California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · July 25, 2000
Student v. Riverbank Unified School District
SEHO Case No. SN 363-00 · Hearing Officer Edwin Villmoare
Riverbank Unified must rescind expulsion and fund an outside ADHD-focused assessment for a student it found ineligible without testing.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Two earlier hearing settings were continued (June 13 and June 29, 2000). The basis-of-knowledge issue was split off for this separate expedited hearing, and the remaining issues were left for later proceedings.
Summary
A parent filed for a due process hearing for her 15-year-old son after Riverbank Unified School District expelled him over a February 2000 incident on campus. A prior district had found him eligible for special education with a learning disability. In August 1999, Riverbank and the Stanislaus SELPA found him ineligible without doing any new assessment, but they kept him in the resource specialist program. His grades were mostly Fs. A clinical evaluation and a county mental health report both pointed to ADHD. This expedited hearing decided one question: did the district have a "basis of knowledge" before the incident that the student had a disability? If so, he had the same discipline protections as an eligible student.
Chief Hearing Officer Edwin Villmoare found that the student's behavior and school performance showed a need for services. The district knew about his prior eligibility, about 1998 testing that showed a severe gap between his ability and his math achievement, and about signs of ADHD. None of the assessments was good enough to show he was not disabled. The district psychologist's view that ADHD was only a medical matter was legally wrong. The Hearing Officer rescinded the expulsion and ordered the district to return the student to his high school placement while proceedings continue. He also ordered an outside assessor with ADHD expertise to do a full psycho-educational assessment, followed by an IEP meeting on eligibility, both by August 14, 2000.
Why it matters
This decision shows how SEHO applied the 1997 IDEA protections for students not yet found eligible. A prior eligibility history, a severe gap between ability and achievement, and signs of ADHD were enough to give the district knowledge of a possible disability. An assessment done after the misconduct did not remove that knowledge.
Issues and holdings
- Student prevailedDiscipline
Issue 1. Is STUDENT entitled to "protections for children not yet eligible for special education and related services" pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8), including an order granting him stay put and rescinding his expulsion?
The district had a basis of knowledge before the misconduct: the student's prior eligibility, a severe ability-achievement gap, failing grades, and ADHD indications showed a need for services. No adequate prior assessment found him not disabled, so his expulsion was rescinded, stay put was ordered, and an outside comprehensive assessment was required.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Student's expulsion rescinded as contrary to Education Code section 48915.5 and 20 U.S.C. 1415(j) and (k).
- Order to assess. District must conduct a comprehensive psycho-educational assessment through an outside qualified assessor or team with expertise in ADHD, by August 14, 2000. The assessment must examine whether ADHD contributes to a qualifying disability.
- Order to convene IEP meeting. District must hold an IEP meeting to determine eligibility no later than August 14, 2000.
- Placement ordered. Until all due process proceedings are complete, the district must return the student to the high school placement he had before the expulsion (stay put).
- If either party is dissatisfied with the eligibility determination and seeks a hearing, that party must promptly notify the Special Education Hearing Office.
Key authorities
20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527; 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(j); California Education Code Section 56320; California Education Code Section 56339; California Education Code Section 48915.5; 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(22)
People named in the decision
- Glenda Nikolson, administrative assistant for special education, Riverbank Unified School District
- Neil Hawkins, Ph.D., school psychologist (1998 assessment), Waterford Unified School District and Stanislaus County Office of Education
- Laura Robinson, M.S., clinical assessor (November 1999 clinical assessment), Conducted for Riverbank Unified School District
- Jackie Connor, school psychologist (March 2000 update testing), Riverbank Unified School District
- Christine Lovely, attorney for District, Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud, and Romo
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
Case Number: SN 363-00 Case Year: 2000 Petitioner: STUDENT Issue:
CDS Code: 50-71225 District: Riverbank Elementary Disability Type:
Case Details This matter was heard on July 18, 2000, in Riverbank, California, by Edwin Villmoare, Chief Hearing Officer, California Special Education Hearing Office, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented by his mother, MOTHER. STUDENT attended the hearing.
Respondent Riverbank Unified School District was represented by Christine Lovely of Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud, and Romo. Also present for the District was Glenda Nikolson, administrative assistant for special education. Documentary and testimonial evidence was received. The record was closed at the end of the hearing and the matter submitted for decision.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The Special Education Hearing Office received a request for a due process hearing for STUDENT from his mother, MOTHER, on February 29, 2000. Ms. PARENT requested that STUDENT be assessed by an independent expert and found eligible for special education. After an unsuccessful attempt at mediation and several continuances, the case came forward for hearing on June 13, 2000. The initial hearing officer continued the matter. Apparently, Ms. PARENT had not submitted Petitioner's documentary evidence in a timely manner and wished to add additional issues, including the legality of STUDENT's suspension and expulsion for breaking into an automobile on school property.
