concentration." Moreover, Mr. Ortenberg’s assessment clearly acknowledged that STUDENT required psychotherapy for his "emotional, behavior, and attention difficulties" and recommended ongoing psychotherapy and medication treatment. Yet the IEP contains no service other than one class of RSP English per day to address STUDENT’s complex problems. The IEP team did not even take the precautionary step of making an AB 3632 referral.

This marked deficiency in the District’s proposed program derives in part from Mr. Ortenberg’s erroneous conclusion that STUDENT was not SED. As Mr. Ortenberg acknowledged during the hearing, STUDENT was more than sufficiently depressed to meet the legal criteria for SED at the time of the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, and the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was clearly SED at that time. (Footnote 8) Such depression is no small matter. By definition, it pervades STUDENT’s life, including his education. The principal educational casualty of STUDENT’s emotional turmoil was his inability or unwillingness to attend school. Mr. Ortenberg’s report acknowledged this problem. Obviously, one RSP English class per day was not designed to remediate the problem of STUDENT’s emotional distress or his poor attendance. Depression and concomitant behavior and attention problems characterize STUDENT’s education. STUDENT’s deficit in achievement identified in Mr. Ortenberg’s report can as reasonably be attributed to STUDENT’s truancy (and the emotional turmoil behind the truancy) as to a learning disability in need of an RSP class.

The District’s default is not limited to its failure to classify STUDENT as SED. A school district must not only provide services for qualifying disabilities; it must also provide services for related problems that may not rise to the level of a qualifying disability, so long as the services are needed for the pupil to benefit from his education. Capistrano v. Wartenberg, 59 F. 3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995). Even assuming STUDENT was not SED, he clearly needed some form of psychological intervention to help overcome his deep resistance to attending school. The suggestion made by Mr. Ortenberg that the parents may have rejected an AB 3632 referral at the IEP meeting is simply not credible. An AB 3632 referral was the one form of assistance they understood might be available through the IEP process; it was the assistance MOTHER requested in her first letter.

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that the IEP proposed by OUHSD failed to identify STUDENT as SED and to address his need for psychological intervention -- intervention he needed promptly to enable him to benefit from his forthcoming sophomore year -- and, therefore, failed to offer STUDENT a free appropriate public education. The Hearing Officer also concludes that the District failed in its obligation to seek psychological services for STUDENT when it failed to make an AB 3632 referral.

7. Did Oxnard Union High School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services during the summer of 1997?

8. Did Conejo Valley Unified High School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services for him prior to the fall of 1997?

Petitioner cited no persuasive authority on these issues. With regard to Issue 8, nothing in OUHSD’s IEP would have alerted CVUSD that it should have offered extended school year services. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes neither school district committed violations of law with regard to information about summer services.

9. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition and other costs surrounding the placement of STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, between July 1997 and February 1998, including the costs of travel and escort services?

Under IDEA, decision makers have the authority to award "appropriate" relief for violations of FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). Appropriate relief may, under certain circumstances, include reimbursement for expenditures made on privately obtained educational services. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. Of Education of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). For example, parents are entitled to be reimbursed for private school expenditures if it is determined that the school district failed to offer a FAPE and the private school placement provided benefit. Parents need not procure a fully appropriate placement for services in order to be entitled to reimbursement. Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 79 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). Reimbursement can be awarded even if the private school does not meet state certification requirements. Florence County School District 4 v. Carter, 114 S.Ct. 361. 365 - 366 (1993).

Equitable considerations, including the conduct of the parties, may be relevant in fashioning appropriate relief. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374; W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range School District, 96 F.2d 1479, 1486 (9th Cir. 1992); Student W. v. Puyallup School District, 31 F.3d 1489,1496 (9th Cir. 1994). In determining whether a reimbursement award should be limited, one appropriate consideration is the quality of the privately obtained educational services. See, e.g., Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, supra.

As concluded above, by some time in May 1997, if not earlier, STUDENT was entitled to: (1) classification as SED, (2) an AB 3632 referral, and (3) an individualized educational program constituting a free appropriate public education. He received none of these.

