California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · December 7, 2000
Student v. Gold Trail Union School District et al.
SEHO Case No. SN 370-00 · Hearing Officer Hee C. Kim
Gold Trail Union and El Dorado County Office of Education owed no FAPE to a voluntarily placed private school student; reimbursement denied.
This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.
Noted in the decision
Minute orders issued September 6, 2000 (preliminary ruling on voluntary placement) and September 13, 2000 (allowing withdrawal of remaining issues without prejudice) were incorporated into this final decision.
Summary
Parents of an eight-year-old girl eligible for special education under autism filed for due process against Gold Trail Union School District and the El Dorado County Office of Education (COE). They sought reimbursement for her private religious preschool and kindergarten, Rainbowland Christian Preschool and then Cool Christian School, and for parent-funded services. Claims before March 4, 1997, were barred by the three-year statute of limitations by stipulation. The Hearing Officer first decided a preliminary question: was the student voluntarily placed in private school? The evidence showed the parents chose the private schools before any referral, for family and religious reasons. At the initial IEP meeting, the mother said she wanted the child to stay at Rainbowland. For the next two years, she asked only for speech-language therapy, which COE provided. On February 11, 1999, she asked the district to fund the in-home Lovaas program, which made up a large share of the child's instruction. The Hearing Officer treated that as the first request for a placement at public expense. Relying on federal special education agency guidance and Burlington, the Hearing Officer held that a district need not develop and offer a FAPE to a parentally placed private school child until the parents show interest in a public placement. The parents did not challenge the district's separate private-school duties under federal rules (EDGAR). The Hearing Officer therefore denied reimbursement for March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. The parents were allowed to withdraw later claims without prejudice.
Why it matters
The decision shows how SEHO treated parents who choose private school for personal or religious reasons. Under the IDEA rules of that era, the district's duty to develop and offer a FAPE started only when the parents asked for a public placement or public funding. Reimbursement turned on that date.
Issues and holdings
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 1. Did Respondents provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
Student was voluntarily placed in private school as a matter of parental preference until February 11, 1999, so Respondents had no duty to develop and offer a FAPE for that period; EDGAR compliance was not disputed.
- District prevailedUnilateral placement and reimbursement
Issue 2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the educational services they funded from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
Reimbursement for tuition, transportation, and parent-funded services was denied because no FAPE obligation existed for a voluntarily placed private school student, and no EDGAR claim was raised.
Issue Preliminary (statute of limitations). Whether claims accruing on or before March 3, 1997, are barred by the three-year statute of limitations (Education Code section 56043(p)).
Petitioner stipulated that claims accruing on or before March 3, 1997, were barred; the hearing addressed only claims from March 4, 1997, on.
- Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction
Issue Withdrawn issues. Petitioner's issues 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 (FAPE for 1999-2000 and 2000-2001, appropriateness of Cool Christian, compensatory services, placement at Cool Christian), and issues 3 and 7 as to claims on or after February 11, 1999.
Over Respondents' objection, the Hearing Officer allowed withdrawal without prejudice because, by analogy to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, trial had not commenced on those issues.
What the Hearing Officer ordered
- Petitioner's requests for relief denied in their entirety.
Key authorities
School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ.; OSEP Policy Letter to Miller, 25 IDELR 1214; OSEP Memorandum 00-14; Honig v. Doe; Hooks v. Clark County School Dist.; Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259; Udall v. Tallman; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca; Landgraf v. USI Film Products; 34 C.F.R. § 300.403; EDGAR, 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 et seq.; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 581
People named in the decision
- Jim Shock, Ed.D., superintendent, Gold Trail Union School District
- Gail Hancock, school psychologist (assessor), El Dorado County Office of Education
- Betty Connolly, school psychologist and program specialist, El Dorado County Office of Education
- Elena Rolene Singleterry, speech and language specialist, El Dorado County Office of Education
- Mary Kimzey, speech and language pathologist (assessor), El Dorado County Office of Education
- Shailesh Asaikar, M.D., private neurologist, Sacramento
- Cheryl Holden, regional center service coordinator, Alta California Regional Center
- Jeffie Gellerman, parents' advocate (non-attorney)
- Teaching for Autistic Children (TAC), private provider of in-home discrete trial training
- Rainbowland Christian Preschool, private religious preschool (parental placement)
- Cool Christian School, private religious school (parental placement)
- Alta California Regional Center, regional center funding in-home Lovaas program
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Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.
This matter was heard before Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer for the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific, in Placerville, California, on July 11 and 12, 2000.
Petitioner STUDENT was represented at the hearing by attorneys Roberta Savage and Bob Varma from the firm of Varma & Clancy. Also present on Petitioner’s behalf were her parents, FATHER and MOTHER. Respondents Gold Trail Union School District (District) and El Dorado County Office of Education (COE) were represented by attorneys Sherianne Laba and David Girard from the firm of Girard & Vinson. Also present on the District’s behalf was its superintendent, Jim Shock, Ed.D.
The following witnesses were called to testify on July 11 and 12: MOTHER; Gail Hancock, a school psychologist with COE; Betty Connolly, a school psychologist and program specialist for COE; Elena Rolene Singleterry, a speech and language specialist with COE; and Jim Shock.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING
1. Did Respondents provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
2. Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the educational services they funded from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
In an issue statement dated June 30, 2000, Petitioner identified the following issues for hearing: (1) whether Respondents provided STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for the 1996-1997 school year, including the 1997 extended school year; (2) whether Respondents provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 1997-1998 school year, including the 1998 extended school year; (3) whether Respondents provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 1998-1999 school year, including the 1999 extended school year; (4) whether Respondents provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 1999-2000 school year, including the 1999 extended school year; (5) whether Respondents provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2000-2001 school year; (6) whether Cool Christian School (Cool Christian) is an appropriate educational placement for STUDENT; (7) whether STUDENT’s parents are entitled to reimbursement for the educational services they funded from the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year through the date of the hearing decision; (8) whether STUDENT is entitled to compensatory services based upon denials of a FAPE during the 1996-1997, 1997-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-2000, and 2000-2001 school years; and (9) whether Respondents must place STUDENT at Cool Christian for the 2000-2001 school year.