The matter again came forward for hearing, this time on June 29, 2000. The hearing officer on that day continued the matter on the grounds that new issues had been added and that the issue of whether the District had a "base of knowledge" that STUDENT was eligible for special education within the meaning of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8) required a separate expedited hearing; the remaining issues would then be heard in subsequent proceedings.
ISSUE
Is STUDENT entitled to "protections for children not yet eligible for special education and related services" pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8), including an order granting him stay put and rescinding his expulsion?
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is a fifteen-year-old student enrolled in the Riverbank Unified School District. He began attending Riverbank High School in March, 1999. He is currently under expulsion for breaking into an automobile at the high school on February 2, 2000.
The scant evidence presented at the hearing indicates that prior to attending Riverbank Unified School District, STUDENT had been found eligible for special education as early as 1992 by the Waterford Elementary School District, apparently for a learning disability involving written language development and processing deficits in visual memory. An assessment at Waterford Unified School District conducted January 17, 1995 indicates that STUDENT suffered a severe discrepancy in written language and processing deficits in short-term memory. An IEP dated April 14, 1997 indicates that STUDENT "suffered significant deficits in auditory attention." Between 1992 and 1999, STUDENT engaged in angry, uncooperative, rebellious and, at times, destructive behavior, in part in possible reaction to the death of his father. STUDENT was also involved in thefts and was suspended from school on a number of occasions.
In an assessment by Neil Hawkins, Ph.D., school psychologist for Waterford Unified School District and the Stanislaus County Office of Education, conducted April 29, 1998, STUDENT scores on the Wechsler Intelligence Skill for Children - III were as follows: Verbal Index, 98; Perfomance Index, 125; and Full-Scale Index, 111. On the Kaufman Test of Academic Achievement, STUDENT's scores included 77 for Math Application, 87 for Reading Comprehension, and 75 for Math Computation. Dr. Hawkins found the math scores constituted a significant discrepancy between IQ and achievement. Dr. Hawkins "deem[ed] [the discrepancy] to be, in part, the result of boredom and lack of motivation/interest in completing (sic) in school and homework assignments," as well as low self- confidence and "possibly feelings of helplessness and mild depression." Dr. Hawkins also attributed STUDENT's discrepancy to "poor receptive/processing of knowledge and information." Dr. Hawkins gave STUDENT diagnoses of Dysthymia and Oppositional Defiance Disorder based on criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV). Dr. Hawkins did not offer an opinion as to whether STUDENT had a learning disability within the meaning of special education law or otherwise recommend a finding of eligibility or ineligibility.
At some point, the Stanislaus SELPA placed STUDENT in Stanislaus Academy, a private school from which STUDENT was expelled. Thereafter, he enrolled in Riverbank High School in March, 1999 and was placed in the resource specialist program.
STUDENT's grades for 1998-1999 (his 9th grade year) were primarily Fs. STUDENT's grades for the first semester of 1999-2000 were all Fs except for a C- in a special day class science course. STUDENT's class rank was 324 out of 334 students.
At an IEP meeting conducted in August 18, 1999, the Stanislaus SELPA and the Riverbank School District found STUDENT ineligible for special education. No assessment was conducted immediately prior to the IEP meeting. The IEP document for this meeting contains no explanation for the conclusion that STUDENT was ineligible. At the due process hearing, Ms. PARENT testified that she did not understand that her signature on the IEP document constituted an agreement that STUDENT was no longer eligible for special education. Thereafter, the District retained STUDENT in the resource specialist program, apparently to accommodate what were now viewed as "regular" education difficulties.
On November 4, 1999, Laura Robinson, M.S., conducted a "clinical assessment" of STUDENT. Ms. Robinson did not administer any standardized tests. Instead, she briefly reviewed STUDENT's family, developmental, mental health, and school histories and reported on her interview with STUDENT. She diagnosed him as suffering from a conduct disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) according to DSM-IV criteria. She rejected Dr. Hawkins' finding of Dysthymia. She attributed most of STUDENT's school problems to anger and low self-esteem. Ms. Robinson did not address the question of whether STUDENT has a processing disorder or might be learning disabled.
In the fall and winter of 1999, STUDENT was suspended on several occasions for a total of approximately 20 days. Most of the incidents involved acts of defiance. STUDENT also had numerous unexcused absences from ranging from 25 to 49 for various class periods.
