California special education hearing decision (SEHO, before OAH) · May 27, 2004

Student v. Pomona Unified School District (consolidated)

SEHO Case No. SN 385-04, SN04-00385, SN04-00459 · Hearing Officer Terrence B. Ohler

Pomona Unified offered a FAPE for 2003-2004 through a Frostig School placement; Student's case was dismissed after his side stopped appearing.

District prevailed on all issues

This decision was issued by the California Special Education Hearing Office (SEHO) at McGeorge School of Law, which heard special education due process cases until the Office of Administrative Hearings took over new filings in July 2005 (SEHO finished some pending cases later in 2005). It applies the law in effect at the time.

Noted in the decision

The decision describes a prior case (SN03-00200/SN03-00541) that was dismissed on May 16, 2003 under a settlement. It records no appeal, remand, or correction of this decision.

Summary

Pomona Unified School District and a 16-year-old tenth grader with specific learning disabilities filed cross due process requests about the 2003-2004 school year. Under a May 2003 settlement, the student received 680 hours of Lindamood-Bell reading instruction plus home/hospital instruction. In the fall, the district concluded his progress had stalled. It offered the Marianne Frostig Center, a nonpublic school, for the second semester. The parents wanted 300 more Lindamood-Bell hours and continued home instruction.

The student's attorney took the case a week before the hearing, knowing she could not attend most hearing days. The Hearing Officer denied repeated requests for a three-week delay, finding no good cause. After the first day, no one appeared for the student. The Hearing Officer rejected the district's argument that the 2003 settlement barred older claims, because the settlement had no release. He still dismissed the student's case for failure to prosecute. He also dismissed the claims about 2004-2005 as premature. He dismissed the Section 504 claim and the claim about graduation credit for home instruction because the Hearing Office lacked jurisdiction over them.

On the district's case, the Hearing Officer found no procedural violations. The unsigned assessment report, the written Frostig offer, the school visits, and the IEP team's makeup were all lawful. He found that Frostig met the student's needs and that the 7.5 weekly home hours were delivered. The district prevailed on every issue, and no relief was ordered.

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Why it matters

The decision shows that SEHO would not delay a hearing when an attorney took a case knowing she was unavailable. It went ahead without the student and dismissed his case for failure to prosecute. It also shows that a settlement without release language did not bar earlier claims.

Issues and holdings

  1. District prevailedThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Prelim A. Whether Student showed good cause for a three-week continuance where counsel accepted the case knowing she was unavailable on the scheduled hearing dates

    Counsel taking a case knowing she cannot attend the scheduled hearing is not good cause; the right to counsel does not mean a right to a particular attorney, and the hearing went ahead without Student.

  2. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Prelim B. District's motion to dismiss Student's claims arising before May 13, 2003 as barred by the parties' prior settlement agreement and dismissal order

    The settlement had no release, and the dismissal order did not bar the earlier claims, so the motion was denied; Student's case (SN04-00385) was still dismissed for failure to prosecute.

  3. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Prelim C. Whether the District has offered FAPE to Student for the 2004-2005 school year

    Dismissed as not ripe because the District was not yet required to make an offer for 2004-2005.

  4. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Prelim D. Whether the District provided Student with the protections established by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

    Dismissed because the Hearing Office has jurisdiction only over IDEA claims, not Section 504.

  5. Dismissed / withdrawnThreshold and jurisdiction

    Issue Prelim E. Whether the District met its obligation under Education Code section 48206.3 et seq. in providing home/hospital instruction, including proper graduation credit and warning that home instruction could delay graduation

    Course credit and the duty to warn about delayed graduation fall outside due process jurisdiction under Education Code section 56501(a).

  6. District prevailedAssessment

    Issue 1A(1). District's alleged failure to ensure that the District's Academic Assessment Report dated November 25, 2003, was signed

    No law requires the report to be signed, the parents knew who wrote it, and there was no prejudice.

  7. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1A(2). District's alleged failure to provide a specific written offer of placement for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year

    The November 25, 2003 IEP and the February 2, 2004 letter made a clear written offer of Frostig School; Summit View was never offered.

  8. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1A(3). District's alleged failure to ensure that a representative from each of the two non-public schools attended an IEP meeting to explain each program

    No representative was required from Summit View, which was never proposed; the District tried to hold a meeting with Frostig present, but the parents did not respond to four letters.

  9. District prevailedImplementation

    Issue 1A(4). District's alleged failure to schedule visitations for the parents to visit non-public schools as stated in the November 25, 2003 IEP document

    The District's letters show it arranged specific visit dates at both Summit View and Frostig.

  10. District prevailedIEP procedure

    Issue 1A(5). District's alleged failure to ensure that a person from Lindamood-Bell attended an IEP meeting to discuss test results, and to convene the IEP team to consider the Lindamood-Bell representative's recommendation for more services

    District psychologist Kaye Goodwin was qualified to interpret the Lindamood-Bell testing; the team did not have to consider the provider's letter, and there was no harm because the parents refused further meetings.

  11. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1B(1). Was the District's proposed placement at Frostig School designed to meet Student's unique individual needs?

    Frostig's small, multi-sensory, applied academics program could carry out all of the May 12, 2003 IEP goals in reading, language, math and social skills.

  12. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1B(2). Was the District's proposed placement at Frostig School reasonably calculated to provide Student with educational benefit?

    Frostig was reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit, and district witnesses agreed that more Lindamood-Bell plus home instruction was not appropriate given the student's limited progress.

  13. District prevailedImplementation

    Issue 1B(3). Did the District's placement comport with Student's IEP, including whether the District failed to provide the full 7.5 hours per week of home instruction required by the November 25, 2003 IEP

    Frostig would have carried out the IEP, and the home teacher credibly testified that she provided 1.5 hours a day (7.5 hours a week) of instruction.

  14. District prevailedPlacement and LRE

    Issue 1B(4). Did the District's proposed placement provide Student an education in the LRE?

    Undisputed; Frostig was far less restrictive than the home instruction plus Lindamood-Bell services the parents sought.

  15. District prevailedFAPE: services offered

    Issue 2. If the District denied Student a FAPE during the 2003-2004 regular school year, is he entitled to compensatory education?

    The request for 300 more Lindamood-Bell hours was denied because there was no denial of FAPE, and there was no link between the relief sought and the violations alleged.

What the Hearing Officer ordered

  • The Hearing Officer found that the District offered and provided a FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year and denied all of Student's requests for relief. Student's case, SN04-00385, was dismissed for failure to prosecute.

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Key authorities

Rowley; W.G. v. Target Range Sch. Dist.; Union School Dist. v. Smith; Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist.; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S.; Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist.; Burlington; Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist.; Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm.; Salmeron v. United States; Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co.; Macaulay v. Anas; Honig v. Doe

People named in the decision

  • Trena Spurlock, director of special education, Pomona Unified School District
  • Kaye Goodwin, lead school psychologist, Pomona Unified School District
  • Beth Pioli, speech pathologist, Pomona Unified School District
  • Diane LaBomme, program specialist, Pomona Unified School District
  • Opel Johnson, special day class teacher providing home/hospital instruction, Pomona Unified School District
  • Dr. Chris Schnieders, director of teacher training, nonpublic school (district witness), Marianne Frostig Center for Educational Therapy (Frostig School)
  • Mr. Harbeson, associate clinical director, private reading provider, Lindamood-Bell, Pasadena
  • Christopher Russell, educational advocate for Student
  • Lindamood-Bell, private reading instruction provider
  • Summit View School, nonpublic school considered by parents
  • Gloria Marquez, signed earlier IEP documents (role not stated), Pomona Unified School District (presumed)

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Full text of the decision

Text of the SEHO decision as published by the California Department of Education, which replaced student and family names with placeholders such as STUDENT and MOTHER. Names, initials, birthdates, and addresses that were missed have also been removed, and page headers have been dropped.

This matter was heard before Terrence Ohler, Hearing Officer of the California Special Education Hearing Office (Hearing Office), University of the Pacific’s McGeorge School of Law, in Pomona, California, on April 20 and 21, 2004, and by teleconference on April 22, 2004.

