California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 12, 2000
San Francisco Unified School District v. Student
SEHO Case No. SN 313-00 · Hearing Officer Van T. Vu
San Francisco Unified and County Mental Health owe no further services after student graduated from a Pennsylvania private placement.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
The decision notes that the student had appealed a prior SEHO decision between the same parties (SN 476-98, August 17, 1998), and that the appeal was pending at the time of this hearing. It also references the earlier consolidated decision in SN 1512-98/SN 1645-98 (February 24, 1999), which found Seneca to be an appropriate placement.
Summary
San Francisco Unified School District and San Francisco County Mental Health asked for a hearing to confirm that they no longer owed services to a 20-year-old student under a conservatorship. She was eligible for special education based on a specific learning disability and serious emotional disturbance. In 1998 her mother placed her at KidsPeace School, a residential facility in Pennsylvania. In February 1999, a SEHO decision found that the District's offer of Seneca, a residential program in San Francisco, was appropriate. It ordered a plan to move her there. The mother did not attend the IEP meetings called to plan the move and kept the student at KidsPeace. In 1999 the student met Pennsylvania graduation requirements and received a KidsPeace diploma. She had not met San Francisco's requirements, which included driver's education and a swimming test. The Hearing Officer denied the student's request to postpone the hearing and her later motion for reconsideration. On the merits, the Hearing Officer found that the mother refused an appropriate offer and kept the student at KidsPeace by choice. That made the student a private school student with no individual right to District services. Pennsylvania graduation rules therefore applied, and the diploma ended her eligibility for special education and related mental health services. The Hearing Officer also rejected the claim that vocational transition services ordered in an earlier decision were still owed. The request for continued services was denied.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO handled a parent who kept a student at an out-of-state private placement after a hearing decision upheld the district's offer. The Hearing Officer treated the student as a private school student, applied the other state's graduation standards, and held that the resulting diploma ended her eligibility.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedEligibility
Issue 1. Do the District and Mental Health currently have a responsibility for providing STUDENT with special education and related services?
The parent kept the student at a Pennsylvania private placement after the District's offer was found appropriate. That made her a private school student subject to Pennsylvania graduation rules, so her diploma ended her right to special education and related mental health services.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- The student's request for ongoing special education and related services from the District and Mental Health was denied.
Key authorities
Union School Dist. v. Smith; Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd.; K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp.; Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259; Russman v. Board of Ed.; Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.122; Education Code § 56041; Education Code § 56174; Code of Civil Procedure § 1008(a)
People named in the decision
- Katherine McCauley, program administrator overseeing compliance; District witness, San Francisco Unified School District
- Helene Weinstein, senior case manager; Mental Health witness, San Francisco County Mental Health
- KidsPeace School, private 24-hour residential treatment facility and school (parent placement) that issued the diploma, Pennsylvania
- Seneca San Francisco Community Alternatives Program, residential placement offered by District and Mental Health and found appropriate in an earlier decision, Seneca, San Francisco
- Devereaux, residential treatment facility requested by parent; declined to accept student, Santa Barbara, California
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, in San Francisco, California, on April 27, 2000, and by conference call on April 28, 2000.
Petitioner San Francisco Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorney Diane Finkelstein and Katherine McCauley, program administrator overseeing compliance. Petitioner San Francisco County Mental Health (Mental Health) was represented by deputy city attorney Barbara Selby. Also present on Mental Health's behalf was Helene Weinstein, senior case manager.
Respondent STUDENT (Respondent or STUDENT) was represented by attorney Amanda Metcalf. MOTHER, STUDENT's mother and conservator, was present for the first fifteen minutes of the hearing.
The District called Katherine McCauley to testify at hearing. Petitioner Mental Health called Helene Weinstein to testify at hearing. MOTHER testified by telephone on her daughter's behalf.