As the insurance coverage for STUDENT’s third stay at Vista del Mar expired, STUDENT’s parents in desperation decided to pool the money they had set aside for STUDENT’s education, plus some of their retirement funds, and placed him in a residential setting, as advised earlier by Dr. Cervantes and by Steve Zimmerman, MFCC, program director at Seabridge. It is not entirely clear how the parents selected Spring Creek Lodge. They testified that they had been making inquiries and may have learned about it through a brochure, magazine advertisement, or another parent. Evidence on Spring Creek Lodge was limited. FATHER acknowledged that STUDENT was resistant to the disciplined, highly structured setting at Spring Creek Lodge, but nevertheless received some benefit because he began to understand the necessity of controlling his behavior. Dr. Harrison wrote in his report to CVUSD:

[A] strong behavioral approach to treatment was quite appropriate for this adolescent [STUDENT]. He has recently begun to show some indication of responding to this strong behavioral program at Spring Creek Lodge. ... The structured nature of his current environment may facilitate psychotherapeutic opportunities not attainable in less structured settings.

While there was no evidence concerning the academics at Spring Creek Lodge, or efforts there to address STUDENT’s learning disability, Dr. Harrison’s report, supplemented by FATHER’s testimony, establishes that Spring Creek Lodge was effectively addressing what Dr. Harrison concluded were STUDENT’s primary educational needs -- concentration on his studies and control of his behavior. To this significant extent, Spring Creek Lodge was an appropriate educational placement for STUDENT.

In its closing brief, OUHSD argued that the Spring Creek Lodge placement occurred primarily, and perhaps exclusively, for family and not educational reasons. The Hearing Officer finds this argument unpersuasive. STUDENT’s misconduct at home and his chronic failures to attend school are part of his longstanding, pervasive, and intertwined disorders, including SED and ADD, that have seriously affected his education and deprived him of much of the benefit of the second semester of his freshman year in high school. STUDENT needed a residential placement for a host of interrelated reasons, including the immediate need to prepare him to benefit from his sophomore year. It is not possible with any degree of precision to separate his SED and ADD from his conduct disorder. See, Capistrano v. Wartenberg, supra. Indeed, it may be that his conduct disorder springs in significant part from his depression and ADD. In any case, STUDENT was in need of a residential placement whether or not he attacked his parents. He was psychologically resistant to attending school, and his resistance required treatment at a residential placement for educational reasons, as both CVUSD and VCBH subsequently recognized. Thus it would appear that STUDENT’s parents are entitled to at least partial reimbursement of the costs surrounding STUDENT’s placement at Spring Creek Lodge. However, before a final conclusion on this issue can be reached, several matters must be addressed.

MOTHER and FATHER did not divulge the full extent of STUDENT’s behavioral problems to the OUHSD, nor did they disclose his change of residence. Information about STUDENT’s misconduct might have produced a more rapid and thorough response by OUHSD. In mitigation, it can be said that the parents were clearly uninformed about the nature of special education and the responsibilities of school districts. This is not entirely surprising, in part since OUHSD failed to provide them with notification contained in the "Parent Rights" pamphlet until the IEP meeting. Moreover, they were preoccupied with an out-of-control adolescent son and his repeated psychiatric hospitalizations. They were also apprehensive about OUHSD’s response to these events.

Moreover, Mr. Ortenberg, a trained and experienced school psychologist, asked no questions of MOTHER as to why she sought a residential placement for STUDENT. Indeed, he never raised the matter in conversations with Dr. Cervantes or with the counselor from Seabridge with whom he spoke. With one or two obvious questions (questions it is difficult to imagine a professional school psychologist not asking), Mr. Ortenberg could have ascertained the seriousness of STUDENT’s situation. In short, OUHSD, through Mr. Ortenberg, was equipped to identify the critical concerns behind the request for residential placement and to solicit information to properly explore these concerns. Mr. Ortenberg failed woefully in this regard. In any case, as discussed above, with the information immediately available to OUHSD, STUDENT should have been diagnosed as SED, and offered immediate appropriate mental health services. On the whole, the Hearing Officer concludes that liability for Spring Creek Lodge should not be reduced on equitable grounds solely because of the parents’ failure to disclose information.