On the first day of hearing, STUDENT was represented by attorney Tania Whiteleather of the Law Offices of Tania L. Whiteleather. Also present on STUDENT’s behalf were his mother, MOTHER, his father, FATHER, and his educational advocate, Christopher Russell. As explained further below, no person appeared on behalf of STUDENT on the second day of hearing on April 21, 2004, or during the teleconference of April 22, 2004, although Ms. Whiteleather and Mr. Russell joined the teleconference briefly at the beginning of the call. Pomona Unified School District (District) was represented by G. Robert Roice, educational consultant. Also present on the District’s behalf was Trena Spurlock, the District’s director of special education.

Student did not call any witnesses. The District called the following witnesses: Ms. Spurlock; Kaye Goodwin, the District’s lead school psychologist; Beth Pioli, a District speech pathologist; Diane LaBomme, a District program specialist; Opel Johnson, a District special day class teacher who worked with STUDENT at home; and Dr. Chris Schnieders, director of teacher training at the Marianne Frostig Center for Educational Therapy (Frostig School), which is a certified non-public school.

Oral and documentary evidence was received. Student did not present a closing argument. Following the oral closing argument of the District, the matter was submitted for decision.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

A. Student’s Motions to Continue

The following discussion relates to Student’s multiple requests for a continuance, both before and during the first day of hearing. Each request has already been denied. The following is a summary of the basis for those rulings. On February 23, 2004, the Hearing Office received from educational advocate Christopher Russell Student’s request for due process in case number SN04-00385. The request generally raised claims related to the denial of a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. On March 3, 2004, the Hearing Office received from educational consultant Robert Roice the District’s request for due process, which as clarified by a letter dated April 12, 2004, raised the issue of whether the District had provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 school year. The District’s case was assigned case number SN04-00459. On March 4, 2004, the Hearing Office notified the parties that the hearing on Student’s case was continued and rescheduled from March 18, 2004, to April 20, 2004, in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

On March 23, 2004, the Hearing Office received Student’s motion to consolidate his case with the District’s case. On March 29, 2004, the Hearing Office received the District’s letter indicating that it did not oppose the consolidation request but would oppose a continuance beyond the currently scheduled hearing date, which was April 20, 2004. By minute order dated March 31, 2004, the Hearing Office granted the motion to consolidate, indicating that the “consolidated matter shall proceed to hearing on April 20, 2004, the hearing date set in SN04-00385.”

On April 12, 2004, the Hearing Office received Student’s issue statement from Mr. Russell. On April 13, 2004, the Hearing Office received attorney Tania Whiteleather’s notice of representation and motion for continuance on behalf of Student. Student indicated that Ms. Whiteleather was unavailable to represent him on the scheduled hearing dates due to prior commitments. On April 14, 2004, the Hearing Office received the District’s opposition to the motion for continuance. On April 15, 2004, the Hearing Office issued a minute order denying the motion for continuance. (Footnote 1)Also on April 15, 2004, the Hearing Office received Student’s motion for reconsideration of the order denying the continuance. Student reiterated that Ms. Whiteleather was unavailable on the scheduled hearing dates due to prior commitments. (Footnote 2) No response was received from the District. On April 19, 2004, the Hearing Officer issued a minute order denying Student’s motion for reconsideration. (Footnote 3)

On the first day of hearing, April 20, 2004, Student renewed his motion for a continuance multiple times throughout the day, and the Hearing Officer denied each respective request. The Hearing Officer indicated on more than one occasion that the hearing needed to proceed day to day, consistent with the Hearing Office’s notices provided to the parties. (Footnote 4) Although Ms. Whiteleather had previously represented during the hearing that the parents would attend the next morning and read a short statement, she indicated at approximately 5:00 p.m. that neither she, Mr. Russell, nor the parents would attend the hearing the next morning. The hearing then was adjourned until 9:30 a.m. the next day. During the course of the first day of hearing, the parties also clarified the issues for hearing. Additionally, Student’s exhibits A and SS were admitted into evidence, but no other documents were admitted. (Footnote 5) Finally, no opening statements were presented, and no testimony was received.

On April 21, 2004, neither STUDENT’s parents, Mr. Russell, nor Ms. Whiteleather attended the hearing. The Hearing Office attempted to contact each of them and left telephone messages on the morning of April 21, 2004, but none of them returned the messages or appeared at hearing. (Footnote 6) At approximately 10:35 a.m., the Hearing Officer inquired of the District how it wished to proceed. The District indicated that it wished to proceed with the hearing and did not wish to move to dismiss the Student’s case. (Footnote 7) The hearing proceeded with additional discussion of prehearing matters, the District’s opening statement, and the presentation of the District’s evidence through the rest of the day. At the end of the day, the Hearing Officer adjourned the hearing until a teleconference the following day at 1:00 p.m. On the morning of April 22, 2004, the Hearing Office left messages with Ms. Whiteleather, Mr. Russell, and STUDENT’s parents advising them of the teleconference at 1:00 p.m. that afternoon. When the teleconference convened at approximately 1:00 p.m., Ms. Whiteleather, Mr. Russell, Mr. Roice, Ms. Spurlock, Dr. Schnieders (a witness), and the Hearing Officer all initially joined the teleconference. At the beginning of the teleconference, Mr. Russell and Ms. Whiteleather noted their objections to the teleconference on the record and then terminated their participation in the teleconference. (Footnote 8) The Hearing Officer then resumed taking evidence on the case. The hearing concluded and was submitted for decision at the end of the teleconference. (Footnote 9)

At hearing on April 20, 2004, Student contended in his repeated motions to continue that he had a right to Ms. Whiteleather’s representation even where she accepted the representation knowing her own calendar prevented her from attending the hearing on the scheduled hearing dates. The consistent basis for Student’s multiple renewed motions to continue was essentially the same as had been initially presented on April 13, 2004: Ms. Whiteleather was unavailable to represent Student on the scheduled hearing dates after April 20, 2004, due to prior commitments. Ms. Whiteleather acknowledged that she accepted the representation of Student’s case on April 13, 2004, knowing that her prior commitments interfered with her ability to represent STUDENT at hearing. Ms. Whiteleather estimated that she believed the case required six days of hearing. Yet, she explained she had conflicts on all days from April 21, 2004, through May 10, 2004: she had a court appearance on April 21, 2004, which she expected to last into the middle of the afternoon; she had two court appearances on April 22, 2004, that rendered her unavailable on that date; she was leaving on April 23, 2004 for an anniversary cruise; she was then attending a conference in Florida; and she had a federal court appearance on May 10, 2004. Accordingly, Ms. Whiteleather requested a three-week continuance until on or after May 11, 2004, due to her unavailability.

Student argued that even though Ms. Whiteleather knew of the Hearing Office’s practice not to grant continuances where an attorney accepts a case knowing she is unavailable for the scheduled hearing dates, the Hearing Office has no authority for this practice that, in effect, interferes with parents’ rights to select the attorney of their choice and interferes with the contracts between parents and their representatives. By the Hearing Office denying his requests for a continuance and proceeding with the hearing, Student contended he and his parents had been denied the right to counsel promised by federal and State special education law. (Footnote 10) Student further contended that his parents were only recently able to afford counsel and that the District had failed to demonstrate any prejudice to it in the event a continuance was granted.

In response, the District contended that Ms. Whiteleather was well aware of the Hearing Office’s practice of denying a continuance where the attorney or representative accepts a case knowing of a scheduling conflict. (Footnote 11) The District contended that a denial of a continuance is not tantamount to a denial of representation but only a reflection that parties are not necessarily entitled to be represented by a particular attorney. The District argued that Ms. Whiteleather should not have accepted representation in this case knowing that her conflicts prevented her from proceeding. The District further contended that it is entitled to a speedy resolution of the case.

The Hearing Officer denied each of the Student’s repeated requests for a continuance that were presented on April 20, 2004. Special education law mandates speedy resolution of due process disputes, and hearings may be continued only for good cause. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(f). Generally, a written decision in a due process hearing must be rendered within forty-five days from the date the Hearing Office receives a request for hearing. Id. The Hearing Office construes “good cause” narrowly in light of the mandate for speedy resolution of disputes. The Hearing Office’s practice of denying a continuance request where an attorney takes a case knowing of her scheduling conflicts has been stated clearly in an order involving Ms. Whiteleather. For example, in Student v. Charter Oak Unified School District, SN02-00822, “Order Regarding Case Scheduling” dated May 1, 2002, the hearing officer stated:

As has been communicated to Ms. Whiteleather in the past in orders issued in other due process matters, an attorney’s assumption of representation in a matter with knowledge that her calendar will not permit her to represent the client at hearing does not constitute good cause for a continuance. A party’s right to be represented by counsel at hearing does not imply a right to be represented by a particular attorney, and a party’s choice to retain a knowingly unavailable attorney may not be used to thwart the requirements of law.

