California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · June 10, 2004

Student v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 348-04 · Hearing Officer Patrick J. Balucan

Saddleback Valley Unified breached a transportation settlement and must reimburse mileage and write an age-16 transition plan; other claims denied.

Split decision: student prevailed on 5 of 13 issues (1 in part)

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

Footnote 1 states the Decision was amended to correct the spelling of the student's name on the first page and to reflect the correct issue date; no other changes were made. Footnote 14 recommends that the student's counsel's conduct (withdrawing and refiling, and raising unsupported issues) be considered in any attorney's fees award. It also notes a prior withdrawn case, SN 03-02279.

Summary

Saddleback Valley Unified School District filed for hearing to establish that it did not have to bus a 16-year-old student with Down syndrome to an after-school day care outside its boundaries. The student filed his own case, and the cases were consolidated. He attended Esperanza School, a district school serving only special education students. A 2002 settlement agreement required the district to provide afternoon transportation from Esperanza to the Afterschool Team Activity Club (ATAC). Capistrano Unified buses provided that service until November 7, 2003. The district then offered a bus to Reilly Elementary, with an ATAC van for the rest of the trip. ATAC's owner testified she never agreed to that arrangement.

The Hearing Officer found that the district breached the settlement agreement and failed to comply with a February 2004 stay put order. He ordered the district to reimburse the mother's mileage. However, special education law alone did not require direct transportation to ATAC. The day care reflected the parent's preference and was not an IEP service. On FAPE, the district prevailed on speech-language services, goals, and the transition plans written while the student was 14 and 15. Several claims were treated as abandoned for lack of evidence. The district denied FAPE only by not updating the transition plan when the student turned 16. It was ordered to hold an IEP meeting to write one. Compensatory services and reimbursement for a private evaluation were denied.

Go to full decision

Why it matters

The decision shows SEHO enforcing an IEP settlement agreement under contract law and awarding mileage as damages. It also held that IDEA alone did not require busing to an out-of-district day care chosen by the parent. Finally, it found that an IEP must add the fuller transition-plan requirements once a student turns 16, even mid-year.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 1. Did the District provide Student with a FAPE for the 2002-2003 school year? (Student alleged insufficient speech-language services, inadequate transition plan, repeated money-identification goal, failure to implement speech services, failure to review goals at the October 29, 2002 IEP meeting, and lack of LRE.)

    Two 20-minute individual speech sessions plus classroom language work met the student's needs; the transition plan met the age-14 requirements; repeating an unmastered goal was appropriate; implementation and goal-review claims were abandoned; LRE was not decided because the parent was satisfied with Esperanza.

  2. Student prevailed in partIEP content

    Issue 2. Did the District provide Student with a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year? (Student alleged vague goals, goals not covering all needs, insufficient speech-language, inadequate transition plan, failure to implement speech services, and lack of LRE.)

    The November 5, 2003 goals and speech services were appropriate, but the District denied FAPE from March 27, 2004 (the student's 16th birthday) by not providing a transition plan that met the age-16 requirements, such as daily living skills, community services and interagency responsibilities.

  3. Student prevailedImplementation

    Issue 3. Did the District fail to comply with the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement when direct transportation from Esperanza School to Student's after school program was discontinued on November 7, 2003?

    The District breached the agreement to provide transportation from Esperanza to ATAC because it never secured the Reilly-to-ATAC leg; the mother's efforts to look for in-district day care were enough and did not release the District.

  4. Student prevailedStay put

    Issue 4. Did the District fail to comply with the Hearing Office's February 2, 2004 order regarding Student's stay put placement?

    The stay put order covered a District bus to Reilly and an ATAC van to ATAC, but the District could not provide the ATAC leg, so it did not comply with the order.

  5. District prevailedIEP content

    Issue 5a. Must the District include in Student's educational program an IEP to incorporate the goals contained in Dr. Davidson's report?

    The District's goals were appropriate, and Dr. Davidson's proposed goals exceeded what the student could achieve, so the request was denied.

  6. Student prevailedTransition

    Issue 5b. Must the District include in Student's educational program a referral to the Department of Rehabilitation?

    The Hearing Officer declined to order an immediate referral as premature but ordered an IEP meeting to develop an age-appropriate transition plan stating when the referral will occur.

  7. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 5c. Must the District include in Student's educational program direct transportation from the Esperanza School to the After School Team Activity Club (ATAC)?

    Under Fick v. Sioux Falls, the District could apply its neutral policy against transporting to day care outside its boundaries, because ATAC attendance reflected parent preference and was not an IEP service.

  8. Issue 6a. Is Mother entitled to reimbursement for mileage for transporting Student to his after school day care program?

    Under Civil Code section 3300, the mother was entitled to mileage reimbursement as damages for the District's breach of the settlement agreement and noncompliance with the stay put order.

  9. Issue 6b. Is Mother entitled to reimbursement for the psycho-educational evaluation conducted by Dr. Davidson?

    The student offered no evidence that the District's assessment failed to meet legal requirements, and disagreeing with its conclusions does not require public funding of a private evaluation.

  10. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 7a. If the District denied Student a FAPE, is he entitled to a verbal therapy evaluation as compensatory education?

    Compensatory education was denied because, apart from the age-16 transition plan, the District provided an appropriate program.

  11. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 7b. If the District denied Student a FAPE, is he entitled to additional speech and language therapy as compensatory education?

    Denied; speech-language services were found appropriate.

  12. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 7c. If the District denied Student a FAPE, is he entitled to 15 hours per week of discrete trial therapy as compensatory education?

    Denied; no denial of FAPE warranting this compensatory service.

  13. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 7d. If the District denied Student a FAPE, is he entitled to instruction with the Picture Gallery Early Concepts program as compensatory education?

    Denied; no denial of FAPE warranting this compensatory service.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • Reimbursement. Within 10 calendar days, the District shall reimburse the mileage the mother incurred to transport the student from Esperanza to ATAC for each school day from November 7, 2003 through the date of the Decision, at the District's prevailing rate. (The discussion section says reimbursement would include mileage from her work to Esperanza, Esperanza to ATAC, and ATAC back to work; the order refers only to Esperanza to ATAC.)
  • Order to convene IEP meeting. Within 10 calendar days, the District shall convene an IEP team meeting to develop an appropriate transition plan for a 16-year-old student. The discussion section also directs that the plan state when the student will be referred to the Department of Rehabilitation.

Go to full decision

Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range; Clyde K. v. Puyallup; Gregory K. v. Longview; Fick v. Sioux Falls; Burlington; Student W. v. Puyallup; Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage; Miller v. Fairchild Industries; Lester H. v. Gilhool; Miener v. Missouri; Cal. Civ. Code § 3300

People named in the decision

  • Dr. Rona Martin, District director of special education, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Robert White, SELPA director, South Orange County SELPA
  • Linda Avila, head dispatcher, bus contractor, Laidlaw Transportation
  • Martina Cruz, payroll coordinator, bus contractor, Laidlaw Transportation
  • Barbara J. Cunningham, special day class teacher, Saddleback Valley Unified School District (Esperanza School)
  • Mary Anderson, school-age autism specialist, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Carol MacPherson (also spelled McPherson), speech-language pathologist, Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Dr. Darlene Carney, school psychologist (triennial psychoeducational assessment), Saddleback Valley Unified School District
  • Beverly Wooley, director and owner of after-school day care program, Afterschool Team Activity Club (ATAC)
  • Jennifer Garvin, program director, after-school day care, Mission Viejo Christian Kid's Club
  • Dr. Christine Davidson, private psychologist; expert witness for Student, Private

Get new OAH special education decisions by email

A weekly Monday-morning digest of new California OAH due process decisions, each with a short plain-English summary from Vanaman German LLP.

You'll get an email asking you to confirm. Unsubscribe anytime. Subscribing does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Mission Viejo, California, on March 30 and 31, and April 1 and 2, 2004.

Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Saddleback Valley Unified School District (District) was represented at the hearing by attorneys Dan Harbottle and Epiphany Owen with the law firm of Ruttan and Tucker. Also present on the District’s behalf were Dr. Rona Martin, the District’s director of special education, and Robert White, the director of the South Orange County Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA). Present on behalf of Respondent/Cross-Petitioner STUDENT (STUDENT or Student) were Robin Champlin and Mike Jewell, his attorneys with the law firm of Roberts, Adams and Jewell. Also present on his behalf was MOTHER, his mother.