Oral and documentary evidence was received. Following the receipt of written closing arguments, the record was closed, and the matter was submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
On April 25, 2000, the Hearing Office received from Respondent a motion to continue the hearing scheduled for April 27 and 28. Respondent argued that the hearing should be continued pending the resolution of an appeal of a prior Hearing Office decision between the parties in case SN 476-98. Specifically, Respondent had appealed the finding that ASTUDENT had not been awarded unearned credits toward her graduation@ during the 1997-1998 school year. Thus, Respondent argued that the determination of whether she had been awarded unearned credits was directly relevant to the pending issue of whether she is still entitled to special education services. On April 26, 2000, the Hearing Office received from the District and Mental Health a joint opposition to Respondent's motion for continuance. Petitioners contended that the hearing should go forward because the issues on appeal have no bearing on whether STUDENT is entitled to ongoing services as a result of her graduation from KidsPeace School in Pennsylvania. Minutes after Petitioner's opposition was received by the Hearing Office, Respondent submitted additional grounds to continue the hearing scheduled for the next day. In further support of her motion, Respondent asserted that a placement had just become available for her in Southern California and that her mother/conservator, MOTHER, was engaged in making arrangements for the her transfer. Thus, according to Respondent, her mother would not be available for hearing. No information was included in Respondent's letter regarding what Aarrangements@ needed to be made or why such arrangements prevented her mother from appearing at hearing.
Shortly thereafter, the present Hearing Officer issued a minute order denying the request for continuance. Pursuant to California Educational Code ' 56505(f), a continuance of a special education due process hearing may be granted upon a showing of good cause. In the order, it was concluded that the appeal of the previous Hearing Officer's decision did not affect the issue for hearing and that MOTHER's Aexpected absence from hearing to make >last minute arrangements for her daughter's transfer to another school was not good cause to continue the hearing.@
On April 27, MOTHER appeared at hearing with her attorney, Amanda Metcalf. At the beginning of the hearing, Respondent made a motion for reconsideration of the Hearing Officer's order of April 26, 2000, denying her request for a continuance. In support of her motion, Respondent restated that her mother could not attend the hearing because she is making preparations to transfer her from her placement at KidsPeace School in Pennsylvania to an unidentified placement in Southern California. Respondent offered proof that MOTHER was confirmed on a flight to Southern California on April 28, 2000, at 6:00 a.m. and could not be present for the second day of hearing.
Petitioners District and Mental Health opposed the request for reconsideration of the order denying Respondent's request for a continuance. The District stated that it understood that the KidsPeace staff would be transporting STUDENT to her placement in Southern California and questioned whether in fact MOTHER was unable to attend the hearing. Additionally, Petitioners stated that Respondent had not provided a witness list or evidence to the Petitioners prior to the hearing and, thus, did not have any independent evidence to present. Accordingly, Petitioners contended that MOTHER would still be able to catch her flight because the hearing would likely be completed in one day.
There is no provision in special education law regarding reconsideration of orders by Hearing Officers. Therefore, the Hearing Officer looks to civil law for guidance in this area. In civil law, a party affected by an order may move for reconsideration of the order within ten days after service of the order Abased upon new or different facts, circumstances or law.@ California Code of Civil Procedure ' 1008(a). Here, Respondent merely restated one of her basis for requesting the original continuance of the hearing. Although MOTHER asserted that she was scheduled to leave for Southern California on the second day of hearing, she provided no persuasive argument for why she was unable to remain at the hearing on the first day. Because Respondent had still not established good cause to continue the hearing, and because Respondent did not present any new or different facts, circumstances or law that would warrant altering the original order denying the continuance, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately following the denial of Respondent's motion for reconsideration, Ms. Metcalf asked for a break to confer with Respondent's mother, MOTHER. After their brief discussion off the record, MOTHER left the hearing. The hearing then proceeded with Ms. Metcalf as the sole representative for Respondent STUDENT.
ISSUE
Do the District and Mental Health currently have a responsibility for providing STUDENT with special education and related services?
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
Petitioner San Francisco Unified School District asserted that, according to federal law, it is no longer responsible for providing STUDENT with ongoing special education and related services because she has earned a high school diploma and is no longer eligible for such services. Specifically, the District contended that STUDENT, while attending a 24-hour residential facility in Pennsylvania called KidsPeace School, met Pennsylvania graduation requirements and received a high school diploma. Petitioner Mental Health concurred with the District's position and asserted that, because STUDENT has graduated from high school, it is no longer required to provide STUDENT with prospective Mental Health services pursuant to her A.B. 3632 referral.