A similar statement was made in an earlier case where a school district had hired an attorney who knew of her scheduling conflicts when she accepted the case. In Student v. Simi Valley Unified School District, SN97-01248, “Order Denying Continuance” dated October 29, 1997, the hearing officer stated:

Although the Hearing Office generally finds that good cause exists when a party's attorney is involved in a previously scheduled due process hearing, it is not acceptable for a District to seek to extend the forty-five day period by hiring an attorney who cannot be available for the scheduled hearing dates. Neither is it acceptable for an attorney to agree to represent a District when such a conflict exists. Therefore, the motion for continuance is denied.

While the Hearing Office is not governed by the rules generally applicable to civil courts, the Hearing Office’s practice of denying a continuance where an attorney takes a case knowing of conflicts with other commitments is consistent with the practices of other tribunals. “The courts do not favor the granting of a continuance where counsel is unavailable due to a claimed engagement elsewhere….” 17 Am.Jur.2d Continuance § 27. “If counsel’s absence is caused by a professional engagement elsewhere, the court may refuse a continuance if the attorney knew when accepting the case that he or she would be unable to attend the trial….” 1 Cal.Jur.3d Actions § 363. A recent federal decision states that “a party’s right to counsel of her choosing is not absolute, and courts are not required either to wait endlessly for lawyers to make themselves available or to conform their calendars to suit attorneys’ preferences.” Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2003).

In essence, the Student insisted that the District’s right to a speedy resolution of the case and the Hearing Office’s ability to schedule hearings must be set aside in favor of his chosen attorney’s schedule, which would have delayed the hearing for three weeks. Yet Student presented no authority for his position in his written motion for a continuance, in his written motion for reconsideration, or during his extensive oral arguments on the first day of hearing. Student and his representatives had ample notice that the case would commence on April 20, 2004, and proceed on a day-to-day basis and that the District was not in agreement with a further continuance of the case. No evidence was presented that Student attempted to obtain representation by other counsel, who would be available to represent Student on the scheduled hearing dates. Despite knowing that the case was set for April 20, 2004, that the District would not agree to a continuance, that Ms. Whiteleather was not available to proceed on a day-to-day basis beginning April 21, 2004, that his motion to continue had been denied on April 15, 2004, and that a motion to reconsider had been denied on April 19, 2004, the Student persistently maintained on the first day of hearing that he was entitled to a three-week continuance as a matter of law so that Ms. Whiteleather could represent him.

In short, the Hearing Officer found that Student had failed to demonstrate good cause for a three-week continuance, and the hearing proceeded in his absence.

B. District’s Motion to Dismiss Claims Arising Prior to May 13, 2003

On the first day of hearing, the District moved to dismiss any and all of Student’s issues that concerned the time period prior to May 13, 2003, the date the parties signed a settlement agreement in a prior matter, case number SN03-00200/SN03-00541 (Agreement; see Exhibit SS). The Student contended that the Agreement did not bar him from litigating past claims. He argued that although the Agreement settled the issues of prospective placement and services, it did not settle the issue of compensatory education for denials of FAPE prior to May 13, 2003. The Hearing Officer did not rule on the District’s motion at the hearing.

The Agreement in the prior matter occurred at a due process hearing on May 13, 2003. As in the current proceeding, Student was represented by Ms. Whiteleather, and the District was represented by Mr. Roice. Ms. Spurlock testified that a District secretary typed the Agreement in Ms. Spurlock’s office. The Agreement is a single-page document that specifies numerous obligations that the District promised to fulfill. The Agreement does not contain a specific release of particular claims or a general release of all claims. Ms. Spurlock testified that after the Agreement had been drafted but before it had been executed, Mr. Roice indicated to her that the Agreement did not contain general release language and that “we need to put that in.” Ms. Spurlock testified that the presiding hearing officer mentioned in Ms. Spurlock’s office that the hearing officer would include language in an order about the parties’ agreement settling any and all claims and that having additional language in the Agreement would be redundant. Ms. Spurlock was unsure whether any of the discussion with the hearing officer had taken place on the record. On May 16, 2003, the presiding hearing officer signed a “Summary Order Regarding Settlement and Dismissal” (Order), which was served on the parties. In pertinent part, the half-page Order states: “Before evidence was admitted or witnesses called, the parties participated in settlement discussions off the record and outside of the presence of the Hearing Officer. The parties reached a settlement agreement and indicated that they had resolved all of the issues for hearing and requested the matter be dismissed. Therefore, in accordance with the settlement agreement, the matter is hereby dismissed.” (Footnote 12)

The Hearing Officer is not persuaded that the Agreement bars Student’s claims arising prior to the date the Agreement was signed. Ms. Spurlock concedes that the District did not include a general release of claims in the Agreement, which would have released any and all claims prior to the date of the Agreement. (Footnote 13) Furthermore, as mentioned, the Agreement itself contains no language releasing specific claims. Accordingly, the validity of the District’s contention that all of Student’s claims are barred by the Agreement rests entirely upon the effect of the May 16, 2003 Order.

The Hearing Officer also is not persuaded that the Order has the effect of barring Student’s claims arising prior to the date the Agreement was signed. The Order did not state that all issues for hearing were being dismissed. Rather, the Order indicated that the parties “requested the matter be dismissed” and that the matter was being dismissed “in accordance with the settlement agreement.” Therefore, the Order merely refers back to the Agreement and does not go further than the Agreement. Additionally, the Order denotes that the case was being dismissed pursuant to the Agreement, not that specific issues were being dismissed by the hearing officer. The Order’s factual reference, perhaps erroneously, to the parties’ supposed indication that all issues had been resolved is not the equivalent of a specific ruling that all issues stated for hearing were being dismissed with prejudice.

The Hearing Officer also finds that neither the audio recording of the prior proceeding nor the hearing officer’s alleged statements provide a basis for its motion. Contrary to the District’s contention, the audio recording did not reflect that the parties stated that all issues for hearing had been resolved. (Footnote 14) Nor does the audio recording reflect that the presiding hearing officer made any representations on the record about what would be included in the Order. With respect to the District’s contention that the presiding officer made off-the-record comments about what would be placed in the Order, the Hearing Office simply cannot base its rulings on such information, even assuming such representations were in fact made. A contrary holding would undermine the central principle that decisions be based on the testimony and evidence presented at hearing. Furthermore, the language of the Order itself does not contain the words Ms. Spurlock testified that the presiding hearing officer purportedly promised to include. In other words, there is no language in the Order that “any and all claims” were being released by Student or were being dismissed by the presiding hearing officer.

Finally, the District contends that the reservation of one particular issue amounts to a release of all other issues not specifically reserved. Section one of the Agreement indicates that the issue of attorney fees “is reserved to the parties for negotiation or the federal courts.” However, this position is unpersuasive, particularly in light of the strict standards applicable to the release of certain rights under federal law. The “validity and interpretation of a release of significant federal rights is governed by federal law.” Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1983). The release of federal rights is implicated in this instance because Student’s rights with respect to special education are grounded in the federal Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA). In the Ninth Circuit, the general standard for determining the validity of a release is to inquire whether the consent was voluntary, deliberate, and informed by considering, on a case-by-case basis, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the release. See Dominguez v. BCW, Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1159 (D.Ariz. 2000)(summarizing the approach stated in Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1989)). (Footnote 15) In this instance, there is no language in the Agreement releasing the claims Student raises in the current case, and the District has not demonstrated that Student released these claims at all, let alone voluntarily and deliberately while informed of the rights he was waiving. Furthermore, the District has presented no authority for its proposition that the reservation of one particular right equates to an affirmative release of all other rights. Such a holding would invalidate the requirement that the release be “voluntary, deliberate, and informed.”

In sum, the District concedes the Agreement did not contain a general release. Furthermore, if the Order did not comport with the District’s understanding of what it should have stated, then the District should have immediately asked the Hearing Office for a corrected amended order or challenged the Order on appeal. Despite Ms. Spurlock’s testimony that a release of any and all claims was the reason the District consented to the Agreement, the District did not obtain the purported statement of the hearing officer on the record, ensure that the nature or scope of Student’s release was stated on the record or in the Agreement, or request that the Order be amended to include the general release language that the District contends was promised by the hearing officer. The District’s motion to dismiss the Student’s claims, on the basis that the Agreement or Order barred claims arising prior to May 13, 2003, is denied.