The District called the following witnesses to testify: Dr. Martin; MOTHER; Mr. White; Linda Avila, the head dispatcher for Laidlaw Transportation; (Footnote 2) Barbara J. Cunningham, STUDENT’s special day class (SDC) teacher; Mary Anderson, the District’s school-age autism specialist; and Carol MacPherson, STUDENT’s speech and language therapist. STUDENT called the following witnesses to testify on his behalf: Beverly Wooley, the director and owner of the Afterschool Team Activity Club (ATAC) program; Jennifer Garvin, program director of the Mission Viejo Christian Kid’s Club; MOTHER; Dr. Christine Davidson, a psychologist; and Martina Cruz, the payroll coordinator at Laidlaw.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. The record was held open for receipt of closing briefs. After receipt of the closing briefs, the record was closed and the matter was submitted for decision.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING (Footnote 3)

1. Did the District provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2002-2003 school year?

2. Did the District provide STUDENT with a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year?

3. Did the District fail to comply with the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement when direct transportation from Esperanza School to STUDENT’s after school program was discontinued on November 7, 2003?

4. Did the District fail to comply with the Hearing Office’s February 2, 2004 order regarding STUDENT’s stay put placement?

5. Must the District include the following in STUDENT’s educational program in order to provide him with FAPE: a. An IEP to incorporate the goals contained in Dr. Davidson’s report; b. Referral to the Department of Rehabilitation;

c. Direct transportation from the Esperanza School to the After School Team Activity Club (ATAC)

6. Is MOTHER entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses: a. Mileage for transporting STUDENT to his after school day care program; and b. The psycho-educational evaluation conducted by Dr. Davidson?

7. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is he entitled to the following compensatory education remedies: a. A verbal therapy evaluation;

b. Additional speech and language therapy;

c. 15 hours per week of discrete trial therapy; and d. Instruction with the Picture Gallery Early Concepts program?

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old student who is eligible for special education because of Down syndrome. STUDENT turned sixteen on March 27, 2004. He currently attends the Esperanza School, a school within the Saddleback Unified School District that exclusively serves special education students. STUDENT is significantly below average in intellectual functioning, with deficits in adaptive behavior which adversely affect his academic performance. After school, STUDENT attends the ATAC program for his day care services. ATAC is located outside the District’s boundaries.

This is not the first due process hearing involving the parties. On January 18, 2002, the parties settled a previous due process hearing. In that settlement agreement, the Student and District agreed to settle their differences regarding STUDENT’s after-school transportation services. The first paragraph of that mediation agreement stated as follows:

1. District agrees to have afternoon transportation provided for Student from Esperanza School to ATAC, (which District currently intends to accomplish through Capistrano Unified School District buses) for all days during which school is in session, including ESY, starting within 10 days of this Agreement. The District will continue to provide morning transportation from home to Esperanza School.

Furthermore, MOTHER agreed to continue to work with the District to pursue appropriate day care within the District’s boundaries. The agreement stated that the purpose of this provision was “to memorialize the District’s desire to be able to eventually provide transportation with the District’s own vehicles and completely within the District boundaries.” When the time came to implement the provisions of the agreement, the District provided transportation from Esperanza to ATAC on Capistrano Unified School District buses. Capistrano agreed to provide these services because it was already picking up students from Esperanza and transporting them in the direction of ATAC. The agreement only settled transportation issues; it affected no other areas of STUDENT’s educational placement. It also contained no provision regarding when this transportation arrangement would end. However, this transportation arrangement continued through the rest of the 2002 and through most of the 2003 calendar year.

On October 29, 2002, the IEP team met for the annual review of STUDENT’s program. At this meeting, the team agreed to a program that consisted of 5 days per week in an SDC class for severely disabled students. They also agreed to provide speech and language services consisting of two 20-minutes sessions per week of individual therapy and one 30-minute group session per week, and adapted physical education (APE) for five sessions per week for 50 minutes each session. This IEP also indicated that STUDENT was to receive special education transportation. The IEP does not indicate the precise transportation service to be provided. However, the District continued to provide STUDENT with transportation from Esperanza to ATAC using Capistrano District’s school buses. MOTHER provided her consent to implement this IEP.

On July 17, 2003, the IEP team met again at the request of MOTHER to revise the October 29, 2002 IEP. At this meeting, MOTHER expressed her concerns regarding STUDENT’s speech and language services. The team agreed to review her speech and language concerns at the annual review of STUDENT’s IEP in approximately October of 2003.

On September 10, 2003, the IEP team met once again. At this meeting, the District recommended that STUDENT’s APE services be reduced from 50 minutes per session to 40 minutes per session. MOTHER did not provide consent to implement these changes.

In the meantime, the District continued to provide STUDENT with transportation from Esperanza to ATAC using Capistrano Unified School District buses. However, On October 24, 2003, Dr. Martin received a phone call from the Capistrano Unified School District indicating that it was not willing to continue transporting STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC because it no longer had any children attending Esperanza. Dr. Martin called MOTHER to inform her that Capistrano could no longer provide the transportation services to ATAC. Dr. Martin also began calling other day care providers within the District to determine whether they could accept a student with STUDENT’s needs. On October 28, 2003, Dr. Martin again called MOTHER to discuss STUDENT’s transportation. Dr. Martin informed MOTHER that the District was willing to transport STUDENT to the Mission Viejo Christian Kid’s Club. As an alternative, Dr. Martin offered to transport STUDENT to Reilly Elementary, and then have an ATAC bus take STUDENT from Reilly to ATAC. MOTHER agreed to observe Kid’s Club in order to determine whether it was an appropriate after-school day care provider for STUDENT.

On October 30, 2003, the Hearing Office received a request for a due process hearing from MOTHER on behalf of STUDENT. (Footnote 4) Her request for hearing indicated only that she was seeking a stay put order to “ensure there is no disruption to STUDENT’s transportation.” Student later filed an amended issue statement that added issues generally related to the District’s denial of FAPE for the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school year. Student also requested reimbursement and compensatory education remedies.

On November 5, 2003, the District convened a meeting of STUDENT’s IEP team. Prior to this meeting, the District had conducted a triennial assessment of STUDENT. Using the Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (CTONI), the District’s assessors found that STUDENT’s cognitive functioning was in the significantly below average range. The results of the adaptive behavior tests determined that STUDENT’s functioning was comparable to that of an average individual at age 4 years and 4 months, and that his functional independence was very limited. Additionally, the speech and language assessment concluded that STUDENT’s receptive and expressive language skills were at or below the three-year-old level. The District offered the following program: five days per week in an SDC class for all subjects at Esperanza; 20 minutes of speech and language services two times per week; and 40 minutes of APE five days per week. STUDENT would be in special education classes for 100% of his day. This IEP meeting also resolved MOTHER’s issues with APE raised in the previous IEP team meeting.

Furthermore, the District informed MOTHER that Capistrano would stop providing transportation services from Esperanza to ATAC on November 7, 2003. The District offered to provide bus transportation to the Reilly school. STUDENT would then be picked up at the Reilly school by an ATAC bus. MOTHER did not agree to this arrangement because STUDENT’s bus trip to get to ATAC would take approximately one and one-half hours and would require him to switch buses at Reilly. MOTHER maintained that this was a safety concern for a student with STUDENT’s disabilities.

Capistrano discontinued its bus service from Esperanza to ATAC on November 7, 2003. The District maintained that an appropriate transportation service would be a District bus from Esparanza to Reilly, and then an ATAC bus from Reilly to ATAC. MOTHER refused this service. Since the time services were discontinued, MOTHER has driven STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC.

On December 23, 2003, the Hearing Office issued an order for stay put. STUDENT requested a stay put order for Capistrano and the District to continue to provide the transportation services from Esperanza to ATAC. The Hearing Office denied the order for stay put with regards to Capistrano. The Hearing Office ordered the District to “continue to provide transportation services specified in the January 18, 2002 agreement.” On January 2, 2004, STUDENT withdrew his request for a due process hearing.

On January 5, 2004, the District sent a letter to the Hearing Office requesting a due process hearing.

On February 2, 2004, the Hearing Office issued an order clarifying its previous order for stay put based upon a request from the District. The Hearing Office ordered that that “the mode of transportation selected by the District [to transport STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC] shall be similar and comparable to the transportation previously provided pursuant to the settlement agreement of January 18, 2002.” STUDENT did not respond to the motion for clarification.