Respondent contended that the District and Mental Health are still responsible for her special education and related services because she has not met California graduation requirements. According to Respondent, San Francisco Unified School District is the local educational agency responsible for providing her with special education services. Thus, she argued that she is entitled to special education and related services until such time that she validly earns a high school diploma based on District graduation requirements.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a twenty-year-old student who is eligible for special education and related services due to her specific learning disability and emotional disturbance. STUDENT's mother, MOTHER, was appointed her conservator on April 3, 1998. STUDENT currently attends an unidentified placement in Southern California.
STUDENT was first identified as a special education student in 1989, during the second grade. Her handicapping condition was identified as a specific learning disability. From 1989 to the 1997-1998 school year, STUDENT received services from the District to address her learning disability.
During the summer of 1996, STUDENT reported to her counselors at camp and school that a boy in her neighborhood had been sexually assaulting her since January of that year. After the disclosure, STUDENT began to exhibit suicidal, depressed and sometimes violent behavior. For the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years, STUDENT continued to attend school at District placements at Hart Day School and at Lincoln High School, respectively, pursuant to her IEPs. However, due to her emotional and behavioral difficulties, STUDENT was hospitalized on numerous occasions and attempted suicide twice during that time. At an IEP meeting on May 18, 1998, STUDENT's IEP team agreed (1) that the category of seriously emotionally disturbed should be added to STUDENT's primary eligibility designation, and (2) that she should be immediately placed in a 24-hour residential treatment program. The team then orally recommended placement at Seneca Residential Placement Center. MOTHER agreed with the SED designation but rejected the placement recommendation.
Three days later, on May 21, a special education due process hearing (case number SN 476-98) convened between the parties to resolve, in part, issues regarding STUDENT's educational placement for the 1997-1998 school year. After the hearing convened for two days, the parties agreed to schedule additional hearing dates in June to complete the hearing. During the third day of hearing, June 22, 1998, MOTHER removed STUDENT from her placement within the District and enrolled her at KidsPeace School in Pennsylvania. In a decision dated August 17, 1998, the Hearing Officer found that the District had committed a number of procedural and substantive violations that resulted in its failure to provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 1997-1998 school year. Among the District's procedural violations was its failure to offer STUDENT an appropriate placement in writing pursuant to the requirements of Union School District v. Smith after the IEP team determined that an immediate residential placement was necessary for STUDENT in May 1998. Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S. 965, 115 S.Ct. 428 (1994).
The Hearing Officer in case SN 476-98 also considered whether the District provided STUDENT with the transition services that she required before leaving the school setting. See 20 U.S.C. ' 1414(s)(1)(A)(vii). The Hearing Officer found that the District failed to develop and implement a transition plan as required by law from the date STUDENT turned sixteen years old on September 19, 1995, to the last day of hearing on June, 24, 1998, except for the period of May 28, 1996, to May 28, 1997.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer ordered the District to convene an IEP meeting Awith STUDENT's expanded IEP team to discuss, identify, and offer an appropriate 24-hour residential treatment program for STUDENT for the next six months.@ The Hearing Officer also ordered as follows:
Within the first thirty calendar days of the date of STUDENT's placement at a residential treatment facility pursuant to the IEP meeting described above, the District shall arrange and have completed a functional vocational evaluation for STUDENT. Within thirty calendar days after completion of the functional vocational evaluation, the District shall convene a meeting with STUDENT's expanded IEP team to discuss needed transition services and develop a detailed transition plan for STUDENT based on, among other things, the findings of the vocational evaluation and STUDENT's needs, taking into account her preferences and interests.