The Hearing Officer next considers the consequence of this ruling in conjunction with Student’s failure to prosecute his claims. Ordinarily, as a result of denying the District’s motion to dismiss, the Hearing Officer would proceed to adjudicate Student’s claims that arose or occurred prior to the May 13, 2003 Agreement. (Footnote 16) However, as mentioned above, Student failed to prosecute these claims or any others. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismisses the Student’s case (case number SN04-00385) because of his failure to prosecute his case. However, Student’s contentions with regard to the 2003-2004 school year shall be addressed in determining the District’s issue of whether it has offered and/or provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year.

C. Dismissal of Student’s Issue Related to Whether the District Provided a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) for the 2004-2005 School Year

While clarifying the issues, Student modified the sixth issue set forth in his issues statement dated April 12, 2004, to state: “whether the District has offered FAPE to STUDENT for the 2004-2005 school year?” There was no dispute that the District had not yet made a specific written offer for the 2004-2005 school year. Because both parties acknowledged that the District was not yet required to make an offer for that year, the Hearing Officer dismissed this issue on the basis that it was not ripe for hearing. (Footnote 17)

D. Dismissal of Student’s Issue Related to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Student’s seventh issue in his issues statement dated April 12, 2004, is: “whether the District provided STUDENT with the protections established by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?” See 29 U.S.C. § 794. The IDEA provides that each state, in return for receiving federal funds under the Act, must establish a system of special education due process hearings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The purpose of the hearings is to resolve disputes arising under the IDEA with regard to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free, appropriate education to a child. Id.; Cal. Educ. Code § 56501(a). The Hearing Office has jurisdiction only to hear claims under the IDEA. The Hearing Office consistently has held that it does not have jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes other than the IDEA, and it has specifically held that it does not have jurisdiction over Section 504 claims. See STUDENT v. San Mateo-Foster City School District, SN02-02682, decision dated April 18, 2003. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismissed that issue.

E. Dismissal of Student’s Issue Related to California Education Code Sections 48206.3 et seq.

Student’s third issue as stated in his issues statement dated April 12, 2004, is: “whether the District met its obligation under the California Education Code section 48206.3 et seq. in providing Home/Hospital Instruction to the Student?” As explained on the first day of hearing, Student contended he has not been awarded proper credit towards graduation for the home/hospital instruction he has been receiving. (Footnote 18) He further contended that the District did not warn him that his participation in home/hospital instruction would adversely affect his accumulation of credits and, ultimately, his ability to graduate on time. The District contended that Student has received proper credit. On his own motion, the Hearing Officer questioned whether he had jurisdiction to decide these issues and award the course credit Student seeks.

California Education Code section 56501(a) provides the jurisdictional statement for due process hearings in the State of California. Section 56501(a) states that parents and public education agencies may initiate due process hearings under any of the following circumstances: (1) there is a proposal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child; (2) there is a refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free, appropriate public education to the child; (3) the parent refuses to consent to an assessment of the child; or (4) there is a disagreement between a parent and a district (or others) regarding the availability of a program appropriate for the child, including the question of financial responsibility, with respect to a private school placement. Student’s issues do not fall within any of these provisions, and no specific authority has been provided to indicate that the Hearing Office has jurisdiction over Student’s issues. Nevertheless, Student contends that the home/hospital instruction at issue was stated in STUDENT’s IEP document and that the issue of whether STUDENT received proper credit for the instruction is related to the provision of a FAPE.

However, the issue of whether a student received the services promised in an IEP document as part an offer of FAPE is separate and distinct from the issue of what credit towards graduation the student should be awarded for that instruction. The Hearing Officer notes that the California Education Code provides procedures and a forum for challenging the content of “any pupil record.” Cal. Educ. Code § 49070. There is no indication in the Code that course credit changes is an issue that may be appropriately raised in a special education due process hearing. In addition, the Hearing Office has previously determined that it does not have jurisdiction to determine such an issue. See STUDENT v. San Francisco Unified School District and San Francisco Community Mental Health, SN 476-98, decision dated August 17, 1998. There is no rationale for a different holding with respect to the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction over the issue of course credits.

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer dismisses as beyond the Hearing Office’s jurisdiction the issues of whether the District has not given proper credit to STUDENT for home/hospital instruction received during the 2003-2004 school year and whether the District is liable to Student for not warning him that home/hospital instruction may delay his graduation from high school. (Footnote 19)

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR HEARING

1. Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2003-2004 regular school year?

2. If the District denied STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2003-2004 regular school year, is he entitled to compensatory education?

CONTENTIONS

The District contends that it has offered and provided Student a FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year and that all of Student’s claims are without merit. Furthermore, the District contends that its offer of the Frostig School for the second semester of the 2003-2004 regular school year is an offer of FAPE.

Student contends that the District has not offered and/or provided him FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year because it has committed numerous procedural and substantive violations. As to Student’s procedural contentions for the 2003-2004 school year, he asserts that the District’s Academic Assessment Report dated November 25, 2003, is not signed. (Footnote 20) In addition, Student contends that the District did not make a specific written offer of placement for the second semester of the 2003-2004 regular school year. He further contends no representative from either of the two non-public schools the District allegedly proposed (i.e., Frostig School and Summit View School) attended an IEP meeting to explain either of the respective programs. He also argues the District failed to schedule visitations for the parents to visit the non-public schools, despite the District’s indication at the November 25, 2003 IEP meeting that it would arrange such visits. With respect to testing performed by Lindamood-Bell, Student contends that the District failed to have a person knowledgeable about Lindamood-Bell testing attend any IEP meeting to discuss STUDENT’s progress and the implications of the testing. More particularly, Student contends that a specific representative of Lindamood-Bell should have attended an IEP meeting. Furthermore, Student contends that the District failed to give the IEP team the opportunity to consider the recommendations of a Lindamood-Bell representative that more Lindamood-Bell services were desirable for STUDENT and that the District failed to give proper consideration to those recommendations.

As to Student’s substantive contentions for the 2003-2004 school year, he contends that the District failed to provide the full 7.5 hours of home instruction per week as required by the November 25, 2003 IEP document. He also contends that the District’s offer for the second semester of the 2003-2004 regular school year should not have been a non-public school, but instead should have been additional Lindamood-Bell services together with continued home/hospital instruction. As a result of the alleged procedural and/or substantive violations, Student contends that he is entitled to at least 300 additional hours of Lindamood-Bell services, in addition to the continuation of 7.5 weekly hours of home/hospital instruction, as compensatory education.

BACKGROUND FACTS

STUDENT is a sixteen-year-old student who is receiving special education because of specific learning disabilities. His IEP document dated May 12, 2003, reflects that he has disorders in the basic psychological processes of attention, visual processing, auditory processing, and cognitive abilities, including association, conceptualization, and expression.

On May 12, 2003, STUDENT’s IEP team met for an annual review. A comprehensive thirty-four page IEP document was generated. Although a special day class at the District was offered in the IEP document, STUDENT did not attend that placement as a result of the parties’ Agreement, which was reached the following day on May 13, 2003. Student acknowledged at hearing that the Agreement resolved the issue of STUDENT’s placement and services for the first semester of the 2003-2004 school year, except that the parties later agreed (at the IEP meeting held on November 25, 2003) to increase STUDENT’s home/hospital services from five hours to 7.5 hours per week. The home/hospital services consisted of a District teacher, Ms. Johnson, providing individual instruction at STUDENT’s home. The Agreement does not indicate what academic areas were to be covered at Lindamood-Bell or what areas were to be covered in home-hospital services. However, the evidence reveals that the Lindamood-Bell instruction related to language arts and that Ms. Johnson’s instruction was in math and English until a third subject, science, was added at the end of November 2003. Pursuant to the Agreement, STUDENT was to receive 600 hours of services from Lindamood-Bell. The Agreement does not state an ending date for either the Lindamood-Bell services or the home-hospital services, although it does indicate that the home/hospital services were to terminate when the 600 hours of Lindamood-Bell services ended. At the time the Agreement was executed, the parties anticipated that the Lindamood-Bell instruction and home/hospital instruction would last through the end of the first semester (January 23, 2003).