I. Statute of Limitations
On the first day of hearing, Respondents, citing Education Code section 56043(p), moved to dismiss all issues barred by the three-year statute of limitations for special education due process hearings. The Hearing Officer noted that the request for hearing was filed on March 3, 2000, which means that a three-year statute of limitations could bar Petitioner from raising any claims that accrued on or before March 3, 1997. Petitioner stipulated that, in this case, the statute of limitations applied and barred the raising of claims that accrued on or before March 3, 1997. In light of this stipulation, it was determined that this proceeding would address only those claims arising on or after March 4, 1997.
II. Identification of and Ruling on Preliminary Issue
Also on the first day of hearing, Respondents raised as a defense the allegation that the parents never expressed an interest in a public school placement or a placement at public expense until they asked for a public school placement for the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years. Respondents contended that, before the 1999-2000 school year, they fulfilled the obligations they owed to STUDENT given her status as a “voluntarily” enrolled private school student.(Footnote 1) Petitioner disagreed, contending that there was no full discussion regarding placements at the initial individualized education program (IEP) meeting and that the parents sought a placement at public expense from Respondents every year. Petitioner asserted that STUDENT was not a “voluntarily” enrolled private school student during any of the years at issue.
Given the number of years at issue, the Hearing Officer concluded that the considerations of judicial efficiency required that a determination be made first on the issue of whether STUDENT was a “voluntarily” enrolled private school student from the period March 4, 1997, to the end of the 1999 extended school year session. Such a preliminary determination, by defining the extent of Respondent’s obligations to STUDENT during the aforementioned period, would narrow the scope of the evidence required. Accordingly, the opening statements and the presentation of evidence on the first two scheduled days of hearing, July 11 and 12, were limited to the preliminary issue identified. Both parties completed their evidentiary presentations with regard to the preliminary issue on July 11 and 12, and agreed to submit written closing briefs addressing the preliminary issue and continue the hearing to September 7-8 and 19-22, 2000.
Once the parties' written closing arguments addressing the preliminary issue were received, the record was closed for further evidence or arguments on the preliminary issue and the matter was submitted for decision. On September 6, 2000, having reviewed the evidence and the parties’ written arguments, the Hearing Officer issued the following minute order:
Based on the evidence presented with regard to the preliminary issue identified at hearing, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT was a “voluntarily” placed private school student during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. This finding is based on, among other things, MOTHER’s testimony that, at the initial IEP meeting, she stated that she did not want to move STUDENT from the Rainbowland Preschool program and the undisputed evidence that the parents did not subsequently thereafter indicate that they wanted a public placement or a placement at public expense until February 11, 1999. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was obligated to provide services to STUDENT as a voluntarily placed private school student during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, including meeting the requirements set forth in EDGAR during the period its provisions were in effect. However, a sufficient showing was made that on February 11, 1999, MOTHER made a request for public funding of an educational program for STUDENT. Thus, beginning February 11, 1999, the District was obligated to develop IEPs that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE. A more comprehensive discussion of this issue will be included in the final decision in this matter.(Footnote 2)
III. Petitioner’s Withdrawal of Remaining Issues
The hearing was reconvened on September 7, 2000. Before any further arguments or evidence was taken, Petitioner indicated that she considered the minute order issued on September 6 to be a final determination with regard to issues one and two and, insofar as they addressed claims arising before February 11, 1999, issues three and seven. Petitioner voluntarily moved to withdraw without prejudice the remaining issues she had presented for hearing. Specifically, Petitioner moved to withdraw issues four, five, six, eight, and nine. Petitioner also moved to withdraw issues three and seven insofar as they dealt with claims arising on or after February 11, 1999. Respondents objected to Petitioner’s attempt to withdraw any issues for hearing. Neither party was able to offer at hearing any authorities to support its position. Out of an abundance of caution, the Hearing Officer continued the hearing to give the parties an opportunity to brief the issue of whether Petitioner could, at this stage of the proceedings, voluntarily withdraw issues without prejudice.
On September 12, Petitioner submitted a brief in support of her motion to withdraw issues without prejudice. Citing California Code of Civil Procedure section 581(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), Petitioner argued that she was entitled to withdraw issues without prejudice because “trial” had not actually commenced on the particular issues identified in her request to withdraw. Petitioner pointed out that, during the first two days of hearing, the Hearing Officer had expressly limited the parties’ presentation of testimony to those matters which addressed the preliminary issue. Petitioner contended that, therefore, neither party had presented its case-in-chief with respect to the issues Petitioner sought to withdraw and that she remained entitled to withdraw the issues.
That same day, Respondents submitted their brief in opposition to Petitioner’s request to withdraw issues. Respondents argued that, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 581(b), “trial” had actually commenced on the issues identified by Petitioner for withdrawal because opening statements had been made and Petitioner had presented evidence regarding all issues, despite the express limitation set that only evidence regarding the preliminary issue should be introduced. Respondents also argued that Petitioner’s withdrawal of issues would severely prejudice them in that they had prepared to present evidence and arguments on all the issues Petitioner presented for hearing.
On September 13, having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the Hearing Officer issued the following minute order:
The Hearing Officer finds that Petitioner is entitled to voluntarily withdraw without prejudice issues related to the period after February 11, 1999. California Code of Civil Procedure section 581 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 41 provide useful guidance. Under both, a plaintiff may dismiss issues without prejudice before the actual commencement of trial. Here, trial did not “commence” on the issues being withdrawn because the initial hearing days were restricted to evidence and arguments on the preliminary issue. The preliminary issue constituted an adjudication of issues related to claims arising prior to February 11, 1999. Given that Petitioner has not raised as an issue or disputed whether Respondents met their EDGAR obligations from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, the adjudication of the preliminary issue is a final one. Therefore, there remains no need for further hearing dates and the hearing dates of September 19-22 are canceled. A more comprehensive discussion of these matters will be included in the decision issued in this case.(Footnote 3)
As the parties correctly pointed out, nothing in State or federal special education law addresses the situation presented here, where the petitioner is attempting to withdraw issues presented for hearing without prejudice after evidence and arguments have already been submitted on a number of the issues. In such situations, statutes concerning civil procedure provide some useful guidance in determining the factors to consider in ruling on such a request. The most closely analogous statute available is California Code of Civil Procedure section 581. Subsection (c) of section 581 states: “A plaintiff may dismiss his or her complaint, or any cause of action asserted in it, in its entirety, or as to any defendant or defendants, with or without prejudice prior to the actual commencement of trial.” The statute provides that a “trial” is deemed to actually commence at the beginning of the opening statement or argument of any party or his or her counsel, or if there is no opening statement, then at the time of the administering of the oath or affirmation to the first witness, or the introduction of any evidence. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 581(a)(6).