On August 28, 1998, STUDENT's IEP team convened to offer STUDENT an educational placement pursuant to the order in the August 17 Hearing Office decision. Because STUDENT's mother/conservator and attorney were not present at the meeting, another IEP meeting convened on September 15, 1998, at which time the District and Mental Health offered STUDENT a placement at a residential facility in San Francisco called Seneca San Francisco Community Alternatives Program. MOTHER did not consent to the placement recommendation. As a result, a second hearing between the parties (of the consolidated cases SN 1512-98 and SN1645-98) convened on December 1 and 2, 1997, to determine whether Seneca was an appropriate placement for STUDENT.
On February 24, 1999, a decision was issued by the Hearing Office for the consolidated cases, SN 1512-98 and SN 1645-98. In the decision, it was determined that Seneca was an appropriate placement for STUDENT, and that STUDENT's move from KidsPeace to Seneca should be facilitated with an appropriate transition plan. Hence, it was ordered as follows:
Within two weeks of the date of this decision, the IEP team, along with a Seneca staff person, shall meet and develop a transition plan which will address STUDENT's needs during and after her move to Seneca.... The plan will provide that STUDENT be transferred to Seneca no later than one month from the date of this decision.
Pursuant to the Hearing Officer's order, the District sent MOTHER notice that an IEP meeting would convene on March 12, 1999, to develop a transition plan to bring STUDENT back into the District from KidsPeace. In the notice, the District indicated that it did not have MOTHER's permission to contact KidsPeace regarding STUDENT and requested that MOTHER make a member of KidsPeace available by telephone for the IEP meeting. When the IEP team meeting convened, no one appeared on behalf of STUDENT or KidsPeace, and the IEP team attempted to develop a transition plan without their input.
By letter to the District dated March 12, 1999, MOTHER requested an IEP meeting regarding STUDENT. In response, Katherine McCauley from the District sent MOTHER a letter dated March 23, 1999, stating that an IEP meeting was scheduled for April 9, 1999, Ato develop a transition plan to address STUDENT's needs.@ MOTHER responded by letter on April 2, 1999, that she did not request the IEP meeting to discuss the Atransition plan,@ but rather to discuss STUDENT's Acurrent needs and placement.@ MOTHER also indicated that she would not attend the IEP meeting unless it was for the sole purpose she requested. Despite additional correspondence between Ms. McCauley and MOTHER to clarify the purpose of the April 9 IEP meeting, MOTHER did not appear at the meeting. Additionally, there was no evidence in the record to indicate that MOTHER ever consented to transition STUDENT to Seneca despite the Hearing Officer finding that Seneca was an appropriate placement for STUDENT. Thus, STUDENT remained at KidsPeace and never enrolled at Seneca.
During the summer of 1999, a KidsPeace representative contacted MOTHER regarding STUDENT. According to MOTHER, the person from KidsPeace discussed with her that STUDENT had met all graduation standards of Pennsylvania and had received her high school diploma. MOTHER also testified that she learned of STUDENT's graduation some time before her conversation with the KidsPeace representative. Although STUDENT had received her diploma from KidsPeace, she remained at KidsPeace and received 24-hour residential treatment.
By letter to the District dated September 24, 1999, MOTHER made a second request for an IEP meeting for STUDENT. In response, Ms. McCauley wrote a letter to MOTHER stating that A[s]ince we have had no contact with STUDENT or access to her records, we need [her educational and mental health records and permission to speak with KidsPeace staff] in order to have a meaningful IEP.@ Ms. McCauley also requested the names of KidsPeace staff persons who would be able to participate in the IEP meeting by telephone.
MOTHER and her attorney, Amanda Metcalf, attended the IEP meeting on October 28, 1999. The purpose of the IEP meeting was to Ashare information about STUDENT's current educational and mental health needs, her status towards graduation, her eligibility for continued special [education] services and placement options.@ At the meeting, MOTHER requested that STUDENT be placed at Devereaux, a residential treatment facility in Santa Barbara, California. The team agreed to reconvene on December 3, 1999, to discuss placement options for STUDENT. It was also agreed that the District would provide MOTHER and her attorney Anotice of the District's/SFDMH's proposed placement ... at least 24 hours prior to the meeting.@ With regard to the exchange of information regarding STUDENT, MOTHER signed a document authorizing KidsPeace to release STUDENT's transcripts, report cards, and other educational records to the District. However, according to Ms. McCauley, the District understood that it still did not have consent to speak with KidsPeace staff.