On September 22, 2003, the IEP team met to consider increasing STUDENT’s home/hospital instruction to 7.5 hours per week, and the District suggested the possibility of STUDENT’s attending Frostig School. An application to Frostig was provided to Student’s parents. On November 25, 2003, the IEP team met to discuss the results of the District’s Academic Assessment Report also dated November 25, 2003. In addition, STUDENT was allocated eighty more hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction, and STUDENT’s home/hospital instruction was increased, pursuant to his parents’ request, to 7.5 hours per week. The additional eighty hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction was provided because the District came to realize that the 600 hours of Lindamood-Bell services would end sooner than the end of the first semester. In addition, another application to Frostig School was offered to Student’s parents, and the District agreed to arrange for the parents’ visitation to Frostig School and Summit View School. After the November 25, 2003 IEP meeting, the District wrote a series of four letters to STUDENT’s parents to arrange for another IEP meeting, but STUDENT’s parents did not respond, and no further IEP meetings have been held.

On January 14, 2004, the District received a letter dated January 9, 2004, from Mr. Harbeson, associate clinical director for Lindamood-Bell in Pasadena, recommending that more Lindamood-Bell services would be beneficial to STUDENT. By letter dated January 22, 2004, the District informed Mr. Harbeson that it would no longer fund additional Lindamood-Bell services after February 9, 2004. By letter dated February 2, 2004, to STUDENT’s parents, the District reiterated its offer of Frostig School for the second semester. However, STUDENT’s parents never accepted the District’s offer of the Frostig School.

Pursuant to the Agreement and the parties’ subsequent understandings, STUDENT received a total of 680 hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction between May 19, 2003 and February 9, 2004. He also received home/hospital instruction during that time, which he continues to receive. No evidence was received that STUDENT is receiving any other formal instruction at this time.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District offer and/or provide STUDENT a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2003-2004 regular school year?

The analysis of whether a child has been provided a FAPE is generally twofold, requiring the Hearing Officer to consider both whether procedural steps were followed and whether the proposed placement was substantively appropriate. Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist., et al. v. Rowley (Rowley) (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 206-207. The Hearing Officer will address each of Student’s particular procedural contentions before discussing the substantive appropriateness of the District’s offer of placement.

A. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS:

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of adherence to the procedural requirements of the IDEA. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205. Federal special education law requires states to establish and maintain certain procedural safeguards to ensure that each student with a disability receives the FAPE to which he or she is entitled and that parents are involved in the formulation of the student’s educational program. W.G. v. Bd. of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992). Not every procedural flaw constitutes a denial of FAPE, but procedural violations that result in the loss of educational opportunity to the student or seriously infringe on the parent’s opportunity to participate in the IEP process may result in the denial of FAPE. Id. at 1484; see also Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 994 (1st Cir. 1990).

1. District’s alleged failure to ensure that the District’s Academic Assessment Report dated November 25, 2003, was signed

Student contends that the District violated the IDEA because the District’s Academic Assessment Report dated November 25, 2003, is not signed (see Exhibit 15). Even though the report is not signed, Student has not demonstrated that the report is required by law to be signed. For example, California Education Code section 56327, which lists items that must be stated in such a report, is silent with respect to whether a signature is required. Additionally, there is no question that STUDENT’s parents were fully aware that Ms. Johnson prepared the report. The evidence reflects that Ms. Johnson, the teacher who delivered instruction to STUDENT at his home, prepared the report and that she discussed the report at the November 25, 2003 IEP. The very stated purpose of the November 25, 2003 IEP meeting was, as stated on the IEP document, “to discuss results of academic assessment/do report of progress.” (Exhibit 4.) STUDENT’s parents attended that IEP meeting, and there is no indication they had any question about who had prepared the report. Given that Student presented no authority that the report was required to be signed and that the Hearing Officer in unaware of such authority, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not violate the law by failing to have the report signed. Furthermore, even if such a report should have been signed, Student has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the lack of a signature. See W.G., 960 F.2d at 1484.

2. District’s alleged failure to provide a specific written offer of placement for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year

Student contends the District was not clear whether it was offering Frostig School or Summit View School or both for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year. The District contends that it made an offer of only the Frostig School for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year. The Ninth Circuit has held that a school district must make a specific, written offer of placement. Union School District v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 965 (1994); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3).

The September 22, 2003 IEP document states that Ms. Spurlock discussed the possibility of STUDENT’s attending the Frostig School, that she gave the parents an application and brochure to review regarding the Frostig School, and that the parents’ advocate, Mr. Russell, indicated that the parents might want to visit the Frostig School. (Exhibit 3.) Furthermore, the November 25, 2003, IEP document states that the “District continues to offer a non-public school setting for STUDENT beginning 2nd semester of 2003-2004 school year. Application/visit to Frostig was offered to the family.” (Exhibit 4.) Although Mr. Russell indicated at that IEP meeting that the parents were interested in visiting Summit View School, the evidence does not reflect that Summit View School was ever offered by the District at this meeting or in any other meeting. The District’s offer of Frostig School was reiterated in a February 2, 2004 letter from Ms. Spurlock to STUDENT’s parents:

As stated at the November 25, 2003 IEP, the district’s recommended placement is Frostig School. At the November 25, 2003 IEP, I provided you with the parent application to Frostig School, which you declined to complete until you visited the campus. Also at the IEP meeting, you asked for another NPS option. Mr. Russell, STUDENT’s advocate mentioned Summit View as another NPS you might want to consider so visitations to both sites were arranged. … The District stands ready to initiate the process to place STUDENT in Frostig School, which is our recommended placement. (Exhibit 10.)

Although it may not have been entirely clear in the September IEP document that Frostig School was the District’s placement offer for the second semester, the offer became clear in November 2003 prior to the start of the second semester. Moreover, Ms. Spurlock’s February 2, 2004 letter left no doubt that Frostig School was the District’s “recommended placement.” (Footnote 21) The Hearing Officer finds that the District satisfied the mandate of a specific, written offer of placement.

3. District’s alleged failure to ensure that a representative from each of the two non-public schools of interest attended any IEP meeting to explain each respective program

Student contends that a representative from each non-public school was required to attend an IEP meeting to discuss each respective school. Special education law requires that before a school district “places a child” in a private school, it must convene an IEP meeting in which a representative of the private school or facility attends the meeting or otherwise participates in the meeting. 34 C.F.R. § 300.349, subsections (a) and (b). With respect to Summit View School, the Hearing Officer has already determined that the District never offered Summit View School as a placement. Therefore, the District has never placed or proposed placing STUDENT at Summit View School. Student did not provide any authority that the District had an obligation to ensure that a representative from Summit View School attended an IEP meeting when the District never proposed placement at Summit View School, and the Hearing Officer is not otherwise aware of such authority. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds that the District was not required to ensure that a representative from Summit View School attended an IEP meeting.

Although the District did not offer Summit View School as a placement, it did offer Frostig School, as discussed above. Ms. Spurlock testified that entrance into Frostig School involves an application process in which both the District and a prospective student’s family are required by Frostig School to submit applications. Student’s parents were given a copy of the application at both the September 22, 2003, and the November 25, 2003, IEP meetings. On December 19, 2003, Ms. Spurlock wrote a letter, which was the first in a series of four letters, in an attempt to convene an IEP team to finalize plans for STUDENT’s enrollment at Frostig School. Despite her letters of December 19, 2003, January 9, 2004, January 22, 2004, and February 2, 2004, Ms. Spurlock testified that STUDENT’s parents never responded to her request for an IEP meeting but simply filed for due process. Ms. Spurlock’s February 2, 2004 letter specifically mentions that “a completed parent application” was required. Ms. Spurlock also testified that the District would have invited a representative of Frostig School to the IEP team meeting she had attempted to schedule, but the parents never agreed to attend.

The law requires only that the District ensure a Frostig School representative participated in an IEP meeting before the District placed the child in the private school. Yet, Ms. Spurlock’s testimony establishes that no placement at Frostig School was possible without the required application from Student. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that the District would have had a representative from Frostig School attend an IEP meeting for STUDENT prior to his placement in Frostig School but was effectively prevented from doing so by parents’ refusal to participate further in the IEP process. The District had attempted to schedule further IEP meetings through four separate letters from December 19, 2003, through February 2, 2004.

The Hearing Officer therefore finds that the District did not violate the law by not having a Frostig Center representative attend an IEP meeting. Furthermore, Student has not demonstrated any serious infringement on the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process given the parents’ refusal to participate further in the IEP process after November 25, 2003.