On February 23, 2004, STUDENT sent a letter to the Hearing Office requesting a due process hearing. The District’s case and STUDENT’s case were consolidated on February 25, 2004.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

As its issue presented for the hearing, the District contends that it is not required to transport STUDENT outside of District boundaries to his day care provider at ATAC. The District argues that it has a policy of not transporting students to day care outside of District boundaries and that this policy is supported by State and federal law.

With regard to the transportation issue, Student responds that he requires transportation to ATAC in order to receive a free and appropriate public education. Furthermore, Student raised other issues related to his transportation. First, he argued that the District breached the January 18, 2003 settlement agreement when his transportation services were discontinued on November 7, 2003. Student argues that the District was required to provide direct transportation to ATAC pursuant to the settlement agreement, and that the District’s offer of transportation from Reilly to ATAC breached the terms of the agreement. Second, Student argues that the District’s offer of transportation failed to comply with the Hearing Officer’s order for stay put dated February 2, 2004. Student alleged that the offer of transportation from Esperanza to Reilly, and then Reilly to ATAC, did not comply with the Hearing Officer’s stay put order. The District responded that it has complied with both the settlement agreement and the Hearing Officer’s order.

Student also raised issues alleging that the District has failed to provide him with a FAPE for the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years. For the 2002-2003 school year, Student alleged that the District’s program was inappropriate in that it: failed to provide all of his speech and language sessions; failed to develop an appropriate transition plan; failed review the goals and objective at the October 29, 2002 IEP meeting; failed to develop goals that addressed all of his areas of need; failed to offer an appropriate amount of speech and language therapy; and failed to offer him a program in the least restrictive environment (LRE). For the 2003-2004 school year, Student argues that his program failed to provide him FAPE in that it: failed to provide him with all of his speech and language sessions; developed goals and objectives that were vague; failed to develop an appropriate transition plan; failed to develop goals that addressed all of his areas of need; failed to offer an appropriate amount of speech therapy and failed to provide a program in the LRE. The District responded that it has provided STUDENT with an appropriate program for those school years.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Issue No. 1: Did the District provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2002-2003 school year?

Pursuant to the IDEA and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 5600.) A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the student at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP). (20 U.S.C. § 1401(8).)

“Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the child. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal.Educ.Code § 56031.) “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” (Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).)

In Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), the United States Supreme Court addressed the level of instruction and services that must be provided to a student with disabilities to satisfy the requirements of IDEA. The Court determined that a student’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit, but that the IDEA does not require school districts to provide special education students with the best education available or to provide instruction or services that maximize a student’s abilities. (Id. at 198-200.) The Court stated that school districts are required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” that consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the student. (Id. at 201.)

The Supreme Court in Rowley also recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. (Id. at 205.) Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. (W.G. v. Bd. Of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992).) Procedural flaws, however, do not automatically require a finding of a denial of a FAPE. (Id. at 1484.) Procedural violations may result in a denial of FAPE if they result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process. (Id.)

Therefore, the inquiry in IDEA cases is twofold. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.) The first question is whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. (Id.) The second is whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive an educational benefit. (Id. at 207.) The school district has the burden of proving at an administrative hearing that it has complied with the IDEA, including that it provided an appropriate educational placement for the student. (Clyde K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No. 3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).) For the 2002-2003 school year, Student has alleged that the District failed to provide him with an appropriate program.

1. Compliance with Procedural Requirements

STUDENT asserts that the District has committed a procedural violation of State and federal special education law because it failed to review STUDENT’s progress on his goals and objectives at October 29, 2002 IEP meeting. However, Student presented no evidence that goals and objectives were not reviewed at this IEP meeting, nor did he argue this issue in his closing brief. The Hearing Officer considers this issue abandoned and will not address it in this Decision. (Footnote 5)

2. Substantive Appropriateness of Proposed Programs

To determine whether the District provided STUDENT a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s program. (Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987).) If the District’s program is designed to address STUDENT’s unique educational needs, is reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit, and comports with his IEP, the District provided a FAPE, even if STUDENT’s parents preferred another program and even if his parents preferred program would result in greater educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.) The District was also required to provide STUDENT a program which educates him in the least restrictive environment, with removal from the regular education environment occurring only when the nature or severity of his disabilities is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) Therefore, under the IDEA and Rowley, the program the District provided for the 2002-2003 school year must meet the following four requirements to constitute an appropriate educational program for STUDENT: (1) be designed to meet his educational needs; (2) be reasonably calculated to provide him some educational benefit; 3) comport with his IEP; and (4) provide him education in the least restrictive environment. (Footnote 6)

For the 2002-2003 school year, STUDENT contends that the District failed to comply with the above requirements. STUDENT contends that the District failed to provide him a program that was designed to meet his educational needs because it failed to provide an adequate amount of speech and language services, and failed to develop an appropriate transition plan. Student also argued that the District failed to develop goals and objectives that provided him with educational benefit. He further argues that the District failed to provide him with a program in conformity with his IEP when it failed to provide him with all of his speech and language services. Finally, he argues that the District did not provide with an education in the least restrictive environment. Each of these contentions will be addressed in turn.

A. Designed to meet STUDENT’s Unique Educational Needs

In order to determine whether the District offered a program for the 2002-2003 school year that met STUDENT’s unique educational needs, it is first necessary to determine what his needs were. STUDENT has Down syndrome and his deficits are generally undisputed. The parties agree that STUDENT has severe cognitive delays and is significantly below average in his intellectual ability. During this school year, STUDENT was in the ninth grade. His intellectual functioning, however, was below the kindergarten level. The parties also agreed that STUDENT exhibits severe speech and language delays. During this school year, his receptive and expressive language skills were at approximately the three-year-old level. The parties did not dispute that, based on these deficits, STUDENT required a program that addressed his low intellectual functioning, his speech and language deficits, his pre-vocational skills, and his gross motor functioning. The parties also agreed that he required individual and small group support to meet these needs. Moreover, neither party disputed that STUDENT’s program should focus on functional skills to prepare him for independent living. This would include transition services and pre-vocational training. However, Student argues that District did not provide an educational program that met these identified needs.

Speech and Language Services

With regard to the speech and language services, Student argues that he required more speech services than were provided. During the 2002-2003 school year, STUDENT was offered two, 20-minute individual speech therapy sessions per week and one, 30-minute group session per week. He contends that his individual speech and language therapy sessions should have been 30 minutes each. In essence, Student argues that each session of individual therapy provided by the District should have been ten minutes longer than actually provided. As noted above, STUDENT exhibited severe speech and language delays; his receptive and expressive language skills were at approximately the three-year-old level. Carol McPherson, the District’s speech and language pathologist, testified that the offer of two, 20-minute sessions of speech and language was sufficient to address STUDENT’s individual needs, such as his articulation and lack of understanding of prepositions and abstract portions of speech. However, Ms. McPherson stated that STUDENT’s overarching need with regard to his speech and language is to become a functional communicator. Thus, STUDENT’s speech and language needs are met not just with the individual therapy sessions, but in his classroom setting as well. Ms. Cunningham, STUDENT’s SDC teacher, testified that daily exercises in her class are designed to increase skills having to do with language concepts and use of language. For instance, in the classroom setting, STUDENT is forced to use language to request materials for projects he is working on in class, and language is used for in-class exercises which could include shopping at a grocery store. Ms. McPherson and Ms. Cunningham both testified that they collaborate with each other in order to increase the use of functional language in the classroom. In addition, Ms. McPherson testified credibly that STUDENT made progress in his speech and language goals and objectives for 2002-2003 school year.

Moreover, the evidence that the Student presented to show that two, 20-minute sessions of individual therapy were not appropriate was simply not credible. Dr. Davidson, Student’s psychologist, testified that in her experience as the special education director of Tustin Unified School District, the amount of speech and language services that the District provided seemed “questionable.” However, Dr. Davidson never testified that that the amount of services provided was in fact inappropriate. She testified that in her experience attending IEPs for developmentally delayed children such as STUDENT, recommendations for speech and language services was typically more than just two, 20-minute sessions per week. However, she provided no evidence that the services provided specifically for STUDENT did not meet his educational needs, or that ten extra minutes per individual speech session would be effective in addressing his individual needs or his overarching need to develop functional communication. Additionally, Dr. Davidson is not a licensed speech pathologist. The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive Student’s evidence in support of his assertion that the speech and language sessions needed to be increased by ten minutes each session. Thus the Hearing Officer finds that the District provided STUDENT with speech and language services that met his unique needs.