On June 4, 1997, just after STUDENT was released from his third confinement at Vista del Mar (and before he was placed at Spring Creek Lodge), the reauthorized and amended Individual With Disabilities Education Act took effect. One key provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), allows for the reduction or denial of otherwise appropriate retroactive reimbursement for the costs of a unilateral private placement if the parents fail to give the school district appropriate notice of their intent to enroll the pupil in a private school. It is not clear that this notice requirement applies to parents in California since 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) requires the states to adopt this requirement (and others) as a condition of federal assistance. California has yet to do so. However, it is unnecessary to resolve this question because there are relevant exceptions to the notice requirement, even if the requirement is in effect. Costs of reimbursement for unilateral private placement may not be reduced if, inter alia, compliance with the notice requirement would likely result in physical or serious emotional harm to the pupil, or the parents have not been informed of the notice requirement. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(II) and (IV). Both exceptions apply in this case. In the move from Vista del Mar to Spring Creek Lodge, STUDENT sorely needed an immediate placement that could assist with his deteriorating emotional and behavioral situation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record remotely indicating that STUDENT’s parents were aware of this literally brand new notice requirement. For example, it was not contained in the "Parent Rights" pamphlet. The Hearing Officer concludes that the parents’ failure to give notice to either OUHSD or CVUSD of their decision to place STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge cannot be ground for reducing reimbursement for the costs of Spring Creek Lodge.

An argument can be advanced that OUHSD had no obligation to refer STUDENT to VCBH until after the first meeting of the IEP team and a determination that STUDENT was eligible for special education. There is support for this argument in 2 C.C.R. §§ 60000 et seq., the emergency regulations governing interagency responsibilities for special education pupils effective at the time of STUDENT’s enrollment at Spring Creek Lodge. Assuming OUHSD made the referral, the argument goes, VCBH would have had the exact same timelines as a school district upon receiving an initial referral, that is, fifteen days from the referral to produce the assessment plan, and fifty days after the receipt of written parental consent to assess and conduct an IEP meeting to determine what, if any, mental health services STUDENT required. (Footnote 9) This argument, if valid, would result in SED students, the group of special education pupils most at risk of harm to self or others, often being denied mental health services until over four months after the initial referral to a school district, a time frame twice as long as that mandated for the offer of an appropriate program and the delivery of other related services. (Footnote 10) The Hearing Officer cannot accept this argument. It is contrary to the policies reflected in IDEA and to the specific language of California special education statutes, which require the relatively prompt determination of eligibility and provision of services. (Footnote 11)

As discussed above, Education Code § 56321(a) requires the development of an assessment plan within fifteen days of referral. The statute does not refer to a partial assessment plan -- or an assessment plan minus a mental health assessment component. Indeed, a pupil must be assessed in all areas of suspected disability, including social and emotional status. Education Code § 56320(f). The IEP team must meet within fifty days of the parent’s consent to the assessment and offer an appropriate individualized education program, in other words, a FAPE. Education Code § 56344. California’s special education statutes do not refer to a FAPE minus the mental health component, or a partial FAPE to be completed only after another round of referrals, assessment plans, assessments, and IEP meetings. Nothing in the State’s special educational statutes envisions a doubling of the normal limits for the delivery of mental health services, services that, as in STUDENT’s case, are often critically needed. Indeed, AB 3632 itself, the specific authority for the interagency regulations, declares that the AB 3632 assessment procedures must conform to the procedures in the Education Code. Government Code § 7572(a). Therefore, under the controlling California statutes, it appears that, given MOTHER’s requests for a residential placement and an AB 3632 referral, OUHSD should have made a simultaneous referral to VCBH in March 1997.

However, in this case, it is unnecessary to resolve whether the timelines in the interagency regulations are in violation of State statutes and, therefore, invalid. What is clear is that STUDENT was entitled to an offer of a complete FAPE in May of 1997 and did not receive one. It may be that, if contacted in early March, VCBH would have been obligated to provide necessary services immediately following the initial IEP team meeting. In the alternative, it may be that OUHSD would have had to provide STUDENT with appropriate mental health services during a mental health referral and assessment process that occurred after the initial IEP meeting. It is unnecessary to decide which governmental entity might have had ultimate responsibility for the mental health obligation during this period, had OUHSD made the AB 3632 referral. Under either approach, OUHSD bears the responsibility in this case because OUHSD never made an AB 3632 referral and never offered STUDENT the FAPE to which he was entitled. (Footnote 12)