In this case, the evidence and arguments received thus far had been expressly limited to those related to the preliminary issue identified by the Hearing Officer (i.e., whether STUDENT was a voluntarily placed private school student from March 4, 1997, to the end of the 1999 extended school year). The Hearing Officer disallowed any attempts by the parties to introduce evidence or arguments on other matters during the first two days of hearing which had been held. Thus, trial had not actually “commenced” on the issues cited by Petitioner in her request to withdraw. Consequently, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner remained free to withdraw those issues without prejudice as neither witness testimony nor arguments had been taken with regard to those issues. The Hearing Officer noted that Petitioner had not raised as an issue or put into dispute whether Respondents met their obligations to STUDENT during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, given her status as a voluntarily placed private school student, i.e., whether Respondents provided STUDENT with a “genuine opportunity for equitable participation” in accordance with the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR), 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 et seq.(Footnote 4) Therefore, the only dispute at issue for the time period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, was whether Respondents complied with their obligations to offer STUDENT a FAPE. Given the Hearing Officer’s ruling that Respondents’ obligations to STUDENT during the period at issue were limited to those applicable to voluntarily placed private school children under EDGAR, the Hearing Officer concluded that the ruling on the preliminary issue constituted a final adjudication of issues related to claims arising prior to February 11, 1999.
BACKGROUND FACTS
STUDENT is an eight-year-old student who resides within the jurisdictional boundaries of the District. She has never attended a public school or been placed at the District’s expense. She presently attends Cool Christian School (Cool), a private religious school, where she was unilaterally placed by her parents.
On March 26, 1996, when STUDENT was three years old, STUDENT’s mother, MOTHER, filled out an enrollment application for STUDENT to attend Rainbowland Christian Preschool (Rainbowland), a private religious preschool, for the fall of 1996.(Footnote 5)
About three months later, on June 24, 1996, STUDENT was seen by Shailesh Asaikar, M.D., a neurologist in Sacramento, because of noticeable developmental delays. Dr. Asaikar’s diagnostic impression was that STUDENT had pervasive developmental delay (PDD). Dr. Asaikar recommended an early intervention program using behavioral modification and speech and language intervention.
A day or two after receiving this diagnosis, MOTHER contacted the District and spoke with Jim Shock, Ed.D., the District’s superintendent. She informed Dr. Shock that STUDENT had just been diagnosed with PDD and that she needed “help.” Dr. Shock told MOTHER that he could not enroll STUDENT in summer school because it was already in session, and that the District could not assess STUDENT until its staff returned for the upcoming school year. MOTHER contacted the District again in August 1996. This time, Dr. Shock referred MOTHER to the COE. MOTHER spoke with Gail Hancock, a school psychologist with the COE. MOTHER and Ms. Hancock then met, completed some paperwork, and set up dates and times during which STUDENT would be assessed. On August 22, 1996, MOTHER signed an assessment plan giving the COE permission to assess STUDENT in the areas of social and adaptive functioning, psycho-motor development, speech and language communication development, intellectual functioning, and health.
In early September 1996, STUDENT began attending Rainbowland. At about the same time, the Alta California Regional Center (ACRC) found that STUDENT was eligible for its services pursuant to the Lanterman Act. According to a psychosocial assessment report completed by an ACRC psychologist and intake counselor, ACRC found that the “most appropriate diagnoses” for STUDENT at the time were borderline to mild range of mental retardation and PDD, not otherwise specified (PDD/NOS).
On September 23, 1996, Ms. Hancock completed her assessment of STUDENT. In conducting the assessment, Ms. Hancock observed STUDENT at Rainbowland on two separate occasions, reviewed psychological records, interviewed MOTHER and STUDENT’s preschool teacher at Rainbowland, and administered the following tests: the Leiter International Performance Test, the Child Behavior Checklist, the Childhood Autism Rating Scale, the Child Symptom Inventory IV, the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, the Developmental Profile II, and the Childhood History Form. Ms. Hancock found that STUDENT’s behaviors were “suggestive to be symptomatic of Autistic Disorder” and that her behavioral manifestations were significant enough to warrant special education services. Additionally, Ms. Hancock found that STUDENT also had needs in the areas of communication and socialization and would benefit from a program which addressed socialization skills. Shortly thereafter, on October 17, 1996, COE speech and language pathologist Mary Kimzey completed a speech and language evaluation of STUDENT. Ms. Kimzey found that STUDENT demonstrated very significant delays in the areas of receptive and expressive verbal language, articulation, and pragmatic (functional) communication. Ms. Kimzey concluded that STUDENT would benefit from a program which was designed to enhance communication efforts and which focused on functional expression of daily needs, preferences, feelings, and social interaction. On November 6, 1996, the District’s school nurse completed a health assessment of STUDENT.
On November 7, 1996, an initial individualized education program (IEP) meeting was held for STUDENT.(Footnote 6) During the meeting, STUDENT’s preschool teacher at Rainbowland reported on STUDENT’s progress at preschool. The IEP team also discussed the assessment results and agreed that STUDENT was eligible for special education and related services as a student with autism. MOTHER then informed the team that, despite some problems during the first two months of the placement, STUDENT had adjusted to the Rainbowland placement and was doing much better. MOTHER also told the team that she wanted STUDENT to remain at Rainbowland because she had become comfortable with the placement. Additionally, MOTHER informed the team that, although STUDENT was not presently receiving any services from ACRC, MOTHER expected that ACRC would soon provide STUDENT with up to twenty hours per week of in-home training. Thereafter, the team agreed that the COE would provide STUDENT with direct speech and language therapy at Sutter’s Mill Elementary School (Sutter’s Mill), a District school, in two thirty-minute sessions per week. However, MOTHER declined the COE’s offer of speech consultation services at Rainbowland.