Transition Plan

STUDENT alleged that the transition plan developed at the October 29, 2002 IEP meeting did not meet the requirements of State and federal law. Specifically, Student argues that the transition plan in STUDENT’s IEP did not state how community resources would be accessed, did not identify programs to develop his daily living skills, and was not outcome oriented.

It was clear from the Student’s presentation of this issue that he was arguing that the District failed to include in his IEP an appropriate transition plan for students who are 16 and older. Student, however, overlooks the fact that, at the time this transition plan was developed, STUDENT had not yet turned 16 years old. At the time of the October 29, 2002 IEP meeting, STUDENT was only 14 years old. At the age of 14, State and federal law require only that the IEP include a statement of the transition service needs of the child under applicable components of the child’s IEP that focuses on the child’s course of study. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); Cal Educ. Code §56345.1(a).) Dr. Davidson, STUDENT’s psychologist, testified that she has developed thousands of transition plans and is well versed in the California Education Code requirements for transition plans. She testified that STUDENT’s transition plan was deficient and did not comport with the appropriate provisions of the law in all the respects noted above. However, the Hearing Officer finds her testimony unpersuasive on this issue. Dr. Davidson testified that the transition plan included in the October 29, 2002 IEP was not appropriate simply because it did not meet the requirements for transition plans for 16-year-old students, overlooking the fact that STUDENT was only 14 years old during this school year. Dr. White testified that this transition plan met the requirements of State and federal law for students who are 14 years of age. A review of the transition plan in the October 29, 2002 IEP indicates that STUDENT’s desired outcome was to continue to attend high school, be involved in a post-graduation program, and have a paying and meaningful job. Based on this desired outcome, the District stated that his transition needs were as follows: continue to work on IEP goals and objectives, continue to access public environments with his family and interact with his peers in his after school program; assess for and develop vocational interests, such as in working in a food program; and to work on vocational goals included in this IEP. Thus, based on a review of the transition plan, the Hearing Officer finds that it states STUDENT’s transition service needs as required under State and federal law. (See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); Cal Educ. Code § 56345.1(a).) Dr. Davidson did not present any testimony that the transition plan failed to meet the requirements for students of age 14 and older. Therefore, the transition plan in the October 29, 2002 IEP was appropriate.

B. Calculated to Provide Some Educational Benefit

Student argues that the goals and objectives in his October 29, 2002 IEP failed to provide him with educational benefit. He alleges that the goal for counting money was deficient because it did not address the fact that STUDENT had failed to make academic progress in the prior year, and any unmet goals from that year were repeated for the 2002-2003 school year. Student points out that STUDENT’s IEP from November of 2000 had a goal whereby “STUDENT will identify penny, nickel, dime, and quarter by name, and will sort those coins by type from a pile of change.” (District’s Ex. 1.) One of the goals developed at the October 29, 2001 IEP stated “STUDENT will identify pennies, nickels, dimes and quarters with 75% accuracy as measured by his seatwork and teacher observation.” Student argues that these goals are identical. Because this goal was repeated from a prior IEP, he argues, the goals and objectives were not designed to provide him with educational benefit. (Footnote 7)

The District does not dispute that the goal for identifying money in the October 29, 2002 IEP was identical to a goal in his prior IEP. The District argues, however, that the goal was still appropriate and provided him with educational benefit because STUDENT had yet to master that goal. The goal from the November 2000 IEP was only partially met by October of 2001. (District’s Ex. 1.) When the IEP team was developing STUDENT’s educational program for the 2002-2003 school year, it was clear the he still could not identify money. Additionally, neither party disputes that STUDENT is severely cognitively delayed. While no party disputes that identifying money is a skill that STUDENT could acquire despite his low cognitive functioning, Ms. Cunningham testified that he has a tendency to lose skills that he has mastered in the past. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that it was appropriate for the District to continue to address this skill with STUDENT’s goals and objectives for the 2002-2003 school year. The mere fact that this one goal was repeated does not establish that STUDENT’s educational program failed to provide him with educational benefit.

Moreover, a review of STUDENT’s entire educational program shows that he did in fact receive educational benefit. Dr. Davidson, Ms. Cunningham, and Ms. McPherson all testified that STUDENT needs to work on gaining skills to allow him to function in the community. To that end, and in addition to the goal stated above, STUDENT’s educational program included goals and objectives that would develop work skills such as getting ready for work, serving food, and food service sanitation in a restaurant setting. There were goals and objectives that would address the use of technology such as shredders and electric staplers in the office setting and would develop sorting and counting skills. In addition, STUDENT’s educational program included goals and objectives for social studies and science, increasing letter recognition and handwriting, and speech and language and APE goals. STUDENT’s educational program involved more than just learning how to identify money. Ms. Cunningham and Dr. White testified that these goals and objectives were appropriate for someone of STUDENT’s intellectual functioning. Ms. Cunningham and Ms. McPherson testified that STUDENT made progress on these goals during the 2002-2003 school year. Student presented no evidence to dispute these facts. Thus, based on the forgoing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s program was designed to provide him with educational benefit.

C. Conforms to his IEP

STUDENT argued that the District failed to provide him with all of the hours of speech and language that were called for in his IEP. He failed, however, to present any evidence on this issue, and neglected to argue this issue in his closing brief. The Hearing Officer considers this issue abandoned and will not address it in this Decision.

D. In the Least Restrictive Environment

Special education law requires that a child be educated in the least restrictive environment. (20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (c)(5)(A)(iii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031.) The IDEA mandates that a special education student be educated with nondisabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate and that removal from the regular education environment occur only when the “nature or severity of the disability of the child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” (20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(5)(A); see Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 and n. 24.)

STUDENT argues that the District failed to provide him with an educational program in the least restrictive environment. STUDENT contends that his placement at Esperanza High School did not provide him with any interaction with typically developing peers, and that, in and of itself, was a violation of state and federal law. However, MOTHER testified at hearing that she was satisfied with the Esperanza placement. The District has consistently informed MOTHER that there are other placement options available for STUDENT on regular education campuses, including at the District’s Serrano Intermediate School, where he would have inclusion and mainstreaming opportunities. (District’s Exs. 1 and 2.) MOTHER, however, insisted that STUDENT be kept at Esperanza. Additionally, when it was possible that Esperanza could close, MOTHER wrote a letter to the principal at Esperanza insisting that STUDENT continue to receive services there. (District’s Ex. 18.) Based on the foregoing, the Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER no longer disputes that the Esperanza placement was appropriate for STUDENT. Thus, the Hearing Officer makes no findings as to this issue. (Footnote 8)

Issue No. 2: Did the District provide STUDENT with a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year?

As noted previously, the inquiry under the IDEA is two-fold: first, whether the school district has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA; and second, whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the student to receive an educational benefit. (Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.)

1. Compliance with Procedural Requirements

STUDENT again asserts that the District has committed procedural violations of State and federal special education law because the goals and objectives it developed at the November 5, 2003 IEP were vague and ambiguous. However, while Student presented this issue as an issue to be heard at the due process hearing, he did not present any evidence that the goals and objectives were vague and ambiguous, nor did he argue this issue in his closing brief. Thus, the Hearing Officer considers this issue abandoned and declines to address the issue in this Decision.

2. Substantive Appropriateness of Proposed Programs

For the 2003-2004 school year, STUDENT contends that the District failed to provide him with FAPE. STUDENT contends that the District failed to provide him a program that was designed to meet his educational needs because it failed to develop goals and objectives that met all of his needs and because it offered an inadequate amount of speech and language services. He further argues that the District failed to provide him with a program in conformity with his IEP when it failed to provide him with all of his speech and language services. Finally, he argues that the District did not provide him with an education in the least restrictive environment. Each of these contentions will be addressed in turn.

A. Designed to meet STUDENT’s Unique Educational Needs

Neither party disputes that STUDENT’s educational needs did not change significantly from the prior school year. During this school year, the District conducted a triennial assessment prior to the November 5, 2003 IEP meeting. The District’s assessment concluded that STUDENT’s cognitive functioning was in the significantly below average range. In terms of his adaptive behavior, STUDENT functioned at an average individual at age 4 years and 4 months, indicating very limited functional independence for a student who was 15 years old at the time of the testing. The speech and language assessment concluded that STUDENT’s receptive and expressive language skills were at or below the three-year-old level. The IEP team determined that STUDENT had needs in the area of functional academics, speech and language, gross motor functions and adaptive behaviors, and that he required small group instruction to address these needs. STUDENT argues that the program he was provided in the November 5, 2003 IEP was not designed to meet his educational needs because it failed to develop appropriate goals and objectives, and because it did not provide him with an adequate amount of speech and language services.