On February 2, 2000, STUDENT broke into an automobile on school property and was expelled. By letter dated February 25, 2000, Ms. PARENT requested that STUDENT be assessed. On March 22, 2000, Ms. Jackie Connor, school psychologist, conducted what she described as "some update testing." She administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - III (WISC-III), the Kaufman Test of Education Achievement- Comprehensive (KTEA-C), the Detroit Test of Learning Aptitude, and the Taylor-Johnson Temperament Analysis Profile. On the WISC- III, STUDENT's scores were Verbal IQ 98, Performance IQ 125, and Full-Scale 111. (Footnote 1) On the KTEA-C, STUDENT's Math Computation score was 70; his Math Composite Score was 80. At the hearing, Ms. Connor testified that the Detroit Test of Learning Aptitude did not reveal a processing disorder, and that STUDENT's results on the Taylor-Johnson Temperament Profile, while elevated, were not sufficient to qualify STUDENT as disabled under SED criteria.
When asked why her report did not address the issue of STUDENT's possible ADHD, which is mentioned in a Stanislaus County Department of Mental Health report dated October 7, 1999, and in Ms. Robinson's report, both of which Ms. Connor reviewed, Ms. Connor replied ADHD is exclusively a medical condition and not a special education matter. She indicated that according to District policy, she had no responsibility to assess for this condition or explore whether this might be a component of a qualifying disability.
ANALYSIS
Under federal and state special education law, students found eligible for special education are accorded certain rights in disciplinary matters that include the right to stay put in the present placement until completion of due process proceedings and a determination of whether the student's misconduct arose from either a disability or an improper placement. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(j); California Education Code Section 56505(d). In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to extend the protections accorded to eligible students to some students not previously identified as eligible for special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8); 34 C.F.R. 300.527. These protections extend under limited circumstances to students not previously identified as eligible for special education services if: (1) the student has engaged in behavior that violated any rule or code of conduct of the school district, and (2) the school district had knowledge, or was deemed to have knowledge, that the student was a child with a disability "before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred." 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(A).
A "basis of knowledge" that the student should be viewed eligible exists when (i) the parent of the child expressed concern in writing . . . to personnel of the appropriate educational agency that the child is in need of special education . . . ; (ii) the behavior or the performance of the child demonstrates a need for such services; (iii) the parent of the child has requested an evaluation . . .; or (iv) the teacher of the child or other personnel . . . expressed concern about the behavior of the child to the director of special education of such agency or to other personnel of the agency. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(8)(e); 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(b). However, pursuant to 34 C.F.R. Section 300.527(c)(1), "the district would not be deemed to have knowledge if, as a result of receiving such information specified above, the district conducted an evaluation and determined that the child was not a child with a disability" or determined that an evaluation was not necessary and appropriately informed the student's parent of this decision. (Footnote 2)
In this case, the only grounds asserted by Petitioner is that STUDENT's behavior prior to the burglary of the automobile demonstrated the need for special education services. Petitioner argued that he should have been viewed as either learning disabled or suffering from a severe emotional disturbance.
As the background facts indicate, STUDENT arrived in the school district eligible for special education under his last IEP. Without conducting an assessment, the District found him ineligible. At most, the District possessed the assessment of Dr. Hawkins, dated April 29, 1998, which identified a severe discrepancy between intelligence and achievement in math and offered no conclusions that STUDENT had overcome his earlier problems, or that he was now ineligible for special education.
After finding STUDENT ineligible, the District through Laura Robinson conducted a "clinical assessment" to determine only if STUDENT suffered from a serious emotional disturbance. Ms. Robinson's assessment involved no testing, and all but ignored the issue of learning disability except to offer the diagnostic impression of ADHD. Ms. Robinson's clinical assessment does not remotely satisfy California requirements for an assessment. In fact, it is not a true psycho- educational assessment at all. California Education Code Section 56320.
By the time STUDENT broke into the automobile, the District knew that the Waterford District had concluded that STUDENT had a learning disability, that STUDENT was eligible for special education when he matriculated, that Dr. Hawkins had identified a severe discrepancy and that Ms. Robinson viewed STUDENT as suffering of ADHD and that evaluation by the Stanislaus County Department of Mental Health on October 7, 1998 also indicated that STUDENT suffered from attention deficit disorder. The District was aware that STUDENT's grades were extremely low and that he was struggling in school.