Following the November 1996 IEP meeting, the District provided STUDENT with speech and language services. In or about early January 1997, ACRC began to fund STUDENT’s early intervention in-home Lovaas program.(Footnote 7) STUDENT continued to attend Rainbowland during the remainder of the 1996-1997 school year and during the 1997-1998 school year. During that time, three IEP meetings were held on the following dates: April 30, 1997; October 9, 1997; and May 14, 1998. During these IEP meetings, the team discussed STUDENT’s progress and agreed that the COE would continue to provide STUDENT with direct speech and language services.
For the 1998-1999 school year, STUDENT’s kindergarten year, STUDENT’s parents enrolled her in Cool. An IEP meeting was subsequently held on November 30, 1998. The meeting proceeded in the same manner as that of the three previous meetings had: the team reviewed STUDENT’s progress, and then agreed that the COE would continue to provide STUDENT with direct speech and language services. On February 11, 1999, at the parents’ request, another IEP meeting was held. During this meeting, MOTHER requested that Respondents “assist” in funding STUDENT’s in-home Lovaas program. The staff members present at the meeting informed MOTHER that they would refer her request to the COE, and that another IEP meeting would be held after a staff member observed STUDENT in her Cool placement. The team then agreed that, in the meantime, the COE would continue to provide STUDENT with speech and language services.
Five days later, on February 16, 1999, the COE drafted a proposed assessment plan to obtain permission to assess STUDENT in all areas of development, including academic achievement, social and adaptive functioning, psycho-motor development, speech and language communication, intellectual development, and behavior. MOTHER signed the assessment plan on February 26, 1999. The COE thereafter completed its assessments, and an IEP meeting was convened on April 29, 1999. At the meeting, the team reviewed the results of the assessments and heard from various personnel, including STUDENT’s ACRC service coordinator, Cheryl Holden. Ms. Holden explained that ACRC expected to cease its funding of STUDENT’s in-home program by May 15 and requested that the District completely fund all services provided for the in-home program, including the discrete trial training provided by Teaching for Autistic Children (TAC), a private organization. The District denied MOTHER’s request that it fund TAC’s services. Ms. Hancock stated that the District could provide the discrete trial training requested by MOTHER on the Sutter’s Mill campus through a trained staff member in sessions conducted once per day. The staff members also discussed other program options at the meeting, including the COE’s special day class for autistic students. The team then agreed to continue the meeting to allow the participants to review the information presented.
On May 21, 1999, the IEP team met again. At this meeting, the team had in-depth discussions about the appropriate placement for STUDENT for the 1999 extended school year (ESY) and the 1999-2000 school year. According to the IEP, for the 1999 ESY Respondents offered STUDENT a summer school program from June 7 to July 2. For the 1999-2000 school year, Respondents offered STUDENT placement in a regular education first-grade classroom with resource specialist support, including direct instruction and classroom support, with a minimum of five hours per week of direct instruction. Respondents also offered STUDENT two thirty-minute sessions of direct speech and language therapy per week, with consultation to classroom staff provided one time per month. However, MOTHER requested, among other things, that STUDENT continue in her Cool placement with three to five hours of behavioral consulting services provided by TAC per week until June 2; continuation of the in-home program, including 28-30 hours per week of direct services during the summer; and, for the fall, placement in a regular education classroom at Cool, which the parents would fund, with a shadow aide and a fifteen-hour per week after-school program, three to five hours of services per week from TAC, and one hour of consultation per month from COE speech and language therapist Rolene Singleterry. The IEP meeting was adjourned without any agreement on services.
By letter dated June 4, 1999, Jeffie Gellerman, the parents’ advocate, communicated the parents’ refusal of the District’s offer for summer school services. Ms. Gellerman indicated that the parents did not believe that the District’s offer for summer placement was appropriate. Mr. Shock responded with a letter dated the same day. Mr. Shock clarified the District’s offers for the 1999 ESY and 1999-2000 school year. By letter dated June 8, 1999, Ms. Gellerman again communicated the parents’ refusal of the District’s offer of services for the 1999 ESY. STUDENT did not attend a District placement during the 1999 ESY.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ISSUE NO. 1: Did Respondents provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
Pursuant to the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities have the right to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. A “free appropriate public education” consists of special education and related services that are available to the child at no charge to the parent or guardian, meet the State educational standards, and conform to the child’s individualized education program (IEP).(Footnote 8) 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). The IDEA had in early 1997, and continues to have, the goal of providing a FAPE for all children with disabilities.(Footnote 9) 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2) (1991); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (1997). Towards that end, local educational agencies (LEAs), such as the District and the COE, are required to establish procedures to ensure that all children with disabilities in need of special education and related services who reside within the jurisdiction of the LEA, including children with disabilities attending private schools, are identified, located, and evaluated. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (1991); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A) (1997). Here, STUDENT was evaluated and, in November 1996, identified as a child with a disability in need of special education and related services. At the time of STUDENT’s identification in November 1996, she was enrolled in and attending a private religious school as the result of a unilateral decision made by her parents. She continued to attend private religious schools at her parents’ expense for the remainder of the 1996-1997 school year and during the 1997-1998, 1998-1999, and 1999-2000 school years. Given her status as a parentally placed private school student during the periods at issue, the question arises as to what Respondents’ obligations were to STUDENT during those periods.