Neither the parents nor OUHSD ultimately asserted a claim of joint responsibility against either CVUSD or VCBH. VCBH was never contacted by OUHSD, and STUDENT’s IEP, even if examined by CVUSD, would not have alerted CVUSD to STUDENT’s urgent need. It may be that CVUSD should have inquired about STUDENT at the beginning of the 1997-98 school year. However, no evidence was presented as to when the school year began. (Footnote 13) CVUSD did convene its first IEP team meeting for STUDENT on October 29, 1997, less than thirty days after requested by the parents, satisfying the timelines in Education Code § 56343. Delays, thereafter, are directly attributable to OUHSD’s failure to properly assess and place STUDENT in the first instance, and the fact that STUDENT was out of state. It should be noted that CVUSD, like VCBH, was under no obligation to assess STUDENT while he remained out of state. See, e.g., Lenhoff v. Farmington Public Schools, 680 F.Supp. 921 (E.D. Mich. 1988). Once STUDENT was returned to California, both entities responded appropriately. The Hearing Officer concludes neither CVUSD nor VCBH bears liability for the costs of STUDENT’s placement at Spring Creek Lodge. Therefore, OUHSD alone bears liability for the failure to offer STUDENT a FAPE and for STUDENT’s subsequent placement at Spring Creek Lodge.

In its closing argument and brief, OUHSD raised the dubious defense of proximate cause, claiming that STUDENT’s placement at Spring Creek Lodge was too remote a consequence of events surrounding the IEP of June 12, 1997, to impose liability on OUHSD. The plain fact is that in mid or late May, STUDENT was entitled to a FAPE with appropriate mental health services, including counseling and a possible residential placement. However events might have enfolded thereafter, STUDENT would have been entitled to whatever mental health services he needed, including residential placement.

Moreover, OUHSD knew that STUDENT had been at Seabridge because of suicidal ideation, knew that he had been at Vista del Mar because of violent outbursts, knew that he had threatened suicide, knew that he had been truant, knew that he had a long history of oppositional behavior, knew that he had a long history of serious depression, and knew that he was an adolescent in the midst of puberty. All of this information and more is contained in Mr. Ortenberg’s report. Such a student is clearly at risk, and it is entirely foreseeable that he might suffer an immediate need for a residential placement.

In addition, OUHSD cited no authority for the proposition that proximate cause plays a role in determining the question of liability for retroactive reimbursement in special education cases, and the Hearing Officer is aware of none. Burlington and its progeny make no reference to proximate cause or any comparable test for determining liability when parents supply service the school district should have supplied. For the above reasons, the Hearing Officer concludes that OUHSD is liable for the cost of STUDENT’s placement at Spring Creek Lodge. The Hearing Officer also concludes that the transportation to and from Spring Creek Lodge, including the escort service at a time when STUDENT was highly fractious, are appropriate costs for reimbursement.

However, the Hearing Officer did not receive enough information about Spring Creek Lodge to justify an award of total reimbursement. Particularly unsettling is the dearth of evidence on academics at Spring Creek Lodge and Spring Creek Lodge’s provisions, if any, for addressing STUDENT’s learning disability. STUDENT had serious academic needs and required assistance in overcoming his learning disability. The nature of the privately obtained educational services, even if they convey some benefits, is an important factor in determining reimbursement. Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, supra. It is always difficult to justify a precise reduction in the amount of retroactive reimbursement. However, looking at the record of the case as a whole, including the nature of STUDENT’s primary educational needs, OUHSD’s many failures, STUDENT’s parents’ failure to fully inform OUHSD, and the limited information about Spring Creek Lodge, the Hearing Officer concludes that an award of 50 percent is equitable. Therefore, the Hearing Officer awards the parents 50 percent of all costs associated with the placement of STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge.