Goals and Objectives

With regard to the goals and objectives, STUDENT asserted that the November 5, 2003 IEP failed to include goals that addressed the following areas: his ability to stay on task, his expressive language skills, his ability to identify currency, his ability to label and distinguish emotions, his social and peer interaction skills, and his daily living skills. Student argued that these are areas that Dr. Davidson identified through her assessment, and that they were not addressed by the IEP goals and objectives. Therefore, he argues, the goals and objectives did not address his unique educational needs.

Dr. Davidson’s report recommends several changes to the goals and objectives in the November 5, 2003 IEP. First, Dr. Davidson recommends that goals and objectives in the area of adaptive behavior and ability to stay on task be added to the IEP. Second, she recommends that the existing goals in his IEP be amended. With regard to the goals and objectives in the area of adaptive behavior, the Hearing Officer notes that these are not needs that the District failed to identify. In her report, Dr. Davidson concluded that goals and objectives for adaptive behavior and ability to stay on task should be added to STUDENT’s IEP. The District does not dispute that these were areas of need that STUDENT has always exhibited. The District’s most recent assessment found that STUDENT’s adaptive behavior functioning was equivalent to an average individual at age 4 years and 4 months. Furthermore, Ms. Cunningham testified that STUDENT does have a problem with staying on task. The conclusions in Dr. Davidson’s report were not at odds with deficits already identified by the District.

More importantly, the goals and objectives recommended by Dr. Davidson do not appear appropriate for someone of STUDENT’s cognitive ability. Based on her assessment, Dr. Davidson concluded that STUDENT’s abilities were in the low to very poor range, which is not inconsistent with the District’s conclusions from its triennial assessment. She testified that her results on the Comprehensive Test of Nonverbal Intelligence (CTONI) were equivalent to the District’s results on the same test. Dr. Davidson testified that her goals were aimed at setting high expectations and that she writes goals in order to overreach. Finally, she testified that the District’s goals were not inappropriate, and that her changes would make them “more appropriate.” But Mr. White testified credibly that the goals Dr. Davidson proposed were outside the realm of what a student of STUDENT’s low cognitive abilities could achieve. For instance, Mr. White testified that one of Dr. Davidson’s goals for STUDENT was that he memorize his phone number. However, STUDENT can currently only recall three numbers in sequence, and therefore remembering seven or even ten numbers would likely be something that was beyond his ability to achieve in one year. As another example, the recommendations that Dr. Davidson made for speech and language needs included sound blending, memory for words, and using articles for verbs. Ms. McPherson testified that these were skills for children with a cognitive ability of a five or six year old. These recommendations were beyond what STUDENT could attain at the start of this school year. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Davidson’s proposed goals do not address an area of need that the District failed to identify. They merely constitute a different conclusion as to what is an appropriate goal for STUDENT’s already identified needs.

Speech and Language Services

With regard to the speech and language services, Student again argues that the amount of speech and language therapy offered at the November 5, 2003 IEP meeting was not sufficient to meet STUDENT’s educational needs. At this IEP, the District offered two, 20-minute sessions of individual speech and language therapy per week. The 30-minute group session he had previously been receiving was discontinued. Student argued that he required two, 30-minute sessions of speech and language therapy; in essence, he argues that his speech therapy sessions should last for an additional 10 minutes. Student also contends that he should continue to be provided group therapy.

To support his position, Student again provided only Dr. Davidson’s testimony that this offer of speech and language services was “questionable.” Dr. Davidson again testified that this amount of speech and language was atypical of offers of speech and language services for students of STUDENT’s developmental level, based on her experience with prior IEPs. Furthermore, she did not state that the speech and language services offered by the District were in fact not appropriate, and significantly, did not state that STUDENT specifically required ten extra minutes per session of individual speech therapy to meet his educational needs. The fact that other students Dr. Davidson had observed would required two, 30-minutes sessions of speech and language therapy is not persuasive evidence that STUDENT, with his unique individual needs and individualized educational program, would also require that same amount of therapy. Ms. McPherson again testified that, for the 2002-2003 school year, the two, twenty-minute sessions of individual therapy were appropriate to meet STUDENT’s individual speech and language needs. Moreover, Ms. McPherson and Ms. Cunningham both testified that STUDENT continued to need to work on using language in more functional settings. To that end, they continued to collaborate as how to incorporate language into every aspect of STUDENT’s SDC placement. With regard to the group sessions, Ms. McPherson continued to collaborate with Ms. McPherson in order to incorporate group speech and language lessons into STUDENT’s everyday curriculum. In fact, Ms. McPherson, who again provided STUDENT’s speech therapy in this school year, testified that STUDENT was making progress in his goals and objectives in the amount of individual therapy provided. Thus it appears that the services provided were in fact meeting STUDENT’s needs. Finally, Dr. Davidson is not a speech and language pathologist. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds Ms. McPherson’s testimony more persuasive as to this issue. The Hearing Officer finds that the District provided an appropriate amount of speech and language services at the November 5, 2003 IEP meeting.

Transition Plan

The transition plan developed at the November 5, 2003 IEP meeting did not differ significantly from the prior school year. Student again alleged that the transition plan in STUDENT’s IEP failed to state how community resources would be accessed, failed to identify programs to develop his daily living skills, and was not outcome oriented. However, Student continued to overlook the fact that STUDENT was fifteen at the start of this school year. Thus State and federal law only require that the IEP include a statement of the transition service needs of the child under applicable components of the child’s IEP that focuses on the child’s course of study. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); Cal. Educ. Code §56345.1(a).) The transition plan included in the November 5, 2003 IEP, similar to the transition plan in his prior IEP, indicates that STUDENT’s desired outcome was to continue to attend high school, be involved in a post-graduation program, and have a paying and meaningful job. Based on this desired outcome, the District stated that his transition needs were as follows: continue to work on IEP goals and objectives, continue to access public environments with his family and interact with his peers in his after school program; and develop vocational interests through vocational activities. The IEP also included vocational education goals and objectives. The Hearing Officer finds that the transition plan in the November 5, 2003 IEP was appropriate while STUDENT was fifteen years old.

However, STUDENT turned sixteen years old on March 27, 2004. After he turned sixteen, the requirements for what must be included in STUDENT’s IEP changed. State and federal law require that, beginning at age sixteen and annually thereafter, the student’s IEP must include a statement of transition services the student needs before leaving the school setting. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); formerly 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(D); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1.) Transition services include instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living objectives, and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional vocational evaluation. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(C).) The services are to be designed within an “outcome-oriented process, which promotes movement from school to post-school activities, including secondary education, vocational training, integrated employment (including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living, or community participation.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A). A determination of appropriate transition services must be based upon the individual student's needs, taking into account the student's preferences and interests. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(B).) Toward this end, the District was required to invite STUDENT to attend each of his IEP meetings and, if he did not attend, to take other steps to ensure that his preferences and interests were considered. (34 C.F.R. § 300.344(b)(1) and (2).) Further, the IEP must include, when appropriate, “a statement of the interagency responsibilities or ... linkages” that are required for the transition services. (20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii).) (See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(vii); Cal. Educ. Code § 56345.1(b).) The District failed to present evidence that STUDENT’s transition plan in his November 5, 2003 IEP met these additional requirements. It appeared that the District continued to operate under this old transition plan even through the date of STUDENT’s sixteenth birthday. Notably, the transition plan, as set forth above, did not address his daily living skills, did not indicate how community services would be accessed and did not include a statement of interagency responsibilities for his transition services. Thus, from March 27, 2004 forward, the District has not provided the required transition plan to STUDENT. Thus, the District has denied him a FAPE in this respect from March 27, 2004 to the present.

B. Calculated to Provide Some Educational Benefit

Student did not allege that his program for the 2004-2005 school year failed to provide him with educational benefit.

C. Conforms to his IEP

For this school year, STUDENT again alleged that the District failed to provide the appropriate amount of speech and language services called for in his IEP. However, he failed to present any evidence on this issue, and did not address this issue in his closing brief. The Hearing Officer considers this issue abandoned and will not address this issue in the Decision.