There are three situations in which a child with a disability may attend a private school, and the obligations of an LEA changes with each of the situations. OSEP Policy Letter to Miller, 25 IDELR 1214 (1997). The first situation involves an LEA placing a child with a disability in a private school because the LEA has determined that the private school can provide the child with a FAPE. Id.; see, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 300.348 (1996); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(i) (1997). In this first situation, the private placement comes at no cost to the parents. 34 C.F.R. § 300.401(a)(2) (1996); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B)(1) (1997). In the second situation, the parents place the child in the private school because they believe that the LEA has denied their child a FAPE. Miller, 25 IDELR 1214; see School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ. (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 370-371, 105 S.Ct. 1996. In such a case, where the provision of a FAPE is at issue, the LEA may be liable for the costs of the private placement if the LEA denied the child a FAPE, and there is a finding by a due process hearing officer or a court of law to this effect. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 371; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (1997). The third and final situation also involves a unilateral parent decision to place the child in a private school, but differs in that the parent elects to place the child in a private school as a matter of personal preference and seeks only related services from the LEA. Miller, 25 IDELR 1214. In this third situation, the LEA may be obligated to provide the child with some related services during the child’s attendance at the private school, but the parent is not entitled to reimbursement for the private school tuition. Id.; 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.403, 300.451 (1996); Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997).
The dispute in this matter centers on whether the second or third of the situations described above accurately reflects STUDENT’s situation from March 4, 1997, through the 1999 extended school year (ESY). Based on the evidence presented, and for the following reasons, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT’s parents placed her in a private parochial school as a matter of personal preference, as reflected by the third of the situations described above.
With regard to the 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 school years, the testimony and documentary evidence showed that STUDENT’s parents applied for enrollment at Rainbowland and had decided to place STUDENT at Rainbowland before she was referred for a special education evaluation.(Footnote 10) The Rainbowland application form shows that the parents applied for enrollment at Rainbowland as early as March 26, 1996. MOTHER testified that, by May 1996, she had made the decision to place STUDENT in Rainbowland for the fall of 1996. MOTHER testified that Rainbowland was a “natural” choice since STUDENT’s older sister had attended Rainbowland and, because of this prior experience, MOTHER was familiar with the school and the staff and “understood” the drive. Moreover, even following STUDENT’s diagnosis in June 1996 and Respondents’ subsequent evaluation of STUDENT, MOTHER remained constant in her decision to have STUDENT attend Rainbowland. MOTHER testified that, at the initial IEP meeting held on November 7, 1996, she informed the IEP team that she did not want to move STUDENT from her Rainbowland placement and that she wanted STUDENT to continue attending Rainbowland. At the meeting, MOTHER explained that she did not want to move STUDENT because STUDENT had, after two months of difficulty, adjusted to the placement at Rainbowland and had “settled down.”(Footnote 11)
The testimonies of Dr. Shock and Ms. Hancock, both of who attended the initial IEP meeting, confirm MOTHER’s testimony in this regard. Various documents generated by the ACRC, which were submitted into evidence by Petitioner, also confirm MOTHER’s testimony in this regard. For example, a psychosocial assessment report from ACRC dated September 9, 1996, about the time STUDENT began attending Rainbowland, states, “The El Dorado County Office of Education has started evaluations, but MOTHER is not in favor of enrolling her daughter in special education because she is afraid STUDENT would mimic and imitate the other children with disabilities.” Moreover, a week before the initial IEP meeting, at an individual program plan (IPP) meeting held by ACRC on October 29, 1996, MOTHER informed the ACRC service coordinator that she wanted the District to provide STUDENT with one-on-one speech and language therapy, wanted ACRC to fund the senior and student therapists for the Early Autism Treatment (Lovaas) in-home program she had set up, and wanted STUDENT to continue attending her private preschool. According to the IPP document, MOTHER also informed the service coordinator that she would be attending an IEP meeting the following week “to determine speech and language services.”
Thereafter, for the remainder of the 1996-1997 school year and during the 1997-1998 school year when STUDENT attended Rainbowland, three more IEP meetings were held. As at the initial IEP meeting, the IEP team agreed at the three following IEP meetings that the COE would continue to provide speech and language services to STUDENT while she attended her private school. No evidence was presented to suggest that the parents ever expressed an interest during this period for a public school placement or a placement at public expense, or otherwise indicated an interest in enrolling STUDENT in the District.
As for the 1998-1999 school year, when STUDENT attended Cool, the evidence established that STUDENT’s attendance at Cool was also a matter of personal preference. The parents executed an enrollment contract for Cool on April 20, 1998, and paid the tuition for Cool on June 29, 1998. MOTHER testified that she and her husband enrolled STUDENT at Cool because STUDENT’s older sister was attending Cool. Additionally, MOTHER testified that they chose Cool because of its “attributes,” which she described as a small class size, a structured setting, and high standards of conduct for all students. MOTHER described these “attributes” as “all the foundations of a Christian education.” She testified that providing her children with a Christian education was important to her.
Documents dating as far back as December 1996 echo the importance that MOTHER placed on family and Christianity in making educational decisions for STUDENT. In a document handwritten by MOTHER on or about December 4, 1996, and entitled “Intensive Early Intervention Program Design,” MOTHER wrote, “We have every hope that with the help of the home-program therapy and a wonderful pre-school staff that STUDENT will be able to attend kindergarten at the same private school which her older sister now attends.” According to the evidence, STUDENT’s older sister had attended Cool since the fall of 1996. Further, according to an IPP dated April 28, 1998, which was introduced into evidence by Petitioner, MOTHER informed the ACRC service coordinators at the IPP meeting that she wanted STUDENT enrolled in a “normal” education program, “preferably with Cool Christian School.” MOTHER also stated that the family was preparing to transition STUDENT into Cool for the fall of 1998 and planned to have her attend Cool through April 1999. MOTHER further stated at the meeting that she would attend an IEP meeting with the District and request that it continue STUDENT’s speech and language therapy. Omitted, however, was any mention of the parents’ desire to seek an educational placement from the District. An annual IPP review completed by STUDENT’s ACRC service coordinator on October 5, 1998, further supports the conclusion that STUDENT’s placement at Cool was a matter of personal preference for the parents. According to the IPP review document, the service coordinator, who conducted a face-to-face visit with STUDENT and MOTHER, noted the following: “[MOTHER] has chosen a private school because it has a small class size with strong academic curriculum. [MOTHER] also wanted her daughter to receive a Christian education.”