On November 16, 1999, a telephone conference was held among the attorneys for the District, Mental Health, and STUDENT. During the phone conference, the District and Mental Health informed Ms. Metcalf that Devereaux would not accept STUDENT's enrollment into its facilities. Additionally, Ms. Metcalf was informed that the District and Mental Health were not proposing any educational placements for STUDENT at that time. One week later, the District received from KidsPeace copies of STUDENT's educational records. From the records, the District was notified for the first time that STUDENT had satisfied Pennsylvania graduation requirements and had received a diploma from KidsPeace.
STUDENT's IEP team then convened on December 3, 1999, as was agreed to at the October IEP meeting. However, neither MOTHER nor her attorney attended the meeting. Proceeding in their absence, the team members discussed that STUDENT had received a diploma from KidsPeace and determined that she was no longer eligible for special education services.
Shortly thereafter, MOTHER requested another IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT's exit from special education services. As a result, the IEP team convened on January 10, 2000, and MOTHER and her attorney were present. At the meeting, MOTHER disputed that STUDENT was properly exited from special education and asserted that STUDENT had not met the District's graduation requirements. Unable to agree as to whether STUDENT should be exited from special education, the District requested a due process hearing on February 22, 2000.
One month later, on March 21, 2000, MOTHER requested another IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT's education. In response, Ms. McCauley wrote to MOTHER that the issue of whether STUDENT was entitled to special education services was pending before the Hearing Office. Thus, according to Ms. McCauley, the District would not convene an IEP meeting for STUDENT until such issue was resolved by the Hearing Office.
The Hearing convened on April 27, 2000, before the present Hearing Officer. On the second day of hearing, MOTHER moved STUDENT from KidsPeace to an unidentified placement in Southern California.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Under both State law and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), students with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. ' 1400; Education Code ' 56000. The term Afree appropriate public education@ means special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, that meet the State educational standards, and that conform with the student's individualized educational program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. ' 1401(a)(18). However, this right to a FAPE is not available to students who have graduated from high school with a regular high school diploma. 20 U.S.C. ' 1412(a)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. ' 300.122.
In this case, it is undisputed that STUDENT (1) has met Pennsylvania graduation requirements, (2) was issued a high school diploma from KidsPeace School in Pennsylvania, (3) did not have an IEP in effect from the District at the time of her graduation, and (4) did not meet San Francisco graduation requirements. The District and Mental Health asserted that STUDENT was a Aprivate school@ student who was unilaterally placed at KidsPeace, and that her graduation and receipt of her diploma from Pennsylvania terminated her right to special education and related services. Respondent, on the other hand, argued that she is still entitled to special education and related services because she has not met the graduation requirements of the San Francisco Unified School District, the district in which her conservator resides. Although the parties generally disagree as to whether STUDENT continues to be eligible for special education and related services, the crux of the dispute centers on whether STUDENT can be graduated based on Pennsylvania standards or whether she should be held to California graduation requirements. Specifically, if California requirements applied, STUDENT has not graduated and cannot be exited from special education on this basis. On the other hand, if Pennsylvania graduation requirements applied, STUDENT has graduated and her graduation can be considered in exiting her from special education services. To determine whether California or Pennsylvania law applied, it is first necessary to determine whether the District was responsible for providing STUDENT with a FAPE at the time she graduated, or whether STUDENT was a private school student placed in Pennsylvania and subject to Pennsylvania law.
Generally, for a student like STUDENT who is between the ages of 18 and 22 and is conserved, the school district where the conservator resides is responsible for ensuring that the student receives a free appropriate public education. Education Code ' 56041. However, a school district's responsibility for providing a student special education and related services is limited by federal law. Under the 1997 IDEA, school districts are required only to expend a proportionate amount of federal funds on children who have been unilaterally enrolled in private schools by their parents. 20 U.S.C. ' 1412(a)(10)(A)(i). Several circuit courts have addressed the issue of school districts' responsibilities to private school students under this new statute. These decisions indicate that when a disabled student has been offered a FAPE and the parents enroll the student in a private school as a matter of educational preference, the child has no individual entitlement to any services from the public educational agency. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 233(5th Cir. 1997); K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 125 F.3d 1017, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. Denied, 118 S.Ct. 1360 (1998); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Russman v. Board of Ed., 150 F3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1998); Foley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. Louis County, 153 F3d 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1998).