The District also knew of STUDENT's long history of defiance, truancy and theft. These behaviors may have blinded the District to STUDENT's prior special education history, the results of Dr. Hawkins's tests and the implications of ADHD as a recognized processing disorder.However, it is absolutely clear that ADHD may serve as a basis for eligibility if it is a component of a learning disability, an emotional disturbance, or other health impairment. California Education Code Section 56339. As such, school districts have an obligation to assess in the area of ADHD. Ms. Connor's notion that ADHD is somehow the exclusive domain of physicians is mistaken. Clinical and school psychologists across California currently assess in the area of ADHD. Moreover, even if a physician is needed, federal law makes it clear that school districts must use physicians when necessary for diagnostic and evaluation purposes. 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(22). Because of its inadequacies, Ms. Connors' assessment, like the assessments by Dr. Hawkins and Ms. Robinson, does not provide a basis to conclude that STUDENT was not a student with a disability. (Footnote 3) 34 C.F.R. 300.527(c)(1). Indeed, the significant discrepancies between aptitude and achievement they identify, along with indications of ADHD, constitute sufficient evidence for the District to know that STUDENT might be eligible for special education on the basis of a learning disability or another qualifying disability.
STUDENT's conduct, while it may be grounds for discipline if it does not arise from the disability or from inappropriate placement, cannot serve as the basis for denying eligibility. Indeed, a reading of the entry on ADHD in the DSM-IV indicates that much of STUDENT's misconduct could be a result of untreated ADHD. DSM-IV, pp 78-85. The Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT is a student entitled to "protections for children not yet eligible for special education and related services."
The question remains as to whether STUDENT is eligible for special education. The assessments presented by the parties, whether read individually or together, do not constitute a full current psycho-educational assessment of STUDENT in all areas of suspected disability. They do not justify STUDENT's termination from special education or provide a proper basis for determining his present status. Given the overall inadequacy of the various purported assessment reports and the vague and, in Ms. Conner's case, the legally incorrect testimony accompanying them, the Hearing Officer concludes that to resolve the question of STUDENT's eligibility nothing less than a full psycho- educational assessment equivalent to an initial assessment will suffice. California Education Code Section 56320. In particular, the assessment must explore STUDENT's apparent ADHD and determine whether it contributes to a qualifying disability, including a learning disability, emotional disturbance, or other health impairment.
Given Ms. Connors unfamiliarity with ADHD and the District's apparent ignorance of the laws governing school districts' responsibility to assess in the area of ADHD, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District must arrange for an assessment by an outside individual or team with substantial expertise in ADHD as well as the necessary credentials to perform an in-depth comprehensive psycho-educational assessment of STUDENT.
Both parties indicated a desire to resolve the question of additional assessment (and the possible question of STUDENT's eligibility) before school begins on August 14, 2000. Consequently, the Hearing Officer concludes that the assessment and subsequent IEP meeting(s) to review the assessment and determine eligibility must be concluded by August 14, 2000. (Footnote 4)
If STUDENT is found ineligible following the assessment, he is entitled to a hearing on eligibility. If STUDENT is found eligible, and the District seeks to reimpose expulsion on him, the District must fulfill all requirements of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(4)and (5) and California Education Code Section 48915.5. Under such circumstances, STUDENT would be entitled to an expedited hearing on the disciplinary matter. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(k)(6); 34 C.F.R. 300.525.
ORDER
1. STUDENT is entitled to " protections for children not yet eligible for special education and related services" under 20 U.S.C.1415(k)(8).
2. STUDENT's expulsion by the District is rescinded as contrary to California Education Code Section 48915.5 and 20 U.S.C. 1415(j) and (k).
3. The District must conduct a comprehensive psycho-educational assessment of STUDENT using an outside qualified assessor, or team of assessors, with expertise in ADHD and hold an IEP meeting to determine STUDENT's eligibility by no later than August 14, 2000.
4. Pending the completion of all due process proceedings, the District must return STUDENT to the high school placement he was in before his expulsion occurred.
5. If either party is dissatisfied with the results of the eligibility determination and seeks a hearing to resolve the matter, that party must promptly notify the Special Education Hearing Office.
PREVAILING PARTY
Pursuant to California Education Code Section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this requirement.
The Petitioner prevailed on the only issue heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety(90) days of receipt of this decision. California Education Code Section 56505(i).
Dated: July 25, 2000 Edwin Villmoare Chief Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnotes 1. These are the exact scores Dr. Hawkins obtained. 2. California uses the word "assessment" to refer to what the IDEA terms "evaluation." 3. Ms. Connors'assessment occurred after the break-in to the automobile. As such, it does not satisfy the provision relieving a district of basis of knowledge responsibilities occasioned by an assessment occurring prior to the misconduct triggering long-term suspension or expulsion. 34 C.F.R. 300.527(c)(1). Additionally, the District made no formal determination that an assessment was not necessary. 4. The federal provisions for an "expedited" evaluation do not apply in this case since STUDENT's misconduct involves neither weapons or drugs, nor was he placed in an interim alternative educational placement by a hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(c)(ii), 34 C.F.R. 300.527(d)(25).