Four IEP meetings were held for STUDENT during the course of the 1998-1999 school year, when she attended Cool. The first was held on November 30, 1998. At the November meeting, the IEP team again agreed that the COE would continue to provide speech and language services to STUDENT while she attended her private school. As with the prior IEP meetings, MOTHER did not express an interest in having Respondents provide or fund any other educational services for STUDENT. Further, no evidence was presented to suggest that, from the beginning of the 1998-1999 school year to February 10, 1999, the parents ever expressed an interest in a public school placement or a placement at public expense, or otherwise indicated an interest in enrolling STUDENT in the District.
All this changed, however, on February 11, 1999. On February 11, at the parents’ request, an IEP meeting was convened. During the meeting, MOTHER requested funding for the completion of STUDENT’s in-home Lovaas program. She told the team that STUDENT was receiving ten hours per week of in-home services in two-hour sessions after every school day.(Footnote 12) Because STUDENT was a kindergarten student at the time, a ten-hour per week program represented a substantial portion of her instructional time. In fact, documents introduced into evidence by Petitioner which were prepared during STUDENT’s kindergarten year, including an annual IPP review by ACRC dated October 5, 1998, and a report written by the TAC early intervention consultant for the in-home program dated April 29, 1999, indicate that STUDENT attended the kindergarten class at Cool approximately twenty hours per week. Thus, STUDENT was receiving a total of thirty hours of instructional time per day at the time, and the Lovaas in-home program constituted at least a third of that instructional time. Moreover, the home program for which the parent was seeking funding was not simply another related service, such as speech and language therapy. Compare with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1997); Cal. Educ. Code § 56363. It was, in fact, a discrete trial training program geared towards teaching autistic children in many different skill areas. For example, according to a monthly report written by her early intervention consultant on February 28, 1999, at the time of the February 11 IEP meeting, the in-home program was working on school preparation skills and pre-academic subjects such as the concept of before and after; comparisons like big, bigger, and biggest; and how to play basic outdoor games like red light/green light. MOTHER testified that the in-home program had been discussed at each of STUDENT’s prior IEP meetings and was used as a means by which she reported STUDENT’s progress to the IEP team. Thus, by the time of the February 11 meeting, Respondents were familiar with the scope of instruction provided by the in-home program. Given the nature of the specialized instruction provided by and the frequency of STUDENT’s in-home program, it constituted an educational placement, or at least a portion of STUDENT’s educational placement. Therefore, the Hearing Officer finds that a sufficient showing was made that, on February 11, 1999, MOTHER made a request for public funding of an educational program for STUDENT.
At the following IEP meetings held on April 29, 1999, and May 21, 1999, MOTHER reiterated her request that Respondents fund STUDENT’s in-home program, as provided by TAC. Respondents denied the parent’s request to fund TAC’s provision of the in-home program but made their own offers for programs for the 1999 ESY and 1999-2000 school year, which they proposed to be provided through their own personnel at public school sites. Thus, beginning February 11, 1999, Respondents were obligated to develop IEPs that would provide STUDENT with a FAPE. However, from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, Respondents were obligated to provide STUDENT with only those services which she was entitled to receive as a voluntarily placed private school student.
The Hearing Officer does not find persuasive Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary. Petitioner contended that, regardless of whether or not the parents voluntarily chose to place STUDENT in private schools, Respondents remained liable to make a FAPE available to STUDENT. Petitioner argued that, to meet their obligation to make a FAPE available, Respondents had to develop and offer an appropriate educational program to STUDENT. Additionally, Petitioner contended that the parent’s consent to the IEPs developed for STUDENT in November 1996, as well as those developed subsequently, was not “informed.” Petitioner argued that the parent’s consent could not have been “informed” because she was never told that her right to an educational placement, or reimbursement for an educational placement, could be affected by her choice to keep STUDENT in private school. Petitioner also seemed to contend that the parents were unaware that STUDENT could be provided an educational placement at public expense. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
First, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the law requires school districts to develop and offer an appropriate program at public expense for children whose parents have elected to place them in a private school or facility as a matter of educational or religious preference, as occurred here. The IDEA provides that, if a child with a disability has FAPE available and the parents choose to place the child in a private school or facility, the school district is not required to pay for the child’s education at the private school or facility. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403(a) (1996) (currently codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (1997)). Thus, the IDEA does not appear to require a school district to specifically develop and offer a FAPE to private school children where FAPE is not at issue. It only requires, in those cases, that FAPE be made “available.” While somewhat ambiguous, the provision cited above suggests that the concept of making FAPE “available” is different from the one proposed by Petitioner, that of developing and offering an appropriate program pursuant to an IEP.
The Office of Special Education Programs of the U.S. Department of Education (OSEP), the agency charged with monitoring and enforcing the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1402(a), has provided valuable guidance on this issue. Prior to the 1997 Amendments to the IDEA (IDEA ‘97), OSEP had consistently interpreted the private school provision to mean that a local school district is required to offer a FAPE to parentally placed private school children with disabilities only if their parents elect to return them to the public school. Miller, 25 IDELR 1214; OSEP Policy Letter to Anonymous, 23 IDELR 650 (1995); OSEP Policy Letter to Champagne, 22 IDELR 1136 (1995). In enacting IDEA ‘97, Congress codified in its entirety the regulation relating to parentally placed private school children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (1997). Since the passage of IDEA ‘97, OSEP has made clear its continuing interpretation that the IDEA does not require school districts to develop an IEP for a child which assumes a placement at public expense unless the parents indicate a desire for such a placement. For example, OSEP provided the following explanation in Attachment 1, Analysis of Comments and Changes, of the final IDEA regulations issued to accompany IDEA ‘97:
Comment: One commentator requested that the regulations clearly state whether a public agency must evaluate and develop an IEP for each private school child with a disability each year in order to avoid potential reimbursement claims. Discussion: The new statutory provisions, incorporated in the regulations in § 300.403(c), (d), and (e), provide that, as a general matter for children with disabilities who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, the claim for reimbursement of a private placement must be made before a child is removed from a public agency placement. It would not be necessary for a public agency to develop an IEP that assumes a public agency placement for each private school child each year. LEAs do have ongoing, independent responsibilities under the child find provisions ... to locate, identify and evaluate all children with disabilities in their jurisdiction, including children whose parents place them in private schools. This would include scheduling and holding a meeting to discuss with parents who have consented to an evaluation, the results of the evaluation, the child’s needs, and whether the child is eligible under Part B. [Citations omitted.] In addition, the LEA must offer to make FAPE available if the child is enrolled in public school. ... [S]ince LEAs must make FAPE available to all children with disabilities in their jurisdiction [citations omitted], public agencies must be prepared to develop an IEP and to provide FAPE to a private school child if the child’s parents re-enroll the child in public school.