Based on the above limitations on a district's responsibility for providing a student with FAPE, it is clear that a parent or conservator can place a student beyond the educational responsibility of the district. Although a district's responsibility over a student is first determined by the residency of his or her parent or conservator, the parent or conservator can opt out of the district's responsibility by declining the district's appropriate special education services and by unilaterally placing the student in a private school as a matter of educational preference. In placing the child in a private school rather than an appropriate public placement offered by the resident district, the parent is subjecting the child to the laws governing that private school rather than the laws governing the district school. Therefore, with regard to this case, if the District had been responsible for STUDENT's education at the time she graduated in Pennsylvania, her receipt of the diploma from KidsPeace would not have cut off her special education eligibility. Rather, the District would have been responsible for providing STUDENT a FAPE and she could not have graduated from high school in the District until she met the District graduation requirements. In the alternative, if STUDENT was a private school student at the time of her graduation, she would not have been entitled to any special education services from the District, and the laws from Pennsylvania would have governed her graduation. Hence, a resulting diploma from Pennsylvania may have been sufficient to terminate her right to special education services.In light of the unique circumstances of this case, it is found that the District was not responsible for providing STUDENT with special education and related services when she graduated from KidsPeace School in Pennsylvania. According to the Hearing Officer's decision issued on February 24, 1999, the District offered STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year. Following the issuance of the decision, the District made numerous attempts to comply with the Hearing Officer's orders. The District convened an IEP meeting on March 12, 1999 to develop STUDENT's transition plan to Seneca, but no one on behalf of STUDENT attended the meeting. Then, the District convened another IEP meeting on April 9, 1999, at the request of MOTHER, but MOTHER again did not attend the meeting. In fact, although MOTHER requested the April 9 IEP meeting, MOTHER stated clearly in her letters dated April 2 and 8 that she would not attend any IEP meeting scheduled to develop a transition plan for STUDENT. Moreover, MOTHER did not provide to the District access to STUDENT to develop the transition plan, or provide consent to transition STUDENT back to Seneca. Despite the District's attempts to comply with the Hearing Officer's orders, MOTHER resisted the transition and elected instead to keep STUDENT at KidsPeace despite the Hearing Officer determination that Seneca was appropriate for STUDENT. Therefore, although the District had offered STUDENT a FAPE, MOTHER chose to keep her at KidsPeace as a matter of educational preference. At that point, by definition, STUDENT was a Aprivate school disabled student@ who was not entitled to any special education and related services from the District.
Additionally, the Student presented no evidence regarding any action or event that would have caused the District to regain responsibility over STUDENT's education at any time prior to her receiving her diploma from KidsPeace. Specifically, no information was shared with the District regarding STUDENT's education or progress. Furthermore, MOTHER made no attempt to schedule an IEP meeting with the District and Mental Health regarding STUDENT's educational placement for the following school year until months after STUDENT had graduated from KidsPeace. Although MOTHER requested an IEP meeting in April 1999 to discuss STUDENT's Acurrent needs,@ the Hearing Officer's decision only a month before had resolved the issue of FAPE for that year. Based on the above, no significant evidence was provided that MOTHER sought to return STUDENT to the District prior to her graduation from KidsPeace.
In summary, by keeping STUDENT at KidsPeace despite a Hearing Officer decision that Seneca was appropriate for STUDENT, MOTHER removed STUDENT from the educational responsibility of the District. Furthermore, by keeping STUDENT at KidsPeace, STUDENT became a Aprivate school@ student and remained a Aprivate school@ student until she graduated from KidsPeace. Because STUDENT was a private school student, she was subject to the Pennsylvania graduation requirements where her private school was located.