D. In the Least Restrictive Environment

Student again argues that his program at Esperanza is not an education in the least restrictive environment simply because STUDENT has no opportunities to interact with typically developing peers. As noted above, MOTHER testified at hearing that she is satisfied with STUDENT’s current placement at Esperanza, and did not want STUDENT to move to any other placement. Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s educational placement in the LRE is no longer in dispute.

Issue No. 3: Did the District fail to comply with the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement when direct transportation from Esperanza School to STUDENT’s after-school program was discontinued on November 7, 2003?

STUDENT contends that the District failed to comply with the terms of the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement. He alleges that the settlement agreement requires that the District provide him with direct transportation from Esperanza to ATAC. Thus, he argues, when Capistrano discontinued providing its bus to ATAC, the District was still obligated to provide the transportation directly from Esperanza to ATAC. The District responds that the settlement agreement does not require direct transportation and that its offer to transport STUDENT to Reilly Elementary School to be picked up by an ATAC bus service complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. Furthermore, it argues, MOTHER has breached her obligations under the settlement agreement by failing to secure an after-school day care service within District boundaries. (Footnote 9)

Special education statutory law does not address how to resolve disputes regarding interpretation of settlement agreements. Absent special education rules for the interpretation of a settlement agreement, the Hearing Officer turns to California law. The law governing settlement agreements in California is clear. An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law. (Miller v. Fairchild Indus., 797 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1986); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 223 U.S. App. D.C. 39, 689 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C.Cir. 1982).) In such a situation, each party agrees to “extinguish those legal rights it sought to enforce through litigation in exchange for those rights secured by the contract.” (Village of Kaktovik, 689 F.2d at 230; Protective Closures Co. v. Clover Inds., Inc., 394 F.2d 809, 812 (2d Cir. 1968).) A release generally extends to all matters within the parties’ contemplation at the time it is executed. (Chadwick v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 297, 654 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Wash.App. 1982).)

According to the California Supreme Court, the primary objective in interpreting a contract is to “ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 1636; City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d 160, 164 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 511 (1996).) When a contract is unclear or ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to aid the interpretation of a written contract. (Pacific Gas and Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968).) To determine the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, the fact finder must engage in a preliminary consideration of all credible extrinsic evidence to determine “whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” (Id. At 37.) If the fact finder concludes that the proffered interpretation is reasonable, the extrinsic evidence relative to those meanings is admissible to determine what agreement the parties in fact made. If the contract is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, then the interpretative process should conclude after the court has completed its preliminary look at the context and the extrinsic evidence. (Id.)

First, the Hearing Officer will analyze whether the District’s offer of transportation after Capistrano discontinued its bus service complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. At issue is whether the transportation the District would provide pursuant to the agreement meant a direct route to ATAC (which is outside of the District’s boundaries) or whether some other arrangement would satisfy the District’s obligations. The parties would have the Hearing Officer use extrinsic evidence of their intent when they entered into the agreement in order to answer this question. However, the analysis need not go so far.

On its face, the agreement states that the “the District agrees to have afternoon transportation provided for Student from Esperanza School to ATAC…” After November 7, 2003, when Capistrano discontinued its bus, the District’s offer of transportation would have STUDENT take a District school bus to Reilly Elementary. After he was dropped off at Reilly, the District’s transportation plan would have an ATAC van transport STUDENT to the day care facility. However, the evidence introduced at hearing shows that ATAC was unwilling to transport STUDENT from Reilly to ATAC. Dr. Martin testified that she spoke with a representative of ATAC, who informed her that it would not be problem to pick up another student at Reilly because ATAC vans already pick up students from Reilly. (Footnote 10) But Dr. Martin acknowledged that she did not use STUDENT’s name, and did not give the specifics of STUDENT’s needs with regard to transportation. Nor did she identify herself as the District’s director of special education, or explain what the specifics of the proposed transportation arrangement were. Beverly Wooley, the director and owner of ATAC, testified at hearing that she has never been contacted by the District about transporting STUDENT from Reilly to ATAC and that she has never agreed to such an arrangement with the District. Moreover, Ms. Wooley explicitly stated that ATAC will not transport STUDENT based upon the transportation arrangement the District wishes to implement because she had too many concerns with the transportation arrangement. She even committed her concerns about the District’s offer to writing on December 3, 2004. (Student’s Ex. 64)

Thus, all that the District could offer when Capistrano discontinued its buses was a vague and generalized statement that ATAC could pick up another student from Reilly Elementary, which was emphatically repudiated by ATAC’s director once the details of the transportation arrangement were made known to her. While the District could arrange for transportation from Esperanza to Reilly, it did not secure transportation from Reilly to ATAC. Thus, it failed to abide by the very terms of the settlement agreement: to provide transportation from Esperanza to ATAC. (Footnote 11)

The District asserts that it was released from any further obligation under the agreement because of MOTHER’s failure to comply with its terms. The District alleges that the agreement was meant to be temporary, and that MOTHER was required to investigate and locate suitable after-school daycare services within District boundaries. To that end, MOTHER testified that she spoke with a “recreation center” to determine whether there were any suitable daycare providers within the District, and visited a daycare center near to her home. After Capistrano informed the District it would no longer bus STUDENT to ATAC, she visited the Easter Seals program and the Mission Viejo Christian Kid’s Club at the request of Dr. Martin. The District argues that these efforts were insufficient and breached the agreement, and that the District was released from any further obligations under the agreement. The terms of the agreement do not provide any guidance with regard to MOTHER’s obligations to investigate after-school day care services. The agreement merely provides that “parent will continue to work with the District to pursue possible appropriate after school day care within District boundaries.” The Agreement contains no other provisions as to precisely what MOTHER’s responsibilities were under the agreement. Because the terms of the agreement are unclear, the Hearing Officer will turn to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent when they entered into the agreement.

As for the District’s contention that the Settlement Agreement was meant to be only temporary, the Hearing Officer notes that the agreement does not state an ending date. General rules of contract construction state if the contract does not specify the time of performance, and the act cannot be done instantly, a reasonable time is allowed. (1 Witkin, Summary 9th (1990) Contracts, § 708, p. 642.) However, acts of the parties, subsequent to the execution of the contract and before any controversy has arisen as to its effect, may be looked to in determining the meaning. The conduct of the parties may be, in effect, a practical construction thereof, for they are probably least likely to be mistaken as to the intent. (1 Witkin, Summary 9th (1990) Contracts, § 689, p. 622.) The District continued to provide services through November 7, 2003, when Capistrano discontinued its bus service to STUDENT. From the District’s conduct, it is apparent that the Settlement Agreement was meant to apply at least through the time periods involved in this due process hearing.

Dr. Martin testified that as part of the agreement, MOTHER was to continue to seek out after school daycare within the District. MOTHER acknowledged that the settlement agreement required her to pursue other day care options within the District’s boundaries. Dr. Martin and Mr. White both testified that the purpose of having MOTHER investigate these other options was to find daycare for STUDENT within District boundaries. The District would then transport STUDENT to this daycare with its own buses. The agreement itself states that it is “the District’s desire to eventually provide transportation with District’s own vehicles and completely within District boundaries.” However, MOTHER’s obligations under the Settlement Agreement were to work with the District to pursue possible day care within District boundaries. To fulfill these obligations, MOTHER testified that she spoke with a recreation center to inquire about day care within District boundaries, and investigated a day care provider near her home. In the almost two years that this agreement was in place, there is no evidence in the record that the District believed that these efforts were insufficient to meets MOTHER’s obligations pursuant to the Agreement. From January 18, 2002 to November of 2003, the District held no fewer than three IEP meetings, none of which discussed STUDENT’s transportation needs to his after-school day care. At the October 29, 2002 IEP meeting, the annual review of STUDENT’s program, the District agreed that STUDENT required transportation, and then continued to provide transportation for STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC through Capistrano Unified School District buses up and until Capistrano stopped providing that transportation to STUDENT on November 7, 2003. Even after STUDENT’s transportation was discontinued, MOTHER continued to investigate possible day care within the District, as was her obligation under the Agreement, when she visited the Easter Seals and Kid’s Club programs at the District’s behest. Only when Capistrano indicated that it could no longer transport STUDENT did the District claim that MOTHER breached the agreement. As noted above, the Hearing Officer finds the conduct of the parties in the performance of the contract as persuasive evidence of their intent. (See 1 Witkin, Summary 9th (1990) Contracts, § 689, p. 622.) Thus, the Hearing Officer finds that MOTHER’s efforts at investigating possible day care within the District sufficient to meet her obligations under the settlement agreement. Her conduct did not discharge the District from fulfilling its obligations under the contract.