34 Fed. Reg. 48, p. 12601 (1999) (emphasis added).
Additionally, as pointed out by Respondents in their closing brief, OSEP has continued to provide consistent guidance on this issue as recently as May 4, 2000. OSEP Memorandum 00-14, Questions and Answers on Obligations of Public Agencies in Serving Children with Disabilities Placed by Their Parents at Private Schools (2000). In Memorandum 00-14, OSEP was posed with the following question: “Following the initial determination that a parentally-placed private school child is an eligible child with a disability under Part B, must the public agency develop an IEP for the child?” OSEP provided, in pertinent part, the following response:
If a determination is made that the child needs special education and related services, the general rule ... is that an IEP must be developed for the child in accordance with 34 CFR §§ 300.340-300.350, with one important exception. If the parents make clear their intention to enroll their child at a private school and that they are not interested in a public program or placement for their child, the public agency need not develop an IEP for the child.
Id. at Q.8 (emphasis added).
Given the ambiguity of the statutory language regarding a school district’s obligations to parentally placed private school children, it is proper to defer to the construction adopted by the agency charged with monitoring and enforcing the statute. Honig v. Doe (1988) 484 U.S. 305, 326 n.8, 108 S.Ct. 592; see also Hooks v. Clark Co. Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2000). Deference to OSEP’s interpretation is particularly proper where, as here, interpretation of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue. Udall v. Tallman (1965) 380 U.S.1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792. The provision at issue in this case was originally issued as an administrative regulation. While the provision was enacted as a statute in July 1997, Congress adopted it in its entirety into the statutory scheme. Furthermore, heightened deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation is warranted where the interpretation represents a “consistently held agency view.” Compare with Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca (1987) 480 U.S. 421, 447 n.30, 107 S.Ct. 1207. As noted above, OSEP’s interpretation of the provision relating to parentally placed private school children has remained fully consistent through the years.
Moreover, OSEP’s interpretation of school districts’ obligations towards parentally placed private school children is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling that reimbursement for private school tuition may be available when a FAPE is denied. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. In Burlington, the Court found that retroactive reimbursement for private school tuition may be appropriate under the IDEA where a FAPE has been denied. Id. However, the Court’s analysis implied the need for a causal relationship between the school district’s actions and the parents’ decision to unilaterally place their child in a private school. Id. In justifying the need to have reimbursement available as a remedy, the Court stated:
... [P]arents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what they consider to be the appropriate placement. If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials.
Id.
Here, there was no such causal relationship between Respondents’ actions and the parents’ decision to unilaterally place STUDENT first in Rainbowland and later in Cool. The parents never expressed an interest in having STUDENT attend a public school or public expense until February 11, 1999. Until February 11, 1999, the parents, with full knowledge that public placements were available to STUDENT, made unilateral decisions to have STUDENT attend preschool and kindergarten at private, religious schools which her older sister attended. MOTHER’s testimony and Petitioner’s documents established that MOTHER had made the decision to keep STUDENT at Rainbowland before the initial IEP meeting was even convened. The evidence also established that the parents never expressed an interest in enrolling STUDENT in the public school before they enrolled her in and had her attend Cool.
Second, Petitioner’s argument that STUDENT was not a voluntarily placed private school student because the parent’s consent to IEPs was not “informed” was not supported by any legal authority. The law requires only that parents be provided with notice of the procedural safeguards available to them under the IDEA. 34 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1996); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1997). There is no dispute that MOTHER was provided with notice of the procedural safeguards as early as November 1996 and that they were explained to her. There was no additional requirement, as Petitioner claims, that obligated Respondents to explain to MOTHER the differing obligations Respondents owed to STUDENT should the parents decide to enroll her in the school of their choice.
Third, the Hearing Officer finds unpersuasive Petitioner’s assertion that the parents chose private schools because they were unaware of their right to a public school placement for STUDENT. MOTHER herself testified that, even before STUDENT’s initial assessment was begun in the fall of 1996, Ms. Hancock informed her that the COE had available a “good” program and that a bus could transport STUDENT to school. Additionally, according to MOTHER, before the initial assessment was completed, she called the COE and set up an appointment to visit its special day class for autistic students because she believed that the autism class would be offered to STUDENT at the IEP meeting.(Footnote 13) Further, MOTHER’s older daughter attended Sutter’s Mill for a number of years before attending Cool. Finally, although MOTHER testified that she did not speak with an advocate or attorney about STUDENT’s case until April 1999, she apparently had sufficient knowledge of her rights to make a request in February 1999 that Respondents fund the in-home program. Given these facts, the Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the parent was unaware of her right to request, or otherwise express an interest in, a public school placement for STUDENT. Rather, the evidence established that the parent purposely chose to continue STUDENT’s placement at a private preschool at the November 1996 and subsequent IEP meetings and then chose to have STUDENT attend a private school for kindergarten.
In summary, based on the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer concludes that STUDENT was a voluntarily placed private school student from the period of March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. Consequently, Respondents had no obligation to develop and offer STUDENT a FAPE from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, because she was a voluntarily placed private school student. The Hearing Officer also concludes that, on February 11, 1999, STUDENT’s parent requested a placement at public expense; therefore, beginning February 11, 1999, Respondents had an obligation to develop and offer STUDENT an appropriate program at public expense.
As noted previously, Petitioner did not raise as an issue or put into dispute whether Respondents provided STUDENT with a “genuine opportunity for equitable participation” in accordance with the Education Department General Administrative Regulations (EDGAR), 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 et seq, or otherwise met their obligations to her as a voluntarily placed private school student, during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer concludes that Respondents met their obligations to STUDENT during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999.