ORDER

Within 15 days of receipt of proof from the parents, the Oxnard Union High School District shall reimburse the parents for 50 percent of the costs surrounding the placement of STUDENT at Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, including the costs of travel and escort services.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute:

1. Should STUDENT have been identified as eligible for special education through the child-find provisions of Education Code § 56300?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

2. Should the letter of March 5, 1997, from STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, requesting an AB 3632 referral have triggered a special assessment of STUDENT?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

3. Did Oxnard Union High School properly inform STUDENT’s parents of their rights?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

4. Was the IEP team meeting of June 12, 1997, unreasonably delayed?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

5. Should Oxnard Union High School District have made an AB 3632 referral to Ventura County Behavioral Health?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

6. Did Oxnard Union High School District fail to provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education?

Petitioner prevailed over OUHSD on this issue.

7. Did Oxnard Union High School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services during the summer of 1997?

OUHSD prevailed on this issue.

8. Did Conejo Valley Unified School District improperly fail to inform STUDENT’s parents that they could obtain services for him prior to the fall of l997?

CVUSD prevailed on this issue.

9. Are STUDENT’s parents entitled to reimbursement for the tuition and other costs surrounding the placement of STUDENT at the Spring Creek Lodge in Montana, between July 1997 and February 1998, including the costs of travel and escort services?

Petitioner and OUHSD prevailed equally on this issue. CVUSD and VCBH prevailed completely on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code § 56505(i).

Dated: October 30, 1998 Edwin Villmoare Chief Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

1.The issues have been reorganized and restated to allow for effective adjudication.

2. "AB 3632" is a common term applied to Government Code §§ 7570-7588, which determine, inter alia, when community mental health agencies operating under the Department of Mental Health must assess pupils with suspected disabilities and provide those eligible with special education services, including residential placements.

3. No evidence was presented as to the basis of STUDENT’s eligibility during this period.

4. No student study team meeting was held.

5. The last name of STUDENT’s counselor is spelled "Giove" in Petitioner’s Chronology of Events and "Angiove" in Mr. Ortenberg’s assessment report.

6. Both letters were addressed "To Whom It May Concern." It is not clear whether these letters were ever disclosed to the District.

7. Denying parents and other members of the IEP team a written assessment report and adequate time to review it before the IEP team meeting is itself a highly dubious practice since the purpose of the IEP team meeting is, in part, to discuss the report (and not a mere oral summary given during the meeting). Title 20 of the United States Code, § 1414(b)(4)(B) requires that a copy of the assessment report be given to the parents. Presumably, one purpose of this requirement is to allow the parents to be fully informed about the contents of the assessment report before the IEP team meeting begins.

8. Mr. Ortenberg’s reliance on a California Department of Education publication to find STUDENT learning disabled but not SED was misplaced. A student who meets the legal definition of SED is entitled to be classified as SED and to receive all the educational services necessary to address that condition. 5 C.C.R. § 3030.

9. To make matters worse in STUDENT’s case, since summer vacation intervened, the fifty days would toll, requiring a second IEP meeting no sooner than thirty days after the beginning of the new school year. Education Code § 56344. Thus, STUDENT, as a student with a SED, could have been without critically needed services not only during March, April and May, while the school district conducted its own assessment procedures, but also during June, July, August and September, while VCBH conducted its procedures.

10. Data available from the California Department of Education indicate that there are over 20,000 SED students in California, most of them adolescents, most of them requiring mental health services. This figure does not include the many other special education pupils who are not SED but who also require mental health services.

11. Permanent regulations governing interagency responsibilities supplanted those in effect during the summer of 1997 (also 2 C.C.R. §§ 60000 et seq.). These regulations make it even clearer that referrals to mental health are to occur only after the school district has completed its own assessment procedures, including referral, parental consent, assessment, and initial IEP team meeting, and that the timelines that apply to a school district’s assessment process, in effect, start over with the referral to mental health.

12. Had OUHSD undertaken temporary mental health services for STUDENT pending a referral to mental health after the first IEP meeting, and STUDENT subsequently changed residence, CVUSD might have been responsible for ongoing provision of these temporary services. It is a moot issue because OUHSD never offered to provide such services.

13. Under Education Code § 56325, at the beginning of the year,CVUSD may have been under an obligation to offer STUDENT a thirty-day interim placement based on OUHSD’s IEP. However, such a placement, consisting of one period of RSP, would have been meaningless, given STUDENT’s condition. As discussed below, CVUSD had no obligation to change STUDENT’s IEP until he was reassessed.