4. District’s alleged failure to schedule visitations for STUDENT’s parents to visit non-public schools as stated in the November 25, 2003 IEP document

Student contends the District did not arrange visits to Summit View School and Frostig School. The November 25, 2003 IEP document reflects that in response to Mr. Russell’s request that STUDENT’s parents visit some non-public schools, Ms. Spurlock agreed to “contact non-public schools to arrange visits.” Ms. Spurlock’s letter dated December 19, 2003, to STUDENT’s parents reflects that the District arranged specific dates for the visitations to Summit View School and Frostig School. (Exhibit 6.) Ms. Spurlock’s letter dated January 22, 2004, also memorializes the efforts made by the District to arrange for the visitations. These letters, together with Ms. Spurlock’s testimony, are persuasive evidence that the District satisfied the obligation stated in the November 25, 2003, IEP document. The Hearing Officer finds this contention is without merit.

5. District’s alleged failure to ensure that a person from Lindamood-Bell attended any IEP meeting to discuss test results and to convene an IEP team meeting to consider the recommendations of the Lindamood-Bell representative

Student contends that the District failed to have a person knowledgeable about the testing performed by Lindamood-Bell attend an IEP meeting to discuss the tests, including their implications. In particular, Student contends that a specific representative of Lindamood-Bell should have attended an IEP meeting. Student also contends that the District failed to give the IEP team the opportunity to consider the recommendation of Mr. Harbeson, associate clinical director for Lindamood-Bell in Pasadena, that more Lindamood-Bell services would be beneficial to STUDENT. The District responds that the IEP team did have a person knowledgeable about the testing performed at Lindamood-Bell, namely Ms. Goodwin. Furthermore, the District contends that it did its own assessment and was not required to rely on Lindamood-Bell’s testing or follow Lindamood-Bell’s recommendations.

As to relevant background information, Ms. Spurlock testified that the District had hoped STUDENT would make significant progress as a result of their Agreement to fund 600 hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction. However, she indicated that the District received the results of testing Lindamood-Bell had performed in August of 2003 that reflected, from the District’s point of view, that STUDENT was not making sufficient progress. Consequently, when the IEP team met on September 22, 2003, Ms. Spurlock suggested Frostig School as a possible placement. There is also a reference in the exhibits to additional Lindamood-Bell testing on October 27, 2003. (See exhibit 4, page 2, reference to a Lindamood-Bell “Retesting Summary.”) Before the next IEP meeting, the District conducted its own testing of STUDENT, which is reflected in the District’s November 25, 2003 Academic Assessment Report. Ms. Spurlock testified that at an IEP meeting also on November 25, 2003, the IEP team discussed what progress STUDENT had made at Lindamood-Bell, which Ms. Spurlock characterized as “stagnation” or even some “regression.” At this meeting, the District stated its offer of Frostig School.

With respect to who must be at an IEP team meeting, the law requires that a member of the IEP team include, among other persons, an “individual who conducted an assessment of the pupil or who is knowledgeable about the assessment procedures used to assess the pupil, and is familiar with the assessment results or recommendations. The individual shall be qualified to interpret the instructional implications of the assessment results.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56341(b)(5); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(v). (Footnote 22)

The Hearing Officer finds that Ms. Goodwin, a District school psychologist, qualified as a “knowledgeable” individual with respect to testing performed by Lindamood-Bell. California Education Code section 56341(b)(5) does not require the actual assessor to be on the IEP team; it only requires that the individual be a person knowledgeable about the assessment procedures and results, as well as be qualified to interpret the instructional implications of the results. Ms. Goodwin credibly testified that she was familiar with the tests created by Lindamood-Bell through its literature and that she felt qualified to interpret those tests. As to the other tests administered by Lindamood-Bell but not created by it, Ms. Goodwin stated she was very familiar with those general tests. The Hearing Officer also notes Ms. Goodwin’s testimony regarding the courses she teaches as an adjunct faculty member of Azuza Pacific University, which includes the diagnosis of disabilities. Ms. Goodwin was readily available to answer questions STUDENT’s parents may have had about testing given that she attended all of the IEP meetings related to the 2003-2004 school year, including the May 12, 2003, September 22, 2003, and November 25, 2003 IEP meetings.

With respect to the contention that Lindamood-Bell’s recommendation was not given consideration by the IEP team, no authority has been presented to demonstrate that Mr. Harbeson’s January 9, 2004 letter needed to be presented to the IEP team, and the Hearing Officer is unaware of any such authority. Furthermore, the evidence reflects that the idea of further Lindamood-Bell services had been specifically considered by the District and rejected in favor of a full-time, non-public school placement. Although the letter was not presented into evidence, Ms. Spurlock testified that she saw Mr. Harbeson’s letter and that the letter concurred with the parents’ request for an additional 300 hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction. Ms. Spurlock testified that from the District’s point of view, additional hours of Lindamood-Bell services would not have been effective because of STUDENT’s particular profile (i.e., his learning disabilities and needs), a finding supported by both Ms. Goodwin and Ms. Pioli.

Finally, even if the Hearing Officer were to accept Student’s argument that the IEP team should have formally considered Mr. Harbeson’s letter, there is no showing of harm to STUDENT. First, the right of STUDENT’s parents to participate in the IEP process was not seriously infringed upon given that they refused to participate in an IEP meeting after Mr. Harbeson’s January 9, 2004 letter was written. STUDENT’s parents refused to respond to Ms. Spurlock’s four letters requesting an IEP meeting. Second, Student did not suffer loss of educational opportunity because Frostig School was an offer of FAPE for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year, as will be explained below.

Accordingly, the Hearing Officer finds these contentions regarding Lindamood-Bell are without merit.

*****

In sum, the Hearing Officer finds that the District did not violate the procedural safeguards of IDEA or California special education law. Furthermore, even assuming that the facts demonstrate one or more technical violations, such violations, if any, did not result in loss of educational opportunity or constitute a serious infringement upon the parents’ opportunity to participate in the IEP process.

B. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS:

Under the amended Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and State special education law, children with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d); Cal. Educ. Code § 56000. The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services that are available to a child at no charge to his or her parent or guardian, meet the standards of the State educational agency, include appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education, and are provided in conformity with the child’s individualized education program (IEP). 20 U.S.C. § 1401(8). (Footnote 23) Special education law also requires that a child with a disability be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).

Such special education and related services must be tailored to meet the unique needs of the child with a disability by means of an IEP. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173 (3rd Cir. 1988). The IEP, which is the “centerpiece of the [IDEA’s] education delivery system for disabled children,” consists of a detailed written statement that must be developed, reviewed, and revised for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56343, 56345; Honig v. Doe (1988) 484 U.S. 305. The IEP must include a statement of the goals and objectives, special education and related services, and program modifications or supports for school personnel that are to be provided to meet the child’s needs resulting from his or her disability to enable the child to be involved in and progress in the general curriculum and be educated and participate with nondisabled children to the maximum extent possible. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(5)(A), 1414(d)(1)(A); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56031, 56345.

In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court determined that a child’s IEP must be reasonably calculated to provide the child with some educational benefit to satisfy the IDEA, but that the school district is not required to provide the child with the best education available or instruction and services that maximize the child’s abilities. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198-200. The Court held that a school district is required to provide only a “basic floor of opportunity” consisting of access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the child. Id. at 201. Consequently, an appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the child. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996). De minimis benefit or only trivial advancement, however, is insufficient to satisfy the Rowley standard of “some” benefit. Walczak v. Florida Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2nd Cir. 1998). To determine whether a school district substantively offered a FAPE, the analysis must focus on the adequacy of the District’s placement. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987). If the proposed program (1) would have addressed STUDENT’s unique needs, (2) was reasonably calculated to provide him with some educational benefit, (3) comported with his IEP, and (4) provided for education in the least restrictive environment (LRE), then the District offered a FAPE, even if the parents prefer another program and even if the parents’ preferred program would likely result in greater educational benefit. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.

The parties agree that placement and services for STUDENT’s first semester of the 2003-2004 school year were resolved by the Agreement, the provision of an additional 80 hours of Lindamood-Bell, and the increase in home/hospital services at the end of November from five to 7.5 hours per week. Thus, the dispute regarding placement centers on the District’s offer for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year.