In light of the above, the Student's arguments against being exited from special education are unpersuasive. Because STUDENT was not entitled to receive special education services from the District at the time of her graduation, her argument that California requirements governed her graduation fails. Moreover, because MOTHER refused the appropriate special education and related services that were offered by the District, she cannot validly argue that STUDENT's graduation is inappropriate due to her failure to receive such services. Having satisfied the high school graduation requirements to which she was subject and having received her high school diploma, STUDENT is no longer entitled to ongoing special education and related services. Similarly, STUDENT is not entitled to related Mental Health services for this reason.
ORDER
STUDENT's request for ongoing special education and related services from the District and Mental Health is denied.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code ' 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following findings are made in accordance with this statute: The District prevailed on the issues decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Education Code ' 56505(i).
DATED: July 12, 2000 ____________________________________ Van T. Vu, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1: Respondent phrased her motion as a Asecond motion to continue@ the hearing. However, because Respondent did not offer any new grounds for her motion, the Hearing Officer treated her motion as a motion to reconsider the order dated April 26, 2000.
Footnote 2: As was noted above, the hearing convened in San Francisco on the first day of hearing. The second day of hearing was convened by telephone conference with MOTHER in participation. MOTHER was also allowed testify on the second day of hearing despite Respondent's failure to notice Petitioners of her intent to call MOTHER as a witness.
Footnote 3: Respondent argued that she cannot be graduated because she has not satisfied the District's driver's education requirement or passed the swimming proficiency exam. She made no allegations regarding the satisfaction of any academic requirements and did not dispute the District's evidence that she satisfied all academic proficiency exams.
Footnote 4: Due to the denial of FAPE, the District was ordered to reimburse MOTHER for a portion of the costs of placing STUDENT at KidsPeace until the end of the 1998 extended school year. Because KidsPeace was not a certified nonpublic school pursuant to California Education Code Section 56366.1, the Hearing Officer was unable to determine whether STUDENT should be placed at KidsPeace for the upcoming 1998-1999 school year. See Cal. Educ. Code Sec. 56505.2(a).
Footnote 5: For purposes of clarity, it is noted that the transition plan ordered in case SN 476-98 is different from the transition plan ordered in case SN 1512-98/SN 1645-98. In SN 476-98, the Hearing Officer ordered the District to develop a plan to transition STUDENT from school to adult independent living. In SN 1512-98/SN 1645-98, the Hearing Officer ordered the District and Mental Health to develop a plan to transition STUDENT from KidsPeace to Seneca.
Footnote 6: On STUDENT's October 28, 1999 IEP, the team wrote that AMother reports that [STUDENT] is not receiving any academic services because she has completed the current academic program. Mother reports that KidsPeace is not willing to offer any other unpaid educational or academic services but cannot release her because she continued to need 24-hour adolescent residential treatment.@
Footnote 7: Federal and State law define Aprivate school children with disabilities@ as children enrolled by their parents in private schools, but not those children placed in private schools by a district.
Footnote 8: The Hearing Officer notes that these circuit court rulings were issued before the final regulations interpreting the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA were published. However, the courts' rulings are consistent with the final regulations which took effect May 11, 1999. For example, the new regulations indicate that children in private schools by choice have no individual right to special education and related services and that due process hearing and mediations are not available for complaints that a local educational agency has failed to provide services to the students. 34 C.F.R. '' 300.454 and 300.457. These circuit court rulings are also consistent with California Education Code ' 56174, which states that a district is not responsible for the costs of education of a student placed at a private facility if the district made a FAPE available to the child but the parent of the child elected to place the child in the private school.
Footnote 9: MOTHER also argues that STUDENT cannot be exited from special education until she receives appropriate vocational transitional services pursuant to the Hearing Officer decision in case SN 476-98. However, the decision required the District to develop a transition plan for STUDENT only after her placement at a residential facility pursuant to an IEP. Because MOTHER never returned STUDENT to the District's appropriately offered placement, the District's responsibilities in this area were never triggered and, thus, such argument is unavailing.