In summary, as long as Capistrano was providing STUDENT’s transportation services from Esperanza to ATAC, the evidence shows that the parties were content to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement. However, when it became clear that Capistrano would no longer provide those services, it was incumbent upon the District to continue to abide by its terms. Thus, the District breached the agreement by failing to secure transportation from Esperanza to ATAC.

Issue No. 4: Did the District fail to comply with the Hearing Office’s February 2, 2004 order regarding STUDENT’s stay put placement? (Footnote 12)

Student contends that the District has failed to comply with the Hearing Officer’s February 2, 2004 order regarding stay put because the District’s stay put placement was not “similar” or “comparable” to STUDENT’s previous transportation arrangements. The District responded that this issue was already adjudicated by the Hearing Office, and that the Hearing Office already ruled that its offer of transportation was constituted an appropriate stay put placement.

In its moving papers for the original motion for a clarification of a stay put order, the District delineated that its offer of placement was a District bus to Reilly and then an ATAC van from Reilly to ATAC’s facility. In issuing the summary order for stay put placement, the Hearing Officer already determined that this offer of placement was “similar” and “comparable” to the placement previously provided by the District. Thus, transportation on a District bus from Esperanza to Reilly and then an ATAC van from Reilly to ATAC’s facility, became STUDENT’s stay put placement for purposes of stay put. However, as noted above, the District could not provide this transportation service to STUDENT. As noted above, all that the District could provide was transportation from Esperanza to Reilly. ATAC’s director testified at hearing that she would never have agreed to this transportation arrangement. Thus, the District could not provide transportation from Reilly to ATAC, as required by the February 2, 2004 order regarding stay put. Therefore, the District has not complied with the Hearing Officer’s February 2, 2004 order.

Issue No. 5: Must the District include the following in STUDENT’s educational program in order to provide him with FAPE: a. An IEP to incorporate the goals contained in Dr. Davidson’s report; b. Referral to the Department of Rehabilitation; and c. Direct transportation from the Esperanza School to the After School Team Activity Club (ATAC)?

Student contends that the following services must be included in his IEP in order to provide him with FAPE: incorporate the goals and objectives in Dr. Davidson’s report; include a referral to the Department of Rehabilitation; and provide direct transportation from the Esperanza School to the ATAC. Each of these contentions will be addressed in turn.

Goals and Objectives in Dr. Davidson’s report

Student requests that his IEP be amended to incorporate the goals in Dr. Davidson’s report and to include a referral to the Department of Rehabilitation. Student contends that he requires these additional services in order to mend the deficiencies from his November 5, 2003 IEP. The Hearing Officer has already determined that the goals and objectives were appropriate. Therefore, the request to have Dr. Davidson’s goals and objectives included in his IEP is denied.

Referral to Department of Rehabilitation

The Hearing Officer has determined that the District denied STUDENT a FAPE from March 27, 2004 forward when it failed to develop an appropriate transition plan for STUDENT. Student is seeking a Department of Rehabilitation referral because it would provide STUDENT with job training and coaching, and would assist him in developing the skills needed for obtaining a job. However, the District responds that such a referral is premature. A referral to the Department of Rehabilitation would normally occur as STUDENT neared his eighteenth birthday. The Hearing Office declines to order the referral at this time, and finds that this is a matter best left to the decision of the IEP team. The District not yet developed an appropriate transition plan for STUDENT since he turned 16 years old. Thus, the District and Student are ordered to convene a meeting of the IEP team to develop a transition plan for STUDENT appropriate to his age. The Hearing Officer further orders that the transition plan state when STUDENT will be referred to the Department of Rehabilitation.

Direct Transportation from Esperanza to ATAC

Transportation is a related service which must be provided if necessary for a child to benefit from special education. (20 U.S.C. § 1401(22).) “Transportation” may include travel to and from school and specialized equipment (such as special or adapted buses, lifts, and ramps), if such equipment is required to provide special transportation for a child with a disability. (34 C.F.R. § 300.24(b)(15).) The appropriate mode of transportation will depend on the student’s unique needs. (See 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300, Attachment 1, § 300.24.) Neither party disputes that STUDENT requires transportation in order to benefit from his education. However, the District contends that it is not required to provide him with transportation to day care that is outside the District boundaries.

Student responds that he requires transportation to ATAC as an educational need, and that this request is not unreasonable because ATAC is only three-and-a-half miles from Esperanza. However, the District is not providing ATAC to STUDENT as part of his special education services. While STUDENT’s educational needs may have included transportation to after-school daycare, it would not include transportation specifically to ATAC. Moreover, Courts have held that districts are not required to transport special education children to a daycare outside of District boundaries. In Fick v. Sioux Falls, 337 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2003), the court held that a school district may apply a facially neutral transportation policy to a disabled child without violating the law when the request for a deviation from the policy is not based on the child’s educational needs, but on the parents' convenience or preference. (Id. at 970.) Dr. Martin and Mr. White both testified that the District’s policy with regard to transportation was that they do not provide transportation outside of the District’s boundaries. MOTHER was informed of this policy as early as October of 2001. (District’s Ex. 2.) Dr. Martin further testified that the District’s policy is to bus children outside of District boundaries only when these off-site services are required in their IEPs. Here, ATAC was not a service that was required pursuant to STUDENT’s IEP. Thus, the Hearing Office finds that STUDENT’s attendance at ATAC was due to MOTHER’s preference. The Hearing Officer concludes that the District is not required to transport STUDENT to ATAC in order to provide him with FAPE.

Issue No. 6: Is MOTHER entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses: a. Mileage for transporting STUDENT to his after school day care program; and b. The psycho-educational evaluation conducted by Dr. Davidson?

Student contends that MOTHER is entitled to reimbursement due to the District’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. MOTHER seeks reimbursement for her mileage for taking STUDENT to his after-school placement. Student also requests reimbursement for the psycho-educational evaluation conducted by Dr. Davidson, his private psychologist. Each of these requests for reimbursement will be addressed in turn.

Mileage Reimbursement

Parents may be entitled to reimbursement for the costs of placement or services they have procured for their child when the school district has failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement or services were appropriate under the IDEA and replaced services that the District was to provide. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; Student W. v. Puyallup School District (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 1489, 1496; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C).) However, request for reimbursement in this matter is a damage remedy sought for breach of a contract, namely, the District’s failure to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement. Pursuant to California Civil Code, section 3300, “For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.” In this case, STUDENT is seeking mileage reimbursement for the District’s failure to abide by the terms of the January 18, 2003 settlement agreement.

With regard to the mileage reimbursement, the Hearing Officer found that the District did not abide by the terms of the January 18, 2003 settlement agreement when it failed to provide transportation from STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC, and furthermore, did not comply with the Hearing Officer’s February 2, 2004 order regarding stay put. In any event, MOTHER continued to provide transportation for STUDENT with her own private vehicle. MOTHER would not have had to provide these services if the District had complied with the terms of its agreement. The Hearing Officer finds that the request for reimbursement for providing this transportation service would compensate MOTHER for the failure of the District to abide by the terms of the Agreement. The Hearing Officer concludes that the reimbursement to fully compensate MOTHER would include mileage from her work to Esperanza, from Esperanza to ATAC, and from ATAC back to work, for each day that school was in session and that MOTHER provided that service to STUDENT. Therefore, the request for reimbursement for mileage in transporting STUDENT to his after-school day care is granted.

Reimbursement for Dr. Davidson’s psycho-educational evaluation

A parent has the right to obtain an independent assessment at public expense if the parent disagrees with the assessment done by the school district. The school district must pay for the independent assessment unless there is a determination through due process that its assessment was appropriate. (Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56329(b) and 56506(c).) For an assessment to be administered appropriately, it must conform to relevant provisions of California Education Code sections 56320 and 56322. Student, however, has presented no evidence that the psycho-educational evaluation conducted by the District failed to meet those requirements.