1. Was the District’s proposed placement at Frostig School designed to meet STUDENT’s unique individual needs?

The District’s witnesses testified regarding what STUDENT’s unique needs are for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year. Ms. Goodwin, a school psychologist, indicated that STUDENT’s needs can be summarized by the categories listed on his May 12, 2003 IEP document. The IEP document, as well as the testimony of the District’s witnesses, established that STUDENT has needs in the broad areas of reading, language, math, and social skills. Despite being in the tenth grade, Ms. Johnson testified that STUDENT reads independently only at the third-grade level, although her instruction is geared at a fourth-grade reading level. She also indicated STUDENT has difficulty remembering facts. Ms. LaBomme, a program specialist, testified that STUDENT has difficulty comprehending what he has read. Ms. Johnson testified that STUDENT is able to write simple paragraphs. Ms. Pioli, a speech pathologist, indicated that STUDENT needs to expand his vocabulary and has difficulty understanding figurative language so that he tends to comprehend words by their literal meaning. Ms. Johnson testified that math is a relative strength of STUDENT’s, although Ms. LaBomme noted that STUDENT had difficulty with even simple math facts during testing such as knowing that six minus six equals zero. Ms. LaBomme stressed that STUDENT had difficulty remembering basic areas of math. STUDENT’s May 12, 2003, IEP document reflects that he has difficulty understanding how to respond in more complex social situations, although he develops positive relationships with peers and adults.

The District’s witnesses were consistent in expressing that STUDENT generally needs a multi-sensory approach to learning where he is given simple instructions and has multiple opportunities and settings to cover the same material. Ms. LaBomme recommended small-group instruction as well as direct instruction where a teacher gives clear simple directions to STUDENT. Ms. Goodwin testified that for STUDENT to learn a concept, he needs to hear it, see it, and practice it across many environments and on multiple occasions. She indicated he does not organize or generalize well and that he needs very specific instructions and coaching. On the basis of the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that STUDENT has needs in the broad areas of reading, language, math, and social skills and that he needs multi-sensory instruction with clear, simple directions in a setting where he can receive frequent guidance from staff.

As to whether the placement at Frostig School was designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs, Ms. Spurlock testified that the District’s offer for the second semester was Frostig School together with all of the other services listed in the May 12, 2003 IEP document. STUDENT’s May 12, 2003 IEP document contains numerous goals and objectives covering his academic and social areas of need, and it provides for counseling services as well as speech and language services. Dr. Schnieders, director of teacher training at Frostig School, testified that the school was started fifty years ago, that there are currently 115 students in the school spread over the first through twelfth grades, and that there is a 6:1 student-to-staff ratio. She testified that the staff at Frostig School could implement all of STUDENT’s goals and objectives stated in his May 12, 2003 IEP document. She indicated STUDENT would be a good match with the school’s applied academics program, which is designed for lower functioning students such as STUDENT and has a major focus on reading, writing, and math skills. She indicated that even simple tasks like using a calculator and reading/interpreting a newspaper are taught. She also stated that the program is real-world oriented where job skills are taught. Students in the class may, for example, work in the student store where they would learn how to set up displays and take inventory, for example. Furthermore, she testified that the school has a course on social skills for ninth and tenth graders and that there is a transition program for ninth and tenth graders where there is some focus on social skills. She also testified that counseling and speech therapy are available on campus.

Ms. LaBomme testified that she currently has a student on her caseload who attends Frostig School and that she believes STUDENT would do well at Frostig School. Ms. LaBomme indicated that Frostig School uses a multi-sensory approach and is good at giving students real-world learning exercises that are meaningful to them, which helps the students retain the information they learn. Ms. Goodwin testified that she has visited Frostig School and talked to Frostig School personnel about STUDENT. She also testified that the school would meet STUDENT’s needs. She believes the Frostig School staff is good at remedial techniques and that all of STUDENT’s needs could be met in a smaller setting that would facilitate his social development. The person who works with STUDENT on a near daily basis, Ms. Johnson, testified that Frostig School would be good for STUDENT because she believes STUDENT needs to return to a more traditional school setting that can cover more academic subjects than he is able to effectively grasp in one-to-one home/hospital instruction. (Footnote 24) On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the Hearing Officer finds that the District’s offer of the Frostig School is designed to meet STUDENT’s unique needs.

2. Was the District’s proposed placement at Frostig School reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with educational benefit?

An appropriate public education does not mean the absolute best or “potential-maximizing” education for the student. Seattle School District No. 1, 82 F.3d at 1500; Union, 15 F.3d at 1524. Moreover, the focus of the inquiry is not on whether the student may obtain greater benefit in the placement that is preferred by the parents but, rather, whether the school district’s proposed placement is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit to the student. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200; Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1314.

With respect to the Frostig School proposed placement, the Hearing Officer finds that it is reasonably calculated to provide STUDENT with some educational benefit. As elaborated upon above, Ms. Bomme, Ms. Goodwin, and Ms. Johnson all persuasively testified that Frostig School would be a good fit for STUDENT. Furthermore, Dr. Schnieders’ description of the school, when compared to STUDENT’s needs, buttresses the opinion of the District witnesses. The evidence reflects that the District carefully assessed the effectiveness of the approach taken as a result of the parties’ Agreement and attempted to design a more effective plan for addressing STUDENT’s needs. Even though the analysis of whether the District offered a FAPE looks at the appropriateness of its offer, irrespective of whether the parents’ alternative may provide more benefit, the Hearing Officer notes that the District witnesses who testified on the subject were unanimous in their view that the continuation of additional Lindamood-Bell services, together with home/hospital instruction, was not a desirable option in light of STUDENT’s needs and the limited progress he had been making. Ms. Goodwin and Ms. Pioli both offered reasonable explanations for why the Lindamood-Bell program was not effective, or no longer effective, for a student with STUDENT’s profile.

3. Did the District’s placement comport with STUDENT’s IEP?

The District did not have an opportunity to provide STUDENT with the proposed placement at Frostig School. The District presented evidence that it was willing to fund Student’s placement at the Frostig School during the remainder of the 2003-2004 school year. The Hearing Officer finds that the provision of instruction and services at the Frostig School would have comported with Student’s IEP document.

Furthermore, the Hearing Officer considers here Student contention that the District failed to provide the full 7.5 hours of home instruction per week agreed to in the November 25, 2003 IEP document. On the basis of the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer finds that Student’s claim lacks merit. Ms. Johnson credibly testified that she has been providing STUDENT 1.5 hours per day (i.e., 7.5 hours per week) of home/hospital instruction since November of 2003.

4. Did the District’s proposed placement provide STUDENT an education in the LRE?

Neither party disputes that the District's proposed placement would have afforded STUDENT a placement in the LRE. Additionally, the Hearing Officer notes that Frostig School would afford STUDENT the opportunity to interact with many students and is far less restrictive than the home/hospital instruction, with additional Lindamood-Bell services, that Student requests.

*****

In light of the foregoing findings, the Hearing Officer concludes that the District offered and/or provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year. Additionally, the Hearing Officer finds that the offer to place STUDENT at Frostig School constitutes an offer of FAPE for the second semester of the 2003-2004 school year.

ISSUE NO. 2: If the District denied Student a free appropriate public education (FAPE) during the 2003-2004 regular school year, is STUDENT entitled to compensatory education?

If a district fails to provide a FAPE, then a child is entitled to relief that is “appropriate” in light of the purposes of IDEA. School Committee of the Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1985) 471 U.S. 359, 369. Based on the principle set forth in Burlington, federal courts have held that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief which may be granted for the denial of appropriate special education services to help overcome lost educational opportunity. See, e.g., Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup School Dist., 31 F.3d 1489, 1496-1497 (9th Cir. 1994)(Puyallup).

Student contends that he is entitled to 300 additional hours of Lindamood-Bell services as a result of the District’s denial of FAPE and/or failure to offer FAPE to him for the 2003-2004 regular school year. However, the Hearing Officer determined above that the Student’s specific contentions about denial of FAPE are without merit and that the District offered and provided a FAPE to STUDENT for the 2003-2004 regular school year. Therefore, Student’s compensatory education request is denied as unwarranted. (Footnote 25)

ORDER

The Hearing Officer concludes that the District offered and provided STUDENT a FAPE for the 2003-2004 regular school year. Accordingly, all of Student’s requests for relief are denied.

PREVAILING PARTY

Pursuant to California Education Code section 56507(d), the hearing decision must indicate the extent to which each party has prevailed on each issue heard and decided. The following finding is made in accordance with this statute: the District prevailed on all issues heard and decided.