ISSUE NO. 2: Are the parents entitled to reimbursement for the educational services they funded from March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999?
When a school district denies a student a FAPE, the student is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of the IDEA. School Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). As noted previously, parents may be entitled to retroactive reimbursement for the placement they have procured for their child when the school district failed to provide an appropriate placement and the placement provided by the parents was appropriate under the IDEA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370. However, the Hearing Officer has already found that STUDENT was a voluntarily placed private school student from the period of March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, and that, therefore, Respondents were not obligated to provide her a FAPE during that period. Therefore, the parents’ request for reimbursement of the expenses they incurred to place STUDENT at Rainbowland and Cool, including the cost of tuition and transportation, during that period of March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999, is denied.
Additionally, as noted previously, Petitioner did not raise as an issue or put into dispute whether Respondents provided STUDENT with a “genuine opportunity for equitable participation” in accordance with the provisions of EDGAR, or otherwise met their obligations to her as a voluntarily placed private school student, during the period March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. Consequently, Petitioner did not argue that EDGAR entitled the parents to reimbursement for any of the related services, such as aide assistance, which the parents funded during the period of March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999. In light of the Hearing Officer’s ruling that Respondents’ obligations to STUDENT during the period at issue were limited to those applicable to voluntarily placed private school children under EDGAR, Petitioner has not established her entitlement to reimbursement for any of the educational services the parents funded during the period of March 4, 1997, to February 10, 1999.
ORDER
Petitioner STUDENT’s requests for relief are denied in their entirety.
PREVAILING PARTY ON EACH ISSUE
Pursuant to Education Code § 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: Respondents prevailed on the issues heard and decided.
RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION
The parties to this case have the right to appeal this decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).
Date: December 7, 2000 Hee C. Kim, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office
Footnote 1: The significance of this distinction will be discussed in detail in the analysis of Issue No. 1.
Footnote 2: This is, of course, the final decision referenced in the minute order. The comprehensive discussion of the issue of voluntary placement follows in the section entitled, “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.”
Footnote 3: As this is the final decision, the more comprehensive discussion of the ruling on Petitioner’s request to withdraw issues is set forth in the following paragraphs.
Footnote 4: During the reconvened hearing date of September 7, 2000, the Hearing Officer specifically asked Petitioner’s attorney whether Petitioner was contending that Respondents failed to meet their obligations to STUDENT under EDGAR. Ms. Savage responded that it was Petitioner’s position that STUDENT was not a voluntarily placed private school student during the period at issue, and thus she did not even “get to” the issue of compliance with EDGAR.
Footnote 5: MOTHER also indicated on the application an interest in STUDENT’s attending Rainbowland during the summer but, because no specific year was indicated with regard to the summer, it is unclear which summer session MOTHER was applying for. However, regardless of MOTHER’s expressed interest in summer services, the evidence established that STUDENT began attending Rainbowland in September 1996.
Footnote 6: MOTHER agreed in writing to an extension of the time line for STUDENT’s initial IEP meeting to allow for the completion of the assessment process and review of STUDENT’s placement.
Footnote 7: “Lovaas” refers to the early intervention program designed for autistic children by O. Ivar Lovaas of the Lovaas Institute for Early Intervention.
Footnote 8: “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, that is provided to meet the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22). State law refers to related services as “designated instruction and services” (DIS) and, like federal law, provides that DIS services shall be provided “when the instruction and services are necessary for the pupil to benefit educationally from his or her instructional program.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56363(a).
Footnote 9: The IDEA was originally enacted in 1970, Pub.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 178 (1970), and was amended in 1997, Pub.L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). Most of the provisions of the 1997 amendments to the IDEA (IDEA ‘97) became effective on June 4, 1997; a few became effective January 1, 1998, or July 1, 1998. Thereafter, Senate Bill No. 1686, which became effective January 1, 1999, amended various State statutes relating to special education. Additionally, the Department of Education issued new regulations to reflect the mandates of IDEA ‘97 on March 12, 1999. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12406 (1999). Petitioner’s claim with regard to the second half of the 1996-97 school year arose prior to the enactment of IDEA ‘97. While IDEA ‘97 did not alter the general standards reflected in the IDEA, the Hearing Officer will apply the law in effect at the time the disputed events occurred in compliance with the general rules against the retroactive application of laws. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994); see Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997).
Footnote 10: While the statute of limitations precluded Petitioner from raising any claims which arose on or before March 3, 1997, it is necessary to review the events surrounding STUDENT’s initial assessment and IEP meeting to determine the extent of Respondents’ obligations to STUDENT following March 3, 1997, especially since another IEP meeting was not held until April 30, 1997.
Footnote 11: Given this information, there is a natural inclination to question whether the parents might have been willing to consider another placement had one been offered at the beginning of the 1996-1997 school year. However, the Hearing Officer notes that no evidence was presented to establish that Respondents had an obligation to offer a placement to STUDENT at the beginning of the year. Although MOTHER originally contacted the District at the end of June 1996 about having STUDENT evaluated, an LEA is not obligated to develop an assessment plan for or assess individuals for special education eligibility during the period between regular school sessions. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321, 56344. Furthermore, an LEA is afforded fifteen days from the date it receives the special education referral in which to provide parents with a proposed assessment plan, and fifty days from the date it receives the parents’ written consent to assess in which to complete its assessment and hold an IEP meeting to develop an IEP. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56321, 56344. Any of these time lines may be extended with the parents’ written agreement, and MOTHER gave her written consent for an extension in November 1996.
Footnote 12: According to documents generated by ACRC and submitted into evidence by Petitioner, at about that time, ACRC had determined that STUDENT met its exit criteria and planned to discontinue its funding of her in-home program by May 15, 1999.
Footnote 13: MOTHER did not thereafter visit the autism special day class. According to MOTHER, shortly after she set the appointment to visit the class, Ms. Hancock informed her that she could not visit the class because the IEP team had not yet recommended any particular placement for STUDENT.