Student argues that the psycho-educational assessment conducted by Dr. Darlene Carney, the District’s school psychologist, was not conducted appropriately because in her administration of the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised, she came to the conclusion that STUDENT needed “limited support.” First, the Hearing Officer notes that this seems to be a typographical error, as Dr. Carney’s conclusions read as follows:

STUDENT will need limited support, much more than others his age, primarily because of very limited adaptive behavior. (Student’s Ex. 36, pg. 29.)

Read as a whole, Dr. Carney’s recommendation is that STUDENT will need more support that other students of his age. More importantly, there is no provision in state or federal law that requires districts to pay for an independent evaluation simply because the student’s parent, or their private psychologist, disagree with the conclusions reached by the District’s own assessments. The District’s assessment must conform to the requirements set forth in California Education Code §§ 56320 and 56324, including, among other things, that the tests be validated for the purposes for which they are used and administered by trained personnel in conformance with test instructions. Student presented no evidence that Dr. Carney’s administration of the SIB-R did not conform to these requirements. The request for reimbursement for Dr. Davidson’s evaluation is denied. (Footnote 13)

Issue No. 7: If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is he entitled to the following compensatory education remedies: a. Verbal therapy evaluation;

b. Additional speech and language therapy;

c. 15 hours per week of discrete trial therapy; and d. Instruction with the Picture Gallery Early Concepts program?

When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. (School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369-370; See also 20 U.S.C. §1415(i).) Court decisions subsequent to Burlington also have extended relief in the form of compensatory education to students who have been denied a FAPE. (See, e.g. Lester H. v. K Gilhool and the Chester Upland Unified School District (3d Cir. 1990) 916 F.2d 865; Miener v. State of Missouri (8th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 749.) The Hearing Officer has found that, except for the failure of the District to develop an appropriate transition plan fafter STUDENT turned 16, the District provided STUDENT with an appropriate program. The requests for compensatory education are denied.

ORDER

1. Within calendar 10 days from the date of this Decision, the District shall reimburse the mileage that MOTHER incurred to transport STUDENT from Esperanza to ATAC for each day that school was in session from November 7, 2003, through the date of this Decision. Mileage shall be reimbursed at the District’s prevailing rate.

2. Within 10 calendar days of this Decision, the District shall convene a meeting of the IEP team. The IEP team will develop an appropriate transition plan for a 16-year-old student.

3. All other of Student’s request for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE

Pursuant to Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: (Footnote 14)

1. Did the District provide STUDENT with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 2002-2003 school year? The District prevailed on this issue.

2. Did the District provide STUDENT with a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year? The District substantially prevailed on this issue. STUDENT prevailed to the limited extent that the District failed to provide him with an appropriate transition plan from March 27, 2004 forward.

3. Did the District fail to comply with the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement when direct transportation from Esperanza School to STUDENT’s after school program was discontinued on November 7, 2003? STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

4. Did the District fail to comply with the Hearing Office’s February 2, 2004 order regarding STUDENT’s stay put placement? STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

5. Must the District include the following in STUDENT’s educational program in order to provide him with FAPE: a. An IEP to incorporate the goals contained in Dr. Davidson’s report; The District prevailed on this issue.

b. Referral to the Department of Rehabilitation;

STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

c. Direct transportation from the Esperanza School to the After School Team Activity Club (ATAC)? The District prevailed on this issue.

6. Is MOTHER entitled to reimbursement for the following expenses: a. Mileage for transporting STUDENT to his after school day care program; and STUDENT prevailed on this issue.

b. The psycho-educational evaluation conducted by Dr. Davidson? The District prevailed on this issue.

7. If the District denied STUDENT a FAPE, is he entitled to the following compensatory education remedies: a. A verbal therapy evaluation;

The District prevailed on this issue.

b. Additional speech and language therapy;

The District prevailed on this issue.

c. 15 hours per week of discrete trial therapy; and The District prevailed on this issue.

d. Instruction with the Picture Gallery Early Concepts program? The District prevailed on this issue.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. (Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i) (West 2004).)

Date: June 10, 2004 Patrick J. Balucan, Hearing OfficerCalifornia Special Education Hearing Office

The Decision was amended to correct the spelling of Student’s name on the first page and to reflect the correct date the Decision was issued. No other changes to the Decision were made.

2 Laidlaw Transportation provides the District’s bus services, including STUDENT’s bus service at issue in this due process hearing.

3 These issues are a restatement of the issues the parties presented for hearing in this consolidated matter, based upon the discussion of the issues held at the beginning of the hearing.

4 That case was captioned STUDENT v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District and Capistrano Unified School District and given case number SN 03-02279. The South Orange County Special Education Local Plan Area was eventually added as party as well.

5 This is one example of many in the due process hearing where Student presented issues at the beginning of the hearing during the clarification of issues, and then presented no evidence on that issue during the hearing.

6 The 1997 Amendments to the IDEA also require that students be provided with a program that “prepare[s] them for employment and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

7 This was the only goal that Student alleged was insufficient, and was the only goal upon which evidence and argument were presented.

8 At hearing, Student presented evidence that STUDENT required mainstreaming in his after-school daycare, and it appeared that he also argued that mainstreaming opportunities in his daycare setting should have been provided to STUDENT as part of an education in the LRE. However, nothing in state or federal law requires that the District provide LRE in a non-educational setting, such as for STUDENT’s after school day care.

9 In its closing brief, the District questioned whether the Hearing Office had jurisdiction to hear and decide this issue. The Hearing Officer notes that both parties requested that the Hearing Officer decide this issue, and in fact, the District explicitly acknowledged at hearing that this is an issue that falls within the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction.

10 Dr. Martin testified she spoke with “Scott” or “Jay.” She did not speak to Ms. Wooley.

11 The District also argued that it is not obligated to provide transportation to an after-school day care facility outside of District boundaries. Whatever the responsibilities of the District, it is undisputed that it entered into a contractually binding settlement agreement to provide transportation from Esperanza to ATAC. The District was required to transport STUDENT to ATAC not because of a legal obligation under State and federal special education law, but because of the contractual obligation it undertook pursuant to the January 18, 2002 settlement agreement.

12 The Hearing Officer notes that the District erroneously requested clarification of a stay put order issued in a prior case. However, that case was withdrawn on January 2, 2003. No subsequent order for stay put was issued in this consolidated matter. The Hearing Officer further notes that the District’s case in this consolidated matter was filed just three days after dismissal of the prior case, that stay put is automatic would not likely have changed between the prior case and this one, and that the Hearing Officer’s clarification of the stay put order analyzed the applicable law and the record before him in making his order. Thus, the Hearing Officer will analyze this issue as if the February 2, 2004 order clarifying stay put was a stay put order.

13 The Hearing Officer notes that Student never alleged at hearing that the assessments conducted by the District were not conducted appropriately. Student merely asked for reimbursement for Dr. Davidson’s assessment, and did not present any evidence as to the appropriateness (or lack thereof) of the District’s assessment.

14 When an award of attorneys fees is considered in this matter, the Hearing Officer recommends that the following be taken into consideration:

First, the Hearing Officer notes that this is not the first hearing between these parties. On October 30, 2003, Student filed a previous case involving the District, in which the same or similar issues were identified for hearing. Student, through his representatives, then withdrew that case after receiving a favorable ruling on a motion for stay put. After the District was forced to re-file, Student filed his own due process hearing request on the eve of hearing, again alleging the same vague issues regarding the provision of FAPE that were raised in their original, October 30, 2003 request for due process. Those matters were consolidated, necessitating a continuance of this due process hearing. Thus, the adjudication of the issues raised in the due process hearing were unnecessarily delayed due to the Student’s attorney’s misuse of the due process hearing procedures.

At hearing, the parties were asked to present their issues in their respective cases of this consolidated matter. After identifying many issues regarding FAPE, Student’s representatives presented no evidence on many of these issues, and in their closing brief argued many issues that were not raised on the first day of hearing at the discussion of the issues. The Student’s failure to delineate the issue for hearing with any sort of clarity, even up to the submission of their closing brief, caused the District to prepare for matters that were never addressed, and has caused the Hearing Officer to expend much time filtering through many issues that Student introduced but did not support with evidence. It was clear from Student’s conduct that the crux of the issue in this matter related to the transportation issue, and that the issues regarding FAPE were not in real dispute. In the future, it would behoove Student’s representatives to be better prepared at hearing and to narrow the issues to those in real dispute rather than raise many irrelevant issues in the hope that one of them is appropriate.