RIGHT TO APPEAL THIS DECISION

The parties to this case have the right to appeal this Decision to a court of competent jurisdiction. If an appeal is made, it must be made within ninety (90) days of receipt of this Decision. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(i).

Dated: May 27, 2004 ____________________________________ Terrence B. Ohler, Hearing Officer California Special Education Hearing Office

The minute order states that the “request of the Student for a continuance of the hearing scheduled to commence on April 20, 2004 is denied as counsel acknowledges availability on that date. If the hearing proceeds beyond that date, counsel may address any request for continuance to the presiding hearing officer.”

2 In Student’s motion for reconsideration, Student stated that Ms. Whiteleather had mistakenly assumed that the hearing was scheduled to start on April 22, 2004, as opposed to the actual start date of April 20, 2004. Student stated that Ms. Whiteleather was also unavailable on April 21, 2004, due to prior commitments.

3 The minute order states that “Student has failed to state new facts, circumstances, or law warranting reconsideration of his previous continuance request. Student’s motion for reconsideration is denied, and the hearing will proceed as scheduled beginning on April 20, 2004.”

4 See the Notice of Due Process Hearing dated February 24, 2004, and the Rescheduled Hearing notices dated March 4, 2004, and April 1, 2004, which all advise the parties that they should be prepared to participate in the hearing “day to day, excluding Mondays, until completed.”

5 Exhibits A and SS were admitted into evidence for purposes of ruling on the District’s motion to dismiss related to the parties’ May 13, 2003 settlement agreement, which is addressed below.

6 At approximately 10:00 a.m., the Hearing Office left a message for each indicating that “the Hearing Officer warns that actions may be taken that may prejudice Student if no one appears at hearing on Student’s behalf within the next 15 minutes.”

7As discussed below, the District had already requested that selected issues be dismissed on the unrelated basis, which pertained to the parties’ prior settlement agreement dated May 13, 2003

8 Mr. Russell and Ms. Whiteleather objected that Student had not received proper notice of the teleconference.

9 As mentioned, Student’s exhibits A and SS were admitted into evidence on April 20, 2004. On April 21, 2004, proceeding without Student or his representatives, the Hearing Officer admitted all of the District’s exhibits, exhibits 1 through 20, into evidence, but none of Student’s exhibits, except for exhibits A and SS, was admitted into evidence.

10 See Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(e)(1), which states that a party to a hearing has the right to be accompanied and advised by counsel.

11 The District provided three orders from two prior cases where Ms. Whiteleather was involved: (1) Student v. Long Beach Unified School District, SN01-00569, “Order to Show Cause Regarding Dismissal” dated July 30, 2001; (2) in the same case as just cited, an “Order Dismissing Case” dated October 1, 2001; and (3) Student v. Charter Oak Unified School District, SN02-00822, “Order Regarding Case Scheduling” dated May 1, 2002.

12 Both parties requested that the Hearing Officer review the audio recording of the prior proceeding before ruling on the motion, and the Hearing Officer subsequently reviewed the recording.

13 California law permits the release of all known and even unknown claims, although there does not appear to be any direct precedent discussing the validity of such a release in the special education context. See Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F.Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993)(discussing the release of unknown claims in light of the protections of Cal. Civil Code section 1542).

14 The Hearing Officer notes that although the Order reflects that the parties “indicated that they had resolved all of the issues for hearing,” the tape recording of the proceeding does not contain such an indication. There was not a transcript of the prior proceeding in case number SN03-00200/SN03-00541 for the Hearing Officer to review. The audio recording reflects the following statements by the presiding hearing officer after a settlement had been reached: We are back on the record. It is approximately a quarter to four, and the parties have been settling all day. And it appears there is a successful settlement agreement, is that correct? (Both Mr. Roice and Ms. Whiteleather affirm.) Okay, then, is the parties’ desire to have this matter dismissed? (Both indicate it is.) Okay, then in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement, this matter is hereby dismissed. And I wish you all good luck and I hope everything works out for your son as you want it to work out. And for the District, that everything works out as well. Thank you. Bye bye. (End of proceeding.)

15 It does not appear that Congress has enacted special rules regarding the release of rights related to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). See Eddins v. Excelsior Indep. Sch. Dist., 88 F.Supp.2d 695, 704 (E.D. Tex. 2000).

16 On the first day of hearing, Student identified his claims related to the time before the 2003-2004 school year as follows: (1) As to the March 23, 2001 IEP document and meeting, (a) Gloria Marquez did not attend the IEP meeting but signed the IEP document; (b) Only a special education teacher attended the IEP meeting and the other (unspecified) individuals required by law to attend were not present; (c) The District failed to conduct a speech and language assessment; and (d) The District failed to offer or provide direct speech and language services to Student. (2) As to the May 20, 2001 IEP document and meeting, (a) Gloria Marquez did not attend the IEP meeting but signed the IEP document; (b) No individual knowledgeable about Student’s speech and language needs attended the IEP meeting; and (c) Despite Student having needs in every area of speech and language except articulation, the District failed to include speech and language goals in the IEP document. (3) As to the March 20, 2002 IEP document and meeting, (a) The District persisted in its failure to assess Student in the area of speech and language, even though Student had speech and language goals; (b) As to goals and objectives, (i) The goal for written expression did not state a present level of performance; (ii) The goal for reading comprehension did not state a present level of performance; and (iii) The goals related to speech and language each failed to state a present level of performance. (4) As to the June 12, 2002 IEP meeting, there was no general education teacher in attendance. (5) As to the January 29, 2003 IEP document and meeting, (a) The District persisted in its failure to assess Student in the area of speech and language; (b) There was no general education teacher in attendance;

(c) The two goals related to the social/emotional area did not state present levels of performance; and (d) The District failed to conduct an assessment as to Student’s social and emotional needs.

17 The parties made clear on April 20, 2004, that they were not raising any issues with respect to the 2004 extended school year. Therefore, this Decision will not adjudicate any issue related to the 2004 extended school year. The parties stipulated that the District’s 2003-2004 regular school year ends on June 15, 2004.

18 California Education Code section 48206.3(c)(1) states that “for purposes of computing average daily attendance pursuant to Section 42238.5, each clock hour of teaching time devoted to individual instruction shall count as one day of attendance.” The Hearing Officer notes that it is not clear that this subdivision has anything to do with a student’s right to graduation credit. The subdivision appears to relate solely to the calculation of average daily attendance for purposes of a school district’s right to funding from other governmental entities. However, the Hearing Officer does not decide the issue.

19 In contrast, the Hearing Officer will address below the issue of whether STUDENT received the 7.5 hours of home/hospital instruction agreed to by the IEP team which does relate to whether the District provided a FAPE.

20 Although Student also argued that the assessment is late, he elected not to make that contention an issue for hearing.

21 The Hearing Officer notes that through February 9, 2004, STUDENT continued to receive Lindamood-Bell services pursuant to the parties’ understanding reached at the November 25, 2003, IEP meeting.

22 It is not entirely clear that Lindamood-Bell’s testing qualified as an “assessment” for purposes of this statute. Lindamood-Bell conducted testing of STUDENT at various intervals of time to measure his progress in the Lindamood-Bell program. The exhibits and testimony reflect that STUDENT’s progress was tested by Lindamood-Bell personnel on March 21, 2003, August 2003, October 27, 2003, December 23, 2003, and February 10, 2004. For purposes of the following analysis, the Hearing Officer will presume that the statute applies.

23 “Special education” is defined as specially designed instruction, provided at no cost to parents, that meets the unique needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25); Cal. Educ. Code § 56031. “Related services” means transportation and other developmental, corrective, and supportive services as may be required to assist a child to benefit from special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(22); Cal. Code Regs. title 5, § 3001(z).

24 Ms. Johnson opined that it would be difficult for STUDENT to add another academic subject to his home/hospital instruction because there is nothing to break up the instruction such as electives and because adding additional time may be “too much for him.” She indicated that STUDENT often starts getting tired toward the end of his ninety-minute sessions with her.

25 The Hearing Officer also notes that it is unclear how Student’s request of 300 additional hours of Lindamood-Bell instruction is logically related to the violations he alleges the District committed. The law requires a nexus between the compensatory education sought and the violation/s committed. See Puyallup, 31 F.3d at 1497 (indicating that a party must demonstrate that the relief requested is an “appropriate” remedy in light of the violation committed).